time

The time of payment is made a substantial, and not a mere formal, circumstance; it enters into the essence of the contract; and, therefore, must be observed.

The measure of duration. Lapse of time often furnishes a presumption, stronger or weaker according to the length of time which has passed, of the truth of certain facts, such as the legal title to rights, payment of or release from debts. Time in Great Britain, in any statute or legal instrument, means, by statute, Greenwich mean time, and in Ireland, Dublin time. The only standard of time recognized by the courts is the meridian of the sun; not any arbitrary standard; Henderson v. Reynolds, 84 Ga. 159, 10 S. E. 734, 7 L. R. A. 327; 3 H. & N. S66. Greenwich time is also in use in Holland and Belgium; France follows Paris time; Switzerland, Italy and Central Germany use mid-European time, which is one hour in advance of Greenwich time. A 24-hour system is adopted in Italy and Canada. Where a policy of insurance expires at twelve o’clock noon, the exact time of noon will be determined by the common or solar time, unless it is shown that a different time was intended by the parties; Jones v. Ins. Co., 110 la. 75, 81 N. W. 18S, 46 L. R. A. 860, contra, Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Gaulbert Co., 120 Ky. 752, 87 S. W. 1115, 89 S. W. 3, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 364, 9 Ann. Cas. 324, where a custom of reckoning by standard time was shown. The termination of a term of court is determined by sun time; Texas T. & L. Co. v. Hightower, 100 Tex. 126, 96 S. W. 1071, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046, 123 Am. St. Rep. 794. A time restriction in a statute refers to local or actual, and not conventional, time; 7 S. C. (So. Africa) 115. The general rule of law is that the performance of a contract must be completed at or within the time fixed by the contract; Leake, Contr. 772. Wherever, in cases not governed by particular customs of trade, the parties bind themselves to the performance of duties within a certain number of days, they have to the last minute of the last day to perform their obligations; 6 M. & G. 593. See Performance. In legal documents the primary meaning of month is lunar month; [1904] 1 Ch. 305. A requirement for publication of a nonecessary to" count the week from Sunday to Saturday; Leach v. Burr, 188 U. S. 510, 23 Sup. Ct. 393, 47 L. Ed. 567. Generally, in computing time, the first day is excluded and the last included; Owen v. Slatter, 26 Ala. 547, 62 Am. Dec. 745; see State v. Elson, 77 Ohio St. 489, S3 N. E. 904, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 686; excluding the day on which an act is done, when the computation is to be made from such an act; 15 Yes. Ch. 248; 16 Cow. 659; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 485; Kimm v. Osgood’s Adm’r, 19 Mo. 60; including it, according to Presbrey v. Williams, 15 Mass. 193; except where the exclusion will prevent forfeiture; 2 Camp. 291; Windsor v. China, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 298. The rule which excludes the terminus a quo is not absolute, it may be included when necessary to give effect to the obvious intention; Taylor v. Brown, 147 U. S. 640, 13 Sup. Ct. 549, 37 L. Ed. 313. Time from and after a given day excludes that day; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 485; Weld v. Barker, 153 Pa. 465, 26 Atl. 239. But see Du teller v. Wright, 94 U. S. 560, 24 L. Ed. 130. A policy of insurance includes the last day of the term for which it is issued; L. R. 5 Exch. 296. Particular words, c. g. at, on, or upon a certain time, will be construed according to a reasonable interpretation of the contract; 10 A. & E. 370. The use of the word until generally implies an intention to exclude the day to which it refers, unless it appears otherwise from the context; Ryan v. Bank, 10 Neb. 524, 7 N. W. 276; Kendall v. Kingsley, 120 Mass. 91; till is held to include the day referred to; Bunco v. Reed, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 352. Whether the expiration of a policy was by standard railroad time was left to the jury, the burden being on the insurance company to prove that such time was customarily used at that place; Jones v. Ins. Co., 110 la. 75, 81 N. W. 188, 46 L. R. A. 860. In a notice of a foreclosure sale, “two o’clock” means standard time; Orvik v. Casselman, 15 N. D. 34, 105 N. W. 1105. If, at the opening of a term of court, the court clock is set by sun time, that governs the closing of the term; Ex parte Parker, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 12, 29 S. W. 4S0, 790. Sunday is a dies non, and a power that may be exercised up to and including a given day of the month may generally, when that day happens to be Sunday, be exercised on the succeeding day; Street v. U. S., 133 U. S. 299, 10 Sup. Ct. 309, 33 L. Ed. 631. Sunday is said to be included in the computation when the time exceeds, and excluded when less than, seven days;- Snell v. Scott, 2 Mich. N. P. 108. Where the last day wherein an act is to be performed falls on a Sunday, the act may Sundays cannot be excluded In computing the time for signing bills of exception; American Tobacco Co. v. Strickling, 88 Md. 500, 41 Atl. 1083, 69 L. It. A. 909. A statute which declares that a holiday should be considered as Sunday applies only to public business, and where an option for stock expires on New Year’s Day, the time was not extended to the succeeding day; Page v. Shainwald, 109 N. Y. 246, 62 N. E. 356, 57 L. It. A. 173. See Sunday; Dies Non. Deeds, bills of exchange, letters, and other written instruments are generally construed to have been made and issued at the time of their date, but the execution of a deed may be averred and proved according to the fact; 10 Exch. 40. Courts will always adopt that constriction in the computation of time which will uphold and enforce, rather than destroy, bona fide transactions and titles, and whenever it is necessary to prevent a forfeiture or to effectuate the clear intention of the parties, the dies a quo will be included; otherwise it will be excluded; Taylor v. Brown, 5 Dak. 335, 40 N. W. 525. The law will take account of the fraction of a day when justice so requires; Gallagher v. Pub. Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 171, 71 Atl. 741, 138 Am. St. Rep. 514; Tower v. Stimpson, 175 Fed. 130. The construction of contracts with regard to the time of performance is the same in equity as at law; but in case of mere delay in performance, a court of equity will in general relieve against the legal consequences and decree specific performance upon equitable terms notwithstanding the delay, if the matter of the contract admits of that form of remedy. In such cases it is said that in equity time is not considered to be of the essence of the contracts; L. R. 3 Ch. G7. Ordinarily time is not of the essence of the contract, but it may be made so by express stipulation of the parties; see Brown v. Trust Co., 128 U. S. 403, 9 Sup. Ct. 127, 32 L. Ed. 468; or it may be so by implication, because of the nature of the property involved; Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 391, 12 Sup. Ct. 646, 36 L. Ed. 479; or because of the avowed object of the seller or purchaser; Cheney v. Libby, 134 U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct. 498, 33 L. Ed. 818; Waterman v. Banks, 144 U. S. 394, 12 Sup. Ct. 646, 36 L. Ed. 479; or from the nature of the contract itself; or by one party giving the other notice that performance must be made within a certain reasonable time fixed in the notice; Kirby v. Harrison, 2 Ohio St. 326, 59 Am. Dec. 677; Bullock v. Adams’ Ex’rs, 20 N. J. Eq. 367; time is always of the essence of unilateral contracts; Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352; Smith v. Gillett, 50 111. 298. Completion of a contract within a reasonable time is sufficient, if no time is stipulated; Minneapolis Time is of the essence of the contract where land is to be paid for in monthly installments and after three months default the contract is to be void and the money paid is to be forfeited to the vendor; Axford v. Thomas, 160 Pa. 8, 28 Atl. 443; -and so where the contract shows an intention of the parties to limit it to a certain period; Hull C. & C. Co. v. Coke Co., 113 Fed. 260, 51

The measure of duration. The word is expressive both of a precise point or terminus and of an interval betwcen two points.

In pleading. A point in or space of duration at or during which some fact is alleged to have bcen committed.

— Cooling time. See that title.

— Reasonable time. Such length of time as may fairly, properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty, or of the subject-matter, and to the attending circumstances. It is a maxim of English law that "how long a 'reasonable time' ought to be is not defined in law, but is left to the discretion of the judges." Co. Litt. 50. See Hoggins v. Becraft, 1 Dana (Ky.) 28; Hill v. Hobart, 16 Me. 168; Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 591, 23 In Ed. 328; Campbell v. Whoriskey, 170 Mass. 63, 48 N. EX, 1070.
—'Time-bargain. In the language of the stock exchange, a time-bargain is an agreement to buy or sell stock at a future time, or within a fixed time, at a certain price. It is in reality nothing more than a bargain to pay differences.

— Time check. A certificate signed by a master mechanic or other person in charge of laborers, reciting the amount due to the labarer for labor for a specified time. Burlington Voluntary Relief Dept. v. White, 41 Neb. 547, 59 N. W. 747, 43 AmSt. Rep. 701.

— Time immemorial. Time whereof the memory of a man is not to the contrary.

— Time of memory. In English law. Time commencing from the beginning of the reign of Richard I. 2 Bl. Comm. 31. Lord Coke defines time of memory to be "when no man alive hath had any proof to the contrary, nor hath any conusance to the contrary." Co. Litt86a, 86b

— Time ont of memory. Time beyond memory; time out of mind ; time to which memory does not extend.

— Time-policy. A policy of marine insurance in which the risk is limited, not to a given voyage, but to a certain fixed term or period of time.

— Time the essence of the contract. A case in which "time is of the essence of the contract" is one where the parlies evidently contemplated a punctual performance, at the precise time named, as vital in the agreement, and one of its essential elements. Time is not of the essence of the contract in any case where a moderate delay in performance would not be regarded as an absolute violation of the contract.

A word expressive both of a precise point, tween two points. Time immemorial: time out of mind. Time out of memory: time out of mind; time to which memory does icy; a policy of insurance in which the risk term.

In English law. Time of memory: time ginning of the reign of Richard 1.

Has no distinctly technical signification. '* Present time" usually means a period of some considerable duration — a period within which certain transactions are to take place. ** Future time " means a period to come after such present time, and after the period when such transactions have actually taken place.s Time-toargain. A contract for the sale and delivery of stock at a future day, the vendor intending to purchase the stock before the day of delivery. See Futures. Time, cooling. See Cooling. Time imm.em.orial, or out of mind- Time beyond legal memory, q. v. In California, seems to be five years.* Time policy. A. policy of marine insurance in which the risk is limittd, not to a 1 Schulenberg v. Harriraan, 21 Wall. 64 (1874), Field, Judge; See also Nelson u. Graff, 12 F. R. 389, 391 (1882), cases; Putnam v. Lewis, 133 Mass. 264 (1S82). 2 Duff V. Bindley, 16 F. R. 1T8 (1883). a Rogers v. Gilinger, 30 Pa. 187-89 (1858), cases, Strong, J.; Leidy v. Proctor, 97 id. 492 (1881). * Bolles Wooden-ware Co. v. United States, 106 U. S. 433 (1882), cases, Miller, J. See also United States v. Mills, 9 F. R. 684 (1881); United States v. Williams, 18 id. 475 (1883): Act 3 June, 1878 (20 St. L. 89), for tbP Pacific States; United States v. Leatherberry, 27 F. R. 606 (1886). voyage, but to a period of time. See Insurance, Policy of. Time the essence of a contract. The general doctrine in equity is that " time is not of the essence of a contract." It often is ot the essence as to contracts for the purchase and sale of realty, so that equity will not interfere in behalf of either party. It may be made of the essence by express stipulation, or ariseby implication from the nature of the property, or from the avowed object of the seller or purchaser. But in the contracts of merchants time is of the essence.'' Time is not, in equity, of the essence of a contract unless the parties have expressly so treated it, or it necessarily follows from the nature and circumstances of the contract. It is regarded so far as it respects good faith and diligence; but if circumstances of a reasonable nature have disabled a party from a strict compliance; or if he comes, recenti facto, to ask for a specific performance, the suit is treated with indulgence, and generally with favor; but, in such cases, it should be clear that the remedies are mutual; that there has been no change of circumstances affecting the character or justice of the contract; that compensation for the delay can be fully made; that he who asks a specific performance is in a condition to perform his part of a contract; and that he has shown himself ready, desirous, prompt and eager to pe Eform the contract. The doctrine was formerly carried to an unreasonable extent; in modern times it has been more guardedly applied. Time may be made of the essence by clear manifestation of the intent of the parties, by subsequent notice from one party, by laches in the party seeking to enforce the contract, by change in the value of land, or other circumstance which would make a decree for specific performance inequitable.* See Performance, Specific. Time, reasonable. What constitutes reasonable time in a particular case must be arrived at by a consideration of all the elements which affect that question; as, when a beneficiary seeks to avoid a sale by his trustee. = What is reasonable time is nowhere so determined as to furnish a rule applicable to all oases. The ques- 1 Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet. 174 (1840), cases, Story, J.; Secombe v. Steele, 20 How. 101 (1857); Ahl v. Johnson, ib. 620-81 (1857); Holgate v. Eaton, 116 U. S. 40 (18S5); Brown v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 d. 414 (1888); 30 Minn. 339; IS Pa. 95; 76 Ya.. 517. "Norringtoa v. Wright, 115 U. S. 203 (1885), cases, Gray, J.; Cleveland Rolling Mill Co. v. Rhodes, 121 td. 261 (1887), cases. S2 Story, Eq. § 776; Smith v. Cansler, 83 Ky. 367, 3,4 Carter v. Phillips, 144 Mass. 102 (1887), followmBarnard v. Lee, 97 id. 93 (1867); Lumber Co. v. Horrition is to be answered in view of the particular circumstances of each case; as, where an adult would disaffirm a contract made during his infancy. ' Where a demand or a notice is necessary before an action can be brought, and the time is not definitely fixed, reasonable time is allowed. What this is necessarily depends upon circumstances.' In computing time, "until," "from," "between," and like words generally exclude the day to which the word relates; but this rule yields to apparent intention. In the interpretation of contracts, where time is to be computed from a particular day or event, as when an act is to be performed within a specified period " from "or " aftpr " a day named, the mle is to exclude the day thus designated and to include the last day of the specified period.* Cases may be found in which it is held, where an act is required by statute to be done a certain number of days at least before a given event, that the time must be reckoned excluding the day of the act and that of the event. But there is no case in which it has been held that both the day of the act and the day of the event shall be included. There are cases which hold that, where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included. Exceptions exist to that rule, and there are many cases which hold that the last day is included and the first excluded. Different rules prevail in Miff erent jurisdictions. See further Day, page 312. See After; At; At Least; Between; By; Forever; For; Forthwith; Immediately; Period; Shortly; Soon; Then; Thereupon; Until; When; With; — Day; Month; Week; Year; — Commence; Date; Delay; Description, 4; Fraud; Indictment; Laches; Limitation, 3; Premeditate; Relation, 1; Stale; Temporary; Tenant; Term, 3, 4. Compare Nunc; Tempus. Time-table. A railroad company is liable for damage resulting to a passenger for a negligent failure to run its trains according to its time-tables; but there must be proof of negligence. Neither a timetable nor an advertisement is a warrant of punctuality.' Reasonable notice must be given of a change of time.' Sims V. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 309 (1880), cases. Strong, J. See also Be Estate of Weston, 91 N. Y. 508 (1883); Gilflllan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 4M (1883); 18 Cent. Law J. 225-39(1884), cases; 27 id. 376-80 (1888), cases; 10 Wall.; 129; Baldw. 331; 6 Mc Lean, 296; 1 Newb. 171; 71 Ala. 167; 3 Col. 640; 59 Iowa, 452; 101 Mass. 409; 20 Mich. 195; 30 Minn. 415; 77 Pa. 228; 65 Vt. 376; 11 Wis. 417. 5 Atchison, &c. R. Co. v. Burlingame Township, 36 Kan. 631-35 (1887), oases. 3 Kendall v. Kingsley. 120 Mass. 93 (1876), cases. 4 Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 190 (1864), cases. Dutcher v. Wright, 94 U. S. 559-61 (1876), cases. e See Whart. Neg. § 662, cases; Angell, Carriers, 527 a; Gordon v. Manchester, &c. E. Co., 53 N. H. 696, 600 (1873), cases; 2 Wood's Ry. Law, 1174; 9 Am. & Timely. See Dub, 2; Notice.

As to the calendar, see Cai>