Volume 93 — Connecticut Reports

Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of.the Compensation Commissioner for the third district in favor of the plaintiff for $41.82, taken to and heard by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, J., which affirmed the order of the Commissioner, and from this judgment the defendants appealed. No error.

Information for perjury, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Warner, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused. No error. The case upon the trial of which the defendant is charged with having given perjured testimony, is State v. Triplett, reported in 92 Conn, page 47, 101 Atl. 486.

Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, J., for the advice of this court. The plaintiff and the defendant employer were subject to the provisions of Part B of Chapter 138 of the Public Acts of 1913,' as amended by Chapter 288 of the Public Acts of 1915.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner for the fifth district in favor of the plaintiff, including therein the cost of an artificial leg and also compensation for an injury to the plaintiff’s shoulder in addition to that awarded for the loss of his leg, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Reed, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Gager, J., for the advice of this court.

Action to recover rent, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Hoyt, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant. August 20th, 1915, tlie plaintiffs were the owners of property in New Haven upon which stood two buildings. One was a large block fronting on Chapel Street, and the other a small one-story structure in the rear of the block.

Action against a conservator and the wife of his ward to recover the price of wearing apparel furnished the'wife for her personal use, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the jury before Hoyt, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants, and appeal by the defendant conservator.

<p>Appeal from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of New Milford appointing John S. Addis, Esq., of New Milford, administrator upon the estate of John Eva of Bridgewater, deceased, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Maltbie, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, confirming the action of the Court of Probate, from which the plaintiffs appealed.</p> <p>From the finding it appears that John Eva, for many years a resident of Bridgewater in the probate district of New Milford, died intestate on December 17th, 1916. He left an estate of about $12,000. This consisted of deposits in Connecticut savings-banks. He left no lineal descendants surviving him. The deceased had two brothers, William J. and Richard H. Eva. They died before the intestate. William J. left eight children, one of whom is Richard Eva, one of the plaintiffs. These children all resided in Michigan when the testator died. Richard H. Eva was married to Margaret Shannon on February 1st, 1866, by Father John Orsenigo, at Croton Falls, New York; and one child, Annie Eliza, was born of this marriage. On June 26th, 1883, Richard H. Eva married Mary R. Brown at Fredericksburg, Virginia. Three children were born of that union. Annie Eliza went to live with the deceased when she was four years of age, and lived with him most of the time until her marriage. For about twelve years prior to his death, John Eva lived with Annie E. and her husband at Bridgewater, ■ where he died. On December 21st, 19Í6, Annie E. made application to the Court of Probate for the district óf New Milford, requesting that John S. Addis of New Milford be appointed administrator of the estate of her uncle, John Eva. On June 10th, 1917, the children of William J., including the plaintiff Richard, made application to the same court for the appointment of Frank W. Marsh of New Milford as administrator of the estate of John Eva. Upon that application the Court of Probate issued an order of notice for a hearing. The finding does not disclose that this application was ever withdrawn. Subsequently, the plaintiff Richard Eva made another application praying that letters of administration be granted to him. On March 6th, 1917, the Court of Probate heard these applications and found that the heirs had failed to agree on the appointment of an administrator among themselves. It also found that from the appearance and attitude of the heirs -toward each other, as shown before the court on the hearing, and from the nature of the testimony offered, it was evident that there existed a strong personal feeling among those claiming to share in the estate.</p> <p>All the children of William j. Eva and the children of Mary R. Brown Eva, still desire the appointment of Richard Eva as administrator, but object to the appointment of John S. Addis. The plaintiff Richard Eva is a resident of Michigan. For more than fifteen years before the decease of John Eva, Richard Eva had not seen him and knew nothing of his affairs. During this period he had not been in this State, except, on two short visits, up to the time of the trial. He was for several years a fireman and is now employed as a through freight engineer on the Michigan Central Railroad between Jackson and Detroit, Michigan. He is a person of good appearance and intelligence, apparently about thirty-five years of age. He can procure a leave of absence from his employment at any time, and can obtain free transportation to and from Connecticut. John S. Addis, who was appointed administrator by the Court of Probate, is a disinterested person familiar with the settlement -of estates, residing in the town of New Milford, and is a suitable person to act as administrator. Upon his appointment he duly gave bond, qualified, and entered upon his duties as administrator and has since then been performing them.</p> <p>From the reasons of appeal on which the plaintiffs tried their case in the court below, we ascertain that their contention then was that the deceased, John Eva, left no widow surviving him, and that the plaintiffs are all of the next of kin and the only heirs at law of the deceased; that none of them have refused or are incapable to act as administrator of the estate of the deceased; and that Annie E. Gough is not an heir at law or one of the next of kin of the deceased.</p>

, which affirmed the decision of the Commissioner, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. This is a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by Julia A. Robinson, mother and dependent of Adelbert Robinson, deceased, against the Highway Department of the State.

<p>While the proponents of an instrument alleged to be a will are bound to prove its due execution, they are not required to establish the essential facts by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses, nor to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt; all that is necessary is that upon the entire evidence it should appear to be more probable than otherwise that the instrument was executed in the manner required by the statute.</p> <p>In the present case the contestants of the alleged will claimed that it was a mere blank sheet of paper when the subscribing witnesses signed it. Respecting this issue, the jury were instructed that in order to establish the due execution of the instrument, which upon its production in court appeared to be a valid typewritten will, it was necessary for the proponents to prove that it contained all the present typewritten matter when the witnesses signed it; that it then bore the signature of the testator; that the witnesses saw this signature when they subscribed their names; and that the testator informed the witnesses — .who did not see him write his name— that the signature was his. Held that these instructions fully and correctly stated the law applicable to the situation; and that the evidence was sufficient to justify the jury in finding that the instrument had been executed in conformity with these requirements.</p>

<p>Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the finding of the Commissioner was corrected by striking out the statement, among others, that the injury sustained by the decedent arose “out of and in the course of his said employment” (Case, J.), and judgment was rendered vacating the award and dismissing the claim, from which the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>This is a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by Ernesto Merlino, widow- and dependent of Eugenio Merlino, against the Connecticut Quarries Company. Merlino was employed in a quarry conducted by the defendant, and quit work at 5:30 p. m. when the quitting whistle blew. He went down a pathway to a commissary situated upon premises controlled by the employer, carrying with him four empty boxes for fire wood. At the commissary Merlino talked for a minute or two with another workman, declined an invitation to drink a glass of beer, and picked up his child who had come to meet him. He then proceeded along a road leading to his dwelling. The commissary was conducted by an individual to whom the defendant gave the use of the land for that purpose, in order that its employees might obtain supplies at a point convenient to their work. It was the custom of the employer to fire blasts about ten minutes after work ended for the day, a warning being given by blowing a whistle five times, when it was expected that employees within the danger zone would seek shelter. On the afternoon in question the warning whistle was blown about four minutes after the quitting whistle blew, and the blasts were fired several minutes later. Merlino had then reached, on his way home, a point from fifteen to sixty feet from the commissary, where he was killed by a stone thrown by the blast.</p> <p>Nearly ten minutes elapsed between the quitting whistle and the blast, and Merlino might easily have been out of danger if he had not stopped at the commissary and had not incumbered himself with the boxes and child. The neighborhood of the commissary was more or less dangerous while blasting was going on. The Commissioner awarded compensation and the Superior Court, on appeal, vacated the award and dismissed the claim.</p>

Action to secure a reconveyance of real estate alleged to have been made by the plaintiffs to the defendant by way of security, for an accounting and for other equitable relief, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiffs were non-suited (Reed, J.), and from the refusal of the court to set aside such judgment they appealed.

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Mary W. Bunnell, of Plymouth, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Reed, J., upon the allegations of the complaint, which were admitted to be true, for the advice of this court. Mary W. Bunnell died December 12th, 1913, leaving an estate consisting wholly of personal property, and a will duly probated.

Action to recover damages for burning and destroying the plaintiff’s buildings by fire communicated from a locomotive engine of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff’s plant, located near the defendant’s railway, was destroyed by a fire discovered about an hour after a double-headed freight-train had passed.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner for the first district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Burpee, J.; the court affirmed the award and dismissed the appeal, from which judgment the defendant appealed. Another case, Carmelo Scalia v. American Sumatra Tobacco Company, like this in all material respects, was tried with this case and was disposed of in the same way.

Appeal by the plaintiffs from an assessment of benefits and damages for the layout of a highway, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action complained of, from which the plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs are the executors of the will of Patrick Martin, deceased.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district acting for the Commissioner of the first district, in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Case, J.; the court found error in the award and set it aside, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. The Commissioner found the following facts among others.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000, and appeal by the defendant for the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict as against the evidence.

Action by a wife to recover damages for the alienation of the affections of her husband by the defendants, his parents, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where, upon the defendants’ motion, the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Bennett, J., and from the refusal of the trial court, upon the plaintiff’s motion, to set aside this judgment, the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for negligently running into and killing the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s intestate, while walking in the highway, was killed by a motor-car operated by the defendant, which approached the decedent from behind.

Action to recover an alleged balance due for merchandise sold, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Wolfe, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $32.73 only, from which he appealed. Plaintiff is a wholesale dealer in plumbers’ supplies and gas and electric fixtures in New York City.

Action in the nature of trover for the alleged conversion of a quantity of potatoes and the bags containing them, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs for $1,700, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Action in the nature of ejectment, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant Pickett, who was left as the sole defendant in the cause through an amendment of the complaint before trial.</p>

Suit to secure an order or decree requiring the defendant to release and discharge a certain mortgage of real estate, upon the alleged ground that the indebtedness thereby secured had been paid, and for damages, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the issues involving equitable relief were, by order of court (Gager, J.), tried first, and judgment rendered (Warner, J.) for the defendant, and afterward the legal issues were tried by the court (Webb, J.) and…

Action upon a written guaranty for the prompt payment of a loan evidenced by a note for $2,500 payable to the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield, County, Warner, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $2,850, and appeal by the defendant. This action is upon a -written guaranty to pay a promissory note for $2,500, made by Cushman & Company and guaranteed by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach by the defendant of its contract to deliver a quantity of brass turnings to the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Tuttle, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $3,090, and appeal by the defendant.

Writ of error to reverse a judgment of the City Court of Waterbury {Larkin, J.), for the plaintiff McAuliffe in summary process, brought to the October term, 1918, of this court held in Bridgeport.

Suit by a trustee in bankruptcy to determine the rights of the respective parties in and to payments made, and to be made, by purchasers of pianos sold upon contracts of conditional sale by the plaintiff prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, and for other equitable relief, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Gager, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff’s trustee, from which two of the defendants appealed.

Application in receivership proceedings for an adjudication of how much, if any, of a trust fund formerly held by the treasurer of the State for the benefit of the policyholders of the insolvent defendant and now in the hands of the receiver, should be transferred to the general assets for the payment of creditors other than policyholders, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered authorizing the receiver to…

Action for an accounting and for judgment for the amount found due thereon, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the cause was referred to a committee who heard the parties and reported the facts; to the committee’s report the plaintiff filed a remonstrance to which the defendant demurred and the court, Curtis, J., sustained the demurrer, accepted the report, and rendered judgment that the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant in the sum of $13,877.40,…

<p>Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Curtis, J., which affirmed the award of the Commissioner, and from this judgment the defendant appealed.</p>

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the second district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Greene, J., which sustained the appeal and modified the award of the Commissioner by crediting the defendant with the sum of $1,010 which it had paid to the injured employee during his lifetime, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Action by writ and complaint claiming a new trial in an action brought by the defendant against the plaintiff, on the alleged ground of a lack of notice and knowledge of its pendency, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Litchfield County where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained (Woodruff, J.) and judgment rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s complaint alleges, in substance, that her husband, the defendant in this case, brought an action against her to the Court of Common Pleas for Litchfield County, which was made returnable upon the first Tuesday of January, 1917; that such action was for the alleged conversion of household furniture claimed to be owned by the husband; that when such action was commenced she had been driven from her home by the intolerable cruelty of her husband; that the writ and complaint therein averred that this plaintiff had gone to parts unknown; that the officer’s return upon the writ stated that he left a true and attested copy of the process at the usual place of abode of the present defendant; that this officer knew, or ought to have known, that no such copy was left at the plaintiff’s usual place of abode; that this plaintiff never knew or had any reason to believe that any suit .was or could be brought against her by her husband; and that she never had any notice, actual or constructive, of the pendency of the former action. The complaint further alleges that on June 18th, 1917, the present defendant, recovered judgment by default against the plaintiff in this ease for $1,000, in the Court of Common Pleas for Litchfield County; that the plaintiff never knew that such action was pending against her and never had any opportunity to appear and defend the same, although she had a complete defense to the entire cause of action.</p> <p>The writ in the present case is dated November 15th, 1917. The plaintiff claims that the judgment of $1,000, hereinbefore referred to, should be set aside, and that a new trial should be granted.</p>

Applications in receivership proceedings by foreign judgment creditors, praying for an order directing the receiver to report their respective claims as duly presented and allowed, and entitled to share in dividends thereafter declared, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Gager, /., upon a finding of facts, for the advice of this court.

<p>Application in receivership proceedings praying for an order directing the receiver of the defendant corporation to list the claim of the plaintiff as a valid claim against such corporation, and that it be allowed to participate as a general claim in the distribution of the assets of the defendant company, and for other relief, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Burpee, J., upon demurrer to the application; the court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the application, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The application, from the denial of which this appeal is taken, alleges the following material facts, to wit: On or about April 15th, 1901, the iEtna Indemnity Company executed a surety bond for $10,000, as surety for one Caldwell who was trustee by general assignment for the Paducah Building Trust Company, of Paducah, Kentucky, under the provisions of the Kentucky statute. Said Caldwell, trustee, converted funds of the Company to his own use, and in 1903 suit was brought against him as principal, and the Indemnity Company as surety, together with another surety company which was also on his bond, in the Circuit Court for McCracken County, Kentucky, to recover on said bond. The Indemnity Company defended said action, confessing the liability but denying any misappropriation of the assets by Caldwell. On March 11th, 1909, judgment was rendered in said action against the two defendants jointly for $3,365.74. All the parties to this action appealed, but the appeals were not pursued at the time and said judgment was paid, the Indemnity Company paying one half, amounting to $1,687.87.</p> <p>The present applicant, Gip Husbands, was made receiver of said Paducah Company, and on August 20th, 1910, under the provisions of the Kentucky statute, instituted an appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals from said judgment rendered in 1909. On November 4th, 1910, the Indemnity Company instituted a cross-appeal upon said judgment. One Mocquot, a lawyer in Paducah, represented the Indemnity Company in the trial court and upon the appeal. On January 7th, 1911, and while said appeal was pending, the Indemnity Company was, by the Superior Court in Hartford County, placed in the hands of a receiver, which receivership still continues. Neither the applicant nor his counsel were ever informed of the receivership' of the Indemnity Company by its counsel or by the receivers, and never knew anything of said receivership or of any proceedings therein until early in 1916. On or about June 11th, 1911, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. On December 4th, 1915, final judgment was rendered against the Indemnity Company for $8,217.13 with six per cent interest thereon from the date of judgment. The Indemnity Company took an appeal from said last judgment, but never prosecuted the same to effect, and the time for appeal has expired, and such judgment is still in full force and unpaid.</p> <p>The applicant further alleges that by reason of the pendency of said action against the Indemnity Company in the courts of Kentucky at the time of the appointment of the receivers of said Company, they had full knowledge and notice of the existence of said claim against said Company; that after their appointment said receivers continued the defense of said action through their Kentucky counsel, though in the name of the ¿Etna Indemnity Company and not of said receivers; that the applicant was never informed, nor did he ever have notice, of the appointment of the receivers of said ¿Etna Indemnity Company or of the time limited by this court for the presentation of claims against said receivers, and had no knowledge of the same until the present year (1916); that said action was prosecuted by the applicant in the Kentucky courts in good faith for several years, in the expectation that a judgment obtained against the ¿Etna Indemnity Company would be valid and binding upon it; and finally, that no prejudice has resulted to the receivers of the ¿Etna Indemnity Company or to the creditors of said Company by reason of the failure of the applicant, due to his ignorance of the appointment of said receivers, to present said claim formally to said receivers. Continuing, it is alleged that the receiver of the ¿Etna Indemnity Company now refuses to entertain the claim of the applicant upon the ground that the same has not been formally presented to the receiver, that it is now too late to present it, and, upon the further ground, that a judgment rendered after the appointment of the receivers is not binding upon and is no basis for a claim against said receivers. The applicant then states his claims, and for relief requests the court to pass an order authorizing and directing the receivers of the ¿Etna Indemnity Company to list said claim in the amount specified in said judgment as a valid claim against said ¿Etna Indemnity Company, and that said claim may participate as a general claim in the distribution of the assets of said Company, or for such other and further relief as to this court shall seem proper.</p> <p>The receiver filed his demurrer to said application and for reasons of demurrer alleged: “(1) The time limited by this court for presentation of claims expired January 1st, 1912. (2) It appears that the claimant did not present any claim within the time limited to your receiver and has never presented any claim; nor obtained an extension of time for so doing. (3) It appears that the claim itself is based solely upon and consists of a judgment rendered in a Kentucky court on December 4th, 1915, and subsequent to the appointment of a receiver in these proceedings. (4) It appears that on January 7th, 1911, the date of the appointment of the receiver in this action, the claim had not accrued but was absolutely contingent and therefore not provable for a dividend in these proceedings, if presented, received or listed.” This demurrer was sustained by the court and judgment rendered thereon dismissing and disallowing said claim. It was agreed upon the argument that the records of the receivership would show that on January 18th, 1911, the court authorized the receiver to continue the defense of actions pending in other States against the iEtna Indemnity Company, of which there were a large number; and also that the extended order of limitation for the presentation of claims expired January 1st, 1912.</p>

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of a written contract, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff but for $296 only, from which he appealed. The plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract, which was called a contract of partnership, for the conduct of the milk business for six years from September 26th, 1912.

Action to recover the purchase price of a carload of potatoes, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $1,016, and appeal by the defendants.

Suit to' restrain the defendants from violating a covenant not to build or allow to be built on their respective premises any building or structure “in front of” the plaintiff’s land that would interfere with or obstruct the view of Long Island Sound, and for damages, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover for work and labor and materials furnished under a building contract, and for the conversion of the plaintiff’s tools, scaffolding and other appliances, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Maltbie, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $5,038, of which $111 was remitted, and judgment for the plaintiff for $4,927, from which the defendant appealed. The complaint at first contained three.counts.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict of guilty, motion to set aside the verdict denied, judgment in accordance with the Verdict, and appeal by the accused.

Action to recover treble damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s automobile by a collision upon the highway, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and ' tried to the jury before Case, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $175, for $25 of which the plaintiff filed a remittitur, after which the trial court trebled the sum so reached ($150) and awarded $450 from which the defendant appealed.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person of the plaintiff, and to his automobile, by a collision alleged to be due to the negligence of the defendant, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the jury before Caplan, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $350, and appeal by the defendant. In this court the appellee filed a plea in abatement.

Action to recover one half of a loss sustained by the plaintiff upon an assigned account, for which the defendant was alleged to be responsible under his written agreement with the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $1,613, and appeal by the defendant. Ón May 4th, 1914, the plaintiff sold to the Wolthausen Rough Hat Company all his stock in that Company for…

<p>Application in the nature of an appeal from the action of a justice of the peace in administering the poor debtor’s oath to the defendant, brought by the plaintiff, a creditor, to the Hon. William M. Maltbie, a judge of the Superior Court, and, by agreement of the parties, transferred to and heard by the Hon. Mil-ion A. Shumway, a judge of said court, who found that the oath had been properly administered, and thereupon dismissed the application and ordered the release of the defendant, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The record discloses that on September 25th, 1917, William W. Wheatley obtained a judgment in the Superior Court for Windham County against Fred R. Dubuc in the sum of $252.08 damages and costs, upon the'ground that Dubuc refused to pay a debt admitted by him to be due and payable to Wheatley, while having estate not exempt from execution, sufficient to discharge the same, concealed and withheld by him so that the same could not be taken by legal process. On October 8th, 1917, Dubuc was committed to the Windham County jail by virtue of an execution levied upon his body for the collection of this judgment. On March 11th, 1918, Dubuc applied to a justice of the peace to take the oath provided for poor debtors. On April 20th, 1918, the justice of the peace, after due hearing, administered to Dubuc the oath provided for poor debtors. Wheatley then made an application for a review of this judgment which came before the Hon. Milton A. Shumway, a judge of the Superior Court, on the 25th day of May, 1918, who, after fully hearing the parties, found that the poor debtors oath was properly administered by the justice of the peace, and ordered that Dubuc be forthwith released. Dubuc was confined in jail from October 8th, 1917, when execution was levied, up to and at the time of the hearing before Judge Shumway. Before judgment was rendered in the action in the Superior Court, Dubuc paid a certain promissory note owed by him to his father. The debtor began voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy about November 20th, 1917, and was adjudicated a bankrupt November 28th, 1917. At the time he was adjudicated a bankrupt he was in the possession of a mowing machine which he bad purchased for and on account of his brother.</p>

Intervening application in receivership proceedings, by the plaintiff, an alleged creditor of the defendant, praying for an allowance of its claim, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and referred to a committee who found and reported the facts; the court, Curtís, J., overruled a remonstrance to the supplementary report of the committee and rendered judgment allowing the plaintiff’s claim in the amount of $10,000, and from this judgment the receiver of the…

Appeal by tbe defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Burpee, Jthe court found that the conclusion of the Commissioner that Antonio Riccio, the plaintiff’s husband, received an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by the defendant Montano was not supported by the evidence properly before him, and set aside the award,…

Petition for an order and decree adjudging the defendant to be in contempt of court in wilfully refusing to pay instalments of alimony theretofore awarded to the plaintiff in an action of divorce, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Burpee, J., upon a demurrer to the defendant’s answer; the court sustained the demurrer, adjudged the defendant to be in contempt, and committed him to jail, and from this judgment he appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Burpee, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $2,000, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>A decree that one of two claimants in an interpleader suit had no right, title, or interest in or to the legacy which was the subject-matter involved, does not establish the right of the other claimant to it; and until such adjudication has been made the executor cannot secure the discharge he asks for.</p> <p>The declarations of a testator to the scrivener and witnesses of his will as to his intent in the use of a word or expression therein, are inadmissible to control or vary the language of the instrument, except in cases of equivocation or latent ambiguity.</p> <p>In the present case the testatrix bequeathed $12,000 to W, and in case of her death before the testatrix, to her “ children.” Held that inasmuch as there was nothing in the will to indicate that the word “ children” was used with other than its strict and primary meaning, evidence of the declarations of the testatrix to the witnesses and scrivener of her will, to the effect that she intended the word should have its usual signification, was inadmissible, but, under the circumstances, harmless, since the court would have been bound, as a matter of law, to reach the same conclusion without the aid of these declarations.</p> <p>Extrinsic circumstances may explain the language of a will, but they cannot contradict, vary or control it.</p> <p>The law does not presume that any woman, however old, is incapable of bearing children.</p>

; the court held the conclusion of the Commissioner to be erroneous and vacated the award, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. Robert Cunningham was employed by the defendant Donovan as a teamster on a coal wagon, and, in connection with that service, to assist in loading and unloading coal thereon and therefrom.

Bastardy complaint, brought before the City Court of Hartford (Bullard, J.) which found probable cause and bound over the defendant for trial in the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County; that court, Markham, J., found the facts and rendered judgment against the defendant, from which he appealed.

Action to recover for services as a civil engineer, and for damages for an alleged breach of the defendant’s promise to pay the plaintiff $10,000 for his assistance in raising money and indorsing notes for the benefit of a trap rock company, practically all of whose stock was owned by the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Gager, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $16,138, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>An exception should be taken to a ruling admitting testimony, in order to make such ruling a ground of error.</p> <p>A motion to strike out testimony is faulty which fails to point out what and how much of the evidence is claimed to be objectionable, and which, moreover, does not give any reason why the motion should prevail.</p> <p>It must be assumed that a witness who testifies to the dying declarations of the deceased and who questioned him relative to the homicide, was diligently trying to get a complete and accurate statement of the event; and therefore an assertion to that effect made by the witness while on the stand, although unnecessary, is harmless.</p> <p>Dying declarations may be made in response to questions, and if they are, the questions are admissible in evidence in connection with, and in explanation of, the answers of the decedent.</p> <p>The presence or absence of the accused at the time a dying declaration is made, does not affect its admissibility in evidence.</p> <p>Evidence that the decedent distinguished between his assailants and others when he made his dying declaration, is admissible to show his mental condition.</p> <p>A witness who telephoned to the police may be allowed to testify that he did so in consequence of information obtained by him from the decedent as he lay upon the ground after being shot. The admission of such evidence does not violate the hearsay rule, since no statement made by the decedent is given, but only the fact that he made some answer to the inquiries put to him by the witness.</p> <p>Whether the biaims made by a litigant are true or not in point of fact, is a question for the jury: it is only where the claims are erroneously recited that this court can correct the finding.</p> <p>It is the duty, as well as the privilege, of counsel, to call the attention of the court at the time to a wrong assumption of fact in the charge, if one is made.</p> <p>A possible wrongful assumption of fact in a charge respecting a trivial matter, will not be treated as reversible error even in a capital case, if the jury were expressly informed that they were to pass upon all matters of fact uninfluenced by any views or comments of the court, and if it is apparent upon the charge as a whole that they could not have been prejudiced by the assumption in question.</p> <p>Under the rules (Practice Book, 1908, page 236, § 116, page 266, § 5) an objection to the admission of testimony should state, succinctly, the grounds upon which it rests; and unless this is done, the ruling ought not to be made a reason of appeal and urged in this court upon grounds which were not before the trial court when its decision was made.</p>

Suit to determine the validity and construction of a clause of the will of Starr Hoyt Nichols of Danbury, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Haines, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court. Starr Hoyt Nichols, bom in and a resident of Dan-bury and a graduate of Yale University, died in 1909 leaving neither wife, child nor issue of children.

Action upon the so-called common counts, brought to the City Court of New Haven where a substituted complaint was filed, which the court refused to strike from the files upon motion of the defendants, and the cause was afterward tried to the jury before Hoyt, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $278, and appeal by the defendants.

Writ of habeas corpus to determine the legality of the plaintiff’s imprisonment, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Case, J., upon a demurrer to the answer to the defendant’s return; the court overruled the demurrer and discharged the plaintiff from further custody, and from this judgment the defendant appealed.

<p>A deed which lacks the assent of the grantor, either because of his insanity or because of undue influence exerted over him by the grantee, is not one which in reality conveys the legal title, though it appears to do so. As between the parties the instrument is voidable at the election of the grantor or of his legal representative, without the necessity of resorting to a court of equity to compel a cancellation or a reconveyance. Accordingly, an action of ejectment, which in this State is more comprehensive than the common-law action, may be brought by an administrator against one who is in possession under a deed from an insane intestate or under one which was procured from him by the undue influence of the defendant.</p> <p>In the present case the first count followed the form commonly used in an action of ejectment, while the second count alleged that the defendants had wrongfully entered on the premises under a false and unjust claim of title based solely on a deed executed by the plaintiff’s intestate while she was mentally incapable of comprehending the nature of her act and while she was under the domination and undue influence of the defendants; and upon issue joined to the jury upon both counts the plaintiff had a verdict. Held that the verdict on the second count was good, as the allegations of that count were sufficient to support a prayer for a decree setting aside the deed; and that the defendants, by voluntarily going to trial upon the merits and without moving to set aside the verdict or to arrest the judgment, had waived the omission of such a prayer in the complaint.</p> <p>An appellant is not entitled to raise in this court a question which was not distinctly raised and determined adversely to him in the court below.</p>

Suit to secure relief from the attempted discontinuance of certain highways in the defendant town, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County where, upon motion of the defendant Cunningham, a committee was appointed, pursuant to §§ 1434 and 1442 of the General Statutes, to determine the question of the common convenience and necessity of said highways (Reed, J.), and from this judgment the defendant town appealed.

Action under the common counts and a bill of particulars to recover a balance alleged, to be due upon a contract for work and materials in papering and painting apartmerjt houses of the defendant, and a further sum for extras, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Markham, Jverdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $479, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover the amount of a written order upon the defendant, which was alleged to have been accepted by it, brought to the City Court of Waterbury and thence, by the defendant’s appeal, to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the court, Makepeace, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $327, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Appeal from orders and decrees of the Court of Probate of the district of New Haven approving the account of the defendant, a testamentary trustee, and refusing to require him to turn over to the plaintiff the balance of the funds in the trustee’s hands, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Curtis, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.</p> <p>Another case — Mary F. Cartwright et al. v. George W. Crawford, Trustee — identical in all material respects with this case, — was reserved and argued with it.</p> <p>These are two appeals from decrees of probate dated November 20th, 1918, approving and allowing two separate accounts presented by George W. Crawford as trustee of two separate trusts created by the will of Ella DeLadson of New Haven, who died in 1916. ■ The two appeals were tried together in the Superior Court and argued together in this court, and present identical questions of law. The clauses of the will creating these trusts are as follows: — .</p> <p>“11. I give, devise and bequeath to William F. Alcorn of New Haven, Connecticut, $1,500 to hold the game in trust, however, for the term of ten years from the date of my death, and to pay the income thereof, to my niece, Mary Scott, also known as Mary Cartwright now or formerly of 143 W. 132 Street, New York City, •and at the expiration of said ten years, to pay over to said Mary Scott, also known as Mary Cartwright, the said sum of $1,500.”</p> <p>“15. All the rest, and residue of my estate, both real and personal, of whatever nature and description and wheresoever located, including all mortgages owned by me, I give, devise and bequeath to William F. Alcorn of New Haven, Connecticut, to hold the same in trust, however, for a period of ten years, and to pay the income thereof to my husband, Edward S. DeLadson, and at the expiration of said period of ten years to turn over to my said husband, all said rest and residue of my estate then remaining in said trustee’s hands.”</p> <p>On June 24th, 1918, Mr. Alc'orn was removed as trustee on account of his absence in the military service of the United States in France, and the present trustee was appointed and qualified in his place. The estate was settled, and on November 15th, 1918, the trustee presented his first accounts under the trusts in question showing in each case that he had on hand the principal of the trust fund, intact save for the premium upon the trustee’s bond. Each of these appeals rests on the same ground: that the decree allowing and approving the trustee’s account is erroneous because the appellant is by the terms of the will the sole and absolute owner of the fund; because the trust attempted to be created is a dry or naked trust; because the attempted trust constitutes an illegal and invalid restriction upon the appellant’s power of alienation of his property; and because appellánt is entitled to an order directing the trustee to turn over all the principal and interest of the trust funds, less necessary expenses, to the appellant.</p>

Action to recover damages for breach of an alleged contract of indemnity, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Warner, J verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $7,755, and appeal by the defendants.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district in favor of the plaintiff children but not in favor of the decedent’s unlawful consort, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Case, J., upon the facts found by the Commissioner, for the advice of this court. Peter Salmon Salvatore Piedmonte, an employee of the defendant, was instantly killed while he was engaged in his work.

Action to recover, damages for negligently running into and injuring the plaintiff’s wagon upon the highway, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Smith, ./.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $85, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Üfader ordinary circumstances a guest riding upon the rear seat of an automobile, with no control or authority over the driver, is bound ■to exercise but a very limited degree of care. He is not expected to direct the driver nor to keep a lookout; he may go to sleep, read, talle, or remain in deep thought, without being chargeable with negligence; but he would be negligent should he unreasonably fail to give warning of known danger. Moreover, the negligence of the driver, if any, is not to be imputed to such a gue.st.</p> <p>Proof that an occupant df a motor-vehicle was alive shortly before a collision with a railroad train at a grade-crossing, raises a presumption of fact that he was alive at the time of the accident, and warrants a finding to that effect. So also, proof that such occupant was upon the back seat shortly before the collision, warrants the inference or presumption that he continued there in the absence of evidence to the contrary.</p> <p>The nature of an accident and the attending circumstances may warrant an inference, as in the present case, that the plaintiff’s intestate was in the exercise of due care at the time of his death.</p> <p>The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s gate-tender was guilty of negligence “in operating” the gates at the railroad crossing at the time of the accident, and the trial court expressly excluded from the jury’s consideration any negligence arising from the physical condition of one of the gates, which was out of order. Held that the jury could not have failed to understand that the operation of the gate was the only ground of negligence charged in connection with them, although the court did use the expression “maintain and operate” in one portion of the charge.</p> <p>The trial court instructed the jury that if they found that the plaintiff’s intestate was on the back seat of the automobile and had no control over the car’s operation, then he was in nowise chargeable with any failure of the driver to use reasonable care. Held that this stated the law upon the subject of imputed negligence clearly and with sufficient completeness.</p>

Action to recover for services and supplies alleged to have been rendered for, and furnished to, the defendants, husband and wife, for their joint benefit, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,500 against each of the defendants, from which they appealed.

Action to recover damages for injury to the plaintiff’s automobile through the alleged negligence of the defendants, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Walsh, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $139, and appeal by the defendants.

Action by a real-estate broker to recover a commission for procuring a sale of the defendant’s property, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Booth, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $166, and appeal by the defendant. The defendant employed the plaintiff to sell certain real estate for $6,500, for a commission of two and a half per cent.

Suit to determine the validity and construction of a clause of the will of Julia A. Holcomb of Bridgeport, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Curtis, J., upon the allegations of the complaint, found to be true, for the advice of this court. Julia A. Holcomb of Bridgeport died in 1914, leaving a will by which the residue of her estate was divided into three equal parts, one for each of her three daughters.

Achon to recover damages for alleged malicious arrest and prosecution, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Webb, J.; verdict and judgment for $750 against the defendant Berry, which the trial court set aside as against the evidence and as excessive, from which action the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Under our statute (§ 5641) and rules of practice (Practice Book, p. 238, § 120; p. 294, Form No. 15), a plaintiff who is in doubt whether a contract made by him with an officer of a corporation in its behalf, was in fact authorized by the latter, as represented by such officer, may sue both of them and claim damages for the breach or nonperformance of the contract “in the alternative,” as the question of authority may be determined upon the trial.</p> <p>The complaint in such an action should allege the facts known to the plaintiff, but it is not demurrable for failing to aver that the contract was or was not in fact authorized by the defendant corporation, since the existence of such doubt or uncertainty is the very situation or condition which the statute and rule recognize as the basis of the action, — a condition which would obviously cease to exist if the plaintiff were sufficiently informed to honestly allege either that the contract was or was not in fact authorized by the corporation.</p> <p>In stating such a cause of action two counts are unnecessary.</p> <p>In the present case a second count repeated by reference all the allegations of the first, but added that if the defendant corporation did not authorize its officer to act as its agent in making the contract, he was guilty of deceit in representing that he had such authority. Held that so long as this count which, like the first, stated the whole case against both defendants, remained unanswered by the defendant corporation, such defendant was not entitled to finai judgment in its favor, notwithstanding the first count had been adjudged insufficient against it upon demurrer.</p> <p>The voluntary filing of an amended or substitute complaint after a demurrer to the original complaint has been sustained, operates as a withdrawal of the latter and removes the ruling upon demurrer from the case.</p>

Action in four counts to recover the amount of four promissory notes, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the “ special defenses” of the answer was sustained, Curtis, J., and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Warner, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff Barnes to recover $4,967, and for the coplaintiff, the Citizens National Bank, to recover $5,533, from which the plaintiff Barnes and the defendant each appealed.

Suit to determine the rights of the respective parties in and to certain mud flats and to quiet and settle the title thereto, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Warner, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, from which some of the defendants appealed.

<p>Section 5275 of the General Statutes, which formed part of the Married Women’s Act of 1877, provides that both husband and wife shall be liable for articles purchased by either which have in fact gone “to the support of the family, or for the joint benefit of both, or for the reasonable apparel of the wife, or for her reasonable support, while abandoned by her husband.” As originally enacted this provision did not contain the final comma, which was inserted by the revisers in the Revision of 1888. Held that under these circumstances the more rational construction was to disregard the last comma, and thus avoid making the husband’s liability for his wife’s “reasonable apparel” dependent upon his abandonment of her, — a result clearly not intended by the framers of the Act.</p> <p>The statute imposes the obligation of support as an incident of the status created by the marriage, but it is not concerned either with the place in which the required support is furnished or the place in which the articles purchased are used or consumed. Accordingly, a husband domiciled and living with his wife in this State is jointly liable with her for her “reasonable apparel” purchased and used by her in a foreign country while temporarily there.</p> <p>There is no reason why the statutory remedy should not be as available to a foreign creditor as to a creditor of our own State.</p> <p>The word “support, ” as used in the statute, includes everything which goes to the sustenance and maintenance of the family; and “family” includes the wife, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intent.</p> <p>A vendor’s right of recovery under the statute is not limited to necessaries or things reasonable, if the articles purchased go in fact to the family support.</p>

Suit for the specific performance of an agreement to reconvey certain property to the plaintiffs under conditions prescribed in the deed, and for other relief, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J.; facts found and an interlocutory decree passed establishing the right of the plaintiffs to the property in question, after which the fair value of the permanent improvements made thereon by the defendants, and to which they were entitled, was…

<p>Action to recover rent, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried to the jury before Waller, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs for $500, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>Evidence, for the most part undisputed, was offered by the plaintiffs to establish the following facts:—</p> <p>April 15th, 1912, James P. Shea was the owner of a building on Bank Street in New London, a part of which was occupied and used in the conduct of a liquor saloon. By an indenture of lease of that date between him and the plaintiff Albert J. Richard, he leased the saloon premises to the plaintiff for the term of five years from April 1st, 1912, at a monthly rent of $106.25. In the lease Richard agreed that he would neither assign it nor underlet a part or the whole of the leased premises without Shea’s permission.</p> <p>Richard and his wife went into possession under the lease and continued to conduct there a liquor saloon until January 17th, 1916. On that date they entered into a written agreement for the sale to the defendant of the lease of the premises, the business carried on there, the license therefor, and the stock of goods and fixtures in the saloon. This agreement contained, by reference to another document, the undertaking on the part of Richard that he secure the written consent of the landlord to the subletting, as well as the following stipulation: “It is further understood that if the said Michael P. Shea vacates the premises under lease before the expiration of the lease period that he, the said Michael P. Shea, shall have the right to place therein a tenant for the remaining unexpired portion of the time, who may engage in the same or different kind of business. If said tenant engages in a different kind of business, the said Albert J. Richard will secure in addition to his own written consent, the consent of the landlord in writing, agreeing to sublet to the tenant for the remaining period of time.”</p> <p>The agreed consideration for this sale was $2,500. In addition the defendant undertook to pay to the Richards a monthly rent of $125 during the unexpired period of their lease.</p> <p>Pending the negotiations which resulted in the execution of this sublease, the defendant sought an interview with James P. Shea for the purpose of ascertaining if the latter was willing to consent to the assignment of the lease. At that interview he told James P. Shea that he had made an agreement with Richard for the purchase of the business, and asked about the clause in the lease requiring the landlord’s consent. James P. Shea thereupon replied that whatever the defendant and Richard had agreed to would be entirely satisfactory to him.</p> <p>Michael, immediately upon the execution of the contract with the Richards, paid them the $2,500 purchase price, entered into possession of the premises and the personal property included in the sale, secured the transfer to himself of the license, employed Richard to manage the business, and proceeded to conduct the saloon as his own for a period of four months, using the stock and fixtures in so doing. During this time he regularly paid to the Richards the stipulated monthly rent of $125. At the end of that time he hired for a much lower rent another saloon which he regarded as being more favorably located, moved his business thereto and abandoned the Richards’ premises.</p> <p>James P. Shea was aware of the facts connected with the subletting of the premises and their occupancy by the defendant, as above recited, and orally consented thereto. His written consent, however, was never asked or obtained. The defendant never requested the Richards to obtain such consent, or indicated in any way at any time during his occupancy that he desired that such consent be secured, or that he was not satisfied with the existing situation. Therefore the plaintiff took no steps to secure it.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiffs from a decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Bozrah, approving and admitting to probate a certain written instrument as the last will and codicil of Nathan Johnson of Bozrah, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Warner, J.; verdict for the plaintiffs against the validity of the will, which the trial court, upon motion of the defendant set aside as against the evidence, and from this…

Action to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff’s intestate, occasioned by a fall upon an icy sidewalk, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff to recover $2,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages resulting from the alleged corrupt and malicious usurpation of judicial authority by the defendant as judge of probate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Keeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a servant of the defendants, in the management of an elevator in one of their buildings, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Maltbie, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $3,000, and appeal by the defendants.

Action by those entitled to the principal of a trust fund to recover damages for a breach of the trustee’s probate bond, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Middlesex County, Case, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the respective plaintiffs against the defendant Northrop, and in favor of the other defendants, from which the plaintiffs appealed.

Action to recover moneys paid by the plaintiff for the support of the defendant’s intestate in the Connecticut Hospital for the Insane, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $500.89, and appeal by the defendant.

Action upon the common counts^ for which a substituted complaint was filed, which the trial court, Case, J., refused to strike out, to recover one half the cost of a carload of peaches and of other fruit purchased for the defendants by the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $517, and appeal by the defendants.

, which affirmed the action of the Commissioner, from which the defendant appealed. This is an appeal from the doings of the Compensation Commissioner in awarding compensation to the widow of one Fiarenzo for his death while in the employment of Richards & Company, the defendant.

Moeller of New Haven, deceased, to reimburse and pay over to the plaintiffs a sum of money alleged to have been expended by them in protecting the estate of said decedent, and the interests of the remaindermen therein, from extortionate charges for fees made by said officials, — taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the reasons of appeal was overruled {Gager, J.), and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Curtis, J.; facts found and…

Action to recover damages for negligently running into and killing the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Gager, Jverdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in New London County where a demurrer to the substituted complaint, filed by the defendant Gilbey, was sustained (Keeler, J.) and, upon the refusal of the plaintiff to plead further, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant Gilbey, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for injuries to a hot-water heating system installed in the plaintiff’s house by the defendant, and alleged to have been caused by his negligence, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Markham, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $231, and appeal by the defendant. The contract was evidenced by a proposal in writing as follows: “Hartford, Conn., April 11,1917.

. Action to recover damages for personal injuries from a fall upon an icy sidewalk which the defendant was alleged to have negligently left in a slippery and defective condition, brought to the Superior Court ia New Haven County and tried to the jury before Haines, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,725, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>While the exercise of undue influence over a testator may be shown by circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be such as to lead fairly and convincingly to that conclusion.</p> <p>The mere fact that the principal legatee was a niece of the testator with whom he had been living for about six months before his death, does not create such a relation of special trust and confidence as to give rise to the presumption that the will was obtained by her by the exercise of undue influence. To create that presumption and cast upon the legatee the burden of disproving undue influence, it must appear that the legatee stood in a professional or business relation to the testator with obligations of a fiduciary character.</p> <p>The evidence in the present case reviewed, and the action of the trial court, in directing a verdict in favor of the proponents of the will, upheld.</p>

<p>A correction of the finding, which, if made, would not affect the judgment rendered, will be refused.</p> <p>The motive with which an act is done may often be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances connected with the transaction.</p> <p>In the present case it appeared that the plaintiffs were sublessees of the defendant corporation in a part of a building leased by it, and that if the corporation renewed its lease for five years, as it had the right to do, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a sublease of their portion of the building for the renewal period, if they so elected. The original lease was renewed, but in the name of the president of the corporation instead of in the corporate name, and the plaintiffs elected to renew their sublease, which the corporation and its president refused to grant. The trial court found that the renewal of the principal lease in the individual name of the president of the corporation instead of in its own name, was for the fraudulent purpose of having it appear not to be a renewal, and so, if possible, to deprive the sublessees of the continuation of their lease; and that such renewal was, in effect, a renewal of the corporate lease and was so intended by the parties. Held that the evidence in the case warranted these conclusions of the-trial court.</p> <p>That rents have greatly increased within a few years is, it seems, a matter of which courts may take judicial notice.</p> <p>The legal remedy must be complete and adequate, in order to preclude a litigant from resorting to a court of equity.</p>

Action to recover for merchandise sold and delivered, brought to the City Court of Waterbury and transferred, upon motion of the defendant, to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Peasley, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant upon her counterclaim, and appeal by the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought this action to recover the price of five barrels of sugar alleged to have been sold and delivered to the defendant for $8.75 per one hundred pounds.

Information in two counts charging the accused with having “guaranteed” certain loans and with demanding therefor interest at a rate of more than twelve per cent per annum, in alleged violation of the statute (§ 4798), brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Peasley, Acting-Judge; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Watertown ascertaining and determining the amount of the succession tax due from the estate of Mary Alathea Curtis of Watertown, deceased; taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in * New Haven County, Warner, J., upon a demurrer to the plaintiff’s reasons of appeal, for the advice of this court.

Appeals by the defendant from the allowance, in taxing costs, of two trial fees and two jury fees, in two cases claiming damages resulting from the same collision, which were tried together to the same jury, in the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Booth, J. The plaintiff Rometsch sued for damages to his automobile, and the plaintiff Chambelis for personal injuries received in the same accident.

Suit to foreclose a mortgage for $1,000 upon real estate conveyed by warranty deed of the plaintiffs to the defendant Stevens prior to the giving of said mortgage, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs after deducting $300 from the amount of the mortgage indebtedness for damages sustained by the defendant Stevens because of an incumbrance upon the premises, and appeal by the…

Action to recover money loaned, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Walsh, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $529, and appeal by the defendants.

Action to recover damages for the alleged wrongful refusal of the defendant to accept delivery of aluminum rods purchased by it of the plaintiff, with a count for other rods sold and delivered, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Tuttle, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,655, from which the defendant appealed.

Action to obtain the cancellation of a written contract for the purchase and sale of a retail liquor business owned and conducted by the defendant, alleged to have been secured by his fraudulent representations, also for a return of the plaintiff’s promissory note given therefor, and for damages, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before McGrath, Acting-Judge; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $8,000 with interest from the date of sale,…

Action in the nature of ejectment, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the defendant Kumpitsch failed to appear and the answer of the defendant Altman, administratrix, was adjudged {Haines, J.) insufficient on demurrer, and upon her failure to plead further judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs, from which the defendant administratrix appealed.