Volume 93 — Illinois Appellate Court Reports

<p>Creditor’s Bill.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Practice—On Appeals from Justices of the Peace by One of Several Parties.—When an appeal is taken by one of several parties from the judgment of a justice of the peace, the statute requires the clerk of the court to which sXich appeal is taken, if the appearance of the parties is not entered, to issue a summons against the other parties, and it is error to proceed with the trial of the case without doing so.</p>

<p>1. Waiver—Of the Bight to Except to the Ruling of the Court.— Where the plaintiff’s demurrer to a plea is overruled, a replication filed by him stricken from the files, and he afterward asks for and obtains leave to reply double, but does not avail himself of such leave and fails to abide by his demurrer, he must be considered as having waived all right of exception to the ruling of the court, not only in overruling his demurrer, but also in striking his replication from the files.</p> <p>2. Appellate Court Practice—Where no Exceptions are Preserved by the Bill of Exceptions.—Where no exceptions are preserved by the bill of exceptions to an order striking a replication from the files an objection to the striking of such replication from the files is not properly before the Appellate Court.</p> <p>3. Limitations—Additional Counts, When Amenable to a Plea of .— When an additional count filed to a declaration in an action for personal injuries sets up a new or different cause of action and is not filed within the time limited by the statute for commencing the action, such amended count is amenable to a plea of the statute of limitations.</p>

<p>Action for Kent.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.</p>

Assumpsit.—Common counts. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridue Hanecy. Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Statement by Mr. Justice Horton. Appellant first commenced a suit against appellee. Afterward appellee commenced a suit against appellant. Both of said suits grew out of the delivery of oil upon the contracts hereinafter mentioned.

Trespass, for disturbing .the plaintiff in the peaceable enjoyment of the demised premises. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Mr. Justice Horton dissenting,

Bill to Enforce a Stockholders’ Liability.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 190Q. Statement by Hr. Justice Horton.—January 19, 1891, the original bill o,f complaint in this cause was filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County by Charles F. Morse in his own behalf, and on behalf of all creditors of- the Pacific Railway Company.

<p>Bill of Revivor.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard' in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Construction of Statutes—Section S3 of the Act Concerning Corporations.—hi the enactment of section 28 of chapter 32 R. S., entitled “An act concerning corporations” relating to persons holding stock in corporations, it was not the intention of the" legislature to enable parties to perpetrate frauds by means of secret or concealed trusts.</p> <p>2. Stockholders—When the Liability is Contractual.—Under section 23 of chapter 83, R. S., providing that each stockholder shall be liable for the debts of the corporation to the extent of the amount that may remain unpaid upon his stock, and may be required to pay his pro rata share of the debts of such corporation to the extent of the unpaid portion of his stock, after exhausting the assets of such corporation, the liability of such stockholder is contractual.</p> <p>8. Same—Liability and Remedies of.—A legal holder of stock in an . incorporated company is liable to the creditors of the company, where its assets are exhausted, even though he is not the equitable owner of such stock, but he is not without a remedy. He may recover from the equitable owner such sums as he may have been required to pay by reason of his being the legal holder of the stock.</p> <p>4. Same—Evidence of the Holding and Liability.—Where a person appears by the certificate held by him and upon the books and records of the company as being personally and in his own right a stockholder in the company, he is to be held liable as such.</p> <p>5. Interest—On Money Decrees.—Where a decree for the payment of money provides that unless the same is paid within thirty days after its entry, interest shall be charged thereon after the expiration of such time, the allowance of interest as provided by the decree is proper.</p>

<p>1. Stock—Implied Warranty in the Sale of.—The vendor of shares-, of stock in an incorporated company impliedly warrants in the sale of such stock that he has a good title to the same, and that they are genuine, but in the absence of fraudulent representations there is no other-warranty.</p> <p>2. Same—Liability of the Assignee of Shares of Stock.—The assigneeof stock in an incorporated company succeeds not only to the rights of the assignor, but in the event of the insolvency of the corporation he is liable to contribute to the payment of its debts in like manner as if he were an original subscriber to the stock.</p> <p>8. Remedies—No Cause of Action Arises upon a Misrepresentation of the Law.—No cause of action arises or can be predicated upon a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the law as to whether certain stock in an incorporated company, being offered for sale, is or is not liable to assessment, as it is presumed that the law is equally within the knowledge of all parties.</p> <p>4. Interest—On Decrees for the Payment of Money.—Where a decree is entered for the payment of a sum of money on a day named, the parties primarily liable for its payment are also liable for legal interest upon it from the day named for its payment.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for a conspiracy. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G. Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement by the Court.—Appellee brought an action in case against appellants in the nature of a conspiracy, a trial of which before the court and a jury resulted in a verdict in favor of appellee of $15,000 and judgment thereon, from which this appeal is prosecuted.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Chables G. Neely, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

Assumpsit. —Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Abner Smith, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1000. Statement by the Court.—Appellants brought suit before a justice of the peace to recover the purchase price of a furnace claimed to have been sold to appellee under a contract embodied in the following written proposition and acceptance thereof, viz.: “ Chicago, August 8, 1895. Mb. De Tamble, Jefferson Street, City.

Assumpsit, for labor and materials. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—Appellee contracted with appellant to build a plank sidewalk on the east and west side of Vincennes avenue, between Seventy-third and Seventy-fifth streets, for twenty-five cents per lineal foot.

Bill for an Injunction, etc.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Edmund W. Burke, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—One John F. McGrew obtained, as a member of the Ancient Order of United Workmen, a certificate, called a beneficiary certificate, issued by the order, and entitling the person named therein as beneficiary to the sum of $2,000, to be paid by the order upon the death of said McGrew.

Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligent act. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlam, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Mr. Justice WlNDES not concurring. Statement.—This suit was brought by appellee to recover for negligence of appellant which, it is alleged, caused the death of Henry M. E-oehl, appellee’s intestate.

Bill for an Injunction.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain. Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900. Statement.—This is an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a temporary injunction.

Debt, on a penal bond. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

Trespass, de bonis asportatis.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jesse Holdom, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This suit was brought by appellee in trespass quare clausum fregit and de bonis asportatis. Appellants pleaded the general issue only.

Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligent act. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This suit was brought by appellee to recover damages sustained through the death of Luther S. Green, appellee’s intestate, whose death, it is alleged, was caused by the negligence of appellant.

<p>1. Pledges—Bonds Payable to Bearer, Without Notice of the Ownership.— When bonds payable to bearer, not clue by their terms, are taken in good faith as collateral security by a party for bona fide debt due him from one in possession of such bonds, without notice that such person in possession is not the owner of such bonds, the title will pass to the pledgee to the extent of the debt for which he takes them in pledge.</p> <p>2. Replevin—Of Property Held in Pledge as Collateral Security.— Under our statutes relating to the action of replevin (Hurd’s Stat. Ch. 119, Sec. 22), where the property sought to be recovered is held in pledge as security for the payment of money, a judgment in the alternative that the plaintiff pay the amount for which the property is held, with proper damages, within a given time, or make return of the property, is authorized.</p> <p>3. Damages—In Replevin—Bonds Held in Pledge as Collateral Security.—In actions of replevin for the possession of bonds, the plaintiff is entitled to recover any depreciation in the value of the bonds between the time he became entitled to their possession and the time he actually receives them.</p> <p>4. Same—For a Wrongful Talcing Under the Writ.—A defendant who succeeds in a replevin suit is entitled to recover any special damage he may have sustained by reason of the wrongful taking of the property from him by virtue of the writ of replevin.</p>

■ Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Ohytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

Mandamus.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

Trust Deed Foreclosure.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Statement by the Court.—The material facts in this case are as follows: One Morrison borrowed from or through Theodore H. Schintz, §18,000, evidenced by two notes, one of $15,000 and the other of $3,000, secured by separate trust deeds upon the same property.

<p>1. Garnishment—0/ Money in the Hands of a Receiver, When Subject to Garnishment.-—As a general rule, money in the hands of a receiver can not be reached by garnishee process, it being regarded as in the custody of the court. Ordinarily it is contempt of the authority and process of the court to interfere with the possession of the property in the hands of a receiver, but it seems to be in line with the better and more recent authorities to hold that after final order or decree of distribution, or where nothing remains to be done except to pay the money, such money is subject to garnishment in the hands of a receiver.</p>

<p>Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligence, etc. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Rehearing denied.</p>

<p>Foreclosure of a Trust Deed.—Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1900. Order reversing and remanding, entered February 8, 1901.</p>

<p>Foreclosure.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain. Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900,</p>

<p>Contest of Claims, under the act of 1895. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Mr. Justice Horton dissenting.</p>

Bill of Interpleader,—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding. Held: or receive the new policy. Afterward the new policy was sent to him by the company with the request in writing that he return the “original certificate for cancellation.” The written portion of said last application, the written portion of the last policy, and said request to return the original certificate, were all written by the…

Assumpsit, on shares in a building and loan association. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.

<p>Assumpsit, for wages. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jesse Holdom, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.</p>

<p>Bill for Belief.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard W. Clifford, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.</p>

<p>Attachment.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Samuel C. Stough, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Rehearing denied.</p>

Bill to Restrain the Infringement of a Trade-mark.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Mr. Justice Horton dissenting. Statement by the Court.—This is a bill in equity filed by appellee, charging appellant with infringement of trademark and unfair competition in trade.

<p>Bill for an Injunction,—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This suit was brought by appellee to recover damages for personal injury sustained, as is charged, through negligence of appellant. Appellee, with his family, occupied a suite of rooms, or flat, in an apartment house in Chicago.

<p>1. Practice—Impaneling Juries.—The ruling of a trial court compelling an attorney to exercise the right of challenge, when only eleven jurors are in the box, or to pass conclusively on ten jurors, while only ten are in the box, is a denial of the party’s right.</p> <p>&AWSi~Numt>er °f Jurors to be in the Box.—Neither party can be to examine jurors, while impaneling a jury, touching then-qualifications, unless there are twelve jurors in the box.</p> <p>3. Evidence—Condition of a Sidewalk at the Time of an Injury.— In an action for injuries resulting from a defective sidewalk, it is competent to prove the condition of the sidewalk at the time the injury was received, and also how long it had been in that condition, or in the condition as alleged in the plaintiff’s declaration.</p> <p>4. Instructions—Singling Out One Fact in Evidence.— Singling out and giving undue prominence to a single fact, or to several facts, in an instruction, is calculated to mislead the jury, and is improper.</p> <p>5. Same—Giving Undue Prominence to a Single Fact.—An instruction giving undue prominence to a single fact, and omitting all mention of other facts proven, which should be considered by the jury in determining the questions at issue, is calculated to mislead the jury and is erroneous.</p> <p>6. Sidewalks—Rights of Persons Traveling upon.—A person traveling upon a sidewalk, without knowledge of existing defects, has a right to presume that it is reasonably safe for the purpose of travel.</p>

Trespass on the Case.—Death from negligent act. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Marcus Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—Appellants were stone-setting contractors and employed Thomas Rawle, appellee’s intestate, as an expert stone-setter.

Debt, on a replevin bond. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Haneoy, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This action, was brought upon a replevin bond. The Superior Pump & Windmill Co. bought certain goods from the Standard Brass Works. The former company transferred the goods to the firm composed of the Griswolds, the usees of appellee. The Standard Brass Works replevied the goods from the Griswolds.

Assumpsit, for services, etc. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Owen P. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of appellee and against appellant, rendered on appeal from a justice of the peace.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Jesse Holdout, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

<p>1. Contracts—No Recovery Under, When Illegal.—When a party can not establish his cause of action without relying upon an illegal contract, he can not recover.</p> <p>2. Same—Courts Will Not Lend Their Aid to Enforce Illegal Contracts—Defenses by Parties in Pari Delicto.—Courts will not lend their aid to a party who founds his cause of action upon an illegal or immoral act, but will allow defenses to be made by parties in.pari delicto, not because such parties are entitled to relief, but upon principles of public policy and to conserve the public welfare.</p> <p>3. Pürprestures—What Are, and When Liable to Abatement by the State.—A contract to build a wall through the watfers of Lake Michigan by driving piles into, and making a permanent structure upon lands under said waters, the title to which is in the State of Illinois in trust for the public, is an illegal contract, and the wall, when built, is a purpresture, and liable to abatement at the instance of the State.</p> <p>4. Consideration—Failure of, When a Part is Illegal.—Where a part of the consideration upon which a contract rests is illegal the entire consideration is illegal and the contract fails.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Court County; the Hon. JosephE. Gary, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—The order here appealed from was entered in a cause wherein appellee was appointed receiver of the Great Northern Theatre and Hotel Company, a corporation. Appellant was and had been for some time a tenant of the Great Northern Theatre and Hotel Company.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

Bill to Foreclose a Lien for Rent.—Appeal from the Superior Court; the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1900. Statement.—In this case a bill was filed by appellee to foreclose a lien for rent under a ninety-nine-year ground lease of the premises known as 188 Monroe street, Chicago. Said lease is dated November 24, 1888, and is by Calvin DeWolf, lessor, to William E. Slosson, lessee.

<p>1. Railroads—Legality of Ordinances Prohibiting Passengers from having Trains While in Motion.—It is not an unreasonable burden upon passengers to require them, to abstain from leaving a train while it is in motion.</p> <p>2. Police Power—Prohibiting Persons from Getting on or off of Trains While in Motion.—An ordinance prohibiting persons from getting on or off of trains while in motion, without the permission of the persons in charge of such trains, and providing a penalty for its violation, is a proper exercise of the police power.</p> <p>3. Arrest—When Without Warrant.— An officer has power to arrest a person without a warrant, for an offense committed in his presence.</p> <p>4. Judicial Notice— Courts Will Take, of Navigable Streams.—The Appellate Court will take judicial notice that the north branch of the Chicago river, across which extends the bridge at or near Kinzie. street, is a navigable stream.</p>

<p>Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.</p>

Creditor’s Bill.—Appeal from an order extending the powers of a receiver entered by the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Statement of the Case.—A receiver was appointed under a creditor’s bill containing apt allegations of the recovery of a judgment at law (on March 4, 1897,) against the appellee JohnL. Lindskoog, and the return of execution unsatisfied.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles A. Bishop, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This is a suit for personal injuries.

Statement.—This is a suit to recover damages for injuries resulting in the death of one John Lennan, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellant in permitting Fifty-first street, near its intersection with the tracks of the P., Ft. W. & O. Ey. Co., to be and remain out of repair, and in an unsafe and dangerous condition. Appellee’s intestate was sitting in his wagon driving the team thereto attached.

<p>Prohibition.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Rehearing denied.</p>

<p>i. Practice—Effect of a Remanding Order.—Under an order of the Appellate Court reversing a judgment and remanding a cause to the Circuit Court “for such other proceedings as to law and justice shall appertain,” the case is open for a new trial and all necessary and proper incidents thereto, and the parties are not, nor is the court, confined to any particular course to be observed on such new trial, but are left free in matters of pleading and evidence, to adopt such a course as the law authorizes and as counsel may advise.</p> <p>2. Same—Opinions of the Appellate Court Binding upon Trial Courts.—Where a judgment is reversed by the Appellate Court, and the cause is remanded for a new trial, the opinion of the Appellate Court establishes the law of the case as applied to the same pleadings and evidence that were in the case at the former trial, and may be referred to by the judge presiding, for the purpose of ascertaining what the law was held to be.</p>

<p>1. Stockholders—Liability of Assingees of Shares of Stock.—An assignee of shares of stock in an incorporated company, in the event of its insolvency, is liable to contribute to the payment of its debts in like manner as if he were an original subscriber, and his re-assignment or disposal of his stock does not relieve him of such liability.</p> <p>2. Interest—Ora Decrees for the Payment of Money.—Where a decree is entered for the payment of a sum of money on a day named, the parties primarily liable for its payment are also liable for legal interest upon it from the day named for its payment. (Rogan v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 93 Ill. App. 39.)</p>

<p>1. Contracts—Substantial Performance, When Sufficient.—Where there has been no willful departure or omission in the essential points of a contract, and the work has been honestly and faithfully done in all material and substantial respects, no forfeiture will result by reason of technical, inadvertent, or unimportant omissions, and the contract price may be recovered, less such damages as will indemnify the owner for the expenses of making the work conform to the contract.</p> <p>2. Evidence—Not to be Made in Favor of a Party by His Writing Letter 's.—A party to a suit can not make evidence in his own favor by writing letters, although such letters are admissible as evidence against him.</p>

Mechanics’ Liens.—Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900. Rehearing denied. Statement.—Appellant, by his answer in the nature of an intervening petition, became a party to a proceeding originally begun by the Western Planing and Manufacturing Company to establish a mechanic’s lien.

Petition, to recover for personal injuries by an employe of a receiver. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County: the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1900.

<p>Appeal from an interlocutory order appointing a receiver by the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Appellate Court Practice—Review of Motion to Vacate a Judgment.—A motion, to vacate a judgment is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and ordinarily the Appellate Court will not review its exercise, but will only do so in furtherance of justice when that discretion has been wrongfully and oppressively exercised.</p>

<p>Interlocutory Order Appointing a Receiver.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March tena, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Receiver—Right to,in a Proceeding to Foreclose a Lien for Rent.— The appointment, in a proceeding to foreclose a lien for rent created by the term of a lease, of a receiver to take possession of the leasehold premises to collect and receive the rents and profits of the same pending the suit, must be determined from the lease itself.</p> <p>2. Same—The Right Under the Lease in This Case.—The right to the appointment of a receiver to take possession of leased premises and collect the rents and profits of the same, is, in this case, sustained.</p>

Foreclosure of a Trust Deed.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

<p>1. Quo Warranto—Officers of Private Corporations.—Quo war-ran to is the proper remedy to determine whether an election of the directors of a private corporation has been legally held, and whether certain persons claiming to be such directors are lawfully elected.</p> <p>2. Same—Equity Jurisdiction.—A proceeding by quo warranto is the proper remedy to try title to such offices and to oust intruders therefrom, and when the question of title is the sole subject of controversy a court of equity is without jurisdiction; but where there are other elements in the case which make it proper for a court of equity to intervene, the mere fact that the questions presented make it necessary, for the purpose of such intervention, to determine which of two sets of officers are the lawful officers of a private corporation, will not deter a court of equity from acting.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Ciiytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the. March term, 1900. Rehearing denied. Statement.—This suit was brought by appellee, who was an employe of appellants, to recover for personal injuries sustained during the employment, and, as it is claimed, through the negligence of appellants.

Trover, for the conversion of collateral securities. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Marcus Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This appeal is from a judgment which has been rendered in a long and stoutly contested litigation.

Bill for Belief.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; ther Hon. Edmund W. Burke, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This suit was begun by appellee, who filed his bill in chancery against appellants to obtain relief in relation to dealings covering a considerable period of time, and in the course of which appellee became a borrower of money from the appellant bank and a stockholder in the Midland Company, also appellant.

Bill of Review.—Error to the Superior Court of Cook County: the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—The decree reviewed upon this writ of error was entered in a suit brought upon a bill of review or bill in the nature of a bill of review.

<p>Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Error to the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

Assumpsit.—Common counts. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. JessbHoldom, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

Assumpsit, on a certificate in a beneficiary association. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles A. Bishop, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 19C0.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Marcus Kavanaugh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.

<p>Assumpsit, on three promissory notes. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.</p>

Assumpsit, for goods sold, etc. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This is an action of assumpsit, brought by appellee against appellant on an account for cement sold and delivered.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Murray F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900. Statement.—This suit was brought by appellee to recover damages for personal injuries caused, as is charged, by negligence of appellant. Appellee was riding in a buggy with one Hull, who was driving.

<p>Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Leslie D. Puterbaugh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the - October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Leslie D. Puterbaugh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>illanilamus.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Leslie D. Putekbaugh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Action Under the Dram-Shop Act.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. John C. Garver, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Contracts—Not to be Construed as Mortgages Unless, etc.—An agreement is not to be considered as a mortgage unless it is made to appear clearly and satisfactorily that it was so intended at the time of its execution.</p> <p>2. Same—Construction—Burden of Proof.—When there is nothing in a contract to show that it was intended to be a mortgage, the burden of showing that it was so intended is upon the party claiming it.</p> <p>3. Chancery Practice—Effect of the Finding of the Master upon Conflicting Evidence.—Where there is a conflict of evidence upon the questions involved in a proceeding in chancery, the finding of the master, who sees the witnesses and hears their testimony, is entitled to the same effect as the verdict of a jury in the trial of an issue at law.</p> <p>4. Same —Requisites of a Decree Allowing Redemption from a Mortgage.—The ordinary decree allowing a bill to redeem from a mortgage is, that a proper conveyance be made to the party asking it, upon the payment by him of the amount found due, and that if such payment is not made within a time to be fixed by the court, such party is to be barred from thereafter asserting a claim for any further relief in the subject-matter of the controversy.</p>

<p>1. Practice—Insufficient Affidavit of Merits.—An affidavit of merits to be used on a motion to set aside a judgment by default which states simply conclusions of law to be drawn from the facts, and not a statement of facts, is not sufficient.</p> <p>2. Appellate Court Practice— Where the Question of Excessive Damages Can Not he Raised.—Where a party in making a motion to have a judgment by default set aside, does not allege as one of the reasons for such action that the damages allowed are excessive, it is doubtful if he can take advantage of such fact on appeal.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County; the Hon. John H. Moffett, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Appeals—Ira Election Contests.—Appeals in election contests lie to the Supreme Court and not to the Appellate.</p>

Assumpsit, for goods sold, etc. Appeal from the County Court of Peoria County; the Hon. R. H. Lovett, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

Trespass on the Case, for injury to crops by the overflow of ditches. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County; the Hon. George W. Patton, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

Assumpsit, for goods sold, etc. Appeal from the County Court of De Kalb County; the Hon. W. L. Pond, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

<p>Replevin.—Error to the Circuit Court of Whiteside County; the Hon. Frank D. Ramsay, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Error to the Circuit Court of Rock Island County; the Hon. Frank D. Ramsay, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

Proceedings for Contempt, for a failure to pay alimony. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County; the Hon. William H. Gest, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County; the Hon. William H. Gest, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Carroll County; the Hon. James Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

<p>Assumpsit.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Leslie D. Puterbauuh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Replevin.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. John Small, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Action for Diverting a Watercourse,—Appeal from the Circuit Court of DeKalb County; the Hon. George W. Brown, Judge, presiding. Heard in this coui't at the October term, 1900.</p>

Assumpsit, for teacher’s wages. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County; the Hon. William H. G-est, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

<p>1. Corporations— When No Part of the Capital Stock to Which Creditors Can Resort in Equity Remains Unpaid.—Where a corporation issued no certificates of stock until the stock was fully paid for, and certain subscribers paid nothing on their subscriptions, or only a small portion thereof, and afterward assigned their stock to the corporation, or surrendered their stock to the company, and it was declared and treated by. the company as forfeited to it, and afterward the company took new subscriptions for all this surrendered, assigned and forfeited stock, and such new subscriptions were paid in full, so that the corporation received full payment for the entire amount of its capital stock, there remains no fund of capital stock unpaid to which a creditor can resort in equity.</p> <p>3. Same—Attempts to Reach Unpaid Stock Not Affected by the Payment of Dividends on New Stock.—In such case the attempt of the creditor to reach supposed unpaid capital stock is not affected by the fact that the company undertook to prefer the payment of dividends upon the new stock.</p> <p>3. Same—Where a Decree Does Not Establish a Diability.—In such a case where a judgment creditor had previously filed a bill against the corporation, and some, but not all of the stockholders sought to be affected by this bill, and had obtained a decree in its favor, that decree does not establish the liability of the defendants, and dispose of the defense that no fund of unpaid capital stock remains, where the bill is not in evidence, and the decree shows there were answers which were also not in evidence.</p>

Debt, for a violation of the medical practice act. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Leslie D. Puterbaugh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

<p>Assumpsit.—Common counts. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lee County; the Hon. James Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for services. Appeal from the County Court of Ogle County; the Hon. R. S. Farrand, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Instructions—When Applicable to Certain Items of Proof and Not to Others.— It is not error to give an instruction correctly stating the law applicable to certain items of proof, though it may be inapplicable to other items.</p>

<p>1. Instructions—Not to Assume the Existence of Matters Denied.— In an action for assault and battery in .which the assault and battery are denied it is error to assume in an instruction that there was an assault and that compensatory damages are to be awarded.</p> <p>2. Same—When it is Error to Specify Elements of Damages Not in, Proof.—In an instruction as to the damages which may be awarded in an action for assault and battery it is error to specify elements of damage of which there is no proof.</p>

<p>1. Husband and Wife— What Will Not Establish a Gift of Money to the Wife.—Where -a husband handed his wife a sum of money he had just brought from the bank, and either said nothing or asked her to take care of it, and she took it to their common bedroom, containing his pocketbook and hers, and put it in her own pocketbook without his knowledge, and he was in the habit of handing her his money to take care of, this does not establish a gift of the money to her.</p> <p>2. Same—What Will Establish a Gift of a Piano to the Wife.—Where a husband bought a piano and brought it home, and told various persons he had bought it for his wife, and had given it to his wife, and that it was his wife’s piano, this is sufficient to support his wife’s claim to the piano as a gift, after her husband’s death.</p>

<p>1. Appeals—From the County Court in Claims Against Estates— County Judge to Approve Security.—In all cases of appeals from the allowance or reduction by the County Court of claims against estates, the security upon the appeal bond must be approved by the county judge, and he can not delegate that power to the clerk.</p> <p>2. Practice—On Motions to Dismiss an Appeal—Limited Appearance of Appellee—Cross-Motion, etc.—Exceptions to be Preserved.— Where, in the Circuit Court, upon an appeal from the County Court, appellee enters a limited appearance, and moves to dismiss the appeal for want of a proper approval of the appeal bond, and appellant enters cross-motions that the Circuit Court approve the appeal bond and for leave to file a new appeal bond, and the cross-motions are denied and the appeal dismissed, and error is assigned in the Appellate Court on the denial of said cross-motions, and there is no bill of exceptions preserving exceptions to the denial of said motions nor preserving the showing upon which the court acted, no error is made to appear.</p> <p>3. Presumptions—As to the Action of the Court Below.—The action of the Circuit Court is presumed to be correct and authorized by the showing made until the contrary appears.</p>

<p>Bill for Separate Maintenance.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County; the Hon. Charles H. Donnelly. Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

Action Under tlie Fence Law, to recover the cost of building a division fence. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County; the Hon. Frank D. Ramsay, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

<p>1. Waiver—Of Errors Assigned But Not Argued.—Errors assigned upon rulings relating to evidence and instructions are waived if not argued.</p> <p>2. Verdicts—When Not to be Disturbed by the Appellate Court.— Where the court of review can not say the jury ought to have rendered a different verdict, the conclusion of the jury upon the facts, approved by the trial judge, will not be disturbed.</p>

<p>Bill to Construe a Will.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. John Small, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Assumpsit.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

Indictment for Keeping a Nuisance, as defined in section 7 of the dram-shop act. Error to the County Court of Mercer County; the Hon. W. T. Church, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1900.

<p>1. Foreign Corporations—What Is Not Doing Business in this State Within the Statute.—Where a foreign corporation manufactures goods in a foreign State, and sends drummers into this State who solicit and take orders in this State, and send them to the corporation in the foreign State, where they are passed upon and accepted or rejected, and if accepted the goods are shipped in the foreign State, consigned to the purchaser, this is not doing business in this State within the meaning of our statute regulating foreign corporations doing business in this State.</p> <p>2. Same—May Invoice the Aid of Our Courts to Enforce Legal Bights.—A foreign corporation which has not done business in this State in violation of our statute, may invoke the aid of our courts to enforce its legal rights.</p> <p>3. Statutes—When in Conflict with the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.—If our statute were intended to prohibit such taking of orders in this State by foreign corporations, until compliance with the regulations of our statute, it would be in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.</p> <p>4. Same—Province of the Appellate Court in Begard to the Constitutionality of.—While the constitutionality of a statute can not be determined by the Appellate Court, yet where two reasonable but inconsistent constructions of a statute are there contended for, one of which would be repugnant to the constitution and the other would not, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to adopt that interpretation of the statute which will harmonize with the constitution.</p>

<p>1. Real Estate Agent—When Entitled to His Commissions.— Where plaintiff, as agent, sold a farm for defendant, and notes and a trust deed securing them were taken for part of the purchase money, and defendant agreed in writing to pay plaintiff a certain sum as his commission for making the sale, “ to be paid out of the purchase money as it is paid to me on the various payments, in proportionate amounts,” and part of the purchase money was paid, and part of the land released, and afterward the trust deed was foreclosed and defendant bought in the rest of the land in full satisfaction of the purchase money, held:</p> <p>1st. That plaintiff thereby became entitled to all his commission, the same as if the purchase money had been collected in any other manner.</p> <p>2d. That after releasing part of the land, defendant can not avail of the failure of some stranger to bid enough for the rest to pay the entire debt, to defeat the commission.</p>

<p>1. Administration or Estates—Allowance of Claims, When Conclusive.—As to the personal estate, the allowance of a claim against an estate, not appealed from, is conclusive, both upon the executors and also upon the heirs and legatees, unless procured by fraud and collusion between the claimant and the executors.</p> <p>2. Same—A Claimant Is Not Bound to Offer Evidence for the Defense. —A claimant against an estate is not bound to offer evidence for the defense.</p> <p>3. Same—Error of Executors in Not Producing Evidence Against a Claim Does Not Vitiate Its Allowance.—If the executors erred in judgment in not producing evidence against a claim, that fact alone does not vitiate the allowance of a claim, or show its allowance was procured by fraud or collusion.</p> <p>4. Same—Frond on the Part of Executors in Not Resisting a Claim Not Participated in by the Claimant'.—Fraud on the part of the executors alone in not sufficiently resisting a claim against an estate, not participated in by the claimant, will not authorize the court afterward to set aside the allowance.</p> <p>5. Evidence—Entries of a Deceased Person in His Private Expense Booh, Not Evidence Against a Claimant.—-Entries by the deceased in a private expense book, showing moneys expended for claimant when he lived in the family of deceased, as a member thereof, while a minor, are not made evidence against claimant upon a claim for services rendered deceased at his request, long after that relation had terminated, merely because of the fact that the executors permitted claimant to copy from later pages of said expense book, items of money deceased expended for claimant during the performance of said later services. 1</p> <p>6. Same—Entries by a Deceased Person of Credits in a Private Ledger, When Not Evidence Against a Claimant.—Entries by deceased in a private ledger wherein he credited claimant with certain small sums for part of the services included in the claim filed, and with which entries claimant is in no way connected, are self-serving entries and not admissible in evidence in favor of the estate against claimant.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Leslie D. Puterbaugh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.

<p>Mechanics’ Lien.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County; the Hon. George W. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Action to Recover the Value of a Horse, etc.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Verdicts—On Conflicting Evidence.—Where the evidence as to the liability of defendant to plaintiff is conflicting, a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff will not be disturbed.</p> <p>2. Instructions—Refusal Where Embodied in Others Given.—It is not error to refuse an instruction which is embodied in another given instruction.</p>

<p>1. Appellate Court Practice—Where the Rulings of the Trial Court Are Rot Presented for Review.—Where, in a case tried without a jury, the appealing defendant did not except to any of the rulings of the court complained of, nor to the finding of the court, such rulings are not presented for consideration.</p> <p>2. Same—When an Exception to the Judgment Can Not Avail.—An exception to the judgment can not avail defendant if the testimony held competent was sufficient to support the judgment.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on checks, etc. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane .County; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Equitable Interests—Judgment Creditors Endeavoring to Beach, Subject to Prior Assignment.—Where a judgment creditor resorts to equity to reach a supposed equitable interest of the judgment debtor in the proceeds of the sale of real estate, and he seeks to reach an interest which the record did not disclose, he must be subject to prior assignments of such interest, though not disclosed by the record.</p> <p>2. Chancery Jurisdiction—Where Parties Intervene.—here, in a chancery cause, after the sale of the subject-matter of the suit, parties intervene and litigate the right to the fund, the-court in passing upon their claims may consider the present state of the suit.</p>

<p>1, Judgments—When a Court of Equity Will Not Enjoin.—A court of equity will not enjoin a judgment at law at the suit of a judgment debtor or his creditor, in the absence Of fraud or injustice in a judgment, even though the judgment debtor is insolvent.</p>

<p>1. Chattel Mortgages—Executed in Another State—When to be Enforced Here.—A'chattel mortgage executed in the State of New York, upon property in that State which is afterward removed to this State without the consent of the mortgagee, is valid in this State as long as it remains valid in the State where it was executed, and as such is enforceable here as against judgment creditors of the mortgagor.</p> <p>2. Same— Consent for the Removal of the Mortgaged Property to One State Does Not Jiistify its Removal to Another.—The consent of the mortgagee that the mortgaged property may be removed from the State of New York to the State of Wisconsin does not justify its removal to the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, for rents. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Commercial Paper—Bom Fide Taker Without Notice Before Maturity.—A party who takes commercial paper before maturity, for a valuable consideration, without knowledge of any defects of title, and in good faith, holds it by a title valid against the world. Suspicion of a defect of title, or the knowledge of circumstances which would excite such suspicion in the mind of a prudent man, or gross negligence on the part of the taker, at the time of the transfer, will not defeat his title. Such a result can only be produced by bad faith on the part of the taker.</p> <p>2. Same—Burden of Proof of Bad Faith on the Part of the Taker.— The burden of proving bad faith on the part of the taker of commercial paper rests upon the party asserting it.</p> <p>3. Same—When the Holder is Not to be Charged with Notice.— Where a promissory note is in proper form and without any suspicious appearance, the purchaser is not to be charged with notice of latent defects or unauthorized writing in it by reason of the condition of the figures in the margin at the top of the note. Such figures can not be used, however, to contradict what is clearly written in the body of the note.</p>

<p>Foreclosure of a Trust Deed. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County; the Hon. Charles Donnelly, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Appellate Court Practice—The Question of Usury Can Not be Raised for the First Time in the Appellate Court.—Where usury is not set up as a defense in the trial court, the question can not be raised in the Appellate Court.</p> <p>2. Building and Loan Associations—Credits to Which Defaulting Members Are Entitled.—Where, in an action by a building and loan association against a member for an amount borrowed by him from the association, for which amount the association holds his shares as collateral security, and such member, having defaulted in the payment of both premium and interest on his loan, seeks the value of his stock on account of his indebtedness, he will be entitled to credit only for the amount paid in by him on account of his stock and not to the value of such stock at the time of the trial.</p> <p>3. Same— When a Member Can Not Share in the Earnings of the Association.—A member of a building and loan association who is a defaulter and who fails to comply with the by-laws of the association or his contract, in the payment of interest and installments of principal, can not share in the earnings of the association with the members who do comply with the obligations of their contracts with the association.</p>

<p>1. Chattel Mortgages—Sufficient Description of Mortgaged Property.—A description of property in a chattel mortgage as “ twenty-three yearling steers, red, roan and black,” is sufficient to notify purchasers that the mortgagee claimed an interest in the steers owned by the mortgagor, and parol proof was admissible to identify them as the steers in question.</p> <p>3. Variance—In Pleadings and Proof—Description of Property.— A declaration in replevin described the property replevied as “ twenty-three yearling steers, of red, roan and black, mixed colors, all coming two years old in the spring of 1900,” while the chattel mortgage under which the plaintiff claimed described the property as “ twenty-three yearling steers, red, roan and black. Held, that there was no material variance.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on drainage orders. Appeal from the Circuit Court of 'Whiteside County; the Hon. Frank D. Ramsay, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Divorce.—Error to the Circuit Court of Knox County; the Hon. George W. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the April term, 1900.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, upon promissory notes. Error to the Circuit Court of • Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.</p>

<p>Application to Open a Judgment by Confession.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County; the Hon. Ferdinand Bookwalter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Gambling—Burden of Proof, When Pleaded, as a Defense.—When the statute against gambling is relied upon as a defense to an action for money paid out, advanced, etc., the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that the transactions in question were of a gambling nature.</p>

<p>1. Verdicts—On Conflicting Evidence.—Where the evidence is conflicting the verdict settles the controversy.</p>

<p>Mandamus.—Appeal from the Circuit Court of Edgar County; the Hon. Henry Van Seller, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1900.</p>

<p>Creditor’s Bill.—Error to the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Owen P. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1900.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Owen P. Thompson, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1900.

<p>1. Sales— What is a Sufficient Change of Ownership.—When the property sold is in the hands of a third person and such person is notified of a change of ownership and undertakes to keep the property for the new owner, it is a sufficient change of possession to vest the title in the new owner as against other creditors or purchasers.</p> <p>3. Replevin—Who is Entitled to Maintain the Action.—A person who owns, and is entitled to the possession of personal property, is entitled to maintain the action against whomsoever he finds in the possession of it, or who assumes control of it by a refusal to surrender it on demand. The action of replevin is ex delicto,and all persons participating in the tort are liable, jointly or severally.</p>

<p>Action for Damages to Personal Property.—Error to the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1900.</p>

Trespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County; the Hoh. Ferdinand Bookwalter, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1900.

<p>Debt, on an official bond. Error to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County; the Hon. Samuel L. Dwight, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1900.</p>

<p>Administration of Estates.—Exceptions to a guardian’s report. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pike County; the Hon. Harry HigBEE, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1900.</p>

<p>1. Consideration—A Promise for a Promise.—It is a familiar principle of law that one promise is a sufficient consideration for another promise.</p> <p>2. Res Adjudicata—Decisions of the Appellate Court.—Under the provisions of the Appellate Court act the opinions of this court in cases submitted to it for its determination and decided by it are of binding authority in such cases, not only upon the court, but upon the parties to the action and this court is without power to reconsider the reasons for its decision.</p>