Knowledge

Information as to a fact. The act of knowing; clear perception of the truth; firm belief; information. Knowledge “is not confined to what, we have personally observed or to what we have evolved by our own cognitive faculties.”

State v. Ransberger, 106 Mo. 135, 17 S. W. 290.

Where in a charge in a homicide case the court used the expression “knowledge to explain,” circumstances proven “tending to show that the defendant was connected with the homicide,” it was held to be synonymous with “ability to explain”; Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 611, 10 South. 106. “Knowledge is Information and information knowledge.” 1 Hemlng 1; 5 Esp. 53. “Absolute knowledge can be had of but few things.” Story v. Buffum, 8 AUen “In a legal sense it may be classified as positive and Imputed — ^Imputed, when the means of knowledge exist, known and accessible to the party, and capable of communicating positive Information. When there is knowledge, notice, as legally and technically understood, becomes Immaterial, It is only material when. In the absence of knowledge, it produces the same results. However clo Sely actual notice may, in many Instances, approximate knowledge and constructive notice may be Its equivalent in effect, there may be actual notice without knowledge; and when constructive notice is made the test to determine priorities of right, it may fall far short of knowledge and be sufficient.”

Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert, 81 Ala. 140, 1 South. 773.

Many acts are perfectly Innocent when the party performing them is not aware of certain circumstances attending them; for example, a man may pass a counterfeit note, and be guiltless, if he did not know it was so; he may receive stolen goods, if he were not aware of the fact that they were stolen. In these and the like cases it is the guilty knowledge which makes the crime. Such guilty knowledge is made by the statute a constituent part of the offence; and therefore it must be averred and proved as such. But it Is in general true, and may be considered as a rule almost necessary to the restraint and punishment of crimes, that when a man does that which by the common law or by statute is unlawful, and in pursuing his criminal purpose does that which constitutes another and different offence, he shall be held responsible for all the legal consequences of such criminal act. When a him, it is murder, though he hftd no Intention to take life. It Is true that in the commission of all crimes a guilty purpose, a criminal will and motive, are implied. But, in general, such bad motive or criminal will and purpose, that disposition of rnind and heart which is designated by the generic and significant term “malice,” is implied from the criminal act Itself. But if a man does an act, which would be otherwise criminal, through mistake or accident, or by force or the compulsion of others, in which his own will aqd mind do not instigate him to the act or concur In it, it is matter of defence, to be averred and proved on his part, if it does not arise out of the circumstances of the case adduced on the part of the prosecution.

Per Shaw, C. J., in Com. v. Elwell, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 192, 36 Am. Dec. 398.

Thus, it is not necessary, in an Indictment against an unmarried man for adultery with a married woman, to aver that he knew, at the time when the offence was committed, that she was a married woman; nor is it pecessary to prove such knowledge at the trial; Com. v. Elwell, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 190, 35 Am. Dec. 398. See, as to the proof of guilty knowledge, 1 B. & H. Lead. Cr. Cas. 185-191. See Intent; Ignorance. As to the doctrine of imputed knowledge, see Notice.