Time

The measure of duration. Lapse of time often furnishes a presumption, stronger or weaker according to the length of time which has passed, of the truth of certain facts, such as the legal title to rights, payment of or release from debts. Time in Great Britain, in any statute or legal instrument, means, by statute, Greenwich mean time, and in Ireland, Dublin time. The only standard of time recognized by the courts is the meridian of the sun; not any arbitrary standard; Henderson v. Reynolds, 84 Ga. 159, 10 S. E. 734, 7 L. R. A. 327; 3 H. & N. S66. Greenwich time is also in use in Holland and Belgium; France follows Paris time; Switzerland, Italy and Central Germany use mid-European time, which is one hour in advance of Greenwich time. A 24-hour system is adopted in Italy and Canada. Where a policy of insurance expires at twelve o’clock noon, the exact time of noon will be determined by the common or solar time, unless it is shown that a different time was intended by the parties; Jones v. Ins. Co., 110 la. 75, 81 N. W. 18S, 46 L. R. A. 860, contra, Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Gaulbert Co., 120 Ky. 752, 87 S. W. 1115, 89 S. W. 3, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 364, 9 Ann. Cas. 324, where a custom of reckoning by standard time was shown. The termination of a term of court is determined by sun time; Texas T. & L. Co. v. Hightower, 100 Tex. 126, 96 S. W. 1071, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046, 123 Am. St. Rep. 794. A time restriction in a statute refers to local or actual, and not conventional, time; 7 S. C. (So. Africa) 115. The general rule of law is that the performance of a contract must be completed at or within the time fixed by the contract; Leake, Contr. 772. Wherever, in cases not governed by particular customs of trade, the parties bind themselves to the performance of duties within a certain number of days, they have to the last minute of the last day to perform their obligations; 6 M. & G. 593. See Performance. In legal documents the primary meaning of month is lunar month; [1904] 1 Ch. 305. A requirement for publication of a nonecessary to" count the week from Sunday to Saturday; Leach v. Burr, 188 U. S. 510, 23 Sup. Ct. 393, 47 L. Ed. 567. Generally, in computing time, the first day is excluded and the last included; Owen v. Slatter, 26 Ala. 547, 62 Am. Dec. 745; see State v. Elson, 77 Ohio St. 489, S3 N. E. 904, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 686; excluding the day on which an act is done, when the computation is to be made from such an act; 15 Yes. Ch. 248; 16 Cow. 659; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 485; Kimm v. Osgood’s Adm’r, 19 Mo. 60; including it, according to Presbrey v. Williams, 15 Mass. 193; except where the exclusion will prevent forfeiture; 2 Camp. 291; Windsor v. China, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 298. The rule which excludes the terminus a quo is not absolute, it may be included when necessary to give effect to the obvious intention; Taylor v. Brown, 147 U. S. 640, 13 Sup. Ct. 549, 37 L. Ed. 313. Time from and after a given day excludes that day; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 485; Weld v. Barker, 153 Pa. 465, 26 Atl. 239.

But see Du teller v. Wright, 94 U. S. 560, 24 L. Ed. 130.

A policy of insurance includes the last day of the term for which it is issued; L. R. 5 Exch. 296. Particular words, c. g. at, on, or upon a certain time, will be construed according to a reasonable interpretation of the contract; 10 A. & E. 370. The use of the word until generally implies an intention to exclude the day to which it refers, unless it appears otherwise from the context; Ryan v. Bank, 10 Neb. 524, 7 N. W. 276; Kendall v. Kingsley, 120 Mass. 91; till is held to include the day referred to; Bunco v. Reed, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 352. Whether the expiration of a policy was by standard railroad time was left to the jury, the burden being on the insurance company to prove that such time was customarily used at that place; Jones v. Ins. Co., 110 la.

75, 81 N. W. 188, 46 L. R. A. 860.

In a notice of a foreclosure sale, “two o’clock” means standard time; Orvik v. Casselman, 15 N. D. 34, 105 N. W. 1105. If, at the opening of a term of court, the court clock is set by sun time, that governs the closing of the term; Ex parte Parker, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 12, 29 S. W. 4S0, 790. Sunday is a dies non, and a power that may be exercised up to and including a given day of the month may generally, when that day happens to be Sunday, be exercised on the succeeding day; Street v. U. S., 133 U. S. 299, 10 Sup. Ct. 309, 33 L. Ed. 631. Sunday is said to be included in the computation when the time exceeds, and excluded when less than, seven days;- Snell v. Scott, 2 Mich. N. P. 108. Where the last day wherein an act is to be performed falls on a Sunday, the act may Sundays cannot be excluded In computing the time for signing bills of exception; American Tobacco Co. v. Strickling, 88 Md. 500, 41 Atl. 1083, 69 L. It. A. 909. A statute which declares that a holiday should be considered as Sunday applies only to public business, and where an option for stock expires on New Year’s Day, the time was not extended to the succeeding day; Page v. Shainwald, 109 N. Y. 246, 62 N. E. 356, 57 L. It. A. 173. See Sunday; Dies Non. Deeds, bills of exchange, letters, and other written instruments are generally construed to have been made and issued at the time of their date, but the execution of a deed may be averred and proved according to the fact; 10 Exch. 40. Courts will always adopt that constriction in the computation of time which will uphold and enforce, rather than destroy, bona fide transactions and titles, and whenever it is necessary to prevent a forfeiture or to effectuate the clear intention of the parties, the dies a quo will be included; otherwise it will be excluded; Taylor v. Brown, 5 Dak. 335, 40 N. W. 525. The law will take account of the fraction of a day when justice so requires; Gallagher v. Pub. Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 171, 71 Atl. 741, 138 Am. St. Rep. 514; Tower v. Stimpson, 175 Fed. 130. The construction of contracts with regard to the time of performance is the same in equity as at law; but in case of mere delay in performance, a court of equity will in general relieve against the legal consequences and decree specific performance upon equitable terms notwithstanding the delay, if the matter of the contract admits of that form of remedy. In such cases it is said that in equity time is not considered to be of the essence of the contracts; L. R. 3 Ch. G7.

— Ordinarily time is not of the essence of the contract, but it may be made so by express stipulation of the parties; see Brown v. Trust Co., 128 U. S. 403, 9 Sup. Ct. 127, 32 L. Ed. 468;

— or it may be so by implication, because of the nature of the property involved; Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 391, 12 Sup. Ct. 646, 36 L. Ed. 479;

— or because of the avowed object of the seller or purchaser; Cheney v. Libby, 134 U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct. 498, 33 L. Ed. 818; Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 394, 12 Sup. Ct. 646, 36 L. Ed. 479;

— or from the nature of the contract itself;

— or by one party giving the other notice that performance must be made within a certain reasonable time fixed in the notice; Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 326, 59 Am. Dec. 677; Bullock v. Adams’ Ex’rs, 20 N. J. Eq. 367; time is always of the essence of unilateral contracts; Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352; Smith v. Gillett, 50 111.

298.

Completion of a contract within a reasonable time is sufficient, if no time is stipulated; Minneapolis Time is of the essence of the contract where land is to be paid for in monthly installments and after three months default the contract is to be void and the money paid is to be forfeited to the vendor; Axford v. Thomas, 160 Pa. 8, 28 Atl. 443; -and so where the contract shows an intention of the parties to limit it to a certain period; Hull C. & C. Co. v. Coke Co., 113 Fed. 260, 51