Certainty

In Contracts. Distinctness and accuracy of statement A thing is certain when its essence, quality, and quantity are described, distinctly set forth, etc.

Dig. 12, 1. 6.

It is uncertain when the description is not that of an individual object, but designates only the kind. La. Civ. Code, art.

3522, no. 8; 5 Co. 121.

If a contract be so vague in its terms that its meaning cannot be certainly collected, and the statute of frauds preclude the admissibility of parol evidence to clear up the difficulty; 5 B. & C. 583; or parol evidence cannot supply the defect then neither at law nor in equity can effect be given to it; 1 R. & M. 116. If it is impossible to tain any definite meaning, such agreement is necessarily void; [1892] Q. B. 478. As to uncertainty of contract see Davie v. Min. Co., 93 Mich. 491, 53 N. W. 625, 24 L. R. A. 357; Van Schaick v. Van Buren, 70 Hun 575, 24 N. Y. Supp. 306. It is a maxim of law that that is certain which may be made certain: id certum est quod certum reddi potest; Co. Litt 43. For example, when a man sells the oil he has in his store at so much a gallon, although there is uncertainty as to the quantity of oil, yet, inasmuch as it can 1 lined, the maxim applies, and the sale is good.

See, generally, Story, Eq. § 240; Mitf. Eq. PI., Jeremy ed. 41.

In Pleading. Such clearness and distinctness of statement of the facts which constitute the cause of action or ground of defence that they may be understood by the party who is to answer them, by the jury who are to ascertain the truth of the allegations, and by the court who are to give the judgment.

2 B. & P. 267; Co. Litt 303; Com. Dig. Pleader. See Giroux Amalgamator Co. v. White, 21 Or. 435, 28 Pac. 390.

Certainty to a common intent is attained by a form of statement in which words are used in their ordinary meaning, though by argument or inference they may be made to bear a different one.

See 2 H. Bla. 530; Andr. Steph. PI. 384.

Certainty to a certain intent in general is attained when the meaning of the statute may be understood upon a fair and reasonable construction without recurrence to possible facts which do not appear; 1 Wins. Saund. 49; Spencer v. Sonthwick, 9 Johns. (X. Y.) 317; Fuller v. Hampton, 5 Ooni Certainty to a >■■ rtain intent in particular is attained by that technical accuracy of statement which precludes all argument, inference, and presumption against the party pleading. When this certainty is required, the party must not only state the facts of controverted, and, as it were, anticipate the case of his adversary; Lawes, PL 54. The last description of certainty is required in estoppels; Co. Litt. 303; 2 EL Bla. 530; Dougl. 159; and in pleas which are not favored in law, as alien enemy; 8 Term 167; Russel v. Skipwith, G Binn (Pa.) 247.

See Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 70.

With respect to an indictment, it is laid down that "an indictment ought to be certain to every intent, and without any intendment to the contrary;" Cro. Eliz. 490; and the charge contained in it must be sufficiently explicit to support itself; for no latitude of intention can be allowed to include anything more than is expressed; 2 Burr. 1127; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588; U. S. v. Simmons, 96 TJ.

S. 360, 24 L. Ed. 819; State v. Stiles, 40 la. 148; State v. Philbrick, 31 Me. 401; Com. v. Terry, 114 Mass. 263; State v. Fancher, 71 Mo. 460; State v. Messenger, 58 N. H. 348.

These definitions, which have been adopted from Coke, have been subjected to severe criticism, but are -of some utility in drawing attention to the different degrees of exactness and fulness of statement required in different instances. Less certainty is required where the law presumes that tbe knowledge of the facts is peculiarly in the opposite party; 8 East 85; 13 id, 112; 3 Maule & S. 14; People v. Dunlap, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 437. Less certainty than would otherwise be requisite is demanded in some cases, to avoid prolixity of statement; 2 Wms. Saund. 117, n.

1. See, generally, 1 Chit. PI. CERTIFICANDO DE REC0GNITI0NE STAPUL/E.

In English Law. A writ commanding the mayor of the staple to certify to the lord chancellor a statute staple taken before him where the party himself detains It, and refuses to bring in the same. There is a like writ to certify a statute merchant and in divers other cases.

Reg. Orig. 148; Black, Diet.