Volume 95 — Connecticut Reports

<p>Appeal by the plaintiff, in condemnation proceedings, from a judgment of the Superior Court in Fair-field County, Webb, J., rendered upon the acceptance of a committee’s report, awarding $10,390 to the defendant for the taking of its land for a public park.</p>

Action to recover the amount of a penal bond alleged to have been forfeited, deposited with the State treasurer by a private banker for the protection of his customers, who afterward suffered loss through his bankruptcy, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $10,583, and appeal by the defendant Surety Company.

<p>Appeal by the plaintiff from an order of the Public Utilities Commission confirming a like order of the selectmen of the town of Stamford directing the plaintiff street-railway company to change the location of its tracks in Hope Street in said town, from the side to.the middle of the highway, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Webb, Jfacts found and judgment rendered affirming the order of the Public Utilities Commission-, from which the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The Connecticut Company operates an electric street-railway upon the westerly side of a portion of Hope Street, in Stamford, for a distance .of 5,500 feet thereon, with the necessary 'tracks, poles, wires and other permanent structures. This side location was established at the time the railway was built, presumably by agreement between the railway and the town.</p> <p>On February 17th, 1919, the town of Stamford, acting by its selectmen, served upon the Connecticut Company an order requiring it to relocate its track from a side-line location upon Hope Street, by placing its track in the middle of the street. From this order the Company duly appealed to the Public Utilities Commission, and after hearing had the Commission confirmed the order of the selectmen and dismissed the appeal of the Company. From this order the Company appealed to the Superior» Court, and the court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the Commission.</p> <p>Hope Street forms a portion of one of the main highways between Stamford and New Canaan. The surface of the highway is out of repair, and the town purposes repairing the same'by widening and grading the highway and laying a permanent pavement thereon. For the purpose of carrying out this improvement the order of the selectmen was made.</p> <p>Aside from the proposed permanent pavement of Hope Street, the shifting of the tracks to a middle location, this conforming to the existing middle location throughout the remainder of the entire line upon Hope Street, will be distinctly proper and highly conducive to the safety of all concerned, whether as passengers upon the street cars or as users of the highway.</p> <p>The cost of relocating the track as required by the order will be $28,113.</p> <p>The town of Stamford intends immediately to construct this pavement, and will seek to require the Company in accordance with General Statutes, § 3831, to pave the portion of its tracks which may be relocated. The cost of this pavement between the tracks and two feet each side will be $76,000.</p> <p>The Connecticut Company operated its system for the year ending October 31st, 1919, at a loss of $10,939.61. Since the promulgation of this order the traffic rates of the Company have been increased and will produce an estimated increase of operative revenue of at least $1,500,000. It is under obligation to expend $1,500,000 for paving, which municipal authorities may momentarily enforce.</p> <p>It owes the State more than $1,190,000 in unpaid taxes.</p> <p>The physical valuation of this line from Glenbrook Corners tb Springdale is $45,000.</p> <p>There was a deficit on this line for this fiscal year of $32.43, allowing a return of five per cent on the investment value of the line of $45,000.</p>

Infoemation for stealing a handbag and its contents of the value of $25, brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried to the jury before Waller, verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused. The appeal assigns error in the admission of certain testimony, in portions of the charge to the jury, and in the court’s denial of a motion to -set aside the verdict as against the evidence, which is made a part of the record.

Appeal by the respondents from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the second district in favor of the claimants, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Reed, J., which vacated and set aside the award of the Commissioner, and from this judgment the claimants appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $2,000, which the trial court, upon motion of the defendant, set aside as against the evidence, and from this decision the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; pursuant to the direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and from the refusal of the court to set aside such verdict the plaintiff appealed.

Appeals from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Hartford fixing the amount of the inheritance and succession tax due the State upon two items of property passing to two legatees under the will of Ira Dimock of West Hartford, deceased, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Burpee, J., upon the demurrer filed in each case by the Tax Commissioner to the pleadings of the respective legatees, for the advice of this court.

Action for a divorce upon the alleged ground of intolerable cruelty, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and referred to a committee who heard the evidence and reported the facts; to the acceptance of the committee's report the defendant filed a remonstrance, and later an amended remonstrance, each of which was overruled (Haines and Keeler, Js.) and judgment was afterward rendered {Keeler, J.) for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed.

Suit to determine the title to real estate, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County where a demurrer to the cross-complaint was sustained (Smith, J.), and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Markham, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. Plaintiff asks for a judgment quieting his title to the described premises, and declaring that the defendant has no claim to or interest in the same.

Action of summary process, brought to the City Court of Hartford and erased from the docket (Bullard, J.) upon motion of the defendant, from which ruling the plaintiffs appealed. Writ of error to reverse a judgment of the City Court of Hartford (Bullard, J.) dismissing and erasing from the docket an action of summary process pending therein. No error.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Keeler, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of murder in the second degree, and appeal by the accused.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant of the defendant in the operation of his automobile, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Burpee, Jverdict for the plaintiff for $5,000, which the court, upon motion of the defendant, set aside as against the evidence, and from this decision the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff through an alleged conspiracy of the defendants to cheat and defraud him, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Reed, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000, and appeal by two of the three defendants.

Application by the plaintiff to the Hon. Donald T. Warner, a judge of the Superior Court, for permission to continue to construct, raise and operate its dam for power purposes across the Housatonic River, and for an order for the abandonment of five sections of highway lying in the town of Southbury and in the town of Oxford, or partly in each, which would be flooded with water when the plaintiff’s dam was completed; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and…

Action to recover a commission, alleged to have been agreed upon, of ten per cent of the net profits received by the defendant, a building contractor, for the erection of certain factory buildings upon which the plaintiff was employed as general manager and superintendent, and for an accounting to determine the amount of such profits, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Webb, Jfacts found and an interlocutory judgment rendered for an accounting,…

Suit to foreclose a mortgage of real estate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs. On February 12th, 1904, Cossitt and Comstock, both residing in Canada, owned jointly Roton Hill Farm in Norwalk, Connecticut, and at their request the defendant Shaw, a lawyer in Canada, drew a trust agreement which they executed.

Action to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff's intestate, alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Warner, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $10,000, which the trial court refused to set aside as against the evL dence, and from this decision and from the judgment rendered on the verdict the defendant appealed.

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Morton F. Plant of Groton, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New London County, Kellogg, J., upon the facts stated in the pleadings, for the advice of this court. Morton F. Plant, a resident of Groton, died November 4th, 1918, leaving an estate estimated at upward of $30,000,000 and a will, dated October 16th, 1918, and duly probated.

Infobmation for a felonious assault with intent to maim and disfigure, with a count for an aggravated assault, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and tried to the jury before Hinman, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused. The first count charged the accused with having assaulted one Clark with a razor, with intent “to maim or disfigure” him.

<p>Action to recover damages sustained by several of the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust through the alleged negligence and omission of the defendant to pursue the sureties upon the bond of its predecessor, a defaulting trustee, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Middlesex County, Málibie, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>This case is a companion case to that of State ex rel. McClure v. Northrop, 93 Conn. 558, 106 Atl. 504. The facts essential upon this appeal are as follows:— Charles Brewer died in 1860, and by his will created a trust fund to be held in trust during the lives of his five sons and of their widows for their use, and at the death of the last life tenant to be distributed to the surviving issue of the sons.</p> <p>One Northrop succeeded to this trusteeship in 1884, and so continued until removed on July 24th, 1911; whereupon the defendant was appointed his successor. Prior to 1897 Northrop had misappropriated the entire trust fund, and at the time of his removal was not financially responsible. Northrop, upon his appointment in 1884, filed a probate bond, with Clarissa L. Northrop, Ettie M. Northrop and Arthur B. Calef as sureties. Clarissa L. Northrop deceased prior to 1911, and her estate was distributed to D. Ward Northrop and Ettie M. Northrop, principal and surety on this bond. Ettie M. Northrop is living and was the wife of D. Ward Northrop, and at the time of defendant’s appointment had equity in real estate of the value of over $1,300. Arthur B. Calef died in 1900, and his estate was distributed in 1901 to his four sons, only two of whom, J. Francis Calef and Arthur B. Calef, Jr., were financially responsible in July, 1911. J. Francis Calef had, at the date of the appointment of defendant, attachable property of the value of at least his distributive share, $3,300, in the estate of his father. Arthur B. Calef, Jr., died in 1912, leaving an estate inventoried at $8,178.50, but no return of claims was ever made. The distributive share of Arthur B. Calef, Jr., in the estate of his father was something over $3,300.</p> <p>The defendant duly made demand on Northrop prior to August 14th, 1911, for the trust fund, but he neglected and failed to turn over the fund. It thereupon referred the whole matter of this trust to Mr. Pearne, a competent attorney at law and its regular attorney, to handle in any way he saw fit. Pearne made some investigation of the matter. There were no funds in the estate to pay for a thorough investigation, or to pay the expenses of litigation against the sureties on the bond or their representatives. Pearne advised defendant that it was under no obligation to expend its own funds in making investigation or in pursuing the litigation. Thereupon defendant requested Mrs. Fox and Mrs. North, upon whose application the defendant had been appointed and who had pressed defendant to take action, to advance to the trustee $150 to $200 to cover the expenses of this investigation and litigation. They offered to pay $25, which defendant refused to accept and the matter was dropped. There were seven other beneficiaries of this trust fund, but defendant never made request of any of them for any sum with which to pay for such investigation and litigation.</p> <p>The defendant has made no inventory of the trust estate, nor rendered an account of its doings to the Court of Probate, nor made demand upon Ettie M. Northrop, nor presented any claim against the estate of Arthur B. Calef, nor made any demand upon his legal representative or his distributees, nor made any investigation of or communicated with the beneficiaries of the trust estate except Mrs. Fox and Mrs. North, nor done anything to preserve or possess the estate, except as above stated.</p> <p>At the time of his removal Northrop was making payment of arrears of income to one of the beneficiaries of the trust, Susan Brewer, who died February 26th, 1913, and who was the last survivor of the life beneficiaries under the trust.</p> <p>Between the date of the defendant’s appointment and February 26th, 1913, the husband of Jennie Blinn, daughter of Susan Brewer, acting for his wife, called on defendant and on one occasion informed defendant that Northrop was making said payments to Susan Brewer and that his wife did not desire action taken against him so long as he continued said payments or so long as Susan Brewer lived.</p> <p>Another beneficiary, William Brewer, informed Pearne shortly after defendant’s appointment, that he desired no action to be instituted to recover the trust estate.</p> <p>Said J. Francis Calef and Arthur B. Calef, executors of the estate of Arthur B. Calef, Sr., were alive on July 24th, 1911, but the defendant neglected to present a claim against said estate within six months after the claim of the trust estate accrued on August 14th, 1911, or at any other time. As a consequence of the failure to present said claim, the estate of Arthur B. Calef, Sr., and the distributees thereof, were discharged from liability as sureties on said bond.</p> <p>None of the plaintiffs, excepting William Brewer, who defaulted, acquiesced in defendant’s failure to present and prosecute such claim.</p> <p>The defendant, by due diligence, would have collected from Ettie M. Northrop and from the distributees of the estate of Arthur B. Calef, Sr., the sum, after deducting all reasonable charges and expenses, of $5,500; and the defendant could have settled the trust estate and distributed the fund on or before July 1st, 1913, which would have been a reasonable time from the date of death of the last surviving life tenant, for this purpose.</p>

<p>Appeal from a proforma award of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district in favor of the plaintiff, taken by the defendant to, and reserved by, the Superior Court in Hartford County, Haines, J., for the advice of this court.</p> <p>The defendant corporation operated a chain of stores, one of which was located on Albany Avenue in Hartford. Its organization consisted of a general superintendent and under him a superintendent, and under them assistant superintendents, and under them managers, each of whom had direct charge of a store.</p> <p>The manager of the Albany Avenue store on July 3d, 1918, was one Howard. Howard had employed the plaintiff’s intestate, Michael McDonald, a boy of eleven years of age, to assist in the store in sweeping, unpacking boxes, running errands and occasionally waiting upon customers. Michael received for his first week’s pay $1, together with certain fire wood. He was to receive $3 for the second week. His work was to continue through the summer until his school opened. He had been in defendant’s employ ten days when, on July 3d, 1918, Howard directed Michael to go across the street to get some drinking water for the general use of the employees of the store, and while he was so engaged he was struck by a passing automobile, and in consequence suffered injuries as a result of which he died.</p> <p>Rose McDonald, the claimant and plaintiff, is the mother of Michael. She lived with her husband, and at the time of Michael’s injury the family consisted of her husband, herself, and four children of whom Michael was the oldest. The father was in the employ of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company and earning a weekly wage of about $22. He is in good health and robust. Rose McDonald, the mother, is in feeble health, and is partially deaf. The money which Michael earned was turned over to his mother and by her put in the family fund. With it she purchased, among other things, a pair of overalls for Michael costing 98 cents. The mother intended to make similar use of the boy’s future earnings if he had continued in his employment.</p> <p>The Commissioner concluded that the injury to Michael arose out of and in the course of the employment; that his employment was not casual; that the duties he was engaged in performing when injured were for the business of the defendant; that the sources of support of the family were the father’s wages and Michael’s earnings, and that the claimant is a partial dependent of the deceased Michael.</p> <p>The Commissioner rendered judgment in favor of the claimant, subject to the reservation of the following questions as stated in paragraph 24: “(a) Is the father, who failed to serve notice of claim for compensation under § 5360, and did not appear as a party to the action, also a partial dependent under the facts here found? (b) If so, may an award of $2.50 per week each for the statutory period be made to the father and mother without further proceedings? (c) If question (b) must be answered in the negative, what supplementary proceedings are necessary and proper to carry out the terms of the Act?”</p> <p>The reasons of appeal are as follows: 1. The Compensation Commissioner erred as a matter of law in finding from the evidence that Rose McDonald, mother of Michael McDonald, deceased, was a dependent of the said Michael McDonald. 2. In overruling the claims of the respondent, that the claimant could not recover because of illegality of the contract of employment. 3. The Commissioner erred as a matter of law in finding that the respondent could not, as a matter of law, “claim immunity from the terms of the Workman’s Compensation Act on the ground that the employment out of which the injury arose was the result of the illegal acts of its agent.” 4. In finding that the said Michael McDonald, deceased, was an employee of the respondent. 5. In overruling the respondent’s claim that the employment of the said Michael McDonald, deceased, if there was any such employment, was casual and was otherwise than for the purposes of the respondent’s trade or business.”</p>

Action to recover the amount of an alleged judgment rendered by the Municipal Court of the City of New York, in favor of the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Wolfe, J.;'facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $567, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>A “particular description” of personal property mortgaged (General Statutes, § 5206) is essential to protect it from the claims of bona fide purchasers and attaching creditors; but a general description, such as “all machinery, tools and equipment located” on certain described premises and “used in connection with the laundry business conducted by the grantor,” is sufficient as between the parties.</p> <p>The rule as to the effect of the retention of possession by the vendor or mortgagor of personal property, never was applied, nor was it intended to apply, so as to affect the rights of the original parties as between themselves. All of our decisions upon this subject rest upon the assumption of a contract valid not only between the parties but as to all others except creditors and bona fide purchasers.</p> <p>A conditional sale of chattels which had theretofore been mortgaged to the plaintiff, was made by the mortgagor, the vendee taking possession of the property and agreeing to assume and pay.off the mortgage debt to the mortgagee in instalments, as part of the purchase price. Held that upon a foreclosure of its mortgage by the plaintiff, the conditional vendee was estopped by its undertaking from asserting that it was a bona fide purchaser with full right to challenge the validity of the mortgage because of the indefiniteness or uncertainty in the description of the mortgaged property; and that to permit it to retain the property and at the same time to repudiate its obligation to pay for it — expressly set forth in the very contract under which it derived its title — would work a manifest fraud upon both the mortgagor and mortgagee.</p> <p>While in its possession, the conditional vendee attached the property in a suit brought by it against its vendor, for an alleged breach oí the latter’s independent and collateral promise to set up and install the machinery in the vendee’s laundry in good condition and running order, and by virtue of such attachment it now claimed a priority over the plaintiff’s mortgage. Held that by such attachment the conditional vendee, under the guise of claiming to be a creditor of the vendor, now found to be insolvent, was seeking to appropriate the property in violation of its express promise, a result which even our somewhat rigorous law in favor of attaching creditors would not sanction or permit.</p> <p>An assignment of error to the effect that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff, is not that “specific statement” required by the statute (§ 5837) in order to entitle it to consideration by this court.</p>

<p>An application under General Statutes, § 5836, to rectify the recital, or so-called “finding,” of the trial judge of the claims urged by the State in a criminal prosecution, will be granted by this court only where such rectification is essential to a fair presentation of the appeal.</p> <p>Obtaining possession of money by false and fraudulent representations, and carrying it away with intent to convert it to the possessor’s own use and to permanently deprive the owner of his property, constitutes theft.</p> <p>The evidence adduced to prove theft in the present case reviewed, and held to have warranted the verdict of guilty returned by the jury.</p> <p>One of the accused having testified upon cross-examination that she was unfamiliar with business matters, was asked whether she had had any financial transactions of any size about the time of the alleged theft, and finally answered “Yes.” Held that this question was plainly admissible, and that the accused had no just ground for complaining that this line of inquiry — thereafter pursued without apparent objection — had prejudiced her case before the jury.</p> <p>The accused complained of parts of the charge as argumentative. Held that a careful reading showed that the court was not making comments of its own, in the main, but was stating the claims of the State on the evidence; and that if in one or two places some color was lent to the criticism, they were manifestly due to the inadvertent omission of a word or two, and all doubt of their real character removed by the context.</p> <p>Undue prominence was asserted to have been given to the State’s claims at the expense of those of the accused. Held that such criticism was unfounded: that the court’s method was in manifest fulfilment of a plain duty.</p> <p>A sentence or portion of a charge may be incomplete, and hence an incorrect statement of the law; but if the earlier instructions have carefully and fully defined the crime upon which the jury are to pass, and have sufficiently emphasized its essential elements, the isolated passage will be considered with intelligent reference to those correct and reiterated directions, and the charge, as a whole, as having given the jury a correct and fixed appreciation of the invariable importance of these essential elements.</p>

<p>General Statutes, § 4946, prescribes that if, after the making of a will, a child is bom to the testator, “and no provision is made in the will for such contingency,” such birth shall operate as a revocation of such will. Held that the “provision” for the contingency mentioned in the statute did not require a testamentary gift to or for the benefit of such after-born child, but was satisfied by some statement or declaration by the testator in his will making it clear that such child had not been passed by through inadvertence.</p> <p>In the present case the testator had two 'children, eight and ten years old, when he made his will giving all of his property to his wife, and a third child was born four months thereafter. The will contained a clause declaring that the testator made “no separate provision for any children that I may have, because I know that my wife will herself make such provision for them out of my estate as I should approve and desire.” Held that the will was drawn in plain contemplation of the likelihood of the birth of this child, and that the obvious purpose of the testator in making that fact manifest in his will was to forestall the operation of the statute upon the realization of that contingency; and therefore that the birth of such after-born child did not revoke the will.</p> <p>To “provide” for a contingency is to prepare for the happening implied by its nature. It assumes and implies prevision of the possible event, and that the present undertaking is entered upon in full contemplation of the future possibility.</p>

, granted the defendant’s motion to quash the alternative writ and dismissed the application, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. The application alleges the following facts: In July, 1919, Hazel M. Fowler and Grace S. Gilbert were employed by the town school committee of the town of Wallingford to serve as teachers in the public schools of that town during the school year beginning on September 8th, 1919, at stated salaries.

Action to recover damages for causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate .by the alleged negligent operation of the defendant’s automobile, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Keeler, J., and from the refusal to set aside this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, in the operation of his automobile, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Keeler, J.; by direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.

Action for the reformation and specific performance of an alleged written agreement for the sale of real estate, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the substituted complaint was sustained (Curtis, J.) and judgment was afterward rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action by a judgment creditor to secure the appropriation to the payment of his claim of the income of a testamentary trust fund of which his debtor was the beneficiary, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County {Haims, J.), upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover the amount alleged to have been awarded to the plaintiffs for the taking of their land for public use, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Curtis, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court. In February, 1917, the defendant city condemned and took certain land of the plaintiffs for the purpose of laying out and grading a city street.

Action for personal injuries incurred through a fall in the lobby of the defendant’s hotel occasioned by the alleged negligent maintenance and use by the defendant of a rug upon the tiling of the lobby floor, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Haines, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant’s chauffeur and agent while acting within the scope of his employment, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; by direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, from the judgment upon which the plaintiff appealed.

Petition under Chapter 217 of the Public Acts of 1919 for the discontinuance of a portion of a certain highway in the towns of Southbury and Oxford, which would be overflowed by the water set- back by the petitioner’s dam across the Housatonic River, brought to and heard by the Hon. Luden F. Burpee, a judge of the Superior Court; facts found and judgment rendered for the petitioner, and appeal by the defendant town of Southbury.

Action to recover the amount of several promissory notes representing the unpaid portion of the purchase price of a second-hand automobile, with an additional count for labor and materials furnished, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, J.; verdict for the defendant, which the court, upon motion of the plaintiff, set aside, and from this decision the defendant appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff's intestate resulting in his death, and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Webb, J,; the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment thereon the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant’s servant in the operation of its automobile, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, Jverdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $450, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit to secure the renewal of a lease, pursuant to one of its provisions, and meanwhile for an injunction to restrain ejectment proceedings, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled (Kellogg, J.) and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants. This is an action to enforce a covenant of renewal contained in a written lease.

Action to secure the cancellation of a promissory note for $1,000 and the discharge or release of a mortgage securing the same, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Under General Statutes, § 6128, execution in an action of summary process is stayed for forty-eight hours during which a losing defendant may file his bill of exceptions and procure a writ of error. Failure to act within that period may subject him to dispossession, but it does not prevent the allowance of a bill of exceptions and the issuance of a writ of error after the forty-eight hours have expired.</p> <p>Upon an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas upon a writ of error from a judgment of a justice of the peace, a general allegation of error is sufficient, since the specific errors have already been assigned in the writ of error dealing with the rulings of the justice, which in reality present the fundamental questions in the case.</p> <p>If a judgment is correct, it is immaterial that the reasons assigned therefor are erroneous.</p> <p>After an alleged forfeiture of a lease for the nonpayment of rent, and the commencement of summary process proceedings, the landlord refused a tender of the rent, as such, under the lease, but notified the tenant that the money, if paid, would be accepted as compensation for use and occupation of the premises. Held that payment and acceptance of the money thereafter, preserved all rights of the parties with respect to the pending litigation.</p> <p>A charge of the justice of the peace in an action of summary process reviewed, and held to have fairly and correctly set forth the issues of law and fact before the jury, notwithstanding some grammatical and literary shortcomings.</p>

<p>Appeal from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner for the fifth district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, J., which affirmed the award and dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the defendant appealed.</p> <p>On September 8th, 1919, and for a considerable time prior thereto, the defendant was and had been engaged in executing contracts for the grading and surfacing of streets in the city of Waterbury. These streets were often widely separated and a large number of workmen were regularly employed upon the different contracts. Among these employees was the plaintiff, who, at the time of the injury sustained by him, was employed on the work in the execution of one of these contracts. A necessary instrumentality in the conduct of the defendant’s business was a large motor-truck for the conveyance of materials, tools, and so forth, from one place to another. Not having one of its own available for use in Waterbury, the defendant rented one from other persons, paying for its use an agreed price per day. This truck was not under the control of the defendant until it in the morning reached the point where it was to work, nor after six o’clock in the afternoon when its day’s work was finished. On occasions when it was necessary to move tools and workmen from one place to another widely separated, it was used to accomplish such removal. Customarily, as the defendant was aware, the plaintiff and other of his fellow-workmen, after the close of the day’s work, rode upon it to the center of the city on their way home when the distance was a substantial one. The plaintiff’s contract of employment did not provide that he should be transported from his home to his place of work or back home after his day’s work was done.</p> <p>The day’s work having been finished on September 8th, 1919, some of the workmen having put up their tools got on to the truck to ride to the city whither it, having also finished its day’s work, was going. The plaintiff and two other men were working at a point a few hundred feet nearer the city, and when the truck came along they attempted to get aboard it while it was in motion. This the plaintiff’s companions succeeded in doing, but he slipped and fell under one of the wheels and was injured. The plaintiff’s attempt to board the truck did not amount to serious and wilful misconduct on his part.</p>

, upon the court's own motion, for the advice of this court. The supplemental finding and award, which together with the appeal therefrom comprise the record before us, recites the following facts:— The plaintiff was injured September 12th, 1916, suffering thereby the loss of four outer toes and one half the great toe of his left foot.

Action to recover damages growing out of an alleged breach of warranty in the sale of several carloads of grapes purchased by the plaintiff of the defendant National Fruit Exchange, and for a return of the purchase price paid by the plaintiff to the defendant Commercial National Bank, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, where successive demurrers, filed by the defendant bank to the complaint as amended from time to time, were sustained (Keeler, Warner and…

Suit by a taxpayer for cancellation of certain releases of liens for sewer assessments upon lands of the defendant Mahan, for an adjudication that the liens were valid and subsisting incumbrances, and for an injunction restraining the city of New London from releasing the liens until paid, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New London County, Waller, Jfacts found and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff as prayed for, and appeal by the defendant…

Action to recover damages, and also to obtain equitable relief, for the alleged wrongful removal of, and injury to, a fish-house and fishing paraphernalia owned by the plaintiffs within the Borough of Fenwick, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County where a demurrer to the second defense and to the defendants’ counterclaim was sustained (Burpee, J.) and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants upon…

Suit to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, where a bond of '$30,000 with surety, given by the owners of the property, was by order of court (Greene, J.) substituted for the claimed liens, and the cause was subsequently referred to and heard by a committee who reported the facts; the court, Warner, J., overruled, in the main, a remonstrance to the committee’s report, and judgment was afterward rendered in accordance therewith, from…

Reservation for the advice of this court by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Maltbie, ./., upon a pro forma denial by the Compensation Commissioner of the first district of the plaintiff’s application to reopen his claim for compensation which had theretofore been settled by voluntary agreement of the parties with the approval of the aforesaid commissioner.

Suit to restrain the defendants from establishing and maintaining building and curb lines upon a certain tract of land in the plaintiff town which they were developing, from erecting buildings thereon and from using the streets laid out by them upon said tract for public travel, in alleged violation of a Special Act of the General Assembly creating a town-plan commission — brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Burpee, J., upon a demurrer to…

Petition for the appointment of a committee to assess the damages to be paid by the petitioner for the right to flood with water certain described lands of the respective respondents, brought to and heard by the Eon. Donald T. Warner, a judge'of the Superior Court; facts found and judgment rendered for the petitioner, from which the respondent McCarthy appealed.

Action to recover money loaned, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Walsh, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit to quiet and determine the title to real estate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Máltbie, Jupon demurrer to the answer and cross-complaint of the defendant Cambell; the court sustained the demurrer, found the issues for the plaintiff, and adjudged that the plaintiff and the defendant John Cope, as tenants in common, had an absolute title in fee simple to the land, and from this judgment the defendant Cambell appealed.

Appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district to award compensation for an injury to the plaintiff’s husband resulting in his death, upon the ground that it did not arise out of his employment, taken to and heard by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Malibie, J., which affirmed the decision of the Commissioner, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

<p>The charter and ordinances of the City of Hartford (12 Special Laws, p. 982; Revised Ordinances, October, 1920, p. 13, § 10) authorize the Court of Common Council to fill vacancies in any town or “city office.” Held:—</p> <p>1. That the office of alderman from one of the wards was a “city office,” a vacancy in which might be filled by the Court of Common Council.</p> <p>2. That although the General Assembly could not, because of constitutional limitations, fill vacancies in its own membership, it might nevertheless direct how a vacancy in a municipal office which it had created should be filled, without thereby depriving the electors of the municipality of any constitutional or fundamental right, or violating the principles of representative government.</p>

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the fifth district, acting for and in behalf of the Commissioner of the the first district, in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Maltbie, J., which affirmed the Commissioner’s award, and from this judgment the defendant appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $3,000, which the trial court, upon motion of the defendant, set aside as against the evidence, and from this decision the plaintiff appealed. The defendant filed a bill of exceptions which was allowed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Webb, J..; verdict and judgment, for the plaintiff for $5,000 damages, and appeal by the defendant.

Actions to recover damages for injuries to the person of one plaintiff and to the property of the other, alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Webb, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs.

<p>Upon an appeal from a judgment of nonsuit the appellant is entitled to have his evidence viewed in its most favorable aspect.</p> <p>It .is negligence for a passenger to ride in an automobile in a city street with his leg protruding from the car in such a way as to render it likely to come in contact with passing objects.</p> <p>The plaintiff's intestate, while riding as a passenger in a crowded automobile owned and driven by the defendant, sat in the lap of another passenger, with his leg protruding over the side of the car. The defendant negligently ran his car into a water-tank and the intestate’s leg was caught between the car and the tank dragging him out and causing injuries from which he shortly died. The trial court nonsuited the plaintiff because the proximate cause of the decedent’s injuries was his own negligence. Held that therein the trial court erred: that whether the intestate’s negligence was the proximate cause of his death, depended upon all the circumstances in the case, the determination of which was a question solely for the jury.</p>

Suit by the lessees of a store to secure the renewal of their lease for a further term of three years, as provided therein, and to restrain the defendants meanAvhile from taking any steps to eject the plaintiffs from the leased premises, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Burpee, ./.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs.

Action by a real-estate broker to recover a commission for his services in securing a purcháser for the defendant’s premises, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $1,207, and appeal by the defendant.

Motion in writing by the accused to this court for an order requiring the Superior Court in Hartford County to certify to this court all the evidence in said cause and make it a part of the appeal record, at the expense of the State.

Writ of Error to reverse a judgment of the City Court of Hartford, Bullard, J., in favor of the landlords in an action of summary process, brought by the tenant, the present plaintiff in error, to the Supreme Court of Errors at its October Term in Hartford, 1920.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Dickenson, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $475, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of covenant against incumbrances, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Dickenson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s yacht through a collision alleged to have been caused by the defendants’ negligence, brought to and tried by the City Court of New Haven, Caplan, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $7,500, which the trial court, upon motion of the defendant, set aside as against the evidence, and from this decision the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for slander alleged in three counts, with a fourth count for libel, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $6,000, of which the plaintiff remitted $1,500 in order to avoid having the verdict set aside as excessive, and from a judgment for the plaintiff for $4,500, the defendant appealed.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s summer cottage situated on the shore of Long Island Sound, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Haines, «/.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $513 damages, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for injuries to plaintiff's automobile, alleged to have been caused by the deféndants’ negligence, brought to the Superior Court iii New Haven County and tried to the jury before Webb, J. ; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,400, and appeal by defendants.

Action by a real-estate broker to recover a commission upon the sale of defendant’s property, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Wolfe, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff, in April, 1917, and thereafter, was a real-estate broker in New Haven, and the defendant was the owner of certain premises in New Haven known as No. 33 Pearl Street.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Webb, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover the balance of the purchase price of a carload of grapes sold and delivered to the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Webb, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,122, and appeal by the defendant. On the trial a written contract was produced expressing an agreement between the parties for the purchase and sale of two carloads of muscatel wine grapes, including the carload in controversy.

Action to recover damages for trespass and injury to the plaintiff’s crops by the defendant’s cattle, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant to recover $90.83 upon his counterclaim, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Petition by the plaintiff for a reassessment of the damages sustained by him from the taking of a portion of his land for highway purposes, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, which appointed a committee, accepted its report, and, pursuant thereto, rendered judgment (Warner, J.) in favor of the plaintiff, increasing his damages from $1,500 to $2,250, and from this judgment the defendant appealed.

Action to recover taxes assessed by the plaintiff upon a piece of real estate on the Quinnipiac River in North Haven owned by the defendant and used by it as a part of its electric light and power plant, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, both upon the complaint and its counterclaim, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action against the surety upon a bond given to release an attachment, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Simpson, J., upon a demurrer to the answer; the court sustained the demurrer and afterward rendered judgment for the plaintiff for $795, from which the defendant appealed.

Action to recover damages for alienating the affections of, and for criminal conversation with, the plaintiff’s husband, brought to the Superior Court in Fair-field County and tried to the jury before Haines, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $4,208, and appeal by the defendant.

. Action by the payee against the maker of a promissory note, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $881, and appeal by the defendant. The note sued upon was in the usual form, made by the defendant November 1st, 1919, for $855, and payable to the plaintiff or order two months thereafter.

Actions by a father and his minor son, to recover damages for personal injuries to the latter alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and tried together in the Superior Court in New Haven County where each plaintiff was non-suited in a trial to the jury before Banks, J., and from the refusal of the trial court to set aside such judgments, the plaintiffs appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for 19,000, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Writ of Error to reverse a judgment of the City Court of Waterbury, McGrath, J., in an action of summary process, brought to the October Term, 1920, of the Supreme Court of Errors at Bridgeport.</p>

Action to recover sums paid as taxes by the plaintiff upon real estate purchased by him of the defendant’s intestate, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, ./.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Suit to foreclose a judgment lien, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the answer was sustained (Curtis, J.), leave to refile the answer was denied and judgment rendered (Webb, J.) for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed.</p>

Action by a former testamentary trustee to recover from the life beneficiary moneys advanced to her by such trustee from time to time in excess of the net income of the trust fund, and for an order requiring the application of subsequently-accruing income to the repayment of such advances, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the defendants’ motion to expunge was denied and their demurrer to the complaint was overruled (Maltbie, J.), the plaintiff’s motion…

Writ of Habeas Corpus to determine the legality of the petitioner’s imprisonment or detention in the Connecticut Reformatory at Cheshire, brought to and reserved by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Wolfe, J., upon a demurrer to the return, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover damages for negligently running into and killing a horse which was attached to and following the plaintiff’s farm wagon driven by her agent, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Dickenson, ./.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $357, against the defendant Belle Resnikoff, from which she appealed.

Resekvation for the advice of this court, by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, /., of a finding and pro forma award by the Compensation Commissioner of the third district. The plaintiff is a barber and conducts a barber shop.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants’ servant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a plea in 'abatement was overruled (Curtis, J.), and the cause was afterward tried to the jury before Banks, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit to quiet and settle the title to Great Island in Greenwich Cove, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants other than Frederick A. Hubbard, whose mortgage interest was recognized and confirmed by the judgment.

Appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of the Compensation Commissioner of the second district to award her compensation for a personal injury to her husband resulting in his death, upon the ground that the injury did not arise out of his employment, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Windham County, Keeler, J.; the court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Actions to .recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried together .to the jury before Haines, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the respective plaintiffs. The parts of the appeal which are pursued, relate to certain rulings on evidence and to portions of the charge.

Application by a property-owner for relief from a sewer assessment upon the ground of its alleged illegality, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court upon a demurrer to the amended complaint; the court, Warner, J., sustained the demurrer and afterward rendered judgment (Greene, J.) in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district, while acting for and in place of the Commissioner of the fifth district, in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J., which confirmed the award of the Commissioner, and from this judgment the defendant appealed.

<p>While a voluntary surrender of a lease by the lessee will not affect the rights of a subtenant acquired under an authorized sublease, the rights of the sublessee necessarily fall if they are expressly made dependent upon an option or privilege of the original lessor to terminate the original lease and all subleases, and such option or privilege is in fact exercised by him in the manner prescribed by the lease.</p> <p>In the present case A leased city property to H for ten years, from December 1st, 1913, reserving an option to terminate the lease at any time after one year upon giving H a written notice of four months and paying him a certain percentage of the cost of a building which H was to, and did, build upon the leased premises. H sublet one of the stores in the new building to the plaintiff for three years, with a privilege of renewal for five years, but subject nevertheless to all the terms and conditions contained in the original lease, and at the same time A promised H not to exercise his option, to terminate the original lease in such manner as to have the same take effect prior to August 1st, 1918, when the lease to the plaintiff expired. In April of the following year (1916) A sold the premises to the defendants who succeeded to all his rights and obligations. On December 9th, 1916, the defendants gave a written notice to H to the effect that four months thereafter and upon payment to him of $3,600, he would be required to surrender his lease and all subleases affecting the premises, except the lease to the plaintiff. Eleven days before the expiration of the four months the defendants paid the $3,600 to H and he quitclaimed to the defendants all his interest in the premises. The plaintiff paid the rent thereafter accruing to the defendants up to August 1st, 1918, and early in that year negotiated for but did not secure a lease for two years more from August 1st. No claim was made by the plaintiff that it had a right to renew its lease for five years, until after the defendants had brought an aetion of summary process against it. In the present action the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendants from proceeding with their summary process case, and for the specific performance of the renewal clause in its sublease. Held:—</p> <p>1. That there was nothing in A’s promise not to exercise his option of termination prior to August 1st, 1918, which afforded any basis whatever for the right of the plaintiff to a renewal of its lease for five years; on the contrary, that such privilege of renewal was expressly made contingent upon the terms of the original lease, under which A or his assigns might terminate H’s lease and thereby the rights of the plaintiff as a sublessee, on August 1st, 1918, or any time thereafter.</p> <p>2. That a valid exercise of this right of termination or forfeiture, must accord with the terms of A’s lease to H.</p> <p>3. That the fact that H surrendered his lease to the defendants eleven days prior to the expiration of the four months prescribed for notice, did not affect the right of the defendants to terminate the lease, nor make the surrender a voluntary one on the part of H.</p> <p>4. That while the defendants, in attempting to terminate H’s lease, and in demanding possession of the premises — except the store occupied by the plaintiff — prior to August 1st, 1918, exceeded their rights, the plaintiff was not disturbed or in anywise injured, and therefore was not in a situation to ask for a renewal of its lease for five years, on the ground that the surrender of H was voluntary, since it was obvious that neither plaintiff or defendants ever intended such a result, the consequences of which would be unreasonable and inconsistent with the remedy of specific performance.</p>

Application by the defendant for an order of this court requiring the judge of the District Court of Waterbury (Peasley, J.) to make and file a finding of facts for the purposes of an appeal; to this application the plaintiff filed a plea in abatement, to which the defendant demurred.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries., alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Burpee, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $6,000, and appeal by the defendant upon the ground that the damages awarded were excessive.

Action to recover damages for assault and battery, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Webb, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $500, and appeal by the defendant.

Actions to recover damages for personal injuries to the respective plaintiffs, husband and wife, and for damages for injuries to the husband’s automobile, which were alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the operation of his automobile, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff husband for $812, and for the plaintiff wife for $2,000, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for breach of an alleged oral agreement to pay the plaintiff for valuable information which he claimed to be able to impart, whereby the defendant could earn large sums of money without expense to it, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where successive demurrers to substituted complaints were sustained, first by Warner, J., and later, pro forma, by Kellogg, J., and judgment rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action against the surety on an attachment bond, by a judgment creditor of the principal named therein, to recover the amount of his judgment, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $384, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Litchfield County, Wood-ruff, J., erasing from the docket of that court an appeal to it taken by the defendant from an adverse judgment of a justice of the peace.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the. negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $12,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Actions by a wife and her husband, respectively, the former to recover damages for personal injuries, and the latter for injuries to his automobile and for expenses incurred by him for medical services to his wife, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried together to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff wife for 13,500 and for the plaintiff husband for $686,…