97 Wash. 2d
Volume 97 — Washington Reports, Second Series
102 opinions
- 97 Wash. 2d 1City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 23Panorama Residential Protective Ass'n v. Panorama Corp. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 30Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 47State v. Regan (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 59Curtis v. City of Seattle (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 83Bertsch v. Brewer (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 92State v. White (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 118Human Rights Commission v. Cheney School District No. 30 (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 131Avlonitis v. Seattle District Court (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 139United Pacific Insurance v. Guaranty National Insurance (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 147In re the Disciplinary Proceeding against Luchini (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 148Senear v. Daily Journal-American (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 159State v. Jones (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 167Consolidated Dairy Products Co. v. Bar-T Ranch Dairy, Inc. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 182In Re R. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 191Ballasiotes v. Gardner (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 203Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance v. Wiscomb (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 215Williams v. Seattle School District No. 1 (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 227Fisher Bros. Corp. v. Des Moines Sewer Dist. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 232Barrie v. Kitsap County Boundary Review Board (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 237In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Moynihan (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 240In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Fortun (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 243In re the Disciplinary Proceeding against Orton (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 246Erickson v. Bank of California, N.A. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 255State v. Danforth (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 260Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Department of Revenue (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 264Pierce County Office of Involuntary Commitment v. Western State Hospital (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 273In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Brown (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 277Ruddach v. Don Johnston Ford, Inc. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 284In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ryan (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 289In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Stroh (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 307Marino Property Co. v. PORT COMMISSIONERS OF PORT OF SEATTLE (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 317Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. Sellers (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 335Bordynoski v. Bergner (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 344Farver v. Department of Retirement Systems (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 351Detonics ".45" Associates v. Bank of California (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 356In Re the Adoption of Henderson (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 360Brown v. McAnally (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 373In Re Rosellini (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 373In re the Disciplinary Proceeding against Rosellini (1982)
<bold>[1] Attorney and Client — Discipline — Misuse of Funds — In</bold> <bold>General.</bold> The usual sanction for an attorney who misuses trust funds is disbarment. Although mitigating circumstances will be considered, such factors as the absence of prior discipline, cooperation with the bar investigation, restitution, and repentance will not necessarily result in a sanction less severe than disbarment. <bold>[2] Attorney and Client — Discipline — Purpose.</bold> In an attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court imposes a sanction which under the circumstances will protect the public from future misconduct and preserve public confidence in the legal system. <bold>[3] Attorney and Client — Discipline — Degree of Punishment</bold><page_number>Page 374</page_number><bold>— Factors.</bold> When determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon an attorney for professional misconduct, the Supreme Court considers the seriousness and circumstances of the offense and whether the sanction is sufficient to prevent recurrence, to deter others from such misconduct, to maintain respect for the legal profession, and to assure the public that it will be protected from unprofessional conduct. <bold>[4] Attorney and Client — Discipline — Misuse of Funds —</bold> <bold>Concealment.</bold> An attorney's attempt to conceal his misuse of trust funds by not disclosing the truth to his clients or by filing a false affidavit with the bar association is an aggravating circumstance warranting a severe sanction. DOLLIVER, UTTER, and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent by separate opinion; ROSELLINI, DORE, and PEARSON, JJ., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
- 97 Wash. 2d 385Tommy P. v. Board of County Commissioners (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 403Meisel v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 412Pennsylvania Life Insurance v. Department of Employment Security (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 419Johnson v. Central Valley School District No. 356 (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 436State v. Carr (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 445Miller v. Sybouts (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 451Muije v. Department of Social & Health Services (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 454DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION v. Seib (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 454Department of Transportation v. State Employees' Insurance Board (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 466Cougar Business Owners Ass'n v. State (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 481City of Hoquiam v. Public Employment Relations Commission (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 493State v. Grisby (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 521City of Longview v. Public Employees' Retirement Board (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 528State v. Stockton (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 534Seattle School District No. 1 v. State (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 544Kennedy v. Sundown Speed Marine, Inc. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 552Pierce v. Department of Social & Health Services (1982)
<bold>[1] Criminal Law — Punishment — Probation — Parole — Purpose.</bold> The parole system is designed to reintegrate convicted persons into society while simultaneously protecting society from further antisocial activity. <bold>[2] Criminal Law — Punishment — Probation — Incompetency of</bold> <bold>Parolee — Effect on Jurisdiction of Board.</bold> The fact that a parolee is incompetent or his competency is suspect does not divest the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles of jurisdiction over the parolee. <bold>[3] Criminal Law — Punishment — Probation — Revocation —</bold> <bold>Incompetency of Parolee — Factual Stage.</bold> Due process does not require that a parolee be competent at the initial factual stage of a parole revocation hearing when the existence of a parole violation is determined. <bold>[4] Criminal Law — Punishment — Probation — Revocation —</bold> <bold>Incompetency of Parolee — Evaluation — Authority of Board.</bold> The Board of Prison terms and Paroles is authorized to order a competency evaluation of a parolee whose parole may be subject to revocation. <bold>[5] Criminal Law — Punishment — Probation — Revocation —</bold> <bold>Incompetency of Parolee — Disposition Stage.</bold> At the disposition<page_number>Page 553</page_number> stage of a parole revocation hearing involving a parolee whose competency has been called into question under standards applicable to criminal proceedings, due process requires the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles to have the parolee's competency evaluated and to consider the results of the evaluation in making its decision. <bold>[6] Criminal Law — Punishment — Probation — Revocation —</bold> <bold>Incompetency of Parolee — Alternative Dispositions.</bold> At a parole revocation hearing for a parolee who has been determined to be incompetent, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles may make the parolee's voluntary commitment under RCW 71.05 a condition of continued parole or may revoke parole and recommend that the parolee be transferred to a state mental institution pursuant to RCW <cross_reference>72.68.031</cross_reference>.
- 97 Wash. 2d 552Pierce v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVS. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 562State v. Loewen (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 574Hall v. Niemer (2009)
- 97 Wash. 2d 584Lectus, Inc. v. Rainier National Bank (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 590In Re the Personal Restraint of Phelan (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 598Ross v. Scannell (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 614Hayward v. Hansen (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 620Niichel v. Lancaster (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 630Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 637Pinehurst Park Royal Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Thompson (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 646Snohomish County v. State (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 652In Re the Estate of Shaughnessy (1982)
<bold>[1] Wills — Action Contesting — Scope — Admission to Probate.</bold> The sufficiency of the proof offered in support of admitting a will to probate may be challenged in an action under RCW <cross_reference>11.24.010</cross_reference> contesting the will unless the person bringing the contest action had made an appearance in the proceeding admitting the will. <bold>[2] Wills — Witnesses — Deadman's Statute — Executor —</bold> <bold>Beneficiary-Scrivener of Will — Lost Will.</bold> For purposes of the deadman's statute (RCW <cross_reference>5.60.030</cross_reference>), an executor defending a will in which he is a beneficiary is "adverse" to heirs contesting the will and is a "party in interest", and if the executor drafted the will the contents of the will constitute a "transaction" with the deceased. Under such circumstances the executor is incompetent to testify as to the contents of a lost will even though he is testifying in favor of the will as representative of the estate. <bold>[3] Wills — Action Contesting — Jury — Discretion of Court.</bold> A will contest is equitable in nature and the use of an advisory jury lies within the discretion of the court. WILLIAMS, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case.
- 97 Wash. 2d 658Cogan v. Kidder, Mathews & Segner, Inc. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 676In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Saulnier (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 680Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 691Foundation for the Handicapped v. Department of Social & Health Services (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 701Scannell v. City of Seattle (1983)
- 97 Wash. 2d 707Olympic View-Mukilteo Action Group v. City of Mukilteo (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 711Sienkiewicz v. Smith (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 719In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kennedy (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 724State v. Taylor (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 731State v. Ogden (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 737State v. Parker (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 743In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kuvara (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 748Brame v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 753Haner v. Quincy Farm Chemicals, Inc. (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 764Christensen, O'Connor, Garrison & Havelka v. Department of Revenue (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 773In Re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Yamagiwa (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 792Estate of Madsen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 801State v. Smith (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 804Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County (2002)
- 97 Wash. 2d 811In Re the Marriage of Elam (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 818In Re the Personal Restraint of Hagler (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 831In Re the Marriage of Dessauer (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 840State v. MacE (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 846State v. Wallace (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 856State v. Smith (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 864State v. Peterson (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 873State v. Brooks (1982)
<bold>[1] Homicide — First Degree Murder — Premeditation — What</bold> <bold>Constitutes.</bold> The premeditation element of the crime of first degree murder is distinct from the specific intent element. Premeditation is the mental state of thinking beforehand, deliberating, reflecting, or weighing or reasoning for a period of time, however short. <bold>[2] Homicide — First Degree Murder — Premeditation —</bold> <bold>Intoxication — Effect.</bold> The fact that evidence of excessive consumption of alcohol is insufficient to negate the element of specific intent in a prosecution for first degree murder does not necessarily preclude its admission as bearing on the element of premeditation. <bold>[3] Homicide — First Degree Murder — Premeditation — Expert</bold> <bold>Testimony.</bold> Expert testimony may be relevant to a determination of whether a defendant charged with first degree murder was capable of the mental process of premeditation.
- 97 Wash. 2d 880Glass v. Stahl Specialty Company (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 893Jeffery v. McCullough (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 899Washington Education Ass'n v. State (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 915Town of Republic v. Brown (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 922Spokane County Fire Protection District No. 9 v. Spokane County Boundary Review Board (1982)
- 97 Wash. 2d 929Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc. (1982)