¶1dissenting.
¶2I generally agree with the majority that “in the case of a partial taking, the market value of property remaining after a taking should be ascertained by a wide factual inquiry into all material facts and circumstances — both past and prospective— that would influence a buyer or seller interested in consummating a sale of the property.” Ante at 515 (emphasis in original). I believe that the jury in this case understood the economic realities involved when it made its award. Accordingly, I would affirm.
¶3We have long held that condemnation proceedings need not fit a rigid mold provided that they yield “justice and indemnity in each particular case.” Trenton v. Lenzner, 16 N.J. 465, 476 (1954), cert. den., 348 U.S. 972, 75 S.Ct. 534, 99 L.Ed. 757 (1955); see also South Orange v. Alden Corp., 71 N.J. 362, 367 (1976). In this case, although technically the evidence of contiguity was not before the jury, the State’s cross-examination of witnesses *523ensured that the jury would assess its argument concerning the unity of the property.
¶4There is no precise and inflexible rule for the assessment of just compensation:
The provision of the Constitution for the payment of just compensation is primarily a restriction on the power of the Legislature for the benefit of the property owner. As we have said, it is not a specific measuring rule and there is a margin of discretion for courts and the Legislature in devising rules to insure such compensation. [Jersey City Redevelopment Agency v. Kugler, 58 N.J. 374, 384 (1971) (emphasis supplied) ].
¶5I would not reverse the trial court for exercising its discretion in this case. In criminal cases, we have often said that a trial need only be fair, not perfect. E.g., State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954) (incidental errors may not be invoked to upset otherwise valid convictions); cf. State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 363 (1979) (“A guilty plea is not to be set aside whenever the trial court procedures are less than perfect”). This same principle should apply with at least as much force to the State’s claims in this civil context. Cf. Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, Comment R. 2:10-2 (1983 ed.) (harmless error rule applicable to both civil and criminal cases).
¶6This case began back in May 1976. Only a serious defect in the trial should warrant further prolonging these proceedings. Since the State’s argument was conveyed to the jury, as the majority opinion requires be done in the future, I find no such defect here.