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980 F.2d 1165

Docket No. 92-2034.

Watson v. Jones

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted Nov. 9, 1992.

Decided Dec. 1, 1992.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1992-12-01

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court: whether the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Roberson v. Hayti Police Department

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Robinson v. Monaghan · Timm v. Gunter · Williams v. Adams

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1992-12-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently August 2023 · most notably Reich v. ConAgra, Inc. (1993), Freitas v. Ault (1997)

16 federal appellate · 3 district ·

1501992200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Joseph Watson and Bill Harris, pro se.

¶2Robert J. Krehbiel and Donna S. Morrison, St. Louis, Mo., argued, for appellee.

¶3Before JOHN R. GIBSON, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

¶4BEAM, Circuit Judge.

¶5Joseph Watson and Bill Harris, Missouri inmates, appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant Jones in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. We reverse and remand.

¶6In a verified complaint, Watson and Harris alleged that Jones, a female corrections officer, performed almost daily routine pat-down searches for the two months preceding November 2, 1990, that consisted of tickling and “a deliberate examination of the genital, anus, lower stomach and thigh areas.” They alleged that, when they informed Jones that they wished to be *1166searched by male guards, Jones retaliated by citing them for false disciplinary violations. They further alleged that, when they refused to be searched by Jones, they were placed in the “hole.” They attached to their complaint conduct violation reports: Harris’s indicates that he stated to the interviewing officer that he refused the pat-down search and had made complaints about Jones “being sexually harassing.”

¶7Jones moved for summary judgment. In an affidavit in support, Jones attested that, during the two-month period in question she patted down plaintiffs only six to seven times; she pats down inmates in accordance with procedure; she never pats an inmate in the crotch area unless she “know[s] something is there”; she never touches an inmate’s genital, anal, or upper thigh area; and she has touched an inmate’s lower stomach with the back of her hands in accordance with procedure. Plaintiffs’ response essentially reiterated the allegations in their complaint, adding that Jones’s searches included “prolonged rubbing and fondling of the genitals and anus area”; her searches violated their Fourth Amendment rights; and they did not refuse pat-down searches by Jones because of her gender, but because of her “ongoing sexual advances toward them.”

¶8The district court granted Jones’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the inmates had made only broad, conclusory allegations of sexual harassment, while Jones, in her affidavit, swore that she had not conducted any improper pat searches.

¶9In reviewing a decision of the district court to grant summary judgment, we must apply the same strict standard as the district court; therefore, our review is de novo. Robinson v. Monaghan, 864 F.2d 622, 624 (8th Cir.1989). We are required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts disclosed in the pleadings. Id.Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

¶10We conclude that a material factual dispute remained concerning whether Jones subjected the plaintiffs to sexually harassing and physically intrusive pat-down searches. Plaintiffs’ verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for the purpose of summary judgment. See Williams v. Adams, 935 F.2d 960, 961 (8th Cir.1991). Plaintiffs’ attestation in their complaint that Jones fondled them during pat-down searches was countered by Jones’s denial in her affidavit supporting her summary judgment motion. Although plaintiffs’ complaint admittedly lacks detail, we do not agree with the district court that the allegations were broad and conclusory. Plaintiffs included allegations regarding when the searches occurred (almost daily for a period of two months preceding November 2, 1990), under what circumstances the searches occurred (routine), how Jones conducted the searches, and complaints to prison officials about the searches (in Harris’s conduct violation report attached to the complaint).1

¶11Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

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