Volume 96 — Connecticut Reports

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and to the automobile of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Keeler, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $16,000, and appeal by the defendant.

Action by a real-estate broker to recover a commission for effecting an alleged sale of the defendants’ premises, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Haines, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s automobile, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Action to recover damages for injuries to the person of the plaintiff and to his motorcycle, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant’s son and servant while engaged upon the defendant’s business, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Hinman, Jverdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,800, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

<p>Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of an automobile owned and driven by the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Hinman, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $3,200, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>The plaintiff offered evidence to prove that the defendant drove his automobile through Hurlburt Street in New Haven at a rate of between twenty and twenty-five miles an hour, while looking at the numbers on the houses in search of No. 8, where he intended to deliver merchandise; that two small children ran across in front of his automobile, and that the defendant turned his head to admonish them, and that while doing so and continuing to drive his car at a high rate of speed along the street he struck and injured the plaintiff, a child of about five and one half years of age. The negligence alleged was in driving the car at a greater speed than was reasonable under all the circumstances, and in failing to keep a proper lookout. The defendant appeals from the denial of the motions to set aside the verdict as excessive and as against the evidence, and for errors in the admission of evidence.</p>

<p>Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award' of the Compensation Commissioner of the fifth district, acting for and in place of the Commissioner of the third district, in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J.; the court affirmed the Commissioner’s award and dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the defendant appealed.</p>

Action to recover moneys received by the defendant upon policies of insurance issued upon the life of the defendant’s intestate, under an alleged oral agreement with the plaintiff’s intestate, who paid all the premiums, that the proceeds of such policies, less funeral expenses, should belong to her, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Wolfe, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $527, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for negligently driving an automobile into and upon several of the plaintiff’s cows upon the highway and injuring them, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Booth, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $235, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for wrongfully expelling the plaintiff from membership in the defendant society, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Middle-sex County, Hinman, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action of interpleader to determine the rights of the respective respondents in and to the principal of a testamentary trust fund held by the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Middlesex County, Hinman, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of Dora Dillon and Herbert Gaffey, or their representatives, from which the respondent Margaret Faherty Gaffey appealed.

/.adjudging that it had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of the United States for taxes alleged to be due from the Derby Manufacturing Company, but requiring the trustees in liquidation of said Company to pay such claims as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should determine to be due, and authorizing them to sue for the refunding of any tax so paid.

Suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering in any manner with the possession of the estate of the Derby Manufacturing Company in the hands of the plaintiffs as trustees in liquidation, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County which denied a motion for a temporary injunction (Banks, J.) and the cause was afterward tried upon demurrer to the complaint; the court, Webb, J., sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendant, from…

Suit for specific performance of an agreement to convey land, or for damages for its breach, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Greene, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, for a decree for conveyance of said land, and appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff and defendant were the joint owners of number 40 Gilbert Street, New Haven.

Action to recover damages for the wrongful repudiation of an alleged contract to accept and use terra cotta for a certain building shortly to be erected, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the amended complaint was sustained, Maltbie, J., and, no further pleading having been filed by the plaintiff, judgment was rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed. The amended complaint was as follows:— “1.

Information for delivering an article of drink containing wood alcohol, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and, after a demurrer to the information had been overruled, tried to the jury before Keeler, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused. The material part of the statute under which the defendant was convicted is as follows: “Sec. 2679. . . .

<p>A testatrix in her will gave pecuniary legacies to three of her nieces, to two nephews and to the children of a deceased nephew, and then gave the residue of her estate to two missionary societies. In a codicil to this will she stated that she did not intend that her “jewelry, household furniture, and personal estate” should be included in the residue given to the missionary societies, but desired that they should be given to her nieces and divided between them as they saw fit. She died, leaving seven nieces and an estate consisting of real property valued at $6,000 and personal property of an amount in excess of furniture and jewelry and that needed to pay the pecuniary legacies, of about $25,000. Held that the will and codicil, when read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testatrix, showed that she intended by the codicil to give to her nieces only her jewelry, household furniture, and such tangible personal property, as her clothing, as was personally used by her, and that the remaining personal property should go to the missionary societies.</p> <p>Evidence of the circumstances surrounding the testatrix, including her relations with her nieces, and her interest in the missionary societies, was properly admitted in order to put the court as near as may be in her condition in respect to her property, and the situation of her family, for the purpose of rightly understanding the meaning of the words of her will.</p>

Action by a real-estate broker to recover a commission, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Markham, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The defendant employed the plaintiffs as real-estate brokers to procure a purchaser for certain real property in the city of Hartford at a price of $19,500, and agreed to pay the plaintiffs a commission of two per cent on the purchase price.

Appeal by the plaintiff from the refusal of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district to award her compensation because of his alleged lack of jurisdiction to make such award due to the fact that her deceased husband at the time of his injury was engaged in interstate commerce, — taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Máltbie, J., upon the facts found by the Commissioner, for the advice of this court.

Reservation for the advice of this court, by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J., of a pro forma finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district.

Information for selling intoxicating liquor without a license, brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County where a demurrer to the information was overruled and the cause was tried to the jury before Munger, Acting-Judge; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

Action to recover for merchandise sold and delivered, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Dickenson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $472 against the Shay Fertilizer Company, from which that defendant appealed.

Suit to secure an adjudication of the invalidity of a street-paving assessment aud of a lien filed by the city therefor, brought to and reserved by the City Court of Hartford, Bullard, J., upon a demurrer to the complaint, for the advice of this court.

Infokmation for having burglar’s tools in his possession in the night season, without lawful excuse, and alleging that the accused had twice theretofore been convicted, sentenced and imprisoned, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Haines, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

Suit to determine the construction of the will of Ann F. Stiles of Southbury, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the advice of this court. Ann F. Stiles of Southbury died in February, 1918, leaving a will in which, after several specific legacies, she left the residue of her estate to the plaintiffs in trust.

Action to recover the possession, of leased premises and for equitable relief by way of injunction, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained, Kellogg, J., and judgment was afterward rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiffs appealed. The defendant Noll, Noll and Worden are the assignees of the original lessee.

<p>Under our Constitution, which is a grant and not a limitation of power, no powers were granted to the General Assembly, and none can be delegated by it to a municipality, which are inconsistent with the reservation of personal liberties contained in the Bill of Rights (Article First of the Constitution).</p> <p>A city in the exercise of authority delegated to it by the legislature may make reasonable ordinances to keep the streets and parks open and safe for public travel and free from encroachment or obstruction; but it cannot constitutionally give to administrative officials an absolute and uncontrolled discretion to grant or refuse permission to do something which all citizens similarly situated have an equal right to do.</p> <p>In the present case the common council of the city of Meriden had enacted an ordinance providing that no person should use the streets, sidewalks, parks, or public squares for the purposes of delivering orations or making speeches or any other public demonstrations without first obtaining a permit from the chief of police, subject to a penalty. Held that the ordinance did not violate the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, since under that instrument legislation of this character was upheld by reading into it the presumption that a public officer would exercise his powers impartially and according to law; but that under our Constitutions and precedents such presumption assumes that the law will tell such official what his duties are, and as this ordinance gave the chief of police unlimited discretion to grant or withhold his license, it was invalid, as violating those sections of our Bill of Rights (1 and 5) which guarantee equality in rights and freedom of speech to all citizens. (Two judges dissenting.)</p> <p>Whether the city might have unqualifiedly forbidden the delivery of any oration or the making of any speeches in such places, qucere.</p> <p>The constitutionality of a statute ought not to depend upon the way in which it is finally administered by those who are charged with its execution.</p> <p>Where a public official is intrusted with discretion, his exercise thereof cannot be controlled by mandamus.</p>

<p>Suit to restrain the defendant fraternal society from depriving the plaintiff of the privileges and advantages of membership therein, for other equitable relief, and for damages, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Simpson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.</p>

Action for an accounting and payment of the amount found due thereon, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the issues raised by the complaint and answer, and by the first and third counterclaims, were referred to a committee who heard the parties and filed his report; the court, Curtis, J., accepted the report and found the facts to be as therein stated, and also found the issues raised by the fourth counterclaim in favor of the plaintiff, and thereupon…

Suit to secure the cancellation of a bond for a deed, alleged to have been obtained from the plaintiff by a fraudulent conspiracy of the defendants, and for other equitable relief, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence in the operation and control of her automobile, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Keeler, J., and from the refusal of the trial court to set aside such judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action of interpleader to determine the rights of the respective defendants, creditors of a bankrupt building contractor, in and to the balance of the contract price of a building erected by the plaintiff Avery, at his own expense, upon land which he had theretofore given to the other plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Málibie, J.; facts found and judgment rendered sustaining the claim of the trustee in bankruptcy of the general…

Action to recover a commission of $300 for procuring a purchaser of the defendants’ business, brought to the City Court of Waterbury and thence, by the plaintiff’s appeal, to the District Court of Waterbury where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the court, Peasley, J., and from the refusal of the court to set aside such judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for the alleged wrongful conversion of certain promissory notes, and moneys collected as rents, owned by the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Banks, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $16,112, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>It is no part of the duty of the jury to pass upon the punishment of an accused; and hence it is not error for the court in the trial of an accused for murder, where the defense asks for a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity, to refuse to charge that under such a verdict the accused will be subject to such restraint as is neces- • sary to prevent his doing injury to the persons or property of others.</p> <p>In the present case the defense, which claimed such a verdict, asked the court to charge that a verdict of not guilty did not mean that the defendant would be entitled to be set at liberty, since the State had ample power to place him in such confinement and under such restraint as to protect the community against the consequences of his mental condition. Held that it was not error to refuse to give this charge, since the defense had at no time claimed a verdict of merely not guilty, and the request assumed that the defendant’s mental condition was such as to justify restraint, which was a fact to be proved; and, moreover, whether an instruction, that a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity would subject the accused to necessary restraint, should be given, was for the trial court to determine in the exercise of its sound discretion.</p> <p>The court refused to charge that if the jury found that, except under the prompting and encouragement of the wife of the man he killed, the accused exhibited no strong or adequate motive or intent for the deed, such facts had an important bearing upon the question of his mental condition. Held that the ruling was not erroneous, since the requested charge assumed, what the finding did not substantiate, that the accused had no strong or adequate motive for the deed except for such prompting, and, moreover, the charge as given was adequate upon the woman’s connection with the killing.</p> <p>It was not error to refuse to charge that the peculiarly atrocious details of the homicide were to be taken into consideration in connection with the accused’s mental deficiency, on the issue of his sanity, since this request was improper as assuming the mental deficiency of the accused.</p> <p>Another requested instruction was that the jury in weighing the testimony of a witness for the State were to give weight to his appearance and conduct on the witness stand, and to the depraved mind revealed by his own testimony. Held that it was not error to refuse to give this instruction, since it assumed as a fact the depraved mind of the witness, and, while the court had the'right to express its opinion upon the testimony of a witness so long as it did not amount to a direction of the verdict, and was fair, and did not present the picture of the case out of focus, whether it should exercise the right was a matter for its wisest discretion, unreviewable unless clearly abused.</p> <p>A medical expert for the State testified that he had applied a mentality test to the accused and that the accused registered a certain mental age. He was then permitted, against objection by the defense, to state that he had applied the same test to three witnesses who had been called by the State, two of whom had been presented with the accused in the same indictment upon which he was on trial. The State then claimed the results of these tests on the ground that the jury, having observed all these witnesses and formed some estimate of their mental character and intelligence, might thus test the reliability of the estimate of the mental age of the accused previously given by the medical expert for the defense. Held that this entire line of evidence was inadmissible, since it was of slight, if any, relevancy, and raised collateral issues; but that as the answers actually admitted were merely preliminary, and the evidence itself was excluded, these answers could have had no influence on the jury, and their admission was harmless error.</p> <p>After this medical expert had testified that he had used a form of mental test employed by alienists for the defense, and had used certain tables of that test, it was proper to admit in evidence as an exhibit a printed copy of the blanks containing such tables, as a useful and time-saving procedure, obviating the necessity of propounding to the expert the many subjects upon the blanks.</p> <p>A medical expert may be cross-examined, or counsel may argue to the jury, by reading opinions from medical treatises of two classes: (1) such as are shown by expert testimony to have been accepted by the medical profession, and (2) such as have helped form the opinion of the expert.</p> <p>Such cross-examination must be confined to such parts of the. authority as tend to contradict the opinion expressed by the witness and cannot be based upon some illustration or isolated case used by the authority to explain or illustrate his opinion.</p> <p>The comparison of the mentality of an accused with that of a child is not a valuable criterion for measuring the responsibility of the accused for his act.</p> <p>It was not proper to ask a medical expert whether in his judgment the accused possessed such mental capacity that he should be held to full accountability for his conduct, since that was the province of the jury, not the witness, to determine.</p> <p>The trial court sustained an objection to a question, asked on cross-examination of a medical expert for the State, as to whether the accused when he committed the deed had that knowledge and understanding of what he was doing that pertains to ordinary men. Held that this was not the attempt to set up a standard of mental responsibility, but was designed to lessen the effect of the expert’s opinion as to the accused’s mentality, and was legitimate cross-examination; but that in view of the wide latitude which the cross-examination had been permitted to take, this court was satisfied that its exclusion did the accused no harm.</p> <p>Medical expert evidence, though indispensable in trials, should be kept within reasonable bounds and not be permitted to prolong trials by injecting collateral issues and by pressing theories too far.</p>

Petition for a new trial upon the alleged ground of newly-discovered evidence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J., upon a demurrer to the petition; the court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition, and from this judgment the petitioner appealed.

Suit for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from organizing or attempting to organize a subordinate lodge of the Knights of Pythias, from interfering with the funds, records and property of the plaintiff lodge, and for other relief, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Warner, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendants.

Action for a divorce upon the ground of intolerable cruelty, brought to and tried by the .Superior Court in New Haven County, Kellogg, J., after the defendant had filed a cross-complaint praying for a divorce upon the ground of the plaintiff’s adultery; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant upon the complaint and for the plaintiff upon the cross-complaint, from which the defendant appealed.

Action by a resident of Naugatuck to recover damages for injuries to Ms automobile, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the city of New Haven where the defendant resided, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County {Booth, J.) which dismissed and erased the cause from the docket for want of jurisdiction, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.</p> <p>The plaintiff, then a child less than four years old, was crossing Winthrop Avenue in New Haven when he was struck and injured by the defendant’s trolley-car. Plaintiff claimed to have proved that the injury was caused by the failure of the motorman to stop the car or bring it under control after he had notice that the plaintiff was or was likely to be in a position of peril. Defendant claimed that the motorman had his car under control, and that the plaintiff, after having reached a place of safety, suddenly turned back and ran into the front end of the car. The errors assigned relate to the charge of the court upon the issue of contributory negligence as applied to children of tender years, and as to the degree of care required of a motorman in operating hfe car at a place where he has notice that children are or may be in the street.</p>

<p>All the restriction imposed by the statute (§ 6634 as amended by Chapter 89 of the Public Acts of 1919) providing that the neglect or refusal of an accused to testify shall not be commented upon to the court or jury, is the omission of all reference, directly or indirectly, to the failure of the accused to testify; and while the trial court should be alert to prevent violation of the statute by subterfuge or indirection, it cannot find a violation of the statute in the argument of the State, fairly presented, that an essential of the case stands uncontradicted, merely because this may suggest that the accused had it within his power to testify upon this point.</p> <p>Disobedience of this statute does not entitle the accused to a new trial as of right, unless it appears to have injuriously prejudiced him before the jury, and unless he has not waived its enforcement by failing to make proper objection.</p> <p>The better practice in making such objection is to move for the discharge of the jury at the time of the comment, but where the ground of objection was fairly stated at the time of the comment, and the court stated that it would cover the matter in its charge, there is no waiver by the accused.</p> <p>If there is a violation of the statute, the court should be pointedly explicit in telling the jury to disregard the comment. It should make its ruling at the very time of the comment, and the ruling should be so unequivocal as to discourage other like violations; and hence a colorless charge, giving a general statement of the rule without definite application to the situation before the jury, is insufficient. In the present case, however, the court might well have instructed the jury that the reference of the State’s Attorney to the failure of the defense to produce evidence as to certain material facts was not a violation of the statute, and the court’s ruling and charge was therefore not prejudicial error to the accused.</p>

Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the first district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to the Superior Court in Hartford County (Maltbie, J.), which affirmed the award of the Commissioner, and from this judgment the defendants appealed. On March 11th, 1920, and for several months prior thereto, a contract of employment had been in force between Randall, the deceased, and the Jewell Belting Company.

Action to recover a reasonable commission for securing a purchaser for the defendants’ real estate and personal property, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the jury before 'Dickenson, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $825 against the defendant Benjamin Kaplan, from which that defendant appealed.

<p>Information for keeping a house of ill fame, brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.</p>

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Meriden approving and admitting to probate a certain written instrument as the last will of Edgar P. Parker of Meriden, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to a plea in abatement was overruled (Warner, J.), and the issues raised by the reply to the plea were tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, sustaining…

Action in two counts to recover savings-bank deposits, brought to the Superior Court in New London County where the case practically became, under the pleadings and procedure, one of interpleader, and was so treated in a trial to the court, Hinman, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for Belton A. Copp, executor, to recover $4,735 of one of the deposits, and for the plaintiff to recover the rest of that deposit and the whole of the other deposit, and from this judgment the…

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a servant of the defendant in the operation of his automobile, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Maltbie, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $12,968, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>A charge that if the plaintiff’s conduct contributed in any way to the accident out of which the injury arose, he could not recover, even though the defendant might in fact have been negligent, is erroneous, since it is only where the plaintiff materially or essentially contributes to his injury that he cannot recover. Contributory negligence, when of this degree, becomes a cause of the resulting injury.</p> <p>The measure of damages for injury to personal property, in this case an automobile, when the injury is less than a complete loss, is the difference in value between the property before and after the loss, with interest from the date of loss; and when the property may be repaired, if the repairs will substantially restore it to its former condition, the cost of such repairs will ordinarily furnish proper proof of such loss.</p> <p>In addition to such damage the owner of an automobile is entitled to recover the value of the use of the car during the period necessary for its repair. Such value is the market value of such use, and while no general rule can be laid down, except that the award should be for fair and reasonable compensation, according to tbe circumstances of the case, elements ordinarily essential to such a finding would be the value of the automobile, its market rental value, less the proportion of this rental value which covers the wear and tear, and depreciation in the use of the automobile, and the period of necessary deprivation of use.</p> <p>The market rental value of the automobile is a material and relevant factor in helping to ascertain the value of the loss of use, but is not itself the measure of such value, for it necessarily includes a substantial sum for wear and tear and depreciation.</p> <p>In the present case the only evidence upon the issue of such value was that the car was used ordinarily for pleasure but occasionally for business purposes, and that because of the damage done to it the owner was deprived of its use for fifty-one days. The court charged that the jurors, having the evidence as to the extent of the use of the car, might fix a proper sum as damages for the loss of use according to their judgment and experience. Held that the instruction was erroneous, since such damages could only be awarded on the basis of some evidence — here entirely lacking — of the pecuniary value of such use, from which the trier might determine what fair and reasonable compensation for the loss would be; but that under our practice a new trial should be awarded only if the plaintiff should not file a remittitur of that part of the damages erroneously included in the judgment.</p>

Appeal by the defendants from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the fourth district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Keeler, J., and reserved by that court, upon its own motion, for the advice of this court. The claimant’s son was employed as superintendent of the estate of his employer at Stamford.

Action in the nature of ejectment, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Kellogg, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs.

<p>Appeal from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the second district in favor of the plaintiff, taken by the defendant to the Superior Court in New London County and reserved by that court, Wolfe, J., upon the finding of the Commissioner, for the advice of this court.</p>

Action to recover damages for an assault, for a slander, and for a trespass to land, brought before a justice of the peace and thence, by the defendant’s appeal, to the Superior Court in Windham County (Hinman, /.), where judgment was rendered sustaining a plea in abatement filed by the defendant in the justice court, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action in the nature of an appeal from the demand of the Tax Commissioner for the payment of a tax of $10,286 from the estate of a decedent upon which the plaintiffs were executors, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Keeler, J., upon demurrer of the Tax Commissioner to the complaint, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover the amount of a check given by the defendant in consideration of his admission, and the admission of his minor 'daughter, to the plaintiff college and their enrollment as students therein, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Markham, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover moneys paid by the insolvent debtor to the defendant, the effect of which was alleged to be a wrongful preference, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Kellogg, J., and from the refusal of the court to set aside such judgment the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Action to recover for services rendered and expenses incurred in the alleged care, support and maintenance of the defendant’s testator for many years, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Banks, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $7,250, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

Action to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiffs’ motortruck, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to and tried by the City Court of Bridgeport, Wilder, Deputy-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $200, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, and for damages, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County where the alleged lien was dissolved {Simpson, J.) upon the substitution of a bond with surety, and the cause was afterward tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $252, from which the defendants, obligors in the bond, appealed. This action was returned to the Court of Common Pleas on the first Tuesday of December, 1919.

Writ of Error to reverse an alleged erroneous judgment of a justice of the peace in favor of the defendant tenants in an action of summary process, brought by the plaintiff landlord to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County {Dickenson, J.) which found error and reversed the judgment of the justice of the peace, and from this judgment of reversal the defendant tenants appealed.

<p>The plaintiff, on some undetermined date between March 3d, 1919, and May 6th, 1919, received an injury, arising out of and in the course of his employment, which was occasioned by a sudden strain and which gave rise to a hernia. He immediately notified his employer, but continued his employment until January 10th, 1920, when he was obliged to cease work. No written notice of a claim for compensation was ever given, but the Compensation Commissioner, on April 17, 1920, assigned a hearing for May 3d, 1920. The defendants claimed that no compensation should be awarded, since neither written notice nor assignment for hearing had been made “within one year from the date of the injury,” as required by the statute (§ 5360). Held that the term “date of the injury” in this section, referred not to the date of the accident or occurrence which injured the employee, but to date when the injury became compensable, and hence the subject of a claim for compensation; that under § 5348 of the General Statutes, an injury did not become compensable until its results had incapacitated the employee for a period of moie than seven days from earning full wages at his customary employment, and that, as the date of compensable injury in this case was therefore January 17th, 1920, the plaintiff was entitled to compensation.</p>

Information charging theft from the person, also an attempt to commit that offense, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Keeler, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty upon each count, and appeal by the accused.

<p>To utter is to offer; and hence to utter a forged instrument is to offer it by some overt act, intending it to be received as good, whether it is accepted or not.</p> <p>The defendant was convicted of the crime of uttering or publishing certain forged bank checks, upon an information which charged that such uttering or publishing was done at E in the county where the trial was had, and with the intent to defraud a bank located at E. It was not disputed that the defendant, at W, in another county, indorsed the checks in question to various persons with whom he had there been dealing, that these checks were drawn on the bank at E, that they were severally accepted by the persons to whom offered, the defendant receiving in each case money or goods to the amount of the face thereof, and that such persons deposited the checks in the bank at W, which collected for them the face amount thereof from the bank at E in regular course of business. Held that the utterance was complete on the making of the offer at W; that since the persons to whom the checks were indorsed purchased them outright and were in no proper sense the agents of the accused to cash them, the presentation to the bank at E could not be considered an utterance; and hence that, under the statute (§ 6628) requiring the offense to be tried in the county were committed, no conviction could be had in the county where the trial took place.</p> <p>The State alleged that the accused had forged the name of C to the checks. The accused admitted that he had signed C’s name to the checks, but his defense was that this signature was made by C’s authority. The State offered in evidence C’s written statement — which did not appear to have been made in the presence of the accused — to the effect that he had given no such authority, and this statement was admitted in evidence as an exhibit, without objection by the accused, who did, however, request the court to charge that it was not to be considered by the jury. Held that this request was properly denied, since the statement, although inadmissible as hearsay, if objected to, having come in without objection, was available for whatever it was worth on its face; and even if the request could be considered as equivalent to a motion to strike out, it came too late and was defective as giving no ground of objection.</p> <p>Although summoned by the State and present dining the trial as a witness, C was not called to testify by either side. The accused requested the court to charge that this raised a presumption against the State’s claim that C had not authorized the accused to sign his name to the checks. Held that the court did not err in refusing so to charge, since such a presumption of fact against a party holding back evidence is not created unless there is an actual withholding, and where, as here, the witness is in court and equally available to be called by either side, neither can claim such a presumption against the other.</p> <p>The accused offered evidence to show that since the arrest C had stated, on one or more occasions, that he had authorized the accused to sign his name to checks. The court excluded this evidence on the ground that O had not testified, and the State, in this court, justified its exclusion on the basis of the post litem motam rule. Held that such rule operated only to exclude, as made after action brought, certain hearsay statements otherwise admitted under a modification of the hearsay rule, and had no application to contra^ dictory statements made out of court by a witness and offered for the purpose of attacking credit; that the State, having had the benefit of C’s hearsay statement that he had not given such authority, could not object to rebutting evidence, admissible if this statement had been properly before the jury through C’s testimony, without withdrawing the statement, and that the accused, although he had waived his right to object to the admission of the statement, should not be deprived of the opportunity of showing a contradictory statement to weaken or destroy its effect.</p>

Action upon an insurance policy providing indemnity for disability caused by accidental injury or by sickness, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Dickenson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $124.97, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a piano, with interest, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Booth, facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $571, from which the defendant appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Avery, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $4,500 damages, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Action to recover money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant because of its alleged false representations, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Dickenson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $607, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>The plaintiff also appealed from the refusal of the trial judge to amend or correct the finding. No error.</p> <p>The trial court found the following facts: February 1st, 1918, the plaintiff sold to the defendant thirty tons of alfalfa feed f. o. b. New York, payable sight draft attached to bill of lading, and shipped the same by rail to the defendant. The car of feed arrived in Hartford on May 21st, 1918, was placed by the railroad on a public delivery siding on May 24th, and the defendant duly notified of its arrival and placement on Saturday, May 25th. Defendant paid the draft on May 22d, and on May 25th obtained the bill of lading from the bank and surrendered it to the railroad company. In the afternoon of May 25th a foreman of the defendant opened this car and took eighty of the six hundred bags of feed in the car from it, being those located close to the car door, and then locked the door. During the unloading of the eighty bags no indication of smoking of or fire in the grain was observable; nor at this time had the grain been on fire, nor had there been sign of any fire in it; and when the foreman left the car its contents had every appearance of being in good condition. On the Monday following, at 3:25 a. m. of May 27th, when the foreman next saw this car, he discovered that the feed was on fire and was damaged by the fire in value the sum of $534.40.</p> <p>When alfalfa feed contains more than sixteen per cent of moisture, it is combustible when left in a confined area without sufficient air reaching it, and feed containing more than sixteen per cent of moisture is defective and unfit for transportation or for consumption.</p> <p>There was no cause for this fire other than the combustibility of the feed. It was in fact caused by combustion of the feed due to the presence of moisture in the feed in excess of sixteen per cent. Opening the door and taking out the eighty bags of feed would not allow sufficient air to reach the bags, which were packed solidly, so as to check the combustion of the feed if it had already started to heat. When in fact the combustion began does not appear. The defendant claimed to the railroad immediately after the fire that the damage by fire occurred before the delivery of the car.</p> <p>On June 19th, for the first time, the defendant notified the plaintiff that this car of feed heated and partially burned, and if the railroad did not pay the defendant for this damage they would expect plaintiff to reimburse it. The plaintiff replied on June 21st that if the feed was damaged on arrival the railroad should pay and offered to assist in the collection.</p> <p>On June 28th the plaintiff wrote the defendant that the car appears to have been in trouble on arrival in Hartford, and, if the defendant desired, plaintiff would file a claim with the railroad on defendant’s account upon its forwarding freight claim and statement of facts. Plaintiff repeated this offer in letter of July 10th, and the defendant wrote on July 12th that upon receipt of a check for the damage to the feed they would forward freight bill and affidavits.</p> <p>On July 30th, and once before this date, the defendant’s officers had informed the plaintiff’s agent that when the defendant went to unload the feed it was on fire. On July 30th, upon the defendant’s promise to furnish freight bill and affidavits, the plaintiff gave the defendant a check for $560.21, which included the damage by fire plus the freight bill.</p> <p>The following paragraphs of the draft-finding were marked "proven —</p> <p>"23. The representations made by the defendant to the plaintiff, to wit: that said fire occurred before the delivery of the same to the defendant; that said fire was discovered when the defendant went to unload the car; and that the car had burned on the morning before the defendant had unloaded it — were false and were either known by the defendant to be false or were made by it recklessly without caring whether the same were true or not, and without an investigation as to whether or not said statements were true. The defendant could easily have ascertained whether said fire occurred while said car was in the possession of the railroad company, and could easily have ascertained whether any of said bags of feed had been removed prior to the date of said fire, but the defendant took no steps to find out the truth or falsity of said representations.</p> <p>“24. Said representations were made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to pay the defendant said sum of $534.40.</p> <p>“25. The plaintiff believed said representations of the defendant to be true and relied upon them, and had the plaintiff known that said representations were false the plaintiff would not have paid said sum or any other sum to the defendant.</p> <p>“26. The defendant knew that the plaintiff relied upon said representations and knew that the plaintiff acted upon said representations.”</p> <p>The trial court also found these facts:—</p> <p>“20. Sometime after the plaintiff had paid said money to the defendant, the plaintiff discovered that at the time of the occurrence of said fire, said car had been delivered to the defendant and was in its possession, and that prior to said fire eighty bags of said feed had been removed from the car by the defendant’s foreman.</p> <p>“21. Thereupon the plaintiff requested that the defendant return the money so paid to it, as the money was paid upon representations made by the defendant which were false, and had the plaintiff known that said representations were not true he would not have paid said money.”</p> <p>The following conclusions were reached by the trial court: “ (27) The car had been delivered to the defendant and was in its possession at the time of the fire. (28) The representations of the defendant were that the car had not been received by it at that time. (29) The moneys paid by the plaintiff to the defendant were paid as a result of these representations, they were false, they were known to be false by the defendant, they were made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to pay said money, and did in fact induce the plaintiff to pay said money to his damage.”</p>

<p>Action to recover for work done and materials furnished, brought to the City Court of Waterbury and thence, by the defendants’ appeal, to the District Court of Waterbury, and tried to the court, Makepeace, Deputy-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $243, from which the defendants appealed.</p>

Action upon a bond given to release an attachment, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Wolfe, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed. To secure the release of an attachment of personalty in an action brought by the plaintiff against the Connecticut Auto and Cycle Company, two successive bonds were drafted.

Action to recover damages for the alleged breach of an oral contract relating to the adoption of the plaintiff by the defendant’s testator, pursuant to which an adoption was afterward executed in legal form, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled (Greene, /.) and the cause was afterward tried to the court, MaltMe, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $39,640, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>A decision on a demurrer is the law of the case until reversed on appeal; and if the party demurring fails to take judgment for failure to plead over, but at the trial obtains a directed verdict and judgment thereon, an appeal from such judgment alone does not bring to this court for review the issues decided by the demurrer.</p> <p>In an action for damages against a patrolman, a sergeant of police, and the superintendent of police of a city, for the alleged negligence of the patrolman in driving the city patrol automobile and thereby causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, the plaintiff offered evidence that the decedent’s sister told the superintendent what she had heard a patrolman say concerning the driver’s competency, and that the superintendent replied that he knew the driver was not just what he should be but he had done the best he could. The plaintiff then offered to prove what the witness had heard from others, but the court ruled that, in the first instance, such statements should not be received unless made necessary by the nature of the superintendent’s reply, which the witness might state. The witness then gave the reply, which went no further than the statement previously testified to. Held:—</p> <p>1, That such reply was insufficient to prove the driver’s incompetency,- and that the court’s ruling was a wise one, since it excluded hearsay until such time as it became admissible for the purpose of understanding the meaning, scope and extent of the superintendent’s reply.</p> <p>2. That if it be assumed that the superintendent heard and understood the statement and knew whether its facts were true, he was not in a situation which called for a reply, since the subject-matter of the statements were not in the line of his duty as superintendent, and hence his silence could not be used as an admission against him.</p> <p>It is not proper to submit to a witness who is an expert driver of an automobile a hypothetical question in which the facts surrounding the accident are assumed to be in accordance with the plaintifE’s proof, and then inquire of him whether or not the driver of the car gave evidence of being an inexperienced driver. Such an offer is an attempt to give the conclusion of the witness upon the same facts upon which the trier is to adjudicate, and such conclusion is one which the average trier can resolve as satisfactorily as the expert.</p> <p>It seems that if the work or conduct under consideration has an established character, by reason of its technical nature or otherwise, and this is relevant and material to the case, the opinion of the qualified expert as to what may be the proper standard may be laid in evidence, and the trier may then utilize this opinion in applying the facts and reaching his ultimate conclusion.</p>

<p>Where there is legal evidence before a committee, to whom the court has referred a matter, upon a contested fact, the weight of the evidence is for the committee, and his finding upon the evidence is conclusive upon the parties, and they cannot retry the question to the court.</p> <p>In the absence of any allegation, in a remonstrance toi a committee’s report, that a material fact was found without evidence, or that there was a refusal or failure to find a material fact that was admitted or undisputed, or that a fact was found in language of doubtful meaning — there is no basis for an examination of the evidence by the court to determine whether or not the report should be recommitted for correction or further findings. Such basis is not furnished by a claim that a fact was found contrary to the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>In an appeal by a lessee from an award of damages resulting from the extension of a street, the fact that in the appellant’s lease there was a restrictive covenant as to its assignment, was relevant upon the question of the value of the lease, the extent to which such value was affected thereby being a question of fact to be determined under all the surrounding circumstances.</p>

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $3,500 damages, from which the defendant appealed.

Suit to restrain the defendant city from carrying out certain resolutions of its Court of Common Council ordering public works in said city, and to restrain the defendants the treasurer, the tax collector, and the controller of said city from drawing, certifying or paying any order for the payment of money of said city under authority of said resolutions or complying with any part thereof, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Hartford County (Maltbie, J.) for the…

Action to restrain the defendants from building a dwelling-house, designed to be occupied by two families, upon a lot in the city of New Haven, in alleged violation of a right in the nature of an easement claimed by the plaintiffs as owners of neighboring lots, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction was denied (Greene, J.) and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Kellogg, J.; facts found and judgment…

Suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell certain real estate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained, Webb, J., and judgment rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the fourth district in favor of the plaintiff, taken to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Keeler, J., upon the facts found by the Commissioner, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover the amount of a policy of insurance against death by accident, brought by the beneficiary of the decedent to the City Court of Norwalk and tried to the jury before Vosburgh, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $350, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit for the reformation of a deed delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants, for other relief, and for damages, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Warner, J.; facts found and judgment rendered reforming the deed as prayed for, from which the defendants appealed.

Action to recover damages for refusal to release an- attachment upon personal property and to have the attachment declared void and discharged, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County (Webb, J.) for the advice of this court.

<p>The proper method of securing a review of rulings on evidence is by appeal from the judgment, and not by motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, or by motion in arrest of judgment.</p> <p>The test of cross-examination is the highest and most indispensable test known to the law for the discovery of truth; and while a cross-examination which has been carried as far as will serve to develop the issues involved and aid the search for truth may be limited by the court, yet it requires the exercise of the court’s wisest discretion and highest judgment not to restrict such examination unduly. Where — as in the present case — the issues are those of testamentary capacity and undue influence in a will contest, the evidence must necessarily take a wide range, covering the whole history, mental and physical, of testatrix, and hence on both direct and cross-examination considerable latitude must be permitted.</p> <p>The defendant executor, who had testified that he had been conservator of the testatrix, and drew her will on the day of its date, and who was the magistrate administering the oath to the witnesses of the will, was asked upon cross-examination what the testatrix said concerning certain of the bequests in the will, where he got the description of the residuary legatee, if he remembered how he got the will, and whether he made any comments at the time. The court sustained objections to all these questions. Held that these inquiries were relevant cross-examination upon the matter of the instructions given him for the drafting of the will.</p> <p>It was error to exclude a question asked of this witness upon cross-examination as to when he was made conservator, since proof by the public record was not the exclusive method of making this proof, and no one ought to know better than the holder of a public ofiiee when he was appointed; but it was not error to exclude a question as to whether he, while conservator, paid his ward’s bills, since the door had been opened only to what occurred at the time of making the will and not to the range of relations between the witness and the testatrix.</p> <p>The appellant, sister of the testatrix, testified to the way in which the testatrix and her mother lived, and that it had been necessary to commit the testatrix to a hospital for the insane because of her violence, and that after her release therefrom she lacked the elements of testamentary capacity, but the court refused to permit the witness to state why she did not move to recommit the testatrix to the hospital. Held that the court erred, since it was but fair to the appellant to permit her to show, if she could, that there was no necessary inconsistency between her testimony and her acts.</p> <p>Evidence as to the relations of the testatrix with her uncle by marriage, who was on such terms with her that he supplied her with intoxicating liquor, was relevant on the issue of testamentary capacity.</p> <p>An alienest testifying for the appellant, after defining and describing the disease insanity, was asked whether there was any characteristic known to alienists affecting the question of attitude of the insane toward their relatives. The court excluded the question on the ground that it was irrelevant until the particular form of insanity from which the testatrix suffered was shown. Held that the court erred in excluding this question, since it was not a necessary prerequisite that the expert should classify the form of insanity, and, moreover, it was for the expert to say whether such characteristic could exist in all forms of insanity, and the court should suspend its judgment as to the sufficiency and credibility of the answer until the time for judgment was reached.</p> <p>The trial court may exclude evidence which is too remote; and, generally speaking, the question of remoteness must depend upon all the considerations, including time, the character of the evidence, and all surrounding circumstances which in the opinion of the court ought to have a bearing upon its worthiness to be brought into the consideration and determination of the matter in contention.</p> <p>Conversations, acts, and conduct of the testatrix subsequent to but reasonably near to the time of the execution of the will, are necessarily relevant and material, but as they get further and further from this time they become less and less important, and, as a rule, they are not of the same relative assistance in helping solve the issue of testamentary capacity as are similar conversations, acts, and conduct prior to the execution of the will.</p> <p>The exclusion of evidence as to a business conversation between the testatrix and one E about twelve years after the execution of the will, held not shown to be an abuse of the court’s discretion.</p> <p>The appellant upon cross-examination was asked several questions as to what property her mother had left her by will, the appellee claiming that the testatrix did not feel kindly toward the appellant because, among other things, she felt and stated that the appellant and her husband had caused her mother to transfer to the appellant all the estate which her father had left to her mother, thus depriving her, the testatrix, of her rightful share in her mother’s estate. Held that the admission of the questions violated the best evidence rule, since the probate records were the best evidence of the fact sought to be elicited by the questions; but that the appellant might properly be asked as a part of her relations with the testatrix what the latter claimed as to such property.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries inflicted by a reservoir guard of the defendant in shooting the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in New London County where a demurrer to the defendant’s second defense was sustained (Keeler J.), and the cause was afterward tried to the jury before Kellogg, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $25,000, and appeal by the defendant.

Information charging the accused with violation of Chapter 312 of the Public Acts of 1919, entitled An Act concerning Sedition, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County (Máltbie, J.) for the advice of this court, on the issues of law raised by a demurrer to the information.

Suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant from taking any action under a judgment of summary process to dispossess the plaintiffs of certain leased premises, brought to the Superior Court in Windham County, where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained, the complaint held insufficient, and judgment rendered for the defendant (Webb, J.), from which the plaintiffs appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries and special damage incurred in consequence, alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Maltbie, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $5,000, which the trial court, upon motion of defendant, refused to set aside, and from this ruling, and for alleged errors in the charge and in rulings on evidence, the defendant appealed.

Appeal by the plaintiff from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the third district, acting for and in place of the Commissioner of the first district, in favor of the defendant, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Haines, J., which dismissed the appeal, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Information for larceny, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Haines, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

Action by the plaintiff to recover moneys paid by him for the benefit of the defendant, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Dickenson, J.; the court rendered a judgment of nonsuit, and from its refusal to set such judgment aside, the plaintiff appealed.

Suit for the specific performance of the defendant’s covenant to sell her real estate to the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Webb, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The defendant leased 378 Elm Street, New Haven, to plaintiff for two years from May 1st, 1917.

Action to recover damages for the destruction of growing crops and herbage on the plaintiff’s land, insufficiently fenced, by the trespass thereon of the defendants’ cattle, alleged to be due to the defendants’ negligence, brought by appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace to, and tried by, the Superior Court in Windham County, Malibie, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action by an administrator to recover damages for the death of his intestate, alleged to have been caused by negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Banks, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action to recover damages alleged to have been caused by the refusal of the defendant to convey certain real estate to the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Wolfe, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Appeal by the defendant from a finding and award of the Compensation Commissioner of the fifth district, acting for and in place of the Commissioner of the first district, taken to the Superior Court in Hartford County and, by agreement of the parties, transferred to and heard by said court in Middlesex County {Greene J.), which directed the dismissal of the appeal, and from the judgment thereafter rendered in conformity with this direction, by said court in Hartford County {Haines, J.), the defendant appealed.</p> <p>The commissioner found that the plaintiff whose back was injured, suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment; that his average wages computed in accordance with the statute were $24 a week; and awarded compensation “at the rate of $12 per week for thirty weeks,” and that the defendant pay all medical, surgical and hospital expenses. On the defendant’s appeal, the Superior Court sustained the award on the ground that it was within the spirit and meaning of § 6367 *; and if not, that the error was not injurious to the defendant. In the Superior Court counsel agreed that the plaintiff’s incapacity was partial. The defendant appeals from the ruling and decision of the Superior Court, because the award of the commissioner was contrary to the statute, and because he had no authority to award weekly compensation for a fixed period of time.</p>

Action to recover damages for breach of covenants against encumbrances and of warranty, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New London County, Waller, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Suit to restrain tbe defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs’ use of a passway, and for $300 damages, brought to the City Court of Waterbury and thence, by the plaintiffs’ appeal, to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the court, Makepeace, Deputy-Judge; judgment for plaintiffs for an injunction and $1 damages, and appeal by defendant.

Action against the surety in a replevin bond, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Simpson, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $162.80, which the court set aside upon failure of the plaintiff to file a remittitur of $154.55, as ordered, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Suit to restrain the defendants from collecting water upon their premises and discharging the same upon the adjoining property of the plaintiff, and for damages, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Booth, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for an injunction and $300 damages as against Dora Richman, from which she appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Burpee, J., and from the refusal of the court to set aside such judgment, the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for an assault and battery, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Walsh, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $200, from which he appealed.

Suit to foreclose a mortgage of real estate and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in Pair-field County and referred to a committee who heard the evidence and reported the facts; the court, Maltbie, J., accepted the report and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant corporations, allowing them to redeem the mortgage sought to be foreclosed, and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Action for a mandatory injunction and for damages caused by interference with and trespass upon a highway, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Middlesex County, Hinman, J., upon a demurrer to the complaint; the court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Keeler J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by defendant.

Applications for orders in the nature of mandamus, under General Statutes, § 6065, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Windham County, Hinman, J judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, denying and dismissing the applications, and appeal by plaintiff.

Action to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s decedent, alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Banks, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $3,500, and appeal by defendant Filippo Catanzaro.