Precedents

are the decisions of courts of justice: when exactly in point with a case before the court, they are generally held to have a binding authority, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, as because the law in that case has been solemnly declared and determined. To render precedents valid, they must be founded in reason and justice, Hob. 270; must have been made upon argument, and be the solemn decision of the court, 4 Co. 94; and in order to give them binding effect, there must be a current of decisions, Cro. Car. 528; Cro. Jac. 386; 8 Co. 163. According to Lord Talbot, it is “ much better to stick to the known general rules, than to follow any one particular precedent, which may be founded on reason unknown to us.”

Cas. Temp. Talb. 26.

Blackstone, 1 Com. 70, says, that a former decision is in general to be followed unless * manifestly absurd or unjust,” and, in the latter case, it is declared, when overruled, not that the former sentence was bad law, but that it was not law.

Vide 16 Vin. Ab. 499; Wesk. on Ins. h. t.; 2 Swanst.

163; 2 Jac. & W. 318; 3 Ves. 527; 2 Atk. 559; 2 P. Wms. 258; 2 Bro. C. C. 86; 1 Ves. Jr. 11; and 2 Evans’s Poth. 377, where the author argues against the policy of making precedents binding when contrary to reason.