sentence

The only sentence known to the law is the sentence or judgment entered upon the records of the court. If the entry is inaccurate, there is a remedy by motion to correct it to the end that it may speak the truth. But the judgment imports verity when collaterally assailed. Until corrected in a direct proceeding, it says what it was meant to say, and this by an irrebuttable presumption.

A judgment or Judicial declaration made by a judge in a cause. The term "judgment" is more usually applied to civil, and "sentence" to criminal, proceedings. A sentence (in criminal proceedings) is the order of court made in the presence of the defendant, and entered of record, pronouncing the judgment, and ordering the same to be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law. Clark, Crim. Law Tex. 580. Sentences are final, when they put an end to the case; or interlocutory, when they settle only some incidental matter which has SENTENTIA (Lat.)

In civil law. Sense; import; as distinguished from mere words. Calv. Lex. The deliberate expression of one's ■will. Tayl. Civ. Law, 532. f he sentence of a judge or court. Inst. 4. 11.4. SENTENTIA A NON JUDICE LATA NEmini debet nocere. A sentence pronounced by one who is not a judge should not harm any one. Fleta, lib. 6, c 6, § 7. SENTENTIA CONTRA MATRIMONIUM nunquam transit In rem Judlcatam. A sentence against marriage never passes into a judgment (conclusive upon the parties). 7 Coke, 43.

A judgment, or judicial declaration made by a judge in a cause. The term judgment is more usually applied to civil, and sentence to criminal, proceedings. Sentences are final, when they put an end to the case; or interlocutory, when they settle only some incidental matter which has arisen in the course of its progress. See Aso & Man. Inst. b. 3, t. 8, c. 1. A sentence exceeding the term allowed by law will be rever&cd upon certiorari; White v. Com., 3 Brews. (Pa.) 30. Under some circumstances a sentence may be suspended after conviction; State v. Addy, 43 N. J. L. 113, 39 Am. Rep. 647; Com. v. Dowdican’s Bail, 115 Mass. 133; but not indefinitely; Ex parte Bugg, 163 Mo. App. 44, 145 S. W. 831. But a single sentence exhausts the power of the court to punish the offender, after the term is ended or the judgment has gone into operation; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 163, 21 L. Ed. 872; Com. v. Foster, 122 Mass. 317, 23 Am. Rep. 326; Com. v. Mayloy, 67 Pa. 291. The court may set a day for the execution of a prisoner after the time originally fixed has elapsed. The prisoner may be held in confinement after the first day fixed for execution has passed; In re Cross, 146 U. S. 271, 13 Sup. Ct. 109, 36 L. Ed. 969. Upon the affirmance of a judgment, sentencing a prisoner to death, there is nothiug which requires that he shall be sentenced anew by the trial court; Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442, 12 Sup. Ct 525, 36 L. Ed. 218. See Execution. When a sentence different from that authorized by law has been imposed and the judgment has been reversed for that error, and the cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to proceed therein according to law, the trial court resumes jurisdiction of the cause at the point where the error supervened and may resentence the defendant and impose the penalty provided by law, although part of the void sentence has been executed; U. S. v. Harman, 68 Fed. 472. Where a court has jurisdiction of the person and the offence, the imposition of a sentence in excess of what the law permits does not render the authorized portion of the sentence void, but only such part as may be in excess; U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48, 14 Sup. Ct. 746, 38 L. Ed. 631; State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310; so, on a plea of guilty, if the court had authority to impose the punishment actually adjudged on a conviction of a higher grade of the offence; In re Paschal, 56 Kan. 123, 42 Pac. 373. Where the judgment on »the first count is der the third may be made to commence on the day fixed for the first count; Blitz v. U. S., 153 U. S. 308, 14 Sup. Ct. 924, 38 L. Ed. 725. Where a sentence is imposed after a general verdict on an indictment containing several counts, some of which were subsequently found bad, such sentence will be sustained, where it is no heavier than what might properly have been imposed upon the good counts; Haynes v. U. S., 101 Fed. 817, 42 C. C. A. 34. Failure in the sentence to name the crime for which the prisoner was sentenced may be supplied by reference to the rest of the record; ' Pointer v. U. S., 151 U. S. 396, 14 Sup. Ct. 410, 38 L. Ed. 208. Statutes providing for a severer punishment when a criminal is convicted of a second or third offence are not in violation of the constitutional provision that no one shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence; Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673, 16 Sup. Ct 179, 40 L. Ed. 301. The doctrine is that the subsequent punishment is no: for the first offence, but for persistence in crime; People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 17 Am. Hep. 401; Kelly v. People, 115 111. 583, 4 N. E. 644, 56 Am. Rep. 184; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W. 785. For the same reason, they are not open to the objection that they are ex post facto, even when the prior convictions occurred before the passage of the act imposing the additional penalty; Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 429; Com. v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579, 10 L. R. A. 256; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18; Rand v. Com., 9 Gratt. (Va.) 738. Such statutes cannot apply to the case of a conviction for an offence committed after that for which the prisoner is on trial, but for which he is first tried; Rand v. Com., 9 Gratt. (Va.) 738. The Indictment must allege that the defendant had been previously convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned (once or twice, as the case may be) in some penal institution for felonies (as such penalties are usually only prescribed for felonies or penitentiary offences), describing each separately; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; State v. Austin, 113 Mo. 538, 21 S. W. 31; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18. As a general rule the courts have no discretion in the matter of imposing sentence under the habitual criminal acts; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18. It is not necessary, unless required by statute, that the subsequent conviction or convictions should be for the same identical offence or character of offence. It is sufficient if the accused has been convicted of any one of the offences of {he grade named; Kelly v. People, 115 111. 583, 4 N. E. 644, 56 Am. Rep. 184. The previous offences for what would otherwise have been misdemeanors; Stover v. Com., 92 Va. 780, 22 S. E. 874. A statute permitting the supreme court to reduce a sentence imposed by a trial court is not unconstitutional as an exercise of pardoning power by the judiciary; Palmer v. State, 70 Neb. 136, 97 N. W. 235; nor is a statute allowing the governor to fix a new date for execution when the date in the judgment has passed, since it is a ministerial and not a judicial act; Bullitt v. Sturgeon, 127 Ky. 332, 105 S. W. 468, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 268. Where one is found guilty of manslaughter on an indictment for murder, and on a new trial granted on appeal he is subsequently found guilty of murder, the case will be remanded with directions to sentence for manslaughter only; Feople v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 109 N. W. 440. A prisoner who is paroled without statutory authority cannot, upon violation of his parole, be required to remain in prison beyond the time when the original sentence expired; Scott v. Chichester, 107 Va. 933, 60 S. E. 95, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304. A person who commits a felony while enjoying his liberty under a bond given to stay execution of a judgment for u previously committed felony must serve such second sentence upon the expiration of the first; State v. Finch, 75 Kan. 582, 89 Pac. 922, 20

The judgment formally pronounced by the court or judge upon the defendant utter his conviction in a criminal prosecution, awarding the punishment to be inflicted. The word is properly confined to this meaning. In civil cases, the terms "judgment," "decision," "award," "finding," etc., are used. See Featherstone v. People, 194 III. 325, 62 N. E. 684; State v. Barnes, 24 Fla. 153, 4 South. 560; Pennington v. State, 11 Tex. App. 281; Com. v. Bish off, 13 Pa. Ch Ct. R. 503; People v. Adams, 95 Mich. 541, 55 N. W. 461; Bugbse v. Boyce, 68 Vt 311, 35 All. 330. Ecolesiastical. In ecolesiastical procedure, "sentence" is analogous to "judgment" (q. v.) in an ordinary action. A definite sentence Is one which puts an end to the suit, and regards the principal matter in question. An interlocutory sentence determines only some incidental matter in the proceedings. Phillim. Ecc. Law, 1260.

— Cumulative sentences. Separate sentences (each additional to the others) imposed upon a defendant who has been convicted upon an indictment containing several counts, each of such counts charging a distinct offense, or who is under conviction at the same time for several distinct offenses ; one of such sentences being made to begin at the expiration of another. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 22 Sun. Ct. 181, 46 L. Ed. 236; State v. Hamby, 126 N. C. 1066, 35 S. E. 614,

— Final sentence. One which puts an end to a case. Distinguished from interlocutory

— Indeterminate sentence. A form of sentence to imprisonment upon conviction of crime, now authorized by stafute in several states, which, instead of fixing rigidly the duration of the imprisonment, declares that it shall be for a period "not less than" so many years "nor more than" so many years, or not less than the minimum period prescribed by statute as the punishment for the particular offense nor more than the maximum period, the exact length of the term being afterwards fixed, within the limits assigned by the court or the statute, by an executive authority, (the governor, board of pardons, etc.,) on consideration of the previous record of the convict, his behavior while in prison or While out on parole, the apparent prospect of reformation, and other such considerations.

— Interlocutory sentence. In the civil law. A sentence on some indirect question arising from the principal cause. Hal-lifax, Civil Law, b. 3, chi 9, no. 40.

— Sentence of death recorded. In English practice. The recording of a sentence of death, not actually pronounced, on the understanding that it will not be executed. Such a record has the same effect as if the judgment had been pronounced and the offender reprieved by the court. Mozley & Whitley. The practice is now disused.

— Suspension of sentence. This term may mean either a withholding or postponing the sentencing of a prisoner after the conviction, or a postponing of the execution of the sentence after it has been pronounced. In the latter case, it may, for reasons addressing themselves to the. discretion of the court, be indefinite as to time, dr during the good bebavior of the prisoner. See People v. Webster, 14 Misc. Rep. 617, 36 N. Y. Supp. 745 ; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y. 264, 40 N. E. 883.

The judgment in a criminal casa In the civil law. The judgment of a court ing of a causa

* A final determination by a criminal court, or (but less frequently) by a court of admiralty. 1 See 3 Bl. Com. 303. « State ex rel. Belford v. Hueston, 44 Ohio St. 6 (1886), Spear, J. s Steph. Plead. 414. " Judgment " is generally used of a decision in a civil, common-law tribunal; and "decree" of a decision in a court of equity or admiralty. "Sentence," or judgment, appropriately denotes the action of a court of criminal jurisdiction in declaring the consequences to a convict of the fact of guilt, confessed or ascertained by verdict.^ Where, upon the trial of an indictment containing several counts charging distinct misdemeanors, identical in character, a general verdict of guilty is rendered, or a verdict of guilty upon two or more specified counts, the court has no power to impose a, sentence or cumulative sentences exceeding in the aggregate what is prescribed as the maximum punishment for an offense of the character charged.' In such case the court ha£ power to pass separate sentences exceeding in the aggregate the maxim punishment for the offense.. One judgment only can be passed upon a single indictment, and each count is, in effect, a distinct indictment.' It is not error to make one term of imprisonment commence when another ends. There is no other mode by which a delinquent may be sentenced on several convictions.* The judgment having been executed so as to be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law, the power of the court as to that oif ense is at an end.* And so, also, as to other offenses as to which sentence was not imposed." In the absence of express power, the court cannot at a subsequent terra alter its sentence.' A court has power to remand a convict for sentence for as long a period as may be deemed advantageous to the ends of justice, and in the meantime to receive evidence as to what would be an appropriate sentence, where the court has discretion.' Power to suspend sentence is inherent in the court. It is indispensable to the interests of. public justice; it rests upon grounds of public policy, or of legal necessity.' The inquiry whether a convicted person has anything to say "why sentence should not be passed'* upon him, is supposed to have originated at a time when prisoners were not allowed counsel, in order to ■ [Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 325 (1872), Gray, J. 2 People ex rei.. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y..560 (1875). 'Castro (" Tichbome ■') v. The (Jueen, 43 L. T. 78 (1880). Affirmed in the House of Lords, 44 id. 350 (1881), cases. See also Be Donnelly, 30 Kan. 424 (1883); Commonwealth V. Foster, 122 Mass. 818-19 (1877); Exp. Bryan, 76 Mo. 253 (1882); Re Haynes, 30 F. R. 769 (1887). • Kite V. Commonwealth, 11 Mete. 685 (1846)..'Exp. Lange, 18 Wall. 176(1873). • Commonwealth v. Foster, 122 Mass. 319 (18V7), cases. ' Commonwealth v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 201 (1868); State V. Addy, 43 N. J. L. 116 (18S1). « People 1). Mueller, 4 Cr. Law Mag. 725-39 (1883), cases,

— Cir. Ct. Cook Co., 111. See also State v. Addy, enable them to move in arrest of judgment any matter sufficient to stay sentence. See further CoNViCTioN; Eebob, 2 (3); Judomknt; Pardon; Reprieve.

May mean almost any final determination by a judicial tribunal; but it was commonly used of those of criminal and ecclesiastical courts; while " judgment " is generally used of civil decisions at common law, and " decree " of decisions in equity. Sentence is sometimes found used with reference to admiralty courts; while the word decree is more common in that connection. Sentence of death recorded. The Stat. 4 Geo. IV. ch. 48, allowed the recording of a sentence of death not actually pronounced, on the understanding that it would not be executed in capital felonies other than murder. The effect of such a record is the same as if the judgment had been pronounced and the offender reprieved by the court. The number of capital felonies has, however, been so much reduced by modern legislation that this is now seldom done.

A judgment or judicial declaration made by a judge ina cause. The term judgment is more usually applied to civil, and sentence to criminal proceedings. Sentences are final, when they put an end to the case; or interlocutory, when they settle only some incidental ' matter which has arisen in the course