Volume 92 — United States Reports

Held: that, notwithstanding the rules, witnesses might still be examined in open court.

Held: that a citizen of one State sued in another State by a citizen thereof on a claim which had belonged to a citizen of the latter State, and had been assigned to the plaintiff, might have the cause removed to the Circuit Court of the United States, although, perhaps, it might not have been originally cognizable therein; but it still remains to determine what kinds of controversies are intended by the act.

Held: and treated as a slave. He belonged ostensibly for years to the father of Roach, the claimant; and, upon the death of the father, the son succeeded to the father’s rights. Hall held the same relations to the latter which he had held to the former. In this respect there was no change. His color was presumptive proof of bondage. The law of the State provided a way in which he could establish his freedom.

<p>Sailing rules and regulations prescribed by law furnish the paramount rule of decision, whenever they are applicable; but where, in any case, a disputed question of navigation arises, in regard to which neither they, nor the rules of this court regulating the practice in admiralty, have made provision, evidence of experts as to a general usage regulating the matter is admissible.</p>

Held: that .the Court of Claims is authorized to adjudge such an allowance as is required ex cequo et bono by all the circumstances of the case. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. Thomas Wilson for the appellant, and by Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips for' the appellee.

Held: that the *50 construction of portions of the road on account of which lands ivere granted, as thus designated, was a condition precedent to a conveyance by the Territory or future State of any of the lands beyond the first one hundred and twenty sections.

Held: that a party giving the information which led to the arrest was entitled to the “ liberal reward,” but not to the specific sum, unless he, in fact, apprehended the fugitive, hr the arrest was made by his agents. 2. Where the offer of a reward is made by public proclamation, it may, before rights have accrued under it, be withdrawn through the same channel in which it was made.

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p> <p>Landers enlisted for three years ; was enrolled Jan. 1, 1864; and mustered into service Jan. 16, 1864, to take effect from the date of his enrolment. He deserted Nov. 12, 1864; was arrested June 2, 1865; restored to duty, with the loss of all pay and allowances due or to become due during the term of his enlistment; and honorably discharged on the 8th of August, 1865. The Court of Claims rendered judgment in his favor for an amount equal to his pay and bounty. The United States appealed.</p>

Held: that the sheriff was not liable to W. & Co. for not paying the money to them upon their execution. 2. The question, whether, under the Bankrupt Act, the District Court had authority to make the order, and the decision of the highest State court adverse to that authority, are sufficient to sustain the Eederal jurisdiction. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

Held: that the party had no right of action, inasmuch as he failed to sue within six months from the date of the decision of the commissioner on the appeal, and had taken no appeal from the second assessment. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for tbe Middle District of Tennessee. Mr. Henry Cooper for the plaintiff in error. Mr. Assistant Attorney- General Edwin B. Smith, contra.

This is an action brought by Sauvinet against Walker, a licensed keeper of a coffee-house in New Orleans, for refusing him refreshments when called for, on the ground that he was a man of" color.

Held: that the plea was bad, as it set forth neither the circumstances attending the delivery of the bond, nor averred misrepre *94 sentations, fraudulent concealment, opportunities to make disclosure on the part of the company, inquiries by the sureties before the bond was delivered, or knowledge by the company that the sureties were ignorant of the facts complained of.

Held: that the decree was proper in not making the payment of the bond a condition precedent to the reconveyance of the plantation. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. .

Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the court ruled on judicial jurisdiction in espionage cases. The case was an important precursor to the court's 1953 decision in United States v. Reynolds wherein it recognized the State Secrets Privilege. The case was later referenced and its holding expanded by the Court in the 2005 case of Tenet v. Doe and then again in General Dynamics Corp. v. United States. In Tenet, which involved a contract claim against the CIA brought by Cold War era spies, Court clarified that “Totten precludes judicial review in cases . . .

<p>1. The words “ grant ” and “ demise ” in a lease for years create an implied warranty of title and a covenant for quiet enjoyment.</p> <p>2. Where the lessors executed a lease and demised the lands in their own names, and not as agents, and the covenants of the lessee were all to them personally, and he entered into the lands, and remained in possession during the time specified in the lease, —11eld, notwithstanding the recital in the lease that “ the lessors were acting as a church-extension committee by authority and on behalf of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, Old School,” that the lease was competent evidence in an action brought by the lessors in their individual right to recover the rent; and that the lessee, having had the full benefit of the contract, could not dispute the title of the lessors. Held further, that the recital is not inconsistent with a holding of the legal title by the lessors in trust to enable them to better discharge their duties touching the property; and, as their act presupposes the prior act necessary to make it effectual, every reasonable presumption is to be made in favor of the validity of the lease.</p>

Held: that the owner could not recover of the lessee the rent for the period during which he had paid it to the military authorities. 2.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p>

Held: among its collaterals' from Bayne & Co., a large number of shares of Washington, Alexandria, and Georgetown Railroad stocks, the market-value of which had been seriously depressed by the failure of Bayne & Co. Having informed himself in regard to the condition of the stock and its supposed value, and after one or two interviews with the president and directors of the defendant, it was finally agreed that the…

<p>Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.</p>

Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), was a United States Supreme Court case that ruled that since 1847, pursuant to the act of Congress of the preceding year, the State of Virginia has been in de facto possession of the County of Alexandria, which, prior thereto, formed a part of the District of Columbia. The political department of its government has, since then, uniformly asserted and the head of its judicial department expressly affirmed its title. Congress has, by more than one act, recognized the transfer as a settled fact. A resident of the county in a suit to recover the amount by him paid under protest for taxes upon his property there situate is therefore estopped from raising the question as to the validity of the retrocession.

This is a suit by the defendants in error, as the assignees of certain promissory notes, against the plaintiffs in error as the assignors. The statute of Illinois bearing upon the case is as follows: — “ Sect. 7.

The Kalmia Mills,' a corporation under the laws of South Carolina, having commenced the erection of a factory, borrowed from W. C. Langley & Co. of New York, in July, 1866, $150,000 upon a mortgage of its entire property. The notes given therefor were indorsed by B. F. Evans, president of the company, and by H. Cogswell and B. Mordecai, upon whom devolved the management of the mills, and the entire responsibility for the payment of its debts.

Held: by the plaintiff had been issued by the bank prior to June 1,1865, — the time specified in the limitation act just quoted. It is further alleged, and to be taken as true, that, prior to that time, the bank had become *158 notoriously insolvent, unable to meet its liabilities, and bad ceased to do business.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio.</p>

Held: that A. cannot recover such proceeds in an action against the United States. Appeal from the Court of Claims. During the war of the rebellion, Whitfield, a resident of the State of Alabama, being the owner of a hundred and seventy-seven bales of cotton raised by himself, sold it to the Confederate States, agreeing to receive in payment their eight per cent bonds.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.</p>

Held: that notwithstanding the proceedings in bankruptcy, and although the assignee thereunder may have been appointed and the assignment made to him prior to filing said bill, the Circuit Court, having possession of the subject-matter in controversy as well as jurisdiction of the parties, had jurisdiction of the cause, and should have decided it upon its merits. 2.

<p>In order to defeat a settlement by a husband upon his wife, it must be intended to defraud existing creditors, or creditors whose rights are expected shortly to supervene, or those whose rights may and do supervene.</p>

Held: except upon sufficient proof of ownership and loyalty. He could not be personally accused of wrongful detention, therefore, until some attempt had been made to convince him of the “ sufficient ” claim of the owner.

The complainants are children and heirs-at-law of Charles S. Wallach, who was an officer in the Confederate army during the late rebellion. While he was thus in that service, his real estate situate in the city of Washington was, by order of the President, seized under the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, and a libel for its condemnation duly filed.

United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), was a voting rights case in which the United States Supreme Court narrowly construed the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as not supporting the Enforcement Act of 1870 prohibition of all state voting restrictions.

Held: that the representations of D. were a fraud upon A., on account of which he could have rescinded the contract of sale, and followed the goods wherever he could find them; and the goods not having lost their identity, nor become part of the permanent stock of B. and C., upon which they obtained credit, their assignee cannot, in the absence of actual fraud in the arrangement for the payment of such proceeds, recover…

Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876), was decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the court held that New York's imposition of a tax per passenger arriving by ship was an invalid state regulation of foreign commerce.

Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that the U.S. federal government has the power to set rules surrounding immigration and to manage foreign relations, not the states. The case has been cited in other Supreme Court cases related to government authority on matters relating to immigration policy and immigration enforcement, most recently in Arizona v. United States (2012).

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p>

The plaintiff in error, a company incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, having its home office in New-York City, issued its policy of insurance, bearing date Aug. 25, 1856, to Mrs. Hendren, the defendant in error, on the life of her husband. The insurance was negotiated through an agent of the company at Norfolk, in Virginia, in which State Mrs. Hendren and her husband then, and until his death, resided. He died Aug. 15, 1862.

Held: — *290 viz., on the 9th of March, 1869, —the charter of said company was amended so as to authorize towns in which said road might be thereafter located to vote and subscribe $100,000 to its capital stock; also that, thirty-two days after said election, — viz., on the seventeenth day of April, 1869, — the legislature passed a validating act, and that ten days thereafter, on the 27th of that month, the supervisor and…

<p>1. The aet of Congress of March 3, 1857, granting certain lands to the Territory of Minnesota for the purpose of aiding in the construction of several lines of railroad between different points in the Territory, only authorized for each road, in advance of its construction, a sale of one hundred and twenty sections. No further disposition of the land along either road was allowed, except as the road was completed in divisions of twenty miles.</p> <p>2. Where land is conveyed to the State by a corporation as indemnity against losses on her bonds loaned to it, the bondholders have no equity for the application of the land to the payment of the bonds which can be enforced against the State, and her grantees take the property discharged of any claim of the bondholders.</p>

Held: that the old county, being solely responsible for the debts and liabilities it had previously incurred, had, on discharging them, no claim upon the new counties for contribution. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wyoming. Mr. W. R. Steele for the appellants. Mr. A. H. Jackson, contra. *308

Held: that the word “property” included all the lands of the said company, and that a valid lien on them was created by the act. 2. The title of a subsequent purchaser from the company of its lands is destroyed by the sale of them under the mortgage. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. This was an action of ejectment.

<p>To give this court jurisdiction over the judgment of a State court, it must appear that the decision of a Federal question presented to that court was necessary to the determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided, or that, without deciding it, the judgment as rendered could not have been given.</p>

Held: that where a party to such an instrument intrusts it to the custody of another for use, with blanks not filled up, whether it be to accommodate the person to whom it was intrusted or to be used for the benefit of the signer of the same, such negotiable instrument carries on its face an implied authority to fill up the blanks necessary to perfect the same; and the rule is, that, as between such party - and innocent…

Held: that no presumption can legitimately arise that any other deed of the demanded premises was executed by the mayor than the one put in evidence, and that the possession created no title upon which the plaintiff can recover. Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Mr. Edward Lander and Mr. William A. Meloy for plaintiff in error. Mr. A. G. Riddle, contra.

Held: that, if a new combination produces new and useful results, it is patentable, though all the constituents of the combination were known and in use previous to the combination; but the results must be the product of the combination, not a mere aggregate of several results, each the complete product of one of the combined elements.

Held: Chief Justice Taney speaking for the court, that, in order to give us jurisdiction in a case dependent upon the amount in controversy, “ the matter in dispute must be money, or some right, the value of which in money can be calculated and ascertained.” This rule has been followed in many cases. Pratt v. Fitzhugh, 1 Black, 273 ; De Krafft v. Barry, 2 id. 714.

The complainant, a private banker in Chicago, held several policies of insurance issued to him by the Mutual Security Insurance Company, of which' he was a director. The company was duly adjudicated a bankrupt. At the time of such adjudication, it had money deposited with him on call, drawing interest, and held his notes for unpaid subscriptions to its capital stock.

The question raised in this case was, whether the charge for the stamps required to be placed on packages of manufactured tobacco intended for exportation was a tax or duty on exports within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.

Held: that no valid contract arose from the transaction. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. The case was argued by Mr. E. C. Carrington for the plaintiff in error, and submitted on printed argument by Mr. Britton A. Sill for the defendant in error.

Held: that by accepting the medium offered, and surrendering the treasury-notes, the holder waived all claim, independently of the question whether or not that medium was a legal tender in payment of them. 2. The protest, being unauthorized by law, had no efficacy to qualify the voluntary surrender of the treasury-notes. Appeal from the Court of Claims. The case was argued by Mr. Conway Robinson for the appellant.

Held: that the former thereby undertook that the warrants were not, in a suit brought against the county, subject to any defence founded upon a want of legal form in the signatures or seals; and that, the absence of the county seals being a breach of the warranty, the vendee, without returning or tendering the, warrants, was entitled to recover of the vendor the damages which he had sustained by such breach.

Held: that as the services of her crew were necessary for her preservation and safety in hauling her to and from the hulk for unloading and reloading, and in moving her while in dock undergoing repairs, their wages and provisions, during the time they were so employed, were properly allowed in general average.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

Held: that th,e “ application and demand ” must be made within that time; but the authority of the agent to adjudicate the claims was not so limited. 2. Where a party alleges that a deed executed by his attorney, under a power to convey, is invalid for matters not apparent on its face, the burden of proving them is on such party. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. Where two vessels under steam, meeting end on, or nearly end on, neglect, until it is too laté to avoid a collision, to comply with the rule requiring each to port her helm, it is no defence for either to prove that she ported her helm before the collision actually occurred. The act of compliance must be seasonable; otherwise it is without substantial merit.</p> <p>2. In this case, as both vessels were in fault, the damages, and the costs in the courts below, should be apportioned between them.</p>

<p>Where, in order to avoid a collision between two vessels propelled by steam, one going with and the other against the tide, it is conceded that one should stop, it is the duty of the vessel proceeding against the tide to do so, as her movements can be controlled with less difficulty than those of the other vessel.</p>

Held: that, as the bank gave no warranty, it cannot be charged with a liability it did not assume. 2. The vendor of such securities is liable ex delicto for bad faith, and ex contractu there is an implied warranty on 1ns part that they belong to him, and are not forgeries. Where there is no express stipulation, there is no liability beyond this. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.

<p>The act of Feb. 26, 1845 (5 Stat. 727), prescribing the time and manner of making protest to a collector of customs in cases therein mentioned, continued in force until the passage of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 id. 202).</p>

Held: that so much of the final decree as discharged them from all liability for and on account of any debt or demand against them or the bank was erroneous. 2.

Held: that the claimants are without remedy under any act of Congress. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of California. Mr. E. L. Croold for the appellants. Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips, contra.

<p>The deed of conveyance executed to the United States on the twenty-fifth day of October, 1854, by the city of Carondelet, of a part of the commons of Carondelet upon which Jefferson Barracks are situate, having been based upon an equitable compromise of a long-pending and doubtful question of title, is valid.</p>

<p>1. A special finding by the court upon issues of fact, where the parties or their attorneys have duly filed a stipulation, waiving a jury, has the same effect as a verdict, and is not subject to review by this court except as to the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment.</p> <p>2. The question, whether an imported article is or is not known in commerce by the word or terms used in the act imposing the duty, is one of fact for the jury.</p>

Held: that, as between the government and the grantee, the grant passed to him a right to the quantity of land men *477 tioned, to be laid off by .official authority in the territory described, it said, that, if any other person within those limits had afterwards obtained a grant from the government by specific boundaries before Alvarado had made his survey, the title of the latter grantee could not be impaired by any…

Held: that the State, by proceedings under this act, which resulted in a judgment adverse to the title of the plaintiff in error to a certain judicial office, did not, through her judiciary, violate that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which declares, “ nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Error to the Supreme Court…

Assumpsit brought by the plaintiff below to recover the amount due on the coupons attached to certain bonds, purporting to have been issued by the town of Coloma, through its proper officers, to the Chicago and Rock River Railroad Company, in payment of a subscription of $50,000 by the town to said company.

Held: That it was the appointed province of the supervisor and commissioners to decide the question, whether the condition precedent to the exercise of their authority had been fulfilled; that they did decide it by issuing the bonds; and that the recital in the bonds was a declaration of their decision. 2.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.</p>

Held: that the bonds were binding on the city. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for tbe Northern District of Kansas. This was an action to recover the interest on certain bonds *504 issued by the city of Fort Scott, Kan. One of the bonds (all of which were similar) is as follows : — “No. 1.

Held: that as the liability of the stockholders arose from their acceptance of the act creating the corporation, and their implied promises to fulfil its requirements, the proper remedy was an action upon the case; and that, as the statute barred such an action at law, it was also a good defence in equity. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina.

Held: that the facts of the case do not justify the claim that the property was incumbered, or that the title of the insured therein was not absolute.

Held: that her owner, a subject of Prussia, is not " entitled to any damages ” against the United States, under the law of nations or the treaty with that power. 8 Stat. 384 . Appeal from the Court of Claims. Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Edwin B. Smith for the appellant. Mr. J. D. McPherson, contra.

Held: that as the proposed funding of the levee debt at par in the consolidated bonds destroys all benefits anticipated from the funding, on which benefits those who accepted its terms had a right to rely, and makes an unjust discrimination between one class of creditors and another, the injunction, so far as it restrained the funding of said debt in consolidated bonds issued, or to be issued, under the act of Jan. 24,…

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court, ruling that the U.S. Bill of Rights did not limit the power of private actors or state governments despite the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. It reversed the federal criminal convictions for the civil rights violations committed in aid of anti-Reconstruction murders. Decided during the Reconstruction Era, the case represented a major defeat for federal efforts to protect the civil rights of African Americans. The case developed from the strongly contested 1872 Louisiana gubernatorial election and the subsequent Colfax massacre, in which dozens of black people and three white people were killed. Federal charges were brought against several whites, led by William J.

Held: and two-thirds of the qualified voters of said township voting thereat voted for it.

Held: — 1. That the words “ capital stock ” mean the property of the corporation, and not the shares of stock owned by the shareholders. 2. That it was competent for the legislature to require the “ capital stock ” of corporations, as thus construed, to be assessed for the purpose of taxation against the corporation. 3.

Held: that the relations of the bankrupt members of the firm of A., B., & Co. to the United States are the same as if they were severally liable to the United States ; and that the United States *619 is entitled to the payment of its debt out of their separate property, in preference ami priority to all other debts due by them or either of them, or by the firm of A. & Co. 3.

Held: That under the statute the town could not make an appropriation or donation in aid of the company until its road was located and constructed through the town. 2. That the constitution of the State, which came into operation July 2, 1870, annulled the power of any city, town, or township, to make donations or loan its credit to a railroad company, and, after that date, rendered the act of 1867 ineffective. 3.

Held: that whether the action of the board in December, 1869, be in substance and legal effect a subscription, or only an undertaking to subscribe which was accepted by the company, a valid contract existed between the county and the company, which, when the new constitution took effect, authorized the subsequent delivery of the bonds. 2.

Held: to determine whether such subscription shall be made; provided, that the amount of bonds voted shall not be above such a sum as will require a levy of more than one per cent per annum on the taxable property of the township, to pay the yearly interest on the amount of bonds issued. In the event of the vote being favorable, the board of *638 county commissioners were to issue the bonds in the name of the township.

Held: and it was necessary to hold so there, that the inquiry into the authority by which negotiable paper was issued was just the same as if it were not negotiable, and that if no such authority existed it could not be aided by giving the paper that form. In County Bond Cases it seems to be otherwise.

Held: that the judgment was proper. 2. While the Court of Claims cannot delegate its judicial powers, and must itself hear and determine all causes which come before it for adjudication, no reason exists why it may not use such machinery as courts of more general jurisdiction are accustomed to employ under similar circumstances to aid in their investigations. 3.

Held: that by virtue of the deed of S. his grantee H. became his legal representative, and acquired as against the heirs-at-law of S. the title to all the tracts of land described in said patent. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. Mr. P. Phillips and Mr. J. L. D. Morrison for the plaintiffs in error. Mr. John P. Shepley and Mr. J. M. Koune, contra.

Held: that consolidation under this act was not a surrender of the existing charters of the two companies, and that it did not work the extinction of C., nor the creation of a new company. Held, further, that the consolidated company continued to possess all the rights and immunities which were conferred upon each company by its original charter. 3.

Held: that if it could be fairly shown that any of the company’s property there was acquired by the present company for the accommodation of the business belonging to its original roads, or for the joint accommodation of the entire system of roads under its control, such property would, pro tanto and in fair proportion, be exempt from taxation.

Held: that issues of the kind are properly directed where such questions are involved in great doubt by conflicting or insufficient evidence. Held further, that such findings are regarded as influential in an appellate court, but they are not conclusive. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>1. The third section of an act of Congress, approved April 20,1832 (4 Stat. 60S), which is still in force, enacts that four sections of land, including the hot springs in Arkansas, shall be reserved for the future disposal of the United States, and shall not be entered, located, or appropriated for any other purpose whatever. The Indian title to them was not extinguished until Aug. 24, 1818, nor were the public surveys extended over them until 1838, nor has the sale of them ever been authorized by law. No part of said sections was, therefore, ever subject to pre-emption or to location; and no claim thereto has been validated or confirmed by any act of Congress.</p> <p>2. The “ Act for the relief of the inhabitants of the late county of New Madrid in Missouri Territory, who suffered by earthquakes," approved Feb. 17, 1815 (3 Stat. 211), required the following steps to be taken: Application to the recorder of land-titles, showing the party’s claim, and praying a certificate of location — certificate of location issued by the recorder, setting forth the amount of land to which the applicant was entitled — application to the surveyor, presenting the certificate of location, and designating the lands which the party desired to appropriate — survey and plat made by the surveyor — return of the survey and plat to the recorder to be filed and recorded, with a notice designating the tract located and the name of the claimant — certificate of the recorder, stating the facts, and that the party was entitled to a patent — transmission of this certificate to the General Land-Office — the patent. In addition to these requisites, the land thus appropriated must have been a part of the public lands of the Territory, the sale of which was authorized by law. A survey, therefore, of part of said four sections made in 1820, if never returned to the recorder’s office, did not within the meaning of said act, or of the act of April 26, 1822 (4 Stat. 668), locate, or segregate from tlie public domain, the land thereby covered, and so appropriate it to the claimant as to give him a vested right thereto, and prevent the operation of the said act of April 20, 1832.</p> <p>8. The asserted rights of the respective claimants to the land in controversy discussed and disallowed.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio.</p>

Held: that this court has no jurisdiction. Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of California. Mr. Aaron A. Sargent for the defendant in error, in support of the motion. Mr. W. Irvine, contra.

Held: that the defendants were the legal representatives of that party within the meaning of the contract. 2. An allegation that L. refused to manufacture and furnish his invention as he had agreed to do, is equivalent to an allegation of a demand on him to do so, and a refusal. 3.

Held: that while the instruction, so far as given, was correct, its general effect was misleading, as it tended to withdraw from the notice of the jury the evidence that the failure of consideration for the plaintiff’s draft was only partial. 2.

Held: distinguishes between reservations to the Indians and reservations to the United States, and speaks of both in the same article (art. 2). The argument of the majority of the court on this head appears to me to defeat itself.

Held: that lands within the boundaries of an alleged Mexican or Spanish grant, which was sub judice at the time the Secretary of the Interior ordered a withdrawal of lands along the route of the road, are not embraced by the grant to the company. 2. The words “ public lands ” are used in our legislation to describe such lands as are subject to sale or other disposition under general laws. 8.