Volume 98 — United States Reports

Held: that the terms used are sufficient to pass a title in fee to the land, and that, in the absence of any thing to the contrary, the instrument must be presumed to be sufficient in form to give full effect to the evident intention of the parties. 8.

<p>1. It is only through the instrumentality of his assignees that creditors can recover, and subject to the payment of their claims, the property which tlie bankrupt fraudulently transferred prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy, or which he conceals from, and fails to surrender to, his assignees.</p> <p>2. Assignees of the bankrupt are subject to the control and direction of the proper court, arid it may, for good cause shown, compel them to take the requisite steps for the full and complete protection of the rights of his creditors.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the trustee and cestui que trust must be considered as purchasers; and if they had no notice of such claim, the lands are subject to sale to satisfy the debt. If the sale yields a surplus, the rights of such third party thereto will be the same as they were to the land. 3. A post-nuptial contract, made upon sufficient consideration, and wholly or partially executed, will be sustained in equity. 4.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

United States v. Throckmorton (98 U.S. 61) is an 1878 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on civil procedure, specifically res judicata, in cases heard at equity. A unanimous Court affirmed an appeal of a decision by the District Court for California upholding a Mexican-era land claim, holding that collateral estoppel bars untimely motions to set aside the verdict where the purportedly fraudulent evidence has already been considered and a decision reached. In the opinion it distinguished between that kind of fraud, which it called intrinsic, and extrinsic fraud, in which deceptive actions exterior to the proceeding prevented a party, or potential party, to the action from becoming aware of the possibility they could vindicate their rights in court.

<p>Where a bill shows no equity in the complainant, and contains no averment that he has been injured by certain statutes of a State, this court will not pass upon an abstract question the object of which is plainly to obtain a decision touching their constitutionality, but will dismiss the hill without prejudice.</p>

<p>Reissued letters-patent No. 5328, granted to William T. Garratt March 18, 1873, for a new and useful improvement in lubricators, infringe letters-patent No. 111,881, granted to Nicholas Seibert Feb. 14,1871, for a new and useful improvement in lubricators. They are, therefore, void.</p>

Held: that the decree was erroneous. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Wyoming. The facts are stated in the

Held: That the acceptance of the policy was not such as waived any right of A., B., & Co. under the agreement covering their interest in the cotton, which A. in their behalf had made with the company, and that they are entitled to the relief prayed for. 2. That a mere mistake of law does not, in the absence of other circumstances, constitute any ground for the reformation of a written contract.

Held: that the bonds are not, in the hands of a bona fide holder for value, rendered void by the fact that, at the time of such election, the company was not created according to law. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. The facts are stated in the

Held: That the parties to the indenture, by their expressed understanding and agreement, intended to incorporate into the instrument the substance of the act of Congress which prohibits any department from “ involving the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of the appropriations.” 2.

Held: that a subsequent entry of them by B. was without author ity of law, and that a patent issued to him therefor was void. 2. A party who has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, acquires a vested interest therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof.

Held: that a holder of the bonds is not in such privity with the corporation, nor has he such interest in the contract between it and the association, as to warrant a suit in his own name to compel the corporation to pay the bonds. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Tbis is an appeal from a decree dismissing, upon demurrer, a bill filed by the Giant Powder Company against the California Powder Works and others, charging them with tbe infringement of three certain letters-patent belonging to the complainant, and praying for an injunction and a decree for damages.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that he was not liable therefor. 2. The importer is liable for the duty; but the bond is discharged as to the surety by the performance of one of its alternative conditions. S. " Or ” is never construed to mean “ and,” when the evident intent of the parties would be thereby defeated. *143 Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The facts are stated in the

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), was a Supreme Court of the United States case which held that religious duty was not a defense to a criminal indictment. Reynolds was the first Supreme Court opinion to address the First Amendment's protection of religious liberties, impartial juries and the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment. George Reynolds was a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church), charged with bigamy under the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying Amelia Jane Schofield while still married to Mary Ann Tuddenham in Utah Territory. He was secretary to Brigham Young and presented himself as a test of the federal government's attempt to outlaw polygamy. An earlier conviction was overturned on technical grounds.

<p>1. The court again decides that the authority conferred by the charter of a railroad company in Missouri upon the county court of any county in which a part of the road of the company might be, to subscribe to the capital stock thereof, was not revoked by sect. 14 of art. 11 of the existing Constitution of that State; and where the General Assembly reserved the right to amend the charter, and the company was consolidated with another, pursuant to a law passed after the adoption of the Constitution, the county court of the county through which the road passed might, without submitting the question to a popular vote, lawfully subscribe to the capital stock of the consolidated company, and issue its bonds in payment therefor.</p> <p>2. County of Callaway v. Foster (93 U. S. 567) and County of Scotland v. Thomas (94 id. 682) cited and approved.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court.</p>

Held: that the Court of Claims was bound to adjudge accordingly. Appeal from tbe Court of Claims. This was a suit by William S. McKnight and James W. Richardson, assignees of Simeon Hart, to recover from the United States the sum of $9,000. The United States interposed a counter-claim and set-off for $21,675.68. The court below found the following facts : — 1.

Held: That the instruction Bhould have been given. 2. That the facts therein stated constituted in law a probable cause, and being such, the existence of malice, if such there was, would not entitle the plaintiff to recover. 6. The jury, if they find for the plaintiff, cannot, in estimating his damages, consider the fees of counsel in prosecuting the suit.

Held: That the survey, having been disapproved by the Secretary, has no binding effect, and that the question of its correctness was not for the determination of the jury. 2. That in the absence of a subsisting recognized survey, the grant not having been confirmed by ascertained boundaries specifically set forth in the order of the board, so that the tract can be located without a survey, the plaintiff cannot recover. 3.

Held: that in the absence of proof that the loss was occasioned by the hand or through the negligence of the hotel-keeper, or by a clerk or servant employed by him in the hotel, A. was not entitled to recover. 2. A hotel-keeper is not liable for a loss occasioned by the personal negligence of the guest himself.

Held: that the matters alleged are not sufficient to estop B. from pleading the statute. Appeal from the. Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York. The facts are stated in the

Held: that the Circuit Court having jurisdiction of the suit, an error, if one was committed, can only be reviewed here after a final decree shall have been passed in that court. Motion for an order to show cause why a mandamus shall not be issued. The facts are stated in the

Held: that, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas as to the effect of such a conveyance, he was entitled to the relief prayed for. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas. The facts are stated in the

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee.</p> <p>The facts.are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that such declarations being in harmony with the deeds that he had executed or authorized, and against his interest in reference to the property not conveyed, or not shown to have been conveyed, were admissible. 8. After the evidence was closed, counsel on both sides agreed that as to the title of said Mary there was no conflict of testimony, and that it was a matter for the court to determine.

Held: that the evidence was admissible in mitigation of damages. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Vermont. The case was argued by The Attorney-Q-eneral and The Solicitor- Qeneral for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. JE. J. Phelps for the defendant in error. Me.

Held: that whether the original bonds were issued in violation of law or not, — a point which this court does not decide, — A. is entitled to recover. *309 Error to tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas. This was an action brought by the Merchants’ National Bank of Little Rock, Ark., against the city of Little Rock.

Held: That it was the intention of the testatrix that the legacies to charitable purposes and to pay annuities should be paid, but not from the proceeds of the personal property which she owned in her own right, and specifically appropriated. 2. That the will was an execution of the power, and it appointed the whole fund to her executors. *316 3.

Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia. The Bank of the Old Dominion sued the makers, and W. N. McVeigh, the indorser, of certain promissory notes which were payable at that bank. At the date of the notes the bank had its place of business at the city of Alexandria, Va., and the other parties resided there.

<p>1. The grant of lands made to the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company, by the act of July 2,1864 (13 Stat. 356), embraced ten odd-numbered sections per mile, to be taken on the line of the road and in equal quantities on each side thereof, which had not been sold, reserved, or otherwise disposed of by the United States, and to which, at the time of the definite location of sucli line, a pre-emption or a homestead claim had not attached.</p> <p>2. Lands are, within the meaning of the act, taken on such line when they are selected along its general direction or course, within lines perpendicular to it at each end.</p> <p>3. The grant was made to aid in the construction of the entire road; but the company, on completing each section of twenty miles, had the privilege to receive a patent for lands opposite thereto.</p> <p>4. The grant having no lateral limits, and the Land Department having for years neglected to withdraw from market lands situate beyond twenty miles from the road, and the lands opposite to certain portions of it having been patented to other parties, it was held that the grant to the company could be satisfied by lands elsewhere situate on the line of the road.</p> <p>5. By the act of July 1,1862 (12 Stat. 489), and by said act of 1864, which was an amendment thereof, Congress intended to place the Union Pacific Railroad Company, and all its branch companies, upon the same footing as to lands, privileges, and duties, except where special provision was otherwise made; and the grant having been enlarged as to the sections and the distance from the road within which they should be selected, by striking out the numbers in the first act and substituting larger numbers, the first act must thenceforth be read as against the government and the parties ^Nufíing under concurren Coi*' subsequent grants, as though the larger numbers had been originally inserted in it. The Burlington ivml Missouri River Railroad Company claiming under the act which declared that that of 1862, making the grant to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, should be thus read, must take its right to the lands subject to the claim of the latter company.</p> <p>6. The Land Department, in executing the act, was not authorized to enlarge the quantity of lands on either side of the road to make up a deficiency on the other. But, at the suit of the United States, patents embracing any alleged excess on one side cannot be adjudged invalid as to any lands which are not identified, so as to be separated from the remainder; nor can any decree be rendered against the company for their value.</p>

Certificate of division in opinion between tbe judges of tbe Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: That by the consolidation the original companies were dissolved, and a new corporation was created, which became subject to that provision of the code. 2.

Held: that the record and proceedings aforesaid being inspected, the said Circuit Court may cause further to be done therein to correct that error what of right and according to the law and custom of the United States should be done.” On the next day, in obedience to the command of this writ, a transcript of the proceedings and judgment of the District Court, including the bill of exceptions, was sent to the Circuit…

Held: for the sum of $320,000, and that by the act No. 109, of 1854, these shares were for ever pledged for the payment of the bonds issued under its provisions; that the city should therefore be compelled to pay out of their proceeds so much of the judgments as appears on the face of the records to have been rendered upon the bonds ; or, in case their payment cannot be enforced in this way, that it should be compelled to…

Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. This is a writ of error sued out by the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, the defendant below, on the 6th of December, 1875, to reverse a judgment rendered against it for $2,250 by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

The plaintiff is a corporation created by the laws of Minnesota, known as the Mississippi and Rum River Boom Company, and the defendant is a citizen of the State of Illinois. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Appeal from tbe District Court of tbe United States for tbe Western District of Missouri.</p> <p>Tbis is an appeal from a decree dismissing, on demurrer, tbe bill of tbe complainants, who, with tbe exception of one, their alienee, claim to be tbe heirs-at-law of Captain Don Joseph Yalliere, who died intestate in tbe city of New Orleans in tbe year 1799. Tbe suit was brought under the act entitled “ An Act for the final adjustment of private land-claims in tbe States of Florida, Louisiana, and Missouri, and for other purposes,” approved June 22, 1860. 12 Stat. 85.</p> <p>Tbe claim in this case is founded on three instruments of writing, of which translations are given in tbe record.</p> <p>1. An order of Baron de Carondelet, Spanish governor of Louisiana: —</p> <p>“ 11th June, 1793, to Captain Don Joseph Yalliere, in the District of Arkansas, a tract of land, situated on the White River, extending from the rivers Norte Grande and Cibolos to the source of the said White River, ten leagues in depth.</p> <p>“Baron de Carondelet.”</p> <p>2. A certificate of survey by Charles Trudeau: —</p> <p>“ Don Carlos Trudeau, Royal and Private Surveyor of the Province of Louisiana.</p> <p>“ I certify having measured, in favor and in presence of Don Joseph Valliere, captain of the stationary regiment of Louisiana, a portion of land situated in the jurisdiction of Arkansas, on the north and south banks of Rio Blanco; bounded on the east, or on the inferior limit, by the Rio Norte Grande, the Rio Blanco, and the Rio Cíbolos; on the west, or superior limit, by the fountainhead or origin of the most western branch of the said Rio Blanco and by vacant lands of his majesty; separated from said vacant lands by a line beginning at the said fountain-head of the most western branch of Rio Blanco, running southwest ten leagues in depth; on the north by the lands of his majesty, separated from these by a drawn line, beginning at the Rio Norte Grande, commencing at a point ten leagues distant in a direct line from its mouth or confluence with the Rio Blanco, running in a course nearly west until it meets the fountain-head or origin of the most western branch of the Rio Blanco, and on the south side by vacant lands of his majesty, separated from these by a line drawn apart, beginning at a point where ends the southwest limit, ten leagues from the fountain-head or origin of the most western branch of the Rio Blanco, running on a parallel line with said Rio Blanco descending, ten leagues in depth, until it meets tlio Cíbolos, at a distance of ten leagues in a direct line from Rio Blanco. All of which is now fully demonstrated in the figurative plan which precedes,— in which are shown the dimensions and courses of the boundaries, the trees and monuments serving as artificial and natural boundaries. The lines and limits have been made at the request of the grantee and in compliance with the order of the governor-general, Baron de Carondelet, of the-of June of the present year. All of which I certify that it may be everywhere valid. I give these presents, together with the figurative plan which precedes, on the 24th of October, 1793.</p> <p>“ Carlos Trudeau, Surveyor-General”</p> <p>The figurative plan is in the form following: —</p> <p> </p> <p>8. A cession or grant by Carondelet: —</p> <p>“For the benefit of the public, and for the greater encouragement of agriculture and industry of the country, I have judged it expedient to take steps for the surveying and granting the royal lands of the provinces :</p> <p>Therefore, I grant to Don Joseph Valliere, captain of the regiment stationed in Louisiana, a portion of land in the jurisdiction of Arkansas, situate on both banks of the White River, ten leagues on both banks, beginning at the origin of the most western branch or source of the White River, and running southwest ten leagues, descending from thence on the south by parallel line with White River, at the distance of ten leagues, until it intersects the Buffalo River at a point ten leagues in a direct line with White River, from thence descending the Buffalo River to its confluence with the White River; following this as far as the mouth of the Great North Fork of the White River, up the same to a point ten leagues in a direct line from its mouth, from thence ascending the White River to the north in a westerly direction ten leagues from the same as far as its source, which will be better seen on the figurative plan made by my order by the surveyor-general, Don Carlos Trudeau, of this province, 24th of October last (it being impossible for the royal surveyor to make an actual survey at this time), and in virtue of my order in June, of the current year, by which I made him a grant and ordered the surveyor-general to put him in possession, according to the usual form, in consequence of the power which has been conferred on me by our lord the king (God preserve), I grant, in his royal name, to the said Don Joseph Valliere, captain of the regiment of infantry of Louisiana, the said portion described above, in order that he may dispose of it, he and his legitimate successors, as property belonging to him. Done in New Orleans, 22d of December, 1793.</p> <p>“El Baron de Carondelet.”</p> <p>A diagram, made in 1876, is filed with the bill as an exhibit, accompanied by an affidavit of Mr. George H. Day, “ a practical city surveyor, duly appointed as such by the city of Brooklyn,” that it is a true and faithful diagram description and extent of the lands covered by the grant. The description as therein set forth is that the tract is “ situated on both sides of White River (or Rio Blanco), in the States of Missouri and Arkansas, extending from the north fork of White River (or Rio Norte Grande) westerly to its source ■ 37-£ miles in depth on both sides (or ten leagues).</p> <p>“ Beginning at the origin or terminal of main fork of White River in Madison County, Arkansas, in township 13 north, range 25 west, from thence south 37| miles (or ten leagues) to a point in township 7 north, range 25 west; thence continuing on a line drawn parallel with the main courses of the said White River and at a distance of 37-£ miles therefrom (or ten leagues) on a line drawn north of west 33|- miles to a point in township 8 north and range 31 west; thence northwesterly 52^ miles to a point in the Indian Territory or Cherokee County near Flint Creek; thence north by east 46T7g- miles to a point in township 23 north, range 34 west, in McDonald County, Missouri; thence northeasterly 60-^ miles to a point in township 28 north, range 26 west, in Lawrence County, Missouri; thence easterly 48 miles to a point in township 29 north, and range 18 west, and distant from a point on White River 37|- miles (or ten leagues) ; thence southeasterly 45-=^ miles to a point on the Big North Fork of White River in township 24 north, and range 12 west, distant 37|- miles (or ten leagues) northerly in a direct line from the mouth of the north fork of said White River; thence southerly down the north fork of White River (or Rio Norte Grande) to its mouth in township 18 north, range 12 west; thence southwesterly up the White River to the mouth of Buffalo Fork of White River; thence westei'ly, following said Buffalo Fork (or Rio Cibolos), to its source in township 14 north, range 24 west; thence southwesterly to the terminal or source of White River, the place of beginning, as more fully shown on the map annexed, containing 11,370 square miles.”</p> <p>The complainants allege that “ Rio Blanco ” is the White River of the State of Arkansas, having its source in the most westerly part thereof, running through the southwesterly portion of the State of Missouri, and thence through the said State of Arkansas, and emptying into the Mississippi River; that Rio Cibolos is the Buffalo River, a branch of the said White River; that Rio Norte Grande is the Great North Fork River of the State of Arkansas, and a branch of the said White River;'that neither they nor any parties holding title under the original claimant have possessed and cultivated any of said lands for the period of twenty years prior to the filing of the petition; that the lands are partly situated in the counties of Ozark, Douglass, Taney, Christian, Stone, and Barry of the State of Missouri, and are within the jurisdiction of the court below; and that all or nearly all of them have been disposed of by the United States. The complainants pray that they may be allowed upon the trial to show by competent evidence what portion of the lands now remains undisposed of and claimed by the United States; that a patént may be issued therefor; and that warrants or scrip be awarded to them and their legal representatives, as an equivalent for the lands, portion of the said grant, which have been disposed of by the United States; and for such other decree as to the court may seem just.</p>

<p>A mere permission by the commandant to settle on land in Florida, not followed by a grant or by other evidence of title under the Spanish government, will • not sustain a claim in a suit in the District Court, brought under the eleventh section of the act of June 22, 1860,12 Stat. 85.</p>

<p>In ejectment in the courts of the United States the strict legal title prevails.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the conveyance barred the claim. 2.

Held: that the steamer was liable. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The facts are stated in the

Held: That the acts charged are not an offence under sect. 13 of the act of July 4, 1864 ( 13 Stat. 389 ). 2. That sect. 31 of the act of March 3, 1873 (17 id. 575, Rev. Stat., sect. 5485), was not intended to apply to a case where the money had been withheld before its passage. 2. The word “ claimant ” in said sect. 13 means a person who, under the act of July 4,1864, has a claim before the pension office.

Held: That the indictment was barred by sect 1044 of the Revised Statutes. 2. That the crime charged was not a continuous one to the time of finding the indictment. Certifícate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. The facts are stated in the

Held: That this section only confirmed to the owners of water-rights and of ditches and canals on the public lands of the United States the same rights winch they held under the local customs, laws, and decisions of the courts, prior to its passage. 2.

<p>Error to tbe Supreme Court of tbe Territory of Utab. ■</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court.</p>

<p>The Statute of Limitations of Iowa begins to run against coupon interest warrants from the time they respectively mature, although they remain attached to the bond which represents the principal debt.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: without the intimation of a doubt, that a State statute cannot bar the United States. The same doctrine has been several times laid down by this court; but it seems always to have been taken for granted, and in no instance to have been discussed either by counsel or the court. United States v. Buford, 3 Pet. 12 ; Lindsey v. Miller’s Lessee, 6 id. 666; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92 .

<p>1. A Mexican was not, by the revolution which resulted in the independence of Texas, or by her Constitution of March 17,1836, or her laws subsequently enacted, divested of his title to lands in that State, but he retained the right to alienate and transmit them to his heirs, and the latter are entitled to sue for and recover them.</p> <p>2. The division of a country and the maintenance of independent governments over its different parts do not of , themselves divest the rights which the citizens of either have to property situate within the territory of the other.</p> <p>3. That Constitution, although declaring generally that aliens shall not hold land in Texas except by title emanating directly from the government, did not divest their title; for it adds, that “ they shall have a reasonable time to take possession of and dispose of the same in a manner hereafter to be pointed out by law.” Before the title can he divested, proceedings for enforcing its forfeiture must be provided by law, and carried into effect; and hitherto they have not been provided.</p> <p>4. In Texas, the protocol of a Mexican title is an archive which may be deposited in the General Land-Office at any time, subject to all just implications arising from delay and the circumstances of its history; and when so deposited, a certified copy thereof from the land-office is competent prima facie evidence of the title.</p> <p>5. Until a title is deposited in the land-office, or duly recorded in the proper county, bona fide purchasers not having notice' thereof, though claiming under a junior Mexican grant, will be protected.</p>

Held: that A. acquired no priority by the levy, and that the assignee in bankruptcy is entitled to the proceeds. Appeal from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe District of Minnesota. William H. Sbuey, a merchant at St. Paul, Minn., executed, March 13, 1874, a deed of assignment conveying bis entire property, including his stock in trade, to William S. Combs in trust, for tbe equal benefit of all bis creditors.

<p>1. Parol evidence is admissible in equity to show that a certificate of stock issued to a party as owner was delivered to him as security for a loan of money. A court of equity will look beyond the terms of an instrument to the real transaction, and when that is shown to be one of security and not of sale, it will give effect to the actual contract of the parties.</p> <p>2. The rule which excludes such evidence to contradict or vary a written instrument does not forbid an inquiry into the object of the parties in executing and receiving it.</p>

Held: pursuant to notice, at Beaufort, in district of Beaufort, in the State of South Carolina, on the thirteenth day of March, a.d. 1863, the tract or parcel of land hereinafter described, situate in the town of Beaufort and State aforesaid, and described as follows, to wit: — “ ‘ Lot B, in block 23, according to the commissioners’ plat,’ was sold and struck off to the United States for the sum of fifteen dollars…

The British steamer “ Carolina ” came to Baltimore, consigned to James Hooper & Co. They were also her agents while she remained in that port. The plaintiff in error was a member of the firm. Having taken on board her return cargo, the steamer proceeded on her homeward voyage. While in the Chesapeake Bay she was injured by a collision with another vessel, and put back to Baltimore for repairs.

Held: that there being no statute giving the right to recover in such cases, the action could not be maintained. *542 Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska. The facts are stated in the

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.</p> <p>Lafayette F. Thompson and Asahel G. Bachelder, claiming to be inventors of a railroad brake, executed, before letters-patent were issued to them therefor, the following assignment, which was duly recorded in the Patent Office: —</p> <p>“ Whereas we, Lafayette F. Thompson, of Charlestown, and Asahel G. Bachelder, now or late of Lowell, in the State of Massachusetts, have invented an improved mode of operating the brakes of railway cars, and have applied, or intend to apply, for letters-patent of the United States of America therefor.</p> <p>“ Now, therefore, this indenture witnesseth, that for and in consideration of §100, in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I have assigned and set over, and do hereby assign, sell, and set over, to Henry Tanner, of Buffalo, in the State of New York, all the right, title, and interest whatever which we now have, or by letters-patent would be entitled to have and possess, in the aforesaid invention, the said invention being described in the specification as prepared and executed by us, or to be prepared and executed by us, for the obtaining of said letters-patent; the whole to be enjoyed and held by the said Henry Tanner and his legal representatives, to the full extent and manner in which the same would have been or could be held and enjoyed by us had this assignment never been made.</p> <p>“ And we do, by these presents, authorize the Commissioner of Patents to issue the said letters-patent to the said Henry Tanner and his legal representatives, as the assignee of onr whole right and title to the same and to the new invention aforesaid.</p> <p>“ In witness whereof, we have hereto set our signatures and seals, this first day of April, a.d. 1852.</p> <p>•‘Lafayette F. Thompson, [seal.]</p> <p>“ Asahel G. Bachelder. [seal.]</p> <p>“ Witness, R. H. Eddy.”</p> <p>Letters-patent were issued on the sixth day of the following July to Tanner,' who, July 18, 1854, assigned to Thomas Sayles all his remaining right and title in them for the unexpired term thereof, and “ any extension thereof that may hereafter be granted,” excepting, however, certain reserved territory and specified railroad corporations. Said letters were renewed and extended for seven years from July 6, 1866.</p> <p>After that date, and until some time in 1873, Hendrie infringed the patents within the territory not so reserved, and Sayles filed his bill for an account, &c., to which Hendrie demurred, upon the ground that Sayles had no legal title to the extended term. The demurrer was overruled, and a decree for want of an answer passed for the complainant. Hendrie thereupon appealed here.</p> <p>Unless the complainant has the sole legal title to the extended term, he cannot maintain this suit. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 30; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 241. The whole case depends upon the assignment of April 1,1852, to Tanner. If it gave him such an interest in that term that the legal title thereto would vest in him the moment the extension should be granted, the demurrer is bad.</p> <p>The assignment is to be construed like any other contract to carry out the intention of the parties, and to further that intention their situation and the surrounding circumstances may be considered. 2 Pars. Contr. 499; Shore v. Wilson, 9 Cl. & Fin. 555-569; Mumford v. Gretling, 7 C. B. N. S. 309; Qarr v. Montefiore, 5 B. & S. 427. It was made before the issue of the patent. The inventors then had an inchoate right to the exclusive use of their invention, it being complete ; and they could assign it, so that the legal right which would result from the issue of the patent would vest in Tanner. Grayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477. And they perhaps had an inchoate right to an extension, assignable with the same effect as their right to a patent. Railroad Company v. Trimble, 10 Wall. 367.</p> <p>The granting clause of the instrument, when taken as a whole, plainly indicates the invention and the letters-patent intended to be conveyed, as described in and to be obtained by the specification, and the latter was not prepared to obtain the extension.</p> <p>And again, the inventors authorize the issue of “ said letters-patent ” to Tanner, as the assignee of their “ whole right and title to the same,” not to any letters-patent, but to “said letters-patent.” There is no grant of, and no reference to, an extension. This clearly shows that the original term was alone intended to be conveyed.</p> <p>This court has never passed directly upon the question whether an assignment of the “ invention ” necessarily includes both terms of a patent, or clearly shows an intention so to do. The authorities on the circuit rule otherwise. Clum v. Brewer, 2 Curt. C. C. 520 ; Waterman v. Wallace, 13 Blatch. 132.</p>

<p>Error to tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe Southern District of Obio.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

The Cairo and Fulton Railroad Company was incorporated by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, Jan. 12, 1853, to construct a railroad from the Mississippi River opposite the mouth of the Ohio, in Missouri, by way of Little Rock, Ark., to the Texas State line. The capital stock was fixed at $1,500,000, with power of increase, divided into shares of $25 each, to be held as personal property.

<p>Where, under sect. 8 of the act of July 28,1866 (14 Stat. 329), the court grants a certificate that there was probable cause for the acts done by an otfieer of the United States, for which the judgment was rendered against him, the amount payable out of the treasury does not include any interest which had accrued upon the judgment before such certificate was given.</p>

Held: and that their repeated consideration and action resulted in an express provision in that respect for the trial of persons charged with crimes, — a qualified one for trials at common law, and an entire omission to regulate the trial of equity causes. *582 There also may be a qualified regulation of suits at common law, because it seems that trial by jury does, in the nature of things, savor of locality, so that it…

Held: that the bank is entitled to enforce the collection of the note by a sale of the lands. Error to tte Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.