Alexander v. Margolis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]t is questionable whether the Board’s duty to license physicians can be characterized as a “service” being denied to plaintiff or whether the Board’s refusal to reinstate his license denies him participation in “programs or activities provided” by a state entity. The Board of Medicine is, if anything, a service, program or activity provided for the public’s benefit and safety, not for the benefit of any given individual who does not meet the state’s requirements for practicing medicine. In any event, plaintiff is not a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA. The very nature of the police powers exercised by state boards of medicine require the state to discriminate on the basis of, among other considerations, a mental condition harmful to the public’s safety. By the very nature of the practice of medicine, given the physician’s necessary independence to “practice” his art, no reasonable modification can be made to a policy of restricting medical practice to those without evidence of mental disabilities. Under M.C.L. § 333.16247(1), the Board may reinstate a license only if the Board is satisfied by “clear and convincing evidence that the applicant is of good moral character, [and] is able to practice the profession with reasonable skill and safety ....” The Board cannot exercise its duty without the discretion to consider the impact of a mental disability upon one’s ability to practice with reasonable skill and safety. The danger of irreparable harm to the ”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Flynn v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio · In the Interest of Doe

2. “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be * * * subjected to discrimination by [a public entity]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Flynn v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio · T.E. v. State Med. Bd.

3. “Title II does not categorically bar a state parole board from making an individualized assessment of the future dangerousness of an inmate by taking into account the inmate’s disability. Title II only prohibits discrimination against “qualified” people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (defining a qualified person with a disability as a person who “meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services”). A person’s disability that leads one to a propensity to commit crime may certainly be relevant in assessing whether that individual is qualified for parole. In addition, the parole board might show that legitimate penological interests justify consideration of an inmate’s disability status beyond that appropriate in other settings. The parole board claims to have and undeniably does have legitimate penological interests in considering the plaintiffs substance abuse backgrounds during the individualized inquiry for parole suitability. We hold only that plaintiffs may state a claim under Title II based on them allegations that the parole board failed to perform an individualized assessment of the threat they pose to the community by categorically excluding from consideration for parole all people with substance abuse histories.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In the Interest of Doe