Olney v. Arnold

¶1THIS was a wat of error on a judgment given in the Sit- . perior Court of Judicature, court of áflize arid jail deli-livery, for the county oiProvidence, in the State of Rhode IJl-t and; and the cafe, appearing, on the record, was as follows' 'Olney, the Plaintiff in error, was the colledtor of impolts for. Rhode IJland; Arnold, the 'Defendant in error, was owner of the' ihip Neptune; arid a citizen' of the name of Bexter, as the declaration ¿Hedged, was owner of the cargo of the' Ihip ; which arrived from Surinam, at Providence, about°4 o’clock' P. M. on the (>th of. November, 1792.'' On that day, the parties applied for a permit"to landthe cargo, ánd. offered bonds to pay the duties; but the colleofor refufed, or negledted, to accept the bonds and grant the permit. On the 7th of November, afecond ápplication was made for a permit;, and bonds, actually executed, were tendered for the payment of the duties ; but the collector again peremptorily' refufed to'accept the bonds, or to' grant the permit; in confequeuce of which the veflel, with the cargo on board, remained at á heavy expence from the'ótb to the 13th of November-, and Arnold laid his damages at ^200. >

¶2Qlney, the Defendant in the court below,

¶3pleaded that by the Aift'fe&ion of the adt of Congrefs, paifed on the 4th of Augujl, *3093:790, “ to provide more effectually for the’ coll eft ion of the duties, &c ” it is declared that all duties on goods, wares and merchandise imported, ihall be paid, or fecured tobe paid, before a permit ihall be granted for landing the fame and that “ no perfon whofe bond for the payment of duties is due and unfatisfied, ihall be allowed a future credit for duties, until fucli bond ihall be fully paid, Or difchargcd that on the 17th of January, 179•¡f Arnold being indebted for duties, gave a bond for the amount, payable on the 17th of May, enfuing ; that on the 5th of November 1792, the term for payment of the bond was elapfed, but the fame then remained unpaid and undif-charged ; that Arnold was the real owner of the cargo, but had fraudulently transferred it to Dexter, in order to obtain a credit at the Cuftom-houfe; that, though Dexter had tendered a bond-on the 7th of November, it was rejected by virtue of the recited aft of Congrefs ; and that a permit had been refufed until the duties of the cargo were paid, or Arnold's old bond was difeharged.

¶4To this plea-the Plaintiff below demurred, and ailigned the following caufesofderhurrer: iff, Becaufe the matters contained in the plea might be given in evidence, if at all, under the general iffue ; and they amount to no more than the general iffue- 2d, Becaufe the plea ftates the property of the cargo to • be in Arnold, and does not traverfe the property of Dexter therein. ■ 3d, Becaufe it does not appear that the old bond given by Arnold was unfatisfied after the 5th of November 1792. 4th,.Becaufe the bond given by Arnold was for his'own proper debt, and the-bond tendered.by Dexter was for his own proper debt: And 5th, b.ecaufe the plea is inccmfiftent, uncertain, not •iffuable, and wants form.

¶5The .Defendant joined in demurrerand, thereupon, the Court of Common Fleas, for the'Courrfy of Providence, decided that the plea.was afuiKcient bar to the aftioiV; and, in December X792, gave judgment for the Defendant accordingly. From this judgment the Plaintiff appealed to the fuperior court of judicature, where it was adjudged,-in December 1794, that the plea in bar was not fufficient; arid the caufe was remitted-to the County Court for trial. On the trial, the Jury gave a verdift for the Plaintiff, damages /13 ef. With colts:' and the Defendant below brought,die prefent writ of error, to .remove the proceedings into the Supreme Court-of the United States ⅛ the conftruftion. and validity of the aft of Congrcfsj under which the Defendant juftified, being involved in the decifion of the State Court. Confutation of the United States, art. 3. f ?. Laws of the United States, 1 ml. -ft. 6g. f. 25.

¶6*310Two leading queftions were made in this cafe? iff, Whe-r • ther the plea was.a fufficient' bar to the a&ion ?—particularly on the ground of the third caufe afligned upon the demurrer; as the'Defendant only alledged Arnold’s old bond to be unpaid an the $th of November,. whereas he admitted a tender of a bond for' the duties on the fh of November. And 2d, Whether the fúperior court, on whofe judgment the writ of error was brought, or the General Affembly, was the higheft Court of Law or Equity of the State of Rhode If and, in which a decifton of the fade could have been had ?■

¶7The firft queftion was argued at the laft term, by Pringle arid Dexter, for the Defendants in error, and by Lee, Attorney General, for the Plaintiff in error: but the court declaring it to be unrieoeffary to give any opinion on the principal cafe, till it was decided, whether the record was regularly before them, directed the fecond queftion to be difeuffed at the prefent term; when Lee, Attorney General, again argued for the Plaintiff in error;- and Ingerfoll for the Defendant. ■

¶8The-Attorney General,, in contending thaqthe writ of error was well brought, ftated, that there could be no doubt, that this court had jurifdidlion in the prefent caufe, as it appeared-upon the record,- that the conftruftion of an a£fc of Congrefs, under which the colledlor juftified, had been drawn into-quef- ' tión, and no other error could be afligned. He faid, that there were two obvious reafons, why the Legiflature of Rhode If and, could riot be confidered as the court contemplated by the law : for, in the firji place,' it mnjl be a court of law or equity*, in-which a decifton of the fuit could be had. A decifton imports-a final determination between -the litigants; and not a partial - adjudication, which fettles one point of the controverfy, and refers the reft to another tribunal. Though, therefore, the Le-giflature fhould be veiled with an equitable power, to examine the proceedings of a court of law, and, if it thinks proper, to. direót a new trial; this cannot be regarded as conftituting a court of law, yvkhin the meaning of the a£l of-Congrefs. But in. the fecond place, it muft be a court of-law or equity, from which a writ of error could be obtained. The 25th. feci, of the judicial a.dl requires, that the citation without’ which," a writ of error cannot be available, fhould be figned by the Chief Juftice or Judge, or Chancellor o{ the court, rendering or pafs-*311!ng the judgment or decree complained of; and rio fuch officer is a conftituent part of the lcgiflaturef." The jurifdiction of the general aflembly in .matters of law, depends on, an adt of their own body.' Laws of Rhode ijland, p.†

¶9*312' But, however extenfive this power may appear to be; ic i¿ wholly of an equitable kind, The Legiflature may* like a Chancellor, review the determinations of the courts of law, and di~ re£t the iflüe to be again tried; but it is not itfelf a court in *313which an ultimate decifion can be had. The jurifdic!tion ~f the ~ourt, on ~,hofe judgment the prefent Writ of erFor is brou~ht~ is of a very different defcri~,tion, in it~ conftitt4tion, as well as in the effea of its adj udications* The appeal was

¶10*314carried horn the inferior court into that court, as to the higbeft court of common law; and is, thence brought regularly hither. But if any doubt fhall exiif upon the fubjedt, the cohíh uólion fhould be in favour of. that general principle, in the policy of all well regulated, paiticuhriy of all republican, governments, which prohibits an heterogeneous union of the legiflative and judicial departments.

¶11Ingerfoll, in reply, clafied his.arguments'.under three points of enquiry:—-ift. Is the Legislature oí-Rhode Ijland a court?

¶12*3152d. Is it a court of law r—"and, 3d. Is it a court capable of giving a decifion within the meaning of the a£t of Congreis ?

¶131. By the a£t of the general aflembly, the Legiflature of Rhode Ifiand is exprefsly conftituted a court, fuper-eminent in its jurifdiction; though, perhaps, novel in its formation and efFcdts. The charatSteriíHc of a fuperior court of law, .is the power of calling parties before it, in order to affirm or reverie the judgments of inferior tribunals. This cannot' be done by a court of equity; nor can it be done by a legiílativé body, in *316its ordinary opa.city: and yet it can be done by the general aiTembly of Rhode IJland., fitting ao a court of law, under the' authority of a legiflative a£t. For fuch occafions, a regular docket is kept; the caufes are entered; the parties’ are-called upon in the courfe of the term; a clerk is employed; and the judgment of tjie inferior court may be reverfed. If is true, that the general afiemBly cannot try a fa£b; but neither can the Houfe of Peers; .yet, that is, undoubtedly, the higheft court of juftic.e in Great Britain,r It is, likewife, true, that the at? bt 'Rbvde IJland does not fay any thing refpe&irtg the power of *317the general affembly, to affirm a judgment; hut if they refufe to interfere upon any petition, is not the refufal, virtually, an affirmance of the judgment, of which the petition complains?' IT then, the powers of a court are thus veiled in the general affembly, mere abftradt confiderations of policy, cannot be allowed, judicially, to obftrucl or defeat their exercife.

¶14a. And if the general affembly is a court, its jurifdi&ion is dearly of a common law defcription; in the nature of a writ of error, to revife and corred: the deci’Gons of inferior common law courts.

¶15*3183- The a<⅛ of Congrefs provides, that the removal of a cauie from a State Court, in the fpecified cafes, fhould only be •“ from a final judgment or decree in any fuit, in the high'eft court of law or equity, of a ftate, in which a decifion in the fuit couldbé had” Now, Olney might, by petition, have obtained from the general aflembly, a c*nftruclion on the ail of Con-grefs, which he pleaded in bar to the a ilion brought againft him. The name or.title of the officer, who attefts the procefs cannot be materialwhoever was the preftding magiftrate, ■ when the general aflembly fat as a court*, might authenticate the citation, or it might be granted'by a Judge of the Supreme Court. Suppofe, indeed, that the judgment were to be affirmed here, Olney might ftill petition the Legiflature, and obtain a revería! and new trial; unlefs it can be maintained that the decifion of this court will work a repeal of the law of Rhode Ifland.

¶16The caufe was held under advifement, till the 8th of Augufí, when the Chief Justice delivered the following decifion on the point laft argued. ‘ ,