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92 Tex. Crim. 657

245 S.W 79

Harper v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided October 25, 1922

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1922-10-25

<p>1. —Murder—Infanticide—Charge of Court — Requested Charges — Defensive Theories.</p> <p>Where, upon trial oí murder, charging defendant with killing his illegitimate child, after the court had charged in a general way on the facts in evidence, the defendant requested a charge that the court instruct the jury that if the death of the child was from suffocation en route between Sabinal and Utopia, to acquit; and in mother special charge, that if without any knowledge or participation on defendant’s part there was something done to the child before it was put in his possession, which was calculated to or did cause the death of the child, to acquit the defendant, even though the child died while it was in his car, all of which the court refused; held: that the case being one of circumstantial evidence, the said requested charges should have been given.</p> <p>2. —Same—Negligent Homicide — Charge of Court — Requested Charge.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, charging the defendant with killing his own child, the facts raised the issue, by way of circumstantial evidence, of negligent homicide, and the defendant in a timely and proper manner submitted a requested charge thereon, which was refused, the same was reversible error.</p> <p>3. —Same—Accomplice—Charge of Court — Requested Charge.</p> <p>Under Article 801, C. C. P., forbidding conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice under the facts of the instant case, the court committed reversible error in not submitted a charge on accomplice testimony, with reference to one of the State’s witnesses, as requested.</p> <p>4. —Same—Accomplice—Rule Stated — Principal—Accessory.</p> <p>An accomplice witness is a person who either as principal, accomplice or accessory is connected with a crime hy an unlawful act, or omission on his part, transpiring either before, at the time of, or after the commission of the offense, and whether or not he was present and participated in the crime. Following Phillips v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 169, and other cases.</p> <p>5. —Same—Rehearing—Affirmative Charge — Rule Stated — Requested Charge.</p> <p>Where the State, in its motion for rehearing, insisted that the court’s main charge was sufficient, held, that this court has often asserted the right of the accused to an affirmative presentation of his defensive theory raised by the evidence, and that a mere negative presentation of such theory in connection with the affirmative charge would not suffice.</p> <p>6. —Same—Malice—Affirmative Evidence — State’s Witness.</p> <p>This court further holds that the testimony of a State’s witness relative to a statement made by defendant which is denied by the latter is not sufficient affirmative evidence establishing the fact of malice on part of defendant, to remove the issue of malice vel non from that of being a matter of dispute on the trial.</p> <p>7. —Same—Accomplice—Charge of Court — Rehearing.</p> <p>In the condition of the record in the instant case, it was the duty of the trial court to submit a charge on accomplice testimony, and permit the jury to solve the disputed issues of fact.</p>

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently December 1926

2 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1922-10-25

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¶1 on rehearing.

¶2 November 29, 1922.

LATTIMORE, Judge.

¶3 — This case was carefully considered by each member of this court upon original presentation, and nothing new appears in the State’s motion for a rehearing. We have often asserted the right of the accused to an affirmative presentation of his defensive *666 theory, if any, raised by the evidence on the trial, and that a mere negative presentation of such theory in connection with the affirmative charge in favor of the State applying the law to the facts, ivill not suffice. We further are of opinion that the testimony given by witness Calvert relative to a statement made by appellant, which is denied by the latter, is not sufficient affirmative evidence establishing the fact of malice on the part of appellant, to remove the issue of malice vel non from that of being a matter of dispute on the trial. At the time of the statement claimed by Mr. Calvert to have been made by appellant, the child was not bom and such statement is easily susceptible of the proposition that the thing most had in mind by appellant was the preservation of the good name of the prospective mother of the child, and that said statement as same related to the child was of but secondary importance in the mind of the appellant.

¶4 The matters urged in the motion as of weight against our conclusion that under the facts a charge submitting the issue of accomplice testimony as applicable to the testimony of Mrs. Keahey, are none of them admitted facts but all are combatted by the accused. In such condition of the record it was the duty of the trial court to submit the law applicable and permit the jury to solve the disputed issues of fact under full and complete instructions as to the law.

¶5 Being of opinion that the case was rightly decided upon the original hearing, the State’s motion for rehearing will be overruled.

¶6 OverruledI.

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