Intention

A design, resolve, or determination of the mind. The exercise of an intelligent will, the mind being fully aware of the nature and consequences of the act which is about to be done, and with such knowledge, and with full liberty of action, willing and electing to do it. 2 Lea (Tenn.) 619. It implies contractual obligation to carry out the intention, and is to be distinguished from "promise." 24 N. J. Law, 430. It is not synonymous with "motive" (131 Mo. 397), nor with "attempt" (3 Dev. [N. C] 330).

INTENT. A design, resolve, or determination of the mind. In Criminal Law. To render an act criminal, a wrongful Intent must exist; 7 0. 4 P. 428; U. S. v. Pearce, 2 Mc Lean 14, Fed. Cas. No. 16,020; State v. Berkshire, 2 Ind. 207; State V. Bartlett, 30 Me. 132; Smith v. Klnne, 19 Vt. 564; State v. Volght, 90 N. 0. 741. And with this must be combined a wrongful act; as mere intent Is not punishable; 9 Go. Torrey y. Field, 10 Vt 363; TJ. S. y. Riddle, 6 Cra. (U. S.) 311, 8 L. Ed. 110; but see R. & R. 308; 1 Lew. Or. Gas. 42; and generally, perhaps always, the Intent and act must concur In point of time; 1 Bish. Or, L. $ 207; 01. Or. L. 45, 2.38, 206; but a wrongful Intent may render criminal an act otherwise innocent; 1 0. & K. 600; Com. y. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 181; 1 East, PI. Or. 265; Ransom V. State, 22 Conn. 153. In considering whether a defendant charged with doing a criminal act did it with criminal Intent, his, prior and accompanying acts are all to be considered, and the rule in civil cases as to the existence of a fraudulent Intent may be Invoked: State v. Mustek, 101 Mo. 2G0, 14 S. W. 212. Where a transaction on its face is as consistent with honesty as with fraud, it will be presumed that the intent was lawful; State V. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512, 36 S. W. 39. Courts must judge the intent a man has in doing an act by the means he employs and the thing to be accomplished. If they all be lawful, courts cannot Impute malice or unlawful motives to the actor; Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho, 609, 123 Pac. 478, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 681. Generally, where any wrongful act is committed, the law will infer conclusively that it was intentionally committed; Hill v. Com., 2 Qratt. (Va.) 594; Taylor v. State, 4 Ga. 14; Com, v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 179; as the Intent to take life may b elnferred from the character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon and the attendant circumstances; Jackson v. State, 94 Ala. 85, 10 South. 509; Winn v. State, 82 Wis. 671, 52 N. W. 775; and also that the natural, necessary, and even probable consequences were intended; 5 C. & P. 538; People v, Herrick, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 87; Com. v. Blandlng, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 15 Am. Dec, 214; Hill v. Com., 2 Gratt. (Va.) 694; State v. Fuller, 1 Bay (S. C.) 245, 1 Am, Dec. 610; West v. State, 9 Humphr. (Tenn.) 66. Generally speaking, when a statute makes an act Indictable, Irrespective of guilty knowledge. Ignorance of fact Is no defence; Com, V. Wentworth, 118 Mass. 441; L. R, 2 O. O. 154; Beckham y. Nacke, 66 Mo. 646; see Halsted v. State, 41 N. J. L. 652, 32 Am. Rep. 247; contra, Farrell v. State, 32 Ohio St. 456, 30 Am. Rep. 614, where the subject is fully treated. See Iqnorancb. Intent is in a certain sense essential to the commission of a crime and in some classes of cases it is necessary to show moral turpitude; but there is a class of cases where purposely doing a thing prohibited by statute may amount to an offence though the act does not involve moral wrong, for instance where shippers pay a rate under the honest belief that it is the lawful rate when It is not; Armour Packing Co. y. U. S., 209 the contract after the change of rate is unavailing; id. When by the common law, or by the provision of a statute, a particular intention is essential to an offence, or a criminal act is attempted but not accomplished, and the evil intent only can be punished, it is necessary to allege the Intent with distinctness and precision, and to support the allegations with proof. On the other hand, if the offence does not rest merely in tendency, or in an attempt to do a certain act with a wicked purpose, but consists In doing an unlawful or criminal act, the evil intention will be presumed,' and need not be alleged, ‘or. If alleged, It Is a mere formal averment, which need not be proved; Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 180; 6 East 474; Com, v, Webster, 5 Cush. (Mas.s.) 306, 52 Am. Dec. 711; State v. Smith, 93 N. C. 516. This proof may be of external and visible acts and conduct from which the jury may infer the fact; 8 Co. 146; or it may be by proof of an act committed, as, in case of burglary with Intent to steal, proof of burglary and stealing is conclusive; 5 C. & P. 510; 2 Mood. & R. 40. When a man intending one wrong fails, and accidentally commits another, he will, except where the particular intent is a substantive part of the crime, be held to have intended the act he did commit; People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 159, 27 Am. Dec. 197; Com. v. Call, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 515; U. S. v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624, Fed. Cas. No. 16,196; 1 C, & K, 746. Where Intent is a material ingredient of the crime it is necessary to be averred, but it may always be averred in general terms; Evans v, U. S., 163 U. S. 684, 14 Sup. Ct. 934, 38 L. Ed. 830; 153 U. S. 608, 14 Sup. Ct 939, 38 L. Ed. 839. As to when a party can prove his Intent under various circumstances, see note in 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 367. As to the distinction between intention and motive, see Pollock’s First Book of Jurispr. 144, where be defines intention as the wish or desire accompanying an act and having regard not only to the act Itself, but to the consequences to be produced; and as including will, but Including much more than is comihonly understood by will. As to “motive,” external or internal, he points out that external motive is a particular inducement to a course of action, but that motive can also mean Internal mortlve, the general moral quality or disposition of the agent which is a constant element as compared vrlth particular inducements, and gives weight in his deliberation to this or tliat inducement. The effect of general moral quality or disposition in the process of deliberation or choice is for many purposes more important than the average or objective value of.things reputed desirable; this he la Contracts. An intention to enter into the contracts Is necessary: hence the person must have sufficient mind to enable him to intend. in Wills. The intention of the testator governs unless the thing to be done be opposed to some unbending rule of law; 6 Cruise, Dig. 295; Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 68, 8 L. Ed. 322. This intention is to be gathered from the instrument, and from every part of it; 3 Ves. 105; Brown v. Bartlett, 58 N. H. 511; Hinton v. Milburn's Ex’rs, 23 W. Va. 166; Metcalf v. First Parish in Framingham, 128 Mass. 374; Banks v. Jones, 60 Ala. 605; Mather v. Mather, 103 111. 607; and from a later clause In preference to an earlier; Woodbury v. Woodbury, 74 Me. 413; Murfltt V. Jessop, 94 111. 158; Hemphill v. Moody, 62 Ala. 510. See Interpretation; Construction; Statutes; Wills.