Volume 9 — Customs Court Reports

<p>Appeal from Board, of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41818.</p> <p>[Oral argument Nov. 8, 1918, by Mr. Wemple and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Conflicting Testimony — Presumption in Favor of Board.</p> <p>With the testimony in conflict, the Board of General Appraisers’ finding of fact should control.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Materiality.</p> <p>For the purpose of construing paragraph 348, tariff act of 1913, with reference to kid-skin crosses, it is not material that goatskin crosses might have to some extent been imported if it is shown that they are not commonly imported in that form.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 348, Tariff Act 1913 — Kid Skins — “ Goatskins.”</p> <p>With proof that kid skins and goatskins are different things commercially, the provisions for goatskin articles in paragraph 348, tariff act of 1913, will be held not to include kid-skin articles.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph 348, Tariff Act of 1913 — Plates—Crosses.</p> <p>With proof that “ crosses ” and “ plates,” as applied to articles made of fur skins, have distinct meanings and are not interchangeable, a cross can not be dutiable as a plate under paragraph 348, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>5. Kid-Skin Crosses.</p> <p>Crosses made of dressed kid skins sewed together are dutiable under paragraph 348, tariff act of 1913, not as “ plates and mats of * * * goatskins,” but as “ manufactures of fur * * *, when prepared for use as material, joined or sewed together * *</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Presumption—Artices 383, Customs Emulations or 1915 — Subsection 4 of Paragraph J or Section 4, Tarot Act of 1913 — “ Models op Women’s Wearing Apparel.”</p> <p>When women’s wearing apparel, which hacl been entered in bond under subsection 4 of paragraph .T of section 4, tariff act of 1913, as being for use as models and not for sale, was presented for exportation showing that the seals affixed in accordance with article 383, Customs Eegulations of 1915, had been tampered with and the cords attached pursuant to the same article had been cut, it must be presumed that the identification marks had been designedly interfered with to facilitate the use of the apparel for some purpose other than as models.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Sufficiency — Witness, Competency.</p> <p>The manager of the importing company testified that the identification marks affixed pursuant to article 383, Customs Regulations of 1915, to women’s wearing apparel imported in bond under subsection 4 of paragraph J of section 4, tariff act of 1913, for use as models, had been unintentionally or accidentally interfered 'with, and that the apparel had not been out of the importing company’s establishment or lent to anyone. Since it did not appear that he had direct charge or custody of the apparel or that he was in a position to know of his own knowledge whether or not the goods had been takes out i of the establishment and put to a use other than that for which they had been entered, he was not competent to so testify, and his testimony did not establish such statements as facts.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41873.</p> <p>[Oral argument Nov. 7, 1918, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Tompkins.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8167 (T. D. 37622).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 31, 1918, by Mr.°Hanson and Mr. Neumann.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41813.</p> <p>[Oral argument Nov. 8, 1918, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Hillis.]</p>

<p>Evidence — Hearsay.</p> <p>Testimony conceded by the witness to be based upon what people told him is wholly hearsay.</p> <p>2. Evidence, Sufficiency of — Presumption in Favor of Collector.</p> <p>The presumption of correctness attaching to the collector’s-classification of the merchandise as distilled oil under paragraph 46, tariff act of 1913, aided by the testimony of a competent witness, is not overcome by the testimony to the contrary of a witness who admitted that his testimony was based on what people told him. The claim for classification under paragraph 418 or paragraph 44 must be denied.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 356, Tariff Act of 1913 — -“Parts of.”</p> <p>An article not an actual constituent of a manufacture can not be considered as a part thereof unless it has been advanced to a point which definitely commits it to that specific class and kind of manufacture. An article commercially suitable and commercially used for the making of different things is a material which is just as much adapted to the production of any of them as to any other of them, and until it has been finally appropriated to some definite manufacturing use and has been given the distinguishing characteristics which clearly identify it as one of the components ultimately to be assembled into a completed whole, it can not be regarded as a part of any specified manufacture.</p> <p>2. Snaps — Clasps—Swivels.</p> <p>Base metal snaps, clasps, and swivels which have been dipped in acid and lacquered, employed in the manufacture of bead necklaces and neck, fan, vest, and eyeglass chains, are not classifiable under paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, as parts of chains, or under paragraph 167 as miscellaneous metal articles, but under paragraph 356 as metal materials suitable for use in the manufacture of the- articles named in the paragraph.</p>

<p>“Roller Varnish” — Gelatin.</p> <p>A physical (not a chemical) solution of gelatin with acetic acid, water, and coloring matter, the gelatin being the component material of chief value and still possessing its natural inherent qualities, known as “ Red Top roller varnish’ ’ or “ roller varnish, ’ ’ used to dress the surfaces of leather rollers in woolen mills to keep the wool from sticking to them, is not a varnish under paragraph 58, tariff act of 1913, or a non-enumerated manufacture under paragraph 385, but a manufacture of gelatin under paragraph 34.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42391.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 29, 1918, by Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Machine-Made Wilton Rugs.</p> <p>Machine-made Wilton rugs are not dutiable under paragraph 300, tariff act of . 1913 (“Oriental, Berlin, Aubusson, Axminster, and similar rugs”), hut are dutiable under paragraph 294 by virtue of paragraph 303.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41992.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 29, 1918, by Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41937.</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 17, 1919, by Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraiers, Abstract 42310.</p> <p>[Oral argument Nov. 8, 1918, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Wemple.)</p>

<p>Construction, Paragraph X or Section 3, Tariff Act of 1913 — Olives in Brine— Dried Pigs — “Fruit.”</p> <p>The word “fruit” in paragraph X of section 3, tariff act of 1913, does not apply to only such fruits as are perishable. — Houlder v. United States (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 247; T. D. 33480). Olives in brine, which will keep two to three years, and dried figs, which will keep six months to a year, are within its meaning. Any claim for allowance in duty by reason of their shortage or nonimportation caused by decay, destruction, or.injury must be made according to the customs regulations promulgated pursuant to this paragraph.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41835.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 29, 1918, by Mr. wakeflold and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Estoppel — Invoice.</p> <p>Paragraph 0 of section 3,'tariff act of 1913, requires that all.invoices of imported merchandise “shall contain a correct, complete, and detailed description of such merchandise and of the packages, wrappings, or other coverings containing it.” If the invoice of imported liquor states its quantity incorrectly, or does not state it, the importer has no right to complain if the capacity of the containers as reported by the gauger be accepted by the collector as the quantity in them at the time of exportation.</p> <p>2. Articles 612, 613, and 614, Customs Regulations of 1915, Reasonable, Legal, and Constitutional.</p> <p>Articles 612, 613, and 614, Customs Regulations of 1915, prescribing how quantities, losses, and outages of imported liquors shall be determined, are reasonable, legal, and constitutional.</p> <p>3. Articles 612, 613, and 614, Customs Regulations of 1915, Legislative Sanction of.</p> <p>The rules laid down in articles 612, 613, and 614, Customs Regulations of 1915, for a the determination of quantities, losses, and outages of imported liquors had been promulgated and enforced prior to the enactment of the tariff acts of 1909 and 1913, and neither of these acts made any change in them. Legislative sanction of them will be inferred.</p> <p>4. Outage op Liquor — How Determined.</p> <p>Where casks of whisky were found to contain less than that declared in the invoice, the collector assessed on the invoice quantity less 2£ per cent; where they were found to contain more, or where no invoice declaration of contents was made, upon the capacity of the casks less 2J per cent. These assessments correctly interpreted articles 612, 613, and 614, Customs Regulations of 1915, and these articles are reasonable, legal, and constitutional.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8190 (T. D. 37726).</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 9 and 10, 1919, by Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Washburn.]</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 175,’Tariff Act of 1913 — “Wood.”</p> <p>In common parlance wood is the tough, hard substance of all trees and shrubs, and it includes not only the hard fiber bundles of trees and shrubs in general but also the tougher fibrous components of some herbaceous plants. It is a very broad term and includes not only material obtained from exogenous plants hut also like substances obtained from palms, from bamboo (which is a giant grass), and from some ferns (which are herbaceous plants). The word “wood” in paragraph 175, tariff act of 1913, will be so construed.</p> <p>2. Raffia is Wood.</p> <p>Raffia is wood within thp meaning of that term as used in paragraph 175, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 175, Tariff Act of ,1913 — “Chief Yalue”— Baskets, Silk Lined.</p> <p>Baskets made of raffia, wood, cane, and willow, and lined with silk, the silk being greater in value than any one of the other component materials, but less than all, are classifiable, not under paragraph 318, tariff act of 1913, as miscellaneous manufactures in chief value of silk, but under paragraph 175, as baskets “in chief value of * * * wood” or “like material.” Steinhardt & Bro. et al. v. United States (8 Ct. Cust. Appls., 404; T. D. 37646). This is true notwithstanding that the silk lining may be greater in value than the wood, cano, and willow, since raffia is held to be wood within the meaning of that term as used in paragraph 175.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 194, Tariff Act of 1913 — Similitude.</p> <p>Biscuits, bread, wafers, cakes, and other baked articles not containing chocolate, nuts, fruit, or confectionery are excluded from the operation of paragraph 194, tariff act of 1913; and, having been excluded, they can not he subjected to its provisions by similitude without violating the expressed will of Congress. — Pensterer & Buhe v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 93; T. D. 31110) and Strauss & Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 203; T. D. 31946).</p> <p>2. Sponge Rusks.</p> <p>Merchandise known as “sponge rusks” — toasted slices of sponge cake — is not dutiable under paragraph 194, tariff act of 1913, since it does not contain chocolate, nuts, fruit, or confectionery. There is nothing in the record to show that its components are the same as those employed in mailing sweetened breads, crackers, or biscuits, so that it can not be held free of duty under paragragh 417 as “biscuits, bread, and wafers.” It is a manufacture of sponge cake and dutiable as a miscellaneous manufactured article under paragraph 385.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8162 (T. D. 37614).</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 16,1919, by Mr. Lane and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Construction — Eo Nomine Designation.</p> <p>An eo nomine designation of an article, nothing appearing to indicate a contrary legislative intent, should govern its classification for duty.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 258, Tariff Act of 1913 — “All Other Jacquard</p> <p>Figured Manufactures of Cotton.”</p> <p>The language “all other Jacquard figured manufactures of cotton,” in paragraph 258, tariff act of 1913, was employed as a precautionary measure rather than as indicating an intention to defeat or invade the specific eo nomine designations of paragraph 358. — Wilson v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 255; T. D. 35476).</p> <p>3. Jacquard Figured Cotton Laces and Nets.</p> <p>Jacquard figured cotton edgings, insertings, flouncings, and nettings are dutiable eo nomine under paragraph 358, tariff act of 1913. They are not to be classified under paragraph 258 within the provision for “all other Jacquard figured manufactures of cotton.” — -Garter v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 253; T. D. 35475); Wilson v. United States (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 255; T. D. 35476); and Levi, Sondheimer & Co. v. United States (7 Ct. Cust. Appls., 447; T. D. 37012).</p>

<p>Paragraph I or Section 3, Tariff Act of 1913 — Entered Higher than Market Value.</p> <p>Where, in the entry, two separate additions were made to the invoice value “to make market value,” while, in the certificate provided by the Treasury Department for claiming assessments of duty on less than, the entered value in accordance with the concluding sentence of paragraph I of section 3, tariff act of 1913, only one of-these sums was claimed to be added to “meet advances by appraiser in similar cases,” the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, upon final appraisement at the invoice value that duty be assessed on the entered value, less the sum so claimed in the certificate and not upon the invoice value or the entered value, less both sums, was correct.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8128 (T. D. 37504).</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 16,1919, by Mr. Lane and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Evidence, Relevancy of.</p> <p>Testimony that merchandise could bb used for paper making does not sustain a protest claiming classification under paragraph 566, tariff act of 1913, as being “used chiefly for paper making.”</p> <p>2. Paragraph 586, Tariff Act of 1913 — Rags.</p> <p>Pieces of old Jiags of comparatively large size, frequently entire bags cut open at one end or side, the fabric in most cases being still sound, can not be regarded as rags under paragraph 586, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>3. Waste Bagging — Paper Stock.</p> <p>Upon the testimony of a competent, undiscredited, and uncontradicted witness that half of a certain lot of pieces of old bags was of a kind chiefly used in paper making, the protest claiming classification as paper stock under paragraph 566, tariff act of 1913, should have been’sustained as to 50 per cent. The rest of the importation was properly classified by the collector as waste not specially provided for under paragraph 384.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42253.</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 9, 1919, by Mr. Washbum and Mr. Hanson.!</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42483.</p> <p>[Oral argument Tan. 15,1919, by Mr. Tompkins and Mr. Isenschmid.]</p>

<p>Appeals from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8182 (T. D. 37698).</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 16,1919, by Mr. Isenschmid and Mr. Lane.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8141 (T. D. 37549).</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 16,1919, by Mr. Lane and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42468.</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 10,1919, by Mr. Hanson.]'</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, SECTION 500, REVENUE ACT OE SEPTEMBER 8, 1916. — “ WHEN Imported.”</p> <p>The expression “when imported,” in section 500, revenue act of September 8, 1916 (39 Stats., 756), should be read as meaning “which are imported” and should be construed as having no purpose to change the time or condition under wnich a collection of revenue is to be had.</p> <p>'2. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH Q OF SECTION 4, TARIFF ACT OF 1913, AND REVENUE Act of September 8,1916.</p> <p>There being no conflict between paragraph Q of section 4, tariff act of 1913, and the revenue act of September 8, 1916, the paragraph was not repealed by the revenue act. Nor should they be regarded as separate and independent of each other. The principle of paragraph Q, that goods in bond shall be subjected to the rate of duty in force at the time of withdrawal and not to that in force at the time of entry, should be applied in the administration of the revenue act. Consequently, dyes which were imported and bonded before but withdrawn after the revenue act went into effect are dutiable under the revenue act of 1916 and not. under the tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8158 (T. D. 37604).</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 9,1919, by Mr. Washburn and Mr. Lawrence.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8149 (T. D. 37579).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 30, 1918, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Hampton.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42482.</p> <p>[Oral argument Jan. 15, 1919, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Tompkins.]</p>

<p>1. Watch Movements and Cases.</p> <p>Where watches and wrist straps for them were imported together but packed separately, a concession that the movements were properly held dutiable eo nomine under paragraph 161, tariff act of 1913, carries with it a concession that the cases were also properly held dutiable eo nomine under the same paragraph.</p> <p>2. Watch Bracelets.</p> <p>Wristlets or straps for holding wrist watches, in chief value of metal, are classifiable, not under paragraph 356, tariff act of 1913, as articles worn on the person for comfort, convenience, or adornment, as like articles, or as parts of such articles or like articles, but under paragraph 167 as miscellaneous articles in chief value of metal. — United States v. Strasburger & Co. (8 Ct. Cust. Appls., 376; T. D. 37630); United States v. Wittnauer Co. (8 Ct. Oust. Appls., 370; T. D. 37628).</p>

<p>1. Construction, Revised Statutes, Section 2921, and Article 608, Customs</p> <p>Regulations op 1915 — Treasury Regulation which Seeks to Amend Law.</p> <p>Section 2921, Revised Statutes, provides that, if the appraiser shall find a deficiency in imported merchandise, he shall certify it to the collector and an allowance shall be made in estimating the duties. Article 608, Customs Regulations of 1915, provides that this shall be done provided the collector be satisfied that such articles were not in the importation. The proviso is an attempt by the Treasury Department to amend the law, and is of no force.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Presumption that Oeeicials Perform Their Duties.</p> <p>When, in accordance with section 2921 of the Revised Statutes, the appraiser certified a shortage, it must be presumed that there was a shortage.</p> <p>3. Shortage in Importation — Appraiser’s Report — Collector’s Investigation.</p> <p>Where the appraiser reported a shortage, and the collector investigated and decided, without impeaching the appraiser’s report for fraud or mistake, that he was not satisfied that there was a shortage, his action in refusing to make an allowance was without.warrant of law.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42831.</p> <p>[Oral argument Mar. 28, 1919, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Tompkins].</p>

<p>Evidence, Judicial Knowledge — Presumption Favors Collector.</p> <p>The- results effected by steaming sugar cane and packing it with sugar and water in hermetically sealed tins are not within the judicial knowledge; and the court is unable to say that such merchandise is either sugar cane in its natural state or sugar cane unmanufactured, within the meaning of those expressions in paragraph 178, tariff act of 1913. The only evidence as to the nature of the commodity being the classification of the merchandise by the collector as “sweetmeats,” under paragraph 217, the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers sustaining the protest of the importers is reversed.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraphs 165 and 441, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Embroidery Machines” — “Sewing Machines.”</p> <p>A machine that is primarily constructed and designed for sewing fabrics is still a sewing machine although used for the purpose of embroidery work; and, on the other hand, a machine primarily constructed and designed tó do embroidering would remain such, even assuming that it might be used for ordinary machine sewing. The provision of paragraph 165, tariff act of 1913, for “embroidery machines” and that of paragraph 441 for “sewing machines” will be so construed. The question is not so much what the machine does as what it was primarily constructed and designed to do.</p> <p>2. Embroidery — Machine Stitching.</p> <p>Stitching done by an ordinary sewing machine may at any time rise to the standard of embroidery if it is employed for the purpose of producing and does in fact produce a designedly ornamental result upon a given fabric.</p> <p>3. Evidence — Judicial Knowledge — Sewing-Machine Attachments.</p> <p>It is common knowledge that the ordinary domestic sewing machine has attachments which are sold with the machine at the option of the purchaser which are adapted and designed and when applied enable such machines to produce embroidery.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph 165, Tariff Act of 1913 — “ Embroidery Machines. ’</p> <p>The provision of paragraph 165, tariff act of 1913, for “embroidery machines” refers to a class of machines which is imported, designed, constructed, and adapted for embroidering only.</p> <p>5. Sewing Machines Used for Embroidering.</p> <p>A sewing machine imported for use in embroidering, and for that reason lacking the presser foot and feed as being unnecessary, this lack making no change in the stitch made by the machine, is still a sewing machine, entitled to free entry as such, or part of such, under paragraph 441, tariff act of 1913, and not dutiable as an embroidery machine under paragraph 165.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42648.</p> <p>[Oral argument Mar. 29, 1919, by Mr. Hanson.)</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 93, TARIFF ACT OF 1913 — “OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS.”</p> <p>An instrument is or is not an “optical instrument” within the meaning of that expression in paragraph 93, tariff act of 1913, according to whether or not it is designed directly or indirectly as an aid to vision, or to produce for optical inspection the picture of some object. — United States v. Bliss & Co. et al. (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 433; T. D. 35980).</p> <p>2. Polariscopes.</p> <p>A polariscope, being an instrument used to enable the observer to view the phenomena of polarized light, and particularly to examine objects under polarized light, is classifiable as an optical instrument (par. 93, tariff act of 1913) rather than as a metal manufacture (par. 167).</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 93, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Mountings” for Optical Instruments.</p> <p>The word “mountings’’ employed in paragraph 93, tariff act of 1913, with reference to “opera and field glasses and optical instruments,” when used in connection with optical instruments such as the microscope and polariscope, is used in the sense of accessories, adjuncts, or parts thereof.</p> <p>4. Polariscope Tubes.</p> <p>Polariscope tubes, specially designed glass tubes with brass fittings for holding liquids to be examined in polarized light, are dutiable as mountings for optical instruments (par. 93, tariff act of 1913) rather than as metal manufactures (par. 167).</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 84, Taripp Act op 1913 — Glass.</p> <p>For the purposes of this case paragraph 84, tariff act of 1913, is regarded as including such articles only as are composed wholly or in chief value of glass which is ornamented, decorated, or processed in the manner described therein.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 84, Taripp Act op 1913 — “Ornamented or Decorated.”</p> <p>Glass tray bottoms, made of two plain panes of common wiiidow glass with decorative threads, leaves, and butterflies between them, not attached to either of the two panes but held there by pressure when the panes are fastened into the frame of the tray, can not be regarded as glass “ornamented or decorated” or processed in any of the ways specified in paragraph 84, tariff act of 1913, nor in any manner ejusdem generis therewith.</p> <p>3. Trays with Glass Bottoms and Bamboo Frames.</p> <p>Trays, the rims of which are of stained bamboo and the bottoms of two panes of common fiat window glass, between which are natural butterflies with paper bodies, leaves, and silk threads so arranged as to give the effect of a decoration on glass, the decorations not being attached to either pane of glass but held in position by the fastening of the panes of. glass into the rims of the trays, are not classifiable under paragraph 84, tariff act of 1913, as articles in chief value of glass “ornamented or decorated” or processed in any of the ways specified therein.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 335, Tarim? Act op 1913 — IIats—“Blocked.”</p> <p>Hats which have been shaped in part as an incident only to the forming of their brims, or partly shaped by hand pressure or manipulation only, without any treatment for the purpose' or with the effect of bringing them to their final shape by blocking, are “not blocked” within the meaning of that language in paragraph 335,. tariff act. of 1913.</p> <p>2. Straw Hats — Blocked—Unblocked.</p> <p>Straw hats of “Alpine” shape, known as “bodies,” which have beén placed upon a zinc brim form and subjected to slight hydraulic pressure in order to bring their brims to the proper widths according to style and demand, but which must yet be subjected to a blocking process by which they are stiffened with suitable sizing and pressed into permanent shape and conventional sizes, are entitled to claim classification as “not blocked,” under paragraph 335, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>Cross appeals horn Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42759.</p> <p>[Oral argument Mar. 28, 1919, by Mr. Mulvaney and Mr. Tompkins.]</p>

<p>1. Tax — Duty'.</p> <p>When provision is made for a tax on an import, it unquestionably provides for a duty. The definition of a duty is a tax on imports; excise or customs dues. When a tax is imposed upon an importation while it is still in customs custody, it is to be inferred that it is intended as duty on imports.</p> <p>2. Section 300, War Revenue Act op 1917 (Chap. 63, L., 1917) — Internal Revenue — Duty.</p> <p>The provision of section 300, war revenue act of 1917- (chap. 63, L., 1917), levying an additional tax upon imported distilled liquor and directing that it shall be-collected under existing law, describes an import tax and not an internal-revenue-tax. •</p> <p>3. Section 300, War Revenue Act op 1917 (Chap. 63, L., 1917) — -Paragraph N of-Section 3, Tariff Act of 1913 — -Estoppel—Jurisdiction of Board of-United States General Appraisers.</p> <p>The Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, having treated the additional tax upon imported distilled liquors provided for by section. 300, war revenue act of 1917 (chap. 63, L., 1917) as duties, and it having been collected as duties, the importers can not be deprived of their -right of appeal under paragraph N, section 3, tariff act of 1913. The action of the Board of United States General Appraisers in dismissing their protest sua sponte for want of jurisdiction in themselves is reversible error.</p>

<p>Pleading — Misjoinder.</p> <p>Ordinarily different parties are not- permitted to litigate their diverse claims against a common defendant in a single proceeding, because such procedure would tend to make complications and cause such confusion and delay as would hamper the administration of justice and make impossible the speedy settlement of legal-controversies. In customs cases, however, while different importers importing the same kind of merchandise may not have a common interest in the merchandise-imported, they frequently do have a comrhon interest in the rulings of the collector affecting the customs status of merchandise of the same kind.imported by them. As such rulings are generally the same, the protests against them usually raise the same issue, and that issue may be tried out and finally disposed of in one proceeding -with less embarrassment to judicial tribunals and less expense, -annoyance, and delay to litigants than if determined in separate proceedings initiated by each importer. Thus the permitting of misjoinder in customs proceedings-is designed to achieve the very result aimed at. by its prohibition in other proceedings. Such has been the continuous and unquestioned practice before the Board of United States General Appraisers and the United States Court of Customs Appeals practically since their respective organizations. The Gov-emment’s motion to dismiss for misjoinder the petition by two importers for review of decisions by three different boards on five diverse dates overruling 11 different protests involving the same kind of merchandise is denied.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42678.</p> <p>[Oral argument Mar. 26, 1919, by Mr. Levett and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42730.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 8,1919, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Sharretts.]</p>

<p>1. Strung Beads — Articles Made op Beads — Paragraph 333, Tarifp Act op 1913.</p> <p>Coral beads which have been cut to final globular shape, pierced, graded, and temporarily strung in final relation from large to small, for use and wear as coral necklaces, are not classifiable as articles in chief value of beads under the last part of paragraph 333, tariff act of 1913. — Lorsch & Co. v. United States (8 Ct. Oust. Appls., 246; T. D. 37521).</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 333, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Beads of All Kinds.”</p> <p>The term “beads of all kinds,” in paragraph 333, tariff act of 1913, does not include any of that class of beads constituting jewelry or the materials for, or suitable for, use in making jewelry. — American Bead Co. v. United States (7 Ct. Oust. Appls., 18; T. D. 36259).</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 357, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Out.”</p> <p>A piece of coral which has been cut or made globular into a bead is “cut” within the meaning of that expression in paragraph.357, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>4. Construction, Paragraph '357, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Not Set.”</p> <p>Coral beads which have been graduated as to size and temporarily strung are “not set” within the meaning of that language in paragraph 357, tariff act of 1913.</p> <p>5. Coral Beads.</p> <p>Coral beads which have been cut to final globular shape, pierced, graded, and temporarily strung in final relation from large to small, for use and wear as coral necklaces, are classifiable not as beads or articles in chief value of beads under the last part of paragraph 333, tariff act of 1913, but as “coral * * * .cut but not set, and suitable for use in the manufacture of jewelry” under paragraph 357.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 41754.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 8, 1919, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Sbarretts.]</p>

<p>Pleading — Protest—Multifabiotjsness.</p> <p>A protest which makes a large number of alternative claims as to several' different classes of merchandise, each of the paragraphs claimed under bearing some relation to the merchandise and the protest being sufficiently explicit to direct the attention of the collector to what claims were made is not subject to motion to dismiss for multifariousness. — United States v. Willenborg Co. (9 Ct. Cust.. Appls., 187; T. D. 39013), decided concurrently herewith, followed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42635.</p> <p>[Oral argument Mar. 27, 1919, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Lockett.]</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 347, TAROT? ACT OE 1913 — “ ARTIFICIAL.”</p> <p>An exact imitation is not necessary to bring an article within the meaning of the word, “artificial” as used in paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913. If an article is in size, shape, and color like “fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems or parts thereof,” it falls within the provision. The association of the word “artificial” with the words “suitable for use as millinery ornaments” would indicate that an imitation close enough to render an article suitable for such use would bring it within the provision.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 347, Tarot? Act oe 1913 — “ Oe Whatever Material Composed.”</p> <p>Paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913, indicates very clearly a congressional purpose to make it exclusive in the field of its application. “Artificial * * * fruits, grains, leaves, and stems or parts thereof,” are of necessity made of materials presumptively covered elsewhere in the act, and.i.t is hardly conceivable that paragraph 347 can have operation at all without invading some other paragraph. The effect of the phrase “of whatever material composed” is to make the paragraph invasive of others, and to suspend the force of a particular material as a factor in determining the question of specificity, as, whatever the material, paragraph 347 has provided for certain specific articles composed of it. If the phrase may he likened to “by whatever name known ” in relative comprehensiveness, its use amounts to an eo nomine designation of the material. — United States v. Snow’s United States Sample Express Co. (8 Ct. Oust. Apple., 351; T. D. 37611).</p> <p>3. AnTmciAL Flowers Made of Beads.</p> <p>Artificial flowers, leaves, and stems, made of heads with the aid of wires and silk threads, having the size, form, color, and outline of natural flowers, are dutiable under paragraph 347, tariff act of 1913, as “artificial and ornamental * * * leaves, flowers, and stems or parts thereof, of whatever material composed,” rather than as beaded articles under paragraph 333.</p>

<p>Papkika — Capsicum ok Red Pepper.</p> <p>Paprika is a capsicum or red pepper. — Yandegrift & Co. v. United States (8 Ct. Oust. Appls., 1; T. D. 37121). The evidence as to a contrary commercial designation being insufficient, the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers so classifying it under paragraph 235, tariff act of 1913, is affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42875.</p> <p>[Oral argument Apr. 21, 1919, by Mr Tompkins and Mr. Lawrence.]</p>

<p>Construction, Paragraph 404, Tariff Act of 1913, and Treasury Regulations Thereunder — “Exported * * * for Repairs” — American Goods Returned.</p> <p>An American vessel, outward bound, was wrecked. Later she was salved and her engine sold to a Arm in British Columbia. This firm repaired it and shipped it back to the United States. It was “exported * * * for repairs ” within the meaning of that language in paragraph 404, tariff act of 1913. It was manifestly impossible to comply with the Treasury regulations as to the manner of proving the identity of American goods returned, and other proof was properly received. The merchandise was dutiable under paragraph 404, tariff act of 1913, to the extent of 'the value of the repairs, and not as a steam engine under paragraph 165.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8247 (T. D. 37971).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 15, 1919, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Tompkins.]</p>

<p>Entirety.</p> <p>Merchandise consisting of a paper carton or box, fitted with small boxes and baskets, intended for counter display after children’s handkerchiefs have been put into the small boxes and baskets, is-not an entirety. The decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers refusing to sustain the collector’s classification thus and assessment of duty as being in chief value of surface-coated paper under paragraph 324, tariff act of 1913, and directing classification of the carton under paragraph 332 as a manufacture in chief value of paper, and the smaller containers some as articles in chief value of surface-coated paper under paragraph 324 and some as manufactures in chief value of wood under paragraph 176, is affirmed.</p>

<p>■Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43083.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 7, 1919, by Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Construction — Doubt Davors Importer.</p> <p>The benefit of the doubt should be given to the importer in cases of doubtful interpretation.</p> <p>2. Construction, Article 333, Customs Regulations of 1915 — American Goods Returned.</p> <p>Paragraph 404, tariff act of 1913, entitles certain goods of domestic origin to free entry provided proof of the identity of such goods shall be made under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Article 333, Customs Regulations of 1915, sets out such regulations. Merchandise was exported from Malone, N. Y., and subsequently imported and entered at Malone for immediate transportation without appraisement to New York City, where it was entered for consumption and bond given for production of evidence of outward shipment. The certificate of exportation by the collector at Malone was not furnished by the importer to the collector at New York. In view of the provision of article 333 that such certificate “will be issued on application of the importer or collector,” and of the fact that the papers in the case set forth the facts necessary for such inquiry, it was the duty of the collector at the port of New York to satisfy himself by application to the collector at Malone as to whether or not the goods had been exported.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42940.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 15, 1919, by Mr. Mulvaney and Mr. Levett.J</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43064.</p> <p>[ Oral argument Oct. 17, 1919, by Mr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8251 (T. D. 37987).</p> <p>[Oral argument October 14. 1919, by Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Construction", Paragraph 15, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Suitable for Medicinal or Toilet Purposes.”</p> <p>“A thing to be suitable, as that term is commonly understood, must be fit and appropriate for the end to which it is to be devoted. In the tariff law the term ‘suitable’ means actually, practically, and commercially fit.” — -Kahlen v. United States (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., 206; T. I). 31947). The provision of paragraph 15, tariff act of 1913, “chalk, precipitated, suitable for medicinal or toilet purposes,” will be so construed.</p> <p>2. Construction — Doubt Favors Importers.</p> <p>It is a well-established rule that the importer should prevail if the case in all other respects stands at an even balance.</p> <p>3. “ Chalk,” Paragraphs 15 and 16, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>Chalk which had been precipitated from municipal water in order to make the water fit for use was imported. While it was shown to meet the requirements of the United States Pharmacopoeia for use as a medicine and to be capable of use in tooth powder, it was also shown that it was bolted in this country to separate it from impurities before being so used and to be quite largely devoted to uses other than medicinal and toilet. It should not be regarded as “suitable for medicinal or toilet purposes” under paragraph 15, tariff act of 1913; and the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers classifying it as “chalk, ground or bolted,” under paragraph'60 is affirmed..</p>

<p>CONTAINERS OF HYDRO SULPHITE OF SODA.</p> <p>Hydrosulphite of soda was' imported packed in tin containers about the size of an ordinary barrel, some of the containers being packed in close-fitting wooden drums which are fortified by iron, and some of them in barrels or casks, the space between the container and the barrel or cask being packed with straw. It was shown that it was necessary to protect the merchandise from moisture; that such containers are the usual ones for such merchandise; that they are not heavy, but sufficiently strong for their pin-pose; and that the contents of only one-fourth of them could be removed without destroying them. As to those whose contents can not be removed without destroying them, the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers sustaining a protest against the collector’s classification as “cylindrical or tubular tanks or vessels,” under paragraph 127, tariff act of 1913, and claiming dutiability at the same rate as the merchandise in accordance with paragraph R of section 3, is affirmed. As to those whose contents can be removed without destroying them, there being no evidence that they are useless commercially, the presumption of correctness attendant upon the collector’s action is not overcome, and the decision of the board sustaining the protest is reversed.</p>

<p>Pleading — -Protest.</p> <p>A protest can not be sustained upon a claim, which, it does not directly or indirectly make. Four protests involving similar merchandise were combined by stipulation. Three of them contained a claim for free entry as a crude drug under paragraph 477 of the tariff act of 1913, but the one at bar did not. The Board of United States General Appraisers held that the merchandise was entitled to free entry under paragraph- 477. In drafting the judgment entry all of the protests were scheduled together as maldng claim for free entry under paragraph 477. The decision of the board is modified so as to overrule the protest at bar.</p>

<p>1. Construction, Paragraph 5, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Chemical ^ * * Compounds ” — Homatropine Hyd rob romide.</p> <p>Homatropine hydrobromide is not composed of a single element, nor is it natural or uncompounded. It is a product of chemical reactions, and is composed of various chemical elements. This constitutes the article a chemical compound as distinguished from a chemical mixture, and brings it within the classification “chemical * * * 'compounds,” in paragraph 5, tariff act of 1913. — Strohmeyer & Arpe Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 285; T. D. 32035.)</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 17, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Individual Packages.”</p> <p>The language of paragraph 17, tariff act of 1913, “put up in individual packages of two and one-half pounds or less gross weight,” is unambiguous, unmistakable, and unqualified; it should therefore be free from extraneous construction. The sole and single test is that of weight; no reference is made, either directly or indirectly, to any other consideration, such as price, quality, origin, method of manufacture, character of container, suitability for use or sale, or any other matter. Nor does any distinction between wholesale and retail packages appear, the only line of demarcation being weight.</p> <p>3. Homatropine Hydrobromide in Less than 2-J-Pound Package.</p> <p>Ten ounces of homatropine hydrobromide contained in a single glass bottle, which is packed in a small wooden box, the entire parcel weighing less-than 21-pounds, is dutiable under paragraph 17, tariff act of 1913 — “chemical * * * compounds * * * put up in individual packages of two and one-half pounds or less gross weight” — notwithstanding that this is so large a quantity as to suffice a wholesale house for several months’ stock.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 43009.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 17, 1919, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Brown.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board-of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8112 (T. D. 37431’),</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 14, 1919, by Mr. Hanson and Mr. Webster.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42767.</p> <p>[Oral argument Mar. 28, 1919, by Mr. Frederick W. Brooks, Jr., and Mr. Mulvaney.]</p>

<p>1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPHS K, L,' AND R, SECTION III, TARIFF ACT OF 1913 — “Market Value.”</p> <p>Within the meaning of the term “market value,” in paragraphs K, L, and R, Section III, tariff act of 1913, a single actual buyer may be a market.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Admissibility.</p> <p>The price which importer paid for merchandise is lawful evidence as to its market value or wholesale price.</p> <p>3. Administrative Practice, Force of.</p> <p>The fact that the collector has for perhaps 20 years followed a practice at variance with his action in the case at'bar should not lead this court to constrain him to continue a course plainly contrary to the provisions of the tariff act.</p> <p>4. Wall Paper Sample Books — Appraisement.</p> <p>Books of wall-paper samples, made up to illustrate the stock of wall paper purchased, were imported. These books were paid for by the importer at a price based upon the cost of production. They were not sold by the importer to his customers, but distributed free, their cost being recouped as a part of the overhead expense. It can not be said that the action of the reappraisement board in refusing to hold them samples of no commercial value and in affirming their appraisement at the price paid for them was, in view of paragraphs K, L, and R, Section III, tariff act of 1913, illegal and of no effect as proceeding upon a wrong principle of law.</p>

<p>Motion by the United States for order to Board of United States General Appraisers . on appeal from Abstract 42768.</p>

<p>Section 300, War Revenue Act of 1917 (Chap. 03, L., 1917) — Internal Revenue — Duty—Jurisdiction of Board.</p> <p>The provision of section 300. war-revenue act of 1917'fChap. 63, L.. 1917), levying an additional tax upon imported distilled liquor, describes an import tax and not an internal-revenue tax. United States v. Shallus & Co. (9 Ct. Cust. Appls., 168; T. D. 37999). The decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers dismissing the protest for want of jurisdiction in themselves is reversed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 42978.</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 8, 1919, by Mr. Place and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8250 (T. D. 38612).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 10, 1919, by Mr. Edward P. Sharretts and Mr. Hanson.]</p>

<p>1. Olbuical Error — Additional Duty.</p> <p>Where merchandise, designed by the seller and the importers to be distributed by the importers gratuitously as samples, was, for this reason, invoiced at a specially reduced price which the importers knew to be below the foreign market value, its entry at the specially reduced' price was not “manifest clerical error” within-the meaning of that expression in Paragraph I, Section III, tariff act of 1913, and additional duty as provided by the paragraph was correctly levied upon the difference between the entered and appraised values.</p> <p>2. Excess Merchandise.</p> <p>Where regular-sized packages of merchandise were invoiced to the importers at' a special price in consideration of,an understanding between the seller and the-importers that they were to be distributed by the importers gratuitously as samples, and the importers entered them at the special price instead of the market value, the fact that the importers believed the samples to be smaller than the-regular-sized packages did not constitute the case one of excess merchandise within-the rule of Downing & Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 278; T. D. 32033). since the importers’ misapprehension as to the size'of the packages did not affect the question of value, and additional duty upon the difference between the entered and appraised values was justly levied under Paragraph I, Section III, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8231 (T. D. 37927).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 16, 1919, by Mr. Pratt and Mr. Lawrence).</p>

<p>1. AGRICULTURE.</p> <p>That the raising, feeding, and caring for animals, such as sheep and cattle, fall within the term ‘‘agriculture” can not he doubted.</p> <p>2. Construction, Paragraph 391, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Agricultural Implements” — Ensilage Cutters.</p> <p>An implement used exclusively for the purpose of cutting corn raised .on the farm and storing the product to be fed on the same farm to cattle raised and fed on the same farm, is an instrument employed in supplying sustenance to cattle and, in even a very narrow sense, is used as an agricultural implement. Such an implement is an ensilage cutter; and it is admissible free of duty under the provision, for “agricultural implements” in paragraph 391, tariff act of 1913.</p>

<p>3. Construction, Group III, Suction 500, Revenue Act op September 8, 1916 (39 Stat., 756) — “Flavors. ”</p> <p>Synthetic coumarin, shown to be used as a material in the manufacture of flavoring extracts, and not as a flavor itself, is not classifiable under the provision for “flavors, ” in Group III, section 500, revenue act of September 8,.1916 (39 Stat., 756J:</p> <p>2. Construction, Section 502, Revenue Act of September 8, 1916 (39 Stat.,. 756), and Paragraph 49, Tariff Act of 1913.</p> <p>The provision of section 502, revenue act of September 8,1916 (39 Stat., 756), that, laws inconsistent therewith are thereby repealed does not operate upon the provision of paragraph 49, tariff act of 1913 for “all natural or synthetic odoriferous o r aromatic substances, preparations, and mixtures used in the manufacture of, but not marketable as, perfumes or cosmetics” sufficiently (if at all) to prevent classification of synthetic coumarin under it.</p> <p>3. Construction, Paragraph 49, Tariff Act of 1913 — “Used.”</p> <p>The language of paragraph 49, tariff act of 1913, “used in the manufacture of but not marketable as, perfumes or cosmetics,” does not require that the chief use of an article must be in the manufacture of perfumes or cosmetics in order that it may be dutiable under the paragraph. A substantial use is sufficient.</p> <p>4. Synthetic Coumarin.</p> <p>Synthetic coumarin, a coal-tar product which'closely resembles a natural product obtained from the tonka bean, shown to be substantially used in the manufacture-of perfumery, though chiefly used in the manufacturé of flavoring extracts,, con-cededly odoriferous or aromatic, is dutiable under the provision of paragraph 49', tariff act of 1913s for “all natural or synthetic odoriferous or aromatic substances* preparations, and mixtures used in the manufacture of, but not marketable as, perfumes or cosmetics.” The decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers classifying it under the provision for “all similar products.” Group II, section 500r revenue act of September 8,. 1916 (39 Stat., 756), is reversed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8211 (T. D. 37829).</p> <p>[Oral argument Oct. 31, 1919, by Mr. Washburn and Mr, Lawrence.]</p>