Saloon

The term does not necessarily jmply a place for the sale of intoxicants. 36 Tex. 364. But see 105 Mass. 40.

A place of refreshment. Kitson v. Mayor of Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325. An apartment for a specified public use. Clinton v. Grusendorf, 80 la. 117, 45 N. W. 408; Ex parte Livingstone, 20 Nev. 282, 21 Pac. 322. In common parlance, the word Is used to designate a place where intoxicating liquors are sold, and this restricted meaning may be given to saloons, where the context or other circumstances requires it; Mc Dougall v. Giacomini, 13 Neb. 434, 14 N. W. 150; Dewar v. People, 40 Mich. 401, 29 Am. Rep. 545; Cahill v. Campbell, 105 Mass. 40; but it does not necessarily import a place where liquors are sold; Kitson v. Mayor of Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 328; Early v. State, 23 Tex. App. 364, 5 S. W. 122. The word has a much broader meaning than dram shop. To constitute a saloon it is not necessary that ardent spirits should be offered for sale and that it should be a business requiring a license under the revenue laws of the state; Snow v. State, 50 Ark. 561, 9 S. W. 306. See Liquob Laws.

Originally, a large public room or parlor; now, usually, a place where intoxicating liquors are sold.^ A licensed saloon-keeper is, therefore, a person licensed to sell intoxicating liquors." Supposed t<^ be a place where persons who call for them are supplied with refreshments." A pool-table is not necessary to the conduct of the business.^ A house or room used for retailing spirituous liquors is sometimes improperly called a saloon, but this use cannot impart to the word any such legal significa-, tion.* See Close, 1 (2); Keep, Open; Restaurant; Tavern.

Does not necessarily import a place to sell liquors. It may mean a place for the sale of general refreshments. Kitson V. Mayor, &c. of Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325. Saloon has not acquired the legal signification of a house kept for retailing intoxicating liquor. It may mean a room for the reception of company, for exliibition of works of art, &c. State v. Mansker, 36 Tex. 864. Saloon-keeper. This expression has a definite meaning; namely, a retailer of cigars, liquors, &c. Cahill v. Campbell, 105 Jifass. 40. SALT LICK; SALT SPRING. In the act of April 19, 1816, the terms " salt lick " and " salt spring " seem to be mentioned as words of substantially the same meaning. State of Indiana v. Miller, 3 Mc Lean, 151, 154. Salus populi est suprema lez:. The welfare of the public is the highest law. The rights or interests of an individual must yield to the public welfare. The principle expressed by this maxim is one fundamental to the organization and existence of society, and its application is almost unlimited. Instances are found in the exercise of the powers of eminent domain; of taxation; of taking or destroying private property in war, to aid the common defence; of punishing crime, to the extent of depriving the offender against the public of his property, his liberty, or his life itself. The public welfare is the first and highest consideration, on account of which individuals are restricted in the exercise of rights and privileges which otherwise they might naturally enjoy without restriction. So, private agreements are controlled by considerations of public policy; and acts of individuals, though not objectionable in themselves, are invalid, if they fail to conform to the requirements imposed by the law. interfere with the paramount rights of the public, ought to be restrained. Uonahoe v, Richards, 38 Me. 379, 412. In a case of necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire, magistrates or individuals may destroy private property, without subjecting tliemselves to an action for damages. This is only one of the many cases where the maxim applies, — saius populi suprema lex. Mayor, &c. of New York V. Lord, 17 Wend. 285. And see American Print Works v. Lawrence, 23