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93 Nev. 8

Bolden v. Sheriff

Nevada Supreme Court

Decided January 19, 1977

Nevada Supreme Court · decided 1977-01-19

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance sold was in fact contraband must be offered at trial”

quoted by 1 later decision, including FIGUEROA-BELTRAN VS. U.S. OF AMERICA (NRAP 5)

Applies NV 171 § 171.206

Relies on Glosen v. Sheriff of Washoe County · DuFrane v. Sheriff, Washoe County · Zampanti v. Sheriff of Clark County

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1977-01-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently July 2020

6 state decisions

20197719801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*9OPINION

Per Curiam:

¶2Brenda Faye Bolden was charged with, and, at the conclusion of a preliminary examination, ordered to stand trial for, selling a controlled substance in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453.-321 and 453.171. She then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which her central contention was that there was insufficient evidence produced at the preliminary examination to establish probable cause that she committed the charged offense. The district judge considered and rejected the petition and Bolden has appealed, reasserting the same contention.

¶3The record establishes that a Las Vegas police officer arrived at Bolden’s apartment and told her he wanted to buy some “coke.” Bolden produced a white powdery substance, and stated to the police officer that it was good “coke” and the price was $25. The officer paid for the substance and departed. He subsequently testified that the “coke” appeared to him to be cocaine. Bolden asserts that, in the absence of an expert’s testimony establishing that the substance was cocaine, the charge cannot stand. We disagree.

¶4Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance sold was in fact contraband must be offered at trial; and, generally, such proof is supplied through an expert witness who has tested the substance. However, for the purpose of meeting the standard of probable cause required to bind an accused over for trial, it is sufficient if the accused either directly, or by necessary implication, represents that the substance is, in fact, contraband. See: Glosen v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 145, 148, 451 P.2d 841, 842 (1969), and its progeny.

¶5Here, Bolden’s representation that the substance was good *10“coke” clearly meets the probable cause test delineated in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.206; therefore, we need not, and do not, reach her subordinate claim, i.e., that it was error to refuse her request to call the state’s chemist as a witness. DuFrane v. Sheriff, 88 Nev. 52, 495 P.2d 611 (1972); Waid v. Sheriff, 88 Nev. 664, 504 P.2d 9 (1972); Zampanti v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 651, 473 P.2d 386 (1970).

¶6Affirmed.

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