Conspiracy
Definitions from Case Law · United States Supreme Court
Definitions from Case Law
From 328 U.S. 640 - Pinkerton v. United States · 1946Most cited · 7,542 citing opinions
a partnership in crime; the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses, and so long as the partnership in crime continues the partners act for each other in carrying it forward, the criminal intent to do any act being established by the formation of the conspiracy itself
How the Supreme Court has restated “Conspiracy”
Each Supreme Court definition of “Conspiracy,” sized by how often later courts cited it. “Change” is measured by wording overlap with earlier definitions — a rough signal, not a semantic judgment.
How often courts cite the cases defining “Conspiracy”
Court decisions citing the 18 opinions that defined “Conspiracy” — 27,783 in all, by decade. Counts are citations to the defining cases as a whole, not verified uses of the term. The dip in the most recent years is a data-coverage gap, not a real trend — our corpus holds fewer opinions from the latest years.
All 21 definitions, chronological · 1910–1966
- ORIGINAL
An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong when done by many, acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of a conspiracy, and may be prohibited or punished, if the result be hurtful to the public, or to the individual against whom the concerted action is directed.
concerted action
A conspiracy in restraint of trade is different from and more than a contract in restraint of trade. A conspiracy is constituted by an agreement, it is true, but it is the result of the agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just as a partnership, although constituted by a contract, is not the contract, but is a result of it. The contract is instantaneous, the partnership may endure as one and the same partnership for years. A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.
continuing
the Sherman act punishes the conspiracies at which it is aimed on the common-law footing,—that is to say, it does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability.
under the Sherman Act · construing 15 U.S.C. § 1 · Sherman Antitrust Act
A conspiracy to accomplish what an individual is free to do may be a crime; and even more plainly a person may conspire for the commission of a crime by a third person. We will assume that there may be a degree of co-operation that would not amount to a crime, as where it was held that a purchase of spirituous liquor from an unlicensed vendor was not a crime in the purchaser, although it was in the seller. But a conspiracy with an officer or employee of the government or any other for an offense that only he could commit has been held for many years to fall within the conspiracy section.
A conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offense from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. The conspiracy, however fully formed, may fail of its object, however earnestly pursued; the contemplated crime may never be consummated; yet the conspiracy is none the less punishable. And it is punishable as conspiracy, though the intended crime be accomplished.
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered.
gravity
The crime of conspiracy to commit an offense is distinct from the offense itself.
it is the collective planning of criminal conduct at which the statute aims. The plan is itself a wrong which, if any act be done to effect its object, the state has elected to treat as criminal.
conspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between not less than two with guilty knowledge on the part of each
The gist of the offense of conspiracy as defined by § 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 88, is agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense attended by an act of one or more of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy.
The gist of the crime of conspiracy as defined by the statute is the agreement or confederation of the conspirators to commit one or more unlawful acts where 'one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy'.
gist
A conspiracy is not the commission of the crime which it contemplates, and neither violates nor 'arises under' the statute whose violation is its object.
distinct from underlying offense
This intent, when given effect by overt act, is the gist of conspiracy. While it is not identical with mere knowledge that another purposes unlawful action, it is not unrelated to such knowledge. Without the knowledge, the intent cannot exist.
one does not become a party to a conspiracy by aiding and abetting it, through sales of supplies or otherwise, unless he knows of the conspiracy; and the inference of such knowledge cannot be drawn merely from knowledge the buyer will use the goods illegally.
knowledge requirement
The essential combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of dealings or other circumstances as well as in any exchange of words. Where the circumstances are such as to warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, the conclusion that a conspiracy is established is justified. Neither proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or potential competitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization under the Sherman Act.
Sherman Act · construing 15 U.S.C. § 1 · Sherman Antitrust Act
A conspiracy is a partnership in crime. Continuity of action to produce the unlawful result, or 'continuous co-operation of the conspirators to keep it up' is necessary.
Its essence is in the agreement or confederation to commit a crime, and that is what is punishable as a conspiracy, if any overt act is taken in pursuit of it. The agreement is punishable whether or not the contemplated crime is consummated. But the same overt acts charged in a conspiracy count may also be charged and proved as substantive offenses, for the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself.
the law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of others.
The foregoing is sufficient to justify the challenged jury finding that respondents had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding when they forbade their purchasers to exceed the fixed ceilings. Thus, there is support for the conclusion that a conspiracy existed even though there is other testimony in the record indicating that the price policies of Seagram and Calvert were arrived at independently.
antitrust
explicit agreement is not a necessary part of a Sherman Act conspiracy—certainly not where, as here, joint and collaborative action was pervasive in the initiation, execution, and fulfillment of the plan
Sherman Act · construing 15 U.S.C. § 1 · Sherman Antitrust Act