Volume 92 — Texas Criminal Reports

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>From Bell County.</p> <p>Original application for writ of habeas corpus asking release from arrest for a violation of a city ordinance requiring a license tax for driving jitneys within the city for hire.</p> <p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>Opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. —Murder—Requested Charge — Manslaughter.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder there was no error in refusing to submit a peremptory charge of acquital, nor that the evidence failed to show defendant guilty of more than manslaughter.</p> <p>2. —Husband and Wife — Self-Defense—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where upon trial of murder the evidence did not show any acting on the part of the defendant in the separate defense of his wife, and there was nothing in defendant’s contention that the court’s charge confined his right of self-defense to the defense of himself alone, and the entire charge must be looked to which submitted defendant’s right to kill in defense of himself or wife against real, threatened, or-apparent danger, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>3. — Same—Charge of Court — Manslaughter.</p> <p>Where defendant excepted to the charge of the court because it authorized a conviction of manslaughter, even though he was acting in defense of his wife, but there was no conviction of manslaughter, the same need not be considered.</p> <p>4. — Same—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where the evidence did not show that defendant claimed to have knowledge of any assault by the deceased on his wife that caused her pain, or in any wise laboring under passion arising from such knowledge, there was no error in refusing the requested charge thereon; besides, the matter was fully covered in the court’s main charge, in which a proper • charge both on self-defense and manslaughter were submitted, as they appeared from defendant’s standpoint.</p> <p>5. — Same—Suspended Sentence — Charge of Court.</p> <p>There was no harm to the accused in telling the jury, in the cnarge on suspended sentence that appellant had filed an application for such suspended sentence and this did not convey the opinion of the trial court, that defendant was guilty of some degree of homicide.</p> <p>6. —Same—Requested Charges — Self Defense.</p> <p>Where a certain number of requested charges were refused on the issue of self-defense, but this matter was fully submitted in the court’s main charge, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>7. —Same—Charge of Court — Withdrawal—Conversation.</p> <p>While the trial judge admitted certain testimony with reference to a conversation which took place in the hearing of defendant, but after learning that defendant did not hear the same withdrew the same from the jury at the request of the defendant, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>8. —Same—Evidence—W eapons.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder there was no reversible error to permit the State to prove that when the body of deceased was found after the homicide there were no weapons upon or around his person, in view of the fact that defendant claimed that he made demonstrations to draw a weapon.</p> <p>9. —Same—Husband and Wife — Cross-Examination.</p> <p>• There was no error for the State to ask defendant’s wife, on cross-examination how long she had been married to the defendant, nor. to ask her how long since she had seen deceased prior to the homicide, althougn not having been asked these questions on direct examination.</p> <p>10. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence.</p> <p>Where upon trial of murder and a conviction thereof, the evidence supported the same, there was no reversible error.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion, states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. —Murder—Charge of Court — Practice in Trial Court.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder and a conviction for that offense, the evidence raised the issue of murder, there was no error in submitting a charge thereon. Following Jones v. State, 47 Texas Crim. Rep., 515, and other cases.</p> <p>2. —Same—Requested Charge — Practice in Trial Court.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, there was no error in refusing a requested charge to the effect that by insulting words or conduct towards a female relative is meant all such words of deceased towards the wife of the defendant as may be insulting to the wife of the defendant or defendant himself, there being no evidence upon which to base the requested charge.</p> <p>3. —Same—Manslaughter—First Meeting — Charge of Court.</p> <p>•Where the court had already given, in his main charge, an instruction upon the subject of first meeting, to which there could be no objection, there was no error in refusing a requested charge on the same subject.</p> <p>4. —Same—Jury and Jury Law — Householder—Voter.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, it was discovered after the trial that one of the jurors was not a naturalized citizen or a householder, this question could not be raised after the trial of the case and motion for new trial, although it would have been a cause for challenge if it had been known at the time when the juror was examined on his voir dire. Following Watson v. State, 32 Texas Grim. Rep., 432, and other cases.</p> <p>5. —Same—Rehearing—Murder—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where it was a question whether the defendant was informed of the insulting words and conduct of the deceased towards the female relative; whether thereby his mind was inflamed to a degree rendering it incapable of cool reflection; whether the homicide took place upon the first meeting, were all questions of fact for the jury and the court was justified in submitting the charge on murder. Following Art. 1135, Penal Code. Distinguishing Doss v. State, 43 Texas Crim. Rep., 551.</p> <p>6. —Same—Manslaughter—Charge of Court — Insult to Female Relative.</p> <p>For failing to respond to appellant’s objection to the court’s main charge on manslaughter, and limit the submission of that issue to the only fact which authorized the charge on the law of manslaughter, namely, that of insulting conduct towards a female relative, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.</p> <p>7. — Same—Charge of Court — Insulting Conduct to Female Relative.</p> <p>Where the defendant did not hear the deceased utter the insulting words, or see his insulting conduct, and the homicide did not take place until some time thereafter at the first meeting between the parties after defendant had been informed of such conduct, a charge of the court to the effect that under the immediate influence of sudden passion was meant that the act must be directly caused by the, passion at the time of the killing, was reversible error. Following Stuart v. State, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 382, and other cases.</p> <p>8. —Same—Charge of Court — Manslaughter—Rule Stated — Sudden Passion.</p> <p>One of the principal ingredients or elements of ordinary manslaughter to wit, that the provocation must arise at the time of the commission of the offense and that the passion is not the result of a former provocation, is not applicable to a case where the insulting words or conduct were not indulged in the presence of the slayer. Following Nyland v. State, 19 Texas Crim. App., 174.</p> <p>9. —Same—Charge of Court — All Facts and Circumstances.</p> <p>Where the record was bare of any circumstances which would raise the issue of manslaughter save that of insulting words or conduct, a charge to the jury to consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence in determining the facts and circumstances were sufficient to produce such state of mind in a person of ordinary temper, was improper. Following Redmond v. State, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 595.</p> <p>10. —Same—Charge of Court — Manslaughter—Rule Stated.</p> <p>In instances in which the accused, by his exception to the charge of the court and requested charges, affirms and insists that he depends upon no other matter to reduce the grade of homicide than insulting words. or conduct to a female relative, and the evidence suggests no other, the court should frame his charge in accord with that view. Following Attaway v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 395, and other cases.</p> <p>11. —Same—Charge of Court — Adequate Cause — Rule Stated — Passion.</p> <p>When there is no dispute in the record as to the existence of one of the adequate causes named in our statutes (insult to female relatives in this case), the trial court should affirmatively instruct the jury that if such cause existed, the jury were called upon to decide only whether the homicide resulted from passion arising therefrom, or resulted from some other cause</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. — Forgery—Record on Appeal.</p> <p>Where the indictment and charge oí the court appear to be in regular lorm, the judgment must be affirmed in the absence oí a statement of facts and bills oí exceptions.</p> <p>2. — Same—Rehearing—Certiorari—Companion Case.</p> <p>Where the facts are similar to those in a similar case, denying a writ of certiorari, the same order is made in the instant case, and the motion for rehearing overruled.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. —Sodomy—Jury and Jury Law — Impartial Jury.</p> <p>Where the motion for new trial showed that by the juror’s conduct the appellant was deprived of a trial by an impartial jury, it being shown that before its selection he had knowledge of the fact that appellant, on a former occasion, had been convicted of a like offense, and he did not communicate this to the members of the jury until after the verdict was rendered, and all of which defendant and his counsel had no notice, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. Following Jones v. State, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 303, and other cases.</p> <p>2. —Same—Impartial Juror — Rule Stated.</p> <p>It has often been held that when a partial or biased juror, or prejudiced juror is selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of the accused or his counsel, they acting in good faith upon his responses to question upon his voir dire and having no knowledge of their inaccuracy, there exists good ground for a new trial, following Long v. State, 10 Texas Crim. App., 98, and other cases.</p> <p>3. —Same—Rehearing—Bill of Exceptions — Partial Juror — Filing.</p> <p>Where the bill of exceptions, relating to the misconduct of the jury was attacked by the State, on the ground that the evidence was inserted therein after it was filed, etc., but it appeared from the record that the clerk took the testimony up at the point indicated by the trial judge and the attorneys, embraced it in the record as a part of the hill, and there was no challenge as to the correctness of this, the same will be considered i on appeal as a part of the record and is not on a footing with those cases in which it appears that the clerk inserted matters in the statement of facts, the contents of unfiled papers, etc. Distinguishing Davis v. State, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 542, and other cases.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. —Burglary—Suspended Sentence — Practice in Trial Court — Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of burglary, the record showed upon appeal that while the jury in the instant case deliberated upon the verdict, another jury trying defendant for a different felony, brought into court a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation of suspension of sentence, there was no error in the action of the trial judge calling the jury in the instant case into open court and withdrawing from them bis charge on suspended sentence, as the defendant was only entitled to one suspension.</p> <p>2. —Same—Withdrawing Charge — Action of Trial Court — Rule Stated.</p> <p>The right of the trial court to withdraw his charge after the conclusion of the argument, and to change the same is not an open question, although in a proper case this might require an allowance for additional argument.</p> <p>3. —Same—Statutes Construed — Conviction of Felony.</p> <p>It seems clear that by the use of the word “conviction of a felony” in Sections 1, 2, 3, and 5, under the statutes under discussion, was meant that status resulting from a judgment based on the verdict of a jury finding the accused guilty of some felony.</p> <p>4. —Same—Statutes Construed — Final Conviction — Words and Phrases.</p> <p>By the use of the expression “final conviction of defendant” in Section 4, of said Act, the law makers intended and referred to a different legal status from that meant in other portions of said act, by the use of the words "conviction of a felony.”</p> <p>5. —Same—Rehearing—Judgment—Formal Entries — Verdict—Appeal—No Injury to Defendant.</p> <p>The formal entries are not the judgments of the courts, and do but evidence and reflect such judgments; the verdict against the accused, rendered by the jury constitutes the conviction of a felony, as there was no appeal therefrom, etc. Following Beerman v. State, 73 Texas Grim. Rep., 234, 164 S. W. Rep., 840, and other cases, and there was therefore, no reversible error in the action of the trial court in withdrawing the charge on suspended sentence in the instant case; besides, there could be no possible injury to the defendant under the facts in the instant case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. —Carrying Pistol — Affidavit—Information—Jurat.</p> <p>Where the jurat on the affidavit was insufficient, the same not being signed by the party making the affidavit, and containing no date, and the court allowed the officer who took the complaint to amend his jurat by inserting the omitted date, and to permit the party to insert his name in the jurat, proof having been made of the fact, and said complaint was sworn to on the date inserted, there was no error. Following Scott v. State, 9 Texas Crim. App., 434, and other cases.</p> <p>2. —Same—Swearing—Party to Affidavit.</p> <p>The fact that the maker of the affidavit did not hold up his hand when ■ sworn would not invalidate the complaint.</p> <p>3. —Same—Continuance—Practice in Trial Court.</p> <p>Where the trial judge offered to postpone the trial until the absent witness could be procured on the next morning, but defendant preferred to go on and finish the case, there was no error in overruling the motion for continuance.</p> <p>4. —Same—Witness—Moral Turpitude.</p> <p>A witness may be asked while on the stand if he has not been indicted and tried for a felony.</p> <p>5. —Same—Evidence—Objectionable Question.</p> <p>Where the answer of the witness could in no event be objectionable, there was no error; besides, the mere asking of an objectionable question was not reversible error. Following Moore v. State, 241 S. W. Rep., 475.</p> <p>6. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of unlawfully carrying the pistol, the evidence sustained the conviction, there was no reversible error.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. — Recognizance—Practice on Appeal — Words and Phrases.</p> <p>Where the parties to the recognizance did not bind themselves to abide the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, “in this case" the same was insufficient. Following Cryer v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 621. However, the record having been corrected, the appeal is reinstated.</p> <p>2. —Same—Bawdy House- — Vagrancy—Former Conviction — Plea in Abatement.</p> <p>Where the judgment of conviction for vagrancy was not pleaded in abatement, but the .case was tried on a plea of not guilty, the judgment of vagrancy did not bar the State in the prosecution for keeping a bawdy house: besides, the proof was conclusive that both before and after the alleged date, of the vagrancy charge, the appellants kept a bawdy house, and the conviction is sustained.</p> <p>3. —Same Bawdy House — Vagrancy—Sufficiency of the Evidence.</p> <p>The proposition that evidence which would tend to sustain both the offense of vagrancy and keeping a disorderly house, prior to the charge of vagrancy, on May 21st, was not admissible in evidence, is untenable, however, there was ample evidence that after said date appellants committed the offense of keeping a bawdy house.</p> <p>4. —Same—Rehearing—Plea in Bar — Plea of Former Conviction.</p> <p>The question as to the availability of a plea of former conviction for vagrancy, as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for keeping a disorderly house when the time covered by the evidence in each case is the same, was not before the trial court, in the absence of a plea of former conviction.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Bail—Practice on Appeal.</p> <p>Where upon appeal from a denial of bail, this court, after considering the evidence, believes the same to be a bailable case, bail is granted in the sum of ?10,000.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>Murder — Escape—Voluntary Return — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Where the escape was proved in the manner provided by law, and it not having been made to appear that appellant has voluntarily returned to custody, this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, and the same is dismissed.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

Tried below before the Honorable J. T. Mathison. Appeal from a conviction of fornication; penalty, a fine of $50. The opinoin states the case.

<p>Procuring — Judgment in Misdemeanor Cases — Rule Stated.</p> <p>The rule is that in misdemeanor cases separate offenses may be charged in separate counts, all of which may be disposed of in one trial, and conviction had upon the different offenses so charged, and where the County Court proceeded in this manner there was no reversible error.</p> <p>Following Sanders v. State, 70 Texas Crim. Rep., 209, and other cases.</p> <p>[Place under November, 1922. Reporter.]</p>

Tried below before the Honorable Geo. L. Davenport. Appeal from a conviction of assault with intent to murder; penalty, three years imprisonment in the penitentiary.

<p>Murder — Sufficiency of the Evidence.</p> <p>Where, upon a trial of murder and a conviction of manslaughter, the evidence supported the conviction there is no reversible error.</p> <p>[Place under November, 1922. Repostes.]</p>

<p>1. — Murder—Charge of Court — Sufficiency of the Evidence.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder and a conviction of that offense, it appeared from the record on appeal that the trial judge, in his charge to the jury, carefully guarded the appellant’s rights in every particular, where the former opinions pointed out errors in this respect, and properly applied'the law to the facts, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>2 — Same—Evidence—Bill of Exceptions — Practice on Appeal.</p> <p>A bill of exceptions should be made so full and certain in its statements as that, in and of itself, it will disclose all that is necessary to manifest the supposed error, and where the bill leaves this court to speculate "to the pertinency, or otherwise, of the evidence complained of, it cannot be considered on appeal. Following Young v. State, 243 S. W. Rep., 472, and other cases.</p> <p>3. — Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence — Co-Principal.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, circumstances were proved from which the jury could reach the conclusion that appellant was in accord with his co-principal in the killing, and the facts were settled by the jury, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>[Place under November, 1922. Reporter.]</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. —Keeping Gambling House — Indictment—Duplicitous Pleading.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of keeping a gambling house for the purpose of gaming, the indictment was in the form of approved precedent and was not subject to the objection of duplicity there was no reversible error. Following Fridge v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. Rep., 75, 233 S. W. Rep., 979, and other cases.</p> <p>2. —Same—Continuance—Subsequent application.</p> <p>Where the residence of the absent witnesses was not set out nor that any process had issued for them or been applied for, or whether it was the first or subsequent application, the same was properly overruled.</p> <p>3. —Same—Evidence—Opinion of Witness.</p> <p>Upon trial of keeping a gambling house, there was no error in not permitting the witness to state that the home of the defendant did not look to be a place that was frequently visited for the purpose of gambling, etc., but looked like a private residence, especially as there was no contention that the paraphernalia of gambling house was in evidence at the said place.</p> <p>4. —Same—Evidence—Opinion of Witness.</p> <p>Whether this witness or any other thought the house in question to be generally known as a public gambling house or not, was not an issue in the case, and there was no error in sustaining objection thereto, nor that defendant did not hold out his house as a public place for the people to gather and gamble, as the inhibition is against the purpose for which the place is kept.</p> <p>u. -^Same — Evidence—Opinion of Witness.</p> <p>There was no error in sustaining the objection to the testimony of a defendant’s witness to the effect that he did not go to defendant’s house as a public place for gambling, as this is not a matter for him to determine.</p> <p>6. — Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of keeping a gambling house, the evidence sustained the conviction, there was no reversible error.</p>

<p>1. — Murder—Former Jeopardy — Jury and Jury Law.</p> <p>Appellant’s contention that after one juror was selected and sworn to try the case jeopary attached and that the discharge of the juror Harper, after selecting six jurors, being unauthorized, appellant was then entitled to his deliverance, is untenable. Following Steen v. State, 242 S. W. Rep., 1047.</p> <p>2__Same — Petit Jury — Definition of — Jurisdiction—Acquittal—Jeopardy.</p> <p>The basic idea is that in Texas, since there is no jurisdiction, to convict of a felony save through a jury, and since the Constitution declares that a jury, in a felony case, must be composed of 12 men, there is nti jeopardy until there shall be organized a jury composed of that number, unless there be an acquittal. Following Dunn v. State, 242 S. W. Rep., 1050.</p> <p>[Place under November, 1922. Reporter.]</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

Tried below before the Honorable J. R. Warren. Appeal from a conviction of murder; penalty, thirty-seven years imprisonment in the penitentiary. The opinion states the case.

<p>1. —Aggravated Assault — Self-Defense—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Self-defense obtains in assault cases, and exists against the reasonable apprehension of danger, and where, in the instant case, there wa" substantive evidence representing such defense, and the court was properly requested to affirmatively charge thereon, its failure to do so was reversible error.</p> <p>2. —Same—Requested Charge — Defensive Theory.</p> <p>Upon trial of aggravated assault, the evidence raised the issue that the injured party voluntarily went to the parties while fighting, and attempted to aid her husband, and was bruised in the melee, and it was seriously controverted as to who made the bruise, this phase of the case should have been submitted as requested, as also the question that the injured party took part in the difficulty, aiding her husband against the defendant.</p> <p>3. —Same—Continuance—Practice on Appeal.</p> <p>Where the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, the application for continuance need not be considered on appeal.</p> <p>[Rehearing denied. November 1922. Reporter] .</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>Opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>1. —Manufacturing Intoxicating Liquor — Indictment—Purpose of Sale.</p> <p>There was no error in declining to quash the indictment and in refusing the requested charges because the indictment failed to allege that the manufacture of said liquor was for the purpose of sale. Following Ex parte Mitchum, 91 Texas Crim. Rep., 62, and other cases.</p> <p>2. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence — Search Warrant.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of unlawfully manufacturing intoxicating liquor, the evidence sustained the conviction, there was no reversible error, and the objection to the evidence because it was not shown that the officers had a search warrant, is not well taken under the facts in this case.</p> <p>3. —Same—Rehearing—Statutes Construed — Purpose of Sale.</p> <p>It will be observed that that portion of Section 1 of the amendment to the Dean law, which is as follows: “Or to possess or receive for the purpose of sale any such liquor herein prohibited,” is set off and separated from the preceding portion of said section which forbids in terms the unlawful manufacture, sale, barter, transportion, etc., of such liquor, and it was not necessary, therefore, that the indictment in the instant case should allege that the manufacture was for the purpose of sale.</p> <p>4. —Same—Search Warrant.</p> <p>Where the officer’s testimony was as to what he found at a given place, to-wit, certain apparatus to be part of a still used in the illicit manufacture of liquor in defendant’s absence, would not be subject to the objection that the officer had no search warrant.</p> <p>5. — Same—Amendment—Statutes Construed — Purpose of Sale.</p> <p>Appellant’s further contention, that since the amendment to the Dean Law authorizes and allows one to possess liquor, if same he not so possessed for the purpose of sale, that the law should he construed to authorize and allow the manufacture, etc., of such liquor, for any other purpose except that of sale, is not well taken.</p>

<p>1. —Receiving Stolen Property — Other Offenses — Evidence—Guilty Knowledge.</p> <p>There is nothing in the nature of testimony in the instant case which differentiates it from the rule which sanctions proof of other criminal transactions in solving the .issue of guilty knowledge in prosecutions for this offense, and there was no error in admitting such testimony. Following Morgan v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 9, and other cases.</p> <p>2. —Same—Charge of Court — Guilty Knowledge — Name of Owner.</p> <p>There was no error in refusing to instruct the jury to acquit unless the defendant knew that the alleged property was stolen from the original owner, as it was enough if he knew it was stolen, and it was not necessary that the name of the owner should he alleged or proved.</p> <p>3. —Same—Rehearing—Owner—Knowledge—Fraudulent Intent.</p> <p>It was not necessary to prove that appellant, in receiving the property, knew it was stolen from any particular party, if he received it fraudulently, knowing that the same was acquired by theft.</p> <p>4. —Same—Accomplice—Corroboration.</p> <p>Where, upon trial, of receiving stolen property, the testimony of the accomplices was sufficiently corroborated, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>5. —Same—Other Offenses — Evidence.</p> <p>Upon trial of receiving stolen property, there was no error in admitting testimony of other like offenses, under the facts of this case. Following Hanks v. State, 117 S. W. Rep., 150. Distinguishing Bismark v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 54.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>L — Selling Intoxicating Liquor — Accomplice—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor, the court correctly instructed the jury that certain two State’s witnesses were accomplices, and was requested to instruct the jury to determine whether a third State witness was an accomplice, which request he refused; held, the record showing on appeal that the whisky was delivered to one of the first two accomplices, the legal purchaser, and it was conceded that this accomplicei received the whisky from the one upon whom the court refused to charge upon accomplice testimony that one of the main accomplices induced appellant to sell him whisky for the purpose of convicting him of the offense, the court should have submitted the question of accomplice’s testimony as to said third witness to the jury to settle the question of fact; the former law under which this indictment was found, placing the purchaser in the attitude of an accomplice witness. Following Franklin v. State, 88 Texas Crim. Rep., 342.</p> <p>2. — Same—Rule Stated — Accomplice Testimony — Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where the complicity of the witness is admitted, but the prosecution claimed that he was merely a feigned accomplice acting with a view to the detection of the real criminal, it is for the jury to determine whether the witness was an actual or only a feigned accomplice. Following Smith v. State, 89 Texas Crim. Rep., 145.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>The opinion states the case.</p>

<p>Opinion states the case.</p>