Sentence

A judgment, or judicial declaration made by a judge in a cause. The term judgment is more usually applied to civil, and sentence to criminal, proceedings. Sentences are final, when they put an end to the case; or interlocutory, when they settle only some incidental matter which has arisen in the course of its progress. See Aso & Man. Inst. b.

3, t. 8, c. 1.

A sentence exceeding the term allowed by law will be rever&cd upon certiorari; White v. Com., 3 Brews. (Pa.) 30. Under some circumstances a sentence may be suspended after conviction; State v. Addy, 43 N. J. L. 113, 39 Am. Rep. 647; Com. v. Dowdican’s Bail, 115 Mass. 133; but not indefinitely; Ex parte Bugg, 163 Mo. App. 44, 145 S. W. 831. But a single sentence exhausts the power of the court to punish the offender, after the term is ended or the judgment has gone into operation; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872; Com. v. Foster, 122 Mass. 317, 23 Am. Rep. 326; Com. v. Mayloy, 67 Pa. 291. The court may set a day for the execution of a prisoner after the time originally fixed has elapsed. The prisoner may be held in confinement after the first day fixed for execution has passed; In re Cross, 146 U. S. 271, 13 Sup. Ct. 109, 36 L. Ed. 969. Upon the affirmance of a judgment, sentencing a prisoner to death, there is nothiug which requires that he shall be sentenced anew by the trial court; Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442, 12 Sup. Ct 525, 36 L. Ed. 218. See Execution. When a sentence different from that authorized by law has been imposed and the judgment has been reversed for that error, and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to proceed therein according to law, the trial court resumes jurisdiction of the cause at the point where the error supervened and may resentence the defendant and impose the penalty provided by law, although part of the void sentence has been executed; U. S. v. Harman, 68 Fed. 472. Where a court has jurisdiction of the person and the offence, the imposition of a sentence in excess of what the law permits does not render the authorized portion of the sentence void, but only such part as may be in excess; U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48, 14 Sup. Ct. 746, 38 L. Ed. 631; State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310; so, on a plea of guilty, if the court had authority to impose the punishment actually adjudged on a conviction of a higher grade of the offence; In re Paschal, 56 Kan. 123, 42 Pac. 373. Where the judgment on »the first count is der the third may be made to commence on the day fixed for the first count; Blitz v. U. S., 153 U. S. 308, 14 Sup. Ct. 924, 38 L. Ed. 725. Where a sentence is imposed after a general verdict on an indictment containing several counts, some of which were subsequently found bad, such sentence will be sustained, where it is no heavier than what might properly have been imposed upon the good counts; Haynes v. U. S., 101 Fed. 817, 42 C. C. A. 34. Failure in the sentence to name the crime for which the prisoner was sentenced may be supplied by reference to the rest of the record; ' Pointer v. U. S., 151 U. S. 396, 14 Sup. Ct. 410, 38 L. Ed. 208. Statutes providing for a severer punishment when a criminal is convicted of a second or third offence are not in violation of the constitutional provision that no one shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence; Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673, 16 Sup. Ct 179, 40 L. Ed. 301. The doctrine is that the subsequent punishment is no: for the first offence, but for persistence in crime; People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 17 Am. Hep. 401; Kelly v. People, 115 111.

583, 4 N. E. 644, 56 Am. Rep. 184; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W. 785.

For the same reason, they are not open to the objection that they are ex post facto, even when the prior convictions occurred before the passage of the act imposing the additional penalty; Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429; Com. v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579, 10 L. R. A. 256; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18; Rand v. Com., 9 Gratt. (Va.) 738. Such statutes cannot apply to the case of a conviction for an offence committed after that for which the prisoner is on trial, but for which he is first tried; Rand v. Com., 9 Gratt. (Va.) 738. The Indictment must allege that the defendant had been previously convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned (once or twice, as the case may be) in some penal institution for felonies (as such penalties are usually only prescribed for felonies or penitentiary offences), describing each separately; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; State v. Austin, 113 Mo. 538, 21 S. W. 31; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18. As a general rule the courts have no discretion in the matter of imposing sentence under the habitual criminal acts; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18. It is not necessary, unless required by statute, that the subsequent conviction or convictions should be for the same identical offence or character of offence. It is sufficient if the accused has been convicted of any one of the offences of {he grade named; Kelly v. People, 115 111.

583, 4 N. E. 644, 56 Am. Rep. 184.

The previous offences for what would otherwise have been misdemeanors; Stover v. Com., 92 Va. 780, 22 S. E. 874. A statute permitting the supreme court to reduce a sentence imposed by a trial court is not unconstitutional as an exercise of pardoning power by the judiciary; Palmer v. State, 70 Neb. 136, 97 N. W. 235; nor is a statute allowing the governor to fix a new date for execution when the date in the judgment has passed, since it is a ministerial and not a judicial act; Bullitt v. Sturgeon, 127 Ky. 332, 105 S. W. 468, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 268. Where one is found guilty of manslaughter on an indictment for murder, and on a new trial granted on appeal he is subsequently found guilty of murder, the case will be remanded with directions to sentence for manslaughter only; Feople v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 109 N. W. 440. A prisoner who is paroled without statutory authority cannot, upon violation of his parole, be required to remain in prison beyond the time when the original sentence expired; Scott v. Chichester, 107 Va. 933, 60 S. E. 95, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304. A person who commits a felony while enjoying his liberty under a bond given to stay execution of a judgment for u previously committed felony must serve such second sentence upon the expiration of the first; State v. Finch, 75 Kan. 582, 89 Pac. 922, 20