Lex Junia Velleja

A law providing that descendants who became sui heredes of the testator otherwise than by birth, as by the death of their father, must be disinherited or Instituted heirs in the same way as posthumous children. Campbell, Rom. L. 77. LEX KANTI^. The body of customs prevailing in Kent during the time of Edward I. A written statement of these customs was sanctioned by the king’s Justices in eyre. They were mainly concerned with the maintenance of a form of land -tenure known as gavelkind (q. v.). 1 Poll. & Maitl. 166. Lombards. It contains many evident traces of feudal policy. It survived the destruction of the ancient government of Lombardy by Charlemagpe, and Is said to be still partially In force in some districts of Italy. LEX LOCI (Lat). The law of the place. This may be either lex loci contractus (the law of the place of making a contract); lex loci rei sitce or lex situs (the law of the place where a thing Is situated); lex loci actus, or lex actus (the law of the place where a legal transaction takes place); lex loci celebrationis (the law of the place where a contract is made); lex loci solutionis (the law of the place where a contract is to be performed); lex loci delicti commissi (the law of the place where a tort is committed). In general, however, lex loci is only used for lex loci contractus. As will appear below, lex loci contractus is used in a double sense in many of the cases. It Is used sometimes, to denote the law of the place where the contract was made, and at other times to denote the law by which the contract is to be governed, which may or may not be the same as that of the place where It was made. The earlier cases do not regard the distinction, and are to be read with this fact in mind. See below, where the distinction is made clear by Dicey, Confl. of Laws. CoNTEACTS. In the older cases it is held that it is a general principle applying to contracts made, rights acquired, or acts done relative to personal property, that the law of the place of making the contfact, or doing the act, is to govern it and determine its validity or invalidity, as well as the rights of parties under it, in all matters touching the modes of execution and authentication of the form or instruments of contract; and also in relation to the use and meaning of the language in which it is expressed, the construction and interpretation of it, the legal duties and obligations imposed by it and the legal rights and immunities acquired under it; 8 Cl. & F. 121; Houghton V. Page, 2 N. H. 42, 9 Am. Dec. 30; Pickering V. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102; May v. Breed, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 30, 54 Am. Dec. 700; Speed v. May, 17 Pa. 91, 55 Am. Dec. 540; Houghtaling v. Bail, 19 Mo. 84, 59 Am. Dec. 331; Hayward V. Le Baron, 4 Fla. 404; Glenn v. Thistle, 23 Miss. 42; Scudder v. Bank, 91 U. S. 400, 23 L. Ed. 245; Dacosta v. Davis, 24 N. J. L. 319; Downer v. Chesebrough, 36 Conn. 39, 4 Am. Rep. 29; Hildreth v. Shepard, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 205. See Conflict of Laws. The validity or invalidity of a contract as affected by the lex loci may depend upon the capacity of the parties or the legality of the act to be done. The capacity of the parties as affected by questions of minority or majority, incapacities Incident to coverture, guardianship, cided by the law of the place of making the contract; Story, Confl. Laws § 103; Appeal of Huey, 1 Grant (Pa.) 61. See infra. The question of disability to make a contract on account of infancy is to be decided by the lex loci; Appeal of Huey, 1 Grant 51; 2 kent 233. So, also, as to contracts made by married women; Gamier v. Poydras, 13 La. 177. Personal disqualifications not arising from the law of nature, but from positive law, and especially such as are penal, are strictly territorial, and are not to be enforced, in any country other than that where they originate; Story, Confl. Laws §§ 91, 104, 620; 2 Kent 459. See Whart. Confl. L. { 101; Price V. Wilson, 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 9. Natural disabilities, such as insanity, imbecility, etc., are everywhere recognized, so that the question whether they are controlled by the lex loci or lex domicilii seems to be theoretic rather than practical. On principle there seems to be no good reason why they should come under a different rule from the positive disabilities. A contract legal by the lex loci will be so everywhere; Miller v. Wilson, 146 111. 523, 34 N. B. 1111, 37 Am. St. Rep. 186; unless — It is injurious to public rights or morals; 1 B. & P. 340; Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 379, 4 Am. Dec. 145; De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 H. & J. (Md.) 193, 3 Am. Dec. 535; or contravenes the policy; Castleman v. Jeffries, 60 Ala. 380; King v. Johnson, 5 Harrlng. (Del.) 31; 2 Sim. Ch. 194; see Armstrong v. Best, 112 N. C. 59, 17 S. B. 14, 25 L. R. A. 188, 34 Am. St. Rep. 473; or violates a positive law of the lex fori; or, in England, violates any English rule of procedure; Dicey, 'Confl. Laws 542. The application of the lex loci is a matter of comity: and that law must, in all cases, yield to the positive law of the place of seeking the remedy; Martin V. Hill, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 631; Mahorner v. Hooe, 9 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 247, 48 Am. Dec. 706. It is held generally that the claims of citizens are to be preferred to those of foreigners. A.ssignraents, under the insolvent laws of a foreign state, are often held Inoperative as against claims of a citizen of the state, in regard to personal property in the jurisdiction of the lex fori; King v. Johnson, 5 Harring. (DeL) 31; Beer v. Hooper, 32 Miss. 246; Tyler v. Strang, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 198; but see Wilson v. Carson, 12 Md. 54. But there appears to be a distinction. This rule is well settled in all cases where the assignment of the property of an insolvent is made, in invitum, by a court in a foreign jurisdiction, to a receiver, assignee, etc.; 6 Thomp. Corp. § 7338; Catlin v. Silver-Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477, 24 N. B. 250, 8