knowledge

more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.

Positive assurance of a fact. It is not synonymous with "information," 21 Pac. 39, or "notice," 1 So. 777, and differs from "belief" in degree. The act or state of knowing; clear perception of fact; that which is or may be known. Acquainted with things ascertained or ascertainable; specific information, 28 Ind. App. 367; a firm belief, 9 Gray (Mass.) 271. It implies actual notice as distinguished from constructive notice. 176 Iowa 316. Believe; to exercise trust or confidence; to be persuaded upon evidence, arguments and deductions, or by other circumstances other than personal knowledge. 28 Ind. App. 367.

Information as to a fact. The act of knowing; clear perception of the truth; firm belief; information. Knowledge “is not confined to what, we have personally observed or to what we have evolved by our own cognitive faculties.” State v. Ransberger, 106 Mo. 135, 17 S. W. 290. Where in a charge in a homicide case the court used the expression “knowledge to explain,” circumstances proven “tending to show that the defendant was connected with the homicide,” it was held to be synonymous with “ability to explain”; Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 611, 10 South. 106. “Knowledge is Information and information knowledge.” 1 Hemlng 1; 5 Esp. 53. “Absolute knowledge can be had of but few things.” Story v. Buffum, 8 AUen “In a legal sense it may be classified as positive and Imputed — ^Imputed, when the means of knowledge exist, known and accessible to the party, and capable of communicating positive Information. When there is knowledge, notice, as legally and technically understood, becomes Immaterial, It is only material when. In the absence of knowledge, it produces the same results. However clo Sely actual notice may, in many Instances, approximate knowledge and constructive notice may be Its equivalent in effect, there may be actual notice without knowledge; and when constructive notice is made the test to determine priorities of right, it may fall far short of knowledge and be sufficient.” Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert, 81 Ala. 140, 1 South. 773. Many acts are perfectly Innocent when the party performing them is not aware of certain circumstances attending them; for example, a man may pass a counterfeit note, and be guiltless, if he did not know it was so; he may receive stolen goods, if he were not aware of the fact that they were stolen. In these and the like cases it is the guilty knowledge which makes the crime. Such guilty knowledge is made by the statute a constituent part of the offence; and therefore it must be averred and proved as such. But it Is in general true, and may be considered as a rule almost necessary to the restraint and punishment of crimes, that when a man does that which by the common law or by statute is unlawful, and in pursuing his criminal purpose does that which constitutes another and different offence, he shall be held responsible for all the legal consequences of such criminal act. When a him, it is murder, though he hftd no Intention to take life. It Is true that in the commission of all crimes a guilty purpose, a criminal will and motive, are implied. But, in general, such bad motive or criminal will and purpose, that disposition of rnind and heart which is designated by the generic and significant term “malice,” is implied from the criminal act Itself. But if a man does an act, which would be otherwise criminal, through mistake or accident, or by force or the compulsion of others, in which his own will aqd mind do not instigate him to the act or concur In it, it is matter of defence, to be averred and proved on his part, if it does not arise out of the circumstances of the case adduced on the part of the prosecution. Per Shaw, C. J., in Com. v. Elwell, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 192, 36 Am. Dec. 398. Thus, it is not necessary, in an Indictment against an unmarried man for adultery with a married woman, to aver that he knew, at the time when the offence was committed, that she was a married woman; nor is it pecessary to prove such knowledge at the trial; Com. v. Elwell, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 190, 35 Am. Dec. 398. See, as to the proof of guilty knowledge, 1 B. & H. Lead. Cr. Cas. 185-191. See Intent; Ignorance. As to the doctrine of imputed knowledge, see Notice.

The difference between "knowledge" and "belief" is nothing more than in the degree of certe inty. With regard to things which make not a very deep impression on the memory, it may be called "belief." "Knowledge" is nothing more than a man's firm belief. The difference is ordinarily merely in the degree, to be judged of by the court, when addressed to the court; by the jury, when addressed to the Jury. Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray (Mass.) 271. See Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo. 232, 55 S. W. 1091, 49 L. R. A. 323, 78 Am. St. Rep. 569; Ohio Valley Coffin Co. v. Goble, 28 Ind. App. 362, 62 N. El 1025; Clarke v. Ingram, 107 Ga. 565, 33 S. E. 802. Knowledge may be classified in a legal sense, as positive and imputed,—imputed, when the means of knowledge exists, known and accessible to the party, and capable of communicating positive information. When there is knowledge, notice, as legally and technically understood, becomes immaterial. It is only material when, in the absence of kn'owledge, it produces the same results. However closely acfual notice may, in many instances, approximate knowledge, and constructive notice may be its equivalent in effect, there may be actual notice without knowledge; and, when constructive notice is made the test to determine priorities of right, it may fall far short of knowledge, and be sufficient. Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert, 81 Ala. 140, 1 South. 773. -

— Carnal knowledge. Coitus; copulation; sexual intercourse.

— Personal knowledge. Knowledge of the truth in regard to a particular fact or allegation, which is original, and does not depend on information or hearsay. Personal knowledge of an allegation in an answer is personal knowledge of its truth or falsity; and if the allegation is a negative one, this necessarily includes a knowledge of the truth or falsity of the allegation denied. West . Homs Ins. Co. (C. Ct) 18 Fed. 622.

1. A being aware of: information, cognizance; notice. Absolute knowledge can be had of few things.^ 1 1 Bl. Com. 246; 2 id. 243; 3 id. 254; 4 id. 32. 2 Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 343 (1879). =1 Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 290 (1885). * In 1554, married Philip of Spain; hence, Philip and Mary, 1554-58. ^ Ascended the throne in 1C60; his regnal years are counted from' 1649 — when Charles I died. 1^, Normans; 5-12, Plantagenets; 13-15, House of Lancaster; 16-18, House of York; 19-83, House of Tudor; 24-25, 87-31, House of Stuart; 32-37, House of Hanover. Kno-wledge and belief. Nothing more than firm belief. Belief applies to the impression on the memory. The difference Is in degree.i See further Belief. Personal knowledge. Actual knowledge of the truth or falsity of a matter, not derived from another person.^ An affidavit filed in an application tor a change of venue, alleging that the defendant had not th6retof ore " full knowledge " of a particular fact, was held to be too indefinite, as an averment. "Full knowledge might never come to him; but he had knowledge, and, for aught that appears, it might have been sufficient to satisfy his mind." ' Knowledge is imputed from a duty to exercise ordinary care. Inquiry is a moral duty where the circumstances are such that a person of ordinary prudence would refuse to act.* One who has reason to believe that a fact exists knows that it exists.* Where there is enough to put one concerned upon Inquiry, the means of knowledge and knowledge itself are, in legal effect, the same thing." When a party is about to perform an act which he has reason to believe may af Eect the rights of third persons, an inquiry as to the facts is a moral duty, and di Ugence an act of justice. Whatever fairly puts a party upon inquiry in such case is sufficient notice in equity, where the means of knowledge are at hand; and, if he omits to inquire and proceeds to act, he does so at his peril, as he is then chargeable with all the facts which by a proper inqmry he might have ascertained.' Knowledge of facts which will enable a party to take effectual action is implied in such terms as " acquiescence," "estoppel," "waiver,"' 33. v. Equal knowledge on both sides makes contracting parties equal. Information in the agent is information in the principal;» but not so, it professional confidence would be 1 Hatch V. Carpenter, 7 Gray, 374 (1867). See Hardson V. Beard, 30 Kan. 533 (1883). ' See West v. Home Ins. Co., 18 F. E. 622 3 Mc Cann v. People, 88 111. 105 (1878). Compare White V. Murtland, 71 id. 259 (1874); Roberts v. People, 9 Col. 4B3 (1886). « Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Cliff. 68-89 (1869), cases. ' Shaw V. North Pennsylvania R. Co., 101 U. S. 566 (1879). « Jones V. Guaranty, &o. Co., 101 V. S. 633 (1879), Swayne, J.; Hoyt,;. Sprague, 103 id. 637 (1880); Goodman V. Simonds, 20 How 367 (1857). ' Angle V. N. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 342 (1875) cases, aiflord, J. See also Commissioners of Leavenworth Co. v. Chicago, &o. R. Co., 18 F. R. 210 (1883)- Martin v. Smith, 1 DUl. 90 (1870), cases; Filmore V. Eeithman, 6 Col. 129 (1881), cases; Efflngar v. Hall, 81 Va. 106 (1386), cases. 8 Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 581 (1878), Swayne, J. betrayed, as, between an attorney and hisclient." See further Agent. Knowingly. Imports thit an accused person knew what he was about to do, and with such knowledge proceeded to commit the offense charged. 2 Known; unknown. In the laws of taxation and seizures of property, apply to owners whose residence is, and is not, known. See Notice, 1. See Fraud; Guilty; Ignorance; Ignore; Information, 1; Innocence; Inquiry; Intent; Permit; Eepre-