Volume 3 — United States Reports

Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794), was an early United States Supreme Court case holding that debts sequestered but not declared forfeit by states during the American Revolution could be recovered by bondholders. It is the only reported jury trial in the history of the Supreme Court.

Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that French consuls in the United States cannot hear cases to determine the property rights of foreign ships captured by French vessels and brought into American ports.

United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), was a United States Supreme Court case in which a defendant charged with treason was released on bail, despite having been imprisoned under a warrant of committal issued by a district court judge.

Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19 (1795), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the Cabot family, a wealthy Yankee shipping family from New England. In the case the court held in a mixed seriatim opinion: On the return of the record (to which were annexed several depositions and papers produced in the court below, as well as the papers referred to in the bill of exceptions) the following errors were assigned, the defendant in error pleaded in nullo est erratum, and issue was thereupon joined: That judgment had been given for the plaintiff, instead of the defendant below, on the 3rd Count.

United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42 (1795), was a United States Supreme Court case determining that the Supreme Court cannot normally compel a federal trial judge to proceed in a case which he feels is lacking sufficient evidence to proceed. In the case, the court held: Where a judge of the district court, acting in his judicial capacity, determined that evidence was not sufficient to authorize him to proceed in a case before him, this Court has no power to compel him to decide according to the dictates of any judgment but his own, whatever might be the difference of sentiment entertained by the court.

Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795), was a United States Supreme Court case about prize causes. It held that federal district courts have the powers that had been granted to the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture under the Congress of the Articles of Confederation: it was held that the Congress under the Confederation had power to erect a court of appeals in prize causes, that its decrees were conclusive, and that the district courts of the United States created under the Constitution have, as courts of admiralty, power to carry into effect the decrees of the former court of appeals in prize causes erected by the Congress of the Confederation.

United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795), was a United States Supreme Court case determining that the federal district court has no jurisdiction over a foreign privateer where the intended captured ship was not within the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court may prohibit the district court from proceeding in such a matter. In the decision the court held: The district court has no jurisdiction of a libel for damages, against a privateer, commissioned by a foreign belligerent power, for the capture of an American vessel as prize—the captured vessel not being within the jurisdiction. The supreme court will grant a writ of prohibition to a district judge, when he is proceeding in a cause of which the district court has no jurisdiction.

Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the jurisdiction of the court extended to the seas and that a citizen of the United States could also hold the citizenship of another polity (in the case of Talbot, being a citizen of France). This holding means that multiple citizenship may be held by Americans.

Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), is an early United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a yearly tax on carriages did not violate the Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 requirements for the apportioning of direct taxes. The Court concluded that the carriage tax was not a direct tax, which would require apportionment among the states. The Court noted that a tax on land was an example of a direct tax that was contemplated by the Constitution. The case is also significant for being the first case by the Supreme Court to rely on judicial review, later formally established by Marbury v. Madison (1803), to decide whether a statute of Congress was unconstitutional.

THIS was a writ of error diredted to the Circuit Court for ■ the'Diftridt of Georgia.

<p>THIS was a writ of error to remove the proceedings and decree from the Circuit'Court, for the Diftriit of Maf-fa.bufetts; and, the record being returned, exhibited the following fa& :—On the 4th oí. November, 1794, the owners and crew of-the .fhip George, filed a libel in the üiftriét Court of Majfachüfetts, in which they fet forth,</p> <p>• -That the faid fhip George was an American veifel, owned and navigated by American -citizens, loaded with a very valuable cargo, principally on freiaht, and bound from Virginia for Rotterdam; and that ,on the fecond day of. October laff, on the high ftas, in latitude 44o and longitude 40o, they fell in,with ' the fhip Mary Ford, which they found utterly .di-ferted, and abandoned, without any perfon on board, and in a moll- perilous íbte : That the captain and crew of the'faid fhip George, took poiTeflion of the Mary Ford, and with the intention of faving the faid fhip and her cargo, the Mate, and three of the faid grew. entered on board the Mary Ford, and- at great peril of their lives,'- ahd'fuffering great hardihip, with the afliftance of two men from a Silling veffel,' whom they hired, brought her into the port of Bofion ; whereupon they pray that the faid fhip arid cargo, may.be.adjudged to them.</p> <p>On the 5⅛ of November, 1794, Thomas M'Donnough, Efq. Confubof.bis Britannic. Majeity, for the Sates oí Majfachüfetts, Rhode", If and, Connecticut and New^ Hámpjhire, Sled a claim' in the'Uiilridf Court of Majfachüfetts,' and Si'ggcfted, that the (hip-Mdr.y Ford, and her cargo, at the timé ihe was taken ppiTeilio.i of by the.crew of the lbip George, was, and now is, owned -by-certain merchants, fubjeiSs of his faid Britannic Ma-jeifyj and prayed that the fame might be delivered to hifn, in behalf of faid;.owners, -.on the payment of a reafonable falvage, ór, if fold, that the proceeds thereof might be delivered to-him, in behalf of faid owners, deducting therefrom fuch iblvage, with-coils and charges. ’ ,</p> <p>On the 2d of December-, 1794, J- B. Thomas Danr.ery, Citizen and Confuí of the French Republic, refident at Bojion, in behalf of faid Republic, and the citizens thereof immediately concerned, likewife filed a claim for. the faid ihip Mary Ford, and her cargo; and fuggefted, that the faid ihip and her cargo, on the twenty-eighth day of September left, were the property of fojne of the fubjecls of the. King of Great Britain ; and afterwards, on the fame day, between two and three o’clock, in the afternoon, on the high feaá, were attacked,1 fubdued, and taken by a fquadron of ihips, to wit, the Filaburtier, Charant, Pejlilion, Semiellante, Jean Bart., and Ranger, all in the pub-lie fervice of and belonging to the French • Republic, com-/ manded by Commodore Vil Mandarine; and that the French Republic,' and all the citizens thereof, were then, and ftill are* at open war with the King of Great Britain; and all his- fub-jefts ; and that fome of the feamen of faid fquadron, entered on board the faid ihip Mary Ford^ took compleat and entire pofleflion of her, and took and brought away the Britijh captain and feamen of faid ihip, and ftill hold them prifone s of war; and that they took and brought away the papers belonging to her;—-by all which, and thé laws of nations, the. faid ihip Mary Ford., and her cargo, became the property of the. French Republic and the captors^ by the rights of war.</p> <p>The faid laft mentioned claimant further fuggefted, that af-terwards, on the twenty-ninth day of the fame September, about thre'e o’clock in the afternoon, %he faid ihip and her car- . go, by order of the Commodore of faid fquadron, from an ap-. prehenfion of weakening his force, were left at fea from neccf-fity. The faid Conful prays a reftoration 'of.the faid ihip and ' cargo, to be adjudged to him; to the ufe of the French Republic, on his paying reafonable.faivage, with coils and char- ■ ges, or that the faid ihip and cargo may be decteed to-be fold to the ufe of the French Republic, and her citizens concerned, after paying fuch falvage,. coils and charges.</p> <p>The fails which appear in evidence in this cafe are, that the Mary Ford and her cargo weie, before the twenty eighth’day of September, the property of certain Britijh fubjeéls; that file was bound on a voyage from the Wejl Indies to London— that, on that day ihe was attacked on the high feas by the fquadron mentioned in the claim of the Conful of ib'e French Republic, or one of the ihips belonging to the-fame to which íhe„fti eck ; — that an Officer and fome of the crew of one or more of the ihips of faid fquadron entered on board, took out her Captain and all her crew, and the greateft part of the ihip’s papers, and that ihe failed fome time, probably more than twenty four hours, with faid French crew on board her, in company with faid fquadron, and was then left by order of the Commander of faid fquadron, who diredte.d her to-be burnt; that fome -attempts were made unfucceiTfully to e fie cl this purpofe; ■—-thatfeveral Britijh vef-fels had been captured and manned by faid fquadron, and many of the people of the fquadron were Tick, and incapable from that caufe’to do duty.; —that from an apprehenfion of weakening his force, the faid Commander had given the faid orders; that the faid ihip George, met with the faid Mar-y Ford at the time and place mentioned in the Libel, and brought her and her cargo into the harbour of Bofton under the circiimftaricss -fet forth in the Libel; — The ihip Mary Ford and her cargo have been fold by order of the Court, and with the confent of all'parties.</p> <p>After argument, Lowel, Judge of the Diftriit, delivered the opinion of the .court, firft recapitulating the fails above ftated.</p>

Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), also known as the British Debt Case, was a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that treaties take precedence over state law under the U.S. Constitution. It was the first Supreme Court case concerned with treaties, the first to rule that treaty provisions were as binding as domestic U.S. law, and the first to affirm the supremacy of federal law over state law. Ware is also notable for articulating the legal doctrine that would later be known as judicial review, whereby federal courts have the authority to settle conflicts of law.

THIS was a Writ of Error to the Circuit Court, for the Diftridt of South Carolina; and, or. the return of the record, the following pleadings appeared: On the ad of'February, 1795, a libel was filed- by the Plaintiffs in error, ftaiing, That the ihip Den Onzekeren and her cargo, cn the 16th oí November, 1794» were, and ever fince have been, the property of Spooner and Springer, and other citizens- of the United Netherlands, owners and freighters of the fame: That peace and…

United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796), was a 1796 decision of the United States Supreme Court which found that a proceeding by the United States to forfeit a vessel is a cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Specifically, "[a]n injunction to enforce the forfeiture of a vessel, for an illegal exportation of arms and ammunition, is a civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The courts will take judicial notice of a geographical fact."

<p>WRIT of Error to thz Circuit Court, for the DiftricS of Georgia, to remove the proceedings .and decree in an Admiralty Caufe. At the laft Term the Decree of the Circuit Court had been affirmed, with cofts ; fubjedl: to the opinion of the Court, whether any, and what, damages ihall be allowed on the affirmance ? . On arguing this queftion,atthe prefent term, it appeared, that the Libel prayed for reftitution, “and all the damages and cofts that have arifen by occafion of the premifes ” that the Decree of.thc Circuit Court awarded reftitution,and that the Defendants do pay all the expences of this fuit; ” and that the Circuit Court affirmed the Decree of the Diftridt Court generally. .When the Decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed here, the Counfel for the Plaintiff fuggeftéd, that he was entitled to damages, and urged the Court to fándlion lome mode of affeffing them. This propolition, however, was rejected ; and, therefore, the Plaintiff in Error applied to the Circuit Court, where the prefiding Judge was in favor of appointing Auditors v but the Diftriñ Judge diffented' from the opinion. Under thefe circumftances, the Plaintiff in error, with notice to the Defendant, engaged fome refpedtable citizens to yalue and certify the damages ; and his counfel, Reed (of South-Carolina') now offered their certificate as the meafure proper to be adopted by the court; urging, that if the proceeding was' deemed irregular, further timé might be allowed, to afeertain the proper remedy for an evident right*.</p> <p>infilled, that the queftion of damages was exhibited on the libel; and that the decree of the Dittridt Court amounted to a negation of the claim. Damages cannot be included in the word “ expences,” which is fynonimouily and indifcriminately ufjd, ain the civil law, with the words cofts and charges. Clark. 15. 17. 87. Flayer. 87. But the caufe now comes before, this court on an affignment for error, that no rejlitution ought to have been awarded ; a plea in nulla ejl erratum, on which iffue was joined ; and upon that tiTue, 'there is a general affirmance of the decree below. The.proceedings, therefore, are complete, and the-jurifdidtion of the court expended, as toevery thing broughc into controverfy upon the record. But on principle,.independent of the peculiar irate of this caufe, the court has not a power to award general damages. The damages fpoken of in the 23d and 24th JeSlions of the judicial a£f, (1 vol. Swift’s Edit, p. 63.) can only apply to damages for delay, from the time of the^writ of error brought: It does not authorize an affeffment and decree for general, damages ; nor does it embrace a pro- . ceeding in rem, but only cafes,, in which a liquidated fum is given by the inferior court. Befides, if the Defendant in error has fuffered any extraordinary damages, for which there is not, at this time, any redrefs, it muit be imputed to his own fault. The decree of the Diftrifl^Court being in his favour, e might have applied for immediate reftitutionof the property on g'v‘ng fecur>fyj or he might have claimed damages. In the latter cafe, if the court had ordered its regifter to examine and report upon the amount, the Defendant in error would have been entitled to in'tereft upon it, if the ultimate decree of this court was in his favour, or, if the court below had. refufed the claim of damages, there mi'o-ht have been a crofs appeal, when the point would have 'been brought diredtly before- the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error to reverie that par£ of the •decree ; and if a reverfal had been pronounced, the caufe would, have been regularly remanded to the CircuitCourt to affefs the damages, under the 24th feclion of the judicial act. Even, indeed, if the Circuit Court had awarded damages, without af-foiling the amount, this court muff have- remanded the caufe. But how can the Defendant be allowed to claim general da- - mages on a writ of error brought' by his antagbnifi:; and in opposition to which, he .is fo far from alledging there was any error in the décree below, that he merely prays for an affirmance r And yet, to grant the. claim, is, in effefl, to reverie fo much of that very decree, which he thus prays may be entirely affirmed, as does not 'allow, and affefs, general damages in his favour. The affeffment of damages, is a matter peculiarly delicate. In the court below the fources of informationare eafily acceffible; but here there are no data-, fe that the enquiry, if at all foie-rated, can only be made- by affidavits, the worli mode of judicial inveftigation. The evil, however, does not occur, when nothing is left for this court to do, but to calculate the intereft on the fum previoufly afieiled and afcertained by the competent tribunal*.</p> <p>After advifement, the chief justice delivered the opinion of the COURT, that where a judgment, or decree, was affirmed, on a writof error, there could be no allowance of damages, but for the delay} and, thereupon, the following order was made in this caufe:</p>

<p>BY order of the court, a letter from the Plaintiff in error, dated the 29th of July, 1796, and directed to the Clerk, was read. The letter ftated, “ that the Plaintiff had employ-n éd Mr/ Campbell\ of Virginia, to argue the caufe';’ that on the, 25th of July-, he was informed, that Mr; Campbell had died in Richmondj on the 18 th of the fame month; and that, being left without counfel, in confequerice of this event, he prayed the caufe might bé continued till next term.”</p> <p>Lee and Ingerfoll, in objection to the requeft, ftated; that, from the nature of the caufe, delay would be worfe to the Defendant in error, than ⅞ decifion adverfe to his claim;‘ that the Plaintiff ought always to beready for trial; thatthere had been fufficient notice of Mr. Campbell’s death, for engaging the a£. fiftance of pther couhfel; that the cafe depended entirely on the record, might yet be confidered by counfel, fo as to obtain á decifion during this court, and that it had already been poft-póned onfe term; at the inftarice of thé Plaintiff in error.</p>

THE decree of the Circuit Court, for the Diftritft of Rhode Ifland, was affirmed-in this caufe, without argument, the principal queftion, which it involved, having been juft decided upon the difcuffion of another writ of error. • It appeared, however, by an eftimate of the damages on which the decree was founded, and which was annexed to the record, that a charge of 1600 dollars for counfel’s fees in the courts below, had beeen' allowed ; to which Caxe objeiSed ; and…

<p>HE allegation in this cafe, as fupported by the evidence, ⅝ was, that the privateer, which took the Britijh prize in queftion, had been built in New Yotk, with theexprefs view of being employed as a privateer, in cafe the then exifting control verfy between Great Britain and the United States ihould terminate in war; that fome of her equipments were calculated for war, though they were alfo frequently ufed by .merchant Ihips; —that the privateer was fent to Charlejlon, where fhe was fold to a French citizenrthat ihe was carried by himi to a French ifland, where fhe was completely armed and equipped, and furnifhed-with a commiflion;-rrand that fhe afterwards failed on a cruize?" during which the prize was taken, and fent into Chdrleji'on.</p> <p>^contended that this was an original conftrudtion of out-fit of a veffel for the púrpofe of war; and that if it was tolerated as legál, it would be eafy by collufion to fubvert the neutrality of the United States, and involve fhe country in a war.</p>

Held: for the trial of perfons for any breach or breaches, of," an aft entituled “an aft to 'prevent ftage-plays-and other theatrical entertainments, within this Colony,” and for the recovery of the fines and forfeitures in id id act contained. * Iredell, JuJlice.

rom the Circuit Court for the Diftriift of South The Phoebe Anne, a Britijh veflel, had been captured by a French privateer, and fent into Chárlejion. The Britijh Coiir ful filed a Libel,, claiming reftitution of the prize, upon afug-geftioo, that the privateer had been illegally out-fitted, or had illegally augmented her force, within the United States.

BILL in Equity. 'The fervice of .the fubpasna in this caía being proved, Leivis moved, at the laft Termj that a Dif-tritigas might be awarded, in order to compel the State to enter an appearance ; arguing, from the analogy between a State and other bodies corporate, that this was the .proper mode of proceeding.

' The original proceeding was on the Equity fide of the Court below, where the Defendant in Error had filed a bill, charging Adrian Wfcart and Augujline De Neufuille, Co-partners,-wirh having fraudulently conveyed all their eftate, real and;perfonal, by three (aparate deeds, to Peter Robert De iteufuille (who was alfo made a.Defendant to the bill) with a view to prevent the;Complainant’s recova ing the amount of a decree, which lie had formerly obtained in another fuit…

THIS caufe came again before the court (fee Ant.p. 1847 and after a difcuffion upon the merits, it became a quef-' feion, whether there had been a regular appearance of.the par-, ties to the fuit below ? The libel was filed by the Britijh Conful, on behalf of Walter Refs, againft Hills, May an-j Wood-hridge (who formed a partnership in Charhjlon, under that firm) and John Miller.

<p>A LIBEL was filed in the Diftrifl Court of South Carolina, by the Defendant in error, againft Del Col, and others, the owners of a French privateer called La Montague, and of the íhip Jndujlry and her cargo, a prize to the ptiva-teer, lying in the harbour of Charleflon, which the Libellant had caufed to be attached. The cafe appeared to be briefly this The privateer had captured, as prize, on the high feas, an American brig called the Grand Sachem, commanded by Ebenezer Baldwin, and owned by the Defendant in error. At the time of taking pofleffion of th'e brig, a fum of 9993 dollars was removed from her into the privateer, a prize-mafter and leveral mariners weré put on board of her, and they were directed to fleer for Charleflon. . Juft, however, as they hove in fight of the light-houfe, the Terpfichore, a Britijh frigate, captured the privateer, and gave chace to the prize:' whereupon the prize-mafter run her into fhoal • water, and there fhe was abandoned by all on board, except a failor originally belonging to her crew, and a paflenger. In a íhoft time, fhe drove on fhore, was fcutled and plundered. When the Mar-, ihal came, with procefs agairift the brig, fhe was in the joint pofleffion of the Cuftom-houfe Officers, and the privateer’s men; the latter of whom prevented the execution of the pro-cefs. The Indujlry and her cargo were then attached by the •Libellant, and an agreement was entered into between the parties, that they fhould be fold, and thb proceeds paid into court, to abide the ifliie of the fuit.</p> <p>On the evidence, it appeared, that the Grand Sachem, had been engaged in afmuggling trade at 'New Orleans, the Spanijh Main, &c. and for the purpofe of carrying it on, fhe had procured a regifter in the name of a Spanijh fubjeél, and'failed under Spanijh colours. Befides other fufpicious qircumftances, Ihe had oh board, at the time of he(r capture, a variety of accounts defcribing her as Spanijh property; and a trunk containing her papers (among which, it was alledged, there was a Spanijh regifter) had beencollufively delivered up to the own-, er, the Defendant in error, by one of the fai'lors. The money removed from her, and taken in the privateer by the Bri-tijh frigate, had been condemned in Jamaica.</p> <p>The Diftrift Court pronounced a decree, ill favor of the Libellant, for the'fum of 33⅝329 dollars 87 cents (the full value ■ of the Grand Sachem, and her cargo) with" intereft at 10 per cent, from the 8th of Auguft, 1.795, the day of capture; declared “ that the proceeds of the ihip Indujiry and her cargo, attached in this caufe, beheld anfwerable V> that amount;” and diredted, that the Defendant in error .ihould enter into a ilipulation to account to the Plaintiffs in error, for the money condemned as prize to the Britijh frigate, or any part of it, that he might recover, as .neutral property. This decree was affirmed, in the Circuit Court, and thereupon the prefent writ of error was inilituted.</p> <p>The cafe was coniidered in four points of view:—iff. Whether there was fufficient probable caufe for feizing and bringing the Grand Sachem into port for further examination, and adjudication ? 2d. Whether, if there was fuch fufficient caufe, the captors can; at all, be made liable for the confequent injury and lofs ? 3d. Whether if the immediate captors, who run the vefiel into íhoal water,- and fcutled her, are refponfi-ble', that refponfibility can be devolved on the owners of the privateer, who bad not authorifed, or contributed to the rnifconduct ? And - 4th. Whether the. Indujiry and her cargo could, before condemnation, be attached, and made liable in this fuir, as the property of the captors?</p> <p>The firft and fecond points were argued, at the laft Term, by Dallas and Reed (of South Carolina) for the Plaintiffs in error, .and by Pringle (of South Carolina) for the Defendant: and the third and fourth points were argued at the prefent Term, by the fame, counfel for the Plaintiffs in error, and by Ingerfoll and Lewis for the Defendant.</p>

Jennings v. The Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that: "The decision in Wiscart v. Dauchy, (3 P. 321,) confirmed. An objection that counsel fees were allowed in the court below as part of the damages, can not be entertained unless the fact appears by the record. If a prize is sold by agreement, and the money stopped in the hands of the marshal, by a third person, not a party to the agreement, increased damages are not allowed, but only interest on the debt."

Clerke v. Harwood, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 342 (1797), was a United States Supreme Court case that followed the court's decision in Ware v. Hylton, concerning debts owed to British subjects. In the Ware case, the Supreme Court had reversed a decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, and restored the decision of a Maryland trial court. In the Clerke case, the Supreme Court considered what should happen to cases presenting a similar question, once the holding of their appeals-court decision had been reversed. Should they be sent back to the Maryland Court of Appeals, or directly back to the trial court?

Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344 (1797), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that: "Under the practice of the courts of Rhode Island, as adopted by the judiciary act, (1 U. S. Stats, at Large, 73,) the entry of a default, after a plea of the general issue, no similar being on the record, does not operate a discontinuance, and a judgment on the default is valid. Under the same practice the court may assess the damages in an action of assumpsit on a foreign bill payable in pounds sterling. Interest on affirmance is to be calculated on the aggregate sum of principal and interest in the judgment below, to the time of affirmance, but no further.."

<p>WRIT of Error to the Circuit Court for the Diftrict of JNew-Jerfey. On the return of the Record, it appeared, that a- declaration in cafe had been filed in this action, containing three Counts ; the firft- and fecond of which, were fpe-cial Counts for a fraud and deceit, and the third was a general-Count, for money had and received by the Defendant to the ufe of the Plaintiff. The firjl Count charged the Defendant vi ith an exprefs affumpfitjthatin confideration that the Commiifioner for fettling Continental accounts, would iffue a certificate for 4273 dollars 49 ninetieths, he promifed his account againft the United States was juft for that fum, and exhibited certain vouchers to fupport it; that the account ought to be allowed, and that the vouchers were true and lawful: It averred, that confiding in the faid promifes, the United States by their faid Commiifioner, did iffue the faid certificate : And it aligned as a breach of the faid promifes, that the Defendant did not regard the fame, but craftily deceived-the United States in this, that the faid certificate ought not to have been iffued and delivered, that the account was not, nor was any part of it, for a juft debt, but was deceitful, and that the account and-vouchers were not true and lawful; whereby the United States had been greatly deceived.—The fecond Count ftated, that whereas the United States had before that time iffued and delivered to the Defendant the faid certificate, and had accepted and received from him as lawful vouchers for the iffujng and delivery thereof, the..account aforefaid, together with certain paper waitings in the declaration fet forrh, in cohfideration thereof he undertook and faithfully promifed that the faid account was a juft and true account, and that the fum. mentioned in it was lawfully due from the United States and ought to be fo certified, and that the faid certain paper writings then and there exhibited as further vouchers for - ifliiing 'the faid certificate, were regular and lawful vouchers : Neverthelefs, the Defendant did not regard his faid laft mentioned promifes, inafmuch as the faid account was not true, nor was any part thereof due, nor were the faid paper writings lawful vouchers, by means whereof the United States were by him deceived and greatly injured. The third count having ftated an ajffumffit in the tifual form, for 8000 dollars received fo the Plaintiff’s ufe, Concluded that the Defendant not regarding his feveral promir fes, for making payment thereof, had not- paid the faid fum of money, but-refufed and ftill refufes to pay the fame to the damage of the United States 8000 dollars. The Defendant pleaded non ajfumpfit, whereupon iffue was joined; and on the trial of the eaufe, the jury found a fpecial verdidt of the following tenor :—“ The jury find that the commiffioner named in the firft and fecond counts, was the lawful officer of the United States, for tranfadling the bufinefs therein mentioned; and that certain regulations were made by Congrefs; in relation thereto, on the-20th of February, 1782,' and the 3d of June, 1784, to which the jury refer. That the Defendant, on the 2d of Auguji 1784, fraudulently exhibited an account, claiming a balance of £. 1602 117 3-4; equal 104.273 49 go dol--lars, as due from the United States to him, which account fo fraudulently exhibited, and the vouchers therefor, the jury fet foith at large. That then and there the Defendant received,. through fraud and impofition, from the United States, the faid balance, fo as aforefaid falfely pretended to be due to him, in a certificate, which the jury fet forth in its'proper words and' figures. That the Defendant gave a receipt for the lame, in the words and figures fet forth by the jury. That according to law, the Defendant, on the 12th oí May, 1791, fubfcribed and, funded the faid certificate in the funds of the United States, and beccame a holder of the ftock it produced, amounting with the intereft, to 4893 8-90'dollars; and chat he gave to the United States a receipt for funded debt compriilng the faid certificate, which was thereupon delivered up and cancelled. But whether the faidr fubfcription,-'thé fubfequent- funding of the faid 4273 49-90dollars, with the intereft of 619 59-90 dollars, and the ftock acquired in virtue thereof as aforefaid, ought ta be allowed' as payment of the amount "of the faid certificate by the faid United States to the faid Defendant, the faid jurors know not;-and thereupon they pray the advice of the court here in the pfemi-fes: And if it ought to be allowed, then they fay he. was paid the full amount, to wit—4893. §-90 dollars. And the jurors further find, that priorato the year 179):, the United States had paid part of the intereft due on, the faid certificate, amounting to 1025 58-90 dollars. That the Defendant on the 2d of Ai{-gx/? i'78q., undertook and promifed to the United States, that the faid account was juft and true; that the fum of 4273 49-90 dollars was juftly-due to him from the United States, and ought to be fo certified ; and that the voutjfiers prt Juced by him in fupport of the faid account were regular and lawful Vouchers for iffuing and delivering the faid certificate to him. That the faid account was not juft, nor was the fum fpecified to be due therein, or any part thereof, juftly due, but the faid account was fraudulent, and the vouchers produced by him in fupport .thereof were not regular and lawful vouchers for iffuing and delivering to him the faid certificate. And whether on the whole matter by the jurors fo as aforefaid found, the Plaintiff ought to recover againft the Defendant, they are ignorant, and pray advice of the court. And, if, upon the whole matter, &c. it ihali appear to the court, that the Defendant did affume in manner and form as the United States complain, then they fay he did affume upon himfelf, &c. and they affefs the damages by reafon of the non-performance of his pro mi fes and affumptions aforefaid, 3,939 70-100 dollar's, befides cofts and charges; and' for cofts and charges 10 cents: But if it appear to the court that he did not aflame, &c. then they fay he did’ not affume, &c. And if upon the whole matter aforefaid, by the jurors found in the manner aforefaid, it ihali .appear to the court that the Defendant did affume as to' the fum of 1025 58- 90 dollars fo as aforefaid paid by the United States, in part of the intereft.To due on the faid certificate, funded as aforefaid, &c. then-they find he did affume, &c. and affefs the damages of the United States by reafon of the non-performance of the promifes. within mentioned, befides cofts-arid charges. at 1023 64-IOO dollars*, and for cofts and charges 10 cents: But if upon the whole„mat- • ter, &c» it ihali appear to the court that he did not affume, in conftru&ion of law,' in manner and-form as the United States complain, then they fay he did not affume as to the faid 1025 58-90 dollars, &c.” Upon this verdidt the C-iRcuiT cqurt rendered the following judgment, on the.2d of Jpril. iyg$ : “ That the Uttited State.s do recover againft the faid Thomas Fenemare, their damages aforefaid, by the jurors aforefaid, in form .aforefaid, affeffed at 4,965 34-100 dollars ; and, alfo, 169 43-100 dollars, for their cofts and charges, by the court here to the United States, with their affent, of increafe adjudg* ed; which faid damages in the whole amount to 5,134 77-100 dollars: And the faid Thomas in mercy, &c.”</p> <p>The caufe was argued at the Iaft term, upon an iffue joined, after an ailignment of the general errors, and the plea of In nullo eft erratum, by Ingerfoll and E. Tilghman, for the Plaintiff in error, and by Lee (the Attorney General) for the United States. It was then alledged in diminution, however, that a rule had been made, by confent, in the court below, which was not tranfmitted with the record, allowing fpecial counts to he added to the declaration, and agreeing “ that no objeftion fhould be made to them, byreaforiof their being of fuch a nature, as not to be joined with the firft or any other counts in confequence of which the two fpecial counts above ftated had been added. A certiorari was, therefore, awarded, at the inftanceof the Attorney General, upon the return to which, at the prefent term, the rule was duly certified*.</p> <p>it was obferved, that the obj eft is to. compel Fenemore to pay the full value of a certificate, which the acftion i'tfelf confidered as fraudulently obtained, and which, confequently, is a mere nullity. For fo much cafh as he had a&ually received on account of intereft, anacftion of af-fumpfit may be regularly brought; but the remedy as to the certificate is a hill in equity to compel him to furrender it; or, perhaps, an aétion of deceit might be proper, but affumpftt will not lie. Two queftions, however, are- fiiggefted by the fpecial verdihh; ift, Whether there has been a payment of the amount by the United States to Fenemore ? and 2d, Whether be afiumed in the manner and form Rated in the declaration? In anfwcring the fi'-Ji queftion, it .is to be remarked, that in a fpecial verdict nothing is to bev intended, the promife whether exprefs, or implied, muft be exprefsly found ; and as. the fpe-cial verdiit finds no confidc-ation for charging Fcnemore with the fum of' 3,939 70-TOO dollars, the certificate of ftock, (which is ftill to be prefumed to be in his poffeffion, which is not proved to have been converted into caib, and which is, indeed, of no value on account, of the fraud'in. obtaining it) cannot be prefutned to be a payment either in faff or lav/-; and, of courfe, there is no foundation for a promife either exprefs or implied. In alifwering th? fecond queftion, it.is not denied, that an exprefs promife (-ffent-ially the fame in both of the fpe-cial counts) is laid in the declaration; and it .is. fuppofed, that an attempt-whs rna.de to prove it as laid ; but ftill the finding of the jury-does not fupport either the firft or fecond count; for, though the jury find the promife, it is not found upon the'confi-deration laid in the declaration, which muft be the governing principie. By way of fupporting the third count,' likéwife,. the jury find all the circumftancés of fubferibing to the funding fyftem ; (which do not amount to a payment) whereas they were bound to find the acftual receipt of the money, and the only finding of an n £lual receipt of money, is the intereft of 1025 dolíais on the funded flock.-</p> <p>But the fairs arifing upon the caf?, as fet forth in the Declaration, are inconfiftent; the Counts are of a nature fo different that'they cannot bsjoine'd in the fame form of action ; the Defendant could not be apprifed of what he muft prepare to try; and he ought not to be entrapped by the generality of the Count for'monev had and received. ■ The,, fpecial Counts áre in the nature of a deceit; which cannot regularly be united with cafe upon promifes. Again: the firft and fecond counts affirm the tranfadtion, confider -the certificates as the- lawful property of Fcnemore, and bring this a ilion to recover damages for the breach of his engagement: but the third Count difiaf-firms the tranfaclion, .confiders the certificate as a nullity, and brings this adtion.to recover the money paid to Fenemore under color of. the .certificate, as lb much money received by him, for the ufe of the United States. The verdiS and the judgment are affected by the fame incongruity; for, both parts of the finding and judgment cannot be true ;' the firft part fup-pofihg the tranfaciion valid, and giving damages; while fue. fecond part fuppofing it invalid,adjudges the money to be the property of the United States. Thus, the Plaintiff pvefented' an iriconfiftent caufe of action; the jury mixed the ir.confuftent ingredients together; and the Court below have unadvifedly given ⅛ whole their fanétión. ■ But, if the inconfiftency ap-gears on the record, this Court cannot undertake to decide, to . which part of the finding the jury would .have adhered, had the qtiejrion been feafonabty propofcd to them; and rnuft, therefore, rcverfe the whole proceeding. The Untied State's may, perhaps, either á.í5rm, or diííkífirm, the tranfaction; but they cannot do both ; and theyrauit make an election before they in~ ftituté their .action.*</p> <p>.The following authorities were-citecf, in the courfe of the argument for the Plaintiff in error 3 T. Rep. 288. I T. R'ep* 22. 3 Bl. Com. 158. Doug. 39. 1 Efp. 97. Cowp. 414. Doug. 132. 4. 2 T. Rep. 289. 143. Imp. Pr. 55. 3 Wils. 354. 2 La. . Raym.%2S).,<So'Wp. 818. 2 Bl. Rep. 848. 9.</p> <p>it was premhed, that there feem-cd to be ho hefitation iri admitting on the p'art of the oppofite Counfel, that every principle of confcioncc and equity was op- t . pofed tothe conduct of-their client; but they contended (and it muff be agreed) that a Court of error-can only decide on the record, and the principles of law which are pertinent to. it. . Confidering the cafe-then, in the ftricteft point of view, the judgment ought'to be affirmed." Though- the verdict is cer-tainiy informa!, and appears at fisft to be.imperfect; yet, every material fact is found; and any un-necc filmy reference to the . Court will be-difregarded as mere ftupluOge. The judgment-is for both the fun.s found by the verdict; and without giving both, it is'manifeft, that jufti'ce 'could not be done- to the United States. A contract may he affirmed, of diffaffirmed. The public policy .of the Government required, that this contradi ilioul.d be affirmed. The per fon who committed the fraud ought net, hewevar, to be benchtcd by it; and,having recovered from him the value of the certificate, he will^iimfelf (á fo'r-tipri'svery purchafer) be entitled in .future to receive'the principal and intéréll from the United'States. The gift, therefore, of the enquiry js, whether it fufficiently appears.on the record, that the United’SLites have fu fie red aninjury by the ■fraudulent conduct .of the Plaintiff in error ? To this en’quiry it is immaterial, whether Fenemorepaid,or received, any thing; and even if there liad been.no exprefs ajfumpfit laid in the Declaration, or found in the fpecial verdidt, the Court were empowered to decide that there was an implied ajjumpjit, upon the reference of the faits for that, purpofe, by the jury : The Jury having however, found an exprefs ajfumpfit; that fubfe-.quent reference to the Court muft be confidered as furplufage. . Trials per Pais 269. 270. 169. Hoi. 5/}/ -</p> <p>. But, it is urged, that the youhts are inccnfiftent, and'cannot be joined in the fame declaration: to which, it is aiyfwercd, that wherever there; can be the fame;plea, and the fame judz-mer,t, different counts may be joined ; 1 T. Repl 257. 2 JVilf. 321: and wherever there h.ts bten an exprefs Warranty (which extends to- aft faults known and unknown to the feller j af-fumpfit is the. proper form; of action, • Boúgd19. There may, however, be different forms of airier. for the fame injury, ¿j, Co. 02■ -in 3 B!. C.m. 1 T¡.. it ⅛ ttated, that if any one fells .one commodity. for another, an aCtion on the cafe lies, again ft him foe damages, upon che contradi which the law always implies» that -every tianfafilon'is fair' and honeft. The fame Commehcstor ybfarves, that an action cf deceit alio lies in the cades'of warranty, before mentioned, and other perianal- injuries committed contrary to goad faith and henefty.: But an . a&qji. on the cafe for damages, in nature .of a writ of deceit, is more üfljruíy brought upon thefe occasions. Ibid '. 166. Mcrfg.. ' ¿¾⅝. 342 to 359. •.r p .</p> <p>p . On the 7⅛ of Jugcf .1)87, :the Judges delivered.their opi-' ni'ons to ti:-- following rffe-df :</p>

Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365 (1797), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court determined the following: The suspension of a statute for a limited time is not a repeal of it. The intention of the legislature when discovered must prevail, any rule of construction. declared by previous acts, to the contrary notwithstanding. In an action on a bill of exchange, which had not been protested for non-payment, it is not necessary to aver in the declaration that the bill had been protested for non-acceptance. As to bills of exchange drawn in the United States payable in Europe, the custom of merchants in this country does not ordinarily require, to recover on a protest for non-payment, that a protest for non-acceptance shall be produced, though the bills were not accepted.

<p>ERROR from the Circuit Court for the DiftricR of Mafia-chufetts.</p> <p>The Plaintiff in error was a native of Majfachufcits, formerly refident in Bojlon, where be contradled the debt in qucfiion to the Defendant in error, who was, alfo a native, and nad always continued a refident, of that ftate. Some years afterwards, the Plaintiff'in errror removed into Pennfylvania-, becaihe ai refident citizen of the ftate, took the benefit, of her bankrupt, law (. which, in its terms and operation, was analogous-to the bankrupt laws of- England) and duly obtained a certificate of'conformity from the c'ommiflioners.. Subfequent to this difi, charge, he returned, on a tranfient vifit, to'Bofion; and, being there arrefted by thq Defendant in error, for the old debt, he caufed the fuit to be removed from the State into the Circuit Court, and pleaded his certificate in bar to the adtion : but the court (confifting of Judge Iredell, and the Diftridf Judge) ever-ruled the plea, and gave judgment fór the Plaintiff below: whereupon the prefent wJit of error was brought.*</p> <p>Lewis and-E. Tilghman, for the Defendant in error.*</p>

ERR Dr from the Circuit Court, for the Diilrict of Georgia. Judgment had been rendered in- the Court below, for the Defendant in Error, on the. 15th. of November . 1796.

Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled early in America's history that the president of the United States has no formal role in the process of amending the United States Constitution and that the Eleventh Amendment was binding on cases already pending prior to its ratification.

Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382 (1798), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the Cabot family, a wealthy Yankee shipping family from New England. It was the second such case following the 1795 Bingham v. Cabot case. In the case the Court held that in diversity suits in federal courts, a party must allege appropriate citizenship and not simply residence, otherwise it may be stricken from the docket.

GAPIAS -in Cafe. This was an atftion brought, Originally, in the Supreme Court, by John Coffin Jones., a‘citizen of Maffiachufetts, as Indorfee of James Swan, againffi the JDe-fcndant, the Conful General of the French Republic, as Drawer of a number'of protefted bills of exchange (for the aggregate amount of 385,964 livres turnois, 3 fols 8 den. equal to 70,05a dollars and 46 cents) correfponding with the following form r At the opening of the Term, Dallas and Du Ponceau…

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court decided four important points of constitutional law.

<p>ERROR- from the Circuit Court of Virginia. , Oh the return of. the record, it appeared, that the Diftri.éb judge had endorfed the following fiat on the petition and aftlgnment of errors, prefented by the Plaintiff in error: u Let a writ of “ error and fuperfedeás iflue agreeably to the prayer of the petition, • on the petitioner’s entering into bond with fecurity “ in the penalty of 3,600 dollars, Conditioned as iifual in fuch ⅛ cafe: Cyjitjs Griffin;” A writ of error accordingly iffued; but, it would feem, that only a copy of the'writ Was ttanfmitted with the record, (to which the feal of the Circuit Court was affixed, though the writ itfelf Was not faid to be undfer the feal of the Court) and the Copy was figned by “ William Marjkall, clerk,” who added in the margin the •following memorandum, in his own hand writing, not fub-fcribed by the Judge: “ Allowed by Cyrus Griffin; Efq. Judge tc óf the. Middle Circuit in the Virginia DiftrieS.” The original citation to the defendant in error was, likewife, omitted, and only a copy accompanied the record, with an affidavitfub-joined, that the deponent, “ did on the 04th of Sept. 1796, “ deliver to Thomas Ddniel wiAin named, a-citation whereof u the above is a.true copy.” There was no certificate of the Judges or clerk of the court, that the record Was returned in obedience to the writj though at the end Of the paper, purporting to be the record, the clerk fubjoined the following mi-, nute: “ Copy.. Tejle> William Marjball-¡ clerk/’</p> <p>Tri February term Í797, E. Tilghmáft, fdr théDsibñdá-nt irl error, objected to the return of the writ, that it was not faid to be iflued under the feal of the court; that the feal affixed to the record was not ftated to have been affixed by order of the court; that the, original writ was not tranfmitted; that the paper purporting to be a citation, being a mere copy, did not appear from the fignature, or any other proof, to have been fign-ed by the Judge, which the a£t of Congrefs exprefsly requires; I E’ol.f. 22. p. 62. and that there was not even any certificate of the clerk of the court, that the entire record had been annexed and tranfrnitred'with the copy of the writ of error.</p> <p>anfwered,. that the Diftridt Judge had, in effedt, allowed the writ of error, by diredfing it to. ¡filie, when fecurity was given; that the feal being a&ually affixed, it was unneceffary to ftate that the writ was under the feal of the court; that the feal implies and authenticates the fact, that the citation had been figned, as well as the writ of error allowed, by the Judge; and that the clerk having. aflerted that the proceedings tranfmitted-were a copy, it muft be prefumed to be an entire copy of the record, unlefs diminution-is alledged,</p>

Dewhurst v. Coulthard, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 409 (1799), was a United States Supreme Court case that initiated with a civil suit brought by Isaac Coulthard (owner of Coulthard's Brewery) against John Dewhurst which reached the Court by a convoluted process. The Court refused to hear the case: "This court will not take cognizance of any suit, or controversy not brought before them by regular process of law."

MR. lIaIloivellha.i been admittted,originally,as an Attof-> ney of this court;-buf now Lewis moved, that his name fhould be taken from the roll of attornies, and placed on the lift of councilors.

Held: that the two letters from the Defendants to the Plaintiff below, of the 20th and '21ft of- January 1796, which werefetup to’prove an undertaking, or guarrantee, might ⅜ explained by parol tcjlimony ; of which kind of teftimony fonie had palled to the jury, without objedliojn, but for what purpofe does not now appear,, as there were divers Counts; feme of which parol teftimony might have fupported.

THIS caufe (fee 2 Vol. 280.) being agí . called cn the lift of arguments, the Court declared, that although they had. propofed to the Defendant’s counfel to wave the ob-jedtion to the form of bringing the action, before the expira.tion of three months from the time of proving the lofs; yet, that on his refufal to do fo, they meant to decide in favor of the objection.

THIS was an ejeftrrfcnt, to be decided by the opinion of the court. It appeared that the LefTor of the Plaintiff claimed as heir at law of James Graham, who made his will on the-Sth of OSiober, 1745, deviling “to my wife one'ihird “ part of all my effects, the improvements excepted.

JUDGMENT having been obtained acrainft-M' Clenachan, a Ca. Sa. iflued to September Term laft, and was returned non efl inventus.

THIS ejectment was tried at Newtown, in Bucks County, May, 1794, when the Jury found the following fpecial verdict: ■ “ The Jurors impannelled, tried, fworn and affirmed to try “ the iffue joined in this caufe- upo 1 their" refpedtive oaths and “ affirmations fay—That Laurence Grouden, being feized in fee “ of the premifes in the declaration mentioned, by his laft will in “ writing duly made and executed, devifed the fame premifes in fee fimple to his daughter Grace…

THIS was an ejectment tried at the Nifi Prius for Dauphin county in October 1795, when a verdict was given for the Leffor of the Plaintiff, fubject to the opinion of the Court, on a cafe, ftating the following facts.

<p>THIS was an aftion ’againft.an Underwriter on a Pbliey of Ihfurance upon the (hip Mount Vernon, warranted to be American property. The fhip was captured by a French Privateer, carried into Porto Rico, and there condemned as. prize. The caufe was tried at the prefent Term ; and Ship-pen, JiJHce, delivered tiie following charge, in which all the material fails and arguments were, fubftantially, fet forth‡.</p>

THIS was an action of Indebitatus -djfumpfit. The caufe was tried at Lancajier, and the J ury found a fpecial ver-ditt in the following terms: “ The Jury find, that B. Breckbill, the Plaintiff, was feized in his demefne as of fee in 216 acres of land, &c. “ That the Prefident, Managers &c. (the Defendants) by and- with their fuperintendants, furveyors, engineers, artifts and chain bearers, workmen and labourers, with their tools &c. entered in and upon the faid trail of…

THIS was an ailion of Debt, inftituted in the name of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, on an official bond,' wnich the teftator had givep, with two fureties, for the faithful-dlfch’arge of his duty as a public Auctioneer, and for. well and duly performing the terms and payment impofed by law. 1F0I. Dali.'Edit. 777; A.t the time of Chaloner’s death, a'confide-rable fum was due to the public; for duties dn (irles- at áuilion ; nor had he accounted to many of his creditors,…

INDEBITATUS ajfumpfit. The aítion was founded on the following fads :—On the 15th day of July, 1749, Jofeph Ogden, being feizcd in his demefne as of fee, of and in a certain mefluage and lot of ground, fituate in the city of Philadelphia, made his laft will and teftament, by which he de-Vifed the premifes to his mother, Hannah Wharton, the tefta-trix, by the name of Hannah Ogden, in fee ; and died in the fame month, unmarried and without iflue: From the 3d of February, 1752,…

THIS was an aftion brought by the aifignee of a ftocfc contract, to recover the amount of the difference, due on the Contraft, which was expreffed in thefe words : “ On the i8tH “ of April 1792,1 promife to receive from Jofepb Beggs, or or- ■ ⅛ der, Ten thoufand dollars, fix per cents, and pay him for the “ fame; at the rate of 23 ihillings and 7 pence 3-4 per pound: (Signed) Francis Ingraham.” The aflignment was ipdorfed in thefe words: “ I do hereby authorife William Reed,…

THIS was an aétion for money had and received to tb* Plaintiff’s ufe, founded on the following fails>—On the. 17th of December, 1796, Lcvinus Clarkfon executed a mortgage to Samuel Clarkfon, on certain flores and lots of ground in Philadelphia, to iecure the payment of 8,000 dollars, with intereft.

THIS caufe being marked for trial, Ingerjott moved for. a. continuance, on the ground, that a Bill in equityhad been continuance, on the ground, that a Bill in equityhad been filed by his client, the Defendant, in the Circuit Court, for the Ñew York diftridi, calling for a difcovery and account, in relation to the matters in controverfy in the prefent. fuit; but that the Plaintiff here had refufed to file an anfwer to the bill, in con-fequence of ■trhich, an attachment-had…