Open Court

A court formally opened and engaged in the transaction of all judicial functions. A court to which all persons have free access as spectators while they conduct themselves in an orderly manner. The term is used in the first sense as distinguishing a court from a judge sitting in chambers or informally for the transaction of such matters as may be thus transacted. See "Chambers;" "Court."

In the second sense, all courts in the United States are open; but in England, formerly, while the parties and probably their witnesses were admitted freely in the courts, all other persons were required to pay in order to obtain admittance. St. 13 Edw. I. cc. 42, 44; Barr. Obs. St. 126, 127. See Princ. Pen. Law, 165.

A court formally opened and engaged in the transaction of all judicial functions. Hobart v. Hobart, 45 la. 501. A court to which all persons have free access as spectators while they conduct themselves in an orderly manner. The term is used in the first sense as distinguishing a court from a judge sitting in chambers or informally for the transaction of such matters as may be thus transacted. See Chambers; Court.

In the second sense, all courts in the United States are open; but in England, formerly, while the parties and probably their witnesses were admitted freely in the courts, all other persons were required to pay in order to obtain admittance. Stat. 13 Edw. I. ec. 42, 44; Barr, on the Stat. 126, 127. See Prin. of Pen. I >aw 165. In most of the states the constitution provides that persons accused shall have a speedy public trial; Stiinson, Am. Stat. L. § 131. This has been construed to moan that “the doors of the court room are expected to be kept open, the public are entitled to be admitted, and the trial is to be public in all respects... with due regard to the size of the court-room and the conveniences of the court, the right to exclude objectionable characters and youth of tender years, and to do other things which may facilitate the proper conduct of the trial People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 37 Pac. 153, 42 Am. St. Rep. 108; in this case a conviction of assault with intent to commit rape was reversed because against defendant’s objection all persons were excluded except the officers of the court and the defendant; id. In a trial of a civil case of trespass for adultery the judgment was reversed because all but parties and witnesses were excluded; Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 29 Atl. 913, 25 L. R. A. 506. In California the court may direct the trial of issues of fact in private; % Cal. Code, C. P. § 125; but this act does not authorize the court to forbid the publication of the testimony, and when such an order was made, an order of contempt against a newspaper publisher was reversed; In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 Pac. 227, 21 L. R. A. 755, 37 Am. St. Rep. 78. On a trial for assault with intent to kill, all persons were excluded except officers of the court, press reporters, and excited by a crowd, as well as to preserve order, and it was held that her right to a public trial was not violated; People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 222, 14 Pac. 849. In a suit for an injunction against the use of secret processes it was held error to exclude evidence of the details, as accurate knowledge on the subject is required before granting an injunction, but (the embodiment of the secret in the injunction is not necessary; testimony taken in camera may be sealed, and used only when it becomes necessary to determine whether there has been a violation; Taylor I. & S. Co. v. Nichols, 73 N. J. >Eq. 6S4, 69 Atl. 186, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 933, 133 Am. St. Rep. 753. It was said by Lord Eldon that it was the uniform practice in chancery, as long as the court had existed, in the case of family disputes, on the application of counsel on both sides, to hear the same in the chancellor’s private room, and that what was so done was not the act of the judge but of the parties; Coop. t. Eldon 106; in a later case, on application for a private hearing relating to the custody of a young lady who was a ward of the court, Lord Brougham directed the case to be heard in private on the assurance of counsel that such course was proper, notwithstanding that one party withheld his consent; 2 Russ. &* M. G8S; and it is noted that this course was frequently followed by the same judge; id. In a patent ease, the court being of opinion that the patent was valid, permitted the defendant to state his secret process in camera; 24 Ch. D. 156; an application for an injunction to restrain a solicitor from disclosing confidential information was ordered to be heard in private without consent of defendant, upon the statement of plaintit Fs counsel that in his opinion a public hearing would defeat the object of the action; 31 Ch. D. 55; 9 Ch. App. 522; but this will not be done without consent of both parties unless it is clear that such would be the result of a public hearing; id. It has been held that suits for nullity of marriage or judicial separation may be heard in camera, but not a petition for dissolution of marriage; L. It. 1 P. & D. 640; this case was put upon the ground that the matter was controlled, to that result, by 20 & 21 Viet. c. 85, § 22; but in a later case there was a distinct disapproval of the limitation, and it was said that as the ecclesiastical courts had the power to hear nullity suits in private when it was desirable for the sake of public decency, the same power must exist in other cases where it was required for the same reason; L. R. 3 P. & M. 230. It was held that under the English practice, a law court had power to try a case in camera, without a jury, when the parties consent; 53 J. P. 822. In 4 Ch. D. 174, Jessel, M. R., considered consent of the parties, except cases affecting lunatics or wards of court, or where a public trial would defeat the object of the action.” The report of the case contains many interesting interpellations of the court during the argument. Lord Esher, M. R., said in Pittard v. Oliver that as to proceedings in courts of justice it was for the interest of all the public to hear what takes place in court; [1891] 1 Q. B. 474, where it was held that where matters discussed in camera were privileged, the presence of reporters did not take away the privilege. And in another case the same judge said that ‘‘public policy requires that some hardship should be suffered by individuals rather than that judicial proceedings should be held in secret;” L1893] 1 Q. B. 65. Again, it was said by North, J., in holding the publication of proceedings in open court to be privileged, that ‘‘the general rule is an excellent one, that legal proceedings should be in public;” [1894] 3 Ch. 193, where it was held contempt to publish any account however meagre, and whether accurate or inaccurate, of a hearing in camera. As long ago as 1^29, Mr. Justice Bayley declared “that it is one of the essential qualities of a court of justice that its proceedings should be public, and that all parties who may be desirous of hearing what is going on, if there be room in the place for that purpose, — provided they do not interrupt the proceedings, and provided there is no specific reason why they should be removed, — have a right to be present for the purpose of hearing what is going on”; 10 B. & C. 237; it was there held that an action would be against a justice of the peace for excluding from his court the attorney of an absent defendant. The subject was fully argued and considered in Scott v. Scott, [1913] A. C. 417, in the House of Lords and certain questions were finally settled. It was there held that a suit for nullity of marriage cannot be heard in camera. The only exceptions to the general rule prescribing publicity of courts are suits affecting wards, those in relation to lunatics, and thirdly, those where secrecy (as a secret process or discovery) is of the essence of the cause. The consent of the parties to try a case in camera does not give jurisdiction. Here, after a hearing in camera in the court below, one of the parties had exhibited to three persons copies of the testimony, and was adjudged to be in contempt. This judgment was reversed above. In his opinion Lord Shaw quoted Hallam as saying that “he ranks the publicity of judicial proceedings even higher than the rights of Parliament as a guaranty of public security” and proceeds: “There is no greater danger than that which proceeds little by little, un- It has been pointed out that as to two of, the exceptions above stated, infancy and lunacy, the jurisdiction of the court is parental or administrative. Even here Lord Shaw, partially disagreeing with the other judges, was of opinion that neither infants nor lunatics should be prohibited from publishing facts relating to themselves merely because they were elicited at a trial in camera. The English Children’s Act 1908 and the Incest Act 1908 both provide that certain criminal trials under those acts should be held in camera. The settled judgment of our ancestors and ourselves is that publicity in the administration of the law is on the whole worth more to society than it costs. Pollock, Expansion of C. L. 32. A hearing in camei'a differs from one at chambers (g. v.); the former being a private hearing by a court and the latter a hearing by a judge not in a regular session of court. See 15 Am. L. Rev. 427; People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N. W. 995, 14 L. R. A. 809, 28 Am. St. Rep. 294, where the subject is fully discussed. See In Camera. The subject is further treated under Trial.

This term may mean either a court which has been formally convened and declared open for the transaction of its proper judicial business, or a court which is freely open to the approach of all decent and orderly persons in the character of spectators. Hobart v. Hobart, 45 Iowa, 501; Conover v. Bird, 56 N. J. Law, 228, 28 Atl. 428; Ex parte Branch, 63 Ala. 383; Hays v. Railroad Go., 99 Md. 413, 58 Atl. 439.

Defined under Open in Black's Law Dictionary.

This term may mean either a court which has been formally convened and declared open for the transaction of its proper judicial business, or a court which is freely open to the approach of all decent and orderly persons in the character of spectators.