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990 P.2d 1005

Duran v. State

Wyoming Supreme Court

Decided November 19, 1999

Wyoming Supreme Court · decided 1999-11-19

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently August 2017

10 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"While Duran claims that the more persuasive approach finds self-defense is relevant to the "reckless” element of the offense, this Court is inclined to follow "[t]he majority of jurisdictions hold[ing] that self-defense requires intentional conduct.” A charge of recklessness involves an unintentional act. The trial court gave proper instructions to the jury on the elements of the offense and the definitions of "recklessness" and "proximate cause." The jury had the applicable law before it. The trial court did not err in refusing to submit an instruction on self-defense to the jury.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Holloman v. State

“[t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation” and further notes that”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Clark v. State

Relies on Elliott v. Commonwealth

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1999-11-19

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

LEHMAN, Chief Justice,

¶1dissenting.

¶2I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that a theory of self-defense is unavailable to one who is charged with recklessly causing a result because “a charge of recklessness involves an unintentional act.” This is not always the case, as Ms. Duran’s dilemma illustrates. There is no question that Ms. Duran intended to dislodge “the victim” from the hood of the car. In fact, she intentionally slammed on her brakes to forcibly remove her attacker and allow her escape. She did not intend to hurt him, but she voluntarily chose to use whatever force was necessary. The question before the jury was whether that intention was a conscious disregard of “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” and her actions constituted “a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation!)]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-l-104(a)(ix) (Michie Cum.Supp.1995).

¶3*1012I cannot distinguish this scenario from those in which we allow a criminal defendant to claim self-defense. Had Ms. Duran stated she intended to harm “the victim,” and had the prosecutor decided to charge her with an intentional homicide, the jury could have considered the reasonableness of her actions in light of her subjective belief of imminent harm. Rather, because her state of mind is less culpable (or because the prosecutor charges her as such), the majority denies her an opportunity to demonstrate that, given her subjective belief, her intentional conduct was reasonable and the risk justifiable.

¶4This case sadly personifies the fundamental unfairness caused by confusing “an unintentional act” with what really is an unintentional consequence. Here, Ms. Duran’s actions were not unintentional; the victim’s death was unintentional. See Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416, 420-22 (Ky.1998) (“As applied to the facts of this case, the definitions of ‘wantonly’ and ‘recklessly’ address appellant’s state of mind, not with respect to his act, but with respect to the result of his act.”). To further illustrate the point, imagine the defendant is faced with a deadly assailant and, in response, the intended victim points and shoots a gun at the attacker’s legs, meaning to incapacitate him. However, the defendant’s lack of skill causes the bullet to enter the assailant’s heart, instantly killing him. Should the prosecutor choose to charge him with manslaughter under Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-105(a)(ii), will we deny a claim of self-defense at trial? Under the majority holding, we do.

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