Page v. State

¶1OPINION

¶2Appellant was convicted of burglary, a felony. NRS 205.060. Following closing arguments, in addition to giving the jury the statutory instruction on reasonable doubt, the trial judge gave an instruction in contrast to a statute precluding any other definition of reasonable doubt than that contained in the statute.1 On appeal Appellant asserts this constitutes reversible error. Here, we find the claim to be without substance.

¶3*387In the instant case, the additional jury instruction read:

It is not necessary that the defendant’s guilt should be established beyond any doubt or to an absolute certainty, but instead thereof that the defendant’s guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt as hereinafter defined.

¶4In Tucker v. State, 92 Nev. 486, 553 P.2d 951 (1976), this Court stated:

[w]hile we disapprove this practice, because we believe the reasonable doubt statute speaks for itself, this court has previously permitted such additional instructions that merely clarify the statutory instruction. . . . Here, we do not believe this district court’s attempted clarification could have misled the jury concerning its duties in this case.

¶5Id. at 490, 553 P.2d at 953-54. In accord, Jackson v. State, 93 Nev. 28, 572 P.2d 927 (1977).

¶6As in Tuckerand Jackson, supra, we reiterate our disapproval of the lower courts’ giving of the additional instruction. However, in doing so, it did not commit prejudicial error. ' The judgment is affirmed.