Obligatio

In Roman law. A legal bond which obliges us to the performance of something in accordance with the law of the land. Ortolan, Inst. 2, § 1179. It corresponded nearly to our word "contract." Justinian says, "Obligatio _ est juris vinculum, quo necessitate adstringimur alicujus solvendae rei, secundum nostrae eivitatis jura." Pr. Just. 3. 13. The Romans considered that obligations derived their validity solely from positive law. At first the only ones recognized were those established in special cases in however, the praetorian jurisdiction, in mitigation of the primitive rigor of the law, introduced new modes of contracting obligations, and provided the means of enforcing them; hence the twofold division made by Justinian of obligationes civiles, and obligationes praetoriae. Inst. 1. 3. 13. But there was a third class, the obligationes naturales, which derived their validity from the law of nature and nations, or the natural reason of mankind. These had not the binding force of the other classes, not being capable of enforcement by action, and _ are, therefore, not noticed by Justinian in his classification; but they had, nevertheless, a certain efficacy even in the civil law. For instance, though a debt founded upon a natural obligation could not be recovered by an action, yet if it was voluntarily paid by the debtor, he could not recover it back, as he might do in the case of money paid by mistake, etc., where no natural obligation existed. L. 38, pr. D. 12. 6. And see Ortolan, Inst. 2, § 1180. The second classification of obligations made by Justinian has regard to the way in which they arise. They were, in this aspect, either ex contractu or quasi ex contractu, or ex malefido or quasi ex maleficio. Inst. 2. 3. 13. OBLIGATION (Lat. obligo; ligo, to bind). A legal bond, whereby constraint is laid upon a person or group of persons to act or forbear on behalf of another person or group. Savigny, Obi. §§ 2-4; Anson, Cont. §2. Secondarily applied to an instrument whereby one binds himself, under penalty, to an act or forbearance (2 Serg. & R. [Pa.] 502; 6 Vt. 40), and sometimes in modern usage to all written contracts (22 Ohio St. 111). Absolute Obligation. One which gives no alternative to the obligor, but requires fulfillment according to the engagement. Accessory Obligation. One which is dependent on the principal obligation. For example, if I sell you a house and lot of ground, the principal obligation on my part is to make you a title for it; the accessory obligation is to deliver you all the title papers which I have relating to it, to take care of the estate till it is delivered to you, and the like. Alternative Obligation. Where a person engages to do or to give several things in such a manner that the payment of one will acquit him of all. Civil Obligation. One which has a binding operation in law, and which gives to the obligee the right of enforcing it in a court of justice. In other words, it is an engagement binding on the obligor. 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 197; 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 318, 337. Civil obligations are divided into express and implied, pure and conditional, primiand indeterminate, divisible and Indivisible, single and penal, and joint and several. They are also purely personal, purely real, or mixed. Conditional Obligation. One, the execution of which is suspended by a condition which has not been accomplished, and subject to which it has been contracted. Determinate Obligation. One which has for its object a certain thing; as, an obligation to deliver a certain horse, named "Bucephalus." In this case, the obligation can only be discharged by delivering the identical horse. ^

— Divisible Obligation. One which, being a unit, may nevertheless be lawfully divided with or without the consent of the parties. Express or Conventional Obligations. Those by which the obligor binds himself in express terms to perform his obligation. Imperfect Obligations. Those which are not binding on us as between man and man, and for the nonperformance of which we are accountable to God only, such as charity or gratitude. In this sense, an obligation is a mere duty. Poth. Obi. art. prel. note 1. Implied Obligation. One which arises by operation of law; as, for example, if I send you daily a loaf of bread, without any express authority, and you make use of it in your family, the law raises an obligation on your part to pay me the value of the bread. Indeterminate Obligation. One where the obligor binds himself to deliver one of a certain species; as, to deliver a horse, where the delivery of any horse will discharge the obligation. Indivisible Obligation. One which is not susceptible of division; as, for example, if I promise to pay you one hundred dollars, you cannot assign one-half of this to another, so as to give him a right of action against me for his share. See "Divisible." Joint Obligation. One by which several obligors promise to the obligee to perform the obligation. When the obligation is only joint, and the obligors do not promise separately to fulfill their engagement, they must be all sued, if living, to compel the performance; or, if any be dead, the survivors must all be sued. See "Parties." Natural or Moral Obligation. One which cannot be enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according to natural justice. As, for instance, when the action is barred by the act of limitation, a natural obligation still subsists, although the civil obligation is extinguished. 5 Bin. (Pa.) 573. Although natural obligations cannot be enforced by action, they have the following effect: First, no suit will lie to recover back what has been paid or given in compliance with a natural obligation (1 tion for a new contract (2 Bin. [Pa.] 591; 5 Bin. [Pa.] 36; Yelv. 41a, note 1; Cowp. 290; 2 Bl. Comm. 445; 3 Bos. & P. 249, note; 2 East, 506; 3 Taunt. 311; 5 Taunt. 36; 3 Pick. [Mass.] 207; Chit. Cont. 10). See "Consideration." Penal Obligation. One to which Is attached a penal clause, which is to be enforced if the principal obligation be not perfdrmed. See "Damages." Perfect Obligation. One which gives a right to another to require us to give him something, or not to do something. These obligations are either natural or moral, or they are civil. Personal Obligation. One by which the obligor binds himself to perform an act, without directly binding his property for its performance. It also denotes an obligation in which the obligor binds himself only, not including his heirs or representatives. Primitive Obligation. This obligation, which, in one sense, may also be called a "principal obligation," is one which is contracted with a design that it should itself be the first fulfilled. Principal Obligation. One which is the most important object of the engagement of the contracting parties. Pure (or Simple) Obligation. One which is not suspended by any condition, either because it has been contracted without condition, or, having been contracted with one, it has been fulfilled. Real Obligation. One by which real estate, and not the person, is liable to the obligee for the performance. A familiar example will explain this: When an estate owes an easement as a right of way, it is the thing, and not the owner, who owes the easement. Another instance occurs when a person buys an estate which has been mortgaged, subject to the mortgage. He is not liable for the debt, though his estate is. In these cases the owner has an interest only because he is seised of the servient estate or the mortgaged premises, and he may discharge himself 'by abandoning or parting with the property. The obligation is both personal and real when the obligor has bound himself and pledged his estate for the fulfillment of his obligations. Secondary Obligation. One which is contracted and is to be performed in case the primitive cannot be. For example, if I sell you my house, I bind myself to give a title; but if I find I cannot, as the title is in another, then my secondary obligation is to pay you damages for my nonperformance of my obligation. Several Obligation. One by which one individual, or, if there be more, several individuals, bind themselves separately to perform the engagement. In this case, each obligor may be sued separately; and Single Obligation, One without any penalty; as, where I simply promise to pay you one hundred dollars. This is called a "single bill," when it is under seal.

An obligation.

Lat.

In Roman law. The legal relation existing between two certain persons whereby one (the creditor) is authorized to demand of the other (the debtor) a certain performance which has a money value. In this sense obligatio signifies not only the duty of the debtor, but also the right of the creditor. The fact establishing such claim and debt, as also the instrument evidencing it, is termed "obligation." Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 360. That legal relation subsisting between two persons by which one is bound to the other for a certain performance. The passive relation sustained by the debtor to the creditor is likewise called an "obligation." Sometimes, also, the term "obligatio" is used for the causa obligationis, and the contract itself is designated an "obligation." There are passages in which even the document which affords the proof of a contract is called an "obligation." Such applications, however, are but a loose extension of the tenn, which, according to its true idea, is only properly employed when it is used to denote the debt relationship, in its totality, active and passive, subsisting between the creditor and the debtor, Tomk. & J. Mod. Rom. Law, 3OL
Obligations, in the civil law, are of the several descriptions enumerated below.
Obligatio owitis is an obligation enforceable by action, whether it derives its origin from jus cwile, as the obligation engendered by formal contracts or the obligation enforceable by bilaterally penal suits, or from such portion of the jus gentium as had been completely nainralized in the civil Jaw and protected by nil its remedies, such as the obligation engendered by formless contracts. '
Obligatio naturalis is an obligation not immediately enforceable by action, or an obligation imposed by that portion of the jus gentium which is only imperfectly recognized by civil law.
Obligatio ex contractu, an obligation arising from contract, or an antecedent jus in personam. In this there are two stages.—first, a primary or sanctioned persona] right antecedent to wrong, and, afterwanis, a secondary or sanctioning personal right consequent on a wrong. Poste's Gaius' Inst. 359.
Obligatio ex delicto, an obligation founded on wrong or tort, or arising from the invasion of a jus in rem. In this there is the second stage, a secondary or sanctioning personal right consequent on a wrong, but the first stage is not a personal right, (jus in personam,) but a reni right, (jus in rem,) whether a primordial right, right of status, or of property. Poste's Gams' Inst. 359.
Obligationes ex delicto are obligations arising from the commission of a wrongful injury to the person or property of another. "Delictum," is not exactly synonymous with "tort," for, while it includes most of the wrongs known to the common law as torts, it is also wide enough to cover some offenses (such as theft and robbery) primarily injurious to the individual, but now only punished as crimes. Such acts gave rise to an obligatio, which consisted in the liability to pay damages.
Obligationes quasi ex contractu. Often persons who have not contracted with each other, under a certain state of facts, are regarded by the Roman law as if they had actually concluded a convention between themselves. The legal relation which then takes place between these persons, which has always a similarity to a contract obligation, is therefore termed "obligatio quasi ex contractu." Such a relation arises from the conducting of affairs without authority, (negotiorum gestio;) from the management or property that is in common when the commuhity arose from casualty, (communis incidens;) from the payment of what was not due, (solutio indebiti;) from tutorship and curatorship; and from taking possession of an inheritance. Mackeld. Rom. Law, § 491.
Obligationes quasi ex delicto. This class embraces ali toris not coming under the denomination of "delicta" and not having a special form of action provided for them by law. They differed widely in character, and at common law would in some cases give rise to an action on the case; in others to an action on an implied contract. Ort. Inst. §§ 1781-1792.

Lat.

In the civil and old English law. Obligation; a bond or writing obligatory. Obligatio est juris vinculum, quo necessitate astringimur ad aliquod dandum vel faciendum: obligation is a bond of law, by which we are necessarily bound to give or to do something.

Lat.

In Roman law. The legal relation existing between two certain persons whereby one (the creditor) is SSS authorized to demand of the other (the debtor) a certain performance which has a money value. In this sense obligatio signifies not only the duty of the debtor, but also the right of the creditor. The fact establishing such claim and debt, as also the instrument evidencing it, istermed “obligation.” Mackeld. SS Rom. Law, § 360. That legal relation subsisting between two persons by which one is bound to the other for a certain performance. The passive Sometimes, also, the term “obligatto” is used for the causa obligationis, and the contract itself is designated an “obligation.” There are passages in which even the document which affords the proof of a contract is called an “obligation.” Such applications, however, are but a loose extension of the term, which, according to its true idea, is only properly employed when itis used to denote the debt relationship, in its totality, active and passive, subsisting between the creditor and the debtor. Tomk. & J. Mod. Rom. Law, 301. Obligations, in the civil law, are of the several descriptions enumerated below. Ohligatio civilis is an obligation enforceable by action, whether it derives ita origin from fus civile, as the obligation engendered by formal com tracts or the obligation enforceable by bilaterally penal suits, or from such portion of the pus genttwm as had been completely naturalized in the civillaw and protected by all its remedies, such as the obligation engendered by formless contracta. Obligatio naturalis 1s an obligation not immediately enforceable by action, or an obligation imposed by that portion of the jus gentium which is only imperfectly recognized by civil law. Obligatio ex contractu, an obligation arising from contract, or an antecedent jus in personam. In this there are two stages,—first, a primary or sanctioned personal right antecedent to wrong, and, afterwards, a secondary or sanctioning personal right consequent on a wrong. Poste's Gaius’ Inst, 359. Obligatio ex delicto, an obligation founded on wrong or tort, or arising from the invasion of a jus in rem. In this there is the second stage, a secondary or sanctioning personal right consequent on a wrong, but the first stage is not a personal right, (jus in personam,) but a real right, (jus in rem,) whether a primordial right, right of status, or of property. Poste’s Gaius’ Inst. 359. Oligatlones ex delicto are obligations arising from the commission of a wrongful injury to the person or property of another. “ Delictuwm” is not exactly synonymous with “tort,” for, while it includes most of the wrongs known to the common law as torts, it is also wide enough to cover soma offenses (such as theft and robbery) primarily injurious to the individual, but now only punished as crimes. Such acts gave rise to an obligatio, which consisted in the liability to pay damages. Obligationes quasi ex contractu. Often persons who bave not contracted with each other, undera certain state of facts, are regarded by the Roman law as if they had actually concluded a convention between themselves. The legal relation which then takes place between these persons, which has always a Similarity to a contract obligation, is therefore termed “obligatio quasi ex contractu. ® Such a relation arises from the conducting of affairs without authority, (negotiorum gestio;) from the management of property that is in common when the community arose from casualty, (com munis incidens;) from the payment of what was not dué, (solutio indebiti;) from tutorship and Obligationes quast ex delicto. This class embraces all torts not coming under the denomination of “delicta,” and not having a special form of action provided for them by law. They differed widely in character, aud at common law would in some cases give rise to an action on the case; in others to an action on an implied contract. Ort. Inst. §§ 1781-1792.