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Precedents

Defined in 3 dictionaries — Cyclopedic (1922), Ballentine's (1916), Bouvier (1839)

The Cyclopedic Law Dictionary

Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf; ed. James C. Cahill · 1922

Authorities to be followed in courts of justice. A term particularly applied to judicial decisions upon points of law arising in any given case. 1 Kent, Comm. 475, 476. These are recognized in equity as well as at law. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 18. The old books are full of expressions in support of precedents. Jenk. Cent. Cas. viii. See "Stare Decisis." Written forms of proceedings which have been approved by the courts, or by long professional usage, and are to be (usually strictly) followed. Steph. PI. 392. Lord Bacon observes that there are political as well as legal precedents. Bac. Works, iv. 354, PRECEPT (Lat. precipio, to command). A writ directed to the sheriif, or other officer, commanding him to do something,

Ballentine's Law Dictionary

James A. Ballentine · 1916

Previous decisions relied upon as authority.

A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States

John Bouvier · 1839

are the decisions of courts of justice: when exactly in point with a case before the court, they are generally held to have a binding authority, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, as because the law in that case has been solemnly declared and determined. To render precedents valid, they must be founded in reason and justice, Hob. 270; must have been made upon argument, and be the solemn decision of the court, 4 Co. 94; and in order to give them binding effect, there must be a current of decisions, Cro. Car. 528; Cro. Jac. 386; 8 Co. 163. According to Lord Talbot, it is “ much better to stick to the known general rules, than to follow any one particular precedent, which may be founded on reason unknown to us.” Cas. Temp. Talb. 26. Blackstone, 1 Com. 70, says, that a former decision is in general to be followed unless * manifestly absurd or unjust,” and, in the latter case, it is declared, when overruled, not that the former sentence was bad law, but that it was not law. Vide 16 Vin. Ab. 499; Wesk. on Ins. h. t.; 2 Swanst. 163; 2 Jac. & W. 318; 3 Ves. 527; 2 Atk. 559; 2 P. Wms. 258; 2 Bro. C. C. 86; 1 Ves. Jr. 11; and 2 Evans’s Poth. 377, where the author argues against the policy of making precedents binding when contrary to reason.