Volume 10 — Federal Cases

In equity. [the Union Bank of Georgetown], objected to a deposition. purporting to be taken de bene esse under the thirtieth section of the judiciary act of 1789, which authorizes such depositions to be taken “before any justice or judge of any of the courts of the United States; or before any chancellor, justice, or judge of a supreme or superior court, mayor or chief magistrate of a city; or judge of a county court, or court of common pleas of any of the United States.”…

Bill for .injunction, before DANIEL, Circuit Justice. RINGO, District Judge, having been of counsel in the case, did not sit. - The bill was brought to enjoin a judgment at law, rendered in the circuit court on the 25th of April, 1845, in favor of the defendant [William Bowling, as administrator of William J. Bowling, deceased], and against the complainant [Josiah Garland], for 1,626 dollars and 25 cents, on the ground that it was part of the purchase-money of five slaves…

Henry Garnett was before the court on a warrant issued on the affidavit of Thomas Price Jones, of Cecil county, Maryland. The affidavit set forth that the claimant was the executor and residuary legatee of Benedict Jones, deceased; that Henry Garnett belonged to the estate of Benedict Jones; that he was held to labor for a term of years, and that said Henry had run away from his owner, as long ago as the year 1842.

<p>Libel to recover damages for an unlawful discharge.</p>

William Garnett, as executor of Bichard Brooke, exhibited his bill in the superior court of chancery, for the Kichmond district of Virginia, against William H. Macon, John Campbell, an absent' defendant, and others, setting forth, that the said Biehard Brooke, devisee of George Brooke, empowered his executors to sell his real estate; and that the plaintiff, as executor, had, on the 10th of June, ISIS, sold a tract of land, called Manta-pike, to the defendant, Macon, who paid…

[This was an action at law by Garnett, as assignee in bankruptcy of D. C. Mayo, against said Mayo, as principal, and W. K. Watts and Lawrence Lottier, as sureties, upon a bond given under the circumstances stated below.

<p>Case No. 5,246.</p> <p>Pkize — Violation ok Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

Appeal [by Alfred C. Garratt] from the decision of the commissioner of patents refusing to grant to him letters patent for an improvement in surgical pump syringes, and awarding priority of invention to Charles H. Davidson and H. E. Davidson. The specification of the appellant states very particularly the construction and nature of his invention, and then says: “I am aware that elastic bags and tubes, and that valves, also, have been in use for syringe purposes.

<p>Case No. 5,248.</p> <p>Patexts — Accounting fok Profits — Apportionment between Patented and Unpat-ented Features — Costs.</p> <p>1. In a suit in equity on two letters patent, each for an “improved mop-head,’,’ an interlocutory decree for profits and damages was made. The plaintiff, before the master, put in no evidence, except evidence to show the damages to the plaintiff and the profits to the defendant, in the manufacture of the infringing mop as a whole. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, tne defendant moved to dismiss the proceedings, on the ground that no basis had been laid before the master to compute or estimate the plaintiff’s damages, and that he was entitled to only nominal damages. The point was reserved and the defendant put in evidence on the basis assumed by the plaintiff. The master reported, that, as no evidence had been given before him of damages resulting to the plaintiff, or of profits accruing to the defendant, from making and selling the patented improvements as distinguished from the whole mop, he found for the plaintiff nominal damages only: Held, that the master’s report was correct.</p> <p>[Cited in Schillinger v. Gunther. Case No. 12,-457; Star Salt Caster Co., Id. 13,320.]</p> <p>2. The patentee must, in every case, give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages, between the patented feature and the unpatent-ed features, and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or he must show, by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to the patented feature.</p> <p>[Cited in Calkins v. Bertrand, 8 Fed. 759; Zane v. Peck, 13 Fed. 476; Maier v. Brown, 17 Fed. 737; Atlantic Milling Co. v. Rowland, 27 Fed. 25.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>3. Exceptions by the plaintiff to the master’s report, founded on the admission of testimony objected to, held to be immaterial, because, the plaintiff having failed to give adequate evidence as to profits and damages, the defendants were not put on their defence in that respect, and it was unimportant whether they gave competent evidence or no evidence.</p> <p>4. Certain exceptions overruled, as too general.</p> <p>5. The plaintiff not allowed to give further evidence, there being no claim of a failure, through inadvertence, to give other or further evidence, or that there was any which could be given.</p> <p>6. Costs awarded to the plaintiff, except the costs of the reference, and report, and exceptions, and the hearing thereon.</p> <p>[Cited in Everest v. Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co., 31 Fed. 743.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For other cases involving these patents, see Garretson v. Clark, Case No. 5.250; Id., 111 U. S. 120, 4 Sup. Ct. 291; Taylor v. Garretson, Case No. 13,792.]</p> <p>[On appeal by Oliver S. Garretson, this case was presented to the supreme court for adjudication. Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion, quoted the following from the opinion of Blatchford, Circuit Judge, given above: “The patentee must in every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented feature and the unpat-ented features, and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural or speculative; or he must show, by equally reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to the patented feature,” — and held that the plaintiff had complied with neither part of this rule, having produced no evidence to apportion the profits or damages between the improvement constituting the patented feature or the other features of the mop. His evidence went only to show the cost of the whole mop and the price at which it was sold; and, concluding, the learned justice remarked that “of course it could not be pretended that the entire value of the mop head was -ftributable to the feature patented. So the whole case ended, the rule was not followed, arid the decree is therefore affirmed.” Ill U. S. 120, 4 Sup. Ct 291.]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Oliver S. Gar-retson. against Charles B. Clark and others for the alleged infringement of certain patents. See Cases Nos. 5,248 and 5,250.]</p>

[This was a'bill in equity by Oliver S. Gar-retson against Charles B. Clark and others for the alleged infringement of two patents for “improved mop-heads.” The first (No. 54,860) was granted to Charles B. Clark and Oliver S. Garretson, May 22, 1866; the other (No. 67,643) was granted to Oliver S. Garret-son, August 13, 18G7.]

Prior to the Civil War, Edward and Phillis Garrett intermarried, and a number of children were born to them. In June, 1S70, Phil-lis, by next friend, brought suit od the chancery side of the circuit court of Alexandria county, against Edward, for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, setting forth, as the grounds, adultery, neglect, etc., and praying alimony and the custody of the children, all of whom were under age.

These suits were brought to charge the defendant Yerby, as a secret partner with the defendant Woodward.

In equity'. This was an application for a preliminary injunction made by Cornelius K. Garrison, a citizen of the state of New York, as a stockholder of the People’s Gas Light and Coke Company, an Illinois corporation,, to restrain the city of Chicago from interference with the rights of the gas company, under and by virtue of a certain contract entered into by the city of Chicago with said gas light and coke company, on the 3rd of October, 1869, for the supply of gas to the…

<p>Case No. 5,254.</p> <p>Tradesman — Books op Account.</p> <p>■ A bankrupt's occupation had been that of a stair-builder. He bought lumber, nails and other materials, and, by the labor of workmen employed by him, wrought the materials into stairs, for persons who gave him orders to build the stairs, and paid him a gross sum therefor. He kept no books except a memorandum book of men’s time: Bdd, that he was a merchant or tradesman, and had not kept proper books of account, and that he was, tberelore, not ent.tled to a discharge in bankruptcy.</p> <p>(Cited in Re Archenbrown, Case No. 505.]</p> <p>[Cited in Re Howard, 59 Vt. 595, 10 Atl. 716; Re Good, 78 Cal. 399, 20 Pac. 801.]</p>

Demurrer to bill. The bill in this cause Is filed by the complainant [Charles M. Garrison] as assignee in bankruptcy, and its object is to recover the value of a certain stock of goods alleged to have been transferred by the bankrupts to the defendant [John J. Markley], a creditor, within four months, etc., with a view to give him a preference, the bankrupts then being insolvent, and, the defendant having reasonable cause to believe, etc., in fraud of the bankrupt act It is…

<p>[This was a bill in equity by John Garrow, Thomas Y. How, Jr., James Seymour, and George Miller against Amos Davis, George M. Pickering, William McCrillis, and Ephraim Paulk.]</p>

These were petitions by George M. Garwood and by Pereival M. Potts for certificates and discharges, both individually and as members' of the firm of Potts and Garwood, they having voluntarily petitioned to be declared bankrupts.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of South Carolina.] The claim for compensation must rest upon salvage service rendered, or upon the contract made. As to salvage service: .A salvage compensation can be awarded only to persons by whose agency the vessel was saved. Unless the property be saved in fact by those who claim as salvors, salvage will not be allowed.

<p>Bill in equity brought by Joseph Gass to be relieved from a bond given by him as surety for one Noah James, to the defendant, Abner P. Stinson; and for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit at law, brought on the bond against James and the plaintiff. The defendant Stinson, being the warden of the state prison of New Hampshire, on the 22d of January, 1S31, appointed one Noah James, of Boston (Mass.) his agent for the sale of granite for the said prison, with power to sell the granite, and collect the moneys arising from the sales, and to sell at such prices, as should from time to time be given to him, with a power reserved to discontinue the agency at the pleasure of the warden or his successor in office. On the 27th of January, 1831, James, together with the plaintiff, Gass, as his surety, executed a bond to the defendant, in his official capacity, payable to him and his successor in office, in the penal sum of of ten thousand dollars, with a condition that James, so appointed agent, should well and truly account to the defendant or his successors, for all stone or granite belonging to the said state prison, which should come to his possession or be consigned to him, and should promptly pay over the proceeds of all sales by him made, and should, from time to time, exhibit a statement of his doings as agent, and all accounts of sales when called for by the defendant or his successor; and upon the discontinuance of his agency, that he should deliver to the defendant or his successor, free of expense and in good order, any granite in his hands, belonging to the prison. The bond was executed in Boston, through the instrumentality of one Thompson (the deputy warden under the defendant,) and he, Thompson, afterwards on the same day, signed a written instrument, by which it was agreed, that if Gass should be dissatisfied with continuing his suretyship in the premises, he should “have a right, on ten days notice being given to the warden of the prison in writing, to discontinue his liability as surety; provided the accounts of the agent are then all settled up, the balance paid, and the property of the state prison delivered over to the warden or his agent.” The agency of James was revoked on the 4th of October, 1833; and about this time, James became insolvent Stinson was removed from his office as warden, in September, 1834. Suit was brought in the circuit court of Massachusetts, at the May term, 1834, against James and Gass, on the original bond. By consent, a verdict on the issue joined between the parties, was entered for the plaintiff (Stinson,) which was to be altered or amended according to the report of Simon Greenleaf, Esq. an auditor appointed for the purpose; and the opinion ■of the .court thereon. At the Hay term of the court, 1S36, the auditor made his report, stating the facts on which it was founded, 'finding that there was a balance due by James to the warden at the termination of the agency of $G,033.39. But the report expressly reserved, for the opinon of the court, the question of Gass’s liability as surety. No exceptions were filed to the report; and ■the same still stands open for the final action of the court; Gass preferring the course of filing a bill ip equity. The cause came on for a hearing at this term, upon the bill, answer and evidence.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Joseph Gass against Abner P. Stinson.] This cause being before the master, under the decretal order already passed [Case No. 5,200] an application was made to the master orally, by the defendant’s counsel, to take the testimony of certain witnesses, the object of which was to establish the incompetency of one Noah James as a witness, who had been examined in the cause, and whose deposition was before the court, when the decretal order was passed.

[This was a bill in equity by Joseph Gass against Abner P. Stinson, for an injunction to stay proceedings, and for other relief.

<p>Case Wo. 5,265.</p> <p>Pleading at Law — Caption op the Declaration —Venue—Othee Averments.</p> <p>1. It is sufficient to state the title of the court in the caption of the declaration.</p> <p>2. The venue if substantially laid is sufficient. And so of other averments in the declaration.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Louisiana.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel for mariner’s wages, ■ filed by Daniel McFarlane, W. H. Themas, Jno.

<p>[This was a suit by Joel H. Gates, assignee, against the Winooski Lumber Co.)</p>

<p>Case Wo. 5,268.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction' — Rules of, not Restrictive — Depositary of Saved Property — Liability in Admiralty.</p> <p>1. The rules in admiralty are not to be regarded as restrictive, but as enumerative of the more common remedies.</p> <p>2. Where the depositary of saved property has rendered himself liable for the lien of the salvors, he may be proceeded against in admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,271.</p> <p>Contracts — Advance as Part Consideration— Bankruptcy — Conveyance for Present Consideration — Bona Pides — Fraud.</p> <p>1. When an advance is made upon an agreement that certain and specific property shall be conveyed, and the conveyance is made within a reasonable time thereafter, the advance will be considered as a present consideration for the conveyance.</p> <p>2. An insolvent debtor may, for a present and sufficient consideration, sell or encumber his estate, provided the transaction is bona fide, and free from fraud, or an intention to defeat the operation of the bankrupt law [14 Stat. 517].</p> <p>3. To defeat a conveyance for a present consideration, the proof must show that the party to whom or for whose benefit it was made knew or had reasonable cause to believe the grantor insolvent, and knew that a fraud upon the law was intended.</p> <p>4. The knowledge thn* *> fraud was intended may be established by circumstantial evidence.</p>

This was a bill filed by John Gaughan, a property owner in the town of Hyde Park, against the defendants to restrain them from carrying on their business of manufacturing fertilizing material out of animal matter, on the ground that their works were a public nuisance, and injurious to his property and health. The bill was originally filed in the circuit court of Cook county, but removed to this court by a writ of certiorari on application of the defendants.

In admiralty. This was a libel to recover freight upon the coal brought by the libelant [John Gaughranj from Schuylkill Haven to this port for $1.85 per ton. The libelant alleges that he brought the coal to this port and carted it to the claimant’s place t>f business, for which he also claims compensation.

<p>Case No. 5,274.</p> <p>Public Lands —Survey after Withdrawal op Entry — Location by Anotuer Warrant.</p> <p>1. A survey after the entry is withdrawn, does not, under the act of congress of March 2, 1807- [2 Scat. 424], prevent the location of the land surveyed, by another warrant.</p> <p>2. That act refers to a subsisting survey, which must be founded on an entry, though the survey may not have been made conform-ably to entry.</p> <p>3. A survey made without an entry is of no validity, nor is the survey valid, after the withdrawal of the entry.</p> <p>4. The withdrawal of an entry by a person wholly unauthorized to do so, does not affect the rights of the persons claiming under the entry.</p> <p>5.But if the act of withdrawal be unauthor-ised, any subsequent sanction of it makes the act valid.</p> <p>(!. Claiming the land, and exercising acts of ownership over it, which has been located by the withdrawn warrant, is such an act.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,275.</p> <p>Execution — Levt— Notice to Subsequent Pub-cnASEus — Definiteness of Levy— Parol Evidence.</p> <p>1. A levy on property, real or personal, -should have such certainty as to show to a subsequent purchaser, on what the levy was made. Short of this, there can, it would seem, be no notice to a subsequent purchaser.</p> <p>2. Parol evidence, after conflicting rights have grown up, can not be received, to make the levy certain, which before was wholly uncertain.</p> <p>3. A levy on one-half of a lot, without designating which half, or of one hundred acres, in a section, is too indefinite to convey the title.</p> <p>4. A defective levy being set aside, on motion, makes good a junior levy.</p>

On demurrer to counts 1 to 10 and 12 to 17 of the amended petition. All of the counts in the petition state, for causes of action, the making by defendant of divers negotiable bonds, payable to bearer, and all acquired by plaintiff [William R. Gause] after maturity.

This was an action [by Charles W. Gau-thier] against [Digby V. Bell] the collector of the port of Detroit, to recover duties alleged to have been illegally exacted upon certain imported fish. Plaintiff was in the habit of purchasing fish caught in the Detroit river and Lake Erie, and of freezing them in barrels or large cakes and exporting them to Detroit, where they were put upon the market or shipped in this frozen condition to distant cities and sold as fresh fish.

<p>Case No. 5,278.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Disckiminatikg Duties op Act op June 80, 1SG4 — Repealing Act op 1S72.</p> <p>By section 18 of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 21G), all goods, wares and merchandise of the growth or produce of countries east of the Cape of Good Hope, (except raw cotton,) when imported from places west of the Cape of Good Hope, were subjected to a discriminating “duty of ten per centum ad valo-rem, in addition to the duties imposed on any such articles when imported directly from the place or places of their growth or production.” By section 5 of the act of June 6, 1S72 (17 Stat. 233), certain articles were declared to be “exempt from duty.” The act of 1872 did not have the effect to repeal the act of 18G4, so as to exempt from such discriminating duty articles falling within the description in the act of 18G4, although they were articles made exempt from duty by the act of 1872.</p>

In bankruptcy. Petition by a bankrupt [Benjamin C. Gay] for his discharge. Creditors objected upon the ground that the bankrupt had given a fraudulent preference, and had not kept proper books of account

<p>Case No. 5,280.</p> <p>Patents— Assignment before Issue — Validitt —Recording—Suit bv Assignee.</p> <p>1. An assignment of an invention before the issuing of a patent, is valid under section 6 of the act of March 3, 1837 (5 Stat. 193), although it is made after the rejection by the commissioner of patents of the assignor’s application for a patent, and after an appeal thereon to the chief justice of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>2. The assignee under such an assignment may file a bill in his own name, under section 10 of the act of July 4, 1836 (5 Stat. 123), and section 10 of the act of March 3, 1839 (5 Stat. 354), against the patentee to whom the patent was issued on the rejection of the assignor's application, for the purpose of annulling the patent issued, and having one granted to him as assignee.</p> <p>3. And it is not necessary that the assignment should be recorded in the patent office before the filing of the bill. It is enough,, if it be recorded at any time before the issuing of the patent.</p>

This cause .came on to be heard upon the motion of the defendants [G. Lyons and. others] to remand the case to the district court for the fifteenth judicial district, where the action had been originally brought,, and from which the plaintiff had removed it. The petition filed in the state court represented that Edward J. Gay, the plaintiff, on.

This was an action at law, founded on a policy of insurance on the life of Sheridan Gay, for $5,000, payable, in the event of his death, to his widow, the plaintiff [Ellen M. Gay], The policy was dated June 3d, 1803, and Gay, whose life was insured, shot himself, in a passenger train, on the Hartford, Providence and Fishkill Railroad, December 10th, 180S. The annual premiums on the policy had been regularly paid.

In bankruptcy. Tbe counsel for the bankrupt [Charles G. Gaylor] moves his final discharge non ob-stante objections filed by one of his creditors, or that those objections be disallowed as irregular and filed out of time.

<p>Case No. 5,284.</p> <p>■Corporations — Forfeiture of Franchise — Practice — Confi.ict of Jurisdiction — Priority of Possession — Amendments—Lis Pendens.</p> <p>1. The court will not forfeit the franchise of a corporation on the application of individ-uáis; the right belongs to the state alone.</p> <p>[Cited in Hardon v. Newton, Case No. 6,-054.]</p> <p>2. But if a bill prays for a receiver and general relief, the court will retain the bill for that purpose; a forfeiture of the franchise is not essential to the power of appointing a receiver.</p> <p>3. The court which first takes jurisdiction of a controversy and the parties, is entitled to retain it to its final termination, and also to take possession of the res, subject of the controversy, exclusive of all interference from any other court of concurrent jurisdiction; and it is not essential that the court first taking jurisdiction of the controversy should also first take the actual possession of the res.</p> <p>[Cited in Sharon v. Terry, 36 Fed. 357.]</p> <p>[Cited in Texas Trunk R. Co. v. Lewis (Tex. Sup.) 16 S. W. (¡48: Sharon v. Sharon. 23 Pac. 1101; Smith v. Ford, 2 N. W. 159.]</p> <p>4. If a receiver appointed by another court •on bill filed pending this controversy, takes prior possession of the res, his possession is wrongful and should give way to the prior jurisdiction of this court.</p> <p>5. The fact that the allegations of the bill were imperfect, and a demurrer was sustained, with leave to amend, does not change the fact of jurisdiction; as the amendments relate back to, and become part of, the original bill.</p> <p>6. This doctrine does not apply to such a case.</p>

Trover by [Carol Gaytes] the assignee against [Oscar L.] American and [John] Smith, judgment creditors of the bankrupt, to recover the value of personal property levied upon by the sheriff under an execution from the superior court of Cook county issued and' levied January 13th, 1868. The property was sold January 25th, and on the 13th of February following the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy, upon which he was afterwards adjudged a bankrupt.

<p>Case No. 5,285.</p> <p>COURTS — JURISDICTION — CITIZENSHIP — SUIT BETWEEN Assignor and Assignee op Promissory Note.</p> <p>1. The assignee of a note, a citizen of Ohio, may bring his action in the circuit court against the assignor, a citizen of Indiana.</p> <p>2. A note made payable in Ohio is an Ohio •contract, and demand of payment when the note is due, protest and notice are due diligence.</p> <p>3. Where the action is between the assignor and his immediate assignee, it is only -necessary to sustain the jurisdiction of the circuit court that plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states.</p> <p>4. The action is on the contract of assignment.</p>

[This was a suit by Carol Gaytes, assignee of the Mercantile Mutual Fire Insurance Company, against William G. Hibbard and Franklin F. Spencer.] Demurrer to declaration upon the following instrument, given for premium upon a policy of insurance: “For value received in policy No. 73, dated 12 August, 1S65, issued by the Mercantile Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Chicago, 'we promise to pay said company, or the treasurer for the time being, the sum of two hundred and fifty…

This was a bill in equity by Carol Gaytes, assignee of the Union Glass Company, bankrupt, to enjoin-Lewis from foreclosing a mortgage given to the defendant by the company prior to its bankruptcy.

In equity. There were eleven of these suits brought [by Alonzo S. Gear against Jonas Fitch and various other defendants] upon the same patent, the pleadings in all of which were the same. Prior to the filing of the bills, a witness visited the several defendants at their respective places of business, and notified them that the complainant was the owner of the patent, and also not to use any machine that infringed the patent, and to make settlement for damages for past use.

In equity. Final hearing on pleadings and •proofs. Suit on letters patent [No. 10.204] ■•‘for a machine for turning and cutting irregular forms,” granted Nathaniel Gear, November 8, 1S53, and extended seven years; brought by complainants [Alonzo S. Gear and others] as assignees of the same [against Jonathan P. Grosvenor and others].

In equity. Motion for provisional injunction. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 10,204], for “a machine for turning and cutting irregular forms,” granted .Nathaniel Gear, November 8, 1853, and extended seven years from the expiration of the original term. The same patent was sued upon in the case of Gear v. Grosvenor [Case No. 5,-291].

James Geary was convicted in the district court of the United States for this district on the 2Sth of February, 1S71, of the crime of “conspiracy to defraud the United States,” under the thirtieth section of the act of March 2, 1SG7 (14 Stat. 4S4).

<p>[This was a libel in rem by Lieut. Thomas R. Gedney and others against the schooner L’Amistad for salvage.)</p>

A rule was issued directing the defendant to show cause on the 31st of August why he should not be adjudged bankrupt. An answer to the rule was lodged with the clerk by the attorney on the 18th of September, after the expiration of the rule. The answer was not verified. The petitioning creditors applied to have judgment by default, and the defendant applied for leave to file answer.

<p>Case No. 5,295.</p> <p>Tax Deed — Acknowledgment—Recitals—Va-liditt of Sale.</p> <p>1. In determining whether an acknowledgment of a deed is sufficient, it is competent for the court to consider the various parts of the body of the deed in connection with the acknowledgment, in order to ascertain whether tine grantor of the deed did acknowledge it to be his before the proper- officer.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. It was objected that the deed offered in evidence did not recite the sum of dollars and cents in the whole of taxes for the non-payment of which the land was sold. Held, that the language of the statute is not that the deed shall be precisely in the form given in it, but only that it shall be substantially so, and a deed which recited various certificates, giving at the end of each certificate a description of the land sold, and the words ‘‘sold for two dollars and forty-three cents,” is a sufficient compliance with the statute. In construing that clause of the statute the whole deed may be taken together.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>3. Where it appears that there was included in the amount for which the land was sold a sum which was not a tax, the sale is void. So where there was added to the tax assessed against the land the sum of five cents, tb“ price of the stamp for the certificate which was to be given by the officer, held, that as this sum. in addition to the taxes due, was added, the officer had no right to sell, and the deed under such sale was void.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>4. The fact that the deed in this case has run unchallenged for three years after being recorded, that being the time limited by statute, in which the owner of lands may bring his action to contest the deed, will not bring this ease within the statute of limitation. The true construction of this statutory limitation is to give it application in cases where there have been irregularities or defects in the sale, but not to cases like the present, where it appears that there existed no authority in the officer to sell in the first instance.</p> <p>[NOTE. On writ of error, this cause was afterwards heard by the supreme court, and the judgment reversed, with costs. The case was remanded to the circuit court, with directions to enter a judgment for the plaintiffs for $6,731.56, with lawful interest on $0,241.42 from April 24, 1876.</p> <p>[The opinion was by Mr. Justice Blatchford, the learned justice also preparing the following syllabus of the decision:</p> <p>fl. Under section 5 of chapter 13S of the General Laws of Wisconsin of 1861, providing that “no action shall be commenced by the former owner or owners of any lands, or by any person claiming under him or them, to recover possession of land which has been sold and conveyed by deed for nonpayment of taxes, or to avoid such deed, unless such action shall be commenced within three years next after the recording of such deed,” land is to be regarded as having been sold for nonpayment of taxes although the sum to raise which it was sold included five cents for a United ¡States revenue stamp, to be put, and which was put, on the certificate issued to the purchaser pn the sale.</p> <p>T2. A deed on a tax sale recited that “8. A. Coleman, assignee of Oconto county,” had deposited certificates of sale showing that five parcels, each of which sold for so much, were sold “to the said Oconto county, and by its treasurer assigned to S. A. Coleman,” for so much “in the whole”; the total being the sum of the five several sums. The statute (chapter 50, § 22, Gen. Laws Wis. 1S59) prescribed a form of deed, ind provided that it should be “substantially” n that or “other equivalent form,” showing ■hat the land was sold for a sum named “in the whole.” Held, that the deed followed the form substantially.</p> <p>[3. A sheriff having possession of property under a writ of attachment is not bound by a judgment in a replevin suit to which he was not a party, and in which he was not served with process, and did not appear, and which he did not defend, although his under sheriff, as an individual, was a party to the replevin suit.</p> <p>[4. Quaere, are the waters of the Menominee river, which is the boundary between Michigan and Wisconsin, within the concurrent jurisdiction of both Wisconsin and Michigan?</p> <p>L5. Although there was no general verdict of a jury in this case, and no special verdict in any form known to the common law, and no waiver in writing of a jury trial, and no such finding of the court below upon the facts as is provided for by section C49 of the Iievispd Statutes, this court, on a written stipulation filed in this court by the parties, agreeing upon the facts, reviewed the case on a writ of error, and reversed a judgment below for the defendant, and directed a judgment for the plaintiff, in an action of trover. 100 U. S. 379, 1 Sup. Ct. 315.]</p>

This was an allegation of prize against the brig Gefla and cargo [Wilte, master], upon an asserted capture by the privateer Mary,’ Pritchard commander.

[This was an action on an insurance policy], The main defence was an alleged concealment by the assured at the time of effecting the insurance, of a previous sale of the property insured, under a mortgage. Respecting the necessity of a d'sclosure by the applicant of the existence of such a fact, and what acts on the part of the local agents of' the company would amount to a waiver of the necessity of making such disclosure, the jury was directed as follows.

Action on insurance policy. The answer sets up three defences; 1. Fraudulent overvaluation of the property insured. 2. False statements respecting the existence of a mortgage on the insured property. 3. Over-insurance in contravention of the terms of the policy in suit.

[This was a bill in equity by Philip Geier against August Goetinger for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 87,103, ■ granted to plaintiff February 23, 1869.] -

Three libels brought to recover for the use and occupation (1) of a wharf at the foot of Woodward avenue, Detroit; (2) of a private wharf fronting certain lots of libellant, in Detroit; (3) of a wliarf on the opposite shore of Detroit river, in Canada.

<p>Case No. 5,304.</p> <p>•Shipping Articles — Definiteness— Construction — Deviation—Right of Seaman to Leave Vessel — Substitute.</p> <p>1. Whether shipping articles which describe the voyage to bo from the port of Salem, Mass.,' to Goree and a market and back to a final port ■ of discharge in the United States, are sufficiently definite in the absence of evidence of usage to put some further limit to the voyage, quaere?</p> <p>2. How far usage could be invoked in aid of .shipping articles, quaere?</p> <p>3. If such articles are valid, it must be by confining the voyage to Goree and neighboring ■ports, or ports usually visited in the same trade.</p> <p>4. Limiting it thus, and holding the articles tó be valid, they refer only to a market for selling the outward and procuring a homeward cargo, and do not authorize an intermediate trading voyage among the islands and on the coast of Africa.</p> <p>5. When a seaman, shipped under such articles, has served until the outward cargo is disposed of, and a new intermediate trading voy•age has been undertaken, and has well-grounded apprehensions of danger to his health, he may leave the vessel at a port where a substitute can be procured, without forfeiting the wages already earned; because there is a deviation, and one which, so far as he is concerned, is a substantial one.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,305.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Effect of Decree —“Lien ” — Suit by Creditor's Bile.</p> <p>1. A decree of bankruptcy and the title of tlie assignee, acquired under it, relate back to the time of filing the petition, and embrace all the property the petitioners then had.</p> <p>[See Ex parte Bennot, Case No. 1,309.]</p> <p>2. The word “lien,” in the second section of the bankrupt act [of 1S41 (5 Stat. 442)], embraces equitable as well ns legal liens, and is not used in any .precise and definite sense, but the meaning and application of the term are to be ascertained by the law of the several states, whenever they may come in question.</p> <p>[Cited in Perego v. Bonesteel, Case No. 10,-970; Johnson v. Rogers, Id. 7,40S.]</p> <p>3. A suit commenced by a creditor's bill, in the court of chancery of New York, gives to the complainant such a lien or security, from the time of the commencement of the suit, by the filing of the bill and the service of a subpoena, as is within the saving clause of the second section of the bankrupt act; and when such suit is instituted, and prosecuted without, collusion with the bankrupt, and in good faith, the lien thus acquired will prevail against a decree of bankruptcy, on a petition filed subsequent to the commencement of the suit by the creditor in the court of chancery.</p> <p>4. Aliter, where the decree of bankruptcy is founded on a petition filed before the commencement of such suit.</p>

<p>This was a case submitted to the court on the report of the assignee [in the matter of Abner S. Ely, a bankrupt].</p>

Libel for towage, by George P. Felcher, owner of the tugs Challenge and Kate Felcher.

<p>Case No. 5,308.</p> <p>Prize — Blockade — Pukcihse op Property in Enemy Country by Loyal Citizen.</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo condemned ns enemy property and for a violation of the blockade.</p> <p>2. The master and owner of the vessel, a resident of Charieston, S. C., purchased her there during the war, and loaded her with the produce of the country, and brought her through the blockade of that port, she having papers issued to her by the enemy: B'cld. that she and her cargo must be condemned, and that a claim by the master that he had always been a loyal citizen of the United States, and had purchased the vessel and cargo as an investment, in order to withdraw himself and his family and property from the enemy country, could not be considered in this court.</p> <p>3. A loyal citizen of the United States is dis-nualified from apjiearing in a prize court to question the legality of the seizure of his property acquired during war in an enemy country by trade with the enemy.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,309.</p> <p>Prize —Blockade — Withdrawal from Enemy Country by Loyal Citizen with His Property.</p> <p>1. Decree of the district court [Case No. 5,-30S], condemning the vessel and cargo as enemy property, reversed.</p> <p>2. The claimant left the enemy port with the1 intent to withdraw from the enemy’s country with his effects, and had for that purpose converted his property into the vessel and cargo, and intended to give himself up to the blockading squadron.</p> <p>3. The withdrawal of the property under the-cireiunslnnci-s did not subject it to capture as enemy property.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,310.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Loss op Vessel — Pout op Discharge — Shipping Ahtici.es pok Speci- - pied Teiim — When Wages Due.</p> <p>1. A ship reached her port of destination on arriving at Falmouth with cargo, being there destined for orders, and earned freight so as to entitle the crew to wages. , • •</p> <p>2. If the ship after sailing thence in obedience to orders is lost before arriving at her port of discharge, the crew are entitled to wages up to the ship’s arrival and during one half her stay at Falmouth.</p> <p>• 3. A crew shipped for a specified term on a general freighting voyage are entitled to their wages upon the completion in safety of each voyage during the term of their employment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary.</p> <p>4. No private contract between the ship-owner and shipper in regard to freight can affect the seamen’s right to wages.</p> <p>5. A stipulation in articles, that seamen shall ■not demand wages until the arrival of the vessel at her final port of destination, does not bar the seamen of their wages in case the vessel is lost before arriving at that port.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,311.</p> <p>Gollision is East Rivek — Steamboats Crossing —Change op Course — Nearness to Piers.</p> <p>1. A ferry-boat was crossing the East river from New York to Brooklyn. The tide being strong ebb, she went above her slip, to drop down with the tide. Her pilot saw a steamboat, heavily loaded, coming slowly up the river on his starboard hand, close in to the Brooklyn piers. He blew two whistles, indicating that he intended to go ahead of the other boat, although her position was such that he could not do so unless she changed her course. The whistles were not heard, and the steamboat kept on. Thereupon the ferry-boat stopped her engine, but did not reverse it, till the steamboat had proceeded so far as to strike a cross tide, which set her out from the piers. The pilot of the ferry-boat then reversed the engine, but too late, and the vessels came together. The pilot of' the steamboat made no change in her helm, and stopped and reversed her engine as soon as he saw there was danger of collision: Held, that the ferry-boat having the steamboat on her starboard side, was bound to keep out of her way, and the steamboat was bound to keep her course.</p> <p>2. The swinging out of the steamboat, when she met the cross tide, was not a change of her course.</p> <p>3. As the pilot of each vessel saw the other in time to execute all manoeuvres incumbent to avoid a collision, the question of lookout had nothing to do with the collision.</p> <p>[Cited in The George Murray. 22 Fed. 122; The Coe F. Young, 1 C. C. A. 219, 49 Fed. 10S.]</p> <p>4. The closeness of the steamboat to the piers did not contribute to the collision.</p> <p>5. The pilot of the ferry-boat should have taken the measures to avoid the steamboat, which were necessary, under the circumstances, and that the ferry-boat was solely in fault.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,312.</p> <p>Tug and 'low — Damage by Stuiking Piek — Sba-WOUTHINESS.</p> <p>1. Where a canal boat which had been in tow by a tug was allowed to get adrift and to strike the end of a pier, but no damage resulting was ■then discovered, and the tow proceeded, and soon after the boat was found to be sinking, but her captain refused to be towed to a place of safety and insisted on going on to his place of destination, and the canal boat thereafter sunk: Held, that such refusal relieved the tug from responsibility for the sinking of the boat.</p> <p>[Cited in The Syracuse, IS Fed. 831.]</p> <p>2. the to" could not be held liable for the striking of the pier by the canal boat, al-\uougn ii could nave been prevented by diligence on the part of the tug, it appearing that the boat had not strength enough to bear the ordinary contacts and blows inseparable from navigation in the harbor.</p> <p>[Cited in Mould v. The New York, 40 Fed. 90a.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,312a.</p> <p>Prize — Enemt Propeutt.</p> <p>1. Vessel condemned as enemy property.</p> <p>2. Cargo restored, but without costs or dam-•nges, there being probable cause for the capture, it being laden in an enemy bottom during the war.</p>

This was a libel for supplies furnished to the schooner General Jackson, in the port of Boston, at various times, while the vessel was owned by residents and citizens of Maine. The last item in the libellant’s account was for articles furnished September 24, 1S32.

<p>Case Ko. 5,313.</p> <p>Pbize — Enemy and Neutral Property.</p> <p>Decree of the district court [Case No. 5,-312a] condemning the vessel as enemy property, and restoring the cargo as belonging to neutral owners, affirmed.</p>

[This was a libel by the owner of the canal-boat John F. Barker against the steamboat General McCullum to recover for damages caused by the sinking of the canal-boat. A decree was entered in favor of the libellant, and the cause referred to a commissioner to ascertain the damages. Case No. 5,317.]

<p>Case No. 5,317.</p> <p>Collision at Pibu — Steamboat and Canal-Boat —Pi.eadings and Pkoof.</p> <p>1. Where a steamboat in coming into her berth at a pier, backed against the canal-boat B. that liad just swung her stern out from the pier, holding on by a line at her bow; and, although warned from the canal-boat, pushed her against the stern of another boat, the R. the rudder of which had become unshipped, and' a projecting iron thus left exposed pierced the side of the B.: Held, that the steamboat was liable for the damages so caused to the canal-boat, the manoeuvre being needless and against warning, and such as the canal-boat was not bound to anticipate and provide against.</p> <p>2. The defences urged by the steamboat of negligence on the part of the canal-boat were not set up in tlie answer nor sustained by the proofs.</p> <p>3. Tlie canal-boat was not in fault for not interposing a fender between her side and the stern of the other canal-boat.</p>

<p>On the 19th of March, 1867, the schooner General Sheridan was chartered to Eberhard Faber, by a written charter party entered into at New York; The vessel was then at sea, and the charter was for a voyage from one or more of several named places of loading on the west coast of Florida to New York. Faber afterward filed his libel against the vessel in rem, alleging a breach of the charter, in that the vessel did not, as she was required to do by the charter party, proceed to any of the ports of loading therein mentioned, or give notice of her readiness to receive cargo, or take any cargo, but returned to New York without having fulfilled any of the stipulations of the charter party. .He. claimed damages for such breach to the amount of $5,000, and alleged, that, by a clause in the charter, it was agreed by the parties that the vessel should be bound for the faithful performance of the charter. The claimants excepted to the libel, on the ground that the facts set forth in it did not constitute any lien on the vessel, and were not within the jurisdiction of this court, or enforceable in admiralty.</p>

This was a libel filed by the owners of the lighter Gem, to recover the damages occasioned by her being sunk, in a collision with a canal-boat towed alongside of the steaming General U. S. Grant. The lighter was bound from pier 3 East river to Jersey City, the wind being northeast. Arriving near Castle Garden, she saw the tug coming down the North river, towing a canal-boat, which was fastened to her starboard side,' with her bow projecting beyond the bow of the tug.

<p>Case No. 6,321.</p> <p>Collision in East Riveh — Steamboat Fol-lowino Anotheii.</p> <p>1. Two steamtugs, the U. and the McC., were going.down the East river, the U. being ahead. The McC. gained on the U., so as to lap her starboard side. A ferry-boat coming up behind them passed to the starboard of both tugs, and, as she was passing, the port bow or stem of the McC. came in contact with the starboard quarter of the U., and she shot off to starboard, across the bows of the McC., and struck the port side of the ferry-boat, receiving injuries, to recover for which a libel was filed, in her behalf, against the McC. No fault was charged by either party against the ferry-boat: Jldd, that the case was one to which alfides 17 and 18 of the act of April 29, 1864 (13 Stat. 61), apply. It was the duty of the McC. to keep out of the way of the U., and the duty of the U. to keep her course.</p> <p>2. As the evidence showed that the U. kept her course, it followed that the McC. was in fault.</p> <p>3. The U., having the right of way, and having no reason to suppose that the McC. would hit her, was not bound to slow, on the approach of the ferry-boat.</p> <p>4. Whatever mistake the U. made in not stopping and backing, was, at most, an error of judgment, under circumstances of danger brought about by the McC., and was not, therefore, to be imputed to the D. as a fault.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,322.</p> <p>Tug and Tow — Negligence.</p> <p>A tug and tow was lying at the long dock at Piermont on the Hudson river. There was a large cake of ice in the river below, which had been blown over to the east shore, leaving a clear passage for the tug and tow along the west shore. The tug thereupon started from the dock. While she was passing the ice, a corner of it caught on the east shore so that phen the ebb tide made, the cake of ice was turned in the river so as to close in on the tug' and tow, and force her ashore before it was possible to escape. Libels being tiled by each, boat of the tow against the tug, for damages occasioned: Bdd, that the master of the tug was not negligent in starting from the dock, and that the tug was not liable for the damage-to the tow.</p>

[Appeal from the district court' of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, by McCracken and Livingston, against the barque Gentleman.

<p>This was an action in rem to recover damages for breach of a charter-party given in this port May 13,1S42, for one-half the vessel. The voyage agreed upon was “from the port of New-York to one or more ports on the west coast of Africa, and back to New-York direct, ■or via the Cape de Yerd Islands.” The vessel was to take out and bring back cargo, and be paid $400 per month for the voyage. The charter-party contained the usual stipulations that the owners should man and find the vessel, keep her in repair, &e. It is unnecessary, in considering the points in dispute in the cause, to detail minutely the course and incidents of the voyage. A succinct summary ■of facts will bring out all that is material to be stated. The libel makes numerous allegations, and the parties on both sides went into a wide range of proofs, neither of which are important to an understanding of the questions decided by the court. The vessel sailed from this port under this charter, June 13, IS 12, with cargo belonging to the libellants -on board, to be sold from the vessel. She touched at ports in the Cape de Yerd Islands, where she disposed of part of her cargo. The remainder of it was sold on the coast of Africa, and she reached Gambia about the first week in September, ready to receive the home cargo. There was laden on board her, at that port, over 00.000 lbs. of hides, consigned to the libellants: and she made sail for this port with the cargo, October 2, 1812. She put into Buena Yista, in the Cape de Yerd Islands, on the 13th of October, on account of sickness of the crew, and their insufficiency to navigate the vessel, and for no other necessity of the ship or voyage. She remained there, for the same reason, until November 18th, when she left for New-York, but stopped the 19th at St. Jago, to obtain more hands, where one hand was procured from a Portuguese vessel; and the consul put on board her three to be taken home. So manned, she departed again for New-York, and arrived off this port January 4th, but was blown off by stress of weather, obtained a pilot, and put into Newport for shelter, and did not get into New-York until January 18th. The hides shipped at Gambia were greatly deteriorated by long confinement on board in a close hold, and by worms and otherwise. It appears, from the evidence, that a few days after the arrival of the vessel at Gambia, the crew were taken sick with the coast fever, and between the 15th and 24th of the month, all the men and both mates were removed from the vessel to the hospital. They left the hospital, and returned on board the 27th, 2Sth and 29th of September. They were very importunate to get back to the vessel, and were permitted to return against the opinion and advice of the physician. They were exceedingly reduced and enfeebled by the effects of the fever and confinement. There is testimony that the physician was of opinion they would experience a relapse of the disease if they attempted to work the ship. In the judgment of other witnesses, they were wholly unfit for the service. But the men themselves testify they were able to do duty, and it was also in evidence that the physician said the men had better go on board, and leave the coast, and that by proper care of themselves they might be in a better condition than to continue at Gambia. The cargo was put on board by natives of the coast, the crew being in the hospital, and disabled by sickness from assisting. One or two of the men experienced a return of the fever soon after leaving the coast, and all the crew were again attacked with it at sea. and became so exhausted and feeble that they were incapable of continuing the voyage. The master being taken sick, also, the vessel put into Buena Vista, because of the unfitness of the crew for service, and for that cause alone. It was proved that raw hides shipped from the coast usually begin to suffer injury from worms and close stowage in thirty days after laden on board; but if opportunity is afforded for doing it, they may be, in a good measure, preserved from serious damage, by opening the hold, and exposing them to the atmosphere, or by beating them. It was in evidence that the master opened the hold in Buena Yista, and became aware of the perishing condition of the hides. It was also proved that forty days was a customary and reasonable period for a-voyage from the west coast of Africa to this port, at that season of the year, and in vessels of that class.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of J. H. George and G. G. Proctor.]</p> <p>Issues of fact tried by jury on objections to the bankrupts’ discharge.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of J. H. George and G. G. Proctor.]</p>

<p>In • admiralty. This was a prize cause brought by appeal from the district court of Maine.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was a case of an American ship, captured by an American cruiser, and afterwards recaptured by the British, and condemned in their courts. The owners proceeded against the captors for restitution in damages, alleging the capture to be illegal, and that the captors, by sundry irregularities, had forfeited the protection otherwise indulged them by the law. .

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.]</p> <p>This was a libel for mariner’s wages in the admiralty, originally against the vessel, and now proceeding against the owners [Joseph Wescott and others]. Upon the hearing of the cause in the district court [Case No. S,035], it was decreed, that the libellant [William Lamson] was entitled to wages to the amount of fifty-four dollars and fifty cents aDd costs of suit. From this decree the owners entered an appeal to the circuit court</p>

<p>Case No. 5,33a</p> <p>Salvage — Compensation.</p> <p>Compensation fixed by the court, upon consultation with merchants and owners of ships, as to the value of service rendered.</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem, by three seamen, demanding wages for the entire voyage for which they had shipped, and for damages for breach of contract in being wrongfully discharged at the inception of the voyage. The claimants appeared and answered that the master discharged the seamen for sufficient cause, and tendered them their wages for the time they had actually served.

<p>Case No. 5,332.</p> <p>Tow-Boat axd Tow.</p> <p>1. A tow-boat took several vessels in tow to tow them through Hell Gate from New York. The tide was flood, and the weather fair. After passing through the Gate, one of the vessels struck some obstruction under water, causing her to leak, and making it necessary to run her ashore. Her owner filed a libel against the tug. claiming that the tug had taken in tow more vessels than she could manage, and that the vessel was allowed to be carried by the tide out of the channel, and to strike a rock on the shore. The tug claimed, on the other hand, that the vessel struck a sunken wreck in the channel: Held, that, on the evidence, the tug had taken in tow more vessels than she had power to manage.</p> <p>2. The burden was upon her. to prove that the object which the vessel struck was one, the presence of which the tug was not bound to have known. She had failed to show this, and was, therefore, liable for the damages.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,333.</p> <p>SaJjVAGE.</p> <p>A brig and cargo valued at about $95,000 were saved from a position of much danger, in the daytime, by a valuable steamer which employed thirteen persons and took four hours for the service, without much danger to the steamer. The property might probably have been saved by another steamer that was in sight. $2,800 awarded as salvage.</p>

In admiralty. The facts were, McLenan, the respondent, in June, 1S75, filed a libel against the George H. Parker, a steam tug, in which he claimed damages for negligence in towing by the tug a raft of timber from Tawas, Michigan, to Tonawonda, New York. [On August 4th] 2 Albert W. Schulenberg filed a claim and answer, in which he set forth that he became the sole owner of the tug some eight months after the cause of action arose.

label for personal damage by Mayhorn against Howes, master of the barque. The libellant was hired as cook and steward of the barque on a voyage to Portugal and back to this port, which was duly performed. During the voyage he was accidentally scalded by hot water, and alleged that before his recovery the master forced him to return to work with threats and oaths. That soon afterward the master assaulted him by kicking him in the face, which resulted in a temporary scar.

' This was a libel by Daniel Shea, owner of the propeller U. S. Grant, to recover damages for a collision.

<p>Case Wo. 5,337.</p> <p>Collision in East Riveh — Steamboats Meeting —Speei>—State Law — Appoutionment of Damages — Costs.</p> <p>1. A steamboat, the A., was going up the East river, against the ebb tide. Off her port bow or side was a ferry-boat, going the same way. Tlie pilot of the A., seeing another ferry-boat, the L., coming down the river, a little to the starboard of his course, heading about two points on his course, and apparently crossing it, blew two whistles, and starboarded his wheel, and shortly afterwards stopped and backed his boat, but she was struck on her starboard side, by the starboard bow of the L., which, after seeing the sheer of the A., had also starboarded her wheel. The L. was coming down the river, at the rate of eleven knots an hour, with the tide, and her engine was slowed, stopped, and backed, before the collision, but not soon enough to stop her headway, while the A. was, at the time of the collision, about still in the water. Edd, that, on the evidence, the two vessels wore meeting end on, or nearly so, when the two whistles of the A. were blown, and that, under the 13th article of the act of April 29, 1S04 [13 Stat. 60], it was the duty of each to port her helm.</p> <p>2. If, as was claimed by the A., the L. was crossing her course from the starboard side, it was the duty of the A., under article 14, to have kept out of her way. and the duty of the L. to have kept her course.</p> <p>3. The A., therefore, should have stopped and backed before she blew her two whistles.</p> <p>4. The A. was not excused from the duty of porting her helm, by the law of the state of New York, requiring steamboats navigating the East river to keep in the middle of it.</p> <p>5. The L. was also in fault, for running at too great speed, contrary to the 1st section of the act of the state of New York, of April 12. 184S [Laws 1848, p. 450].</p> <p>6. The A. was not excused from porting, under the 19th article of the act of April 29. 18(54, by reason of the presence of the other ferry-boat on her port bow, and danger of a collision between her and the L., if the L. kept on.</p> <p>i. Independent of. that statute, her speed was too great, and it was her duty, under article 10 of the act of 1804, to have slackened her speed sooner than she did.</p> <p>8. Both vessels being in fault, the damages must be apportioned. The question of costs was reserved till after the apportionment was made.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.</p> <p>[Libel in rem William D. Reed and others against the steamboat New Haven for a collision. The New York & Erie Railroad Company appeared as claimant. The court below found for libelants (Case No. 11,649), and claimant appealed to this court.]</p>

The schooner George Prescott (a British vessel) was libelled on the 11th day of August, 1SC5. by Robert Johnson, her master, and six of her crew, to recover wages for services in navigating her. Subsequently, on the same day, William H. Birchard filed his libel against the same vessel, her tackle, &c., to recover certain advances alleged to have been made for the purchase of supplies. On the 12th day of August, Benj.

<p>Case No. 6,340.</p> <p>.Pilotage — State axd Federal Licenses — Hale Pilotage — Remedy against Consignee.</p> <p>1. By the act of February 25. 1SG7 (14 Stat. 411), a sea-going steam vessel, subject to tlie navigation laws of the United States, when navigating any of the waters thereof, is required to be in charge of a pilot licensed by the inspectors of steam vessels, but such act is cumulative, and does not annul or supersede a state law requiring that such pilot when piloting such vessel within the limits of the state, should also be licensed by the pilot commissioners of the state.</p> <p>[Cited in The Alzena, 14 Fed. 175.]</p> <p>2. Claims for half pilotage for offer and refusal of services, are cases of admiralty jurisdiction, and a suit therefor may be maintained against the vessel or master; and a state statute which provides that in a certain contingency the consignee shall also be liable therefor, does not aftect the jurisdiction in admiralty, but only gives an additional remedy against a third person.</p> <p>[Cited in The California. Case No. 2,312; Holmes v. Oregon & C. Ry. Co.. 5 Fed-. 84; The Glenearne. 7 Fed. OUG; Sylvester v. The Edith Godden, 25 Fed. 512; McDonald v. Frioleau, 44 Fed. 770; The Allianca, OG Fed. G13J</p> <p>3. Suggestions as to the regulations of pilot fees by congress .rather than the state.</p>

Petition by a committee of the creditors of Isaac Taylor, a bankrupt, asking that the proceeds of sale of the bark George T. Kemp, remaining in the registry after paying the wages for which the vessel had been arrested, might be ordered to be paid to them as representing the creditors generally. This was resisted by the libellants, who claimed liens on the vessel.

<p>[This was an action on debt by the corporation of Georgetown against C. A. Beatty.]</p>

This was a suit brought by the complainants [the mayor, recorder, aldermen, and common council of Georgetown, and others] to enjoin the defendants [.Tames M. Porter, secretary of war, and William Trumbull, corps topographical engineers] from proceeding further in constructing a draw-bridge.

This was a rule upon G. W. P. Custis to show cause why an inquisition which had awarded him three thousand dollars on con- ■ demnation of a part of his land for the road, should not be quashed and a new warrant issued. contended that this court had no jurisdiction in this case. By the charter of the company (Act Cong.

The Georgia was captured as prize on the high seas by the Niagara, and sent into a port of this district for adjudication. The taking of depositions in Liverpool, and elsewhere, occupied a considerable time. The facts appear in the opinion of the court. R. H. Dana, Jr., Dist Atty., for the United States and captors, cited: The Minerva, 6 C. Rob. Adm. 390; 2 Wildm. Int. Law, 90; U. S. v. The Etta [Case No. 15,000]; 3 Phil-lim.

<p>Demurrer to a bill in equity.</p>

This was an application made by counsel ■on behalf of the state of Georgia for leave to sell the depots, freight-houses, passenger-houses and offices of the railroad company, by virtue of a writ of fieri facias, w'hich had been levied on said property to enforce the collection of taxes due the state.

Trial of an indictment for murder. In January, 1S76, three United States soldiers. belonging to the garrison in Atlanta, Ga., were arrested in Gilmer county, Ga., under state process, for the alleged murder of one John Emory, a citizen of that county. After examination by the magistrates, they were committed to prison to await trial.

Plaintiff’s prayers: “1. The plaintiff prays the opinion of the court and their instruction to the jury, that the return of the debt sued on in this case, in the schedule of the defendants [Evan J. Ellicott, Andrew Ellicott, and Elias Ellicott], when they made their respective applications for the benefit of the insolvent laws of Maryland, is evidence to the jury of an acknowledgment of the said debt by the defendants, sufficient to remove the bar of the statute of…

<p>Case No. 5,353.</p> <p>Pilotage Through Hell Gate—Tender or Services—Long Island Sound—Construction of State Statute.</p> <p>Where a Hell Gate pilot offered his services to a vessel bound through Hell Gate, at a point 17 miles east of Sand’s Point, and was refused: Hdd, that, under the statute of the state of New York such tender of pilotage services at that place was effective, and the libel-lant might recover half pilotage upon such refusal.</p> <p>[Cited in The Glaramara, 10 Fed. G79.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,355.</p> <p>Salvage — Derelict—Degree of Peril — Compensation' — Distribution.</p> <p>. 1. The doctrine is now well established in courts of admiralty that the salvors of derelict property stand on the same footing as other salvors, although in estimating the peril from which they have rescued the goods, the fact that they were derelict on the high seas is of great importance, because the chance of recovery by the owner is very small.</p> <p>2. This peril depends more on the actual situation of the saved property, than on the intent with which it was abandoned.</p> <p>3. Where a vessel of small value was found derelict on the high seas and towed into port by a vessel of much larger value with a valuable cargo on board, without great personal risk or labor, two-fifths of the gross proceeds of sale were awarded as salvage, together with some necessary expenses and costs.</p> <p>[Cited in The Anna, Case No. 398.]</p> <p>4. Distribution of this salvage between the owners and the men.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,356.</p> <p>Collision in East River — Steamer and Sloop —Change of Course.</p> <p>A sloop was sailing up the East river against the tide, running free. A ferry-boat coining down the river was running within about a hundred and fifty feet of her course, so that she would have cleared the sloop, if the latter had held her course. The master of the sloop, who was at her helm, left it in the becket and 'went forward to assist in bearing off the anchor, so as to get it on the bow, and while he was thus absent from the helm, the sloop luffed towards the course of the ferry-boat. The latter whistled, and the whistle called the attention of the master to the ferry-boat. He ran to the wheel and put it hard aport, and the sloop rapidly swung off, but was struck by the ferry-boat on her port side. Held, that the ferry-boat was not in fault in running so close to the course of the sloop; and that the latter was in fault in luffing, and was solely responsible for the collision.</p>

This was a motion for a new trial. stated the grounds of his motion to be: First, that the court had improperly refused to allow him to prove, by a clerk of the bank, from the books of the bank, that a check of Gerbier for the amount of the premium on the Fanny, had been paid by the bank. The reason assigned by the court, was, that as notice had not been given to the opposite party to produce the check, no evidence could be given of it.

This is a suit in equity wherein the plaintiffs seek to recover from the defendants a certain sum of money which they allege the receiver of the defendant — the Third National Bank of the State of Missouri — has in his possession, which are the proceeds of a certain draft drawn by August Taussig on the firm of Taussig Bros. & Oo. for $10,000, which said plaintiff forwarded to.the defendant on the ISth June, 1877, “for collection and credit.”' This sum of. money the…

<p>Case No. 5,360.</p> <p>Damage to Person — Right of Action in Admiralty — Liability of Owner and Vessel —Privity of Contract.</p> <p>1. In admiralty, the owner of a vessel is liable in personam, and the vessel is liable in rem, for injuries done to person or property by the negligence of the master and crew of ihe vessel, only where the owner would, under the same circumstances, be liable in a suit at common law.</p> <p>[Cited in Gerrity v. The Ivate Cann. 2 Fed. 244; The Rheola, 7 Fed. 782; The Kate Cann. 8 Fed. 720: The Victoria, 13 Fed. 44; The Carl, IS Fed. G5G; The Explorer, 20 Fed. 139; The Gladiolus, 21 Fed. 418; The Max Morris, 24 Fed. 8G2, 28 Fed. 882.]</p> <p>[Cited in Davies v. Oceanic S. S. Co., S9 Cal. 280, 2G Pac. S27.] -</p> <p>2. A person not in the employment of a vessel or of her owners, nor acting in their service or for their benefit, and sustaining no relation to them by contract, has no right of action in rem, in admiralty, against the vessel, for an injury received by him on board of her by falling through an open hatchway.</p> <p>[Cited in Carriff v. Blanchard Nav. Co., GO Mich. 640, 33 N. W.. 748.]</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel in personam brought by several insurance companies to recover amounts paid by them respectively on policies of insurance on damaged wheat.

This was an action brought by the plaintiff, a corporation created under the laws of California, against the defendant [George Oulton] collector of taxes of the United States for the first collection district of California, to recover taxes paid to him by the plaintiff under protest. The facts are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court.

<p>[This was a suit by the German Savings Bank of New York City against Joseph Arch-bold, collector of internal revenue for the Southern district of New York.]</p>

In admiralty. This was an action upon a policy of insurance for $4,500, effected by li-bellant upon advances valued at the sum insured upon the bark Irma, from Baltimore to Aspinwall, in which the libellant claimed for a total loss. The vessel sailed from Baltimore, and becoming disabled put into Nassau, where she remained for over four months.

In equity. Plea to the jurisdiction of the court, (sworn to,) that the plaintiff was, at the time of filing his bill, a citizen of the state of Pennsylvania. To the'plea, a general replication was filed.

A ne exeat had been awarded in this case, by the district judge, and bail taken.

<p>Case 3STo. 5,363.</p> <p>Prize — Reference to Respective Governments op the Parties — Decision nr Ministers — Evidence of — Master of Vessel as Agent of Owners and Shippers.</p> <p>1. Parties agreeing to refer a matter of prize or no prize to their respective governments shall be concluded by the decision of the ministers of those governments resident here.</p> <p>2. Such decision sufficiently evidenced by a letter from the consul general of the party against whom the decision is made, stating what the ministers had ordered him to communicate as their determination.</p> <p>3. Consuls represent the subjects of their respective nations (if not otherwise represented), where such consuls reside.</p> <p>[Cited in Harrison v. Vose, 9 How. (50 U. S.) 3S2.]</p> <p>4. A captain of a ship, in a foreign port represents both owners and shippers not having any other agent on the spot.</p>

This was an appeal from the decree of the district court for the district of Maine. The original proceedings in the district court are fully presented in the following statement of facts and in the opinion of the district judge. This was a libel for a forfeiture founded on the 50th section of the collection act of 1799, c.' 128 [1 Stat. CG5, c. 22].

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 5,373.</p> <p>Baxkkuptct — Powers op Register — Effect of Decision.</p> <p>It was the intention of congress to make the register’s acts the acts of the courts, and to vest them with all the powers of the district courts in relation to all matters about which there is no contest. They are also to give their opinions upon all questions, points, and matters arising before them upon which there is a contest, which opinions will be final unless the parties litigant reauest the question, point, or matter contested to be certified to the district judge.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Lanier. Case No. 8.070; Re Hy-man, Id. 0,984; Re Bogert, Id. 1,398; Re Kingon, Id. 7,815; Re Bond, Id. 1,018; Ro Blaisdell, Id. 1,488; Re Allen, Id. 208.]</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

A rule has been obtained by tbe plaintiff [Geyger’s lessee], requiring tbe defendant to shew cause why an order should not be made for tbe production of certain deeds and papers on tbe trial of this cause, agreeably to tbe provision of tbe 13th section of tbe judicial act [of 17S9 (1 Stat. 73)], and now, on proof that a copy of the rule was served on tbe defendant’s attorney, it was moved to make tbe same absolute.

<p>[In bankruptcy. In tbe matter of D. Gliir-ardelli & Co.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, by persons claiming to own the schooner G. H. Montague, to recover possession of her. The district court dismissed the libel [case unreported], and the libellants appealed to this court.

<p>Case No. 5,378.</p> <p>Maritime Tort — Aidin'® Seamen to Desert-Ratification.</p> <p>1. The owners of a ship filed a libel against a tug, alleging that while their ship was lying at anchor, ready for sea, the tug came alongside, against the remonstrance of the ship s officers, and took off eight sailors and their baggage, whereby new men had to be obtained, and the ship was detained; and they sought to recover the demurrage and the advance wages paid to the deserters: Held, that, if the facts constituted a maritime tort, cognizable in the admiralty, yet, in order to hold the tug liable, the libellants must show knowledge or notice to those in charge of the tug that they were committing a wrongful act.</p> <p>2. Such knowledge or notice was not shown in this case.</p> <p>3. The bonding of the tug by her owners, when seized under process in this cause, was not an adoption by them of the acts of those on board the tug at the time.</p>

Demurrer to bill to enjoin the infringement of a patent In addition to the facts stated in the opinion of the court the following bearing upon the points decided were alleged in the bill: Alfred Nobel on the sixteenth day of September, A. D. 1SG5, duly filed in the United States patent office an application for a patent addressed to the commissioner of patents, praying for letters-patent for his invention; and with said petition said Nobel filed in said patent office a power…

<p>Case No. 5,380.</p> <p>Customs Duties — -Examination bt Appraisers— Selection op Samples — Official Reports — Costs of Transportation to Place of Ex- . PORT.</p> <p>1. An examination of goods by the appraisers is indispensable.</p> <p>2. Personal examination of each article not necessary. A fair selection of samples sufficient.</p> <p>3. The official report of the appraisers, is prima facie evidence as to examination. Appraiser under the acts of congress is a quasi judge. His acts, as such, are not purely ministerial. If such an office has been colorably created, and one commissioned under it who has discharged de facto its duties, his acts so far as the public or third parties are concerned, are as valid as those of one acting de jure would be.</p> <p>4. The additional charges authorized by law, to be added to the appraised value of dutiable merchandise, may be added by the appraisers, with the sanction of the collector.</p> <p>5. Costs of transportation of goods from the interior to the place of exportation, are not included in those charges under the act of 3d March, 1S51 [9 Stat. G29].</p> <p>[Cited in Hutton v. Schell. Case No. G.9G1; Tomes v. Itedfield, Id. 14,0S5; Bartels v. Redfield, 10 Fed. 340.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,381.</p> <p>Joinder op Causes op Action — Where Depend-ants Mere Trespassers.</p> <p>1. Under the Oregon Civil Code (section 91) a plaintiff in an action to recover the possession of a particular tract of land is not entitled to join parties as defendants, who occupy in severalty distinct parcels of said tract; and if he docs so join them, and the fact does not appear upon the face of the complaint, the defendants may plead it in abatement of the action.</p> <p>2. The rule in such cases at common law.</p> <p>3. Semble, if the defendants are mere trespassers or squatters without color of right or definite claims to distinct parcels or established and visible boundaries, they may be joined in one action.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,382.</p> <p>Slavery — Power op Attorney to Make Arrest.</p>

Appeal [by James E. A. Gibbs] from the decision of the commissioner of patents, refusing to grant him letters patent for his improvement in sewing machines. The appellant states his claim thus: “What I claim as my invention and desire to secure by letters patent is: 1st. The sewing by machinery of cloth or other fabric by interlacing a binding thread with the loops of the tam-bour or chain stitch. 2nd.

<p>Case No. 5,386.</p> <p>Shipping — Clearing por One Port with Design to Proceed to Another — Capture —Liability of Captors.</p> <p>1. Clearing out as for one legal port, but with a design to go to some other legal port, in order to conceal the real voyage, for mercantile purposes, is never deemed an offence, nor have the paper.-, found on board a vessel under such circumstances, been considered as double papers, such as should induce a condemnation.</p> <p>2. If such a vessed be captured, the owner may libel against the capturing vessel and her captain, for reparation of the loss and damage sustained by such capture.</p> <p>• NOTE. — An appeal, and the judgment confirmed. [Case unreported.]</p>

This was a libel [by C. & J. Gibbs against the schooner Texas] for bottomry.

The bill of complaint charged that Mr. Joy, an attorney, pretending to act for one David Bowlas, of England, sued out a writ of replevin in this court, in the name of said Bowlas, against [W. H.] Gibbs, the complainant, residing at Clinton, Massachusetts; that said Joy went to the house of the complainant, with the defendant Shaw, a deputy of the marshal (the defendant [Roland G.] Usher), and others, and asked in a friendly way to see certain papers, without saying that Shaw…

<p>Case No. 5,389.</p> <p>Patents — Conflicting Assignments — Failure to Fulfil Agreement.</p> <p>1.W., the patentee of a patent which was mbout to expire, being about to apply for an extension, agreed with R. that he would convey to him a certain right under the extension, on certain terms. R. paid some money and gave some notes, on making the agreement. After the extension was granted, W. assigned to J. all his interest in the agreement with R. and in the right, covered by it. R. refused to fulfil his part of the agreement, and, having used the patented thing from the time of the extension, to the extent of the right covered by the agreement,' was sued by J. for infringement. During the pendency of the suit, J. granted to B. his interest in the right conveyed to him by W. The decision in the suit was that R. was entitled, aside from his agreement. with W.. to a portion of the right covered by it. After this decision, B. went on to use the patented thing, to the extent of the right covered by the grant from J., and R. continued to use it to the same extent. G., being the owner of 'the exclusive right to the extension for the territory in which both B. and R. were using the patented thing, with the exception of the right covered by the agreement between W. and R., by the assignment from W. to J., and by the grant from J. to B., filed a bill against B., praying for a perpetual injunction against him: Held, that the failure of R. to fulfil his agreement with W. did not of itself operate to annul and cancel the agreement, as the contract was partly executed and R. was in the use of the patented thing.</p> <p>2. Although a court of equity might have decreed a surrender of the contract, and its cancellation on terms, yet. until then, R. must be deemed to have been in the lawful use and enjoyment of the right under the extension, and that an injunction should issue.</p> <p>3. Even assuming the contract to have been annulled and the parties, to have been remitted to their original rights, J. had power to grant to B. but a portion of the right he assumed to grant, as a part was awarded to It. in the suit between him and J.</p> <p>rXOTE. For other cases involving this patent. see note to Bicknell v. Todd, Case No. 1,389.</p> <p>[An appeal was taken by the defendants, hut was dismissed by the supreme court, Mr. Justice McClain delivering the opinion, upon the ground that the appeal was not from the final decree; it appearing that the decree of the circuit court had referred the report to a master to ascertain the amount of damages, and that in the meantime the bill had not been dismissed, nor a decree rendered for costs. 7 How. (4S U. S.) 630.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,391.</p> <p>Motion por New Trial — Verdict—Interest.</p> <p>Verdict rendered in favor of plaintiff, but judgment delayed because of motion for new trial: Held, that on overruling the motion the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the amount of the verdict and interest from the day it was rendered. And the rule applies as well to actions of torts as to those founded upon contracts.</p> <p>[Cited in Griffith v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 44 Fed. DS5.]</p>

In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction. The plaintiff [John Gibson] was assignee, for the city and county of Albany, for the extended term of seven years from December 27th. 1S42, to December 27th, 1849, of letters patent to AVilliam Woodworth for an improvement in the method of planing, tonguing and grooving boards and plank, as re-issued July Sth, 1S45.

This was action for publishing in the Cincinnati Enquirer, a paper of large circulation and influence, the following libel: “Still Another. — -The new city of Huntington, up the river, is now enjoying one of the j juiciest crim. con. scandals of the day.

This was an application [by John Gibson] for a provisional injunction against the defendant [William W. Cook] for an alleged infringement of the Woodworth patent, in using six Woodworth machines, without license, since the 27th of December, 1S49.

In equity. Bill by [N. S. Gibson] the as-signee against John N. Dobie, Hannah R. Dobie, his wife, John T. Burhyte and Henry N. Glening, to set aside conveyance as fraudulent under the bankrupt act.

<p>In equity. This was an application for.a provisional injunction. The plaintiff [John Gibson] was the grantee of the exclusive right to the Woodworth patent for the county of Onondaga, N. Y., for the congressional extension of seven years, commencing on the 27th of December, 1S49. See Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. [45 U. S.] GG1, GG2. The bill was founded on the re-issued patent of July 8, 1S45, and alleged that the defendant [Henry Gifford] was infringing the plaintiff’s rights by running a Woodworth machine in the county of Onondaga, without authority. The defendant opposed the application, on an answer and affidavits, and, among other defences, which are alluded to in the opinion of the court, set up that he had a valid license to use the same machine for the original term of the patent ending December 27, 1842, and for the first extension of seven years ending December 27, 1S49, and had the machine in actual use on the last named day. On that ground he claimed the right to continue its use during the second extension.</p>

In equity. Letters patent of the United States were granted, on the 27th of December, 1828, to William Woodworth, for 14 years from that day, for “a new and useful improvement in the method of planing, tonguing and grooving, &c., plank, boards, &c.” On the 16th of November, 1842, under the ISth section of the patent act of July 4, 1S3G (5 Stat. 124), the patent was, on the application of William W. Woodworth, administrator of the patentee, extended for seven years from the…

Motion to docket a cause removed from the state court. The appearance of defendant was entered September, 1S09; and, after passing two terms, the petition to remove was filed in February last, and granted as of September.

The charter of a railroad company provided, that in case of default of any stockholder to pay an assessment on his stock, after a prescribed notice, the stock and any payments made thereon, should be forfeit-able to the company. This company had failed to pay interest accrued on its mortgage-bonds.

<p>Case Wo. 6,400a.</p> <p>Attachment —Pleading without Special Bail.</p> <p>Defendants in attachment may appear and plead without entering special bail to the action, and then the property attached is considered as a substitute for bail.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 5,401.</p> <p>Indebitatus Assumpsit — When It will Lie.— Fkaud — Thovek—WAitEnousE Receipt —Lien—Attachment.</p> <p>1. Money fraudulently obtained from a bank may be sued for before the note given to the bank, for the same, becomes due.</p> <p>2. A forged note to the bank is no payment, and the bank may sue for the money advanced by it.</p> <p>3. An action of trover for the bank notes, or for the property purchased with them, would have been the proper action. But, in such a case an action of indebitatus assumpsit will lie.</p> <p>4. A suit for the original consideration, disregarding the fraudulent note, is not, in fact, an affirmance of the contract.</p> <p>5. A receipt by the warehouse man for property to be forwarded to order and of payment, when assigned to a commission merchant, who makes an advance, does not create a lien on the property, paramount to that of an attachment laid before notice of the assignment.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>6. The money advanced, not being equal to the value of the property, leaves an attachable interest, beyond the lien, if it exist, of the commission merchant.</p> <p>' 7. On the attachment all the creditors may come in, under the Indiana statute.</p> <p>[NOTE. This judgment was reversed by the supreme court — S How. (49 U. S.) 3S4 — in an opinion by Chief'Justice Taney, who held there was but a single question involved in it, viz. whether the property in dispute was transferred to the plaintiff and vested in him by the in-dorsement and delivery of the warehouse documents in the manner stated in the case. “This mode of transfer and delivery has been, sanctioned in analogous cases by the courts of justice- iri'England ahd fhis country, and is absolutely necessary for the purposes of commerce.” This symbolical delivery was fully sustained in Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (2G U. S.) 445. No formal assignment in such transactions is necessary, as the technical rules of common-law conveyances and transfers of property have never been applied to mercantile contracts made in the usual course of business.]</p>

<p>2 [Motion for provisional injunction.</p> <p>[Suit brought [by John Gibson against Stephen Van Dresar and Daniel Stearns], on letters patent for an improvement in the method of planing, tonguing, and grooving, and cutting into moldings, or either, plank, boards,- or other material, and for reducing the same to an equal width and thickness, etc., granted to William Woodworth, December 27,- 1828-, extended in the name of his administrator, William W. Woodworth, for seven years from December 27, 1S42, reissued July 8, 1845, and again extended by act of congress for seven years from December 27, 1849.</p> <p>[The plaintiff, who was assignee of said reissue under the second extension, -claimed that a machine which the defendants were operating in Oneida county, state of New York, was an infringement of the Woodworth patent. Those parts of-the specification and the claims of said reissue which are material to the present case are as follows:</p> <p>When the planks or boards have been thus prepared (on separate machine), they may be placed on or against a suitable carriage, resting on a frame or platform, so as to be acted upon by a rotary cutting or planing and reducing wheel, which wheel may be made to revolve either horizontally or vertically, as may be preferred. The carriage which sustains the plank or board to be operated upon may be moved forward by means of a rack and pinion, by an endless chain or band, by geared friction rollers, or by any of the devices well known to machinists for advancing a carriage or materials to be acted upon in machines for various purposes. The plank or board is to be moved on toward the cutting edges of the cutters or knives, on the planing cylinder, so that its knives or cutters, as they revolve, may meet and cut the plank or board in a direction contrary to that in which it is made to advance.</p> <p> </p> <p>In the accompanying drawing, figure 1 is a perspective representation of the principal operating parts of the machine, when arranged and combined for planing, tonguing, and grooving, and when so arranged as to be capable of planing two planks at the same time, the axis of the planing wheel being placed vertically. A A is a stout, substantial frame of the machine, which may be of wood or of iron, and may be varied in length, size, and strength, according to the work to be done. B B are the heads of the planing cylinder, and C C, the knives or cutters, which extend from one to the other of said heads, to the peripheries of which they may be attached by means of screws. The knives, C 0, with the faces forming a planing angle, may be placed in a line with the axis, J, of the cylinder, or they may stand obliquely thereto, as may be preferred; but in the latter case the edge should form the segment or portion of a helix, b represents a pulley near- to the upper end of the axis, J, and J. a pulley or drum, which may be made to revolve by horse, steam, or other motive power, and from which a belt may extend around the pulley b, to drive the planing cylinder and other parts of the machinery. G is the carriage which is represented as being driven forward by means of a rack and pinion, H. Against this carriage, the plank IÍ, which is to be planed, tongued, and grooved, is placed, and is made to advance with it It will be manifest, however, that the plank may be moved forward by other means, as, for example, by an endless chain or band, passing around drums or chain wheels, or by means of geared friction wheels, borne up against it. To cause the carriage and plank to move forward readily, there may be friction rollers, f f f, placed horizontally, and extending under them. The rollers, iff, which stand vertically, are to be made to press against the plank and keep it close to the carriage, and thus prevent the action of the cutters from drawing the plank up from its bed in cutting from the planed surface upward. They may be borne against it by means of weights or springs, in a manner well known to machinists. In the single horizontal machine, the horizontal -friction-rollers may be geared, and the pressure-rollers placed above them to feed the board with or without the carriages, a bed-plate being used directly under tlie planing cylinder. Figure 7 represents the same machine, with the axis of the planing-cylinder placed horizontally, and intended to operate on one plank only at the same time. A A is the frame; B B the heads of the planing cylinder; C G the knives or cutters attached to said heads. To meet the different thicknesses of the planks or boards, the bearings of the shaft or cylinder may be made movable, by screws or other means, to adjust it to the work; or the carriage or bed-plate may be made so as to raise the board or plank up to the planing cylinder. E and E' are the revolving cutters, or tonguing and grooving wheels, which are placed upon vertical shafts, having upon them pulleys, D D, around which pass belts or bands from the main drum, I, to which a revolving motion may be given by any adequate motive power.</p> <p>From the drum, I, a belt, L, passes also around the pulley, b, on the shaft of the planing-eylinder, and gives to it the requisite motion. There may in this machine be a horizontal carriage, 'moved forward by a rack and pinion, in a manner analogous to that represented in figure 1; but in the present instance the plank is supposed to be advanced by means of one or two pairs of friction or feed-rollers, shown at f f’. The uppermost, f' f', of the pairs of rollers, may be held down by springs, or weighted levers, which it has not been thought necessary to show in this drawing, as such are in common use. The lowermost of these rollers may be fluted or made rough on their surfaces, so as to cause friction on the under side of the plank. R R are guide-strips, used in place of the rollers used for the same purpose, and also for bearing or friction-rollers, when the machine is vertical, to direct one edge of the plank, and against its opposite edge. Any pressure may be used equal to the weight of the board or plank, when worked in a vertical position. One of the cutter-wheels should be made adjustable, to adapt it to stuff of different widths.</p> <p>The planing cylinder, and likewise the cutter or tonguing and grooving wheels, may be constructed in the manner represented in-figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and G, and hereinbefore fully described. One of the heads of the planing-wheel may be made movable, to accommodate its width to the widtli of the boards or plank to be. planed.</p> <p>What is claimed therein as the invention of William Woodworth, deceased, is the employment of rotating planes, substantially such as herein described, in combination with rollers, or any analogous device, to prevent the boards from being drawn up by the planes when cutting upward, or from the reduced or planed to the unplaned surface, as described.</p> <p>And also the combination of the rotating planes, with the cutter wheels for tonguing and grooving, for the purpose of planing, tonguing, and grooving boards, etc., at one operation, as described. And also the combination of the tonguing and grooving cutter-wheels for tonguing and grooving boards, and at one operation, as described. And finally, the combination of eilbor the tonguing and grooving cutter-wheel, for tonguing and grooving boards, etc., with the pressure-rollers, as described, the effect of the pressure-roller in these operations being such as to-keep the boards, etc., steady, and prevent the cutters from drawing the boards toward the center of the cutter-wheels whilst it is moved, through by machinery</p> <p> </p> <p>In the planing operation, the tendency of the plane is to lift the boards directly up against the rollers; but in the tonguing and grooving, the tendency is to overcome the friction occasioned by the pressure of the rollers.</p> <p>4 [The defendants resisted the motion, principally on the ground that the machine used by them was substantially different in construction and operation from that of Wood-worth, and, therefore, no infringement. Their machine was constructed in accordance with letters patent for au improvement in planing machine granted to John Levy, as-signee of Hazard Knowles, April 10, 1S49. They held under Levy. Those parts of the specification and claims of the Levy patent, involved in the present controversy, were as follows:</p> <p>[“My second improvement is more particularly applicable to the cutter-wheel of Bra-mah. That improvement consists in forming one, two or more offsets, or in lieu thereof one or more bevels, near the outer periphery of the cutter-wheel. Upon the circuit of the outer or deeper of these offsets is set a series of reducing cutters, marked h, h, fig. 5. These cutters may project a short distance beyond the periphery of the wheel A. The purpose of the offsets or bevels is, to allow a board thicker than the finished work is intended to be, to enter between the edge of the wheel and the face of the bench or support. The side or projecting corner of the reducing cutter is made sharp, as well as the lower edge, as represented at h, h, fig. 5. Entirely within the outer circumference of the wheel are set, through inclined mortices of appropriate form, the second series of plane irons or jack cutters, h,’ h.’ The plane irons here used are concave on their faces, by which conformation the corners precede a little the center portion of the cutter. These cutters stand further out towards the plane of the wheel than the reducing cutters. Still nearer to the axis of the wheel is another series of cutters, called smoothing cutters, the edge of each of which is ground straight, and made sufficiently broad to cover the whole face of the board to be planed. Two of these cutters are seen' at h,” h,” in front of each of which is an adjustable gauge-plate i, having a set-screw passing through a countersunk slot, by means of which it is capable of being set nearer to or more remote from the edge of the cutter, in order to limit the feed or hold taken of the timber by the smoothing plane.” ■</p> <p>[The claims were: 1. The method of holding the board firmly against the bearing bench or roller of the planing machine, by means of obliquely placed rotary guides; firmly pressed against the edge of the board, and drawing it to the bed. 2. The oblique rotary guides in combination with a cutter-wheel, having bevels or offsets around its face, and with the adjustable plates in front of the-smoothing cutters.</p> <p>[The defendants’ cutter-wheel was a very flat cone, set upon a leaning shaft, and made a long shaving cut.]4</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] In this case a petition was filed by John E. Giddings, praying to be allowed a seaman’s full share of the prizes made by the privateer America, John Iyehew commander, during her cruise, the proceeds of which prizes remained in the court for distribution.

This cause comes before the court on a writ of error, to the district court for the Eastern district. Giddings, the bankrupt, in October, 18G0, was a country merchant, owing $G,000, and having assets to the amount only of $2,400. In that month he sold his entire stock of goods to one Pendleton, for $l.S0n, who executed two notes to Giddings therefor, one for $1,378, the other for $302.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Frederick Gies.] Petition for allowance from the bankrupt’s estate of an attorney’s fee of one hundred dollars for services in preparing debt- or’s petition and schedules in a case of voluntary bankruptcy; also for reimbursement of thirty dollars and seventy cents marshal’s fee, advanced by petitioner.

<p>Case No. 5,406.</p> <p>Phactice — Status of Cause ox Removal— Amendatory Answer.</p> <p>1. A case removed from a state court, to the ■circuit court of the United States, .stands, in the latter, as it did at the time of the removal in the former.</p> <p>[Cited in Wolf v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., Case No. 17,924; Moynahan v. Wilson, Id. 9,897.]</p> <p>2. If an amendatory answer repeat what was said in the answer filed before, without varying the defense, it may be considered as impertinent, and will be referred to a master, etc.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,408.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Right to Discharge — Consent— Involuntary Bankruptcy.</p> <p>1. In the absence of consent by creditors in voluntary cases, no matter when commenced nor when the debts were contracted, the assets must pay thirty per cent., or there can be no-discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Townsend, 2 Fed. 5G2.]</p> <p>2. In compulsory eases, if otherwise entitled thereto, the bankrupt is entitled to a discharge irrespective of the assent of creditors or the amount of his assets.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,409.</p> <p>Seamen — Minor Shipping fob Whaling Voyage — Consent of Pap.ents — Oonthact without Termination of Time oh Place — Usage of Poet — Trading Voyage — Desertion — Forfeiture of Wages — Palliating Circumstances.</p> <p>1.Where a minor shipped for a whaling voyage, under the direction of his father, who furnished liis outfit of clothing, the libel was rightly brought in the father’s name.</p> <p>2. A description of a whaling voyage, “to the North Pacific Ocean and elsewhere,” is a defective desor ption. A contract for a voyage that has no termination of time or place, is a void contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Slocum v. Swift, Case No. 12,954.]</p> <p>3. If the usage of a particular port, or a particular trade, authorizes an interpolation of the port of departure as the port of termination, this must be qualified by another implied term, that the return of the vessel to her home port shall be within a reasonable time.</p> <p>4. A wh'aling voyage is properly a cruise for taking whales, and does not include a trading voyage to dispose of the cargo after it is obtained.</p> <p>5. If the master undertakes such a voyage, it seems that men engaged for the whaling voyage are not bound to continue in the vessel</p> <p>6. By the ancient maritime law, constituting the common law of the sea, desertion by seamen, during the voyage, works a forfeiture of all wages previously earned. But the law is not imperative. The court may take into consideration palliating circumstances, not amounting to a justification, and mitigate the penalty to a reasonable indemnity to the owners.</p> <p>[Approved in Coffin v. Shaw, Case No. 2,-952. Cited in Swain v. Howland, Id. 13,-661; The Balize, Id. 809.)</p> <p>7. The only ease of desertion in which the forfeiture is absolute of the whole wages, is when all the requisites of the statute have been strictly observed. St. July 20, 1790 [1 Stat. 133].</p>

<p>A creditor having applied for leave to examine the bankrupt [Joseph F. Gilbert] and his wife, the practice of the court was thus stated by</p>

Plaintiffs [George I. Gilbert and others], who were brokers and commission men on the Chicago Board of Trade, composing the firm of Gilbert, Wolcott & Co., brought this action to recover from defendants [William T. Gaugar and others], their principals,' for commissions earned,, and losses paid by plaintiffs in settlement of time contracts for the sale of grain by plaintiffs for account of defendants.

In equity. On motion of the complainant [Mary Gilbert] to appoint an examiner and assign the times within which the parties shall take their proofs under equity rule G9 and amendments, and for a reference to ascertain and compute the amount due upon the bond and mortgage described in the bill of complaint

[This was a bill in equity by the Gilbert & Barker Manufacturing Company against Abraham Bussing for the alleged infringement of patent No. 93,207, granted to C. N. Gilbert and J. F. Barker, August 3, 1809, for an “improved apparatus for carburet-ting air.”]

<p>[This was a bill in equity by tbe Gilbert & Barker Manufacturing Company against Oakes Tirrell praying for an injunction and account.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,418.</p> <p>Patents — Patentability of Invention — Change of Location of Pants.</p> <p>1. The patent for an improved apparatus for carburetting air. No. 93,208, dated August 3, 1869, held invalid for want of patentability in the alleged invention.</p> <p>2 Mere change of location of parts is not patentable except where such change of location brings into existence a new combination of devices, operating by reason of such new combination to produce a new and useful result.</p>

Among other like property stolen from the state capitol of Virginia, on or about the 3d of April, 18G5, at the capture of Richmond, were eight coupon bonds of the Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad Company, for $500 each, dated the 1st of July, 1S57, payable to bearer on the 1st day of July, 1870, with coupons at seven per cent., payable to bearer semiannually, on the 1st day of January and July in each year.

Embargo. A motion was made by Mr. Ward for rule on the collector to show cause why a mandamus should not be issued against him, to compel the granting of clearances for the ship Resource, Moreton; ship Two Pollies, Wilder; ship Navigator, Bow-den; ship Rising States, Anderson; and ship- Louisa Cecilia, Fowler, founded on the following affidavit: “Adam Gilchrist and J. S. Barker, of Charleston, merchants, being severally sworn according to law, depose, that the American…

Action on negotiable bonds and coupons-issued by the city of Little Rock in payment for stock subscribed by the city in a railroad company. An act of the legislature of the state authorized the subscription, and the issue of bonds, and did not prescribe the time for which they should run. The bonds aré dated June 1, 1859, and contain a recital that they are issued and executed in pursuance of law, and an ordinance of the city passed on the 20th day of March, 1S55.

<p>Case No. 5,422.</p> <p>Composition in Banicuuptoy — Calculating a Majouity.</p> <p>In calculating a majority of creditors who approve of a composition, under the 14th section of the bankruptcy amendment act of June 22, 1S74 [13 Stat. 178], creditors whose debts do not exceed $50, are to be reckoned in calculating the majority in value, but are not to be reckoned in calculating the majority in number.</p>

An American vessel had shipped her hands in Philadelphia, for what is called a trading voyage, having as usual cleared out for the “West Indies” or elsewhere, and to return to Philadelphia. She went to several ports, and finally was wrecked on her way to Jamaica from the Spanish continental possessions, after having been at a port which was at first alleged not to be a port of entry, or place of delivery of a cargo.

<p>The petitioner [John Gile] having been declared a bankrupt on the twenty-fourth of May last, on his own application, now filed a petition praying, for the reasons therein set forth, that the decree of bankruptcy might be set aside and all further proceedings stayed.</p>

[This was a suit in bankruptcy by Gilker-son and Sloss against P. C. Hamilton.] T. C. Hamilton, a merchant of Prescott, Arkansas, \becoming insolvent, made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors to J. H. Arnold, as assignee, the assignment conveying all the assignor's property, real and personal, wherever found. On the day the assignment was executed, or the previous day, Hamilton paid to Arnold a debt he owed him of $2.0110 in cash.

<p>Case No. 5,435.</p> <p>ADMIRALTT AND MARITIME JURISDICTION — HOME Port.</p> <p>Tho jurisdiction of the courts of the United States conferred by the constitution, is exclusive and does not depend upon state legislation. Supplies and materials furnished in the home port give a maritime lien, and the lien may be enforced in the district court. There is no distinction in the maritime law between supplies furnished in the home or foreign ports.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,426.</p> <p>State Insolvent Law — Effect of Discharge Under.</p> <p>A discharge under a state insolvent law does not entitle a defendant, in the custody of the United States courts on mesne process, to be released on common bail.</p>

The question submitted to the court, in this case was, “Whether valuable and permanently useful improvements made upon the land,, may be given in evidence in mitigation of damages by the defendant in an action of trespass for mesne profits, brought after a recovery in.ejectment.” F. L. Lee, for defendant, submitted the following written argument: May improvements be recouped in an action of trespass for mesne profits? 1st. Permanently useful improvements were recouped in the…

Writ of inquiry, upon a judgment on demurrer in an action of covenant on a lease; breach, not paying rent contended that as the landlord has a summary process to compel payment, he is not entitled to interest. Mr. Youngs. The action is covenant and sounds in damages, and the jury alone can assess them.

<p>Case No. 5,431.</p> <p>Jurisdiction Depending on Situation op Parties to toe Record — Contracts — Necessary Averments in Declaration — Demurrer to Whole Declaration which is Only Partly Bad.</p> <p>1. Jurisdiction of the court is neither given nor ousted by the relative situation of the-parties concerned in interest, but by the relative situation of the parties named on the record: and in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the party named in the record.</p> <p>2. Where a declaration on a special agreement, which was, that one G., who had been arrested in the city of New York, upon certain promissory notes made by a firm in the state of Alabama, in which he was a partner, to L. & B. of Boston, in consideration that plaintiffs would discharge him from that arrest, undertook and promised that he would forthwith proceed to Boston and cal! on L. & B., and offer such payment and satisfaction to them as he could accomplish, and in case his offer was not satisfactory to them, that he would surrender his person to any suit which L. & B. might institute against him within three weeks from the date of the agreement, and acknowledge service in the same, and the defendants, for the same consideration, bound themselves to the plaintiffs that the said G. should well and truly accomplish the conditions of said' agreement, and in case of neglect on the part of the said G., within thirty days to perform, to enter bail for the said G.’s personal appearance at the suit of L. & B.; it was held on demurrer, that before G. could be charged wifh having violated liis agreement by not surrendering himself, it must be averred that L. & B. had instituted a suit against him, and that if the declaration had contained an averment to that effect, plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover the amount of the notes without a further allegation as to their damnification.</p> <p>3. In covenant, when several breaches are assigned, some of which are sufficient and others not, the defendant should only demur to such as are bad; and if he demur to the whole declaration, judgment must be given against him.</p>

<p>Buie on the United States marshal to bring in the body of Sheffield, or show cause, &c. The facts as disclosed by affidavit on the part of the officer, were as follows: In July, 1S23, a caídas ad respondendum was issued against ail the defendants [Russel Stebbins, Joseph Sheffield, and others], and returned cepi corpus as to Sheffield, and non est as to the others. Bail below had been taken for his appearance, but the bond was mislaid or lost. Nothing had been done by the plaintiffs [Theophilus A. Gill and Henry Bennett] until April, 1S2S, when the above rule was served upon the marshal. For the marshal ■it was contended, that he had become exonerated by laches on the part of the plaintiffs, in not having proceeded within a reasonable time'to fix his liability, and that courts have adopted this as a rule for the protection of the officer. In support of the position, the following eases were cited: Rex v. Sheriff of Surrey, 7 Term R. 452; Rex v. Sheriff of London, 1 Taunt. Ill; Rex v. Perring, 3 Bos. & P. 151; People v. Stevens, 9 Johns. 72; J'ourden v. Hawkins, 17 Johns. 33.</p>

<p>Case No, 5,433.</p> <p>E.tf.ctment — Insanity of Lessor of Plaintiff— Witness — Competency of Wife to Prove that Her Husband is Living — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. The court will not dismiss an action of ejectment when the lessor of the plaintiff is living, though he may be insane.</p> <p>2. The wife is not a competent witness to prove that her husband is living, on such a motion.</p> <p>3. Where an individual is proved to have been living within seven years, the burden of proving his death lies- upon the party who asserts it.</p> <p>4. The death of the lessor at the time of the demise laid in the declaration, when proved, will defeat the action.</p> <p>5. If the lessor be a lunatic the action is well brought in his name.</p>

<p>Case Tío. 5,434.</p> <p>Patents — Multi famousness.</p> <p>1. Where two separate patents for improvements in the manufacture of brooms owned by the complainant are alleged to have been infringed by the defendant, and the broom manufactured by the defendant appears to be an infringement of both patents, the bill is not bad for multifariousness.</p> <p>[Cited in Hayes v. Dayton, S Fed. 705; Deer-ing Y. AViuona Harvester AA7orks, 24 Fed. 00.]</p> <p>2. AA'liere the right to both patents alleged to be infringed for the state of California, lias been assigned to complainant, the bill is not bad for mullifariousness. because the assignment of one of the patents also embraces other territory than the state of California.</p>

<p>Case Tío. 5,435.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Conveyances —Deed op Trust for Benefit of Bankrupt’s Wife.</p> <p>1. In Mississippi, husband gave promissory note to the trustee of wife, for alleged balance on account stated between them, growing out of the use of the separate personal and real property of the wife, and executed a deed of trust on certain land of the husband to secure payment of the note, and subsequently went into voluntary bankruptcy. On petition of as-signee and a secured creditor, held, the said conveyance must be held to be fraudulent and void as to existing creditors at the time it was made.</p> <p>2. Semble, even if the wife’s claim was valid under the laws of Mississippi, the effect of the conveyance would be to delay and hinder creditors, and enable the debtors to obtain an inequitable advantage over them, and so void.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,436.</p> <p>Ejectment in Illinois — Evidence—Cory of Re-couoed Deed — Seal—Notice to Subsequent JPUUCnA-SEKS.</p> <p>1. In Illinois, all fiction in the action of ejectment is abolished.</p> <p>2. Tlie copy of a recorded deed may be received in evidence, to show that when recorded, it had a seal on it, which had been removed from the original.</p> <p>3. Deeds recorded under a statute in Illinois, are made notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers, though not properly acknowledg. d. But such deed, when used in evidence, must be proved as similar instruments of writing.</p>

Motion of libellants [John R. Gillet and others] to strike from respondents’ answer a demand for a jury trial. The action was in personam on a contract for towing certain rafts of timber for the respondents [Jerome Pierce and others] from various places on Lake Huron to Buffalo. The answer admitted the contract, but alleged, by way of defense, negligence and damages in the performance of it. and contained a request that the issue thus joined be tried by a jury.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of J. H. Gilley.] The register certified that the first meeting of creditors was duly notified to be held at his office, at ten o’clock in the forenoon of a certain day. Several creditors appeared and proved their debts, and voted for assignee.

This was a libel on behalf of the seamen to recover wages against the vessel, by reason of the failure of a voyage to China and back, for which they had shipped. They were shipped in this port by a broker, at the' request of one Hanna, who was alleged to be the master of the ship, and four of them rendered themselves on board to do duty.

[In equity. Bill by Mary Gilman against Samuel Brown anil others.] This cause was by consent beard upon the bill, answer, and exhibits in the case. There were no facts in dispute between the parties; and the whole controversy turned upon questions of law.

[This was a bill by Gilman, Cowdrey and others, trustees, against the Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Company.] In 1S57 the Des Moines Valley Railroad Company made to trustees a mortgage, and in 1S5S, to other trustees, another mortgage' to secure a large number of bonds.

Bill in equity. The material allegations in the complainant’s bill were as follows: In 18G7 she [Anna K. Gilman] was executrix, with others as executors, of the last will and testament of Nathaniel Gilman, both in the state of Maine and in the state of New York.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] On the morning of February 4, 1870, about four o’clock, the steamboat Garry Owen, which was the property of the libelant [William T. Gilman], collided with the steam-tug Tyler, on the Mississippi river, in front of the city of New Orleans.

<p>Case No. 6,448.</p> <p>Fraudulent Conveyances — Intent — Presumption — Purchaser under Execution against Partner.</p> <p>1. A conveyance is fraudulent, under St. 13 Eliz. c. 5, when the same is voluntarily made by the owner of the land, if land be conveyed, the grantor being indebted at the time it was executed; the conveyance must be made with intent to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors or others.</p> <p>[Cited in McKee v. Jones, 6 Pa. St. 427.] [Cited' in Willis v. Whitsitt (Tex. Sup.) 4 S. W. 25G.]</p> <p>2. A fraudulent intent will in general be presumed, from the fact that the party conveying was indebted at the time the conveyance was executed.</p> <p>[Cited in Heath v. Page, 63 Pa. St. 119.]</p> <p>[Quoted in Briscoe v. Bronaugh, 1 Tex. 326.]</p> <p>3. A purchaser under an execution against one partner, becomes a tenant in common with, the other partners, in an undivided share of the land purchased, subject to all the rights of the other partners. Until the partnership debts are paid, he can have no claim, hut on the. separate interest of the individual partner in the residue.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Corbett, Case No. 3.220.]</p> <p>[Cited in Newhall v. Buckingham, 14 Ill. 408.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,448a.</p> <p>Towage — Negligence of Tug.</p> <p>[It is negligence for a tug which has brought a tow of canal boats to port to immediately cast off and go away, without inquiring as to the condition of one of the boats, with which she had come in violent contact during the day.]</p>

<p>[This was a libel by William Gilooley against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to recover damages for injuries to a canal boat. There was a decree for libellant, and a reference to ascertain damages. Case' No. 5,44Sa. The cause is now heard on exceptions to the commissioner’s report.]</p>

This was action on the case, on a contract made between the supercargo of the plaintiffs, merchants of Philadelphia, with the defendant, who was a Hong merchant in Canton; in writing, but not under seal; whereby the defendant agreed to deliver to the supercargo, Redwood Fisher, a cargo of tea, for the Pennsylvania Packet, at certain prices, fixed in the contracts; the same to be fresh, prime, and of the first chop.

<p>Case Tío. 6,453.</p> <p>Slavery — Recapture in Free State — Parol Authority to Agent to Seize Fugitive Slave —Liability for Rescue — Rescue by Crowd— Discrediting Witness.</p> <p>1. It is under the constitution and act of congress only, that the owner of a slave has a right to reclaim him in a state where slavery does not exist. There is no principle in the common law, in the law of nations, or of nature, which authorizes such a recaption.</p> <p>[Cited in Rodney v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 19 Ill. 44.]</p> <p>2. A parol authority by the master to his agent, is sufficient to authorize a seizure of a fugitive from labor.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Weld, Case No. 1C,COO.]</p> <p>S. To make a person liable for a rescue, in such a ease, he must act “knowingly and willingly.” But this knowledge that the colored person is a fugitive from labor, is infer-able from circumstances.</p> <p>[Cited in Weimer v. Sloane, Case No. 17,-3G3; U. S. v. Buck, Id. 14,030.]</p> <p>4. To every one who mingles with the crowd, it is not necessary that the agent should state on what authority he proceeds. It is enough that he states it generally. And one of a crowd, who interposes by manual force, or by encouraging others, by words to rescue a fugitive. is responsible. But he does not make himself responsible where he endeavors to allay the excitement, and prevent a breach of the peace.</p> <p>5. The agent, in seizing a fugitive from labor, acts under the sanction of law, no warrant being necessary.</p> <p>G. Distinct trespassers can not be joined in the same action.</p> <p>7. Where a rescue is made by the continuous action of a crowd, any one who took a part in the course of action is responsible, and may be sued with others wiio participated at a different time in the same action.</p> <p>8. A female fugitive from labor, having had a child during her residence in a free state; on an action for her value, and the value of her husband, etc., on a charge of rescue against the defendants, the court held, as the child was not claimed in the declaration, the question whether the claimant had a right to it and a control over it, was not necessarily involved in the case.</p> <p>9. A witness con not be discredited by proving that he made a certain remark, which in his examination he does not deny, but can not recollect.</p> <p>10. An expression by the agent of the plaintiff, that he should not pursue the slaves, is no abandonment of his right of action.</p> <p>11. A witness who stated a falsehood, which probably does not arise from mistake or misapprehension, will not be believed by the jury in other parts .of his evidence unless corroborated.</p>

This was an action [at law by Maria B. Gimmy against William Culberson] for the possession of certain land in the county of Napa. It was tried by the court at the July term, 18G5, without a jury, by the stipulation of parties.

[This was a bill in equity by James A. Gindrat and others against Francis Dane and others.] By the bill it appears that the complainants are the assignees in bankruptcy of the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company, duly appointed as such by the district court for the middle district of Alabama, in which court the corporation was previously adjudged bankrupt.

The city of Philadelphia had brought- ejectment in a state court of Pennsylvania against J. F. Girard and eleven other persons. The writ was served on J. F. Girard alone, he having been the only one of the twelve named in the writ who was in actual possession.

<p>Case No. 6,456.</p> <p>Vessel and Cakgo Condemned — Blockade.</p> <p>The vessel was pursued while attempting to violate the blockade. All on board of her escaped before she was taken. The court allowed other testimony to be given. Letters on board afforded a strong presumption that the vessel and cargo were enemy property. No claimant intervened: It not being probable that the papers of the vessel, or any of her crew, or any further proof could be produced, the court decreed condemnation of vessel and cargo, the vessel having been appraised and taken for the use of the government in the Gulf of Mexico, where she was captured, and not having been brought within this district.</p>

Nicholson being the owner of 11 tracts of wild land, mortgaged them in 1797 to the Bank of the United States. The bank after-wards bought them in under this mortgage, and in February, 1830, its trustees sold them to Girard, who took deeds describing the tracts in the ordinary way.

The ship Montesquieu, belonging to the appellant, sailed from Canton, on her return to Philadelphia, in November, 1S12; and in March, 1813, was captured, within the capes ■of Delaware, by the British blockading squadron; her crew were put on shore, forcibly, by the captors, and they arrived at Philadelphia.

In equity. Heard on demurrer to the bill. The bill alleged in substance as follows: On July C, 1875, the complainant, a fire and marine insurance company of the city of Philadelphia, appointed one Benjamin E. Guerard, of Savannah, Georgia, its agent for that place.

Bill in equity [brought by Martha M. Girardey, for herself and as guardian of her ■children,’ against Andrew M. Moore, John W. Bessman, and Isidor P. Girardey, and] removed to the United States circuit court from the Richmond superior court. Heard on -motion to remand to the state court

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by Emanuel Giro and others against the cargo of the brig Alexander Wise on a bottomry and respon-dentia bond.] This was an action upon a bottomry bond. The British brig Alexander Wise, while on a voyage from Marseilles to New York, ran upon a reef and was injured so as to make it necessary for her to go to Gibraltar, discharge her cargo and obtain repairs and sup-lilies.

<p>Case Wo. 6,465.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of District Court — Suits against Consuls and Vice-Consuls — Immunities — Laws of Nations.</p> <p>1. In the second section of the 3d article of the constitution of the United States, it is declared that “in ail cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, tue supreme court shall have original jurisdiction:” held, that this does not conflict with and render unconstitutional the act of congress passed 24th September. 1789, 8 '9 [1 Stat. 7fi], giving jurisdiction to the district court of the United States, in civil cases, against consuls and vice-consuls.</p> <p>[Cited in State of Texas v. Lewis, 14 Fed. G7. Quoted in Bors v. Preston, 4 Sup. Ct. 410, 111 U. S. 258.]_</p> <p>2. The grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court, does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive.</p> <p>[Cited in Bors v. Preston, 4 Sup. Ct. 410, 111 U. S. 258.]</p> <p>3. A consul is not entitled, by the laws of nations, to the immunities and privileges of an ambassador or public minister. He is liable to civil suits, like any other individual, in the tribunals of the country in which he resides.</p> <p>[Cited in Bors v. Preston, 4 Sup. Ct. 410, 111 U. S. 258.]</p>

In equity. Bill by [Thomas M. Giveen] the assignee of a bankrupt against [Joseph Smith] a mortgagee o£ chattels, to set aside the mortgage as a fraudulent preference given by the bankrupt The assignee had sold the chattels before he brought his bill, but without order of court for the sale of incumbered property under section 25 of the bankrupt act.

In equity. Amended bill by [Thomas M. Giveen] the assignee of a bankrupt, filed by leave of court granted [Case No. 5,466] against [Joseph Smith] the mortgagee of the stock in trade of the bankrupt and sundry vendees of the same under a title derived from the as-signee, who sold the same free of incum-brances under an order of court granted without notice to the mortgagee, seeking to have the mortgage decreed void as a fraudulent preference, and the mortgagee perpetually…

<p>Case No. 6,468.</p> <p>PLEADING IS ADMIRALTY — DENIAL OF ALLEGATIONS or Answer — Seamen Shipped in Foreign Port —Master and Mate — Duty — Orders op Master — Wages.</p> <p>1. Where the libellant intends merely to deny the truth of the allegations in the answer, a supplemental libel in replication is not necessary. But when the allegations of the answer are intended to be avoided by new facts, the matter in avoidance should be put upon the record.</p> <p>[Cited in The Edwin Baxter, 32 Fed. 296.]</p> <p>2. It is not necessary that a seaman shipping in a foreign port should sign articles.</p> <p>3. A mate who had been improperly put off duty by the master, and charged by him, without sufficient reason, with incompetency and acts of impropriety, is not thereby justified in refusing to return to duty, upon the order of the master.</p> <p>4. There is no inflexible rule requiring the court, in all eases, to withhold wages for a wrongful refusal of duty, but the judge may look into the circumstances, and exercise his discretion.</p> <p>[Cited in Swain v. Howland, Case No. 13,-661.] . •</p> <p>NOTE. Whether new matter (before Adm. Rule 52) should be pleaded by replication, or by .•supplemental libel, see Taber v. Jenny [Case No. 13,720]; Ben. Adm. § 4Í-2; Conkl. Adm. 239; but now by the rule, it is by amendment of the libel. That seamen shipping 'in a foreign port need not sign articles, see Curt. Mereh. Seam. 39; Gardner v. The New Jersey [Case No. 5.-233]; Abb. Shipp. 607, note. That the court is not compelled to pronounce a forfeiture of the entire wages, see The Moslem [Case No. 9,-875]; Smith v. Treat [Id. 13,117]; Sprague v. Ivain [Id. 13.250]; Drysdale v. The Ranger [Id. 4.097]; Macomber v. Thompson [Id. 8,-919]; The Maria [Id. 9,074]; Thorne v. White [Id. 13,989]; The Mentor [Id. 9,427]; Scott v. Russell [Id. 12,540]. Contra, The Blake, 1 W. Rob. Adm. 87.</p>

This was an action* on a charter party, brought by the plaintiffs [Lawrence Gladstone and others], as owners of a vessel, to recover an amount claimed to be due by the defendants [William Chamberlain and others] on a charter of such vessel, made by the plaintiffs to the defendants, at Ceylon, in November, 1862, by which the defendants agreed to pay, as charter money, $29.000, “to be paid in cash, on right and safe delivery of the cargo” at New York.

<p>This was an action brought^ to recover an amount alleged to be due upon a charter. The plaintiffs [Lawrence Gladstone and others] were the owners of the ship John O’Gaunt,’ which the defendants [William Chamberlain and others], in November, 1862, chartered at Ceylon to bring a cargo to this port for the lump sum of $29,000, which by the terms of the charter was to be paid “in cash upon due delivery of the cargo.” On the arrival of the ship gold was at premium and the present controversy arose — the plaintiffs claiming to be paid in gold and the defendants offering payment in legal-tender notes. By an agreement between the parties, the $29,000 in legal tender was paid, and the action was brought to recover .the difference. Testimony was given as to what was said between the parties at the time the charter was made, "one testifying that it was agreed at the time that “in cash” meant gold or silver, and the other averring that nothing whatever was said about it.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,472.</p> <p>Slave Teade—Forfbituke and Condemnation— Distribution of Proceeds.</p> <p>Where a vessel is condemned for a violation of a statute of the United States, and a moiety of the proceeds is given to the officers and crew of the ship of war which made the seizure, such moiety is not to be paid into the treasury of the United States, but must be distributed by the court.</p> <p>[Cited in Rice v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 261.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,474.</p> <p>Arrest op Bankrupt — Protection- — Power of the Court — General Order No.</p> <p>87 — Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>1. The “protection-’ spoken of in the fourth section of the bankruptcy act [of 18G7 (14 Stat. 519)] means protection to the bankrupt from being arrested in cases where he is not liable to arrest, under the twenty-sixth section.</p> <p>2. The provisions of general order No. 27, so far as they authorize the discharge, from arrest or imprisonment, of a bankrupt arrested on process founded on a claim provable in bankruptcy, where that claim is one from which his discharge in bankruptcy will not release him, are not warranted by the twenty-sixth section of the act.</p> <p>3. The granting of such protection is an act done “under and in virtue of the bankruptcy.”' So, also, is the enforcing of such protection.</p> <p>4. The district court has jurisdiction, therefore, under the first section of the act, to enforce such protection.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Carow. Case No. 2,426; Re-Brinkman, Id. 1,884.]</p> <p>5. The court also has power, if a bankrupt is arrested in violation of the twenty-sixth section of the act, to release him from imprisonment, by habeas corpus, under the act of February 5, 1807 (14 Stat. 3S5).</p> <p>[Cited in Re Ghirardelli, Case No. 5,376; Ex parte Schulenburg, 25 Fed. 2L2.]</p> <p>6. Where a bankrupt was arrested in an action in a state court on allegations of fraud in contracting the debt to recover which the action was brought, and gave bail, and applied to this court, on affidavits denying the allegations of fraud, for an order discharging him from arrest, and discharging the bail: Held, that the court was competent to give him the relief sought, provided his arrest was founded on a debt from which his discharge in bankruptcy would release him.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Alsberg, Case No. 261; Re Smith, Id. 12,976.]</p> <p>7. The court must inquire into that question of fact, and decide it on this application.2</p> <p>[Cited in Re Devoe. Case No. 3,843; Re Wright, Id. 18,065.]</p>

Rule to show cause why the levy and sale of the land under a vendiuoni exponas should not be set aside. Suit was brought by Glas-sell against James Wilson in 1797, and judgment was entered in 1798; soon after which, Wilson died, and administration on his estate was granted to Bird Wilson. In 1S19 Glassell died, and a scire facias, to revive the judgment, was sued out in the name of Mr. Swan, a citizen of Maryland, his administrator.

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Samuel ■Glaser.]</p>

At about ten o’clock, on the night of the first of February, 1868, the schooner Electric Flash, with a full cargo of frozen herring on board, was beating up Long Island Sound on her voyage from Newfoundland to New York, and was off New Haven. She was making about five and a half knots, and was close-hauled on the port tack, heading about northwest by west, the wind being a whole-sail breeze from west southwest.

Rule upon the plaintiffs to show their cause ■ of action, and why the defendant should’ not be permitted to appear on common ball, having been discharged as an insolvent-’ under the laws of the state of Maryland. ’• The case was as follows: Swift, being a: debtor to the United States in a considerable-’ sum, applied to the secretary of the treasury ; to be discharged as an insolvent, upon surrendering all his estate to the United States, agreeably to the provisions of the…

<p>Case No. 5,479/</p> <p>Prize — Wrongful Arrest — Discharge.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo discharged from seizure and restored to the claimant, with costs and damages, because of a wrongful arrest</p>

<p>Petition [by John Glenn and Charles M. Thurston, claiming under Jacques Clamor-ean], under act of 17th June, 1844 [5 Stat. G7G], for the confirmation of a Spanish claim.</p>

Assumpsit [by John Glidden and others] on a policy of insurance. At the trial, which was upon the general issue, there was a demurrer to the evidence, upon which the cause was submitted to the decision of the court.

<p>Case No. 6,483.</p> <p>Admirai/ty — Jurisdiction — Great Lakes — Act of Feb. 26, 1843 — Seuvioe in’ Personal Action's — Suits ix Rf.ii — Foreign Vessei.s — Maritime Liens — Sufplies and Materials — Priority.</p> <p>1.The extension of admiralty jurisdiction to tlie lakes, by the act of February 20. 1S45 (5 Stat. 720), did not take away the concurrent remedy which existed at common law, and which is to be sought in the jurisprudence of the states, and usually in the state courts.</p> <p>[Cited in The Henrietta, Case No. 0,121.] [Cited in Randall v. Roche, 30 N. J. Eq. 222.)</p> <p>2. As a general if not universal rule, in order to bind a defendant, or to confer any rights upon a plaintiff, by force of a ju.dgment in a.personal action, the former must be served with notice of the institution of the suit, so that he. may have an opportunity to appear and defend.</p> <p>[Cited in Daily v. Doe, 3 Fed. 918.]</p> <p>3. But a proceeding in rem forms an exception to the general rule, and binds the res in the absence of any personal notice to the party interested.</p> <p>[Cited in Kearney v. Kearney (Cal.) 15 Pac. 770.)</p> <p>4. A foreien vessel was attached by a proceeding in rem. under a law of Ohio, in a court of that state, for repairs made and supplies furnished, and sold upon a judgment duly recovered in pursuance of such attachment: Eeld, that the judgment was conclusive upon the transfer and disposition of the vessel, in whatever place she might be found, and upon the title to her, by whomsoever it might be questioned, and whether involved directly or collaterally. .This was especially so where the owner of the vessel at the time appeared in the suit in the Ohio court, and contested the proceedings throughout.</p> <p>5. The case of The Chusan [Case No. 2,717] commented on. and explained.</p> <p>G. The rule ' in respect to maritime liens against vessels for supplies and materials furnished to her master at a foreign port is, that the party first instituting legal proceedings for the purpose of enforcing his claim against the vessel, is entitled to satisfaction out of the proceeds of her sale.</p> <p>[Cited in The Young Mechanic. Case No. 18,-180; The Pathfinder. Id. 10,797; The William T. Graves, Id. 17,759; The Minnie R. Childs, Id. 9,040; The Frank G. Fowler, 8 Fed. 333; The J. W. Tucker. 20 Fed. 130; The Arcturus, 18 Fed. 744; The Lady Boone, 21 Fed. 733.)</p> <p>7. The true meaning of a maritime lien is, that it renders the property liable to the claim without a previous judgment or decree of the court sequestering or condemning it or establishing the demand, as at common law, and the action in rem carries it into effect.</p> <p>8. The appropriation of the property to that end becomes absolute and exclusive on suit brought, unless superseded by some pledge or lien of paramount order.</p> <p>9. The first action by which the property is seized is entitled to hold it as against all other claims of no higher character.</p> <p>[Cited in The Edith, Case No. 4.282.]</p> <p>10. The “lion,” so termed, is, in reality, only a privilege to arrest the vessel for the demand, which, of itself, constitutes no incumbrance on the vessel, and becomes such only by virtue of an actual attachment of the same.</p> <p>11. G. filed a libel in rem in the admiralty in New-York, under the act of February 2G, 1845 (5 Stat. 726), against a vessel, to recover for supplies and materials furnished to her in New-. York, as a foreign vessel, owned in Michigan. Before the filing of the libel, she had been sold in Ohio upon a judgment recovered in a state court in Ohio, for supplies and materials furnished to her by C. subsequently to the time when G. furnished his supplies and materials. The Ohio judgment was recovered in a proceeding in rem against the vessel by attachment under a law of Ohio, she being then also a foreign vessel, owned in Michigan: Eeld. that the priority of time in the furnishing of the supplies and materials by G. gave him no paramount lien on the vessel over the lien of C.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,484.</p> <p>Admiralty — Proceeding in Rem Under State Statutes — Effect—Sale on Execution— Priority of Maritime Liens.</p> <p>1. A judgment in rem rendered in a court of the state of Ohio, in virtue of the act of the general assembly of that state, entitled “An act providing for the collection of claims against steamboats and other water crafts, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name,” passed February 20, 1840 [38 Laws Ohio, p. 35], and the act explanatory thereof, passed February 24, 1848, is to be regarded as a nullity by judicial tribunals in other states, unless the owner of the vessel proceeded against appeared in the suit and had an opportunity to make a defence.</p> <p>2. The title, if any, acquired by the purchaser at a sale of the vessel on execution, in virtue of such a judgment, is subordinate to the lien in favor of a material-man, conferred by the general maritime law of the United States and the act of congress of February 20, 1S45, c. 20 L5 Stat. 72G].</p> <p>[Cited in Put*ey v. The Celestine, Case No. 2,541.] •</p> <p>3. A judgment recovered in a proceeding under the statute of Ohio, in a court of that state, for supplies, is not a bar to a subsequent suit in rem in admiralty, for the same supplies.</p> <p>[Cited in Ashbrook v. The Golden Gate, Case No. 574.]</p> <p>4. Quere — Whether the provisions of the statute of Ohio are not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New Y ork. [This was a libel by the steamer Splendid against the scow Globe for damages caused by collision.

<p>Case Wo. 5,486.</p> <p>Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors— When Void — Bankrupt Act.</p> <p>1.A general assignment for the equal benefit of all creditors is void, as against an assignee in bankruptcy, being at war with the policy of the bankrupt law [of 1867 (14 Stat 517.)].</p> <p>[Approved in Re Beisenthal, .Case No. 1,236. Cited in Macdonald v. Moore, Id. 8,763; Re Croft, Id. 3,404; Re Kimball, Id. 7,770; Re 1]6219’] Platt v. Preston, Id.</p> <p>2. The same rule was applicable to the law of 1841 [5 Stat. 440].</p> <p>3. Such has always been the rule under each successive English act, and is now a matter of statutory provision in England.</p> <p>4. The rule, that where a statute is taken from another country or state which has received a judicial interpretation, the presumption will be that such interpretation is also adopted, held to be applicable, in this instance, with more than ordinary force.</p> <p>. 5- In the law of 1867, the judicial interpretation which in England held general assignments to be void, as against a claimant, under the bankrupt law, has been expressly adopted by adding the words, “or to defeat the operation of the act.” It was this effect in England which the courts declared avoided such transfers.</p> <p>[NOTE. The Cleveland Insurance Company sned out a writ of error to this decision of the circuit court, and it came before the supreme court on a motion to dismiss said writ. 98 U. S. 3GG. Under section 4986, Rev. St., the circuit court had “general superintendence and jurisdiction” of all bankruptcy eases arising in the district court. No particular form of proceeding is required in order to take a case to the circuit court for review under this jurisdiction. Chief Justice Waite dismissed the writ of error for want of jurisdiction in the supreme court, for that tribunal has no control over the circuit court in bankruptcy matters. It is otherwise when the record discloses a suit at law or in equity. Mr. Justice Clifford, in a lengthy opinion, dissented from this view, upon the ground that the circuit court had not properly exercised the supervisory jurisdiction according to the bankruptcy act.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This appeal from the district court [Case No. 18,183] came before this court on the following agreement:— “This is a libel founded on a policy of insurance, which comes before the court on appeal from the uistrict court, and under an agreement filed early in the case, and in the anticipation that much testimony would be produced on both siaes, that the-fnding of the judge of the district…

The libel in this case was filed in personam to compel the payment of demurrage by the consignee Thomas Walton,' for seven -days.’ detention of the schooner Glover, in unloading a cargo of barley in the port of Cleveland; The bill of lading was in the usual form, but did not provide for “lay” days, nor for com.-pensation for detention. It was general in its form, such as is customary on the lakes.

This action was brought [against the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company] to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff by reason of a collision on the defendant’s road. The plaintiff was a dentist by profession, residing near Madison, N. J. On the evening of January 8, 1879, he entered the defendant’s cars at Hoboken, on an express train, to go to Madison. He appeared to be in the enjoyment of ordinary health.

[This was an .action at law by Joseph W. Goddard and others against Chester A'. Ar-. thur, for the recovery of duties illegally exacted by him as collector of the port of New York.]

<p>This case was tried before the district judge, and a verdict having been rendered for the plaintiff for $3,353.52 damages, a motion was made by. the defendant for setting aside the,verdict and for a new trial. On this motion, after .argument, the court were divided in opinion; one of the judges being for, and one against the motion. After the judges had delivered their opinions, a question arose and was shortly spoken to by counsel,-whether'judgment could be entered on the verdict, the motion for a new trial having been overruled by an equal division of opinion.- The circuit judge was in favor of rendering judgment. The district judge doubted whether this could be done as a matter of course, the court being divided, and desired time to consider the question; and it was ordered to stand over for argument, before the district judge, on the 21st of October, the circuit judge having directed an entry on the docket, that he was in favor of rendering judgment, he having been in favor of overruling the motion for a new trial. At the same time it was agreed that the case should be considered as open for any motion by either party; and each party be at liberty to take such steps in the case as he should be advised were for his interest. At the adjournment no counsel appeared for the plaintiff. Hobbs, counsel for the defendant, appeared and spoke shortly to the case, and read an argument in writing by Benjamin Rand of the Suffolk bar. After the adjournment, and before any opinion was given by the district judge, the counsel for the plaintiff desired to be heard and the case was continued to the next term of the court. The counsel appeared, no motion was made and none was before the court; but the counsel contended that the motion of the defendant having been overruled, judgment for the plaintiff followed as a matter of course, and ought to be entered by the clerk, without any special motion by the party, or any particular order of the court</p>

<p>Case No. 6,491.</p> <p>Pleading — Trespass — General Issue — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. In trespass, the defendant cannot justify under the general issue.</p> <p>2. This court has jurisdiction in trespass, although the damages do not amount to twenty dollars.</p> <p>[Cited in Hellrigle v. Dulauy, Case No. 6,313.]</p>

On motion for a new trial. The action was for damages for breach of a contract for the purchase of merchandise, and the de-fence was that the defendants were deprived of an opportunity to inspect the merchandise within a reasonable time. The court directed a verdict for defendants.

This case came by certiorari from the supreme court of New York into this court It was an actien [by Lemuel Goddard] against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back duties and a penalty exacted on a cargo of iron. The iron was entered August 25, 1851, on an invoice dated at London, July 2,1851, stating that the iron was shipped from Liverpool for New York.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. ■ [This was a suit in admiralty by David Goddard, John H. Pearson, and others against the bark Tangier (Charles Bichardson and others, claimants). The district court dismissed the libel (case unreported), and the libelants appealed to this court.]

<p>Bill in equity, submitted on motion for the allowance of an injunction and the appointment of a receiver..</p>

<p>Case No. 5,496.</p> <p>■General Average — Contribution—Jettison or Deck Load.</p> <p>[1. Where the master, by the notorious and established usage of a particular trade, has the right to carry a. part of his cargo on deck without obtaining the consent of the shipper, contribution will be allowed for a loss by jettison.]</p> <p>[2. If such usage only authorizes the stowage of certain kinds of goods on deck, then, to make the other shippers liable, it must appear that such goods form a usual and customary part of the cargo of vessels in the trade.]</p> <p>[3. Where goods are carried on deck by special agreement with the owner, and at a lower rate of freight, he cannot have contribution for a loss by jettison, though the practice of carrying deck loads is invariable in the trade.]</p> <p>[4. Where a cargo of lumber is taken to be carried “on deck and under deck,” at a uniform rate for the entire lot, with the understanding that part is to be laden on deck, the rate being les» than if the load were all carried under deck, and it is the established usage to carry deck loads by express consent of owners, the shipper is not entitled to general average contribution for a jettison of the deck load.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,497.</p> <p>Public Lands — Right op Indians to Use — How Divested — Treaties — Construction — Acknowledgment op Conveyance — Inadequacy op Consideration — Notice op Claim.</p> <p>1. The fee in unsold lands is either in the federal or state governments. The Indians have only a right of use. which, however, can not be divested, except by purchase or war.</p> <p>.[Cited in McKay v. Campbell, Case No. 8,-840.]</p> <p>2. An Indian treaty, which cedes lands within certain boundaries, reserving certain parts, does, in no respect, change as to such parts the original right. But, if a treaty declares there shall be granted certain tracts designated, to certain persons, and, in the same article, these are referred to as grants, they are held to operate as such.</p> <p>3. The treaty is best explained by itself.</p> <p>4. Where, in a treaty, the lands are reserved and granted to individual Indians, the lands can not be conveyed without the permission of the president, and that permission may be given in such form as the president shall think proper. Such permission having been given by the president, his successor can not revoke or annul it, especially where the rights of a third person are concerned.</p> <p>[Cited in Pickering v. Lomax, 145 U. S. 310; 12 Sup. Ct. 861.]</p> <p>[Cited in Crews v. Cleghorn, 13 Ind. 439; Steeple v. Downing, 60 Ind. 496.]</p> <p>5. The acknowledgment and recording of a conveyance of land, in Indiana, operates as proof of the instrument and notice. They are not necessary to the validity of the deed.</p> <p>6. Inadequacy of consideration no ground to infer fraud, unless it is so great as at once to strike every person with its grossness.</p> <p>7. Notice of a claim is sufficient if it put the party on inquiry.</p> <p>8. Evidence of identity, which describes the land so as to distinguish it from other tracts, sufficient for a deed, and, also, in an action of ejectment.</p>

This hill was brought by complainants as aliens, alleging that they own real estate in the county of Manitowoc subject to taxation, of the value of six thousand dollars and upwards.

<p>Case No. 6,602.</p> <p>-Equity Jurisdiction — Suit by Holdbks op Municipal Bonds — -Mandamus to Compel Collection op Taxes.</p> <p>Upon a bill in equity against the city of Elizabeth by holders of its bonds, application was made for an injunction and a receiver of the moneys, rights, and credits of the city, on the ground that it was insolvent and had made default in the payment of the interest on its bonds, and that its 'officers had collected and proposed to collect taxes and had refused to apply them to the payment of the debt. It was held that the complainants were not entitled to equitable relief because they had a remedy at law, viz. a writ of mandamus to compel the city to levy a tax for the payment of, the debt. The question whether the court of equity could interfere after the remedy at law; was exhausted was not before the court.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by John G. Goesele and others, heirs of Johannes Goe-sele, against Joseph M. Bimeler and others, for a partition of certain lands claimed by plaintiffs as the individual property of Johannes Goesele.]

In equity. Suit was brought by [Darius Goff and others] the assignees of patent No. 50.318, granted to Marcus Brown Westhead, October 3d, 1865 [against William H. Stafford and others].

Heard on special exceptions to the plaintiff’s petition. The plaintiff [Patience Gohen], a citizen of the state of New York, and mother and sole surviving parent of Edward L. Gohen, brought suit against the Texas Pacific Railway Company, to recover damages resulting from the death of her son, who was employed as a fireman by the said company, and was accidentally killed while so employed, through the alleged fault and negligence of the company.

This was an action for damages brought [by Patience Gohen against the Texas Pa•cific Railway Company] under the act of the legislature of Texas of February 2, 1860 :[Laws 1860, p. 32], which is substantially that of 9th and 10th Viet, commonly known ■as “Lord Campbell’s Act.” [Exceptions to plaintiff’s petition were •overruled. Case No. 5,506.]

This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs. On the 8th of March, 1864, letters patent [No. 41,897] were granted to John B. Gale,' as assignee of William E. Hagan, for an “improvement in stoves.” On the 6th of June, 1805, this patent was surrendered, and reissued, in two separate reissues, to the Hagan Manufacturing Company, and William E. Hagan, as assignees, by mesne, assignments, of William E. Hagan.

<p>Case No. 6,509.</p> <p>.Bankruptcy — Discharge Under State Law— State Laws in Federal Courts — Roles of Practice — Law of Place Where Contract is Made or Discharged — Comity of Nations— Constitutional Law — Obligation of Contracts.</p> <p>1. Action on a bill of exchange, drawn 10th of May, 1811, by the plaintiff, at St. Barts, on himself in Philadelphia, and by him accepted, and afterwards regularly protested for non-payment. The defendant claimed to be discharged from this debt, by a law of the state of Pennsylvania, passed 13th of March, 1812 [Laws Pa. 1812, p. 114], under which he had received a certificate, having conformed to the provisions of the law, and which law declares, that the certificate shall discharge such insolvent from all debts and demands due from him, or for which he was liable at the date of such certificate; and also, from all contracts originating before the said date, though payable afterwards.</p> <p>[Cited in Woodhull v. Wagner, Case No. 17,-975.]</p> <p>2. The laws of the several states, constitutionally passed since 1789, are binding on the courts of the United States, held within the state in which the same prevail.</p> <p>[Cited in Gill v. Jacobs, Case No. 5,426; Raymond v. Danbury & N. R. Co., Id. 11,593.]</p> <p>[Cited in Re Stephens, 4 Gray, 560; Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 129.]</p> <p>. 3. Aliter, as to rules of practice. Every court possesses the power of making its own rules of practice, unless forbidden by law; and the 17th section of the judiciary law [1 Stat. 83], vests, expressly, this power in the courts of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in The Unadilla, Case No. 14,332.]</p> <p>[Cited in Edwards v. Pope. 3 Scam. 470; The Aurora Borealis v. Dobbie, 17 Ohio, 128; Barry v. Iseman, 14 Rich. Law, 129; Sheppard v. Steele, 43 N. Y. 52.]</p> <p>4. By the comity of nations, the laws of a foreign country where a contract is made or discharged, is considered by the tribunals of other nations, as the law of that contract, and they •will decide according to such laws.</p> <p>5. The bill of exchange upon which this suit was brought, being payable in Philadelphia, had a view to the laws of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>6. A law which authorizes the discharge of a contract, by the payment of a smaller sum, or at a different time, or in a different manner than the parties have agreed, impairs its obligations, by substituting for the contract of the parties a legislative contract, to which they never assented. Such is the law of Pennsylvania of 13th of March, 1812, and as such, it is unconstitutional and void.</p> <p>[Cited in Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 14; State v. Amery, 12 R. I. 60.]</p> <p>7. It seems to be a safe rule, that where an unqualified power is granted to the general government to do a particular act, the exercise of which, by the state governments, would be inconsistent with the express grant, the whole of the power is granted, and consequently, vests, exclusively, in the general government. The state governments cannot, in that case, exercise it, without showing an express grant; or that it is fairly deducible from the circumstance in which or where the claim is founded.</p> <p>[Cited in People v. Wilson, 15 Ill. 392; Lafayette, M. & B. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. 198.]</p> <p>8. The exercise of the power by the state governments, to pass bankrupt and naturalization laws, is incompatible with the grant of a power to congress, to pass uniform laws upon the same subjects.</p> <p>[Cited in Passenger Cases, 7 How. (48 U. S.) 556; U. S. v. Rhodes, Case No. 16,151; Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 669.]</p> <p>9. The omission of congress to pass a bankrupt law, does not authorize the several states to pass such laws; but the omission of that body to pass such a law, is, in effect, a declaration that there ought not to be such a law.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, Case No. 15,807.]</p> <p>10. The law of Pennsylvania of 13th of March, 1812, is unconstitutional, because it impairs the obligation of a contract; and because congress have exclusively the power to pass a bankrupt law.</p> <p>[Cited in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 295; Ashley v. Board of Supervisors, 8 C. 6. A. 455, 60 Fed. 61.]</p> <p>[Cited in Sheppard v. Steele, 43 N. Y. 57.)</p>

. In bankruptcy. [In the matter of Dwight C. Golder & Co.] Petition by the assignee to expurge and disallow certain debts proved before Mr. Register Fessenden.

Debt on a bond for twelve hundred Sicca rupees, in the penalty of two thousand, executed at Calcutta in 1702, at twelve per cent, interest, payable in twelve months.

The agreed statement of facts and the evidence together, show that the plaintiff is a municipal corporation, and the defendant a mining corporation, having a mining claim within the corporate limits; that upon this claim there are hoisting works- and machinery affixed to the soil; that there is also personal property about the mine used in working it; that a tax for municipal purposes was levied upon the town lots which embrace the surface of defendants’ mining claim, upon…

<p>Case No. 6,513.</p> <p>Maritime Contracts — Bill of Lading — Rights of Parties — Lien—Sale of Cargo to Effect Repairs — Carriers — Depredations by Passengers— Peril of the Sea — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>1. A bill of lading is a contract maritime in its character, and within the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty, whether it be made on land or on the high seas.</p> <p>[Cited in The Gilbert Knapp, 37 Fed. 212.]</p> <p>2. The owner of goods which are shipped and are not delivered according to the bill of lading, has a lien upon the ■ vessel, for the value of the goods, which may be enforced in admiralty by an action iñ rem. '</p> <p>[Cited in The Boston, Case .No. 1,669; Du- . pont de Nemours v. Vance,' 19 How. (60 U. S.) 170.]</p> <p>3. The owner of cargo, part of which is sold by the master to raise money for the necessary repairs of the vessel, and part of which is consumed by the crew and passengers on the voyage, has a lien on the vessel for the value of what is so sold and consumed.</p> <p>•[Cited in Dupont de Nemours v. Vance, 19 How. (60 U. S.) 170.]</p> <p>4. Owners of ships which are employed in transporting goods for hire, are common carriers.</p> <p>5. Depredations on a ship’s stores or on her cargo, committed by her passengers or crew, in consequence of a short allowance made necessary by the length of a voyage, is not a peril of the sea, within the meaning of a bill of lading.</p> <p>6. Where a libel is brought for the non-delivery of goods according to a bill of lading, the measure of damages is the current value of the goods at. the port of destination at the time when the goods ought to have been delivered, with interest from that time.</p> <p>[Cited in The Nith, 36 Fed. 96.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,515.</p> <p>Judgment Lien — Appeal.</p> <p>Where a creditor had obtained a valid lien on the bankrupt’s property by judgment, execution and levy, from which .the bankrupt had taken an appeal, but had not executed the bond necessary to cause the appeal to operate as a stay of proceedings, and the property had been sold subsequently to the bankruptcy and the proceeds brought into this court: Held, that the creditor was entitled to satisfaction out of the proceeds.</p> <p>[Cited in Claridge v. Kulmer, 1 Fed. 402.]</p>

. Assumpsit for not performing an award, and for use and occupation of a brick-yard, with the common money counts.

[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] This was an action of assumpsit, brought in the district court, by the United States against [William Goldsborough] the administrator of Charles H. Goldsborough, deceased. The amount in dispute was claimed by the defendant, as a proper.allowance for commissions, at the rate of 2y2 per cent., upon the disbursements made by the deceased, as acting purser, in tne years 1835-3836.

<p>[In the matter of Abraham Goldschmidt.]</p>

[This was a suit in equity by E. Sarah Goldsmith and John Nininger against Mary Greve, Herman Greve, Nathan Schwarzen-berg, and Moses Lowenstein to settle title to real estate.] The complainants bring suit, and ask that their title set forth to certain real estate described in the bill of complaint be declared good, and superior to the claim of title urged by defendant Mary Greve, and that a decree be granted ordering and requiring Mary Greve and her husband, Herman Greve,…

Hapgood], as assignee in bankruptcy of one Henry Hyde. In the year 1867, Hyde’s estate, including the real estate here in controversy, became vested in his assignees in insolvency duly appointed under the insolvency law of Massachusetts.

This was a summary proceeding by petition by the trustees of the estate of Adam Baierle, bankrupt, against Conrad L. Niehoff and Gus-ta vus Troost to recover money received by them on an execution sale of property of the bankrupt.

<p>Case No. 5,525.</p> <p>Cargo — Non-Delivery—Drainage or Scgab— Costs.</p> <p>1. A cargo of sugar was shipped from Bahia to New York in bags. The sugar was green, and the drainage from it on the voyage excessive; the vessel also met with heavy weather. On discharging, many bags were found broken, and new ones were furnished and refilled. A. quantity of sugar was also swept up from the hold, and sold by the crew with the master’s knowledge. The consignee libelled, claiming $1,850 damage for non-delivery of cargo: Held, that he could only" recover for the value of the sweepings sold.</p> <p>2. A libellant who fails as to the most part of his claim, cannot recover costs.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,526.</p> <p>Prize — Objection to Condemnation — Blockade —False Papers.</p> <p>1. An objection that this vessel, seized by naval forces in the harbor of Beaufort, N. C., after its capture, and while that place was in' custody of the army of the United States, was. not subject to capture solely by the naval forces, overruled. If the vessel and cargo are subject to condemnation, the claimants cannot contest in a prize court the competency of the libellants alone to control the proceeds of the forfeiture.</p> <p>2. Vessel and cargo condemned ,{1) for having violated the blockade in entering Beaufort; (2) for shipping there a new cargo, with intent to violate the blockade in coming out; (3) for taking an export license and clearance from the enemy at Beaufort; (4) for a false representation on the vessel’s papers aB to who was master of the vessel.</p>

' [Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. . [In admiralty. Libel by the United States against the ship Gondar and cargo for an alleged violation of the blockade. The vessel and her cargo were condemned in the district court (Case No. 5,526), and the claimant appeals.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] This was a libel for wages by ten Spanish sailors, mariners Of a Spanish schooner, the Vencejo, against Antonio Minor, its master, and Figuera and others, consignees in whole or in part of the cargo or vessel.

<p>[These vessels and their cargoes were seized by the United States in the harbor of-Beaufort, N. C., and libeled for alleged violations of the blockade. Decrees of condemnation and forfeiture of both vessels and their cargoes were entered in the district court. (Cases Nos. 5,526 and 245), from which decrees the claimants appealed. When the cases came up for hearing in the circuit court (Cases Nos. 5,527 and 246), the vessel and her cargo in each case was acquitted of the alleged violation, and an order made for further proofs as to the ownership of the property.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,631.</p> <p>Courts — Water Power.</p> <p>1. Federal courts are designed by the constitution as fora free and unembarrassed by local prejudices.</p> <p>2. The difference of level between the surface where a stream first touches land and the surface where it leaves it is the property of a riparian proprietor. It must be so used and enjoyed as not to encroach upon the rights of adjoining or proximate owners.</p> <p>3. The owner below the line of a riparian proprietor cannot subtract from the proprietor above by swelling or backing the water upon him.</p>

<p>[This was a suit by Edward Good against Samuel Davis.]</p>

In bankruptcy. This was a suit by Ira E. Goodall, assignee of the Rock River Insurance Company, bankrupt, appointed by the district court of the Eastern district of Wisconsin, where the bankruptcy proceedings were pending against L. S. Tuttle, a resident of this district, to collect a debt claimed in favor of the bankrupt’s estate, being a premium note given by the defendant for insurance issued to him. The defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court.

<p>Case No. 5,534.</p> <p>Removal or Causes — Deed—Record or Deed— Agent — Knowledge or.</p> <p>1. A suit against tenants in common or persons claiming to be such, concerning the title to or possession of land, is divisible and removable into the national court under section t¡39 of the Revised Statutes, by either of said tenants so far as he is concerned.</p> <p>2. The complainants brought suit in the state court against W., a citizen of California, to quiet title to certain lands, and joined with him as defendants certain citizens of Oregon, from whom W. derived whatever right or title to the premises he has: Reid, that the substantial controversy in the suit was wholly between citizens of different states — the complainants and W. — and might, therefore, under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 470), be wholly removed by the latter into the national court.</p> <p>[Cited in The Debris Case, 10 Fed. 34.]</p> <p>■ 3. At common law a deed is valid between the parties thereto and their privies, although not witnessed, acknowledged or recorded, and it is so in this state without acknowledgment or record: Semble, that under the Of-egon statute the attestation of a deed is no part of its execution, but only the appointed means of preserving the evidence thereof; and quere, is acknowledgment equivalent to attestation; but the deed of a married woman is not operative until acknowledged upon a privy examination, as provided by statute. '</p> <p>4. A record of a junior deed does not avoid an unrecorded elder deed to the same premises, when the junior deed was taken with knowledge of the existence of the elder one; the grantee in the junior deed, under such circumstances, is not considered a bona fide purchaser. ,</p> <p>[Approved in Manandas v. Mann (Or.) 13 Pac. 449.]</p> <p>5. The grantee in a conveyance obtained through the ngency of a ‘third person is bound” by the knowledge of such agent as to the existence of a prior unrecorded deed to the same premises.</p> <p>[Cited in Fitzgerald v. Wynne, 1 D. C. 115.]</p>

In equity. Bill by an assignee [Henry C. Goodenow], charging that the bankrupt, within four months of his bankruptcy proceedings, being insolvent and in contemplation of insolvency or bankruptcy, with intent to give a preference to the respondents [Seth M. Milliken and others], who were his creditors, paid to them $175.09 in money and delivered to them a horse in full payment of their debt in fraud of the bankrupt act, they at the time having reasonable cause to believe…

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 6,537.</p> <p>Indian Treaty — Construction or Grant Made Thereby — Indian Title Possessory in General — Pottawatomie Treaty, Not a Grant in Presentí.</p> <p>1. Grants and reservations claimed under Indian treaties are strictly construed against the grantee or beneficiary.</p> <p>2. It has been uniformly held by the supreme court of the United States that, in the absence of express legislation by congress to the contrary, the Indian title is but a right of occupancy, the fee remaining in the United States.</p> <p>3. The treaty between the United States and the Pottawatomie tribe of Indians, of November 15, 1861 (12 Stat. 1192), is not an exception to this general rule, and does not amount to a grant in presentí.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,538.</p> <p>Evidence as to Handwriting — Source or Witness’ Knowledge — Deposition — Testimony Beyond Personal Knowledge of Witness.</p> <p>1. Where a witness swears positively to the handwriting of an individual, it is sufficient. The question as to the source of his knowledge must come from the other party.</p> <p>2. If a deposition be taken under the act of congress, in the absence of the party, he should take the deposition again, if not.satisfied with the examination.</p> <p>3. Where a witness swore to certain items charged, of which he had no personal knowledge, his statement was overruled.</p>

This was a proceeding in bankruptcy, instituted by Hays, Gibbons & Co., of St. Louis, against Rachel Goodman, a married woman.

This was an action of assumpsit on two promissory notes. The defendant pleaded the general issue and the statute of limitations. General replication to first plea. Demurrer to second.

Certain questions as to the right of the clerk to commissions on money ordered to be paid into court, and as to the party liable to pay such commissions, were submitted on the following agreed case: “Several writs of mandamus have issued from this court against the city of Little Rock, in favor of different parties, commanding the city to levy a certain tax for the purpose of paying off the judgments upon which the writs of mandamus were issued, and ordering that, when, the…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois.] In admiralty. This was a libel filed by Albert E. Goodrich to recover damages sustained by reason of an obstruction in the Chicago river. The libellant alleges that he is the owner of a line of propellers regularly navigating the Lakes, and that one of them, leaving the port of Chicago, ran against a sunken rock in the river and was seriously injured.

<p>Case No. 5,543.</p> <p>- Fishing Vessels—Rights or Seamen.</p> <p>Where by the articles the crew of a fishing vessel were bound to make the fish, and on the arrival of the vessel the owners declined to allow -them to do so, and the men remained by the vessel for nearly two months, at all- times ready and willing to make the fish, and then left her and-sued for their shares of the catch, held, that their readiness and willingness to make the fish were equivalent to an actual performance of their contract; and that they were entitled to be paid their shares. Various charges made by the owners disallowed.</p>

In equity. . The case was as follows: [Logan] Hunton, the defendant, brought an action at law in the Fourth district court forthe parish of Orleans, against the commercial firm of Pilcher & Goodrich, the Goodrich of said firm being the complainant in this; case. In said action ,Hunton, on the 23d day of January, 1874, recovered a judgment against said firm for 82,500, with interest at eight per cent, from May 1, 1861.

This was a libel in personam, by James E. Goodrich and others, against John Norris, master of the schooner John I. Adams, to recover damages for the breach of a contract of affreightment.

In equity. The plaintiffs in these cases [Horace P. Goodrich and others] were the assignees in bankruptcy of Hiram J. Messenger.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

- B. Goodsell and others against H. S. Briggs and others]. The original bill was against the appraisers of certain importations of the complainants.

In bankruptcy. The district court, on .the motion of the assignee, expunged the claim of the Valley National Bank on the note for $6,000 held by it, made by Goodwin, Behr, & Co., bankrupts, to the order of Gustavus Hoeber, and by him endorsed to the bank for value. The bank appeals from this order. The further facts appear in the following opinion of the district court:

In equity. Bill asking specific performance of the terms of a stipulation given by the respondents [David G. Cartwright and others] to the orator [Asahel Goodwin] that the former would satisfy and discharge a judgment against the latter, which they have refused to do.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of William P. Goodwin.] By the Register: I,Isaiah T. Williams, the registerof this •court in bankruptcy, to whom has been referred the above-entitled matter, do hereby •certify to this honorable court, that George V. House, of 683 Broadway, in the city of New York, was on the 9th day of July, A. D. 1869, duly elected assignee of the estate of the above-named bankrupt, and duly executed the bond required by the 13th section of the act, and…

This was an action of covenant for nonpayment of a certain sum of money, the consideration for a tract of land lying in the state of New York.

[This was a libel in rem by Ebenezer Goodwin and others against the tug C. Durant for damages for negligence.] The libelants, owners of the bark Elizabeth, sue to recover $212.50 damages, alleging that in October, 1856, they employed the tug to tow the bark to sea, and that in doing so she carelessly towed the bark against a schooner, injuring the bark to the amount of $100, and the schooner to the amount of $112.50, which the libelants had to pay.

This was a writ of error from the judgment of the district court, in an action of debt, brought by the United States against [John] Goodwin, under the 66th section of the “Act to regulate,the collection of duties on imports and tonnage,” March 2, 1799 [1 Stat. 677], for the value of certain goods alleged to have been fraudulently entered.

<p>Case No. 5,655.</p> <p>Patents — Marking Articles — Act oe March 2, 1861 — Damages—Burden of Proof — Penalty—. Parties to Suit in Equity — Verification by Equitable Owner of Patent.</p> <p>1. Section 13 of the act of March 2, 1861 [12 Stat. 249], does not require that the bill should aver that the patentee had marked the articles made or vended under the patent as required by the statute.</p> <p>2. To prevent the recovery of damages under that -statute it must appear, either from the bill or in the proofs, that the patentee has made or vended the articles under the patent.</p> <p>3. The burden of proof is upon the defendant to show a failure on the part of the patentee to mark, as required by the statute, articles made or vended under the patent. If this be shown, the burden of proof is upon the patentee, to show that before suit was brought, the defendant was notified that he was infringing the patent, and that he continued, after such notice, to make and vend the patented article.</p> <p>[Cited in Schofield v. Dunlop, 42 Fed. 325.]</p> <p>4. The penalty imposed by the statute for a failure to mark patented articles is only the taking away of the right to recover damages in the suit. It does not affect the right to an injunction, either perpetual or provisional.</p> <p>[Cited in Putman v. Sudhoff, Case No. 11,483; New York Pharmical Ass’n v. Tilden, 14 Fed. 741; Anderson v. Monroe, 55 Fed. 404; Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U. S. 244,14 Sup. Ct. 578.]</p> <p>5. Whether the statute applies to a suit in equity, or any other suit, except an action brought under section 14 of the act of July 4, 1836 [5 Stat. 123], quaere.</p> <p>6. The plaintiff in a suit in equity does not recover damages.</p> <p>7. The practice is well settled that it is proper, in a suit in equity on a patent, to join as plaintiff with the owner of a legal title to the patent, the party who is immediately injured by the infringement, and who is equitably entitled to the fruits of the recovery in the suit.</p> <p>[Cited in Black v, Allen, 42 Fed. 621;]</p> <p>8. The bill may be verified by the equitable owner of the patent, and a verification by the holder of the legal title is not necessary.</p>

This was a bill in equity, filed [by Henry B. Goodyear, administrator, and Samuel A. Duncan] to restrain the defendant [Archibald Berry] from infringing letters patent [No. 8,075] for an “improvement in the manufacture of India rubber,” granted to Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, deceased, May 6,1851, and surrendered and reissued May 18, 1858, in two divisions, numbered 556 and 557, respectively.

Bill in equity [by Charles Goodyear and others] to recover damages for the infringement of a patent right. Charles Goodyear was the inventor and patentee of an improved process for the manufacture of India-rubber, and the other complainants were grantees and licensees under him, of the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to others to be used, the said improvement for making clothing.

This was an action on the case tried before Judge SHIPMAN and a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 3,633] granted to Charles Goodyear June 15, 1844, and reissued [No. 156] December 25, 1849, for “improvement in processes for the manufacture of India rubber.” So much of this invention as covered the right to manufacture wearing apparel for men and boys, of rubber cloth, was conveyed, by license, to Jonathan Trotter for $10,000, and a royalty…

<p>Case No. 6,658.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement— Suit fob Benefit of Exclusive Licensee — Indemnity against Costs — Nominal Plaintiff.</p> <p>1. Where an action at law for the infringement of letters patent is brought in the name of the holder of the legal title to the patent, but for the benefit or a party who is an exclusive licensee, under the patent, of the right to make a particular article, the suit will not be discontinued on the application of the defendant and the consent of the nominal plaintiff.</p> <p>[Cited in Nelson v. McMann, Case No. 10,109; Brush-Swan Electric Light Co. v. Thomson-Houston Electric Co., 48 Fed. 226; Brush Electric Co. v. Electric Imp. Co. of San José, 49 Fed. 74; Same v. California Electric Light Co., 3 C. C. A. 368, 52 Fed. 961.]</p> <p>[Cited in Jackson v. Allen, 120 Mass. 77.]</p> <p>2. The nominal plaintiff may claim indemnity against costs, and the court, on a proper application, will provide for it</p>

This was a bill for an injunction and for an account of profits made by defendant by an alleged infringement of a patent. The original patent [No. 8,075] was granted to Nelson Goodyear, for an improvement in the manufacture of India rubber, on the 6th of May,' 1851. On the 18th of May, T858, this patent was surrendered by Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, and two reissues obtained, Nos. 556 and 557, one for the process and one for the product.

This was a bill in equity, filed by the plaintiff [Charles Goodyear] against George O. Bourn and William W. Brown, of Providence, Rhode Island, and John Griswold and two others, of New York. The bill was founded on letters patent [No. 3,633] granted to the plaintiff June 15th, 1844, and reissued to him December 25th 1849 [No. 156], commonly known as the “vulcanizing patent.'” for vulcanizing India rubber.

<p>Case No. 5,562.</p> <p>Patents — Construction — “Shikked or Corru gated Goods” — Evidence — Acts and Admissions op the Parties — Transfer op Exclusive Rights — “Renewals. ”</p> <p>1. The meaning of the terms “shirred or corrugated goods,” as used in certain agreements made between Charles Goodyear and Horace H. Day, in 1846, defined.</p> <p>2. Where certain terms are used in a grant, which have a well-known general meaning, such meaning must, in the interpretation oí such grant, be given to the terms used, unless it appears that some other or different meaning was intended by them.</p> <p>3. If such general meaning appears clearly from the grant itself, extraneous evidence will not be resorted to.</p> <p>4. It is not to be presumed that a grantor intends to grant more than he has a right to grant, or that a grantee intends to receive, by way of grant, that to which he has a full right without a grant.</p> <p>5. In giving an interpretation to a particular clause of a deed, every part of the deed must be looked to.</p> <p>[Cited in Straat v. Uhrig, 56 Mo. 482; Mayor of New York v. Starin, 106 N. Y. 19, 12 N. E. 631.]</p> <p>6. Acts and admissions of the parties to a deed, subsequently to its execution, are legitimate evidence to show what they then admitted to be the meaning of certain terms used in the deed, in order to ascertain the meaning of those terms, when those terms are ambiguous.</p> <p>7. A patentee, by an agreement executed by him, July 18th, 1844, transferred the exclusive right, under his patent, for the unexpired terms of all “patents or renewals of patents owned by him, or in which he may have an interest, issued or to be issued:” Held, that the term “renewal” carried the right to extensions of such patents, including extensions of patents issued to him.</p> <p>8. The case of Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. [45 U. S.] 646, commented on and explained.</p>

This was a motion for a provisional injunction to restrain defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 3,633] granted to Charles Goodyear June 15, 1844, and reissued [No. 156] December 25, 1S49, for “improvement in processes for the manufacture of India rubber,” the exclusive use to employ which, in the manufacture of car springs, had been granted to the New England Car Spring Company. The claims are given in the report of the case of Goodyear v. Dunbar [Case No. 5,570].

<p>This was a bill in equity, filed by Charles Goodyear and four foreign corporations, two of New Jersey and two of Connecticut, against Edwin M. Chaffee and George O. Bourn, both of Providence, Rhode Island, and John Griswold and another of New York. The bill was founded on letters patent ' [No. 3,633J granted to Goodyear, June 15th, 1844, and reissued to him December 25th, 1849, [No'. 156], commonly known as the “vulcanizing patent,” for vulcanizing India rubber. It averred that, in July, 1848, those corporations became, by an agreement with Goodyear, which was recorded in the patent office in August, 1S48, and which was still in force, the owners of the exclusive right to make and sell India rubber shoes under the patent; that Chaffee had notice of such agreement before he committed the infringements complained of; that those corporations were now in the enjoyment of the rights they had acquired under that agreement; that, since the reissue, Chaffee and Bourn, as partners with or interested with William W. Brown, of Providence, under the firm of E. M. Chaffee & Co., had made and sold shoes of vulcanized India rubber, in violation of the patent and of the rights of tlie plaintiffs; that, in June, 1853, 30,000 pairs of such shoes, made by the firm of E. M. ' Chaffee & Co., and the title to which was in I them, had come into the posselsion of the other two defendants to be shipped to Europe for sale; that the four corporations had, for ■ many years, been in the habit of sending •large quantities of vulcanized India rubber shoes .to Europe for sale, and of paying the plaintiff Goodyear a tariff on them; that the sale of the shoes in question would injure the plaintiffs; and that the members of the firm of E. M. Chaffee & Co. were unable to respond in damages. The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain Chaffee and Bourn from making, using, or selling any articles in violation of the patent. The plaintiffs now moved for an injunction. It appeared that all the shoes made or sold by E. M. Chaffee & Co., were made and sold at Providence, Rhode Island. The defendant Bourn was not served with process. The defendant Chaffee was served in New York. It appeared that he had gone to New York in pursuance of a summons served upon him in Rhode Island, by the United States marshal there, to attend this court as a witness on the trial of a suit pending therein; that the sole purpose of his going to New York was to attend this court as a witness in that suit, and that he remained in New York for that pujóse only; that he attended the court while that suit was on trial, as a witness therein; that, while so attending, and while the court was in session, and while that suit was on trial, he was served with the subpoena in this suit, in the court room, and in the actual presence of the court. It was, therefore, urged by the defendant Chaffee, in opposition to the motion for injunction, that he had not been regularly brought into court. Both Bourn and Chaffee had appeared and answered the bill.</p>

<p>This was a bill in equity, brought by [Charles Goodyear] a citizen of Connecticut against [Horace H. Day] a citizen of New York, and a corporation created by the laws of New York, and four other citizens of New York, as corporators of said corporation. The defendants demurred to the bill. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,566.</p> <p>2. The publication of an invention on discovery by a defective specification is not an abandonment.</p>

This was a case in equity for the infringement of a patent right in the manufacture of vulcanized India rubber. The bill prayed a perpetual injunction. The answer denied the allegations, and concluded by praying “a trial by jury of the various issues of fact formed by it.” The argument involved many interesting inquiries; but facts were so interfused throughout the whole case, in the questions of law, that these last have not been found very capable of being reported.

<p>In equity. The bill in this case was founded upon a special agreement entered into between the plaintiff [Charles Goodyear] and the defendant [Horace H. Day] on the 29th of October, 1846, adjusting several suits pending between them concerning patent-rights-claimed by the plaintiff relative to the manufacture of India-rubber. It charged a breach of the agreement, and prayed an account, &c. The plaintiff now moved for an - injunction. The facts appear by the opinion of the court.</p>

This was a motion [by Charles Goodyear and the New England Car Spring Company] for a provisional injunetion, to restrain the infringement of letters patent [No. 3,633] granted to Charles Goodyear, June 15, 1S44, and reissued [No. 15G] December 25, 1849. The process consisted in mixing rubber and sulphur in certain proportions, and subjecting the compound to a high degree of. heat.

In equity. This was a motion for a provisional injunction to restrain the defendant [George Evans] from infringing letters patent [No. 8,075] for an “improvement in the manufacture of India-rubber,” granted to Nelson Goodyear, May 6, 1S51, reissued in two divisions, Nos. 556 and 557, to Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, deceased, and. extended to said administrator for seven years from May 6, 1865.

In equity. There were two motions, made in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, for provisional injunctions to restrain the defendant from infringing two separate patents, the legal title to which was vested in different parties, who held both in trust for the use of the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company.

In equity. This was a motion for a provisional injunction, to restrain defendant from infringing letters patent [No. 8.075] for an “improvement in the manufacture of India rubber,” granted to Nelson Goodyear May 6, 1851, re-issued to Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, deceased, May 18, 185S, in two divisions [Nos. 550 and 557], and extended to Henry B. Goodyear, for seven years from May 0. 1805.

In equity. These were motions, on the part of complainants [Henry B. Goodyear,' administrator of Nelson Goodyear, deceased, and Samuel A. Duncan] for provisional in-1 junctions, to restrain the defendants [M. F. .Hullihen, Charles Wingerter, and Thomas Lunsford] from infringing reissued letters patent Nos. 556 and 657, granted to Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, deceased, May 6, 1851, and more particularly referred to in the report of the case of Goodyear…

This was a motion for leave to file an amended replication to a plea of puis darrein continuance. ¿The action was case for the infringement of letters patent [No. 3,633] granted to the plaintiff [Charles Goodyear] for improvements in the manufacture of India-rubber. The plea was put in in September, 1851, by [Charles] McBurney and Cheever, two of the defendants.

<p>Case Wo. 6,576.</p> <p>Patents — Law op 1793 — Prior Use — Improvements.</p> <p>1. A patent, under the law of 1793 [1 Stat. 318], is valid, although the invention may have been in use for years anterior to the patent, if the patentee was the original inventor.</p> <p>[Cited in Treadwell v. Bladen, Case No. 14,-154; Whitney v. Emmett, Id. 17,585; Shaw v. Cooper, -7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 317.]</p> <p>2. A patent for an entire machine is valid, although the invention consists only of an improvement on suc-h machine; but. the patentee is entitled to an exclusive use of no more than his improvement. -</p> <p>[Cited in Treadwell v. Bladen, Case No. 14,r 154.]</p> <p>[Cited in Rheem v. Holliday, 16 Pa. St, 350.]</p>

<p>In equity. These were separate motions for attachments against the two defendants [William Mullee and John Miller] for alleged violations of an injunction. The injunction was a perpetual injunction, issued on the 18th of October, 1866, in pursuance of a decree made .on a final hearing in this' cause. The injunction restrained the defendants from '“making, manufacturing and selling, in violation of” letters patent of the United States, reissued on the 18th of May, 1S5S, to Henry B. Goodyear, as administrator of the estate of Nelson Goodyear, deceased, for “a new and useful improvement in the manufacture of India rubber,” and known and distinguished as reissues Nos. 556 and 557, and extended for seven years from May 6, 1865, “any combs or other articles which are made and manufactured of India rubber, or other vulcanizable gum, mixed, with sulphur, or any equivalent therefor, either with or without auxiliary ingredients, in the proportion of one pound of India rubber, or other vulcanizable gum. to about from four ounces to a pound of sulphur, and then subjecting such mixture of India rubber, or other vulcanizable gum, and sul-phur, or any equivalent therefor, to a high degree of artificial heat, substantially as described and claimed in the said two reissued letters patent.” [The original patent, No. 8,075, was granted to N. Goodyear, May 6, 1851.] This injunction was served on the der fendant Mullee on the 6th of November. 1S66, and on the .defendant Miller on the 20th of December 1866.</p>

This was a motion [by Henry B. Goodyear, as administrator, etc., and Conrad Poppenhu-sen] for attachments against the defendants [William Mullee and John Miller] already referred to in the report of the case of Goodyear v. Mullee [Case No. 5,577]. The matter having been referred to a master to take testimony as to the intention of the defendants in violating the injunction, the case came up upon his report.

This was a bill in equity filed [by Henry B. Goodyear and Conrad Poppenhusen] to restrain the defendants [William Mullee, J. H. McLellan, H. M. Hover, and others] from infringing letters patent [No. 8,075] for an “improvement in the manufacture of rubber,” granted to Nelson Goodyear, May 6, 1851, and reissued and extended to Henry B. Goodyear, administrator, in two divisions known as reissues 556 and 557, and more particularly referred to in the cases of Goodyear v. New York…

This was a bill in equity filed [by Henry B. Goodyear and Conrad Poppenhusen] to restrain the defendants [the New York Gutta Percha & India Rubber Vulcanite Company and others] from infringing letters patent [No. 8,075] for an.“improvement in the manufacture of India rubber,” granted to Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, deceased, May 6,1851, and surrendered and reissued May 18, 185S, in two divisions, numbered 556 and 557 respectively.

In equity. This was an application [by Charles Goodyear and the New England Car-Spring Company] for a provisional injunction [against Anson G. Phelps and others] to restrain an infringement of letters patent [No. 3,633], granted to Charles Goodyear, June 15th, 1844, and reissued December 25th, 1849 [Nos. 156 and 157], for an “improvement, in India-rubber fabrics.” It appeared that five of the defendants were stockholders in and directors of a Connecticut corporation; that…

<p>Case Wo. 5,583.</p> <p>Patents — Equity — Feignbi> Issue — Verdict or Jury — State Regulations — Practice in Federal Courts — Bill Filed by Executor — Specification of Patent — Reissue—Act of March 8, 1837 — Patentability of Both Product and Process — Decision of Commissioner of Patents — Proceeding to Set Aside Patent — Fraud.</p> <p>1. The general rule is, that an interlocutory order for issues to a jury in an equity suit will not be directed until the proofs are taken and publication has passed.</p> <p>2. It is not indispensably necessary, as a matter of law, in any case, that any question in an equity suit in a federal court should be sent to a jury.</p> <p>3. When feigned issues are directed by the court sitting in equity, it is generally done upon the ground that the evidence in the record is not of a character, or not sufficient to afford the means of a satisfactory conclusion; but the verdict of the jury is only advisory, and may be set aside or even overruled.</p> <p>[Cited in Garsed v. Beall, 92 U. S. 695; Johnson v. Harmon, 94 U. S. 378.] '</p> <p>4. State regulations to the extent that they define the rules of property are regarded as furnishing the rule of decision, but they do not control or affect the process or practice of the federal courts.</p> <p>5.The equity practice of the federal courts, when not controlled by an act of congress or the rules prescribed by the supreme court, is in general regulated by the chancery practice of the parent country as it existed prior to the adoption of what are called the “New Rules.”</p> <p>[Cited in Every v. Candee, Case No. 4,583; Griswold v. Bragg, 48 Fed. 520.]</p> <p>[Cited in Griswold v. Bragg, 48 Conn. 579.)</p> <p>C. In this case the bill of complaint was not founded on the title of the original patentee, but on the derivative title of the first-named complainant, to whom, as executor of the pat-entee deceased, the patent was reissued; therefore, objection to the right of the complainants to maintain their bill, because only one of the persons named as executors in the last will and testament of the original patentee was made party to the bill, cannot be sustained.</p> <p>[Cited in Carew v. Boston Elastic Fabric Co., Case No. 2,397; Thomas v. Shoe Mach. Manuf’g Co., Id. 13,911.]</p> <p>[See' note at end of case.]</p> <p>7. The reissued patent, under these circumstances, is a new contract between the government and the executor, since the decease of the original patentee.-</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>8. Where other persons named as executors did not join with the complainant in proving the will of an original patentee, or in the surrender or reissue of the original patent, they need not be made parties to a bill of complaint for the infringement of the said reissued patent.</p> <p>[Cited in Grover & B. S. M. Co. v. Florence S. M. Co., 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 579.]</p> <p>9. The objection to the maintenance of a bill in equity founded on letters-patent, that the specification did not set forth the invention in such full, clear, and exact terms as would enable any person skilled in the art to practise the invention, is not open to the defendants, when no such defence is set up in their answer, and the record fihows that application was made to the court to amend in that particular.</p> <p>[Cited in Jennings v. Pierce, Case .No. 7,283.]</p> <p>10. Under the fifth section of the act of March 3, 1837 [5 Stat. 10], when a patent is properly returned for correction and reissue, the patent office is authorized to reissue the original in several parts, if the patentee desires it, and pays the additional sum or sums required by law.</p> <p>[Cited in Fassett v. Ewart Manuf’g Co., 58 Fed. 365.]</p> <p>11. A new product or article of manufacture, and the process by which the same is produced, may be the proper subjects of separate patents.</p> <p>[Cited in Merrill v. Yeomans. Case No. 9,-472; Milligan & Higgins Glue Co. v. Upton, Id. 9,607. Applied in Badisehe Anilin & Soda Fabrik v. Hamilton Manuf’g Co., Id. 721; Tucker v. Dana, 7 Fed. 214. Cited in Judd v. Fowler, 10 C. C. A. 100, 61 Fed. 821.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]’</p> <p>12. An inventor claimed “curing caoutchouc or India-rubber, by subjecting it to a high degree of artificial heat”; also “curing the compound of India-rubber, sulphur, and a carbonate or other salt or oxide of lead, by subjecting the same to the action of artificial heat”; but in the descriptive part of the specification declined to limit himself to the exact compound last named, and set out others. A reissue of the patent claimed “a combination of India-rubber with sulphur, with or without other ingredients, chemically altered by the application of heat.” It was held, that the latter claim, when construed in the light of the description, was not invalid by reason of embracing more than the former.-</p> <p>[Cited in Cahart v. Austin, Case No. 2,288; Carew v. Boston Elastic Fabric Co., Id. 2,-307; Smith v. Merriam, 6 Fed. 718.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>13. The reissued patent having been issued in two parts, one claiming a process and the other the product thereof, the claim for the process, when construed in view of both the earlier and later specifications, was held not to be broader than the corresponding claim in the original, in so far as it claimed mixing with the rubber other ingredients than sulphur; but the second claim of the reissue was held void, because it included not only India-rubber when compounded with sulphur and subjected to artificial heat but other vulcanizable gums, — no other gums having been described in the original patent nor in.the one to which the claim was appended.</p> <p>[Cited in Carew v. Boston Elastic Fab. Co., 'Case No. 2,397; Jones v. Sewall, Id. 7,495; Wonson v. Peterson, Id. 17,934; Atwood v. Portland Co., 10 Fed. 287.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>14. The commissioner of patents has full power to examine and decide upon, an application for reissue; and as there is no provision made for an appeal, the decision must in general be regarded as conclusive in all collateral proceedings.</p> <p>[Cited in Tucker v. Burditt, Case No. 14,-216; In re Day, 27 Fed. 080.]</p> <p>15. In a proceeding between the government and a patentee to set the patent aside, or in an application for an extension, proof of fraud is conclusive, but it must be clear and satisfactory.</p> <p>16. In this case, proof that the extension was obtained by fraud, was held insufficient; but if it had been full, it would not have availed the respondents, because they were shown to have consented to the act3 complained of.</p> <p>[Cited in Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 543.]</p> <p>17. After the originality of Charles Goodyear’s invention has been repeatedly affirmed by the circuit courts of the United States, and there has been no effort made to call .the decisions in question, under the circumstances of this case, those decisions were followed by this court.</p> <p>18. Construction of the license under which the defendants claimed to manufacture the articles covered by the complainants’ patents.</p> <p>[19. Cited in Ivelleher v. Darling, Case No. 7,653, to the point that patents, in certain cases, may be good in part and void in part, the rule being that whenever a patentee, through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention, has claimed more than that of which he was the original inventor, his patent shall be valid for all that part which is truly and justly his own, provided the same be a material or substantial part of the thing patented.]</p> <p>[NOTE. An appeal was then taken to the supreme court, and two motions were made,— the first by the appellees, to dismiss the appeal as not having been taken to the proper term; and the other by the appellants, to reduce the amount of the bond given on appeal. The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Chase, who said that although a decree was entered “as” of a prior date, the date of an order settling apparently the terms of a decree to be entered later, the rights of the parties in respect to the appeal are to be determined by the date of the actual entry of the final decree. He also said that security was not required in double the amount of the decree, but only that it be sufficient. 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 153. The case was then heard on its. merits, and the judgment was affirmed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Swayne. He said that, where a patent was granted to one executor, he could maintain a suit thereon as if he had been designated in the patent as trustee instead of executor. This is a specific grant by the government, and vests the legal title exclusively in him. In a reissue, the claim may be enlarged, or restricted so as to give it validity, and secure the invention. A process and the product may both be the subject of a patent, as being wholly disconnected, and independent of each other. 9 Wall. (70 U. S.) 788.</p> <p>[For other cases involving these patents, see note to Goodyear v. Central R. Co., Case No. 5.503.]</p>

Tljis was a motion ■ [by Henry B. Goodyear and others] for a provisional injunction to restrain the defendant [T. S. Rust], who was a dentist, from infringing letters patent reissued to Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, deceased,’May 18, 1858, and more particularly referred to in the report of the case.of Goodyear v. Berry [Case No. 5,556].

This was a bill in equity, alleging the infringement of letters patent, by repeated sales of the patented article, and prayed for a discovery, for an injunction, and for an account of profits.

<p>Case No. 5,586.</p> <p>Patents — License—Bill in Equity — Enforcement of Covenants — Jurisdiction of Federal Courts.</p> <p>Where a license was granted under a patent, with covenants that the licensee should pay certain tariffs, and keep correct accounts, and permit his books to be examined, but there was no express provision • that, if the covenants were broken, the rights granted should revert to the licensor, and a bill was filed by the licensor against the licensee, praying for a decree that the covenants should be performed, and for an injunction to prevent the use of the patent, under the license, until the covenants should be performed, and the citizenship of the parties did not give to the court jurisdiction of the suit: Bdd, that the subject-matter did not give the ■court jurisdiction; that the suit was not one to prevent the violation of any right of the licen-sor, secured by any law of the United States, within section 17 of the patent act of July 4, 1836 (5 Stat. 124), but was one to prevent the violation of the rights secured by the Covenants; and that the court had no jurisdiction of the case.</p> <p>[Cited in Merserole v. Union Paper Collar Co., Case No. 9,488; Magic Ruffle Co. v. Elm City Co., Id. 8,949; Dowell v. Griswold, Id. 4,041; Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S. 554; White v. Lee. 3 Fed. 224. Applied in Teas v. Albright, 13 Fed. 412. Cited in Albright v. Teas, 106 U. S. 620, 1 Sup. Ct. 556.] .</p>

This was a bill in equity, filed [by Henry B. Goodyear and others] to restrain the defendant [Thomas G. Wait] from infringing letters patent [No. 8,075] for an “improvement in the manufacture of India rubber,” granted to Nelson Goodyear, May 6, 1851, reissued in two divisions numbered 556 and 557, May 18, 185S, and extended for seven years from May 6, 1865, to Henry B. Goodyear, administrator of Nelson Goodyear, deceased.

[This was a bill in equity by the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company against Charles G. Davis and 67 other defendants for alleged infringement of certain patents.]

This was a bill in equity-filed to restrain the defendant [Benoni E. Gardiner] from infringing letters patent [No. 43,009] for “improvement in artificial gums and palates,” granted to John A. Cummings, June 7, 1854, and subsequently reissued and assigned to complainants [March 21, 1865, No. 1,904]. • The nature of the invention, and the claims of the original and reissued patents, are set forth in the report of the case of Dental Vul-canite Co. v. Wetherbee [Case No. 3,810].…

<p>[This was a bill in equity by the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company and others against Eben M. Flagg.]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by the Goodyear .Dental Vulcanite Company against Charles H. Osgood, Denison D. Dickinson, and George A. Lowe.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,696.</p> <p>Patents — Improvement in Artificial Gums and Palates — Infringement.</p> <p>1. The reissued letters patent granted to the Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Company,. March 21st, 1865, originally issued to John A. Cummings, June 7th, 1864, for an “improvement in artificial gums and palates,” the validity of which was settled in Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486, are infringed when parts of hard rubber plates of teeth are replaced by new parts, made of the materials and according to the mode described in the patent.</p> <p>[Cited in Banker v. Bostwick, 3 Fed. 518.]</p> <p>2. The patent is also infringed, when the hard rubber plate formed and holding teeth in the manner prescribed in the patent is made, although it is mounted on a gold plate, which goes between it and the mouth, so that it does not touch the surface of the mouth. ’</p> <p>3. The use of celluloid and rose pearl, in making plates in the manner described in the patent instead of -hard rubber, held to be an infringement, although, in a prior case, in another circuit, such use was held to be not an infringement, but on different evidence.</p> <p>[See Case No. 5,589.]</p>

<p>Case Mo. 5,698.</p> <p>Patents — Impkovement in Artificial Gums and Palates — Abandonment to Public.</p> <p>1. The claim of the patent, for improvement in artificial gums and palates, was for “the plate of hard rubber or vulcanite or its equivalent, for holding artificial teeth, or teeth and gums, substantially as described.’’ The specification described the method whereby the plate is formed, and the teeth, gums, etc., embedded in it: Eeld, following Dental Vulcanite Co; v. Wetherbee [Case No. 3,810], and Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Gardiner [Id. 5,591], that the invention patented, was the described product and manufacture, by the means described in the specification.</p> <p>[Cited in Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Root, Case No. 5,597; Same v. Flagg, Id. 5,590.]</p> <p>2. In 1856, an application for a patent was improperly rejected. The inventor did not withdraw his application, or in any manner acquiesce in the rejection, nor did he appeal from the commissioner, but he pressed his claim for a patent, from time to time, as his circumstances allowed, until 1864, when he made a new application: Held, that the patentee, neither lost, nor did the public acquire against him, any rights by their unauthorized use of his invention during the time between the two applications.</p> <p>3. The reissued patent, for an improvement in artificial gums and palates, granted to the Dental Vulcanite Company, assignee of John A. Cummings, March 2lst, 1S65, held valid.</p> <p>[Followed in Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Root, Case No. 5.597. Cited in Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Willis, Id. 5,603; Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, Id. 5,589; Colgate v. Western Union Tel. Co., Id. 2,995; Dederick v. Cassell, 9 Fed. 30S; Schultz Belting Co. v. Willemsen Belting Co., 40 Fed. 157.]</p>

These were bills in equity, filed against the defendants [Albert E. Root, Perry.

<p>Case No. 6,600.</p> <p>Patents — Infkingement — Awabd op Damages— How Computed — No Pkofit by Defendant as a Defense.</p> <p>1. The principle’ on which damages are to be awarded for violation of patent rights, considered.</p> <p>2. In applying the provision of the statute, that, in a suit in equity, the court may award, “in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained thereby,” it is pertinent to inquire how the owner of the patent has seen fit to use his invention. He may retain a close monopoly of it, and then the damages are computed by investigating the defendant’s profits, which are reckoned a fair criterion of the complainant’s loss. Or he may grant license fees, allowing the benefits of his invention to every one who will pay a stipulated price for its use, in which case the amount of the license fee fixed by the complainant is usually considered a proper compensation in damages, except in those cases where the evidence warrants an allowance of exemplary or punitive damages by reason of a wanton infringement.</p> <p>[Cited in Buerk v. Imhaeuser, Case No. 2,-107.]</p> <p>3.In a suit for infringing a patent it is no'-' answer to a claim of damages that the defendant made no profits by his infringement.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,601.</p> <p>Libel — Answer—Leave to Amend — Inadvertence.</p> <p>In an action for damages for publishing a libel, the answer omitted to deny statements in the complaint as to the manner in which the plaintiff was damaged and as to the amount of the damages sustained. The defendant was allowed to amend the answer, by denying such statements, on the ground that the omission to deny them ought to have been regarded by the plaintiff as inadvertent.-</p>

This was an action at law in the nature of trespass on the case for maintenance. The declaration alleged the granting of letters-patent [No. 43,009], dated June 7, 1864, to-John A, Cummings, for an improvement in artificial gums and palates, and two reissues of the patent, and assignments vesting in the plaintiff the title to the last reissue, dated March 21, 1865 (No. 1,904).

In equity. This was a bill filed against the defendant [George Willis], a dentist, for infringement of re-issued letters patent No. 1,904, granted to the Dental Vulcanite Company, assignee of John A. Cummings, for improvement in artificial gums and palates.” The claim in the patent is for “the plate of hard rubber or vulcanite, or ■ its equivalent, for holding artificial teeth, or teeth and gums, substantially as described.” Cummings filed his caveat May 14, 1852.

In bankruptcy. Petition by the assignee of a bankrupt to expunge and disallow the claim of a creditor, proved, and allowed against the bankrupt estate by the register, tipon the ground that the bankrupt and creditor were copartners and not debtor and creditor. The creditor by answer denied the co-partnership, and proofs were taken. The matter was heard by the court, all right of appeal being waived.

<p>Case No. 5,605.</p> <p>Patents — Photographic Shield —Infringement —Bill Brought After Expiration of Patent-—Account of Profits — Bill of Discovert— Assignment of Patent bt Receiver.</p> <p>1. The letters patent granted to Ebenezer Gordon, October 19th, 1858, for “a photographic shield,” are valid.</p> <p>2. Although a suit in equity for the infringement of a patent is brought after the patent has expired, and no injunction can be granted, and the bill is not a bill of discovery, the court has jurisdiction to award an account of profits, and. can take cognizance of the suit.</p> <p>[Cited in Atwood v. Portland Co., 10 Fed. 284; Consolidated Oil Well Pack°r Co. v. Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co., 12 Fed. 870.]</p> <p>[Cited in Carver v. Peck, 131 Mass. 294.]</p> <p>3. A bill without interrogatories, under the amendment to rule 40 in equity, made at the-December term, 1850, and which prays only for a disclosure of gains and profits from infringement, is not a bill of discovery.</p> <p>4. The case of Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. [58 U. S.] 455, examined and explained.</p> <p>5. An assignment of an interest in a patent, made by a receiver, appointed by a state court, of the property of the owner of the patent, conveys no title to the assignee, because the assignment is not a written instrument, signed by the owner of the patent.</p> <p>[Cited in Secombe v. Campbell, 5 Fed. 806; Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 131; Adams v. Howard, 22 Fed. 658.]</p> <p>[Disapproved in Wilson v. Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co., 151 Mass. 520, 24 N. E. 186.]</p>

[This was a suit by George W. Gordon and his administrator against George S. Coolidge and his trustees.] This case came before the court upon a disclosure of the trustees, McGaw and Hatch. The facts upon which it turns are as follows: McGaw and Hatch are attorneys at law and partners in business at Bangor. Previous to the month of October, 1831, Loring and Kup-fer, of Boston, sent to McGaw and Hatch a note of the defendant, Coolidge, for $358.56 and interest, for collection.

The bill sets out in substance the facts hereinafter detailed relating to a ground-rent sold by Snyder to Gordon.

Bill in equity [by Charles Gordon against Polly Hobart and another].

This was a bill in equity, brought [by Charles Gordon and others against Leavitt Hobart and Polly Hobart] to redeem certain parcels of land, which were separately mortgaged by three different and independent mortgages, by John Gordon (under whom the plaintiffs claimed by intermediate assignments), to John Hobart, since deceased, un•der whom the defendants claimed title.

Harry Gordon, being seized of the land in question in fee simple, on the 6th of March -1778, as well as on the 20th of March 1781; an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania was made, on the former day, attainting certain persons therein specially named, of high treason; and forfeiting their estates, unless they surrendered themselves by a certain day, and took their trial for high treason; and declaring that all persons, subjects or inhabitants of that state, or those who…

This was an ejectment [by the lessee of Harry Gordon against Kerr, Clossam and Lowry] to recover 299 acres of land. The plaintiff’s title was as follows: On the 17th of March, 1762, a warrant for 2000 acres of land was granted to Richard Peters, in consideration of services rendered to the proprietaries; and it recited a prior warrant, dated in 1754, which had not been executed.

<p>This is a bill in equity to redeem certain mortgaged premises, brought by the plaintiff [Jesse Gordon], as assignee of the mortgagor of the mortgaged premises, against the defendants [Arehelaus Lewis and the Portland Manufacturing Company], as assignees of the mortgagee. The bill charges, that Joshua Webb, on November 1st, 1808, mortgaged the premises to Mark Haskell; Haskell on the 31st of August, 1816, assigned the mortgage to the defendant, Lewis; and Lewis assigned the same to the Portland Manufacturing Company, on the 3d of August, 1831. It further charges, that the mortgagor, Webb, on the 14th of April, 1812, conveyed the mortgaged premises to John Gordon; and that John Gordon, on the 23d of January, 1832, conveyed the same to the plaintiff. It then alleges a tender, &c. &c., and prays an account and redemption. The answers of the defendants admit the mortgage of the premises, excepting an old gristmill, which is said to have belonged to Jonathan Webb, and the assignment of the same mortgage, as charged in the bill. They require proof of the plaintiff’s title; and then assert, as matter of defence, an entry into the premises after condition broken, for the purpose of foreclosure by Lewis, on or from and after the 16th of August, 1816, and open, and visible, and exclusive possession by him of the same for more than three years thereafter, and until his conveyance to the company, whereby he acquired an absolute title under such entry and foreclosure; and then , denies the right to any account, &c. &c. At the hearing, two questions arose: (1) Whether there had been any entry for condition broken and foreclosure, as asserted in the answers; (2) whether the defendants had shown any title to the-old mill, (called the Haskell Saw-Mill.)</p>

<p>This is a bill in equity to redeem certain mortgaged premises, brought by the plaintiff [Jesse Gordon], as assignee of the mortgagor of the mortgaged premises, against the defendants [Archelaus Lewis and the Portland Manufacturing Company], as assignees of the mortgagee. The bill charges, that Joshua Webb, on November 1st, 180S, mortgaged the premises to Marls Haslsell; Haskell on the 31st of August, 1816, assigned the mortgage to the defendant, Lewis; and Lewis assigned the same to the Portland Manufacturing Company, on the 3d of August, 1S31. It further charges that the mortgagor, Webb, on the 14th of April, 1812, conveyed the mortgaged premises to John Gordon; and that John Gordon, on the 23d of January; 1832, conveyed the same to the plaintiff. It then alleges a tender, &e. &c., and prays an account and redemption. The answers of the defendants admit the mortgage of the premises, excepting an old gristmill, which is said to have belonged to Jonathan Webb, and the assignment of the same mortgage, as charged in the bill. They require proof of the plaintiff’s title; and then assert, as matter of defence, an entry into the premises after condition broken, for the purpose of foreclosure by Lewis on, or from and after the 16th of August, 1816, and open and visible, and exclusive possession by him of the same for more than three years thereafter, and until his conveyance to the company, -whereby he acquired an absolute title under such entry and foreclosure; and then denies the right to any account, &c. &e. The cause was heard in May term, 1834, on the bill and answer, and a decree was awarded [Case No. 5,612] for a redemption of the mortgage, and for taking an account according to the prayer of the bill; and the cause was referred to a master to take an account, and to make due report thereof to the court. At this term, the cause came up again on exceptions taken by the defendants to the master’s report. The nature of the report, and the exceptions thereto, will sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity brought by Jesse Gordon, as assignee, against Archelaus Lewis and the Portland Manufacturing Company, for the redemption of certain mortgaged premises. The court rendered a decree in favor of the plaintiff, and referred the cause to a master to take an account Case No. 5,612.)</p> <p>This case was formerly before the court upon exceptions to the master’s report [Case No. 3,613). The decree thereupon entered at May term, 1835, was as follows:</p> <p>It is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court, that the report of the master Be, and do hereby stand confirmed, in all respects, in which it is not altered or varied by this present decree. And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, inasmuch as it appears in and by the report aforesaid, that the original mortgage to Mark Haskell in the proceedings mentioned, under which the defendants claim title by assignment thereof, has been long since satisfied and extinguished, that the said Portland Manfactur-ing Company, do forthwith and immediately, surrender and deliver up to the plaintiff, the possession of the premises: and, that unless the same be done, on or before the eighth day of September next, that a writ of possession, in the nature of a writ of habere facias possessionem, do issue from the clerk’s office in due form of law, for the possession of the same premises; and that the plaintiff also do have execution against the defendants, for his costs in the premises up to the present time. And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the said Daniel Fox and Josiah Pierce, as executors of the said Archelaus Lewis, do from the assets of the said Lewis in their hands, if any such there be, pay into court the sum of eighteen hundred and ninety-one dollars and five cents, being the amount of the surplus rents and profits received by the said Lewis, from and after the satisfaction and extinguishment of the said Haskell mortgage, viz. from and after the twenty-third day of April, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and eighteen, to the time of the sale of the said mortgaged premises to the said Portland Manufacturing Company, viz. to the third day of August, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and thirty-one. And that the said Portland Manufacturing Company do pay into court the sum of eighty-six dollars and ninety cents, being the amount of interest allowed by the master, as and for an occupation rent, or what might have been received by them, as rents and profits of the said mortgaged premises, since their purchase thereof as aforesaid. And it is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the charge of interest upon such surplus rents and profits received by the said Lewis according to the annual rents made by the master and contained in his report, he, and hereby is, under all the circumstances of the present case, disallowed. And it is further ordered; adjudged and decreed, that the said several sums of money so ordered to be paid into court, be so paid into court on or before the first day of October next, by the parties respectively; otherwise, process in the nature of an execution as for a specific performance, is to issue against the parties respectively for the same. But the said Fox and Pierce, executors as aforesaid, are to be at liberty at the term of this court, to be held on the first day of October next at Wiscasset, within and for this district of Maine; to show what assets they have in their hands, or whether they have any assets in their hands of the said Lewis to pay the said sum; and if they shall not appear at the said time and place, or shall not render a due account of the assets of said Lewis in their hands, as they shall be ordered and re-' quired by the court, then ‘they shall be taken to have confessed that the assets in their hands, are sufficient to pay the "sum aforesaid, and be held chargeable therewith accordingly. And all parties interested, or claiming an interest in the sums so to be paid into court, shall, when the same shall be so paid into court, be at liberty to apply by supplementary proceedings, to have their respective rights thereto ascertained and established. And all further orders and decrees are reserved for the consideration of the court.</p> <p>At May term, 1836, the executors of Arche-laus Lewis filed a petition to the court, in substance as follows:</p> <p>Josiah Pierce, of Gorham, in said district, .and Daniel Fox, of said Portland, executors of the last will and testament of Archelaus Lewis, late of Westbrook, in said district, respectfully represent, that at May term of this honorable court, A. D. 1835, in the suit in equity, in which Jesse Gordon was plaintiff against them and the Portland Manufacturing Company, they were ordered by the decree of said court, to pay into court $1,891.05, from the assets of said Lewis in their hands, if any such there be; with liberty for them to show to the court what assets they have in their hands, which they did at the last term of the court. That said sum of $1,896.05 was for rents, which accrued long before the conveyance was made by John Gordon to Jesse Gordon, as hereafter stated, and did not pass to said Jesse by said conveyance, but belonged to said John, and still belong to him, subject to the equitable claim, which they the said Pierce and Fox have against the same as executors of said Archelaus Lewis, as hereafter stated. And it was further ordered and decreed, that all parties interested, or claiming an interest, in the sum so to be paid into court shall, when the same is paid into court, be at liberty to apply by supplemental proceedings to have their respective rights thereto ascertained and established. And the said Pierce and Fox further represent, that although a deed was produced from John Gordon to said Jesse Gordon, under which said Jesse and his representatives pretend to claim said sum of $1,891.05, your petitioners have reason to believe, and do in fact believe, that said deed was given without consideration, and for the purpose of covering said property in the hands of said Jesse for the benefit of said John, he being in debt and insolvent. And, that whatever is paid under said decree, or the greater part of it, will go to the use and benefit of said John Gordon. That said John is largely indebted to them, the said Pierce and Fox, in their said capacity of executors of said Lewis, to wit, in the sum of $1,071 25, and was so indebted at and before the time hie made said deed to said Jesse Gordon, and at the time the rents accrued, which they are required to pay into court as aforesaid. That there is no mode in which they can obtain payment of the debt so due from said John Gordon to said Lewis’s estate, unless they can be permitted to deduct the same from the sum, which they are ordered to pay into court, or to receive the same out of said sum, by order and decree of this honorable court.</p>

<p>Motion by Mr. Law for defendant, to appear without ball.</p> <p>1st Because the defendant is a resident of Alexandria county, and has never resided in this county; and by the law of Maryland (1791, c. 43, § 14) cannot be arrested here until a non est has been returned in Alexandria county.</p> <p>2d. Because this is an action of debt upon a judgment in an action of debt in Virginia, in which bail was given. 1 Sell. Pr. 45; Col. lins v. Powell, 2 Term It. 757; Melan v. Fitz-james, 1 Bos. & P. 138. If this action had been brought in Virginia, he could not have been held to bail. Upon a foreign contract ■on which the defendant could not in that county be held to bail, no bail can be required here.</p> <p>3d. Because these suits were brought while other suits for the same cause were pending in Alexandria. Sell. Pr. 50.</p> <p>If the first suit be in a different court, bail shall be given. Davies v. Leckie, Barnes, Notes Cas. 94; Kendal v. Carey, 2 W. Bl. 768. The defendant ought to be put to his plea of abatement on the ground of other actions depending in Alexandria.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] In this case both parties appealed from* the decision of Judge Blatchford in the court below [Case No. 9,217]; the libelants [John Gordon and others], on the question of damages; and the respondents [the propeller Mary Vaughan and the steamboat Telegraph] upon the collision.

These were exceptions to the taxation of costs in bankruptcy, which are sufficiently explained in the opinion of the court.

[This was a suit in equity by George Gordon against the South Fork Canal Company.] A bill was exhibited in this case to enforce a statutory lien and for other objects. The defendant filed a plea setting forth the invalidity of the lien sought to be enforced.

<p>Case No. 5,622.</p> <p>Collision — Tug and Tow — Lights on Canal-Boat in Tow — Inspector’s Rules — Ferbt.</p> <p>1. The tug G. having towed three canal-boats out of a slip at Jersey City into the river, all three on her port hand in the neighborhood of the ferry from Desbrosses street, in order to take one of the boats, the N., on the other side, her lines were slacked and she was dropped back' till her stem was ten or fifteen feet from the sterns of the other two boats, and a line was made fast from her to one of the other boats. In this position the N. was run into by a ferryboat crossing from New York to Jersey City. When the approach of the ferry-boat was seen, the master of the N. hailed the tug to go ahead, but the hail was not heard. The master of one of the other boats went forward abreast of the pilot-house of the tug and spoke to the master of the tug, hut he failed to start his boat ahead in time to get the N. out of the way of the ferryboat, and the owner of the N. filed a libel against the tug to recover the damages sustained by the N. The N. had no light on her at the time of the collision, and was not seen by the ferry-boat in time: Held, that the place chosen by tie tug in which to shift the canal-boat was not well chosen, being in the track of the ferryboat, and that the master of the tug was bound to greater vigilance, therefore.</p> <p>2. The master of the tug was not as vigilant as he should have been, in that he did not see the approach of the ferry-ooat in time,' and did not start ahead with his tug when warned to do so.</p> <p>3. The tug was liable for the damages to the boat.</p> <p>4. It seems that the rules of the inspectors throw the duty of seeing that a boat in tow has a light upon the steam-tug and not on the boat, and that there is no such duty on the part of the boat to have a light that the failure to have one constitutes negligence on the part of the boat as regards the tug.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,623.</p> <p>Collision — Damages—Demurrage.</p> <p>A canal-boat, while on a voyage to Port Johnson, to take on board a cargo of coal which she had agreed to carry to MiddletownrConn., at a stipulated rate, was injured by a tug. which was held liable to pay the damages. The commissioner, to whom it was referred to ascertain the damage, reported as part of the damages $53 80, the estimated net freight which the boat would have earned. It was proved that the voyage in question would have taken fifteen days; that the boat was detained for repairs five days, and at the end of that time was again employed by her owner in her usual occupation: Held, that the owner of the boat was not entitled to recover the whole of the net freight, but only a proportionate part, viz., one-third of it.</p> <p>[Cited in The Belgenland, 36 Fed. 505; The City of Alexandria, 40 Fed. 699.]</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

This was an action on the case for an alleged infringement of a patent [No. 1,503, granted to the plaintiff, Chester Gorham, March 3, 1840] for “an improvement in the machine for pressing palm-leaf hats.” The defense set np was: First That defendants' [William Mixter and others) had not infringed; or, in other words, that the machine used by them was substantially different in its construction and mode of operation from the machine described in plaintiff’s specification of…

<p>Case No. 6,627.</p> <p>Patents poe a Design — Test op Inpeingement-—Resemblance.</p> <p>1. The letters patent granted to John Gor-ham, Gorham Thurber and Lewis Dexter, Jr., July 16th, 1861, for a design “for the handles of table-spoons and forks,” are not infringed by articles constructed, in design, in accordance with letters patent granted to Le Roy S. White, January 15th, 1$67, for a design for the handles of spoons and forks, or with letters patent granted to said White, March 31st, 1868, for a design for the handles of spoons and forks.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. The mere fact, that the resemblance between a patented design and another design is such ns to mislead ordinary purchasers and casual observers, and to induce them to mistake the latter design for the former, is not enough to make the use of the latter an infringement of tne patent. The test in regard to a patent for a design, on the question of its infringement is not the eye of an ordinary observer.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>3. The same principles which govern in determining the question of infringement in respect to a patent for an invention connected with the operation of machinery, must govern in determining the question of infringement in respect to a patent for a design.</p> <p>[Cited in Hartell v. Viney, Case No. 6,158.]</p> <p>4. The proper test is substantial identity, in view of the observation of a person versed in the business of designs, in the particular trade in question.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>5. A patent for a design must be for the means of producing a certain result or appearance, and not for the result or appearance itself.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. From this decree the Gorham Company appealed to the supreme court, where, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Strong, the decree was reversed. 14 Wall. (81 U. S.) 511. Justices Field, Miller, and Bradley dissented. The question as to-what constitutes identity of design was fully considered with the aid of the testimony of the experts, and the application of the language of the patent acts of August 29, 1842 (5 Stat. 543), and of March 2, 1861 (12 Stat. 246). „ .</p> <p>„ [The mode in which the appearance of a design is produced was held to have very little to do with the salability of it. The appearance itself is the test of popularity. The patent here was for the product, and not for the elements entering into it. It is the effect upon the eye which gives such an article value. Sameness of appearance is the true test of identity of design.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,630.</p> <p>Decedent’s Debts — Dormant Judgment — Suit on Appeal Bond — Return oe Sheriff —Ohio Code op 1S53.</p> <p>1. Under the statutes of Ohio, the widow and heirs of a deceased person, who are the recipients of property from the estate, are liable for his debts to the extent of such property, under the conditions and limitations of the statute.</p> <p>2. The courts of the United States take cognizance of cases .to enforce remedies given by a state statute, where the plaintiff who sues is a citizen of another state.- #</p> <p>3. Suit was brought, in 1S67, on an appeal bond executed in 1839, under the provisions of the statute of 1831 regulating judgments and executions which provided “that in all cases where judgment shall be rendered in the supreme court against the appellants . . . the successful party shall, before he brings suit on the appeal bond, issue execution against the principal debtor,” etc. Held, that said provision was repealed by the Code of Ohio which took effect in 1853, yet being in force when the appeal bond was executed, it is the law of the contract, and applies to all bonds dated before the adoption of the Code.</p> <p>4. The Ohio statute of 1831 makes it a condition precedent to the right to sue the surety in an appeal bond, that it shall appear by the return upon the execution that the principal in the bond had not property sufficient to satisfy the execution, and this court can not give it a construction in conflict with this requirement.</p> <p>5. The statute ■ referred to provides that an action on the appeal bond shall be barred aftei one year from the return of the execution that the principal has no property. Where an exe-, cution was issued against the principal on a' dormant judgment by complainants, such execution and the return thereon were not nullities; they are voidable but not void.</p> <p>6. A sheriff made the following return upon an execution: “Received this writ April 19, 1856, at four o’clock p. m., and on examination I find that the lands within described have all been sold under a proceeding in favor of Robert Boyd, in the court of common pleas, against the defendants and others; and as ro the command for further levy, I have made search, and can find no property of the defendants, or either of them, in my bailiwick whereon to levy.” Held, that it sufficiently appeared by the return upon the execution, that the defendants had not sufficient property to satisfy the writ.</p> <p>7. A sheriff is protected from liability in obeying the command of an execution on a dormant judgment, and his proceedings can not be collaterally impeached, especially by the person at whose instance they have been commenced.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit [by John H. Gossler and others] against the defendant [John C. Goodrich], the collector of the port of Boston, to recover the sum of $29,112.04, part of the sum of $40,350.70 paid, under protest, as duties upon a cargo of white and brown sugars, and was presented to the court upon facts agreed. The goods were imported in the ship Southern Cross.

<p>Case No. 5,632.</p> <p>Patent — Anticipation—Infkingement.</p> <p>1. A simple, economical invention is not anticipated by a complex and expensive one. A stationary apparatus for surface-coating the interior of barrels, in which an air blast is forced up through a grate fire, and the escaping gases and products of combustion discharged into the barrel, to heat its surface, is not anticipated by a device wherein the air blast circulates through heated pipes, and passes thence into the barrel.</p> <p>[Cited in Gottfried v. Phillip Best Brewing Co., Case No. 5,633; Same v. Crescent Brewing Co., 9 Fed. 762; Crescent Brewing Co. v. Gottfried, 128 U. S. 165; 9 Sup. Ct. 85.]</p> <p>2. Letters patent No. 42,580, issued to John F. T. Holbeck and Matthew Gottfried, May 3rd, 1864, for an improved mode of pitching barrels, held to be valid, and to be infringed by round, portable machines producing and applying a similar blast for a similar purpose.</p>

[These were bills in equity brought by Matthew Gottfried and others against the Phillip Best Brewing Company, and against Valentine Blatz, the Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company, Jacob Obermann and others, Peter Fortune and others, Frank Bartholo-mae and others, and Peter Schoenhofen.]

<p>[In equity. Bill by William B. Gould and others against George M. Ballard and others.]</p>

This was a libel in personam [against Charles H. Christianson] to recover damages for assault and battery. The pleadings in this case are inserted at large, that the references made to them in the opinion of the court may be the better understood, and that the version of the case given by each party under oath may fully appear.

Bill in equity. The bill sets forth in substance, that the plaintiffs [Daniel Gould and others] are the only surviving children of Nathan Gould, deceased, who was one of the brothers of Jacob Gould of Stoneham, in the county of Middlesex and common•wealth of Massachusetts, yeoman, deceased, intestate; that their' said father, Nathan Gould, died in November, A. D. 1816; that their said uncle, Jacob Gould, died on the nineteenth day of November, A. D. 1819, leaving…

<p>Case No. 5,638.</p> <p>Costoms Doties — Perishable Goods — Sale of— Liabilitt of Collector.</p> <p>1. When a statute gives a person discretionary powers to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a rule of construction that the statute constitutes him judge of those facts.</p> <p>• 2. In the exercise of that discretion, he is in the discharge not of a ministerial but a quasi judicial function.</p> <p>3. To render him liable in damages for his-conduct, it must be proved, either that he exercised his powers in cases not within his jurisdiction, or in a manner not confided to him, or with malice, corruptly, or oppressively.</p> <p>4. When upon a report made to the collector by the warehouse keeper, of the perishable condition of goods, the collector directed two United States appraisers to obtain information and report to him the condition of the article; and upon their recommendation of the necessity of an immediate sale, ordered the perishable article to-be sold under the proviso of the 1st section of the-act of congress, 6th August, 1846 [9 Stat. 53],— held, that in .the absence in the argument on die triai of any imputation to defendant of a corrupt motive, the shortness of the public notice of the contempiated sale was not, per se, sufficient evidence of fraud to warrant a judgment against the collector.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by William Gould and David Banks against Hiram P. Hastings for an injunction against the publication of certain copyrighted law reports, to which they claimed an exclusive right as assignees of the original publishers.] The bill was filed in this case by the complainants, as assignees of Esak Cowen and John L. Wendell, and proprietors of nine volumes of Cowen’s Reports, and seventeen volumes of Wendell’s Reports.

<p>In equity. This suit was brought [against John-P. Cowing and others] upon letters patent [No. 117,925] granted to the plaintiffs, as assignees of William H. Pollard, the inventor, August Sth, 1871, for an “improvement in gas-pumps.” The specification stated that the improvement was one “in gas-pumps for oil-wells.” It' said: “This improvement is applicable to any ordinary use where a double-acting pump is required, but it is specially designed for drawing off the gas from the casings of oil-wells, and conducting the same to the furnace of uie engine. For this purpose it is necessary to have tight joints to the pump; and the invention consists in the construction of the side-chamber of the cylinder and the valve-casing, as hereinafter described, with this special purpose in view. In the drawing, A represents the base of the pump; B, the cylinder; C, the cap or top of the pump; and D, the piston. These parts, in general arrangement, are the same as those in use in ordinary double-acting pumps. On one side of the cylinder is cast a chamber, E, extending from top to bottom. This chamber is divided longitudinally by a partition, a, which' thus forms two longitudinal passages, b, b, which have no direct communication with each other, or with the cylinder. Lateral ports, c, c, are made in the sides of these passages, for the connection of the pipes which extend to the well and to the furnace. These passages b, b, do not open at top and bottom into the interior of the cylinder, as in ordinary double-acting pumps, but open outward by ports d, d, and thus communicate with similar ports, d', d', of the valve-casings, F, the construction of which will presently be described. By this arrangement the passages b, b, are made to communicate' with a valve-casing bolted outside the pump, which is a distinguishing feature of my invention. Two of the valve-casings F, F, are used, one at the top and one at the bottom, and they are simply bolted tightly in place against the plane-seats f, f, with only a packing between. These valve-casings are each cast in a single piece, and, besides, the ports d', d', before spoken of, have a central port dz, which communicates with the interior of the cylinder by a similar port, ds, formed in the latter. These ports are shut off from the pasages b, b, and the gas from the latter can reach them only by making the circuit through the hollow valve-casings. The valve-casings are each cast hollow, and provided with seats, g, g, on which strike the valves h, h. The ports d', d', which open from the passages b, b, open one over and the other under the valves h, h, so as to produce a reverse action, as the piston goes up and down; and the open spaces i, I, above and below said valves, respectively, connect directly with a central space, which forms a continuation of the central port d2. This construction (which is clearly shown in Fig. 2) consists simply of a web, which is cast entire in the hollow valve-casing, thereby allowing the free reverse action of the valves without any of the loose or open joints that occur where the valve-casing is made up of several separate and detached parts. In this improved construction there is hut one joint to each end of the pump, and that is at the junction of the valve-casing with the seat f; all else, both of the side-chamber and the valves, is inclosed by a solid construction; and hence there can bé no essential escape of the volatile gas as it passes through. The special construction of the valve-casings to produce this result, I believe to be new. The stems of the valves h, h, rest in screw sockets, 1, 1, in the usual manner. I am aware that it is common to cast a side-chamber to a double-acting pump, to allow the medium to follow the action of the plunger. Such, in its broad sense, I do not claim. I claim only the special construction of my chamber, whereby the same is adapted to use with the valve-casings bolted upon the outside. In this connection the passages b, b, must open outside, while in other pumps they open inside the cylinder. In the same manner I do not claim, broadly, locating the valves in a hollow casing, but only the special construction of the casing described, whereby the same is adapted to be bolted upon the outside of the gas-chamber, thereby making but a single joint at each end of the pump. It will be noticed that there is not only an alternate action of each pair of valves in a single casing, but also a similar action in each pair situated in line at the top and bottom, thus producing a compound action, which keeps up a continuous movement of the gas. In a gas or air-pump, it is essential to get the full stroke of the piston, to leave none of .the medium or fluid at either end at the reverse movement. What I claim, as my invention, and desire to secure by letters patent, is: 1. The chamber E, provided with the longitudinal partition a, forming distinct and separate passages, b, b, which' have side ports, c, c, for the attachment of the induction and eduction pipes and ports, d, d, at top and bottom, opening outward into the valve-casings, as herein described. 2. The duplex valve-casings F, with the ports d', d', d2, opening respectively to the passages in the side-chamber and to the cylinder, and provided with the seats g, g, so arranged as to admit the gas or other fluid over one valve and under the other, as herein described. 3. The combination and arrangement with the cylinder B, of the outside chamber E, provided with the seats f, f, of the valve-casings F, F, bolted thereon, in the manner and for the purpose specified.”</p>

<p>Case Wo. 5,643.</p> <p>Patents — Improvement—Infringement—Nominal Damages.</p> <p>In Gould’s Manuf’g Co. v. Cowing [CaBe No. 5.642], it was held, that the invention covered by the plaintiff’s patent was of an improvement in a pump, and that, as the plaintiff had failed to show the profits or damages arising to the defendants from .the use of such improvement, it was entitled to only nominal damages. On further evidence being given, showing that, after the plaintiff’s pump had been introduced into certain oil regions, other pumps could not be sold in .those regions: field, that such further evidence did not show that the plaintiff was entitled to other than nominal damages.</p> <p>[Cited in Schillinger v. Gunther, Case No. 12,457; Star Salt-Caster Co. v. Crossman, Id. 13,320.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The complainants thereupon appealed to the supreme court, which, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Waite (103 TJ. S. 253), reversed the decree below, and ordered one entered against the appellees for $4,470, at the rate of $15 per pump. The fruits of the infringer’s advantage were his profits, and they were peculiar, as the evidence shows a monopoly in favor of the complainants in certain regions. The market was not only limited in locality, but in demand. While nominally, the plaintiffs made only an improvement in pumps, it was really an improved pump. For ordinary uses, the improvement added nothing to the value of the old pump; but, for the new and special purpose in view, the old pump was useless without the improvement. Therefore, damages above the cost of manufacture should have been given.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,644.</p>

<p>This was a libel in rem by John Van Pelt, owner of the steamboat Worcester, against the steamboat Governor, to recover damages for a collision. The collision complained of ■ occurred under the following circumstances: The steamboats Worcester and Governor were passenger vessels, which sailed trl- • weekly from New York, on the same day and at the same hours. They left New York on the afternoon of March 2, 1847, about simultaneously, bound on the same course up the Sound for Boston. The Worcester belonged to the Norwich line of steam-; boats, the Governor to the Stonington line. ■ As they passed through the Bast river and . through Hell Gate, the Worcester was somewhat ahead, the Governor being most of the time in her wake, and occasionally lapped upon one quarter. The Governor was slightly the superior in speed, and was seeking, j from time to time, between New York and Sands’ Point, to avail herself of a favorable opportunity to pass her rival. The boats ran in company in this manner, from one to two lengths apart, until, when they reached the Stepping-Stones, three or four miles from Sands’ Point, the Governor took a course parallel with that of the Worcester, and continued a length or two distant from her, each boat steering for Sands’ Point buoy, and in such manner as to give it in passing the usual safe berth. They came in collision at that place — the larboard bow of the Governor striking the starboard quarter of the Worcester, near the gangway and just aft the boiler, and causing some little damage, the expense of repairing which amounted to $53. . •</p> <p>The cause now came before the court upon the pleadings and: proofs. " There was some conflict of testimony upon the question which of the boats was responsible for the collision. Several witnesses, who were on board the Governor at the time, testified that that boat held her course steadily, edging as close to the shore as could be done with safety, and in such manner that she brought the buoy at Sands’ Point against her starboard guards and under them; and that the Worcester, as it appeared to the witnesses, deviated from her true course, bearing towards the Governor, until, when within a quarter of a mile from the buoy, she sheered directly across the bows of the latter boat, thus causing the collision. The two pilots on board the Worcester, on the contrary, both swore that that boat was running by the compass N. E. % E., from the time of passing the Stepping-Stones up to the moment of collision; that she was not sheered from that course towards the Governor; that the course of the Worcester was the course usually taken by steamboats on the Sound to pass Sands’ Point, being calculated to secure a safe berth from the buoy; and that the usage of navigation was to run near Sands’ Point in going into the Sound. In these general statements as to the course of navigation, all of the witnesses on both sides, who were acquainted with the subject, concurred.</p>

In admiralty. Arbitration upon the claim of the owners of a vessel, in case of wreck, for the entire freight for the voyage and general average charges, less the freight, upon cargo saved, from place of wreck to port of destination, and for expenses of the master in saving and forwarding cargo, to which the owners of the cargo seek to offset their expenses of saving and recovering it, incurred on account of the disaster.

Information for a breach of the revenue laws. The libel was filed against the propeller Governor Cushman, for smuggling distilled spirits in violation of section 103 of the act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 703). [cited Taylor v. U. S„ 3 How. [44 U. S.) 197, as to intention to evade the revenue laws, and knowledge and privity on the part of claimants; also, U. S. v. Breed [Case No. 14,-G3S); U.' S. v. Riddle, 5 Crunch. [9 U. S.] 311; U. S. v. Nine Packages Linen [Case No.…

[This was an action on an insurance policy by Goyon and Efrin against Pleasants.] The policy, subscribed by the defendant, was on goods on board the Elizabeth, on a voyage at and from Guadaloupe to a port in Prance, on the Atlantic; premium 50 per cent; to return 20, if the risk should end without loss.

<p>Case No. 6,648.</p> <p>Policy or Insurance — Cancellation—Notice to Agent.</p> <p>1. G. instructed N., an insurance broker, to procure fire insurance. N. employed another insurance broker, A., who procured a policy from the defendant, and it passed to G. The policy, in clause 8, provided, that the policy might be terminated at any time, at the request of the assured, and also at the option of the insurer, on giving notice to that effect, and that any person other than the assured, who “may have procured” the insurance to be taken, should be deemed to be the agent of the assured and not of the insurer, “under any circumstances whatever, or in any transaction relating to this insurance.” Afterwards the defendant notified A. of its election to then terminate the policy. A. accepted the notice and promised to return the policy. The next night the property insured was burned. G. had no knowledge, then, of the notice of termination. In.a suit by G. on the policy: Held, that the policy was terminated by the notice.</p> <p>[Cited in Adams v. Manufacturers’ & Builders’ Fire Ins. Co., 17 Fed. 632; Chadbourne v. German-American Ins. Co., 31 Fed. 534]</p> <p>[Cited in Insurance Co. v. Brecheisen, 50 Ohio, 548, ¿5 N. E. 53: Indiana Ins. Co. • v. Hartwell, 100 Ind. 568.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. By the terms of the policy, A. was the agent of G. for the purpose of accepting notice of the termination of the insurance.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>3. It was competent for the defendant to show a universal custom for the insurer desiring to terminate a risk to give notice to the broker who procured the risk.</p> <p>4. The evidence in relation to such custom being positive and uncontradicted, it was not error for the court not to submit to the jury the-question as to whether the existence of such a custom had been proved.</p> <p>5. It was not competent for the plaintiff to-show a usage that a notice to the broker did not take effect until a reasonable time had elapsed.</p> <p>6. The plaintiff, by accepting the policy, ratified the employment of A., so as to make A. the person who procured the insurance.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. On writ of error sued out by the plaintiffs, the judgment of the circuit court was reversed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan (109 U. S. 278, 3 Sup. Ct. 207). The words quoted from clause 8 of the policy, in their natural and ordinary signification, import nothing more than that the person obtaining the insurance was to be deemed the agent of the insured in all matters immediately connected with the procurement of the policy. When the contract was-consummated by the delivery of the policy, he ceased to be the agent of the insured. If the clause was doubtful, then, as the words of an. instrument are to be taken most strongly against a party employing them, they are therefore most favorable to the insured.]</p>

Action [by William R. Grace and others against the American Central Insurance Company of St. Louis] on a policy of insurance for loss by fire. The policy contained a clause authorizing the company to terminate the policy at any time by notice of cancellation. A written notice was not required, nor was it necessary that the policy should be returned in order to effect a cancellation. The question in the case was one of notice.

. In this case, a libel was filed [by William L. Grace against Joseph Evans], alleging that the defendant, a master of a vessel, had sold cargo on board her belonging to the li-bellant, and had brought the proceeds to this port, and had refused to pay them over to libellant On this, an order was made that the respondent be arrested and held to bail.

In admiralty. Libel in rem by the master and crew of a porgy steamer to recover their shares or wages. The owners filed claim and answer and evidence was taken.

In admiralty. This case was submitted to the. court upon the following statement ■of facts: On the 28th day of December, A. D. 1868, the barque Grace Greenwood was arrested by monition issued out of this court at a suit prosecuted for mariners’ wages. On the 22d day of February, A. D. 1869, the barque was sold by the United States marshal, and brought the sum of seven thousand, three hundred and seventy-f[ve dollars.

<p>Case No. 5,653.</p> <p>Agreements of Seamen —Shipping Commissioner — Act of June 7, 1872.</p> <p>1. Section 13 of the act of June 7, 1S72 (17 Stat. 262), requiring agreements of seamen to be signed in the presence of a shipping commissioner, refers only to the agreements mentioned in section 12 of that act.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. The second clause of section 14, which provides for penalty for receiving to be entered on board a merchant-ship any seaman engaged or supplied contrary to the provisions of the act, does not refer to seamen who have agreed to make a voyage not mentioned in section 12, and have not signed the agreement in presence of a shipping .commissioner.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S, v. The Thomas W. Haven, S Fed. 349.]</p> <p>3. Section 8 authorizes the master, owner, or consignee of a ship about to make a' voyage not mentioned in section 12, to be his own shipping commissioner; and this provision is not affected by sections 13 or 14.</p> <p>[NOTE. Upon argument in the supreme court (95 U. S. 527), Clifford, X, was of the opinion that, under -the Bevised Statutes, vessels engaged in trade between the United States and the West Indies are not subject to the regulations enacted with respect to vessels engaged in foreign commerce not falling within the exceptions mentioned. The provision in the old acts, under which this suit was brought, requiring the agreements to be signed in the presence of a shipping commissioner, it was decided, referred only to the agreements described in section 12, and does not include .the exceptions. The position of the circuit court upon all points was explicitly affirmed.]</p>

These cases involved the same principle, and presented the same state of facts, and were argued together. John W. Grady, being a member of the firm of Grady & Hawthorne, and of Grady, Hawthorne & Turbyfill, by his attorney, Gov. B. F. Perry, filed his petition for voluntary bankruptcy in December last; and in his schedules showed assets and liabilities in behalf of each of these firms as well as for himself individually.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] Heran, Lees & Co., of New-York, filed a libel in rem, in the district court, against the ship Grafton, to recover the loss on one hundred and sixty-two bales of hemp, alleged to have been damaged by rain while being discharged from the vessel and through the fault of those having the management of her. The cause was heard in the district court upon proofs taken on both sides.

The following summary of facts and tes-r timony, connected with the comments thereon in the opinion of the court, present the-main points bearing upon the question in-dispute in this cause. The ship Grafton, a general vessel, took a freight at New-Orleans, 267 bales of American hemp, consigned to the libellants at New-York.

<p>Case No. 5,657.</p> <p>Habeas Cobpus.</p> <p>1. The petitioner was arrested by the marshal of the district of Pennsylvania, under an attachment from the circuit court of Rhode Island, for a contempt; in not appearing in "that court, after a monition served upon him in the state of Pennsylvania, to answer in a prize cause,. as .to a certain bale of goods con•demned to the captors, and which had come into the possession of Peter Graham, the relator.</p> <p>2. The circuit and district courts of the Unit-ed States, cannot, either in suits at common law or equity, send their process into another district; except where specially authorized so to do, by some act of congress.</p> <p>[Followed in Picquet v. Swan, Case No. 11,-134; Wilson v. Pierce, Id. 17,S26. Approved in Paine v. Caldwell, Id. 10,674. Cited in New England Mut. Ins. Co. v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co., 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 306; Atkins v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., Id. 304; Re Hodges, Case No. 6,-562; Re Manning, 44 Fed. 276; Walker v. Leaj 47 Fed. 649; Re Boles, 1 C. C. A. 48, 48 Fed. 76.]</p> <p>[Cited in Turrill v. Walker, 4 Mich. ISO.]</p> <p>3. The same restrictions as to proceedings In prize causes exist, not only by the express provisions of law, but also by the principles which apply to prize causes in this country, in England, and elsewhere.</p>

In bankruptcy. Petition by the bankrupt for an order directing the assignee to add to the list of exempt property set off to Mm, one family sewing machine, one silver watch, one single sleigh, one harness, one manufacturer’s sewing machine, one horse and one buggy.

<p>■ [In bankruptcy. In the matter of W. H. Graham.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,664.</p> <p>Arrest — False Representations — Agent—Bail.</p> <p>The principle that governs a preliminary investigation as to bail, is, that if a reasonable cause of action is shown the defendant is held to bail.</p>

In support of the title of the lessor of the plaintiff he produced a grant from the state of North Carolina to William Mebane, dated the 14th day of March, 1787, for seven thousand two hundred acres of land, and a deed from Mebane to him dated the 1st day of October, 1790.

[In admiralty. This was a libel for seamen’s wages brought by Henry Graham and others against the steamboat Exporter, her engines, etc.]

<p>Case Wo. 6,666.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Supplies—Home Poet.</p> <p>[There is no lien for supnlies procured from another state by a vessel lying in her home port.]</p>

Ttiis is a bill in equity to restrain the alleged violations of a patent [No. 74,342] issued by the United States government to Alvaro B. Graham, dated February 11th, 1S6S, for an improvement in harvesters.

<p>This is an action in personam against the master of the steamship Great Britain, a British vessel, to recover wages for' services "by the' libellants on board that ship from New York to Liverpool and back to New York. The libel alleges that the libellants -are mariners and firemen by trade and profession, and that they shipped, on the 30th •of August last, on board the Great Britain, ns firemen, to perform the voyage aforesaid, .at the rate of £4 sterling each per month; that they continued with the vessel, performing services until her return to this port, when they were both discharged, leaving due to Graham $20 and upwards, and to •Currie $14 and upwards, which the master refuses to pay. The answer denies the agreement set up by the libellants, and avers that Currie alone hired on board the ship from ■the port of New York to Liverpool, and at the rate of £4 per month wages, and that Graham was received on board, with the privilege to work his passage out to Liverpool .without pay. It further denies that the libellants did duty on board as they allege; .and charges that Currie having received an injury in Liverpool upon his discharge from the ship, was admitted on board at his urgent request, to be brought back to this port; and that he was unable to do duty during the return voyage; that after Graham had been discharged at Liverpool, he earnestly solicited to be permitted to come on board and work his passage back to New York, and was so received; but that on the voyage back he refused to do such reasonable duty as was required of him, and denies that any wages are due to either libellant. The answer admits the charge in the libel that no written or printed agreement was signed by the libellants, but avers that the ship is a British vessel, and denies the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter.</p>

Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [against William Mason] upon letters patent [No. 30,441] for an “improvement in picker-staff motion for looms,” granted Edmund H. Graham, October 16, 1860, and reissued October 2, 1866 [No. 2.367], An undivided half having been assigned to Wanton Rouse, the letters patent were again reissued to complainants May 28, 1867 [No. 2,626].

Exceptions to the master’s report of profits made by the defendant [William Mason] from his infringement of reissued letters patent [No. 2,626] granted Edmund H. Graham ,and Wanton Rouse, May 27,1867. The original patent [No. 30,441] was granted to Graham October 16, 1860.

This was an action of trover, to recover the value of certain steamships claimed to have been wrongfully converted by the defendant [Lewis H. Meyer] to his own use. The amount demanded as damages was $400,000.

This was an action upon an open policy, dated the 16th of February, 1805, underwritten by defendants for 10,000 dollars, on goods on board the Concord, at and from her port or ports-, place or places of loading, in Honduras, to Liverpool; warranted by the assured free from any charge, damage, or loss, which may arise in consequence óf a seizure or detention of the property, for or on account of any illicit or prohibited trade.

<p>Case No. 6,676.</p> <p>Fraudulent Preference — Mobtgage — Agent— Insolvenct.</p> <p>1. A debtor, who is unable to meet his engagements and pay his debts in the ordinary course of business, as persons in trade usually do, is insolvent within the meaning of the bankruptcy act.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Bininger, Case No. 1,420.]</p> <p>2. When a creditor accepts a security for his debt, he is conclusively presumed to know what appears upon its face, and to have reasonable 'cause to believe it was intended to accomplish what must be its ordinary and necessary effect.</p> <p>[Cited in Singer v. Sloan, Case No. 12,899.]</p> <p>3. Securities given for the purpose of giving a preference, are none the less void under the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)] because they were given in pursuance of a previous promise, made when the debt was contracted, to give security for it.</p> <p>[Cited in Hubbard v. Allaire "Works, Case No. G.814; Ex parte Ames, Id. 323; Hall v. Wager. Id. 5,951; Goodenow v. Milliken, Id. 5,535; Re Montgomery, Id. 9,732: Re Jackson Iron Manuf’g Co., Id. 7,153; Lloyd v. Strobridge, Id. 8,435.]</p> <p>[Cited in Cook v. Whipple, 55 N. Y. 156; Sartwell v. North, 144 Mass. 194, 10 N. E. 827.]</p> <p>4. Where a married woman, engaged in business, gave the management of her affairs to her husband, and was afterwards adjudged bankrupt: E-eld, that his acts, knowledge and intentions in reference to the business must be held to be her acts, knowledge .and intentions.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Goodman, Case No. 5,540.]</p> <p>5. Where a mortgage was given by such bankrupt to secure a debt, but without the creditor’s urging its execution or asking for •security, but the mortgage covered the whole •of the bankrupt’s personal property, and was not given in the ordinary course of business, and other mortgages to another creditor were •executed at the same time: Edd, that this mortgage was fraudulent and void under the bankruptcy act.</p> <p>[Cited in Martin v. Toof, Case No. 9.167; Walbrun v. Babbitt, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 581.]</p> <p>[See Babbitt v. Walbrun, Case No. 695.]</p> <p>'6. The other mortgages, which were on the stock and real estate, and were taken at a time and in a form which must necessarily break up the bankrupt’s business, to secure a debt which had been overdue for a year and a half, were also fraudulent and void.</p>

<p>[This was a suit by John Graham against Edward Sheken, impleaded, etc., with Charles R. Poillon.]</p>

In equity. This was an application [by John Graham] for a writ of ne exeat against the defendant [Edward] Stucken, founded upon the allegation, supported by affidavit, that he was about to break up his residence in New York and remove from the couhtry.

<p>Case No. 5,679.</p> <p>Foreign Attachment — Proceedings under, in Pennsylvania.</p> <p>1. A- foreign attachment may be laid on property in the hands of the plaintiff in the attachment.</p> <p>2. Form of proceedings under tne foreign attachment law of Pennsylvania; and an examination of the practice under the same, and of the principles by which it is regulated.</p> <p>S. When the garnishee is plaintiff, there is no necessity for a summons, scire facias, interrogatories, or any coercive process, against himself.</p> <p>[Cited in Smith v. Miln, Case No. 13,081.]</p> <p>4. Lands are subject to a foreign attachment, in Pennsylvania.</p> <p>[Cited in Beach v. Fairbanks, 52 Conn. 172.]</p> <p>5. Mode of proceeding, where there is no garnishee, or when lands are attached.</p> <p>6. Quaere. Whether under the foreign attachment law of Pennsylvania, it is necessary, that the plaintiff, who has attached the property of the defendant in his own possession, should obtain a judgment, that he retain the property in satisfaction of his debt.</p>

[In bankruptcy. In tlie matter of Harrison Grambo.] A petition of Stephen A. Potter and William Wright, trustees of said estate, was filed, in which it was set forth that Samuel Wright, a co-trustee, had obtained possession of certain bonds, mortgages, and assignments from the fire-proof of the petitioners; that demand had been made therefor under a resolution of a meeting of creditors, and that all had not been returned; and praying relief.

Assumpsit for money had and received. R. G. Lanphier, Jr., having made a seal for the supreme court of the United States, of which court the defendant ivas clerk, and being indebted to the plaintiff, drew the following bill: “Washington, October 11, 1831. Mr. Carroll, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Louisiana.] On January 15, 1876, one J. M. Oriol, a merchant of New Orleans, entered into a contract of charter-party with A. N. Christensen, master, whereby he chartered the bark Ibis for a voyage from New Orleans to Liverpool, England, for the carriage of a full cargo of timber or other merchandise to be furnished by Oriol.

<p>Case No. 5,682a.</p> <p>Ejectment — History oe.</p> <p>1. The action of ejectment was authorized by our laws as far back as 1807, and continued to exist without the fiction of “lease, entry, and ouster,” until 1S16, when the common law Was adopted by positive enactment, and the action of ejectment introduced according to the forms of the common law.</p> <p>2. History of the action of ejectment reviewed,, and our legislation on the subject referred to.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] John Carlton the respondent filled his libel against the ship Grand Turk, alleging that in December, 1815, he was employed by William and James Dunlap, the appellants, who were her owners, to go a voyage in her as master, from New York to Belfast and back.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Granger and Sabin.] Tfiis matter came to be heard and was argued and submitted upon the petition of John J. Speed, assignee, to expunge the claim of the Merchants’ Bank of Canada, and to compel the delivery to the assignee of certain securities alleged to be held by the bank, and upon the answer of the bank and the proofs taken.

<p>Case No. 5,685.</p> <p>Boundary op Government Lands Lying Along-Lakes and Rivers — Meandered Line — Accretions — Waste Land — Adverse Possession wbicb Avoids a Deed — Color op Title,</p> <p>1. The boundary to lands bordering on rivers- and lakes is the meandered line established, by the government surveyors.</p> <p>[Cited in James v. Howell, 41 Ohio, 709.].</p> <p>2. If, at the date of an entry of government land, one of the boundaries of which is such meandered line, the lake or river extends to. and borders on. such line, accretions afterwards formed belong to the party holding title under the entry.</p> <p>[Cited in East Omaha Land Co. v. Jeffries, 40 Fed. 388.]</p> <p>[Cited in Bissell v. Fletcher, 19 Neb. 725, 28 N. W. 304.]</p> <p>3. But if, at the time the entry was made, between such line and the bank of the lake or river, there was a body of swamp, or waste land, or flats, on which timber and grass grew, horses and cattle fed, and hay was cut, such laud was not included within the entry.</p> <p>4. The adverse possession necessary to avoid the deed of a grantor, out of possession, must be under color of title.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,686.</p> <p>Prize — Spoliation op Papers.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p> <p>Violation of the blockade by the vessel on previous voyages.</p>

This 'was a suit in rem, promoted by James Reeder, Jr., of Baltimore, for repairs and materials furnished to the vessel in Baltimore, in September last. Richard F. Loper, of Philadelphia, intervened for his interest, as owner.

<p>Case No. 5,688.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Unlawful Preferences,</p> <p>[Notes and mortgage assigned by an insolvent debtor to a creditor about a month before an adjudication of bankruptcy, as security for pre-ex-isting indebtedness and a small additional loan, held void under section 35 of the bankrupt act of 1867 [14 Stat. 534], as made with intent to create a preference.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,689.</p> <p>Waqes op Seamen — Shipping Articles — Borden' op Proof — End op Votage.</p> <p>1. In a suit for seamen’s wages, the proctor for the libellant, though not legally incompetent as a witness for his client, has a bias which is to be regarded in weighing the credit to be given to his testimony.</p> <p>2. A stipulation in the shipping articles, that the seamen shall not sue for wages until the vessel is unladen, is binding upon them, if it is fairly made.</p> <p>3. Under such a stipulation, the libellant, in a suit for wages, has the burden of proving that the vessel was actually unladen when the libel was filed, or had then been moored fifteen days.</p> <p>4. Where an action in personam for wages' is brought prematurely, but becomes perfected before the stipulations and answer of the respondent are filed, and the answer, when filed, admits a right of action in the libellant, the court need not dismiss the libel; yet, if the suit is vindictive or unreasonably prosecuted, costs may be imposed on the libellant.</p> <p>[Cited in The Grace Darling, Case No. 5,G51.]</p> <p>5. The case of The Cadmus [Case No. 2,280] considered.</p> <p>6. The voyage ends when the vessel is safely moored at her port of final destination.</p> <p>[Cited in The Annie M. Smull, Case No. 423.]</p> <p>7. A stipulation in the shipping articles not to sue for n ages until the vessel is unladen, is not an extension of the voyage; and, if a seaman leaves her, without permission, after she is moored, but before her unlivery, that is not a desertion which works a forfeiture of wages under the act of July 20, 1790 (1 Stat. 131, 133).</p> <p>[Cited in The Frank C. Barker, 19 Fed. 333.]</p> <p>This was a libel in personam, by a steward [Lewis Granon] against the master [Richard T. Hartshome] for wages. The vessel reached New York harbor on the 14th of April. 1834, and got into her berth at the dock on the 15th. The libellant left her on the 16th, and on the 24th filed this libel. The answer admitted that $42 remained unpaid on his wages, after deducting credits claimed, but set up, as a defence on the merits, that the libellant had forfeited his wages, by deserting the vessel at New York. It also set up a dilatory exception, that the libellant’s right of action had not matured when the suit was instituted, the vessel not being then unladen, and set forth an agreement in the shipping articles, signed by all the crew, that the mariners should not be entitled to wages until the vessel was unladen.</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Benjamin B. Grant and others.] This case came up before the district court [case unreported] upon the report of a commissioner (William Gray) preparatory to a •dividend, in which several questions were raised for the decision of the court. It appeared, that the American Bank held certain collateral securities, which the corporation •desired to assume at their actual value, deducting the amount from their claim.

In bankruptcy. This was a motion by the assignee to expunge a proof of debt, filed by the Globe Bank against the private estate of Benjamin B. Grant, as indorser of a note for thirty-six thousand dollars, signed by Grant, Seaver, & Co., a firm of which Grant was a member, and which was in bankruptcy.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Benjamin B. Grant, a bankrupt, filed in the district court his petition, as follows: “And now, Benjamin B. Grant respectfully represents to this honorable court, that on the second day of February last past, and at the time of filing his petition, he was possessed,in his individual capacity, of the sum of twenty-two hundred and fourteen dollars and seventeen cents, in cash, as set forth…

Indebitatus assumpsit for a balance of accounts. The declaration also contained the money counts. Plea-general issue. At the trial it appeared, that the plaintiffs were merchants at Trieste, in Austria, and the defendant a merchant in Boston. In December, 1836, the plaintiffs, by their agent, Mr. Trueman, a resident at Boston, advanced to the defendant the sum of £4565 sterling, by a'bill drawn on Messrs.

<p>Case No. 6,695.</p> <p>Wager.</p> <p>1. At common law, a wager, fairly made, was recoverable.</p> <p>2. If the money was paid, it could not be recovered back again.</p> <p>3. But, under the statute of Michigan, money lost at play, cr on a horse-race, &e. may be recovered.</p> <p>[Cited in Tinker v. Van Dyke, Case No. 14,-058.]</p> <p>4. Under this statute, an action may be maintained in the circuit court.</p>

<p>This was an action against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties paid on goods purchased in Austria on two different days in May, 1850, and shipped from Trieste to New York. The invoice and entry set forth the purchase-price of the goods in paper florins, and they were paid for in paper currency. It appeared upon the trial, by oral testimony, and also by the official certificate of the United States consul at Trieste, that the paper florin -was depreciated in Austria, at the two several dates of the purchase of the goods, 18% and 19% per cent, below the value of the silver florin. It was furttter proved, that the legal currency in Austria at those dates was paper money, estimated in florins, and made by law a legal tender at its nominal value. The plaintiff [Samuel Grant] claimed, that the duty on the goods should be paid upon their value in silver florins. A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on a ease to be made..</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] | This was a libel by William B. Grant, William L. Flitner, and others, owners of the sli'p Constellation, against Cornelius Poillion; ■ to recover freight. The decree was dismissed in the district court (case unreported), and libelants appeal.]

At the late term of the circuit court of the U. S. held in the city of New York, a case was decided in relation to a patented machine for making hat bodies. This machine is one of wonderful ingenuity, and has been of vast advantage to the public; and it is gratifying to learn, that its worthy and indefatigable inventor has been thus far successful in the recovery of exemplary damages for the violation of his just rights. The plaintiffs in the case were Messrs.

This was a petition filed on behalf of one-O’Brien, a material-man, seeking to be paid the amount of certain supplies furnished the schooner Grapeshot, in the port of New Orleans, out of the proceeds of that vessel now in the registry of the court.

<p>This cause comes up for hearing on exceptions to the report of J. W. Gurley, master.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,704.</p> <p>Collision in the Kills —Schooner and Steam-eh — Lookout—Sheeh.</p> <p>1. Where a collision occurred in the night, between a steamboat and a schooner, each party claiming that the other vessel sheered across-the other’s bows: Held, that the fact that the sails of the schooner did not jibe, was sufficient to confirm the evidence from the schooner, that she made no change.</p> <p>2. The steward, who was standing by the companion way, and was no mariner, and had not been stationed as a lookout, was no proper lookout.</p> <p>[Cited in The Ancon, Case No. 348.]</p> <p>3. The steamboat was in fault, in not having-a proper lookout, and in not avoiding the schoonér, and was liable for the collision.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,705.</p> <p>Collision in the Kills — Steamboat and Schooner.</p> <p>1. A steamboat, with a canal boat in tow, fastened to her port side, was coming through the Kills from Elizabethport to New York, on the right hand side of the channel. When near the corner stake, where the channel turns, a schooner corniDg the other way, having the wind free, came in collision with the canal boat. The steamboat, as soon as she saw there was danger of collision, stopped, and backed, and put her wheel hard a port. The schooner claimed that she was on the other side of the channel, and had caught on the mud, so as to be stationary, and was run into by the steamboat. A libel was filed against the steamboat and schooner, by the owner of the canal boat, and the insurer of the cargo, to whom it had been abandoned. Held, that, on the evidence, the steamboat was on the starboard side of the channel, and the schooner had the whole channel, and was not so aground as to be stationary.</p> <p>2. The schooner was in fault, in keeping her helm to starboard, after rounding the comer stake, and was solely responsible for the collision.</p>

Bill in equity. The bill in substance stated, that Sir John Caldwell died at the city of Boston, on or about the eighth day of October, A. D. 1842, and that the plaintiff [Thomas C. Grattan], on the twenty-second day of April, A. D. 1844, was duly appointed administrator of the estate of the said Sir John, within the commonwealth aforesaid, and has given bonds according to law for the faithful performance of his duties as such.

This was an action of assumpsit [by Maurice Grau against James H. McVicker]. Defendant pleaded in defense a breach of lease and amount due thereon as a set-off. Demurrer to the plea.

<p>Case No. 6,710.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Kind of Executorship Administered under Act of 1867.</p> <p>A made a codicil to his will nominating C and D his executors for the limited purpose of winding up his business (banking,) and clothing them with the necessary power to carry on the business to effect that object, without injury either to his estate or to those dealing with him as a banker. The codicil was admitted to record, and C and D qualified as such limited executors. The business was continued until the recent panic, when the executors suspended and failed to pay their depositors, and their other liabilities as bankers. A petition in bankruptcy was filed against them, which they moved to dismiss, mainly on the ground that under the powers conferred upon them by the will they are not subject to the provisions of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)]. Held, that this is not one of the class of executorships designed to be administered under the bankrupt act, therefore, the petition must be dismissed at the cost of the petitioner.</p>

<p>[In the matter of John Graves, a bankrupt]</p> <p>In this case, the register certified to the court the question whether assignees must apply to the court for authority, if they wished to take action under the seventeenth and twenty-fifth sections of the bankruptcy act.</p> <p>2 [I, Isaiah T. Williams, one of the registers of said court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that in the course of the proceedings in said cause before me, the following question arose pertinent to the said proceedings, and was stated and agreed to by the oounsel for the opposing parties, to wit: Messrs. Sanford, La Baron & Porter, who appeared for the bankrupt, and Mr. Albert Smith the-assignee of the said bankrupt. The bankrupt had, shortly before the filing of his petition, purchased a quantity of carpets. The vendor conceiving that they had been bought with the fraudulent intent not to pay for them, brought replevin for them, and the sheriff took possession of the goods. The bankrupt immediately bonded them back under the provisions of the Code, and they thereupon came into the hands of the as-signee. The suit is now pending, the as-signee claiming now, as the bankrupt before claimed,' the goods. Of course the event of the suit is uncertain, and the sureties in the bond so given by the bankrupt to procure the return of the goods, now claim that they should be protected, so far as protection is possible against loss in case of an adverse termination of the case. The parties appear before me and ask that the goods be held by the assignee to abide the result of the action, or that they be delivered over to the plaintiff in the action, and the bond of the sureties to be cancelled, or for such other relief in the premises as to the court may seem fit I am arrested in limine by a question of jurisdiction, whether the part? should not apply to the court, and not to a register. The concluding paragraph of section 17 of the act gives the assignee full power to deal with a matter of this kind, “under the direction of the court” Does the word court here mean “register,” as in many other cases? I am not willing without first referring the matter to the court, to assume that ft does. If your honor is of opinion that it does, I shall have no difficulty in properly disposing of the case. If not, the parties must make their application directly to the court I think section 25 should also be construed in the same connection, and if your honor will consider both these sections, and determine what, if any of the duties in these two sections referred to devolve upon the register, it will be of much aid to us in the discharge of our duties. I think I may safely say that scarcely an hour of the day passes, In which at least one assignee does not apply to me to know what in a given ease he ought to do. Doubting my jurisdiction touching such matters, I have the honor to apply to the court for instructions in the premises, as I may do under the 25th rule of this honorable court.] 2</p>

This was a bill in chancery, fixed to enjoin the defendant [the Chicago, Iowa & Nebraska Railroad Company] from erecting a bridge across the Mississippi river at Clinton, Iowa. The plaintiff, during the summer vacation, procured from the district judge an order allowing the injunction as-prayed for. The writ was accordingly issued, and .was duly served upon the officers of the defendants, previous to the October term of the court.

<p>In equity. Bill by the tenants in possession of land in Maine, to remove a cloud from the title arising under a levy of execution thereon, invalid for irregularity. The respondents demurred for want of equity, and because of a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law.</p>

This is an action of ejectment [by Panela Gray against Jacob Coffman] for lands situate in Lyon county, in the state of Kansas. The case was tried upon testimony submitted to the court, a jury liaying been waived. The evidence was voluminous, but the material facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court

This was a bill in equity filed by John A. C. Gray, a citizen of the state of New York, receiver of the Memphis, El Paso and Pacific Railroad Company against Edmund J. Davis, governor of Texas and Jacob Kuechler, commissioner of the general land office of Texas, both citizens of Texas. The case was argued and submitted on demurrer to the bill.

This was an action of assumpsit to recover the sum of $841.39, the balance of an account, alleged to be owing by the defendants [John Harper and Brothers] to the plaintiffs [Milliard, Gray & Co.], for sundry volumes of Sparks’s American Biography. The plaintiffs, in order to maintain their action, produced in evidence the following agreement: “Boston, May 22, 1839.

Suit [by A. W. Gray, L. Gray, and A. Y. Gray against Daniel Hulshizer and Henry B. Larzalere] for infringement of patent [No. 15,693] granted to A. W. Gray, September 9, 1856, for “improvement in horse-powers,” reissued July 1, 1862 [No. 1,322], and extended seven years from September 9, 1870. No -written opinion delivered. The judge stated orally that, leaving other questions aside, he did not regard the proof of infringement as satisfactory.

This was an action [by Gray and Osgood against James, Odion, and Wilson,] for a violation of the plaintiffs’ patent right, for an improvement in the art of cutting and heading nails by one operation.

<p>Case No. 5,719.</p> <p>Patents — Improvement on Original Device— Declaration — Title—Specification —Over—Priority.</p> <p>' 1. If a machine in the state in which it was first made, was so far inferior to other machines used for the same purpose as that it was of no intrinsic value, yet if another person 'superadd to the invention and remove its defects, the invent- or of the improvements derives no right to the original machine from having made it of- .value by addition to it.</p> <p>[Cited in Blake v. Smith, Case No. 1,502.]</p> <p>2. The declaration ought always to show a title in the plaintiff, and that with sufficient certainty, and to set forth all the matters which are the essence of the action; without these, the plaintiff fails to show a right in point of law to ask the court for judgment in his favour.</p> <p>3. If the plaintiff’s title depends upon the performance of certain acts, he must affirm the performance of those acts.</p> <p>4. What defects are cured by verdict.</p> <p>[Cited in Ivay v. Fredrigal, 3 Pa. St. 222; Richardson v. Farmer, 36 Mo. 46.]</p> <p>5. Where the declaration describes the plaintiff’s improvement in the words of the patent, it is not necessary, that the description of the machine as stated in the specification, should be set forth. If the defendant require the specification in his defence, he may have it placed on the record by asking oyer of it.</p> <p>■[6. Cited in Whitney v. Emmett, Case No. 17,-585, to the point that the want of utility may be a good reason for not issuing a patent, but is no cause for avoiding it.]</p>

Writ of entry. — The cause was argued on special pleadings, setting up a defence, that the suit was brought on a satisfied mortgage.

Trial of issues by the court This was an action to recover the possession of land in San Francisco, and was brought by Matilda C. Gray and Franklina C. Gray (an Infant suing by next friend) against Richard Larri-more and others. The facts immediately material to the decision are stated in the opinion of the court. See, also, Gray v. Brignardello, 1 Wall. (68 U. S.) 627.

This was an action [by George Gray] to recover back an excess of duties exacted by the defendant [Cornelius W. Lawrence], as collector of the port of New York, on several invoices of Irish linens, consigned by the plaintiff to Bird, Gillilan & Go., his agents, and entered by them.

<p>Case No. 5,734.</p> <p>Imprisonment or Debtoks — Time of Operation op Act Feb. 28, 1S39 — Bail.</p> <p>L The act of the 28th February, 1839 [5 Stat. 321], which adopts the laws of a state in regard to imprisonment of debtors, gives immediate effect to such laws, as well in cases pending, as in those subsequently commenced. This law relates to the remedy, and does not impair the obligation of the contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Brown v. Dillahanty, 4 Smedes & M. 713; McCormick v. Rusch. 15 Iowa, 136; Willard v. Harvey, 24 X. H. 353; Baldwin v. Buswell. 52 Vt. 61.]</p> <p>[See Beers v. Haughton, Case No. 1,230.]</p> <p>2. In a ease where appearance hail had been giren, before the passage of the law, the defendants are not bound to give special bail, but may be discharged on motion, on common bail.</p> <p>[Cited in Wilber v. Ingersoll, Case No. 17,-G32.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,726.</p> <p>Equity Practice and Pleading — Federal Courts —PLE A — N ON-J OINDEIl — N ON-RESIDENTS.</p> <p>Where a plea of non-joinder is interposed and it appears that the parties omitted are not inhabitants of the federal district and do not voluntarily appear, the plea will be overruled.</p> <p>[NOTE. The case was heard upon the proors, and a decree was rendered by the circuit court dismissing the bill. From this decree the complainants appealed to the supreme court, which, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Field (115 U. S. 116. 5 Sup. Ct. 1166), affirmed the decree, holding. upon a review of the proof, that the National Steamship Company ought not to be charged with a debt of the old navigation company.] _</p>

Bill in equity. The bill set forth that the complainants, Harrison Gray, James Brown, .and Charles Brown, booksellers and copart-ners, under the firm of Hilliard, Gray & Co., were the proprietors of the copyright and publishers of a certain book, entitled “Adam’s Latin Grammar, with Some Improvements ■and the Following Additions: Buies for the Eight Pronunciation of the Latin Language; .a Metrical Key to the Odes of Horace; a List of Latin Authors Arranged According to the…

<p>This was a case reserved for the opinion of the court, and is as follows: — -On the 17tb of December, 1810, the plaintiff underwrote a policy for 5000 dollars, on two-thirds of the brig South-Carolina, belonging to the defendants [Sims & Bethel], on a voyage at and from Philadelphia to Calcutta, and at and from thence to Philadelphia, with liberty to touch and trade at Madras, on her outward and homeward voyages. The vessel cleared out for Calcutta, from Philadelphia, and sailed on the voyage insured, in December, 1810; and at Calcutta took in a cargo of British goods, one of the defendants being her supercargo and commander on her return voyage, and with that cargo returned to the United States. On her arrival, she was seized, with her cargo, on behalf of the United States; and the forfeiture, or alleged forfeiture, was afterwards remitted to the defendants and the other owners. This action is brought, to recover the amount of the premium. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on the above case.</p> <p>I. R. Ingersoll and Mr. Rawle objected to the plaintiff’s right of recovery, npon the ground, that the voyage insured was illegal; the non-importation law being to take effect on the 2d of February, 1811, unless Great Britain should, before that daj', repeal her Orders in Council. They read the acts of congress of the 1st of March, 1809 [2 Stat. 52S], 1st of May, 1810 [Id. 605], and 2d of March, 1811 [Id. 651]; the president’s proclamation of 19th of April, 1809, reviving trade with Great Britain; of the 2d of November, 1810, declaring that France had repealed her edicts. 1 Burrows, 341; Park, Ins. 232; Marsh. Ins. 180, 1. 72, 05-68, 74, 57; 1 Ld. Raym. 724; Roccus, note 1; Bynk. bk. 1, c. 21; 1 P. Wms. 1S5; 3 Ves. 373; [Mitchell v. Smith, Maybin v. Coulon, Duneanson v. McLure] 4 Dali. [4 U. 8.] 269, 298, 308; Murgatroyd v. McLure [Case No. 9,943],</p> <p>contended, that at the time this policy was underwritten, there was no law which forbade the importation of goods from British possessions; and that consequently, the policy having once attached, no future circumstance could affect it. The policy is on the vessel only; and the conduct of the insured in taking goods on board, contrary to law, cannot exonerate him from paying the premium. He cannot make a violation of law the ground of his defence.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,730.</p> <p>Oaths— Justice of the Peace — Promissort Note - —Burden- of Proof.</p> <p>1. Justices of the peace, and masters in chancery of the state of Arkansas, are _ authorized to take affidavits, to be used in the circuit court of the United States, in civil causes, and affidavits so taken, are as valid and effectual as if subscribed in open court.</p> <p>2. Non assumpsit sworn to, puts in issue the execution of the writing sued on, and it then devolves on the plaintiff to prove the execution.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,731.</p> <p>Bonds or Towns in New York — Subsckiptions to Stock op Railroad Corporation —Liability on Coupons.</p> <p>Under the act of the legislature of New York, passed May 18. 18G9 (Laws N. Y. 1869, p. 2303, c. 907), commissioners were appointed to issue the bonds o'f a town and invest the proceeds in the stock of a specified railroad corporation. The commissioners subscribed for the stock, but, before the bonds were issued, the corporation was merged in a new corporation, by proceedings taken under a general statute in force when the proceedings to appoint such commissioners were taken, which provided that all debts due to the old corporation, and all stock subscriptions belonging to it, should vest in-the new corporation. After the stock was subscribed for, the provisions of such general statute were extended to said two corporations by a special act. The bonds were issued to the' new corporation. Afterwards, by a special act,the issuing of the bonds to the new corporation was ratified, and the bonds were" declared to be binding on the town. In a suit to recover on coupons attached to the bonds: Bdd, that .the town was liable on the coupons.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,733.</p> <p>Limitations — Civil War.</p> <p>1. The act of congress approved June 11,1864 [13 Stat. 123], which suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the Rebellion, is not itself a statute of limitation.</p> <p>2. Article 12 of the constitution of Texas, which declares that “the statutes of limitation of civil suits were suspended by the so called act of secession of January 28, 1861, and shall be considered as suspended within this state until the acceptance of this constitution by the congress of the United States,” does not conflict with the said act of congress.</p> <p>3. The constitution was accepted on March 29, 1S70. Therefore when an action was commenced on May 8, 1871, for goods sold in 1860, the plea that more than two years had elapsed after the cause of action had accrued and before suit brought, and that more than four years had elapsed after the close of the war and after the time the court was reopened to suitors, was held bad and stricken out.</p>

• In admiralty. This was a libel brought by John Greening and Charles JST. Deott, owners of the schooner Perseverance, which -sailed from the port of Chicago for Ogdensburg, with a cargo of wheat on board, in the month of November, 1864. In a storm on Lake Michigan, she shipped a heavy sea, which washed away her screen, and broke both her colored signal lamps, leaving her with nothing but a white light.

This was an appeal from a decree of the district court dismissing a libel filed by John Greening- and Charles N. Deott, as owners of the schooner Perseverance, against the schooner Gray Eagle, for damages caused by a collision. [See Case No. 5.734.] Emmons and Van Dyke, for respondents, as to absence of lights cited Waring v. Clarke, 5 How.- [46 TJ.

<p>Case No. 6,736.</p> <p>Wages op Seamen — Stipulation for Costs — “Slush. ”</p> <p>1. When a sailor brings a suit in rem against a ship to enforce a conditional agreement, made with'the master, and outside of the writtenVar-ticles, he will be required to file a stipulation, for costs in the same manner as an ordinary, suitor.</p> <p>2. Rule 45 of the district court was intended to give seamen high privileges for the collection of the wages agreed upon for their services;-.it will not be extended to claims extraneous the contracts for wages.</p> <p>3. A cook not allowed to proceed under the rule in rem against a vessel to enforce a demand for the slush made during a voyage, when that perquisite was not agreed for in the shipping articles. -He must give the stipulations exacted in ordinary cases for libellants.</p>

Assumpsit to recover back money paid for a partial loss, under a policy of insurance, on the ship Alhambra, on a voyage from. Liverpool to San Francisco.

In bankruptcy. The Great Western Telegraph Company was adjudicated a bankrupt by the district court, on the petition of John C. Hilton, and thereupon a petition for a review of the proceedings in the district court was filed in this court by the company; and pending this petition in the circuit court, an application was made by the petitioners for leave to take testimony in addition to what was before the district court, as affecting the question of the bankruptcy of the…

In bankruptcy. This was a motion by the respondent, the Great Western Telegraph Company, to set aside the adjudication of bankruptcy pre-: viously entered against it on the petition of John C. Hilton, a creditor.

The trial and conviction of Ridgeley Great-house, for treasonable acts, is reported [Case No. 15,254]. Application was now made, on his behalf, for a writ of habeas corpus, to procure his discharge.

<p>Case No. 5,742.</p> <p>Pleading at Law — Suit on Boxi> — Illegal Consideration.</p> <p>1. A plea which does not traverse the facts averred in the declaration, but sets up new matter in defence, admits the case made in the declaration. So a demurrer to the plea admits all the facts of the plea which are well pleaded.</p> <p>2. Want of consideration, on general principles, cannot be pleaded to a bond, nor fraud, except to the execution of the instrument. But under the statute of Ohio, both of these de-fences to a sealed instrument may be made.</p> <p>[Cited in Hoitt v. Holcomb, 23 N. H. 554; Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Hosmer, 1 D. C. 302.]</p> <p>3. To an action on a bond to pay the sum that shall be recovered in a certain action then pending, between different parties, a defence cannot be set up which might have been available in the first action. Fraud between the parties to such action might be shown.</p> <p>[Cited in Gage y. Lewis, (5S Ill. 613.]</p> <p>4. Bail cannot go behind the judgment against the principal.</p> <p>5. The first judgment cannot be impeached collaterally.</p> <p>6. The amount of the judgment is as conclusive against the bail as against the principal.</p> <p>7. On a demurrer to any pleading, the court may go back to the first fault.</p> <p>[See Bank of Illinois v. Brady, Case No. 88S.]</p> <p>8. A bond is good at common law. if entered into for a valuable consideration, and is not re-pugnan t to any statute or the general policy of the law. It does not follow that a voluntary bond is void, where an individual undertakes to do more than the law requires.</p> <p>9. A bond is void which shows upon its face an illegal consideration.</p> <p>10. Every plea in discharge or in avoidance of a bond, should state particularly the matters of discharge or avoidance.</p> <p>11. Where a bond is required in restraint of liberty, which the law does not authorise or require, it is void. But, in such a case, the facts must be specially alleged. They cannot be presumed.</p> <p>12. Matters which make a deed void may be given in evidence, under the general issue of non est factum. But matters in avoidance must be pleaded.</p>

<p>In this case the bankrupt [Alexander Greaves] presented an affidavit setting forth that he was poor and destitute of all means of support, or to pay the expenses of obtaining the benefit of the act, and that the general assignee had required an advance of ten dollars, previous to acting upon the decree of bankruptcy in this case. The affidavit stated further that he had no property or effects, and that none passed to the as-signee by the decree. His counsel moved that the bankrupt be allowed to complete his proceedings, without any action of the as-signee under the decree. The general as-signee referred to the inventory of property filed by the bankrupt on presenting his petition, by which he represented his property to consist of one fifth of ten thousand acres of land in Kentucky, one half of one hundred acres in Essex county, N. Y., three lots of land in Pennsylvania, (unless sold for taxes), five shares in the Norfolk Granito Company, Quincy, N. Y., and also claims of debts amounting to seven or eight hundred dollars. The petition wras sworn and filed March 1, 1842.</p>

Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought under section 52 of the act of July 8, 1870, for the grant of a patfent, the same having been refused by the commissioner of patents. Greeley filed his application for a patent September 13, 1869, for “an improvement in metallic button-holes and links.” His application was finally rejected by the examiner, February 28, 1870. He then appealed to the board of examiners-in-chief, and was rejected April 27, 1870.

[This was a bill in equity by J. C. Greeley, assignee of Joseph W. Scott, against Joseph W. Scott and wife and others.] Submitted on motion for injunction. The-facts appear in the opinion of the court

<p>Case No. 5,747.</p> <p>Corporation — Citizenship—Pleadings—Rule to Amend — Practice.</p> <p>1. A corporation established by and in a state, and doing business there, is to be deemed a citizen of the state, and the citizenship of the cor-porators is immaterial to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in Re McKibben, Case No. 8,859.]</p> <p>[See Bank of Cumberland v. Willis, Case No. 885.]</p> <p>2. Where a suit is brought by or against a corporation in the courts of the United States, the state in which the corporation is created and established should be averred.</p> <p>3. It is perfectly competent for this court to grant a motion to strike out the name of one of the defendants, where its jurisdiction might otherwise be ousted. The same practice also obtains in the supreme court of the United States, and is within the remedial action of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, § 32 [1 Stat. 91],</p> <p>[NOTE. In Case No. 5,748 the surrender of the charter of the Exchange Bank was suggested, and it was decided that the suit against it was thereby abated. The other defendant thereupon (Id. 5,749) filed a plea of a former judgment in bar, to which plea there was a demurrer and joinder. The demurrer was allowed, and the ease ordered to trial. The question was submitted to the court upon the findings of the jury, who gave judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for the value of the Alfred, secured in a certain bottomry bond under consideration. Id. 5,750.]</p>

[This was an action at law by Philip Greeley and others against Joseph Smith and the Exchange Bank.] This case was formerly before the court upon a plea to the jurisdiction, which having been overruled, Rand for the defendants suggested, that by an act of the legislature of Maine, passed on the 7th of -, 1840, the surrender of its charter by the Exchange Bank (one of the defendants,) was accepted, and thereupon it was declared, “that the same shall terminate when the act…

<p>This was an action of trover commenced January 10th, 1842, for a brig called the Watson. [Joseph] Smith pleaded not guilty, and also, by leave of the court, filed a plea in bar. that the plaintiffs [Philip Greely and another], on the second Tuesday of November, 1S39, prosecuted in the supreme court of the state of Maine, one Joshua Waterhouse, a deputy sheriff, in a writ of replevin for this same vessel, and on an issue joined, denying that the property therein was in the plaintiffs, it was adjudged by said court on the second Tuesday of November, 1841, that the plaintiffs become nonsuit, and that said Waterhouse have return of the property. To this plea there was a general demurrer and joinder.</p>

<p>This case was drawn up by counsel, in the words following:</p> <p>This is an action of trover for an alleged taking and converting, by the defendant [Joseph Smith], of the brig Albert and of two-third part of the brig Watson, on the 7th day of January, 1842; said vessel being alleged to be the property of the plaintiffs [Philip Greely, Jr., and others]. The writ is dated January 10th, 1842, and may be referred to by either party. Plea, — the general issue and joinder. It is admitted that Smith, the defendant, was at the time of the alleged taking, sheriff of the county of Cumberland. The plaintiffs read in evidence, the following papers, dated May 11, 1838, and October 26, 1839, viz:</p> <p>“To all whom these presents shall come. I, Luther Jewett, of Portland, county of Cumberland, state of Maine, owner of the brig called the Albert, of Portland, of the bur-then of about 214 tons, now lying in this port of Portland, and bound on a voyage hence to the port of Guyama, Porto Rico, and thence back to Portland or Boston, or a port of discharge in the United States, send-eth greeting. Whereas, I, the said Luther Jewett am under the necessity of borrowing the sum of $2,200 for the purchasing and fitting out of the said brig, for the said intended voyage; and Messrs. Greely and Guild, merchants of Boston, have lent and advanced to me, the said Luther Jewett, the said sum of $2,200, viz., $1000 in cash, and two acceptances of theirs of this date, each for $600, payable in sixty days and grace, at the rate of two and one-half per cent, on said sum, for the purpose of purchasing and fitting out the said brig, as aforesaid. Now,' know ye, that I the said Jewett, do, by these presents, for myself, my executors and administrators, covenant, grant and agree, to and with the said Greely and Guild, that the said brig called the Albert shall, with the first fair wind set sail and depart from this port of Portland, after being loaded, and proceed directly to the port of Guayama, and from thence return back to a port of discharge in the United. States, and here end her intended voyage. And I, the said Luther Jewett, for and in consideration of the said money and acceptance to me in hand paid by the said Greely and Guild, at and before the ensealing and delivery of these presents, the receipts whereof is hereby acknowledged, do bind and obligate myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, my goods- and chattels, and particularly the said brig Albert with her- hull or body, together with her tackle and apparel and freight, to be earned for the said voyage, ■ to pay the said Greely and Guild, their executors, administrators or assigns, the said sum of $2,200; provided the acceptance of said Greely and Guild paid by them as so much of the $2,200 as may be paid by them within sixty days next after the safe arrival of the said brig Albert at her port of discharge in the United States, from the said intended voyage; together with six per cent, interest thereon, amounting together to the sum of $2,320. And I, the said Luther Jewett, for myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, covenant, grant and agree, to and with the said Greely and Guild, their executors administrators, by these presents, that I am the true and lawful owner of the - said brig, and that I have good authority to charge and engage said brig as aforesaid; and that the said Drig' shall at all times after the said voyage, be liable-and chargeable, for the said sum of $2,320, with the interest thereon as aforesaid, until paid. In witness thereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 11th day of May, in the year of our Lord, 1838. Luther Jewett (L. S.)</p> <p>“Signed, sealed, and delivered, in presence of George Jewett.</p> <p>“Cumberland, ss. Then personally appeared the above named Luther Jewett, and acknowledged the above instrument to be his free act and deed, this 11th day of May, A. D. 183S. Before me, R. W. Lincoln, Jus. Pacis.”</p> <p>“Know all men by these presents, that, I Luther Jewett, of Portland, county of Cumberland, state of Maine, am held and firmly bound unto Messrs. Greely & Guild, of Boston, commonwealth of Massachusetts, in the just sum of $3,G00, money of - the United States of America; for the payment of which sum well and truly to be made, I hereby bind myself and respected heirs, executors and administrators, by these presents. Dated at Portland, aforesaid, this 26th day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine. Whereas the said Greely and Guild have this day lent and advanced unto the said Luther Jew-ett, the sum of $3,600, at bottomry, on the body, tackle and furniture, of the brig Albert, of Portland, whereof - Beanderly is at present master, and said Luther Jewett being sole owner of said brig Albert. Now the condition of this obligation is such, that if the said Luther Jewett, his heirs, executors or administrators, shall and do within one year from the date of this instrument, well and truly, or cause to be paid unto the said Greely and Guild, their successors or assigns, the above sum of $3,600, the amount loaned, together with marine premium and interest thereon at the rate of six per cent, per annum; if during any voyage of said brig Albert, an utter loss of said vessel by fire, enemies, men-of-war, or any casualty shall unavoidably happen and to said Luther Jewett, his heirs, executors or administrators, shall, and do well and truly account for upon oath if regained, and pay unto said Greely and Guild, their successors or assigns, the whole salvage on said brig Albert, the vessel and appurtenance, then their obligation to be void; otherwise to be and re-. main in. full force and virtue; and in consideration of, and as security for said bond, premium and interest, the said Luther Jewett does by these presents assign, pledge, mortgage, set over, transfer and convey said brig Albert, the vessel and appurtenances to the said Greely and Guild. It being mutually understood and agreed, that in case the amount of said loan, premium and interest, or any part .thereof, according to the terms of these presents, shall remain due and unpaid to said Greely and Guild, after the expiration of one year from the date of these presents, the said Greely and Guild may take possession of said brig Albert, the vessel and appurtenances, and sell the same at public auction in order to satisfy what may then remain due, without any proceedings in court, or otherwise, for the purpose of authorizing such sale, and therefore may execute and deliver a sufficient bill of sale to transfer completely to any purchaser or purchasers, all title and property in and to the said brig Albert, the vessel and appurtenances, to the said purchaser or purchasers, as owner or owners thereof now belonging. The said Greely and Guild thereupon to account to the said Luther Jewett for any surplus of proceeds of such sale after paying all charges and expenses and all demands which said Greely and Guild may then have against said brig Albert. The said Greely and Guild discounting interest for anticipating the payment of the demand not then presently due; and in case of such sale aforesaid, the said Luther Jewett, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, shall, whenever they are requested, make, execute and deliver to said purchaser or purchasers another bill of sale of said brig, the vessel and appurtenances, in which the register shall be recited, or any further documents that may be necessary for transferring completely to said purchaser or purchasers, all the right, interest and claim of said Luther Jewett, his executors, administrators or assigns, as owners of said brig Albert the vessel and appurtenances. Luther Jewett (L. S.)</p> <p>“Signed, sealed, and delivered in presence of George Jewett, James C. Jewett.”</p> <p>Also, a bond of the same tenor and date, (Oct. 26, 1839,) executed by Luther Jewett to Greely and Guild, of two-thirds of the brig Watson, for §2,000.</p> <p>George Jewett, a witness called by plaintiffs, testified that he witnessed the bond of May 11, 1S3S, and the two bonds of October 20, 1S39. Luther Jewett, a witness called by plaintiffs, testified that he owned the Albert and two-thirds of the Watson, on May 11, 1838; that he sent the bond of May 11, 1838, to the plaintiffs, by mail, and has a letter of the plaintiffs’ dated May 12, acknowledging its receipt. The 1839 bonds were sent to plaintiffs October 26; thinks he put them in the mail that day; sent them by plaintiffs’ previous request. The arrangement was made in Boston with the plaintiffs; has not paid to the plaintiffs the amount loaned. The second bond on the Albert was a renewal of the first, (of May, 1838,) the plaintiffs lending me about §1,400 more, to make up the $3,600. The $2,200 named in bond of May, 1838, was used to buy the vessel. The property was insured, and the policy assigned to plaintiffs; does not recollect whether he received any money at the time of giving the bond on the Watson, or whether it was given on general account for previous arrangement for bottomry. The bond on the Watson was made under an arrangement that the plaintiffs should make further advances on the brig, and they were to advance me $10,000 more in the West Indies. In, or about October, 1839, I received enough from Greely and Guild to purchase outfits for the Albert, and a bond was executed to cover theadvances. I cannot say whetherthe sums loaned me by Greely and Guild were charged to me in account or not; I do not recollect whether anything was said about my being personally liable for the money in case the vessel was lost The plaintiffs had the whole control of the Albert while I was in the West Indies. I stated to Greely and Guild that if they would make me the advances in October, 1S39, I would put the vessel into their hands as security. I have no recollection of anything being said between us about money advanced being exposed to risk.</p> <p>The plaintiffs also read in evidence a written demand made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant, dated January 6, 1842, which, with the written reply of the defendant thereto, is hereto annexed, and makes part of this case. The defendant then proved that the vessel now in controversy was attached upon a writ in favor of the Exchange Bank against Luther Jewett, as the property of said Jewett, on the 29th day of October, 1839; that said vessels were afterwards re-plevied by the plaintiffs in suit commenced by them against Joshua M. Waterhouse, the attaching officer; that the judgment was rendered in said action of replevin in favor of-said Waterhouse, at the November term (1841,) of the supreme judicial court of the state of Maine, holden within and .for the county of Cumberland, and a writ of return issued December 24, 1841; that judgment was rendered at the same term of said supreme judicial court in favor of the plaintiffs, in the suit Exchange Bank against. Luther Jewett, and execution Issued against said Jewett on the same 24th December, 1841; that said writ of return against said Greely and Guild the plaintiffs in this suit, in said execution against said Jewett was duly delivered to the defendant, as sheriff of the county of Cumberland, to be executed; that by virtue of said writ of return the defendant demanded said brigs Albert and Watson of said Greely and Guild, who duly-delivered the same to this defendant; that said brigs were thereafterwards duly sold by this defendant, as sheriff of the county of Cumberland, upon the execution in favor of the Exchange Bank against said Jewett.</p> <p>A copy of the judgment of the supreme judicial court of Maine in the suit Greely and Guild against Waterhouse; also a copy of the writ of return issued upon said judgment, with the defendant’s official return thereon; also a copy of the writ sued out by the Exchange Bank against Luther Jew-ett, with the sheriff’s official return thereon; also a copy of the judgment of the supreme-judicial court of Maine, in suit Exchange Bank against Luther Jewett, with a copy of the execution issued upon said judgment, and the sheriff’s official return thereon, may be referred to by either-party as a part of this case. The defendant also read in evidence a-letter from Luther Jewett to Greely and Guild, dated October 28, 1839, and a letter from Greely and Guild to Luther Jew-ett, dated October 29, 1839, which letters may be referred to by either party. The defendant also read in evidence the deposition of Luther Jewett, taken in the suit Greely and Guild against Waterhouse, which deposition may be referred to by either party. It is admitted that Smith, the defendant, was sheriff of the county of Cumberland at the time of the alleged taking; and that Waterhouse was not an officer at that time, but ceased to be a deputy sheriff in February, 1841. The plaintiffs read in evidence two letters from Greely and Guild to Luther Jewett, dated October 22 and 24, 1839, which letters may be referred to by either party.</p> <p>The court submitted to the jury the following questions, to which the jury returned the answers annexed:</p> <p>1st. Were all of these bonds, or any of them, given for advances and acceptances of drafts, under a promise at the time, by Jewett, to execute the bonds in question as security for those advances and acceptances? If any and not all of them, were not executed under this arrangement, but for debts existing before any such arrangement, please to state which. 2d. Were the advances and acceptances made, the obligees in fact relying on the bonds as charging the vessels? and not relying on Jewett’s personal credit? If only a part of them were so made, please to state which.</p> <p>Circuit Court, U. S. Oct. Term, 1840. Philip Greely et al. v. Joseph Smith. The jury find that the advance of thirty-six hundred dollars was made under a promise that a bond of the brig Albert should be made and executed by Luther Jewett to Greely and Guild as security for said advance of thirty-six hundred dollars. And that advances were not made and executed by said Greely and Guild to said Jewett under a promise that a bond of the brig Watson should be made and executed to said Greely and Guild as security for said advances, but the bond of the Watson was made and executed to secure the payment of a debt existing before that time. Answer to second question. — We also find that the plaintiffs did not intend to relinquish their personal claim on said Jewett, but received the bond as collateral security for tne aforesaid advances and claims. Nathaniel Crockett, Foreman.</p> <p>It is agreed that the value of the brig Albert at the time of the alleged taking, was one thousand and fifty dollars, and the value of two-thirds of the brig Watson, nine hundred and five dollars. The whole case is now submitted to the court upon the above evidence, under the finding of the jury upon the questions submitted to them, to enter such judgment as the law requires.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of John Green.)</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] This was a proceeding in rem, instituted by the owners of the brig Laurel and the owners of her cargo, against the schooner Adelaide, to recover damages sustained by a collision between the two vessels, on the Sth of December, 1856.

Judgment was obtained by the plaintiffs, in this court, on the 10th of December, 1807. A fieri facias issued, returnable in April, 1808, which was levied on the personal and real estate of the defendant: the personal being sold, and being insufficient to discharge the debt, the real estate of the defendant, lying in Bucks county, was, upon an inquest taken by the marshal, returned to be insufficient by its rents, to pay the debt in seven years.

<p>Case No. 5,754.</p> <p>Civil Rights — Common Cauhieks — Reasonable Regulations — Case in Judgment.</p> <p>1. Congress has enacted no law which forbids inter-state common carriers by water or land from regulating the business of their vessels or vehicles in such manner that the accommodations for colored passengers and their respective conveyances may be distinct and separate from those assigned to white passengers. Colored persons are, however, entitled to accommodations as suitable as those designated for the exclusive use of white passengers.</p> <p>2. The libellant, a colored woman, went on hoard a steamboat and took herposition as a passenger on the upper deck aft, a portion of the boat assigned to the exclusive use of white passengers. She was directed by one of the officers of the boat to the cabin on the lower deck, a place affording substantially the same accommodations as the place where she now was. but designed especially for colored people. She refused to do so, and. tendered the customary fare, which was declined. Having been threatened that she would be put off the boat at the next landing place if she persisted in remaining where she was. she voluntarily left the boat at such landing place. Held, that she had no cause of action for such exclusion.</p>

The plaintiffs [William H. Green and others] were citizens of the state of Rhode Island, doing business at Providence in that state, and the defendant [Bernard Collins] was a citizen of this commonwealth, doing business at Milford in this district.

On the 21st day of March, 1878, in the-United States circuit court at Memphis suit was brought upon past-due coupons of bonds, issued by the town of Dyersburg, of which the following are samples,… Held: and that the legislature of Tennessee had by law authorized the bonds to be issued. 5. To the fifth plea: That it appears by the plea that the plaintiff was an innocent purchaser for value without notice.

[This was a bill by Benjamin F. Green against Phineas French, William L. Smalley, Daniel G. Van Winkle, and William E. Gardiner, for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 4,372, granted to N. W. Green, May 9, 1871, the original patent, Ño. 73,425, having been granted January 14, 18C8J '

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Benjamin T. Green against William E. Gardner and others for an injunction and an account.]</p>

This was a motion to dissolve an injunction awarded at the suit of the plaintiffs, legatees of the late Peter Lyons, to restrain John Wickham, one of the defendants and the attorney at law, and in fact, of the representatives of Capel and Osgood Hanberry, from paying away, if collected, a sum of money claimed by him under a decree of this court, pronounced in December, 1S28, in a suit depending between Lidderdale’s Executors et al. v. Robinson’s Administrator; the ultimate…

This was an action of debt, brought on a judgment recovered in the mayor’s court of New York, in an action of assumpsit against the defendant and Maliony, as partners, on a contract stated to have been made at Madeira. Plea nil debet, and bankruptcy of defendant in 1S01, and a certificate of discharge at Teneriffe.

In equity. In the early part of December, 1S72, W. A. S. Taylor was in Hampton. Whilst there he was approached by A. B. Green, who desired to purchase of him a tract of land near Newport News, of great prospective value, on account of being near the expected terminus of the Chesapeake and Ohio Kailroad; land which he derived from his wife. Taylor agreed to write him from Norfolk (Taylor’s home) a response to his proposition.

<p>This was assumpsit for the payment for’ one hundred and twenty-one bunches of shingles sold by the plaintiff [Oliver F. Greéne] to the defendant [William P. Bate-man] in June, 1846, as he alleged, at the price of $3.25 per bunch. The defendant pleaded, that he never promised, and at the trial here this term, the delivery of the shingles was admitted; but the defendant insisted, that he bought them at $3.25 per thousand, instead of $3.25 per bunch; and as there were but five hundred in a bunch, that the plaintiff ought to recover only at that rate. Much evidence was offered to prove what the parties meant as to the price when the shingles were delivered. The plaintiff was shown to be resident in Albany, N. Y., where shingles are sold by the bunch, and the defendant in Providence, It. I., where they are sold generally by the thousand; and several witnesses who were present, and others who conversed with the plaintiff beforehand, were introduced on both sides to show, whether the plaintiff meant to sell at $3.25 per bunch, or $3.25 per thousand. It further appeared in evidence, that after the delivery of the shingles, and the defendant came to pay for them, the plaintiff refused to receive $3.25 per thousand, contending that he expected and sold them for $3.25 per bunch. And the defendant, denying that he so understood the bargain, offered to the plaintiff that he might take the shingles again; but the plaintiff declined that, insisting that he had sold them for more. The parties separated on this, the defendant not having brought the shingles back and tendered them, but proceeded to sell them at retail for the price of $4.50 per thousand. The plaintiff having at once brought this suit, the defendant, during the present session, paid into court $202, in full of what he was bound to pay, but offered no costs, as is required under the rule on this subject.</p>

This was a bill in.equity praying that the respondent [William Bishop] might be restrained from selling, or exposing for sale, ■copies of a certain book entitled “Covell’s Digest of English Grammar,” and that he might be ordered to render an account of the copies already sold.

This was an action of replevin. The defendants, in answer thereto, filed the following avowry: “And the said defendants come and defend the force and injury’ when, &c., and well avow the taking of the goods and chattels in the declaration aforesaid above-mentioned, in the said place in which, &c., and the detention thereof, &c., and justly, &c., because they say that the said Nathan M. Briggs now is a police constable of the city of Providence, in said district, and for a…

<p>Case No. 5,765.</p> <p>Set-Off — Disconnected Debts.</p> <p>1. Courts of equity, independently of any statute of set-off, do not exercise jurisdiction to set off mutual disconnected debts, unless where the dealings of the parties imply it as matter of agreement, or mutual credit.</p> <p>[Cited in Gordon v. Lewis, Case No. 5,613; Howe v. Sheppard, Id. 6,773; Gordon v. Lewis, Id. 5,614; Drexel v. Berney, 122 U. S. 253, 7 Sup. Ct. 1205; Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Co., 58 Fed. 266.]</p> <p>[Cited in Second Nat. Bank v. Hemingray, 34 Ohio St. 390; Leavitt v. Peabody, 62 N. H. 189; Barnes v. McMullins, 78 Mo. 271; Pond v. Harwood, 139 N. V. 119, 34 N. E. 70S.]</p> <p>2. Quaere, whether in Rhode Island, judgments can be set off against each other, where the debt due to the plaintiff has been assigned before suit brought.</p> <p>3. An award, upon a submission of a question whether the parties had a right of set-off, is conclusive.</p> <p>4. Quaere, whether a decision by a court of law, of concurrent jurisdiction on the same point, would not be conclusive.</p> <p>5. How far notice of a set-off is necessary to defeat the rights of an assignee.</p> <p>6. Quaere, whether a party, who has procured an assignment of a debt of the plaintiff, can set it off against his own debt due to the plaintiff, which was previously assigned.</p> <p>[Cited in Wood v. Carr, Case No. 17,940; Al-drich v. Equitable Safety Ins. Co.. Id. 155; Whetmore v. Murdock, Id. 17,509.]</p> <p>[Cited in Buffum v. Deane, 4 Gray, 392; Mc-Graw v. Pettibone. 10 Mich. 537; Spaulding v. Bachus, 122 Mass. 555, 556; Backus v. Spaulding, 129 Mass. 238.]</p> <p>7. Where a set-off or defence to a debt was available at law, and the party omitted by laches to take advantage of it, it seems a court of equity will not relieve him.</p> <p>[Cited in Howe v. Sheppard, Caso No. G.773; Hendrickson v. Hinckley, 17 How. (08 U. S.) 447.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,766.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Intoxicating Liquors— Seizure.</p> <p>The act of the legislature of Rhode Island, passed at the January session, 1S53, entitled “An act for the more effectual suppression of drinking-houses and tippling shops” [Laws R. I. 1S5I-53, p. 94S], so far as it authorizes a seizure of property, is in conflict with the constitution of the state, because it does not provide for notice to the owner, by due legal means, of the nature and cause of the accusation, nor for a .trial of the question, whether the liquors seized were held for sale in violation of law.</p> <p>[Cited in Mitchell v. Lippincott, Case No. 9.005.3</p> <p>[Cited in Dunn v. Burleigh, 02.Me. 30.].</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. In Greene v. Briggs, Case No. 5.-7&4, a similar act was held unconstitutional, because the law authorized a complaint against no person in particular, and did not require a recital of the substantive facts necessary to constitute the offense. Such a proceeding the court said was not “due process of law.”]</p>

<p>Motion to remand.</p>

This was a suit in equity [by Richard Greene, trustee, against David Sisson and others].

<p>Case No. 5,769.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition with Creditors— Schedule of Debts.</p> <p>[1. In accepting a composition of creditors all the court requires is to be satisfied that the creditors have been fully and honestly advised of the true condition of the debtor’s affairs, so that Iho creditors have acted intelligently and understand! ngly in full view of the facts, and with a knowledge of their own rights in the premises.)</p> <p>[2. The whole question of whether the composition should be accepted is relegated under the law to the necessary quorum of creditors, and if it appears that they acted intelligently and without undue influence, the court should confirm their action, unless subsequent disclosures are made, which it may be fairly presumed would, if known, have caused the creditors to act differently.)</p> <p>[3. It seems that, where the requisite majority of creditors agree to a composition, the mere fact that some of that majority signed in a representative capacity, as assignees in bankruptcy, administrators, etc., is not a valid objection to the composition; for, as the receipts of administrators and assignees are sufficient, and if they sign for indebtedness due their estates without authority they become personally liable, it would seem that, in the absence of evidence, the court would presume them to be personally liable if they signed the composition without sufficient authority.)</p> <p>[4. A bankrupt is not bound to schedule among his debts a contingent liability as a stockholder in a savings bank which has failed, when it. does not appear that the bank will not pay in full, and there has been no judicial determination that the liability exists.)</p> <p>[5. The fact that a bankrupt has failed to-schedule all of his debts is not an insuperable obstacle to the confirmation of a composition, for he will only be discharged from the debts which have been scheduled, remaining personally liable for those which have been omitted.)</p>

<p>Case No. 5,770.</p> <p>'Collision in Hudson River — Sailing Vessels— Privileged Tace — Lookout—Pleading.</p> <p>1.Two schooners, the T. and the W., were beating up the Hudson river, the wind blowing down the river. Both vessels had been standing -on their starboard tack towards the Jersey shore. The T. was ahead and stood out her tack and went about near the Jersey shore and came on her port tack. The W. continued on her starboard tack and the vessels collided, the stem of the W. failing to clear the stern of the T. by only a few feet. The master of the T. claimed that, before going about, he looked to see where the W. was and saw her about a third of the way across the river from the Jersey shore, heading nearly across the river but a little up, and being a little further up the river than the T. was; that, after the T. had gone about and he had ordered her jib to be drawn away, he saw that the W. was about 100 or 150 feet off, pointing for his starboard quarter, whereupon he put his wheel to starboard, and, just as his sails began to shake, the collision occurred. Cross libels were filed by the owners of each schooner against the other: Eeld, that on the libel of the Tanner, filed four days after the occurrence, which did not claim that the W. was so near the Jersey shore as not to leave room for the T. to go about with safety, and on the evidence, the T. got headway on her port tack; before sbe did anything in discharge of her duty to keep out of the way of the W., which was on the privileged tack.</p> <p>2. The master of the T. either came about without carefully observing the W., or, if he observed her, persisted in coming on liis port tack and trying to cross the bows of the W. instead of porting and going under her stern.</p> <p>3. The TV. had the right to keep her course and was not in fault in that she did not try, by starboarding, to go under the stern of the T.</p> <p>4. As the W. did not fail in her duty, her keeping or not keeping a lookout was not an element in the case.</p> <p>' 5. The T. was responsible for the • damages.</p>

By I. T. WILLIAMS, Register: 2 [I, the undersigned, register in charge of the above-entitled matter, and to whom it was referred by a special order of this court, founded upon the petition of Albert Smith, Esq., the assignee therein, to take proofs of the matters alleged in the said petition, and report the same with his conclusion thereon, and further to report whether the proceedings in bankruptcy' either in this court or in the district court for Louisiana are of any…

This was a petition for a review of an order of the district court, refusing a discharge to [Thompson Greenfield], a bankrupt. [The opinion of the district court, which ■ is reported in full in 6 Blatchf. 287, is here published as Case No. 5,774.]

<p>Case No. 5,775.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Appucation foe Discharge.</p> <p>Under section 29 [Act 1807; 14 Stat. 531], it is only in cases where the bankrupt can apply for his discharge within less than six months frem his adjudication, that he must do so within a year therefrom, in order to obtain a discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Watson, Cases Nos. 17,273, 17,-275; Re Martin, Id. 9,153; Re Holmes, Id. 6,034.] -</p>

<p>Case No. 6,776.</p> <p>Garnishment — Dissolution of Attachment— Payment of Interest.</p> <p>Where the respondents owed freight to the libellants, and were summoned as their garnishees in the state court, and, after some time, gave bond to the plaintiffs in the action in which they were summoned as garnishees, and thus dissolved the attachment, and afterwards the case in this court for the recovery of the freight was decided, — held, that the respondents, not having tendered the freight, were bound to pay interest on the amount found due, at the market rate of three per cent, while the money was under attachment, and at the statute rate of six per cent, after the attachment was dissolved.</p> <p>[Cited in Albion Lead Works v. Citizens’ Ins. Co., 3 Fed. 197.]</p>

Contract, to recover money paid to the collector of the port of Boston under protest, as duties laid upon certain dress goods under the act of 1862, as being goods “of similar description” to delaines. The cause was tried upon the general issue; the verdict was for the defendant [John Z. Goodrich], and the plaintiffs [Itichard G. Greenleaf and others] moved for a new trial for misdirection, and because the verdict was against evidence.

In equity. The case, as it appears from the bill and answer, is shortly as follows. The plaintiff drew two bills of exchange on Smith for 8000 dollars each, payable at four and six months; which Smith accepted for the accommodation of the plaintiff. These bills were drawn in favour of Maher, who endorsed one of them to A. Harper.

This cause now came on to be heard, upon the bill, answers of all the defendants [Ma-her, Smith and Pendleton], replication, and the deposition of a Mr. Jackson, an agent of Maher; who deposed, that in ISOS, he (having been authorized by Maher to take land), received a conveyance from one Justice Smith, in part payment of Smith’s acceptance of the bill held by Maher, at the price of about twenty-four hundred dollars, at which it was valued by three disinterested persons, for…

<p>Case No. 6,782.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Action to Recover Payments —Proof of Protest — Verdict by Consent.</p> <p>1. In a suit brought against a collector of customs, to recover back duties paid under protest, it is, under the act of February 26, 1845 (5 Stat. 727), an indispensable item of proof, to be made by the plaintiff, on the trial of the suit, that such a protest as that act requires was made.</p> <p>2. Where the verdict in such a suit is, that, by consent of counsel, the jury find for the plaintiff, “for the amount, with interest, of the excess of duties paid under protest, on more than two per cent, commission on all importations specified in the bill of particulars in this cause, from the continent of Europe, except Paris, the amount to be adjusted by the clerk of this court or his deputy,” and the clerk reports that, according to his adjustment the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for a sum named, the report cannot be excepted to on the ground that the duties are shown to have been paid by a certain firm, and that the plaintiffs did not prove before the referee that they composed that firm when the duties were paid, or that they alone paid the duties.</p> <p>[Cited in Simpson v. Schell, 14 Fed. 287.]</p> <p>3. Even if such objection be not one which ought to have been taken by plea in abatement, as being an objection that some party who ought to have been joined as a plaintiff in the suit, was not joined, the verdict cures any defect in that regard.</p> <p>4. Such verdict must be considered as being also an order of reference made by the court and entered in its minutes, and confines the action and duty of the referee to an arithmetical adjustment and computation of amounts, on the basis of computation prescribed in the verdict.</p> <p>5. Under such verdict, the plaintiff is not required to prove before the referee that the duties were paid under protest.</p>

<p>[This was a suit in equity by Halbert S. Greenleaf against the Yale Lock Manufacturing Company.]</p>

<p>At law. Action on an account [by Frederick W. Greenough against Samuel D. Lang-tree].</p>

<p>[Petition by certain creditors of the Green-Pond Railroad Company to have it adjudged, a bankrupt.]</p>

[Petition by Daniel E. Scannell and others to have the Greenville & Columbia Railroad Company declared a bankrupt:] This case was ably argued in July last, and taken under advisement

This action was instituted, on the 10th March 1849, on the following contract for the purchase of a house and lot in the city of Baltimore: “I hereby agree to purchase the house and lot, No. 52 Mount Vernon place, 37 by 1(10 feet, for the sum of twenty-four thousand dollars, payable in 18, '24, 30 and 36 months, interest on the whole to be paid semi-annually, the right reserved by the owner of the adjoining lot to build against the walls of said house and lot, although it…

In admiralty. This case came up on exceptions to the report of the commissioner. The suit was brought to recover damages for the non-delivery of freight shipped for Rio Ja-neiro, and the libelants [John Greenway and George C. Dickson] having obtained a decree in their favor, the commissioner reported the damages, taking the value of the freight at Rio as the rule of damages, to which the claimants excepted.

Assumpsit on a bill of exchange. The defendant [Henry M. Rector] plead that since the institution of this suit, a writ of garnishment had been sued out of the Pulaski circuit court of the state of Arkansas and served on him, in respect to the same debt mentioned in the declaration, which was still pending, and prayed to be discharged from this suit; to which plea the plaintiffs [Moses Greenwood and Thomas E. Adams] demurred, on the ground that this suit having been just…

<p>Case No. 5,795.</p> <p>Patents — Damages fob Infringement — Agreement to Collect — Contingent FEE — CHAM-PERTY AND MAINTENANCE.</p> <p>1. Where -I., the patentee of a patent which had expired, haring claims for damages for its infringement, made a written agreement with G., giving to G. the exclusive right to control the claims, and collect or compromise them, G. to bear all expenses, except that I. was to bear the taxable costs of any suit in which a recovery for costs should be had against him, and G. to have, as compensation for his time and all expenses. except such taxable costs, one half of the gross amount he might collect, the rights under the agreement to survive to and against the personal representatives of each party, and the contract not to be revoked except by the consent of both parties in writing, and the agreement was accompanied by an irrevocable power of attorney from I. to G., authorizing G. to sue in the name of I. and conduct the whole business of collecting the damages in all the states of the Tinion except four: Held, that the contract was tainted with champerty and maintenance, and that a court of equity would not uphold it.</p> <p>[Cited in Goldsmith v. American Paper Collar Co., 2 Fed. 241.]</p> <p>2. The case of Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Younge & C. Ex. 481, cited and approved.</p> <p>3. The absence of an agreement to indemnify against taxable costs does not make such a contract valid.</p> <p>4. The fact that the contract was made in New York, and that the common law doctrines concerning champerty and maintenance no longer exist in New York, cannot uphold the contract, as it is to operate in many states where it is clearly void.</p> <p>5. Even though such a contract might be barely valid at law, a court of equity will lend no countenance to it.</p>

In bankruptcy. Petition by Hayford and Pearson to charge funds, received by the as-signee from the sale by him of certain logs as the property’ of the bankrupt [Thomas B. Gregg], with a lien that attached to them before their sale. The cause was heard upon the report of Mr. Register Hamlin, to whom the same had been referred.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[This was a suit by Gregg and Wald against Gier.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,800.</p> <p>Promissory Note — Jurisdiction or United States Court.</p> <p>1. The statutes of Indiana make all promissory notes negotiable so far as to vest the property in each indorsee successively; but unless a note is made payable to order or bearer at a particular bank, whatever equity the maker was entitled to against the payee he may assert against any in-dorsee. Under such a statute the United States courts have no jurisdiction of an action by an assignee of a note not made payable at a bank, as such a note is not a “promissory note negotiable by the law merchant.”</p> <p>[Cited in Porter v. Janesville, 3 Fed. 619; Bank of Sherman v. Apperson, 4 Fed. 31; Hardin v. Olson, 14 Fed. 705.]</p> <p>2.. The statutes of a state enter into and become part of a note made in that state.</p>

<p>[Tbis suit was brought by James B. Gregory against Hewson & Holmes and- others.]</p>

This case was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts, which are, that on May 1, 1874, the defendant, Enoch Marks, borrowed of Ann Y. Boardman the sum of $12,500, for the term of five years, with interest at ten per cent, per annum, payable semiannually; that the said defendant, Enoch Marks, executed his promissory note for said debt, a copy of which is given in the stipulation, and certain interest coupons; that accompanying said principal note were ten…

[In error to the district court of the United ■States for the Southern district of New York..) [This was a proceeding by the United States against George O. Gregory for the unlawful use of his premises in permitting them to be used for purposes of ingress and egress to and from an illicit distillery. A ■decree of condemnation was entered in the ■district court, and the claimant brings error.)

<p>Case No. 6,804.</p> <p>1. Where a libel claims three hundred dollars damages, and a decree is given for the libellant for forty dollars, in which he acquiesces, the respondent cannot apneal to the circuit court.</p>

Mary D. Gresham, then and now of Jeffer-sonville, Indiana, became, in 1869, the owner of 720 acres of land in Grayson county. That county took stock in the E. & P. Railroad, and levied a tax for the years 1872 and 1873 to pay the interest.