Volume 11 — Federal Cases

<p>On demurrer to bill of complaint filed by assignee in bankruptcy to set aside as fraudulent a transfer of personal property by the bankrupt to the defendants. The special causes assigned for demurrer were: 1, That the bill does not allege, nor does it anywise appear, that the transfer was made within two months nest preceding the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy. 2, That .there is no allegation that at the time of the transfer the defendants knew that it was fraudulent in- law.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,807.</p> <p>[See Wattson v. Marks, Case No. 17,296.]</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by Mary L. «Gridley, against the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company.]</p>

[In the matter of Grieves Bros., bankrupts. On application for the debtors’ discharge.] About the time of their failure there were several transfers of property made by the bankrupts which did not appear on the books, and these could not be taken advantage of as preferences, because the bankruptcy was some three or four months after the failure.

[In this case Register [Charles L.) Beale certifies to the judge, that in the due course of proceedings the following questions, pertinent to the same, arose, and were stated and agreed to by the counsel for the opposing parties, to wit: Mr. John P. H. Tallman,' who appeared for the bankrupt [William Grillen], and Mr. Alland Anthony, who appeared for Henry Bostwick, one of the creditors of said bankrupt.

• This was a libel against the barkentine John Laughlin brought by one Griffenberg for masts and spars furnished by him to said vessel. The libelant claimed a lien under the act of assembly of Pennsylvania of June 13, 1836, § 1 (supra). The hull of the vessel was built and completed at Seaford, Del., and was then taken up to Philadelphia to be rigged.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, against the barque Griffin, to recover the value of 132 boxes of furniture, shipped on board that vessel at the port of New York, consigned to the libellants at Rio Janeiro. The ground of the claim was the non-delivery of the goods.

<p>[In equity. Bill by Oramel Griffin against the Clinton Line Extension Railroad Company and others.]</p>

Indebitatus assumpsit, “for sundry matter and articles properly chargeable in account, as by a particular account thereof herewith into court exhibited appears,” amounting to $97.93.

<p>Case No. 5,817a.</p> <p>Duebidl — Assignment op — Power op Agent.</p> <p>A duebill payable to order or bearer, is assignable, and may be assigned by an agent.</p>

This bill was filed to obtain an injunction. The facts will be gathered from the allegations of the bill and the statements in the affidavits which have been filed.

<p>Case No. 5,820.</p> <p>Baxkhuptcv — Membership of Fiiim — Adjudication.</p> <p>1. The court has jurisdiction on a voluntary petition for the adjudication of a firm, to entertain and determine the question what persons in fact constitute the firm, and an adjudication based upon the determination of such fact is valid until set aside or reversed.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Kitzinger, Case No. 7.861; Pel-ham v. The B. F. Woolsey. 3 Fed. 461; Allen v. Thompson, 10 Fed. 124.]</p> <p>2. In 1872 the bankrupts were adjudicated upon a voluntary petition, which alleged that they composed the firm of G. & IV. In 1874, in a proceeding in the state court, it was held that one A. was a general partner in said firm, and not a special partner, as he was believed to be at the time the petition was filed. On a petition filed in 1878 to set aside the adjudication, held, that the application should he denied, on the ground that so long an interval had elapsed since the adjudication that rights and interests of other parties had grown up under it and been adapted to it.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Meade, Case No. 9,370; Lavin v. Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank, 1 Fed. 000.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,821.</p> <p>SURVET — PlilORITT OP SETTLEMENT RlGTIT — OUTSTANDING Title — Fifteen Years’ Possession in Pennsylvania.</p> <p>1. A survey returned and accepted is, prima facie, presumed to have been legally made, and it is for him who says it was not, to prove the fact. In a survey of adjoining tracts returned and accepted, it is not necessary to produce the original, or copies of the surveys and connected plots, unless so far as they may be necessary to identify the land.</p> <p>[Cited in Collins v. Barclay, 7 Pa./St. 69.]</p> <p>2. Where a man sets up a settlement right against another settlement right, or against a warrant and survey, he must prove his settlement to be prior to the opposing right, and continuing; or he must content himself with the right of some prior settler, by deducing a title from him down to himself.</p> <p>3. If the defendant sets up an outstanding title in a third person, he must show it to be a legal subsisting title, and better than the plaintiff’s.</p> <p>4. What laches in a settler will postpone him to a warrant and survey.</p> <p>5. What is a sufficient survey of a number of tracts adjoining each other, belonging to the same person? Each tract need not be run on the land.</p> <p>6. Fifteen years’ possession under the act of the assembly of Pennsylvania of 1785 to bar ejectment, is only where the possession bad commenced when-the law was passed.</p> <p>[Cited in Billon v. Larimore, 37 Mo. 384.]</p>

This was an ejectment for a tract of land in Beaver county, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff exhibited in evidence ten warrants, granted to Ann Duncan and nine others, on the 14th of April, 1792, which were surveyed on the- 14th of February, 1795; Ann Duncan’s warrant being the leading warrant, and the others adjoining thereto.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

In admiralty. An involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed in the Eastern district of New York on the 14th November, 1873, against Daniel Dolton. On the 21st of the same month he was adjudicated a bankrupt. In due course of proceedings, Rufus T. Grigg was appointed assignee; and, on the 16th January an assignment of the effects of the bankrupt was made to the assignee.

<p>Case No. 5,828.</p> <p>Land Grant — Abandonment—Boundart.</p> <p>Objections removed by additional testimony, and by the ruling of the supreme court in Fremont v. U. S. [17 How. (58 U. S.) 542.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,830.</p> <p>Lien on Bankrupt's Property — Sale of Pledge BEFORE THE APPOINTMENT OP AN ASSIGNEE —Power op the Court.</p> <p>1. Stocks and bonds were deposited with B. B. & Co., bankers, as collateral security for loans to G. & Co., then solvent, but who afterwards became bankrupt. Before an assignee was appointed, B. B. & Co. applied to the court for an order authorizing them to sell the collaterals to reimburse themselves for the loans, which had become due1 Held, that the court could not, before the appointment of an assignee, make the order for sale contemplated by the 20th section of the bankruptcy act [of 1807 (14 Stat. 926)]. nor authorize any sale which would cut off or affect the rights of an assignee thereafter to be appointed; but that, there being no suggestion of the invalidity of the debt, or of the lien of the petitioners, or that they would not be able to respond for any liability which they might incur by making the sale, an order might be made allowing them to sell the securities at their own risk, and reserving all the rights and powers of the court to hold them to account for the property and proceeds thereof to an assignee, when he should be appointed — a sworn statement of such sale and proceeds to be filed within two days after sale.</p> <p>2. It is the principle of the bankruptcy act, that all valid liens, which exist on the property of a bankrupt when the bankruptcy proceedings are commenced, are preserved, and will be respected and enforced by the bankruptcy court.</p> <p>3. But it is confided to that court to determine whether the debt or lien is valid, and to regulate the disposition of the property, and, for this purpose, power is given to the court, in involunrary cases, by the 40th section, to restrain the debtor and any other person from making any disposition of any part of the debtor’s property.</p> <p>4. The filing of a petition in bankruptcy, whether voluntary'or involuntary, if followed by an adjudication, and the appointment of an as-signee, operates, from the time of such filing, as a practical restraint on a pledgee of the property of the bankrupt, who is notified of such filing, from disposing of it, otherwise than at his own risk, until the bankruptcy court can act in the premises.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Duncan. Case No. 4,131; Taylor v. Robertson. 21 Fed. 214.]</p>

<p>This was an action to recover back an alleged excess of duties paid to the defendant [Cornelius W. Lawrence], as collector of the port of New-York.</p> <p>On the 15th of November, 1847, the plaintiffs [Henry Grinnell and others] shipped from London to New-York, in the ship American Eagle, 1050 rolls of Canton matting, containing 42,000 yards, at the cost of $3,880. A commission of 2% per cent, was added, making a total of $3,977, on which a duty of 25 per cent, was charged, amounting to $994.-25. The entry was made at the custom-house from the original invoice which accompanied the goods when shipped from Canton to London on the 10th of August, 1S46. This invoice also accompanied the goods on their reshipment from London to New-York. On the entry of the goods at New-York, the collector directed the appraisers to report the charges upon each roll of the matting, and they reported, accordingly, to be charged on each, $150 for freight from Canton to London, making the additional sum of $1,575, upon which duties were chargeable, which, at 25 per cent., amounted to $393 75., It being claimed that the appraised value of $5,552, (which included the addition of the charges for freight from Canton to London,) exceeded, by ten per cent., the value. $3,977, as entered at the custom-house, a duty of 20 per cent on such amended value was also imposed and charged by way of penalty, under section 8 of the act of July 30, 1846 (9 Stat. 43), which amounted to $1,110 40. The aggregate amount of duties, including the penalty of 20 per cent thus charged upon the Canton matting, was $2,498 40. The sum of $393 75, the duty on the charges for freight from Canton to London, and also the $1,110 40 imposed by way of penalty, making the sum of $1,504.-15, was paid to the collector under protest. There was also shipped, at the same time, and in the same vessel, a quantity of crape shawls, which were entered at a cost, including charges and commissions, of $4,079 47, and charged with a duty of 30 per cent amounting to $1,223 84. These articles had also been shipped from Canton to London, and reshipped by the plaintiffs [Henry Grinnell and ethers] to New-York. The charges for freight from Canton to London were added to the entry, amounting to $102, on which a duty of 30 per cent, was exacted, amounting to $30 60. This sum, also, was paid under protest, making an aggregate of $1,534 75, with interest from the time of payment, which the plaintiffs claimed to recover, and for which a verdict was taken subject to the opinion of the court.</p>

This was an action to recover the possession of certain real property, situated at or-near the place known as Black Toint, or Point San Jose, in the city of San Francisco. .The plaintiff [Emil Grisar] claimed to be the owner in fee of the premises, deriving his title from the city of San Francisco by virtue of the ordinance of the common council for the settlement of land titles in the city, passed on the twentieth of June, 1855, commonly known as the “Van Ness Ordinance,”…

<p>Action at law. The parties waived .a jury and submitted the cause to the court, both on the facts and law.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,834.</p> <p>Judgment — Entry—Prior Death op Party.</p> <p>1. Where a party dies during term, the judgment may be entered in this court as of a day antecedent to his death.</p> <p>2. But there is this difference, in this respect, between its equity proceedings and those of the English court of chancery, that this court is •open only during term, and a decree cannot be entered if the death occurred before the beginning of the term.</p> <p>3. Where an order for the dismissal of a bill was taken ex parte, the complainant having avowed his intention not to pursue the cause any further; on a motion to vacate the order, on the ground that the defendant died before it was entered; held, that it was riot distinguishable, in .principle, from the case of death after argument. but before judgment, and that the order might be entered antecedent to the death.</p>

<p>[In equity. Suit by Daniel S. Griswold against Samuel Hill.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,836.</p> <p>Action on Judgment — Effect — Detention of Debtor in Prison — Suspension of Judgment Lien — Discharge.</p> <p>1. The bringing an action ón a "judgment of this court, and recovering and perfecting judgment thereon in another court, is no satisfaction of the first judgment.</p> <p>2. So long as the body of the debtor is detained in prison, the creditor cannot íesort to the property of the debtor, and tne judgment will not be considered a lien as against other creditors.</p> <p>3. The lien of the judgment is suspended during the imprisonment on the ca. sa.; so that a judgment obtained by another creditor during that time, gains a priority of lien on the debt- or's property; or the debtor may sell the property and give to the purchaser a title discharged of the incumbrance of the judgment.</p> <p>4. Discharge of the debtor from imprisonment, without the consent and against the will of the plaintiff, under a state law, reserving to the creditor certain rights as to future acquired</p> <p>■ property, will not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment.</p> <p>5. Where an action is brought on a judgment of this court, and judgment recovered thereon in another court,, if the plaintiff be entitled to continue in force his judgment in the latter court, and enforce payment thereon, against the future acquired property of the defendant, satisfaction of the jpdgment of this court, which is the foundation of the second judgment, will not be entered of record.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,837.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Appraisement at Time and Place of Exportation — Patmest under Protest.</p> <p>1. Where goods are imported from the country of their production, they must, under section 16 of the act of August 30,' 1842 (5 Stat. 563), for the purpose of fixing their dutiable value, be appraised at their market value in that country at the time of their purchase.</p> <p>2. Where the importer claimed that certain goods should be appraised at their value abroad at the time of their purchase, and the collector directed them to. be appraised at their value at the time of their exportation, they having risen in value in the meantime, and the importer, for the purpose of obtaining possession of the goods, and of avoiding the penalty imposed by section 8 of the act of July 30, 1846 (9 Stat. 43), for an excess by 10 per cent, in the appraised value over the value in the entry, added to the cost of the goods a sum which made their value equal to their value abroad at the time of their exportation, and paid duties on that value under protest: Held, that the payment of the duties was not voluntary.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,839.</p> <p>Admiralty — Stale Demands Barred.</p> <p>Where libels in rem against a vessel were not filed until nearly two years after the cause of action had accrued, the libellants having been, during the whole period, residents of the state and under no disability to sue. and the vessel had made repeated voyages in the interim, and, for a considerable time prior to the filing of libels, had remained constantly within the jurisdiction, and the claimant was a mortgagee, without notice, under a mortgage made to him about nine months after the cause of action accrued, and about fourteen months before suit was brought; held, that the demand was stale, and barred by prescription.</p> <p>[Cited in The Columbia. Case No. 3,036; Fitzgerald v. The H. A. Richmond, Id. 4,839:</p> <p>The Bristol. 11 Fed. 162; The Queen of The Pacific, 61 Fed. 215.]</p>

<p>This action was brought against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back duties charged on the freight of a cargo of silks from China to London. The invoice was made up at Shanghae, October 4th, 1S50, of silks shipped on board the Peninsular and Oriental Company’s steamer, bound for Hong Kong, there to be transshipped by the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer to Southampton, thence to New York, consigned to the plaintiff [George Griswold, Jr.]. The freight and expenses to England, $632 12, were added to the invoice, and 30 per cent, duty was charged by the defendant on the value of the goods, and also on the amount of the freight and expenses. The plaintiff paid the whole duty under a protest, in due form, against that imposed on the freight and expenses of shipping the goods to England.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit upon a policy of insurance effected, in February, 1848, by the plaintiffs [Nathaniel L. Griswold and others] with the defendants [The Union Mutual Insurance Company of Philadelphia], who were a Pennsylvania corporation. The policy was executed at Philadelphia. The insurance was for $5,000, upon freight on board the ship Helena, on a voyage from New York to Canton, and back to the United States, with liberty to use any northern port in China.

[This was a bill in equity by Florian Gros-jean against the Peck, Stow & Wilcox Company and others, praying for an injunction to restrain the alleged infringement of a patent.]

This is an action at law upon a judgment alleged to have been rendered against the defendant in favor of one Lombard by the state district court for Dubuque county, Iowa.

[This was a suit by the Gross & Phillips Manufacturing Company against Gerhard.] Rule on the defendant in an interpleader issue to enter security for costs. The plaintiff, a non-resident, brought suit and obtained judgment in October. 1S78. Execution issued, and certain goods, consisting of the stock of a lumber yard, were seized as the property of the defendant, but were claimed by defendant’s brother.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.) In this cause a motion was made to the court to order into its custody the prize property [the Gfotius and cargo], which, after a decree in the district court, and an appeal, had been delivered to the claimants [Thomas Sheafe and others] on bail by the court. The motion was made upon the ground, that after the appeal, the district court had no jurisdiction.

This was an action of assumpsit, by the Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company, against A. T. Clinton, R. C. Douglass and E. D. Loomis, their agents in La Crosse, to recover a balance of one thousand six hundred and thirty dollars and seventy-one cents.

This was a bill in equity filed [by the Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company] to restrain the defendants [George B. Sloat and others] from infringing letters patent [No. 12,116] granted to W. P. N. Fitzgerald, as assignee of the inventor, Allen B. Wilson, December 19, 1854, for an “improvement in sewing machines,” which was an improvement in the feeding device, also invented by Wilson, and patented November 12, 1850 [Patent No. 7,776], which is more particularly described…

This was a motion [by the Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Company against Charles W. Williams and others] for a provisional injunction to restrain the infringement of letters patent [No. 7,931], for an improvement in sewing machines granted to William O. Grover and William E. Baker, February 11, 1851, reissued June 15, 1858 [No. 56S], and assigned to complainants. The claims of the reissued patent were as follows: ‘'First.

<p>Case No. 5,848.</p> <p>Bakkbuptct — Assignment bt Insolvent — Exemption.</p> <p>An assignment by an insolvent of all his property for the benefit of preferred creditors is an act of bankruptcy. Where property of an insolvent was assigned to the creditors with fraudulent preference, held, in an action brought by the assignee in bankruptcy to recover said property, that the value of property exempt from execution must be deducted, and judgment entered up for remainder.</p> <p>[Cited in Graham v. Stark, Case No. 5,676; Re Marter, Id. 9,143.]</p>

David Foree, by deed of indenture made in 1769, reciting his title to 302 acres of land, grants, bargains and sells 20 acres of it which are described, to William Benpet; leaving 282 acres still his… Held: that the Lord Mountjoy could not divide the interest, viz.,' “to grant to one to dig within a parcel of the said waste.” Anderson gives the words of the deed which much resembles ours.

<p>Case No. 5,849a.</p> <p>Dismissal op Action — Effect op — Limitation to Action by Creditor op Deceased Perbon.</p> <p>1. A dismissal of a bill, except upon the merits, is no bar to a subsequent bill for the same cause.</p> <p>2. If there be no administrator of a deceased creditor to bring suit, the act of 1780 requiring creditors in the state to bring their actions within three years cannot operate as a bar.</p>

[This was an action on a promissory note, brought by Alice B. Grunninger, as executrix, against Brian Philpot and others. Plaintiff demurs to the pleas.]

The same defendants [Bryan Philpot and others] were sued by this plaintiff [Alice B. Grunninger] in the superior court of Chicago on the same cause of action. That suit was dismissed at plaintiff’s cost, by plaintiff’s attorney, he not being ready for trial.

This is an action [by George A. Guernsey] upon bonds and coupons. The following is a copy of one of the bonds: “United States of America. “$500.00. Bond of Burlington Township.

<p>Case No. 5,854.</p> <p>Bills and Notes — Rate or Exchange.</p> <p>On a promissory note given in New York, payable at Detroit, with the current rate of exchange on New York, the rate of exchange may be recovered.</p> <p>[Cited in Leggett v. Jones. 10 Wis. 36; Sea-ton v. Scovill, 18 Kan. 436.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,856.</p> <p>Shipping — Rui.es op Navigation — Sailing in Fog — Faults.</p> <p>1. The statutory rules of navigation, as to fog-hells and fog-horns, must not be construed to excuse the faults of bad seamanship.</p> <p>2. A vessel must not sail in a fog with too much canvas to allow of prompt manoeuvring to avoid collision with craft lying at anchor.</p> <p>3. The presumption of fault is conclusive against vessels sailing with too much canvas in a fog in fishing waters, and colliding with vessels at anchor, where there is no vis major.</p> <p>[NOTE. Reference was made to a master to ascertain the damages. The case was heard on exceptions to the master’s report as to the valuation of the vessel, outfit, and cargo, and the report was in general confirmed. 3 Fed. 5S1.]</p>

[In equity. Suit by Charles Guidet against Samuel Barber for the alleged infringement of reissued letters patent No. 4,106, granted to the complainant, August 23, 1870. The original patent, No. 85,814, was granted to said Guidet, January 12, 1869.]

[This was a bill in equity by Charles Guidet for the alleged infringement of reissued letters patent No. 4,106, granted to the complainant, August 23, 1870, the original patent having been dated January 12, 1869.]

Suit brought [by Charles Guidet against Lorin Palmer and others, composing the department of city works of the city of Brooklyn], upon letters patent [No. 85,814], for an “improvement in pavements,” granted to complainant [Jan. 12, 1869], and reissued to him, August 23, 1870 [No. 4,106]. The circumstances of the case, and the nature of the questions involved, sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] The bankrupt in this case [Moses Guild] moves for costs to be allowed him against Earle, a creditor, who had opposed his discharge. It appeared, that in the district court, on a trial of the facts in issue, relating to his discharge, a verdict was returned against Guild; but on appeal here and another trial had, he was discharged. The motion was for costs in both trials.

[In error to the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] 2 [This was an action of debt, commenced by . the .plaintiff in error [Guillou, assignee in bankruptcy of Charles Vezin], in June, 1873, by process of foreign attachment, in the district court of the United States, for. the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.

This was a libel by the firm of B. P. Met-calf & Co., of New York City, to recover the amount of advances made by them for the brig Guisborough, on the order of her master, Enos, in the port of New York, in the year 1873. The libellants alleged that the brig was a British vessel and that the advances were made on her credit. Joseph S. Enos and Edward JF.

<p>Case No. 5,867.</p> <p>Unrecorded Deed — Possession—Notice — Mistake op Tract — Estoppel—Agency —Sale Agent.</p> <p>1.Complainant purchased certain land from B. and took a conveyance which he neglected to place on record. B. subsequently made a mortgage to respondents upon other lands, and by mistake included in said mortgage the land previously sold to complainant. The respondents claimed the land under the mortgage. Held, that they were not bona fide purchasers without notice, since the complainant was in the actual open, notorious, adverse possession of the land when the mortgage was executed. Actual possession is constructive notice to all the world.</p> <p>2. B., in order to obtain a loan of $3,000 from respondents, proposed to secure them by deed of trust on his home farm.- In his application for the loan and in the appraisement which accompanied the same, the land which complainant had previously purchased from B. was by mistake included with the farm. The complainant was one of the appraisers of the land and signed the writter appraisement, supposing it related to the farm only, and ignorant of the fact that his own land was included. Held, that he was not estopped.</p> <p>3. A mere appraiser of land, serving gratuitously for the benefit of others, without any interest of his own involved, is not to suffer by reason of an innocent mistake respecting the description of the land. Estoppel in such a case can proceed only upon the ground of fraud or gross negligence.</p> <p>4. It is not always necessaiy that a sale agent should be known to his principal, or in any way recognized by him, in order to bind the latter. Authority is sometimes implied from the very nature of the duties and powers committed to a general agent, to employ sale agents, and, when this is the case, the principal is bound by the acts of the sale agent whether the sale agent be known to him personally or not.</p>

This case was determined by the court upon the following state of facts: One Gunike applied in March, 1868, for the benefit of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat 517)], and filed his schedules. Warrants were issued, and the proceedings were all regular up to some time in July, 1868, when Gunike died.

This was an action for money had and received, for the price of a negro sold by the defendant to plaintiff, without title. The plaintiff, on the evening before the trial, gave notice to the defendant to produce a deed of trust including the negro in question.

<p>Motion to remand the cause to the circuit court of Brunswick, county.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,873.</p> <p>UNRECORDED BlJ.L OF SALE — SECRET LlEN — Rights of Assignee — Assignee Represents Creditors.</p> <p>■ 1. Where a bill of sale of personal property is made, and the vendee leases the same to the vendor, with a clause in the contract of lease by which the bankrupt agrees to buy the property back at a fixed price, both bill of sale and lease being unrecorded, the transaction is, in effect, a mortgage.</p> <p>[Cited in Lane v. Innes, 43 Minn. 141, 45 N. W. 5.]</p> <p>2. Such an agreement is a secret lien, and a fraud on the. rights of creditors.</p> <p>3. The adjudication of bankruptcy is equivalent to a judgment and levy, and the assignee has the same right to have such a transaction nullified as a judgment creditor would have.</p> <p>[Cited in Re W erner, Case* No. 17,416.]</p> <p>4. An assignee not only represents and stands in place of the bankrupt, but he also represents the creditors. He has a stronger right than the bankrupt. He can contest claims and rights to property which the bankrupt cannot contest.</p> <p>[Cited in Cady v. Whaling, Case No. 2,285; Lloyd v. Hoo Lúe, Id. S.432; Platt v. Preston, Id. 11.219; Adams v. Merchants’ Nat. Bank, 2 Fed. ISO.]</p>

This was a libel in personam by Jacob Gurney against William Crockett, to recover wages earned by the libellant as ship-keeper. The respondent, master of the schooner Excelsior, employed the libellant to unload her, as stevedore, on her arrival from Tampico. It appeared that the libellant was afterwards employed to watch and take care of the vessel during the temporary absence of the master from town.

This was an action of debt, brought on a bond, under seal, executed by the defendant [William Hoge] on the 28th of January, 1859, to the plaintiffs [Samuel Gurney and others], in the penalty of £20,000 sterling, lawful money of the kingdoni of Great Britain, conditioned for the payment to the plaintiffs, by the defendant, of the sum of £10,000 sterling, with interest, at the rate of five per cent, per annum, from the 21st of December, 1858, as follows: £2.500 sterling, and…

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem by a ship’s broker against the Gustavia, a foreign vessel. Held: with reference to the exception to the answer itself, that the furnishing of all the articles was either admitted or denied, and that whether they were necessaries or not was a question of law. The exception was therefore disallowed.

<p>Case No. 5,879.</p> <p>Injunction — Patent—Knowledge against Opinion.</p> <p>1. On an application for an injunction against the infringement of a patent, the bill should show-, either that the validity of the patent has been established in an action at law, or that the right of the complainant under the patent has been recognized and acquiesced in by long unquestioned use and enjoyment, or other equivalent acts.</p> <p>[Cited in American Bell Tel. Co. v. Southern Tel. Co., 34 Fed. 804; Wirt v. Hicks, 4G Fed. 71.]</p> <p>2. Where a motion for an injunction against the infringement of a patent rests upon affidavits of dealers in the article, stating their opinion as to its composition, is opposed by counter-affidavits of the manufacturer of the article, who states the composition from his personal knowledge, other things being equal, the statements of the latter are the more reliable, and the injunction will be denied.</p>

Assumpsit, to recover back the purchase-money from the defendants, for lot No. 5, in square No. 489, in Washington.

<p>This was an action on the case [by Henry G. Guyon against William F. Serrell and James R. Hitchcock] for the infringement of letters patent granted to the plaintiff, July 2d, 1836, for an improvement “in the compound lever for pressing and raising substances.” A disclaimer of part of the claim was filed in the patent office, November 4th, 1842, after the commencement of this suit. On the trial, the plaintiff recovered a verdict of $200, and now moved for an increase of the verdict under the 14th section of the act of July 4, 1830 (5 Stat 123).</p>

<p>Case No. 5,882.</p> <p>Promissory Notes — Payment—Assignment when Overdue.</p> <p>1. An agreement oí one partner to pay a note against his co-partner-, by entering a credit on a note which he holds against the payee, and a charge is made on the books of the firm against the partner for whom the payment is made, and he delivers to his partner other paper as payment, it is a payment to the payee of the note, although a credit was not indorsed on the note to be credited, until after the lapse of some months.</p> <p>2. Should the payee be sued, after the agreement. on the note, on which the credit was to he entered, he could set up the agreement in de-fence.</p> <p>3. And so could the agreement be set up in the defence by the partner who owed the first note.</p> <p>4. The assignment of this note after it became due, in violation of the agreement', would not prevent the partner from making this defence.</p> <p>5. A note assigned, after it becomes due, leaves the equities open between the original parties.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,883.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Interest Acceding after Adjudication — Secured Creditors — Title of Mortgagee of a Chattel — Homestead Law as Affecting Rights of Cestui que Trust under a Trust Deed to Secure Advances.</p> <p>1. Interest accruing subsequently to the time of adjudication is nor proveable in bankruptcy. [Distinguished in Re Town, Case No. 14,112.]</p> <p>2. But a secured creditor will be allowed to apply the proceeds of his security to the satisfaction of the principal and interest of his debt until paid, when so stipulated in his contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Phelps v. Selliek, Case No. 11,079.]</p> <p>3. The title of a mortgagee of a chattel becomes absolute after condition broken. If ho takes possession and omits to sell or foreclose within a reasonable time, the debt is satisfied to the extent of the value of the chattel, when taken possession of.</p> <p>[Cited in Lee v. Fox, 113 Ind. 102, 14 N. E. S91; Whittemore v. Fisher, 132 111. 257, 24 N. E. 640.]</p> <p>4. The cestui que trust under a trust deed to secure present loans and subsequent advances, will be protected as to such advances against the claims of the borrower who has declared the land a homestead, and has subsequently obtained such advances, and fraudulently concealed his declaration of homestead.</p>

<p>[This was an action by Simeon Haas and others against Chester A. Arthur, collector of the port of New York.]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Frederick Habeman and others against Samuel Whitman for the alleged infringement of reissued letters patent No. 3.438. granted to plaintiffs, May 18, 1869. The original patent, No. 02,-807, was granted to Bardell and Smith, March 12, 1867.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,886.</p> <p>Contract between Alten ano Citizen of Rebellious States — Public Policy.</p> <p>A contract for the purchase of cotton made during the late war of the Rebellion, by a subject of the king of Norway and Sweden, domiciled in the city of New York, with a citizen of the state of Texas, actually residing therein at the date of the contract, was void as against public policy and the laws of war and the spirit of the legislation of congress.</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by William E. Hacker against Stevens and Berryhill. See Case No. 5,888.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,888.</p> <p>Unnecessary Plea — Incumbrance of Record.</p> <p>An unnecessary plea will, on motion, be directed to be withdrawn, as improperly incumbering the record.</p>

3 [The declaration in this case charges that on the second day of August, 1869, the defendant, the city of Ottawa, a municipal corporation of this state, made and delivered to one W. H. W. Cushman, its one hundred and twenty (120) bonds or written obligations, for the sum of five hundred (500) dollars each, bearing date on said second day of August, 1809; one-third of which bonds were due in five (5) years, one-third in ten (10) years, and one-third in fifteen (15) years…

<p>This was an action [by David Hadden against Jesse Hoyt] to recover the excess of duties on knit shirts and drawers. The evidence was similar to that of the case of Hall v. Hoyt [Case No. 5,934]. But in the present case the defendant introduced the former collector of New York, who gave evidence that from the act of 1828 [4 Stat. 270] to that of 1832 [4 Stat. 583] the articles in question had, in pursuance of orders from the treasury, been charged with the duty on clothing ready made, and not with the duty on hosiery.</p> <p>insisted that the court should charge, upon this new evidence, that the act of congress of 1832 must in judgment of law be deemed to have reference to the then existing practice of the treasury department and its circulars to collectors, and that therefore, in this construction of the law, the articles were to be deemed as falling under the term “ready-made clothing,” anil not under the term “hosiery.”</p> <p>insisted that the words in the law must be construed as they would be understood in their common or commercial use; and not in any peculiar sense or use, practised by the treasury, and as such known to congress. That the law was made to govern not the members of congress, but dealers in the articles to whom the law was most addressed, and whose understanding of its terms should control.</p>

<p>On exceptions to creditors’ petition. Tlie several grounds of exception are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

In bankruptcy. The assignee in his certificate of exempted property set apart the separate property of the bankrupts [James H. Hafer and brothers], but refused to allow them any part of the partnership assets.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Hafer & Bro.] The adjudication of bankruptcy was made in the district court [case unreported], during the pendency of auxiliary proceedings in equity, in the circuit court, to restrain execution creditors.

Demurrer [by the defendants. William R. Kean and others] to the petition on the ground of the plaintiff’s want of capacity to-sue.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Thomas Haggett against J. W. Bowman and others.]</p>

The bill states the plaintiffs [Benjamin and Halsted Haight] to have been since the 10th of April 1S21. owners of a grist niill, situated on a branch of the Speedwell river, in Morris county, New Jersey, which, with the pond, the waters flowing into it, and all other appurtenances, they purchased on that day, at a sale thereof made by the administrator of Ural Tuttle, under an order of the orphan’s court, and received a regular conveyance therefor.

<p>Trial by the court This action was brought to recover arrears of interest upon bonds given by the defendants to the plaintiff, secured by a mortgage upon land. The defendants claimed to deduct from the interest due by the tenor of the bond, the amount of the income tax imposed by the internal revenue law upon the plaintiff, in respect of such interest, and which had been paid in behalf of plaintiff by defendants.</p>

This was a suit in equity, founded on two letters patent. One was a reissued patent [No. 1,397], granted to the plaintiffs [William Hailes and Ellen T. Treadwell] February 3d. 1863, for an “improvement in stoves,” the original patent [No. 32,257] having been granted to John G. Treadwell and William Hailes, as inventors. May 7th, 1861.

In equity. This cause was submitted upon a motion by complainant for the appointment of a receiver, and at the same time upon the demurrer of defendants to the bill.

<p>Case No. 5,906.</p> <p>Pkivateek — Bkeakinq up of Giíujze — Prize Monet.</p> <p>If a single mariner withholds his consent, and’ the cruize is broken up by the rest of the concerned, and a new cruize commenced, this must be done subject to the legal claim of the uncon-senting mariner, of wages or prize money that may accrue during the term of the first cruize for which he contracted.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,907.</p> <p>Navigation of Rivers — Colusión between Steamboats — Damages—Apportionment — Regulation op Commerce.</p> <p>1. The general usage of a river, in regard to the navigation of ascending and descending boats, and which, from long experience, has been established as a precautionary measure, should be followed by pilots and others.</p> <p>[See Barrett v. Williamson, Case No. 1,051.]</p> <p>2. A descending boat, when apprehensive of a collision, will stop her engine, and float, leaving the ascending boat to choose the best mode of avoiding a contact.</p> <p>3. If the plaintiff is in fault, he can not recover damages; nor where both parties are in fault, by the common law.</p> <p>[Cited in Wright v. Brown, 4 Ind. 98.]</p> <p>4. The maritime rule apportions the damages as the faults of the respective boats may be established.</p> <p>5. A state has no power to regulate a commerce which extends beyond its jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in Sherlock v. Ailing. 44 Ind. 195; Com. v. Philadelphia & It. Ry. Co., 62 Pa. 290.]</p> <p>6. Where a commerce begins and terminates within a state, it has the exclusive commercial power over it</p> <p>7. The Louisiana law, which adopts many regulations in regard to the navigation of the Mississippi, can not affect boats engaged in carrying on commerce between the state of Louisiana and other states. Such a power exercised by the states, would be destructive to a general commercial intercourse.</p> <p>8. What damages may be recovered from an offending boat?</p>

<p>Case No. 5,908.</p> <p>Bill in Equity — Judgment by Confession.</p> <p>1. Before a bill can be taken for confessed, the defendant must have been ruled to answer, according to the seventeenth rule of equity adopted in 1S22. 7 Wheat. [18 U. S.] 5.</p> <p>2. The eighteenth rule commented on and construed in relation to filing answer.</p> <p>3.A court of equity would not permit a bill to be taken for confessed, when at the same time the defendant offers to file his answer; but the court can impose terms on the defendant.</p> <p>[See Case No. 5,909.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,909.</p> <p>Evidence — -Secondary—Suits between Partners.</p> <p>1. A copy is inadmissible unless the original is lost or destroyed, or beyond the power of the party to produce it.</p> <p>2. Until there is a final settlement and adjustment of all partnership accounts, and a balance struck, one partner is not permitted to sue the others, either at law or in equity, for money paid by him on account of the partnership concern.</p> <p>3. For money due to a partner from the partnership. payment, except in a few special cases, can only be enforced by application to a court of equity for an account and dissolution of the partnership.</p> <p>[Cited in Culley v. Edwards, 44 Ark. 423.]</p> <p>4. When upon the dissolution of a partnership, all accounts have been adjusted, and a balance struck, an action at law will lie for such balance.</p> <p>5. The jurisdiction of a court of equity in such a case doubted.</p>

<p>This case was adjourned into this court from the district court of New Hampshire district The petition was as follows: “Respectfully represents to the said honorable court, John P. Hale and John H. Wiggins, attorneys and counsellors of said court and partners, that they were solicitors in the case of the said Palmer, and in such capacity have advanced and expended large sums of money at different times, since the filing of the petition of the said Palmer for the benefit of the general bankrupt law [of 1841; 5 Stat. 440], at his request, to enable him to obtain a certificate of discharge under said law; that said Palmer is indebted to the said Hale and Wiggins in a further sum for services as solicitors; that said Hale and Wiggins made said advances and expenditures and rendered the said services with the understanding that the assets of the said bankrupt’s estate would be appropriated to reimburse said solicitors, and secure their fees aforesaid; that a great part of the advances and expenditures aforesaid were made necessary in consequence of the proceedings of an objecting creditor, who several times, to the great delay and hindrance of the said bankrupt, obtained from the court orders for the taking of testimony and the examination of the bankrupt; that at such taking of testimony on three several occasions, the said solicitors were present at the request of the bankrupt, and were present also at the examination of the bankrupt, at his like request; that said objecting creditor, after the taking of said testimony and examination at the time of the hearing of the petition for discharge of the said bankrupt, withdrew his objections and appearance without in any way having made provision for the payment of the costs of the bankrupt, to which he had been subjected in consequence of his proceedings, in objecting to said bankrupt’s discharge, although the court had directed, and in all cases made it a rule that every objecting creditor should, at the time of filing his objections, give a bond for the payment of all costs which should be awarded against him by said court, in consequence of said objections; that said bankrupt is advanced in years and utterly worthless; that said solicitors have no knowledge of any way of securing themselves now or in time to come, unless from the assets of the bankrupt’s estate. The said solicitors therefore pray for relief, and move this honorable court, that so much of the assets of the said bankrupt’s estate may be allowed to them, as will compensate them for their said services, and reimburse them for the advances which they have made according to the account hereto annexed. Mem. The bankrupt has obtained his certificate of discharge.” Upon this petition, it was ordered, that the question arising upon it be adjourned into this court. The case was now submitted by the petitioners without argument.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,911.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Provisional Warrant — Arrest —Voluntary Proceeding.</p> <p>1. The bankrupt was adjudicated upon his own petition. He remained in possession of his assets and disposed of a portion of them, and expressed an intention of going to Europe for the purpose of adjusting his foreign accounts, which constituted a considerable portion of his assets. He had expressed an intention of offering a composition. but had presented no application therefor to the court, and declared that his affairs were so confused, especially his foreign' accounts. that he was unable to do so. Held, that the case was a proper one for a provisional warrant.</p> <p>2. The bankrupt law [of 18G7 (14 Stat. 517)] does not authorize the arrest of the bankrupt in a voluntary proceeding.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,912.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Following Property — Sale of Real Estate of Bankrupts.</p> <p>1. The court does not follow the property of the estates of bankrupts into the hands of purchasers, but only to their hands. After they have once had the property, they must take care of it and of the possession of it.</p> <p>2. The bankrupt occupied the premises in question until conveyance thereof was made by the assignee to the purchaser. After the purchaser had perfected title, he had an interview with the bankrupt, in which it was agreed that the latter should vacate on a subsequent specified day. This he did not do. On petition by the assignee for delivery of possession to the purchaser, held, that the bankrupt was holding as a tenant under the puiehaser, and not under the assignee; that the assignee had no further interest there, and was not further bound to maintain the purchaser’s possession for him, nor to keep possession ready for him.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit. Defendant was the maker of a certain promissory note as follows: “$2,000. Boston, February 21, 1854. Six months after date I promise to pay to the order of myself two thousand dollars, payable at Boston, value received. James W. Baldwin.” The note was duly indorsed by the defendant to the order of the plaintiff [Oscar C. Hale].

<p>Case No. 5,914.</p> <p>Suit against Receivers — Leave of Court Essential— Statute.</p> <p>1. A suit cannot be commenced against a receiver without leave being first obtained from the court appointing such receiver. Therefore, where a suit was commenced in a state court against the receiver of a railroad appointed by an order of the federal court, no leave to bring said suit having been obtained from the latter court, and the suit was removed to the federal court, a demurrer on the above ground was sustained, and the suit was dismissed.</p> <p>[Cited in Kennedy v. I., C. & L. R. Co., 3 Fed. 100.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. The statute of Mississippi, providing that all receivers appointed by any court may be sued without leave of the court appointing or control-ing'them, can have no application to receivers appointed by courts of the United States.</p> <p>[Under the act of congress of March 3. 18S7 (24 Stat. 5521. this permission is no longer necessary. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327, 12 Sup. Ct. 11; Railroad Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,915.</p> <p>Patents — Old Devices — New Combination.</p> <p>1. The patentee of a machine which consists merely of a combination of old parts, can not prevent the use of any number of those parts less than the whole, nor of new and substantial improvements of those old parts themselves, but only his own combination of parts or known substitutes therefor.</p> <p>[See Case No. 5,904.]</p> <p>2. A patentee can not repudiate one of the parts of his machine after another inventor has taught him to dispense with it.</p> <p>3. The machine patented to William N. Oakes, June 8, 1858, for cutting irregular forms, is not an infringement of the reissued patent granted to Hale and Goodman. February 10, 1803, for “improvements in shaping irregular surfaces in wood.”</p>

<p>Case No. 5,916.</p> <p>Marine Insurance — Collision—Between Sailing Vessels — What Deemed a Peril op the Seas — French Law — Liability op Master op Ship.</p> <p>1. The doctrine of De Lovio v. Boit [Case No. 3,776), respecting the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States, as courts oí admiralty, over policies of insurance, affirmed.</p> <p>[Cited in The Martha Anne, Case No. 9,146; Camden & A. R. Transp. Co. v. The Lotty, Id. 2.337a; The Lotty, Id. 8,52-1; Gloucester Ins. Go. v. Younger, Id. 5,487; New England Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 33; Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. The Waubaushene, 24 Fed. 559.]</p> <p>2. A collision between two ships on the high seas, whether it result from accident or negligence, is, in all cases, to be deemed a peril of the seas, within the meaning of a policy of insurance.</p> <p>[Disapproved in General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. (55 U. S.) 367.]</p> <p>[Cited in Walker v Boston & Hope Ins. Co., 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 289.]</p> <p>3. It seems, that by the French law. the underwriter is not liable for those losses by collision, which are solely occasioned by the fault of the assured or his agents.</p> <p>4. Where a loss by collision arises from the negligence of the master and crew, the master is personally responsible; but the ship also is primarily, although not exclusively, liable for the compensation.</p> <p>[Cited in Edwards v. The Robert F. Stockton. Case No. 4,207: Sherwood v. General Mut. Ins. Co.. Id. 32,776: New Jersey Steam Nav. Go. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 432.]</p> <p>[Cited in Dyer v. Piscataqua Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 53 Me. 121; Nelson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 479.]</p> <p>5. All expenses, resulting as a direct and immediate consequence of a peril insured against, are covered by the policy.</p> <p>[Cited in Indianapolis Ins. Co. v. Mason, 11 Ind. 180; Nelson v. Suffolk Ins. Go., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 492; Blanchard v. Equitable Safety Ins. Go., 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 390.]</p> <p>6. Where the ship Columbia, through the negligence or fault of her mate and crew, came into collision with the bark Ritchie, by which both vessels sustained damage; and the master of the Columbia, in behalf of his owners, paid to the owners of the Ritchie a certain sum, by way of compromise for the damage sustained by the latter vessel; it was held, that the underwriters on the Columbia were liable for the sum so paid, as well for the damages as for the repairs and losses by the collision, to the Columbia.</p> <p>[Cited in Williams v. New England Ins. Co., Case Ño. 17.731.]</p> <p>[Cited in Nelson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., (52 Mass. (8 Cush.) 477.]</p> <p>[7. Cited in Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Wager, 35 Fed. 364, to the' point that the remedy against the vessel and the remedy against the owner cannot be united or enforced in the same action.)</p>

On the 8th day of May. 1868, Daniel Johnson, a creditor of the bankrupt, presented to the register a deposition in proof of his debt, with security, taken and certified to by William T. Price, one of… Held: before one of the registers of the court therein, and that commissioners of the circuit court of the United States are not authorized to take such proofs in that district.

<p>This was the case of a petition by Horace Hall, of Charlestown, in the state of New Hampshire, in which he set forth, that he was, and for many years had been, a partner with James Read, doing business in Boston, under the name and style of James Read and Company. That the said Read, on the seventeenth day of March last, filed his petition in this court, representing "bat he and the said firm were unable to meet their debts and engagements, and praying that he and they might be decreed to be bankrupts. That the petitioner was not joined as a party byname to the said petition. Wherefore the petitioner now presented his petition, setting forth, that the said firm was insolvent at the time of the said petition by James Read; that the petitioner was also unable to meet his debts and engagements, which he owed as a member of said firm, and in his individual capacity. And he prayed that he might be permitted to become a party to the petition of said Read, and be entitled to the benefit of all the decrees which heretofore had been, or that hereafter might be had therein. The petitioner further represented, that he had previously filed a petition in this court for the same purposes, which was informal and insufficient, wherefore he prayed that all further proceedings thereon might be stayed, and for leave to withdraw the same. Upon this petition it was ordered by the district judge, that the question be adjourned into the circuit court, “whether upon the facts set forth in said petition of Horace Hall, and in the petition of James Read, filed on the seventeenth day March last past, and who has been declared a bankrupt, and in the several decrees in the case of said Head, the court here may take jurisdiction of said petition of said Horace Hall, and what decree shall be made thereon.”</p> <p>The cause was spoken to by Dehon for the petitioner, no objection being made on the other side.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 5,921.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Allotment op Homestead — Reassessment.</p> <p>Where the homestead has been duly laid off and allotted under the law of North Carolina, act of April 7th, 1869, and no fraud, complicity, or other irregularity is shown, the bankrupt courts will not order a reassessment for mere excess of value.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

On motion to dismiss creditors’ petition upon the ground it did not set forth that the requisite number of creditors had joined in it.

In ejectment the plaintiff claimed title through J. P. who was alleged to be heir .at law of the original owner; and to prove the heirship, offered in evidence the deposition of one Zebulon Hall, regularly taken in New York, A. D. 1S22, in an ejectment then pending in this state, for other land by this same plaintiff against a different defendant, and where the fact in dispute was the heirship.

<p>Case No. 5,925.</p> <p>Pleading —Redundancy — Equitable Intekest as Defense in Ejectment — Double Pleas.</p> <p>1. Under the Oregon Code, a defendant in ejectment cannot avail himself of an estate in the premises, in himself or another as a defence, unless the fact is pleaded.</p> <p>2. A detailed statement of matters which might be evidence in support of a plea of title-in the defendant, is not a proper or sufficient plea of such title, and will be stricken out on motion, as redundant.</p> <p>[Cited in Bank of British North America v. Ellis, Case No. 859; Drexler v. Smith, 30 Fed. 755.]</p> <p>3. An alleged equitable interest or right in the defendant in an action of ejectment, is no de-fence to such action.</p> <p>4. Section 72 of the Oregon Civil Code, which gives the defendant a right to plead ns many several defences to an action as he may have, is similar to 4 Anne, c. 10. 8 4, allowing double pleas, and should be similarly construed, so as to permit the defendant to plead inconsistent or contradictory defences to the same action.</p>

<p>This was an action on the case [against James Bird] for the infringement of letters patent [No. 43.9S7] granted to the plaintiff [Charles Hall], August 30th, 1864, for an “improved machine for stretching chains.” It was tried before the court, without a jury.</p>

[This was a suit in admiralty by Johnson L. Hall, owner of the bark Indiana, against the propeller Buffalo, for damages caused by the collision of the Buffalo with the Indiana on the St. Clair river.]

<p>Case No. 5,928.</p> <p>•Bankruptcy — Livery Stable Keeper — Trading.</p> <p>1. Livery stable keepers, as such, are not liable to be proceeded against on the petition oí creditors, under the late bankrupt act [of 1841 (5 Stat. 440)], as “persons being merchants, or using the trade of merchandize, or retailers of merchandize.”</p> <p>[Cited in Be Smith, Case No. 12,9S1.]</p> <p>2. The owner of timber lands who cuts down his trees and manufactures them into lumber for sale, merely as a means of deriving profit for his real estate, as such, does not thereby constitute himself a merchant or trader within the act. But if he carries on this business upon a large scale, substantially and independently as a trade, the course of decision in the English courts strongly favors the conclusion that this would be sufficient to bring him within the act; and if it further appears that he has from time to time bought timber lands, for the express purpose of manufacturing, and does manufacture lumber from the trees growing thereon, for ■sale, and in one instance erected a saw-mill on the land purchased, and in another instance, in ■connection with the purchase of timber land, also purchased a large lot of sawed lumber for sale; the case is clear.</p>

[This was an action at law to recover possession of lands by Laura S. Hall and others against Henry S. Dexter and others. After judgment for plaintiffs (Oase No. 5,949), ihe plaintiffs took a writ to obtain possession of the lands, which the marshal would not execute because the persons then in possession claimed title under a tax sale subsequent to the bringing of the suit. Plaintiffs now tender a bond of indemnity, and pray that the marshal be directed to enforce the writ]

<p>Demurrage. In this bill of lading there was a special clause concerning demurrage, lately adopted by the owners of colliers, as-follows: “And twenty-four hours after the arrival at the above-named port, and notice thereof to the consignee named, there shall be allowed for receiving said cargo at the rate of one day, Sundays excepted, for every hundred tons thereof, after which the cargo, consignee or assignee shall pay demurrage at the rate of eight cents per ton upon the full amount of the cargo as per this bill of lading for each and every day’s detention beyond the days above specified until the cargo is fully discharged, which demurrage shall be a lien upon said cargo.” The vessel brought 2S8 tons of coal consigned to the respondents, and the arrival was notified to them on Monday, September 6th, at 9 o’clock, a. m.; on Tuesday the master [Gershoin Hall) left the vessel in charge of the mate; on Wednesday, the eighth, at 8 o’clock, a. in., the consignees notified the mate to go to the wharf of the Boston and Albany Railroad Company to discharge the cargo, but, for some unexplained reason, he failed to do so. On Friday, the tenth, the master returned to Boston, and in the afternoon of that day took the schooner to the designated wharf and found the berths occupied, which detained him for some days longer, though precisely how long he was in getting a berth and how long in discharging be could not remember. He was fully discharged on the afternoon of Thursday, the sixteenth of September. He demanded de-murrage for six days and a half, besides his freight. The answer admitted that freight was due, and averred that the respondents [C. X Eastwick and others] had been always ready to pay it, and that the delay was wholly caused by the libellant’s fault.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by George TV. Hall and others against the Equator Mining & Smelting Company and others. Heard on motion to dissolve an injunction.]

[This was a suit by Hall, for the use of Carter, against Fox.] A. T. F. Bill was examined on his voir dire, and said he was not interested, and was, thereupon, sworn in chief for the plaintiff. Upon his cross-examination his interest was disclosed, and the plaintiff then offered to release and re-examine him.

[This was a bill in equity by Hall, as as-signee of Leonard Lakin, against Andrew P. Hayner and others, to set aside a mortgage executed by the bankrupt, upon the ground that it was given in violation of the bankrupt act.]

At law. This action was brought to recover back the excess of duties demanded by the defendant collector of New York, upon knit shirts and drawers. The defendant [Jesse Hoyt] had demanded duty on them as “ready-made clothing”; the plaintiff [James Hall] insisted that they were subject to duty as “hosiery,” and that he was entitled to recover back the excess.

<p>Case No. 5,935.</p> <p>Admiralty — Libel for Supplies by Part-Owners — Jurisdiction—Statute of Limitations.</p> <p>1. Equitable ownership in a vessel, or ownership pro hac vice, need not be shown by a bill of sale or registry.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. The Fidelitcr, Case No. 15 - 088.]</p> <p>2. Equitable co-owners of a vessel who are also material men, cannot maintain a libel in admiralty against the other co-owners to recover their bill for supplies, if their.claim constitutes a portion of the accounts of the part-owners. In such case admiralty has no jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in The H. E. Willard, 52 Fed. 388; Id., 53 Fed. 601.]</p> <p>3. Proof of a custom to pay the mechanic part-owner his bill without awaiting the general settlement of accounts, will not avail, if it also appear that such bills' do await the settlement of what is known as the outward account of the voyage.</p> <p>4. This court is not bound by the Massachusetts statute of limitations, but is inclined to follow its analogies.</p> <p>5. Where more than six years have elapsed since a cause of action has accrued, the commencement within that time of a suit in equity, which was subsequently discontinued, in the state court, will not excuse the delay, especially where the other owners may have been prejudiced by the delay.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland. [This was a suit in admiralty toy Isaac C. Hall, James H. Myrick, and others against Samuel Hurlbut.]

[This was a suit in equity by Elihu Hall and others against Phineas Jones and others for an injunction, account, profits, and damages for an infringement of certain letters patent granted to the complainants April 22, 1873, for improvement in hubs for vehicles.]

On or about the 5th day of February, 1873, Hall, Kimbark & Co., wholesale iron merchants of Chicago, caused to be published the following: “Our present price for blue seat springs if-as follows: On orders for 100 pairs and over, in one shipment: “We continue the warranty, and for every spring which may fail from fair ordinary' usage, we will furnish a new one. All sales-at the above price will be for cash on receipt of invoice, or within 15 days.

[This was a suit in admiralty by Hall & Eddy against William Little and others to recover for the breaking and loss of a raft of logs in the Ohio river, attached to the Kentucky shore, opposite Louisville, with which the steamboat Brilliant, owned by the defendants, collided.]

This was an action brought by the plaintiffs to recover the value of forty-one bales of cotton, part of two hundred and fifty-five bales shipped from Macon, Georgia, destined for Louisville, Ky. The cotton was the property of Rogers, Garrett & Go., and shipped by them from Macon to care of the agent of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad at Nashville, and ultimately consigned to Hall & Long, factors at Louisville, Ky.

[In admiralty. Libel by Hall and others, being the owner, master, and crew of the schooner Joseph P. Comegys, against the derelict barque Paquet Bot de Cayenne, Bordeaux, to recover salvage. The district court allowed the salvors one-half the value of the derelict, and the claimants and underwriters .appealed therefrom.' Modified.]

This case was marked for trial by special jury, under a rule for trial or non pros, at the present term, and a list of the special jurors had been made out and regularly struck before the marshal, but was lost by accident before it was returned to • the office of the clerk, so that no venire issued.

[This was a suit in equity by Lydia C. Hall and others against Edwin Russell and wife, W. W. Page and wife, and George H. Williams to have the defendants decreed trustees for the plaintiffs of a donation of land in Oregon.]

Writ of dower. In this cause, the following facts were admitted by the parties. (1) That the plaintiff, Tryphena Hall, was the wife of Ezra Hall, and that the said Ezra Hall had deceased. (2) That Ezra Hall was lawfully seised during coverture, of the premises described in the demandant’s writ. (3) That the demand of dower had been legally made on the tenants.

Before JOHN RUHM, Register. From the petition, and answer, and the proof, I report as follows: First. The defendant, H. G. Scovel, has collected the rents of the land described in the pleadings since the 19th of February, 1S68, the day of adjudication, to the 1st of January, 1873, and for a period of three months in the year 1S73, at the rate of ten dollars per month, being in all the sum of six hundred and thirteen dollars and thirty-three and one-third cents. Second.

This was a bill in chancery, filed by John Hall, assignee of John S. Hall, against James A. Speer and John C. Bidwell, to prevent the defendants from the further use of two certain patents, obtained by John S. Hall, for an improvement in plows. The complainants filed their bill, and at the same time moved the court for a preliminary injunction, to prevent the defendants from manu-factoring any plows upon the principle of the complainant’s patents.

<p>Case No. 5,946.</p> <p>Pkactioe — Capias—Bail Bond — Pleading'.</p> <p>1. A writ, by virtue of which a bail bond was taken, will not be set aside on motion, after judgment in the original action and suit on the bond. ,</p> <p>2. A plea cannot contradict the record.</p> <p>3. Errors in the original suit should have been corrected as they occurred, or by writ of error.</p> <p>4. It is too late to correct such errors by plea, or after action brought on the bail bond.</p>

[In equity. This was a bill by Andrew T. Hall and others against the Sullivan Railroad Company, asking for the transfer to the plaintiffs, as trustees, of certain franchises of the defendant. The defendant company gave a mortgage to the plaintiffs as trustees, according to the terms of which certain portions of the railroad were to be transferred to plaintiffs upon default by the defendant. After default the defendant company resisted the transfer.

This was an action to recover possession of lands. It was originally commenced by Mary K. Hail, who was the widow, and four other plaintiffs, who wore the children of John Hall, deceased; from whom the plaintiffs claimed to inherit the premises in question. Mary IC Hall died during the proceedings, after which the action was prosecuted by the other plaintiffs.

A petition or statement under oath, is filed in the court, by Samuel E. Hall and John W. Morse, citizens of the United States, and of the state of Iowa, ashing for a writ of mandamus to be directed to the Union Pacific Railroad Company to compel it to operate its trains over the whole of its road as one continuous line, from Council Bluffs westward, and to desist from operating its bridge over the Missouri river between Council Bluffs and Omaha, as an independent and…

This was a suit in equity brought by Augustus O. Hall, assignee of Leonard Lakin, bankrupt, to set aside a mortgage given by the bankrupt to the defendants Wager & Fales, on the ground that it was void under the bankrupt act. The mortgage was for $3,000, dated December 15th, 1869, and was given to secure a debt of that amount owing by Lakin to the firm of Wager & Fales for balance due for. stoves sold by them in 1867.

<p>Case No. 5,952.</p> <p>Revenue Laws — Jurisdiction of the District Court — Pleading — Duties and Liabilities of the Officer Making Seizure — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>1. It is the duty of an officer of the customs, on making a seizure of goods, for having been imported in violation of the revenue laws, to institute proceedings in rem in the district courl.</p> <p>2. The district court has exclusive jurisdiction of forfeitures.</p> <p>3. Whether the seizure has been rightful or tortious, cannot be ascertained until the matter has been adjudged by that court.</p> <p>4. If the person making the seizure refuse to proceed in the district court, on application to the court by the owner, he will be compelled to do so, or return the goods.</p> <p>5. The pendency of the proceedings in rem may be pleaded in abatement, to an action of trespass against the officer.</p> <p>6. Should the goods be adjudged to be returned by the court, and a certificate of reasonable cause refused, it is final.</p> <p>7. There can be no justification of the act of seizure, except on a judgment of condemnation, or a certificate of reasonable cause.</p> <p>8. The officer making the seizure should examine the goods before it is made, and not make it unless there be reasonable cause. Where goods are taken from the possession of the owner, and detained, without reasonable cause, the officer is liable to damages to the full extent of the injury.</p> <p>9. The circumstances may be proved in mitigation of damages, but not to excuse or justify the seizure.</p> <p>10. Having possession of the goods, and exercising acts of ownership over them, the plaintiff may sue for a trespass on them in his own name.</p>

<p>This was an action on the case [by Alfred Hall against John Wiles] tried before Nelson, Circuit Justice, for the infringement of letters patent [No. 2,768], granted to the plaintiff on the 3d of September, 1842, for an “improvement in the construction of the brick-press.” 2 The points raised on the trial are stated in the charge of the court.</p> <p>[Drawings of patent No. 2,76S, published from the records of the United States patent office.]</p> <p> </p>

This cause was submitted on the motion of the plaintiff, who was judgment creditor of the defendant, to dismiss a proceeding, under the claim law of Georgia, commenced by one Vandyke, who set up title to certain real estate levied on by the marshal as the property of defendant, by virtue of an execution issued in this case.

[At law. This was an action of trover brought by George Tritcli, assignee of Wilcox & Watterson, against Hallack & Brother, to recover damages for the wrongful detention of a lot of glass.]

<p>Case No. 5,961.</p> <p>Admiralty — Fx.ag Worn Determines Character of Vessel — Blockade—What Constitutes VIOLAT10N OF.</p> <p>1. A vessel is clothed with the character of the flag she wears.</p> <p>2. Vessel condemned as enemy property, and for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p> <p>3. A vessel approaching a blockaded port, with intent to violate the blockade, is not entitled to be warned off.</p> <p>4. Cargo condemned as enemy property. It was also shipped for an enemy port, with intent to violate the blockade.</p> <p>[Cited in The Amy Warwick, Case No. 341.]</p>

This was an action of assumpsit [by John C. Halsey and others] on several promissory notes, signed by the principal defendant. In June, 1826, Fairbanks, being unable to meet the demands against him, made an assignment of all his property to Whitney, in trust, for certain of his creditors, who should become parties to the assignment, and upon the consideration that they should release all their respective claims and demands upon him.

<p>LTkis was a bill in equity by Eliza G. Halsey against Alfred S. Garlick, Frederick Coleman, and Noah R. Osgood for the alleged infringement of reissued letters patent No. 6.600, granted to Edgar Huson, September 28, IS75. The original patent. No. 3 6.648, was granted to Huson, February 17, 3857.]</p>

<p>[This was an action by the firm of R. & H. Halsey to recover from J. L. Hurd & Co. damages for failure to deliver wheat.]</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by William M. Halsted against Edward Lyon.]</p>

<p>Case No. 5,970.</p> <p>Injuries by Negligence op a Fellow Servant.</p> <p>1. The owner of a vessel is not responsible for injuries to a seaman, caused by the negligence of the mate, where no personal negligence on the part of the owner appears.</p> <p>[Cited in Couillard v. The Victoria. 4 Fed. ICO; Peterson v. The Chandos, Id. 649; The Edith Godden, 23 Fed. 46; The Egyptian Monarch, 36 Fed. 776; McFarland v. The J. C. Tuthill. 37 Fed. 716; The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 597; The Frank and Willie, 45 Fed. 495.)</p> <p>[Cited in Benson v. Goodwin, 147 Mass. 239, 17 N. E. 518.)</p>

This was a bill in equity [by Chalkley J. Hambleton against the Home Insurance Company of New York] to enforce an alleged verbal contract of renewal of a policy of insurance issued by the company on the second day of October, 1869, to indemnify the plaintiff for loss on buildings owned by complainant in Chicago,- and destroyed by fire on the 9th of October, 1871.

By W. J. CLAWSON, Register: I, the undersigned, having been designated by the court as the register in bankruptcy, before whom the proceedings in the above matter of the bankruptcy of Abner Hambright are to be had, do hereby certify that in the due course of such proceedings, the following question pertinent to the same arose and was stated and agreed to by J. Bolton Smith, Esq., attorney for A. E. Smith, executor of J. B. Manning, deceased, and T. W. Clawson, attorney for…

In this matter, a bill of fees for services and disbursements of counsel in various actions which were pending in the courts of the state against the bankrupts [Max Ham. burger and Berthold Frankel] at the time of the election of the assignee, had been presented to the assignee and paid by him. The question of the allowance of the bill was referred to the register, who reported in favor of the allowance of the bill, and the report was presented to the court for approval.

This case came before the court on a writ of habeas corpus, issued at the request of the petitioner [William L. Hamilton], to procure his discharge from the military service of the United States. The return to the writ showed that he had been legally enlisted, and was held as a deserter. This return was traversed by the petitioner, and testimony was taken at considerable length before a United States commissioner, upon the issues raised by the traverse.

This was an action on the case, brought by the plaintiffs [Hamilton, Donaldson & Co.], merchants in the city of New York, against Alexander Cunningham, of Peters-burg, Virginia, to recover a large sum of money alleged to have been advanced by the plaintiffs to the defendant.

This was an action of assumpsit brought to recover $281,48S 4S, being the aggregate of payments of four cents per pound upon cotton made by plaintiffs [A. Hamilton & Co.] between August 13, 1863, and June 11, 1864, to defendant [J. R. Dillin], as surveyor of customs at Nashville, for permits to ship the cotton from Nashville to the loyal states.

In equity — Motion for a new trial. Suit brought upon letters patent for “improvement in saw-mills,” granted Palmer Hamilton, December 5, 1SG5, No. 51,310. In the engravings, Fig. 1 represents a front elevation and Fig. 2 a vertical section of a portion of a saw-mill, containing the patented improvements. D, D is the frame-work, to which the guides are fastened; C, C, the curbed upper guides; t, t, the'straight lower guides.

<p>[Suit by Susan Hamilton against Gilbert J. Kingsbury and George T. Davis for an alleged infringement. Heard upon bill and plea.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Susan Hamilton against Gilbert J. Kingsbury and George T. Davis to restrain the infringement of certain letters patent for an improvement in saw mills. The cause was first before the court upon bill and plea, and the plea was allowed (Case No. 5.984); whereupon the plaintiff amended his bill by setting forth two unrecorded instruments. There was a plea to the amended bill, and a replication to the plea, and proofs were taken thereon.

[This was a bill in equity, brought by Peter-Hamilton, as sole acting executor of the-will of Duke W. Goodman, deceased, against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Western district of Missouri. [This was a proceeding by H. B. Hamilton, assignee in bankruptcy of the Lexington & St. Louis Railroad Company, against the National Loan Bank of St. Louis and M. W. Withers.] The county of Lafayette, in Missouri, in April, 1871, subscribed 820.000 to the stock of the Lexington & St. Louis Railroad Company, and to pay for the same executed twenty negotiable bonds of the same date, May…

These suits, heard together, were brought [by Susan Hamilton against John Rollins, and against Shubael D. Todd and others, Levi Butler and others, and George Sherwood], to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 51,310, granted to Palmer Hamilton, December 5th, 1865, for an improvement in saw-mills, and for an account of profits.

Trespass for ordering an execution to be served on the plaintiff’s goods, at the suit of the defendant [James Russell], against James and Robert Hamilton. The goods had been taken in the possession of Robert, and the defendant alleged that the deed of conveyance under which the plaintiff [Thomas Hamilton] claims, was fraudulent as to the creditors. The plaintiff offered Robert Hamilton as a witness.

[This was a bill in equity by John Hamilton against Simons and Sample, upon which an injunction was issued restraining the defendants from selling a certain machine covered by patents Nos. 17,916 and 20,324. An attachment for contempt was issued against defendants, who now move for an order discharging them from the attachment, alleging that the machines sold since the injunction were without the parts covered by the said patents.]

In February, 1876, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against H. D. Brodt, as surviving partner of the firm of R. W. Dresser & Co.; and he at once offered a composition, which was finally accepted, and ordered to be recorded in April, 1876. It provided for payment of twenty per cent, by instalments, secured by notes, the last payment to be at the end of six months from the date of recording the resolutions.

This was a libel for fuel furnished Oct. 27, 1857. It appeared, upon the trial, that one Isaacs, who held himself out as master and owner, ordered of libellants, at Cleveland, on Oct. 23d, 230 tons of coal, and, at Isaacs’ request, the same was shipped by them, upon the schooner Velocity, consigned to the tug Hamilton Morton, at Algonae, Michigan, Isaacs representing that he purchased it for the use of the tug.

Petition by Hamlin for adjudication of the firm of Hamlin, Hale & Co., composed of petitioner and R. W. Hale, filed April 13, 1S77. Answer of Hale to rule to show cause, filed June 21, 1S77, contains general denial, and a special motion, upon affidavits filed, to 'dismiss proceeding as to said firm because it is instituted not in good faith for the benefit of creditors, or to obtain a discharge, but for private and malicious purposes of petitioner.

[In bankruptcy. Suit by R. S. Hamlin, as-signee, against W. C. Pettibone and others.] Motion for new trial after judgment for plaintiff.

This was an action of trespass to try titles. It had been tried by DUVAL, District Judge, and a jury, and came up on motion of plaintiff for a new trial, which was heard by WOODS, Circuit Judge, and DUVAL, District Judge.

[This was an action at law by Adolph Hammer against John Kaufman and others, upon a bond accompanying an agreement in which the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff $30,000 for a disclosure of his improvement in the process and apparatus for brewing beer. The case was first before the court upon defendants’ motion for an order on the plaintiff for oyer of the bond and • agreement. See Case No. 5,99S].

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Hammond and Coolidge.)</p>

<p>Case No. 6,998.</p> <p>Pbofeht or Documents — Effect—Right to Ovek —Special Pleading.</p> <p>1. If, in his declaration, a plaintiff makes profert of the bond declared on, and also a -collateral agreement necessary to establish his right to recover on the bond, the defendant may ■crave oyer of the bond and the collateral agreement.</p> <p>2. As the legal effect of the profert of the papers. they are presumed to be in court, and the ■opposing party has a right to know their contents, and oyer will be granted on his application.</p> <p>3. The right to oyer in a proper ease, is a part of the eoimpon law system of special pleading, which, in a modified form, has obtained in this court from its first organization.</p>

Bill in equity to set aside an agreement founded in a mutual mistake of important facts. The bill prayed, among other things, that a certain power of attorney, and a certain agreement between the complainant and defendant mentioned in the bill, might be decreed to be delivered up to the complainant to be cancelled.

This was a suit in admiralty in personam, brought by [William Hammond], the master of the schooner Sally, for his wages and supplies for part of the voyage, of which the defendants became owners by an abandonment to them as underwriters. The facts were as follows: The schooner belonged to Messrs. Putnam, Cheever, and others, of Danvers, and on the 21st of October, 1824, was lying at the port of New York.

The defendant had obtained a rule in October term last for a trial at this term or non pros.2 E. Tilghman now moved to make the rule absolute, the counsel for the plaintiff stating that the cause was not ready to be brought on by him at this term.

<p>Case No. 6,003.</p> <p>Patent — Infringement—License— Delivery of —Practice and Pleading.</p> <p>1. The question of what amounts to a delivery of a license, considered.</p> <p>[Cited in Dietz v. Ham Manuf’g Co., 47 Fed.' 321.]</p> <p>2. Where an exclusive license has been granted, the licensee and the patentee are both necessary parties to a suit for infringement.</p> <p>[Cited in Clement Manuf’g Co. v. Upson & Hart Co., 40 Fed. 472; Rice v. Boss, 40 Fed. 190; Brush Electric Co. v. California Electric Light Co., 3 C. C. A. 368, 52 Fed. 961.]</p> <p>3. As a general rule, a cestui que trust is a necessary party to a bill in respect to the trust property.</p> <p>4. The practice, with reference to a plea in bar for want of parties, stated.</p>

[Bill in equity for an injunction to restrain alleged infringement of reissued letters patent [No. 4,486], for an improvement in me-lodeons or reed instruments, granted El Dora Louis, as administratrix of La Fayette Louis, July 25,1871; and for an account The original patent was granted to Louis Nov. 18, 1856 [No. 10,094], and extended for an additional term of seven years.

<p>Case No. 6,005,</p> <p>Collision Off Nantucket — Steamer and Babk —Fob—Ignorantly Changing Course —Evidence.</p> <p>1. A steamer and a bark came in collision off Nantucket Shoals in the day time, in a fog. There was a dispute as to the wind, the steamer claiming that it was south southwest, and free for the bark, which was sailing east half north, while the bark claimed that it was south southeast, and that she was close-hauled. The steamer’s whistle was heard on the bark, off her weather bow, and, at the second whistle, the course of the bark was changed to port about half a point, to give her a good full. The foghorn of the bark, which was properly blown, was heard ahead of the steamer, which was heading west half south. The steamer ported her helm, so that, at the collision, she was heading north northwest, and she struck the bark on the starboard side, stem on, at nearly right angles: Held, that the bark was not in fault.</p> <p>2. The steamer was in fault in porting, in ignorance of the bark’s position and course, which, though parallel, was not end on to her own. She should have stopped and reversed, without changing her helm. She could only infer, from hearing the fog-horn, that it came from a sailing vessel under way, and she was, therefore, chargeable with knowledge that, if there was any risk of collision, it was her duty to keep out of the way, and also her duty to slacken her speed, and, if necessary, to stop and reverse, and the duty of the sailing' vessel to keep her course.</p> <p>[Cited in The City of New York, 35 Fed. 009.]</p> <p>[See The Aleppo, Case No. 157.]</p> <p>3. The testimony of the witnesses from the hark, as to the wind, was more reliable than that of the witnesses from the steamer.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,006.</p> <p>Passenger’s Contract — Contagious Disease— Duty op Master — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. P. filed a libel against a steamship, alleging that he took passage on her for Hamburg, with his wife and son, and that when two days out from New York, the master compelled them to leave the stateroom in the first cabin and confined them during the voyage, in another room which was unfit for them. It appeared that the child was taken with an attack of small-pox or varioloid, and that the master of the ship directed the child to be removed to the steward’s room, telling the father and mother that, if they went with it they must stay and would not be allowed to come into the first cabin again, and accordingly they were all removed and were not allowed thereafter to come to the first cabin: Held, that the court had jurisdiction of the cause of action.</p> <p>2. The act of the master was but the performance of his duty towards the other passengers.</p> <p>3. The accommodations provided were reasonable, and there was no unreasonable confinement, and the libellant had no cause of action.</p>

<p>Case Ho. 6,007.</p> <p>Collision — Poe—Excessive Speed — Steamer and Sailing Vessel.</p> <p>1. If there is not time, after the sound of a fog-horn from a sailing vessel, in a fog, becomes audible to a steamer, for the latter to slow and deliberate sufficiently to learn the position and course of the sailing vessel, and thereupon take the proper measures to avoid her, that fact shows, per se, that the steamer is moving at too great speed. '</p> <p>2. In a fog so dense that another vessel cannot be seen, it is the duty of a steamer to move at such a rate, and with such control of herself, that, when apprised, by the means prescribed by statute, of the neighborhood of a sailing vessel, she san slow or stop in season to learn the position and course of the latter, and what measures are suitable and proper to avoid her.</p> <p>3. It is no satisfactory test of the propriety of the speed of the steamer, that it is proved to be half-speed.</p>

This was an action [by the president, directors, and company of the Hampden Bank against Edward M. Morgan, Henry F. Morgan, Knowles Taylor, and William H. Jes-sup] to recover about $14,000, being the balance of an account. The action, though nominally against all the defendants, was virtually but against Knowles Taylor, the other parties making no defense.

The defendant [Hillogas] had given a promissory note to the plaintiff [Hancock, administrator] for a specific sum. on which, in different modes, there had been several partial payments.

In the year 1851, Augustus Hancock insured his life with the defendant, in the sum of $5000, payable to his wife at his death, he, Hancock, agreeing to pay the defendant $142 annually at Richmond, Va., by way of premium on the same. He paid his premiums regularly until the war, when the defendant removed its agency from Richmond, and had no agency within the military lines of the Confederate States during the war.

In equity. Heard on demurrer to the bill and on motion for injunction pendente lite. The original bill was filed on March 6, 1875. by George Hancock, a citizen of Kentucky, against J. J. Groos, who at that time was commissioner of the general lana office of the state of Texas.

Assumpsit on a policy of insurance. The policy was as follows: “The president, &c., of the Fishing Insurance Company, do by these presents, cause Z. Cook, Jr., for F. Hancox, to be insured lost or not lost one thousand dollars on clothes and the proceeds thereof, on board schooner Emily, at and from ^ New York, on the first day of September, at noon, to the South Seas, and elsewhere, for the purpose of taking seals and oil, and to continue to the termination of her voyage at…

[This was a libel in admiralty by Recompense Hand, Daniel Hildreth. Enoch El-dridge, John Reeve, Isaac Smith, William Ourgie, Francis Elbertson, Humphrey Hughes, assignee of Simeon Palmer, Jeremiah Bennett, Aaron Bennett, Albert Hughes, and Enoch Willis against the schooner Elvira and her cargo.]

<p>Case No. 6,016.</p> <p>Judgment by Default — Opening of Same.</p> <p>A default was set aside, and judgment opened where defendant, by affidavit, excused his neglect in not making defense, and made it appear that he had a good defense, and offered to pay costs and plead instanter; the motion to set aside the default having been made at the term at which the judgment was rendered, and continued several terms without fault of defendant.</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Richard Handell.] By S. T. NEWTON, Register: I, the undersigned, register of said district, pursuant to the special order of reference made herein of the claim of Messrs.

Petition for review under section 2 of the bankrupt act. This case came before the court on a question as to the right of individuals composing a bankrupt firm to claim individual exemptions out of partnership effects. The individual schedules of each of the partners aforesaid disclose personal property of Handlin to the amount of $532.83, .and of Yenny to the amount of $150.00.

Habeas corpus and petition to discharge an apprentice. [Joel] Brown, the master, being about to leave Georgetown, assigned the apprentice, with his shop, to another person. The articles of apprenticeship were merely a contract between the boy (who was sixteen years old) and the master. There are only three modes of binding under the act of Maryland, namely, by the orphans’ court, by two justices of the peace, or by the father.

<p>Case No. 6,020.</p> <p>Collision' — Steamer and Sailing Vessel — Mutual Fault — Look-Out—Rules of Navigation.</p> <p>1. Where a steamboat and sail vessel are approaching each other, and a collision takes place between them, if there is mutual fault, the loss that is occasioned must be divided.</p> <p>2. A steamboat in the night time navigating the waters of a bay or river, must always have a look-out. who, for the time, has no other duty or occupation.</p> <p>[Cited in The City of Washington, 92 U. S.</p> <p>3. The rules of navigation, as settled in St. John v. Paine, 10 How. [51 U. S.] 583. The Genesee Chief, 12 How. [53 U. §.] 401, and The Oregon v. Rocea [18 How. (59 U. S.) 572], re-affirmed and acted upon.</p>

This case came before the jcircu.it court oil cross-appeals from the decree of the district court in favor of the libellants [Benjamin Haney, Charles Ogden, and John Trenehard, owners of the schooner Wm. K. Perin).

<p>Case No. 6,022.</p> <p>Trade-Mark — Interference of Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>1. The commissioner of patents has authority under the statute and the rules of the patent office to institute an interference between opposing claimants for registration of the same trade-mark for the purpose of determining the ownership of the same.</p> <p>2. The decision of the secretary of the interior in 13 O. G. 963, and of the commissioner of patents in Hoosier Drill Co. v. Ingals, 14 O. G. 7S5, considered and approved.</p> <p>3. The decision of the examiner of interferences, not appealed from, in such an interference is conclusive upon the parties and their privies, and cannot be questioned in any other tribunal.</p> <p>4. The. successful party in such an interference is entitled to a provisional injunction against the licensees of the unsuccessful party when no doubt exists as to the infringement.</p> <p>[Cited in Peck v. Lindsay. 2 Fed. 690; Hol-liday v. Pickhardt, 12 Fed. 148; Smith v. Halkyard, 16 Fed. 415; Shuter v. Davis, Id. 565: Mubel v.^ Tucker, 24 Fed. 702.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of John R. Hanibel and others.] The petition was filed by the Laflin & Rand Powder Company, which was described as a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York. Whether this was sufficient to show that petitioner resided in that state, was made a subject of discussion. The defect complained of in the petition is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Case No. 6,024.</p> <p>Guaranty op Dividend — Insolvency of Principal — Responsibility op Guarantor.</p> <p>1. The defendant guarantied to the holder of certain certificates of stock in the Portage Hydraulic Manufacturing and Land Company, ten per cent, on moneys paid for two years. Held that an averment that, within the time specified, the company neither made nor declared a dividend was insufficient.</p> <p>2. The undertaking was collateral, and in all such eases a demand and notice are necessary to be averred and proved, or an excuse alledged, to charge the guarantor.</p> <p>3. The total insolvency of the principal supersedes the necessity of a demand of the principal and notice to the guarantor.</p>

Assumpsit by the plaintiffs [Charles M. Hankin and others], merchants in New York City, to recover $658.50, balance of account for which they had drawn a ten days’ draft on the defendant, July 10th, 1868, through the First National Bank of Chicago. Defendant [William H. Squires] pleaded payment of the draft, and offered the draft in evidence, but without any marks of cancellation.

In this case, which was a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy, an injunction had been issued staying the proceedings in a foreclosure suit brought by the firm of A. T. Stewart & Co., .to foreclose a mortgage upon real estate given by the bankrupt [Samuel Hanna]. A decree had been made in the foreclosure suit, and the property was advertised for sale when the injunction was issued.

The libel in this case was filed.[by Perry Hannah and others against the schooner Car-rington, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and against John Lane, claimant] for the recovery of damages alleged to have been sustained by the violation of a charter-party, or memorandum of charter, made between the libellants and certain part-owners and agents of the Carrington.

<p>Case No. 6,029a.</p> <p>Puize — Pleading — Reasonable Cause fok Sei-zuke.</p> <p>1. Mode of pleading in an answer and claim ■commented on.</p> <p>2. The prize law regards property which was enemy property when shipped as continuing to be such, although consigned by a bill of lading to other parties, unless clear evidence is given ■of a change of title.</p> <p>3. Vessel released as not being enemy property, and restored on payment of costs, there having been reasonable cause for her seizure.</p> <p>4. Cargo condemned, ns enemy property, unless further proof be furnished within ten days as to ownership of cargo.</p> <p>[NOTE. There was a hearing upon further proofs, and judgment affirmed, in Case No. 6,-030. An application for allowance of freight for the carriage of the confiscated cargo was denied in Case No. 6,031.]</p>

<p>Hearing on further proofs. [The original proceeding upon the libel is given in Case No. 6,029a.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,031.</p> <p>Freight — Property op Enemy — Confiscate» Cargo.</p> <p>The vessel having been restored, as belonging to loyal owners, and part of her cargo having been condemned as enemy property, captured on a voyage from New Orleans to New York during the war, the master of the vessel applied to be paid, out of the proceeds of the condemned cargo, the freight upon it for the voyage: Eeld, that the application must be denied.</p>

<p>Various specifications were filed of objections to the discharge of [John J. Hannahs] the bankrupt herein. Some were as to alleged false swearing by the bankrupt, which were held to be not sustained. As to others the following opinion was rendered.</p>

<p>[In the matter of John J. Hannahs, a bankrupt.]</p>

[This was an action at law by the Hanover National Bank against Benjamin E. Smith, impleaded with Clark R. Griggs. Heard on motion to remand cause to state court.]

<p>Case No. 6,036.</p> <p>Collision in New York Harbor — Steam Vessels Crossing — Lookodt.</p> <p>1. Where a steamer was coming into New York harbor from the sea. in the daytime, having on her starboard hand a steam vessel, built for a floating grain elevator, which was crossing her path, and the latter kept her course, but was struck b> the steamer, and the steamer claimed that there were vessels at anchor which prevented her from going under the stern of the elevator, the steamer’s lookout having seen the latter, but not having reported her for the reason that, as he supposed, the captain and pilot, who were on the bridge, saw her: BrUl, that, as the vessels were crossing, it was the duty of the steamer, having the elevator on the starboard side, to keep out of tho way. The failure of the lookout to report tho elevator, when he saw her, was negligence.</p> <p>2. As the steamer did not pretend that she was baffled or misled by any movement on the part of the other vessel, and her only mode of keeping out of the way of the latter was to go under her stern, she must prove that, at no time after she was first near enough to have discovered the latter, could she have ported, and thus avoided the collision.</p> <p>3. It was not proved that the steamer entered among the crowd of vessels before she ought to have discovered the elevator.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,037.</p> <p>Collision at Sea — Steamek and Bahqde— Lookout — Lights—Fog-Signals—Speed 'op Steamek.</p> <p>1. The Norwegian barque R. was sunk, on Hay 31st, 1871, about 2.30 a. m., by a collision with the steamer H., at sea, about 350 miles from New York. The H. was bound to New York, heading west one-quarter north, and going at the rate of 9% knots an hour. It was foggy at the time, having been so for some time, the fog being thinner and thicker at intervals, and the steam whistle of the steamer was being blown at intervals of about a minute between each three blasts. She'kept an attentive lookout, but no sound was heard from the ■R. before the collision. The light of the R. was seen two or three points on the H.’s starboard bow. Orders to starboard the wheel and to stop and back the engine were at once given, but the H. struck the R. a square blow on her port side, cutting into her 18 feet, and sinking her at once and drowning eight of her crew. The bark was heading south half west, close hauled on thewind. which was aboutwest southwest, and was making between three and four knots an hour. Her lookout was blowing a foghorn at brief intervals. The whistle of the steamer was not heard till just as her lights were seen, and the collision immediately followed. The wheel of the barque was put to port just before the blow; but no change was made in the course of either vessel by the movement of their respective helms: Held, that the H. blew her steam whistle properly, and that the R. blew her fog-horn properly, and the fact, that neither signal was heard on the other vessel, was due to the fact that the vessels were approaching nearly at right angles,- with the wind blowing the sound away, and to the noise of the wind and sea.</p> <p>2. The testimony of those on the deck of the R., as to the direction of the wind, was more to be relied on than that of those on the deck of the H.</p> <p>3. The fog-horn on the R. was a proper fog.horn, and was blown in a proper manner — by blowing, stopping to take breath and listen, and then blowing again.</p> <p>4. The R. was not in fault in not having an additional lookout stationed forward, besides the man who was blowing the horn.</p> <p>5. Although the R. was crossing the usual track of ocean steamers, that fact only imposed upon her the duty of exercising proper care and vigilance, and it was not a part of the ocean in which she had no right to be.</p> <p>• 6. The fact, that the R. had but one man at her wheel, was no proof of negligence, or of want of seamanship on her part.</p> <p>7. The lights of the R., which were in the mizzen rigging, were where they are customa.rily carried on Norwegian vessels, and the H. was not misled in any way by them.</p> <p>8. It was the duty of the H. to keep out of the w;ay of the R.</p> <p>9. The burden was on the H. to excuse herself for not having performed that duty.</p> <p>10. The rate of speed at which the H. was going was not a moderate rate, under the circumstances, and she was solely in fault for the collision.</p> <p>[Cited in The Aleppo, Case No. 157.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,038.</p> <p>Collision — Steamships—Crossing under Risk op Collision.</p> <p>1. The rule, that, where two ships under steam are crossing, so as to involve risk of collision, the ship which has the other on her starboard side, shall keep out of the way of the other, enforped and applied.</p> <p>[Cited in Clare v. Providence & S. S. Co., 20 Fed. 536; Meyers Excursion & Nav. Co. v. The Emma Kate Ross, 41 Fed. 828.]</p> <p>2. Embarrassment by proximity to vessels at anchor is not an excuse for not observing such rule, where there is no justification for being in such proximity.</p> <p>3. The not slackening of speed by the vessel bound to observe such rule, condemned; and the keeping of her course by the other vessel, approved.</p> <p>[Cited in The City of Panama, Case No. '2,-764; The State of Alabama, 17 Fed. 853; The Lepanto, 21 Fed. 669.]</p> <p>[See The Albemarle, Case No. 135.] ‘</p>

This action was brought [by Andrew Hanson] against the defendant [Mary Ann Cox] as administratrix of William Cox, deceased, for the board, .maintenance and clothing of a female child, the slave of the said William Cox, in the sum of $500.

This suit was commenced January 30, 1871. The libel charges • that ■ • in ■ August, 1870, while on a voyage from Newport, Wales, to this port, in the American .brig Madawasca, the defendant [A. F.] Turner being then second mate on said brig,' in' the presence and with the consent of the defendant [Frank] Fowle, who was then master of the same, did,' without cause, beat the libellant [Christian Hanson], a seaman on said brig, with a capstan bar and otherwise, and thereby…

<p>Case No. 6,042.</p> <p>Seamen — Assault and Battekt op Officer — When Master Liable for — Satisfaction, Proof of — Receipt for Claims ex Contractu and Claims ex Delicto — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>1. A master of a vessel is liable for an unjustifiable assault and battery by one of his officers upon one of the crew, when the same is done by his connivance, consent or authority.</p> <p>2. The consent and authority of the master will be presumed when it appears that he knew of the trespass or had reason to know it, and did not interfere to prevent it.</p> <p>3. A receipt given by a seaman upon the payment of his wages, which contains a clause acknowledging satisfaction of all claims for assault and battery, is not binding unless shown to have been the result of a fair and free compromise or settlement for some substantial compensation or benefit to the seaman besides the payment of his wages.</p> <p>[Cited in The Oriflamme, Case No. 10,572.]</p> <p>4. A receipt for all “demands and dues” against a vessel, her master and officers, is not upon its face a receipt for assault and battery.</p> <p>5. The word “demand” on a receipt ordinarily relates only to claims arising ex contractu, and not to those arising ex delicto.</p> <p>6. Rules for assessment of damages in cases of beating and wounding a seaman.</p>

<p>Case 3STo„ 6,043.</p> <p>Wages of Seamen — Forfeiture bt Desertion.</p> <p>1. Where there was a collision, in the night time, and a cry that the vessel was sinking, and a seaman jumped from his own vessel to the other vessel for safety, and Üfterwards endeavored to rejoin his own, without success: Held, that he had not incurred a forfeiture of wages.</p> <p>2. Wages were allowed up to the time of leaving his own vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in Antone v. Hicks, CaBe No. 493.)</p>

The petition by the Manchester Shoe & Leather Company of New Hampshire against the two defendants, doing business at Boston under the firm name of Hapgood & Co., alleged a debt due from said firm to the petitioners of about $1,000; and that said defendants, being insolvent, did, on the twenty-seventh day of December, 1872, and on the fifteenth day of January, 1873, make certain payments to two of their creditors by way of preference.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[This was a libel in rem by John H. Har-beck and others against the ship Francis A. Palmer to enforce an alleged lien. Russel H. Post and others appeared as claimants.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] This was a suit for subtraction of wages, brought jointly against [Joshua Gordon and another] the master and the owner of the brig Enterprize, for wages earned by the plaintiff [William Harden] as mate on a voyage described in the shipping articles to be from the port of Portland to Guadaloupe and a market, and back to a port of discharge, and to Portland.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Herman P. Hardin.) Two questions were certified by Mr. Register Thatcher to the court for decision; (1) Are debts due citizens of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, who have always resided in those states, provable against the estate of the bankrupt, who has always resided in Maine, when such debts are barred by the statute of limitations of that state?

<p>[This was a bill in equity by William A. Harding against Charles P. Crosby.]</p>

This was a bill in equity brought by [Stephen Harding and another] two of the heirs at law of Comfort Wheaton, deceased, which charged, that on the 9th of May, 1805, Comfort Wheaton was seized of certain real estate in Providence; that he was then infirm and weak, both in body and mind, being very old, viz. seventy-five years of age, and having been severely affected by a stroke of the palsy, which destroyed the soundness of his understanding; that he was conducting himself…

<p>[This was an action at law by Albert G. Harding against Alexander S. Walker.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,052.</p> <p>Customs Duties — An Valokem Duty — Rule ron Ascertaining Value — Meaning op “Market Value” — Appraisement.</p> <p>1. By section 16 of the act of August 30, ISIS' [5 Stat. 563]. the actual market value or wholesale price of merchandise imported into the United States and subject to an ad valorem duty, or where the duty imposed was regulated by, or based upon, the value of the square yard, or of any specific quantity of the same, was required to be ascertained, as it was in the principal markets of the country from which the iame was-imported, and at the time the merchandise was purchased, and that there should be added thereto, as the true value upon which the duties should be assessed, all costs and charges except insurance, but including a charge for commissions.</p> <p>[See Bailey v. Goodrich, Case No. 735.]</p> <p>2. The same provision was incorporated into-the act of March 3. 1851 [9 Stat. 629], except that the actual market value or wholesale price of the merchandise, under the latter act, was to be ascertained at the period and place of exportation.</p> <p>3. Under the act of March 3, Í851, where the liability of the merchandise to import duty depends upon the value of a given quantity or parcel of the same, there is no necessity for a preliminary appraisement in order to ascertain whether it is subject to duty at all, or entitled to free entry, before it is appraised as required by law to ascertain its dutiable value.</p> <p>4. Where wool was baled up before it was purchased, the words “market value” in the act of August 30, 1S42. include the cost of covering as well as the goods.</p> <p>5. On entry of imported merchandise actually purchased, or procured otherwise than by purchase, the owner, consignee, or agent may make such addition in the entry to the cost or value given in the invoice, as may, in his opinion, raise the same to the true market value of such imports in the principal markets of the country, where the importation is made, and may add thereto all costs and charges which would form-a part of the true value at the port where the same was entered. No duties can, however, be assessed upon an amount less than the invoice or entered value.</p> <p>6. Where the price paid for the merchandise included the box, package, or covering, the appraisers ascertain the actual market value, or wholesale price, of the merchandise, in the condition as purchased at the time, in the principal markets of the country from which the same was imported. Charges for baling or covering in such cases are not to be added, because they are included in the purchase as a part of the merchandise.</p> <p>[Cited in Saxonville Mills v. Russell, Case No. 12,413.]</p>

In this case the following questions were adjourned from the Norfolk district court, to this court: 1. Can the court decree the petitioner [John Hardison] a bankrupt, under the act of congress, entitled “An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States,” passed the 19th of August, 1841 [5 Stat. 440], when in his petition and schedule he does not include all his creditors, and the debts due to them? 2.

[Bill by Chester F. Hardon against Isaac E. Newton and others, praying for the dissolution of a corporation known as the American Suspender Company, and for other relief.)

In equity. On bill and demurrer. In June, 1872, defendant filed a bill in this court to foreclose a mortgage for $20,000, executed by Sprague, in 1867, upon certain real estate in Chicago.

<p>Case 3STo. 6,056.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Maritime Contracts.</p> <p>A contract by which a steamboat navigating the public inland waters of the United States engages, in consideration of freights to be earned, to carry certain goods, and collect from consignee the freight money, charges, advances, and insurance, together with, the price of the goods, and after deducting the freight money to pay the balance to the consignor, is a maritime contract, within the jurisdiction of the district court, in admiralty, and is a contract within the scope of the master’s authority, and binding on the owners of the vessel in favor of a shipper who had no knowledge that the boat was already chartered for the use of others.</p> <p>[Cited in Zollinger v. The Emma, Case No. 18.218; The St. Joseph, Id. 12,230; The New Hampshire, 21 Fed. 925: The Josephine Spangler, 11 Fed. 441; Iirohn v. The Julia, 37 Fed. 370.]</p> <p>[Cited in Peoria & P. U. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 109 Ill. 137.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,059.</p> <p>Patent fob Mexican Grants — Purchasers from Patentee.</p> <p>Where a bill was filed by the alleged heirs of a deceased Mexican grantee of a ranch against certain persons who had purchased from a party to whom the land had been confirmed and patented, to compel a transfer of the estate purchased, and a delivery of the patent and other muniments of title to the complainants, and it appeared that the patentee derived title under a sale made by order of the probate court which under the decisions of the supreme court was without jurisdiction to order the sale, and it further appeared that the defendants were bona fide purchasers for full value, from the patentee and had no actual notice of any defects in the deraignment of his title from the original grantee: Hdd, that the recitals in the patent that the claim was founded on a Mexican grant; that it had been confirmed by the board and the district court; and that the patent did not affect the rights of third persons, did not affect the defendants with constructive notice of the transcript and records of the board and of the district and of the proceedings in the probate court and the administrator’s sale which those records described, and further that their omission to take notice of those proceedings and that the administrator’s deed was a nullity was not an act of crassa negligentia or “an omission to take a reasonable and well established precaution which should be treated as equivalent thereto.”</p> <p>[Cited in Parkhurst v. Hosford, 21 Fed. 835.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. An appeal was then taken to the supreme court by the plaintiffs, and the judgment was affirmed in an opinion by Mr.-Justice Hunt, who said that there was not sufficient evidence to hold that John Hardy and Thomas Hardy were the same person. 154 U. S. 59S, 14 Sup. Ot. 1172.]</p>

This was a suit in equity to charge the defendants [James M. Harbin and others] as trustees of certain real property in California, and to compel a transfer of the title. It came before the court on demurrer to the bill.

Libel in admiralty. The steam propeller Ruggles, Charles Early master, was owned in New York by N. Barber, and was enrolled in New York. While in the waters of North Carolina in 1S74, she was burnt to the water’s edge; her hull remaining untouched, and her steam engine and propeller remaining in the hull.

<p>Case No. 6,064.</p> <p>Contract for Payment of Money — Suit in Another Country — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>Where a contract for the payment of money is made in one country, payable in the currency of that country, upon suit brought in another country to recover for breach of the contract, the plaintiff ought to recover such a sum in the currency of the country where the suit is brought, as would be equivalent to the sum to which he would be entitled in the country where the debt is payable, calculated by the real and not the nominal par of exchange.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,005.</p> <p>Carriers — Injuries to Passenger — Railroad Platforms — Damages.</p> <p>[1. A railroad company is bound to the highest degree of care and skill in the construction of its platforms for the safety of passengers in getting on and off its trains. But it is only required to build platforms of sufficient dimensions to accommodate the passengers getting off or on at the particular station; and if the platform is safe, and constructed according to the opinions of persons skilled in such matters, the fact that it might have been made more convenient will not render the company liable for an accident. The laws require safety rather than convenience.]</p> <p>[2. A passenger injured by the fault of a railroad company is entitled to reasonable actual damages, in determining which the jury may look to the medical and all other expenses resulting from the injury, the time lost by plaintiff, and the value of his services while disabled, and the nature and extent of his injuries.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,067.</p> <p>Admiralty — Prize op War — Not Attachable in Private Action.</p> <p>In this case, after the vessel had been libelled as prize, a libel on the instance side of the court was filed against her to recover a private claim. The court dismissed the latter libel, holding that the case was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the prize court: that the vessel, while under arrest as prize, could not be attached in a private action, and that relief must be sought in the prize court.</p> <p>[Cited in Re People’s Mail Steamship Co., Case No. 10.970.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,066.</p> <p>Admiralty — Prize *f War — Private Liens Supplanted.</p> <p>1. A motion being made by the libellants in a private suit for the "sale of the vessel as perishing. and it appearing that the vessel was under capture as prize of war, the motion was denied.</p> <p>2. The capture as prize overrides and supplants nil private liens.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.)</p> <p>[NOTE. An appeal was then taken to the circuit court by the claimant, where the judgment was affirmed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Nelson, who held that the seizure of the vessel as a prize of war discharged all liens. Case No. 10,028.</p> <p>[See, also, Cases Nos. 6,067. 10.025-10.027, for other cases bearing on the seizure of this vessel.)</p>

<p>Case No. 6,068.</p> <p>Salvage Contract by Mastek Sustained —Additional Compensation Refused.</p> <p>A contract made by the master with sal-vors, for the recovery of the cargo of a sunken vessel, sustained.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,069.</p> <p>Misconduct Forfeits Right to Sai.vage.</p> <p>Where, by the law of the state [Laws Cal. 1850-53, p. 134], it was provided that any person who shall take, away any goods from any stranded vessel, or any goods cast by the sea upon the land, or found in any bay or creek, * * * and shall not within four days deliver them to the sheriff, etc., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, etc., etc.; and the libellant having recovered an anchor and chain which had been lost in the Bay of San Francisco, and failed to deliver them to the sheriff, or to libel the same for salvage; but sold the anchor and appropriated its proceeds, and the anchor was subsequently surrendered by the purchaser to the owner, who also recovered the chain from the salvor; and the latter filed his libel in per-sonam to recover a salvage compensation; held, that he had by his misconduct forfeited all right to a salvage compensation.</p> <p>[Cited in TJ. S. v. Stone, S Fed. 251.]</p>

<p>By CHARLES HAMLIN, Register:</p> <p>The petitioner, Ramsdell, has filed his petition before the court, alleging, in substance, that he rented, October 1, 1871, to said bankrupt, the westerly half of his store, No. 3 Kendusheag Bridge, Bangor, to be used as a jeweler’s shop, at the annual rent of five hundred dollars, to be paid in monthly installments of forty-one dollars and sixty-seven cents each, as fast as the same should become due; that the bankrupt became his tenant, as aforesaid, and remained such tenant up to the time of his filing his petition in bankruptcy, viz., August 13, 1873. He also alleges, that the rent was not paid according to the stipulated terms, but that the bankrupt suffered it to run in arrear, until the 1st of June, 1S72, when it amounted to one hundred and fifty dollars, or nearly four months rent; and that he then owed the petitioner besides, on account of certain fixtures, fourteen dollars more; and that the bankrupt, June 5, 1S72, executed and delivered to the petitioner- an absolute bill of sale of a certain silver cornet with gold trimmings, valued at three hundred and fifty dollars, and thereupon delivered the cornet into the hands and possession of the petitioner, to be held as security, as well for whatever thereafter might be due, on account for rent and otherwise, as for what was then due for rent and on account, which bill of sale and cornet was accepted and received and delivered as aforesaid; and that the bankrupt afterwards borrowed the cornet, to use on some special occasion, agreeing to return it immediately after to the petitioner, since which time he has been unable to obtain possession of the same. The prayer of the petition, after reciting the proceedings in bankruptcy, and stating that petitioner’s claim •against the estate amounts to three hundred and forty-five dollars and seven cents, asks, that his rights under and by virtue of said bill of sale may be adjusted and secured, to the end that his claim against the bankrupt’s estate may be satisfied, etc. The as-signee having been duly notified of the pend-ency of this petition, the court thereupon ordered the same to be referred to the register to investigate and report upon the facts and 'his conclusion as to the rights of the parties in the matter. A hearing has been had of parties. The assignee filed his answer to the petition, and in the answer sets up for his defense: First, that the bill of sale is fraudulent and void against the assignee, because it was made for the express purpose, between the bankrupt and this petitioner, of being a fictitious and colorable sale or transfer of said instrument, and to secure and save the same from attachment, or .liability to attachment, as the property of the bankrupt, who was then largely in debt, unable to meet his payments, and threatened with suits and attachments; second, that the petitioner has fully surrendered and effectually waived whatever right or interest he had to the instrument or cornet by or through the bill of sale; and third, that any liability which at any time may have subsisted on the part of the bankrupt to the petitioner by virtue of the bill of sale has been fully discharged and paid in money and goods. Testimony of the petitioner, bankrupt, and other witnesses, was adduced on all of the questions thus raised, and an examination had of their accounts and other documentary evidence, all of which appear in the depositions returned to court.</p> <p>The case, as disclosed upon the petitioner’s showing, is found almost entirely in the first, part of his deposition, pp. 1 and 2. There is no controversy between the parties but that the bankrupt became the petitioner’s tenant October 1, 1871, at the agreed rent of five hundred dollars per annum, nor of the execution of the bill of sale, which is as follows: “Bangor, June 5, 1872. J. W. Kamsdell bought of A. D. Harlow one gold and silver instrument. $350.00. Received payment, A. D. Harlow.”</p> <p>The petitioner says, in answer to the (2) question, “When and where was the bill of sale given, and for what purpose?” that “It was given at my store, at the date it purports to be given. It was given to secure me on rent of the west half or side of my store while he (the bankrupt) remained in there.” And in answer to the question (3) “How the bankrupt happened to secure him in this way, and whether the cornet was delivered, etc.,” he testifies: “I spoke to him frequently about rent. He was some three or four hundred dollars behind hand and kept promising to pay me so and so, but failed to do so. I asked him if he would secure me on that instrument? He said he would, and produced the bill of sale. He delivered it up to me and I put it in my safe. He was to pay me five hundred dollars per annum rent. It began on October 1,. 1871. Directly after he gave me the bill of sale he asked me if he could borrow the instrument to use on the street. I told him he could if he would return it to me again, as soon as he had got done with it. He used it several times and returned it to me again as soon as he had got done with it. Have not had it in my possession since last May, I think. He has kept it since. He gave me the bill of sale at the time I requested him to give me security on the instrument. Couldn’t say that any one else was present.” In answer to the (4) question, “Whether the bankrupt owed him on account aside the rent, and what was said about securing that as well as the rent,” he says: “He was owing me a small account besides the rent. * * * It was not mentioned at the time he gave me the bill of sale whether it was. for security on the other account besides the rent. I presented my bill against him for the rent he owed me. and the security was for what he owed me. He said, I could hold the instrument as long as he stayed there and until the rent was paid.” The petitioner has treated his case as one of an equitable mortgage in his argument, and claims that between himself and the assignee there is no necessity of retaining possession of the property mortgaged, nor recording the bill of sale; but the transaction, as stated in his petition and testimony, shows it to be a pledge and not a mortgage. The distinction between a mortgage and a pledge will always be observed both in equity and law. A slight examination of the testimony of the petitioner will show, first, there was no condition of defeasance (4 Kent, Comm. 13S), and, second, there was no fixed time within which the debt was to be paid and the property redeemed thereby (Cortelyou v. Lansing, 2 Caines, Cas. 200). Ramsdell distinctly states, near the close of his answer to the fourth question, that at the time of the execution of the bill of sale the bankrupt said “he could hold the instrument as long as he stayed there and until the rent was paid.” There is no evidence to indicate when the rent was to be paid, or when it was necessary for the bankrupt to redeem the property, in order to prevent the petitioner’s interest from becoming absolute. Third. There is nothing in the evidence tending to show that the petitioner has more than a special property in the cornet. He held it as security until it should be relieved by the payment of rent, and there is nothing to indicate how long, if the rent was not paid, it would take for the property to become petitioner’s absolutely; or that the whole legal title passed, or was intended to pass, to the petitioner, as in the case of a mortgage. In order to make a mortgage out of the transaction, it is incumbent on the petitioner to show that it is more than a pledge, and that the legal title passed to him, and this he has not done. As is said by the court in Jones v. Baldwin. 12 Pick. 310, “there is no evidence to show that the transaction was intended as a mortgage rather than a pledge, and it cannot so operate unless it can be made to appear that it was the intention of the parties that the legal property should pass, liable to be defeated by the performance of the condition.” In this case the transaction was held to be a pledge. See, also, Hazard-v. Loring, 10 Cush. 267, and Newton v. Fay, 10 Allen, 503. Finally, it appearing that the petitioner having voluntarily surrendered the possession of the pledged property into the hands of the bankrupt months before the proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted, must be held to have waived his lien and takes nothing by this petition. In re Mitchell [Case No. 9,657].</p> <p>No opinion is given on the other questions raised.</p>

By a former decree in this case the court had directed refunding bonds to be given by the complainants, who resided in France. They executed a power of attorney, before a notary in France, according to the forms of the civil law, authorizing their agents here to execute bonds pursuant to the order of the court; but the instrument was not under the seal of the parties.

In equity. The Portsmouth Saving Fund Society of Portsmouth, Virginia, was a bank of discount, deposit, and circulation, on a capital of 832,000, for a period of some twenty years anterior to 1862. It was compelled to close its doors in that year by the troubles of the country. Its cashier, George 11. Bain, Sr., now dead, preserved its assets as best he could, with care and fidelity, during the period and until the close of the Civil War.

Action of assumpsit. The Portsmouth Saving Fund Society ceased business as a bank in 1862, in consequence of public invasion. At the close of the war, in the summer of 1S65, it resumed business only for purposes of liquidation, and its directors by resolution authorized its cashier to wind up its affairs as far as possible by setoff. From sales of property the society afterwards derived some funds in greenback currency.

Bill of foreclosure in equity. This bill is brought to subject certain real estate of the defendant, (Samuel M.] Wilson, to the payment of… Held: in Ward v. Smith, supra: If the rule that interest is not recoverable on debts between alien enemies, during war of their respective countries, is applicable to debts between citizens of states in rebellion, and citizens of states adhering to the national government in the late Civil War, it can only apply when the money is to be…

<p>[This was a bill in equity by William Harmer and others against A. E. Gwynne.]</p>

<p>[Action by the lessee of Harmer’s heirs Against George Morris and David Gwynne.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,078.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United ' States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel by the United States against the schooner Harmony, Paoli Hewes, claimant, for unloading goods without a permit.]

This was an action of trespass [by Manuel X. Harmony against David D. Mitchell]. The declaration contained three counts, alleging the stoppage and seizing by the defendant, of horses, mules and wagons, with goods, the property of the plaintiff. [Damages $100,000.]3 There was a plea of not guilty, and three special pleas to each count.

By a charter-party, dated on the 23d day of September, 18S0, the Delaware Transportation Company of Philadelphia, chartered to John E. Reeside of Washington City, the steamer Sydney L. Wright, to be used on the waters of Albemarle Sound, in North Carolina, on a route from Elizabeth City to Eden-ton, from the 1st of October, 1880, until the 1st of May, 1881.

A steamer brought a quantity of Portland cement, shipped under an ordinary bill of lading, and unloaded it at a dock in the East river. Many barrels of cement had the heads stove in and staves loosened, and cement escaped on the dock in quantities, which was afterwards scraped up to fill the depleted barrels, without much care to keep it clean.

<p>Case No. 6,084.</p> <p>Carriers — Connecting Lines of Steamers — Through Bile of Lading — Liability for Damage to Goods.</p> <p>Where several carriers unite to complete a line of transportation and receive goods for one freight, and give a through bill of lading, each carrier is the agent of all the others to accomplish the carriage and delivery of the goods, and is liable for any damage to them, on whatever part of the line the damage is received.</p> <p>[Followed in Richardson v. The Charles P. Chouteau, 37 Fed. 533.]</p> <p>[Cited in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Roach. 35 Kan. 748, 12 Pac. 9S; Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 80 Iowa, 100. 45 N. W. 575; Knight v. Providence & W. R. Co., 13 R. I. 574.]</p>

<p>Demurrer to specifications against a discharge.</p>

[This was a proceeding in equity by James M. Harper against Howard O. Cooke and others, and was heard with another suit of the same nature by the same plaintiff against Nathaniel B. Stevens, for the alleged infringement of reissued letters patent .No. 6,-493, granted to plaintiff June 22, 1875. The original patent, No. 131,09S, was granted to him September 3, 1S72.]

<p>Case No. 6,089.</p> <p>Chattel Mortgage — Security por Performance of Contract — Substitution.</p> <p>A mortgage having been given on certain articles of property to secure the payment of $1,-500, a subsequent agreement was entered into between the parties to deliver over to the mortgagor the articles of property, on his giving security to sell the same at reasonable prices, and account to the mortgagee every fifteen days for the proceeds, and pay the same over to him, &c. The security was given, and,an action being brought on the new agreement, the security pleaded that the original mortgage on the articles had been assigned to him. To this plea the plaintiff demurred. The court held that this plea was no answer to the declaration; that the new agreement was substituted for the mortgage, the plaintiff relying on the personal security given instead of the lien on the articles of property.</p>

The New Brig having been condemned and sold by the decree of the court, made at August sessions, 1834 [Case No. 3,643], the money arising from the sale was brought into court for distribution. A great number of claims were filed, and among them one on the part of Charles A. Harper and William C. Bridges. All of them were referred to an auditor for liquidation. On his report being made to the court, Messrs. Harper and Bridges filed exceptions thereto.

Trover for two hogsheads of sugar. The defendant moved for the continuance of the cause to the next term on account of the absence of a witness. The affidavit stated that the witness would prove a conversation be; tween himself and Gilpin, a witness who it was supposed would be produced on the part of the plaintiffs [Harper and Lyles].

Debt on a joint and several bond, executed by Douglas as principal, and Smith as surety.

Assumpsit, upon a bill drawn by Luke, on West, in favor of plaintiff, and accepted by West, by C. Stephenson, his agent. The evidence was an order drawn by Luke, on West, and on the back of it, an order drawn by Stephenson, in behalf of West, on the treasurer of the theatre. objected, that this was not evidence of an acceptance by West

<p>Case No. 6,094.</p> <p>[See Barnard v. Adams. 10 How. (51 U. S.) 270; Columbian Ins. Co. v. Ashby, 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 331; Scudder v. Bradford, 14 Pick. 13; Delano v. The Gallatin, Case No. 3,751.]</p> <p>[See Jackson v. The Julia Smith, Case No. 7,-136.]</p> <p>4. Where a vessel has been captured, on her voyage, and condemned at an intermediate port, and part of the cargo has been restored and sold at the same port, no freight is due therefor.</p> <p>[See Sampayo v. Salter, Case No. 12.277; The Nathaniel Hooper, Id. 10,032.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,095.</p> <p>Rules op Court — Costs.</p> <p>. 1. Under the rule of this court, in suits in Tem for services on board of vessels on the North river, a libellant cannot recover costs when less than $50 is in demand, .if he had a olear remedy therefor known to him, in the local courts.</p> <p>2. The onus is upon the claimant to show that thé libellant had such remedy, to entitle himself to a decree for costs.</p> <p>3. The object of this rule was to prevent an unnecessary resort to the expensive proceedings In rem. It will not be so enforced as to compel the mariner to resort to the local courts only in case his remedy there is convenient and sure.</p> <p>4. A similar doctrine prevails in the civil law, and is also employed as a means for preventing the creation of costs unnecessarily in the prosecution of demands.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,097.</p> <p>Maritime Services — Lien under State Law— Enforcement in Admiralty.</p> <p>1. Where no materials are furnished or laboi-bestowed in the refitment or reparation of vessels, services, which are entitled to take the rank and character of maritime, are such as are performed in aid of the ship’s company, or the navigation of the vessel, and are rendered while she is afloat upon tide waters.</p> <p>2. A watchman employed on board a domestic vessel, is, under the state law, entitled to a lien upon her for his services, provided they amount to over fifty dollars, and he may sue therefor in. his own name in admiralty.</p> <p>[Cited in Bradley v. Bolles, Case No. 1,773; Cunningham v. Hall, Id. 3,481; Fox v. Holt, Id. 5,012; The George T. Kemp, Id. 5,341; The Erinagh, 7 Fed. 234.]</p>

This was a libel for wages promoted by the chief mate of the schooner Harriet. It appeared that the libellant was discharged from the vessel on the 7th of September, at which time the master gave him his note, not negotiable. for the amount of the wages due, and took his receipt in full. On the next day the libellant applied to an attorney and sued out a writ against the master, upon the note, and caused him to be arrested.

<p>Case No. 6,099.</p> <p>Penal Statutes — Construction — Bounty for Pishing Vessels — When is Vessel “At Sea” —Memorandum—False Certificate — Fraud-Mistake.</p> <p>1. Although penal statutes are to be construed strictly, yet all the provisions thereof must be taken together, and interpreted according to the import of the words, and not by the mere division into sections, so as to give effect to the ■objects and intent of the statute. All statutes relating to the same subject matter, are to be interpreted together, and such a construction is to be given to them, consistent with the words, as will avoid the mischief, and promote the objects and policy contemplated by the statutes.</p> <p>[Cited in The Bolina, Case No. 1.00S; Bains v. The James and Catherine. Id. 736: Livingston v. Story, 11 Pet. (3G TJ. S.) 395; TJ. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, Case No. 15,-867; Harrison v. Vose, 9 How. (50 TJ. S.) 379; TJ. S. v. Wilson. Case No. 16.731; TJ. S. v. Marks. Id. 15,721: TJ. S. v. One Raft of Timber, 13 Fed. 799; TJ. S. v. Starn, 17 Fed. 437.]</p> <p>[Cited in Tilton v. Tilton, 35 N. H. 432; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 149, 35 N. E. 881.]</p> <p>2. The 5th and 6th sections of the act of 1S13, c. 84 [2 Story’s Laws, 1352; 3 Stat. 51, c. 35] and the act of 1819, c. 212, [3 Story’s Laws. 1742; 3 Stat. 520, c. 89], relating to the bounty upon all such vessels and boats, employed in the bank and other cod-fisheries, as shall be employed at sea for the term or four months, include within their terms all vessels engaged in the cod fisheries, without limitation or specification as to the length of their fares, or the nature of their fisheries,</p> <p>[Cited in TJ. S. v. The Reindeer. Case No. 16,-145; TJ. S. v. The Paryntha Davis, Id. 16,-003.]</p> <p>3. A vessel is “at sea,” within the intent of the acts of 1813 and 1819, when she is without the limits of any port or harbours on the seacoast.</p> <p>[Cited in The Helen Brown, 2S Fed. 112.]</p> <p>4. In this case, an almanac was offered as evidence of the particular days On which the vessel (the Harriet) sailed and returned, wherein the letters R. and S. and dots were placed against particular days, as being the very days of her sailing and returning. It was held, that such a ■document was not a proper journal or memorandum book thereof entitled to credit, and that for this purpose an exact journal or memorandum of the actual days of her sailing and returning, should have been kept, in the nature of a logbook.</p> <p>5. Where a vessel was enrolled and licensed for the fisheries, and without an oath having been taken by all the owners to the ownership, as prescribed by the statutes of 1813 and 1819, and fraud and deceit were charged in procuring the bounty allowed by law to such vessels; it was held., that it must be satisfactorily proved, on the part of the United States, that the omission by the owners, who did not take the oath, was through fraud and deceit, and not through mistake, in order to render the vessel liable to forfeiture.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. The Reindeer, Case No. 16,-145.]</p> <p>[Cited in Murray v. Joyce, 44 Me. 347.]</p> <p>6.Where a certificate, made by the agent of the owner, of the particular times of sailing and returning of a vessel, engaged in the cod fisheries, was discovered to be incorrect and false after the bounty was received, it was held, that if the incorrectness and falsity were by mistake, there was no forfeiture under the acts of 1818 and 1819; but if by fraud and deceit, there was.</p>

This was a libel filed by the district attorney on behalf of the United States, against the schooner Harriet [Boynton and others, claimants], of about twenty-four tons burden, for an alleged forfeiture in fraudulently obtaining the fishing bounty. The Harriet was regularly enrolled and licensed for carrying on the bank and other cod-fisheries, for the year 1833, when the forfeiture is alleged to have accrued.

In admiralty. This was a libel, filed April 3, 1873, by- Ole M. Nelson, against the scow Harriet Ann, for seaman’s wages during the years 1869, 1870 and 1871. The vessel was owned by John A. Nelson, who was also her captain. In the spring of 1870, quite expensive repairs were made on the vessel, the money to pay for which was obtained from Amos J. Snell and Clark Lipe, to whom Nelson gave a mortgage for their advances.

<p>Case No. 6,102.</p> <p>Collision — Measure op Damages for Loss of Cargo.</p> <p>1. The nature and measure of damages considered. When intentional and when not.</p> <p>[2. In cases of loss of cargo by collision the damages are limited to the actual loss, without any allowance for expected profits; hence the basis of the computation is not the value of the cargo at the port of destination, but its prime cost, together with all charges, premiums for insurance, etc. Following The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. (16 U. S.) 546.]</p> <p>NOTE. How far courts and juries are, in cases of malicious torts, authorized to award penal damages, is a question perhaps not perfectly settled in the jurisprudence of the common law. The question has been learnedly and acutely examined by Mr. Sedgwick of the New York bar, in a treatise on the Law of Damages, and by Mr. Greenleaf, in the second volume of his excellent treatise on Evidence, No. 253, note. Mr. Sedgwick holds, on the authority of decided cases, that the jury may legally give punitory damages by way of example. Mr. Greenleaf, that only compensatory damages can be given. It is certain that the language often used by the courts, not only in chargeB to the jury, but in opinions deliberately given on questions of law, goes very far to justify the doctrine maintained by Mr. Sedgwick. Exemplary, vindictive, and punitory damages, and most money damages in poenam; in their fair and common meaning, imply something more than a bare and naked compensation to the complainant. Mr. Greenleaf, by a careful analysis of the cases, has endeavored to show that this language may be satisfied if it is restricted to mere compensatory damages, a simple resti-tutio in integrum of the injured person, and in some of them he has perhaps successfully shown it; but in others this seems to be doing some violence to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words. Whether all the cases will admit of this construction or not, where the question is reduced to its elements and examined on principle, it seems to be quite clear in theory that Mr. Greenleaf maintains the true principle. Every private wrong that involves a violation of public order, includes two kinds of injury perfectly distinct in their nature: the private damages sustained by the injured individual and the public injury by the example of violation of public order, and the license and encouragement which would be given to the lawless and violent if it were not repressed by due punishment. The individual is to be indemnified by a private action in his own name, the public by their own action and by a penalty proper in its nature and extent to protect the public from, the influence of such examples. But there is no reason why the indemnity due to the public for the wrong done to them, should be transferred as a gratuity to the individual through whom they have suffered.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of California.] On the seventh of May, 1866, C. J. Jansen, the owner of the ship B. L. Harrimau, chartered her to Joseph Bmeric, the libellant, for a voyage from San Francisco to Cobija, Bolivia, or other ports in the Pacific, the port of discharge to be designated before the sailing of the vessel.

The libel in this case was filed [by Charles Harrimnn against Sewell V. Dodge] to recov: er $51.83 for an anchor supplied by the libel-lant to the sloop Exchange, in May, 1854. The vessel had belonged to one Kingsland, as the libellant knew, having dealt with him as such owner. In November, 1853, • Kingsland conveyed her to the respondent to secure his indebtedness to him.

This was an action against [Hugh Maxwell], the collector of the port of New York, to recover back certain sums of money paid to him by the plaintiffs [William Harriman and others] — first, for the attendance of an inspector of the customs at the private bonded cellar of the plaintiffs, in New York; second, for duties, and a penalty for undervaluation, on certain wines, imported in the Argo, from Havre, in the spring of 1849; and, third, for duties, and a penalty for…

<p>Case No. 6,107.</p> <p>Trade-Mark — Exclusive Use of “Bucket” for Collars.</p> <p>The exclusive use of a tin pail with a bail or handle to it. the tin ornamented with a geometrical pattern, and used to contain paper collars for sale, and sold with the collars, cannot be claimed as a trade-mark, either under the statute or by virtue of the general law of trademarks.</p> <p>[Cited in Ball v. Siegel, 116 Ill. 143, 4 N. E. 667.]</p>

In bankruptcy. John Cochrane, Jr., the bankrupt, was a manufacturer of carpets, and Harris, Chipman, & Co. were his selling agents or factors, and advanced him their notes from time to time, which he indorsed and procured to be discounted. Both parties failed, at which time there were outstanding in the hands of several banks and individuals notes of this kind for about $116,000; and1 the factors had goods of Cochrane’s to the value of about $20,000.

The petitioner [Samuel Harris] filed this petition as a voluntar}- bankrupt for the benefit of the bankrupt act [of 1841 (5 Stat. 445)] on the fifth of July..

<p>Case No. 6,111.</p> <p>Proceedings in Different Districts.</p> <p>A firm was adjudged bankrupt, on petition of creditors, without opposition, the warrant was delivered to the marshal, a meeting of creditors was held, and an assignee chosen, who entered on his duties. Thereafter, one of the creditors applied to set aside all the proceedings as irregular, under the 16th general order, because he had, previous to the filing of this petition against the bankrupts, filed a petition against them in another district: Held, that the proceedings in this court were regular, notwithstanding the prior filing of the other petition, and that there was no ground for setting them aside.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,112.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge—Specifications.</p> <p>When the specifications filed in opposition to the discharge of a bankrupt are not sustained by the proofs, a discharge will be granted whenever the register shall certify that the bankrupt has conformed to the requirements of the bankrupt law [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)].</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the AVestern district of Missouri.] This was an action on the official bond of the plaintiff in error, John S. Harris, as cashier of… Held: as the by-laws required, on the first Tuesday of February or March, 1S73, and the first meeting of the board after the election of officers, on the 16th January, 1873, was held on tlie 13th March, 1873. None of the officers elected on the 16th January, 1873, gave bond for that year.

Quantum meruit for carpenter’s work and labor upon the defendant’s house, in Prince George’s county, Maryland. Verdict for the plaintiff [William A. Harris] for $1,500. The defendant [Thomas Berry] moved the court for a new trial — -(1) on the ground that the verdict was against the law and the evidence; (2) that the court erred in admitting evidence to go to the jury against the objection of the defendant.

This is an action for three thousand sacks of corn, mentioned in an instrument claimed to be a warehouse receipt, made by the defendants May 26th, 1870, and indorsed to the plaintiffs [Harris, Hutchinson & Co.]. The instrument itself, and the circumstances under which it was indorsed to and is held by the plaintiffs, appear in the special verdict of the jury hereinafter mentioned.

The defendants set up a title in themselves, as holding under James Potter, and deny the title of the plaintiff [David Harris’ lessee], upon the ground that his warrant, calling for particular boundaries, was removed to the land in question, but the survey not actually made. On the 27th July, 1774, the plaintiff obtained a warrant for three hundred acres of land, bounding south on W. M..

[This was a libel by James E. Harris against Frederic W. Capen, for wages as a seaman.] It appeared in evidence that libel-ant shipped as an able seaman on board the ship Thomas Perkins, and during the voyage received an injury' which partially disabled him, and was left in Liverpool, sick, and the vessel proceeded on her voyage without him.

<p>Case No. 6,119.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Effect of Agreement not to Record Mortgage on 'hue Rights of the Assignee.</p> <p>A deed of trust intended to give a creditor a preference, fraudulent under the bankrupt act [of 1SG7 (14 Stat. 517)], was executed more than four months before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy against the grantor therein; in order to prevent the knowledge thereof from coming to other creditors, and to have it validated by lapse of time, the grantor and beneficiary agreed that it should be kept off the record: after the lapse of four months from the date of the deed of trust, but within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the instrument was deposited for record: Held, on a bill in equity, filed by the assignee in bankruptcy against the beneficiary to set aside the deed of trust, that the suit was not barred because the proceedings in bankruptcy were-commenced more than four months after the execution of the deed of trust.</p> <p>[Cited in Bostwick v. Foster, Case No. 1.682: Re Oliver, Id. 10,492; Aníbal v. Heacock, 2' Fed. 170; Matthews v. Westphal, 48 Fed. 665.]</p> <p>NOTE. — Certain observations in Sawyer v. Turpin, 91 U. S. 114, throw some doubt upon what is said in the foregoing opinion as to the effect of an agreement not to record a mortgage; but it is believed there is no'necessary conflict between the points really decided in the two cases. The subject is fully discussed by Love, J. (United States circuit court for Iowa, May term, 1878), in Stephens v. Sherman [Case No. 13,369a]. The principal case wad not appealed.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,121.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — State Legislation — Seizure and Sale of Vessels under State Laiv — Effect of.</p> <p>1. The admiralty and maritime law of the j United States, except where it is changed by act of congress, is as much the law of the United ■ States as if it had been formally enacted word 1 for word in a statute. ¡</p> <p>2. The laws of the United States “are the su- ! preme laws,” and cannot be changed or altered, modified or repealed by state enactments.</p> <p>[Cited in The Ann, 8 Fed. 927.]</p> <p>3. No right or privilege given or secured by the laws of the United States, can be abrogated, displaced or superseded by state enactments.</p> <p>4. A lien given by the maritime law is a right.</p> <p>5. If a state legislature should pass an act declaring that a maritime lien should have no effect in that state, or should be postponed to liens given by the laws of that state, such enactment would have no binding force or effect.</p> <p>6. The act of the legislature of Missouri, entitled “An act concerning boats and vessels,” does not abrogate, displace, or supersede, any lien given by the general maritime law of the United States.</p> <p>7. A seizure and sale under the Missouri “act concerning boats and vessels," does not divest a lien given by the general maritime law.</p> <p>[Applied in Ashbrook v. The Golden Gate, Case No. 574. Cited in The N. W. Thomas, Id. 10,3S6.]</p> <p>[See, contra, Author v. The Atlantic, Case No. 668.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem [by George Harris against the schooner Kensington] for money advanced for repairs and supplies.

Action of assumpsit to recover from the defendant $2,091, the balance of an account due from the former co-partnership of Lindsay and Tomlinson.

This was a motion for a new trial. [See Case No. 6,123.] insisted that partners being, as to debts contracted by them, principal debtors, they can by no act or agreement between themselves change their situation to that of principal and surety, without the express assent of the creditors: their liability is unconditional; neither of them can be discharged from his obligation but by payment or release, nor can any act of the creditor amount to a release which he did not…

Action to recover one hundred vara lot No. 19, of the Laguna survey. This lot is within the charter lines of San Francisco, as defined in the act of incorporation of 1851. It lies west of Larkin street, and north-west of Johnson street, and is within the limits covered by the Van Ness ordinance. On September 25, 1848, T. M. Leavenv orth, as alcalde, issued a grant for this lot to a party designated in the grant by the name of Stephen A. Harris.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel by George Harris and others against Samuel G. Wheeler, Jr., to recover for supplies furnished to the steamer Eu-taw.]

<p>This ease came up on exceptions to the report of the commissioner to whom it had been referred to compute the damages which the libelants [John A. Harris and others] were entitled to recover by reason of a collision between the schooner Mechanic and the steamship [Prometheus]. The commissioner, among other items of damage, reported “for what the vessel would have chartered for 76 days, while undergoing repairs,, at $27.50 per day, $2.090,” to which the claimants excepted.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,130.</p> <p>Lechee in Admiralty — Form op — Execution.</p> <p>The respondent in a suit in admiralty appealed to this court from the decree of the district court in favor of the libellant, and, after a trial,.an order was entered in this court affirming the decree of the district court, with costs: Held, that no execution could issue in this court, until the entry of a formal decree awarding a recovery to the libellant.</p>

<p>•Case No. 6,133.</p> <p>Pilotage — Performance within a State — Admiralty Jurisdiction.</p> <p>[1. A contract for pilotage, to be performed wholly within a state, cannot be enforced in admiralty.]</p> <p>[2. A claim for half pilotage, given by a state law for services offered and refused, cannot be enforced in admiralty.]</p>

<p>This was a libel for wages [by John Harrison, a mariner, against the schooner Eclipse, Wade, master.]</p>

Trover for a mulatto woman slave, named Nell; with a special count for carrying away the plaintiff’s slave, without his consent, whereby she was lost to the plaintiff. offered evidence that the plaintiff had permitted the slave to go about and hire herself where she ■chose. But THE COURT (nem. con.) permitted the evidence to be given to the jury. The count for trover wras abandoned by the plaintiff’s counsel. .

[This was a bill in equity by William M. Harrison against Ozro.

<p>Case No. 6,139.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proof of Debt — Prefeuexce — Shipments before Bankruptcy but after Insolvency.</p> <p>1. A. & Co. had been for a number of years the commission merchants of the bankrupts, who were merchants, dealing mainly in cotton. They advanced a large sum of money to the bankrupts, supposing that they had advanced the entire cash capital required by the bankrupts, and expected in return to receive all the cotton shipped by them. Notes of the bankrupts were presented for payment at the office of A. &' Co., and were protested for nonpayment. A short time after this, one of the bankrupts visited A. & Co., and informed them that they were hard pressed, that they owed a large debt besides that due to A. & Co., and requested aid in arranging it. A. then went to the place of residence of the bankrupts and obtained a judgment for the amount due his firm, with the intention thus to receive the entire estate for an equal distribution among the creditors. On a motion to expunge the proof of debt of A. & Co., held, that they had reasonable cause to believe their debtors insolvent before obtaining their judgment.</p> <p>[Cited in Harris v. Hanover Nat. Bank, 15 Fed. 788.]</p> <p>2. Shipments of cotton after the insolvency to A. & Co., when they made advances at the time to the bankrupts, were not a preference, but in effect a sale of so much cotton to procure the necessary means to realize upon their assets.</p>

This case came on upon a plea to the bill, which was set down by the plaintiffs [Josiah Harrison and others] for hearing. The bill respects land lying in New Jersey. Tne plea states that the defendants [Thomas Rowan and wife] are citizens and residents of Pennsylvania; that they were served with subpoenas in this cause in that state, and not in the state of New Jersey.

This was an issue of devisavit vel non, directed, by this court, on its equity side, to try ■whether John Sinnickson did make a valid and legal will, to pass his real estate? During the trial, the following points of evidence were ruled by the court. 1.The plaintiff offered to examine one of the daughters of Mrs. Dick, (now living,) in support of the will.

The jury having found in favour of the plaintiff [Case No. 6,141], the defendant now moved the court for a re-trial of the issue upon the following grounds: (1) That the jury, before they had agreed on a verdict, ate and drank at the expense of the plaintiff in whose favour they found, without the leave of the court.

This was a suit on the equity side of the court. The bill stated that John Sinnickson, of the state of New Jersey, departed this life, leaving two children, the female defendant and one son, then and yet a lunatic, named Francis; having first duly made and published his last will and testament; whereby, amongst other things, he devised to the plaintiffs, Josiah Harrison and his successors, his real and personal estate in trust, out of the profits and interest, to raise an…

Bird, Savage and Bird, merchants of London, had been agents for the United States from the month of June, 1802, about which time they had received remittances on account of the United States, amounting to 127,171 dollars; with other sums that have been since put into their hands: and this long before the existence of any other lien produced in this cause.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] The respondents [David Stewart and George R. Vickers] were owners of the ship Charles and residents of the city of Baltimore. In the year 1819, they advertised her to be ready to receive freight for San Francisco, and that she was then loading at the port of Baltimore, and would positively sail about the 20th of February.

<p>[This was a libel in rem by Alexander T. Harrison against the schooner Susan Ludwig, her tackle, etc., to recover possession.]</p>

Bill in equity. The bill was brought by [Thomas] Harrison, as administrator of Ellen Harrison, averring himself to be a citizen of Pennsylvania, against the defendants [Richard Urann, Elisha Copeland, Jr., and John Van Buskirk], averring them all to be citizens of Massachusetts, and was founded upon certain transactions, in which Van Bus-kirk acted as trustee of Ellen Harrison, with the other defendants, Urann and Copeland, with the assent and knowledge of the plaintiff, her…

<p>Two tugs, the Harry and the May-Plower, each with a coal-boat in tow alongside, encountered one another at night on the Rari-tan river, and a collision ensued, whereby a “chunker” towed by the May-Flower was instantly sunk with her cargo. The master of the chunker libelled both tugs for the loss of his boat, the coal on board, and his personal effects.</p>

This is an action [by G. W. Harshman], against the county of Bates on a large number of coupons originally attached to bonds issued by the county court of the above named county. Held: and two-thirds of the qualified voters of the said township voting thereat voted for it.

<p>Case No. 6,149.</p> <p>Municipal Corporation- — Negligence of Servants — Ultra Vires.</p> <p>1. A municipal corporation is not liable to an Injured party, for the negligence of its mayor and its police officers, who have sufficient power and ability to preserve the peace and protect property, in not discharging the duty of protecting private property against a known violation of law.</p> <p>2. The distinction pointed out between the public, governmental duties of a municipal corporation and its private or corporate duties.</p> <p>3. A municipal corporation is not liable for the unlawful acts of its officers, committed ultra* vires, and not colore officii, in the known and -wilful violation of law.</p> <p>[Cited in Greenwood v. Town of Westport, 60 Fed. 571.]</p> <p>[Cited in Russell v. City of Tacoma (Wash.) 35 Pac. 606.]</p>

Action [by Hart, Vandyne and Patterson] on a policy of insurance, dated 3d September, 1806, on freight of brig Hannah, at and from New-York to Wilmington in North-Carolina, at and from thence to Barbadoes, with liberty to go to another British island, at and from thence to the city of St Domingo, there, and at the usual loading places on the coast, and after completing her cargo, to return to New-York.

Assumpsit upon the money counts. Plea, the general issue. At the trial, it appeared, that the defendant [Asa Gray] had been appointed, by the town council of Tiverton, guardian of the plaintiff [Hannah Hart], who was at the time a pauper of the town of Tiverton; and the defendant had, as such guardian, received the sum of $480, on account of the plaintiff, as a pensioner of the United States.

<p>Case No. 6,153.</p> <p>Wages or Seamen- — Capture op Vessel — Deduction of Salvage.</p> <p>An American ship delivered her cargo at Liverpool; and on her return to the United States, was captured by a French cruizer, recaptured by an English frigate, and restored, on payment of salvage. The libellant, a mariner, having been taken on board the French cruizer, was carried into France, and there released.— Wages for the whole voyage of the Littlejohn claimed, and allowed, deducting a proportion of salvage.</p> <p>[Cited in Bordman v. The Elizabeth, Case No. 1,657; Walton v. The Neptune. Id. 17,-135; Watson v. The Rose, Id. 17,288; Emerson v. Howland, Id. 4,441; Brown v. The Independence, Id. 2,014; Fuller v. Colby, Id. 5,149; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, Id. 15,867; The Atlantic, Id. 620; The Ocean Spray. Id. 10,412; Highland v. The Harriet C. Kerim, 41 Fed. 223.]</p>

This was a libel for wages. The libellants [George Hart and John Gilman] shipped on board the brig Otis, on the 6th September, 1836, and sailed from Philadelphia to Havana. On their arrival at the latter port, wishing to complain of the captain’s treatment of them, they were forbidden to quit the vessel. They did so, however, and went before the American consul, where the captain [Joseph L. Noble] found them.

<p>Case No. 6,154a.</p> <p>Contract — Delivery — Condition Precedent— Effect of Demurrer.</p> <p>1. Where R. covenanted to build H. a flatboat by a certain time, the latter to furnish the plank, and to be delivered at either of two places. this is a condition precedent, to be performed by H., befoie any liability arises against R.; and the averment as to the delivery of the plank must be certain and positive, as to place; otherwise the declaration will be demurrable.</p> <p>2. A demurrer puts in issue the sufficiency of all previous pleadings, and judgment will be given against him who committed the first fault.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] The libellant [Thomas Shaw], master of the schooner B. F. Reeves, chartered her to respondent [George Hart], to bring a quantity of cedar spars from Thoroughfare Island, In North river, N. C., for the round sum of one thousand dollars as freight; the cargo to be delivered by respondent within reach of the vessel’s tackles, by whom also eight feet of. water at the place of loading was…

<p>Case No. 6,156.</p> <p>Patents — Priority—Specifications—Machinery for Graduating Carpenters’ Squares.</p> <p>1. The 3d claim of reissued letters patent No. 5,40S. granted to plaintiffs as assignees of Horace K. Jones, May 13th, 1873, for improvements in machinery for graduating carpenters’ squares, which claim is for ’“the construction of the tool and socket so that the edge of the tool fits into a V-shaped recess, the angle of which is in line with the working point of the tool, substantially as and for the purpose herein described,” held, not to be anticipated by prior patents in which the V-shaped grooves were not so arranged as to take hold of the cutting edge of the tool, as it is essential to the claim that the angle of the V be in line with the working-point of the tool.</p> <p>2. Nor is the 6th claim of said patent, which is for “the clamping device for holding squares of varying tapers to be graduated, consisting of the fixed jaw P, the rocking adjustable jaw M, and the cam N, in combination, substantially as described,” anticipated by prior patents for improved hand-vices which have no relevancy to a clamp which shall uniformly hold in proper position an article to be graduated by machinery.</p> <p>3. The gist of the 5th claim of -the said patent, “In a machine for cutting graduations on squares, etc., the combination of the gravers I and their holders H with cams G and springs d, for throwing the gravers out of action at predetermined periods of time during the stroke of the same to cut graduation-marks of varying lengths, substantially as described,” is the “flying cut” as it termed in the specification, and is infringed by a machine in which there is but one graver, and in which the square is moved along by an intermittent feed, the mode of operation by which the cutting of the graduating-marks is effected being the same in both machines. Held, also, that this claim was not anticipated by a machine not having the “flying cut.”</p>

Sur bill, answer, and proofs. The bill set forth that the plaintiffs [Hartell and Letch-worth] were the original inventors of certain designs for medals, for which letters patent were granted them in November, 1874, consisting of perspective views of the Centennial Building; that the defendants are making and selling medals embodying the same designs as those described in said letters patent.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of J. Har-tel.] By JOHN K. CRAVENS, Register: . On the 25th day of July, 1872, Sarah Teed filed her deposition in proof of claim against the estate of said bankrupt, setting up a security by way of deed of trust upon certain real estate. The deposition does not state whether the real estate was the property of the bankrupt at the date of the deed of trust, or who now claims it.

<p>In error to Sevier circuit court</p> <p>At law.</p>

This suit was brought to recover back money which the plaintiffs [the Hartford & New Haven Railroad Company] alleged that the defendant [Henry A. Grant], as collector of internal revenue for the First collection district of Connecticut, had illegally exacted of them, and was submitted to the court on an agreed statement of facts. .The following were the material facts agreed upon by the parties: (1) Early in the year 1866, the plaintiffs commenced building a new bridge at…

This was a bill filed by the Hartford Fire Insurance Company of the state of Connecticut against Peter Doyle, as secretary of state, for an injunction restraining him from proceeding to revoke and recall the license or certificate of authority granted by the state to such company to transact business in this state.

In this case, which was a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy, a petition was filed on the 17th day of June, 1868.

<p>Case No. 6,163.</p> <p>Sale op Vessel by Master — Title unde it Such Sale. ’</p> <p>1. It is well settled that the sale of a ship by the master, to be sustained by a court of admiralty, must be enjoined by a policy so clear as to be equivalent to a moral necessity.</p> <p>[Cited in The Raleigh, 37 Fed. 126.)</p> <p>2. One who accepts title under a captain’s sale must see that his title is without taint or just cause of suspicion.</p> <p>3. The captain is an agent from necessity and his conduct will be closely scanned.</p> <p>4. On the question of the integrity of the sale, the captain’s evidence is vital to the claimant’s case.</p> <p>NOTE. Vide Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. [Case No. 11,949]; Pope'v. Nickerson [Id. 11,274]; The Lucinda Snow [Id. 8,591]; Scull v. Briddle [Id. 12,509]; Skrine v. The Hope [Id. 12,927]; The Tilton [Id. 14,054].</p>

[In the matter of the petition of Peter C. Hartough for an adjudication of bankruptcy against himself and James C. Hayden and William Reed, trading as P. C. Hartough & Co.]

[This was a bill in equity by Stewart Harts-horn against James E. Almy and others for the alleged infringement of reissued patent No. 2,750, granted August 27,1867. The original patent, No. 44,624, was granted to complainant October 11, 1864.]

<p>[Bill by Stewart Hartshorn against John Shorey and others for infringement of a patent.)</p>

<p>In equity. [Bill by Stewart Hartshorn against Lemon A. Tripp and Samuel M. Boyd.] This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs.</p>

[This was a libel in rem by Robert H. Hartshorn and others against 25 cases of silks, for salvage. The Mutual Insurance Company appeared as claimant.]

Ejectment [against Wright and Dill] for a saw-mill, and ten acres of land, covered with water, &c. Two of the counts were on the demise of [Pattison] Hartshorn and others, and two upon the demise of Robert Wain. Plaintiff’s Title. — A resurvey dated in 1714, to Mahlon Stacey, for 800 acres of land, lying on each side of Assanpink creek, including the mouth, where it empties itself into the Delaware.

<p>Case No. 6,170.</p> <p>Variance — Plea in Abatement — Office Judgment.</p>

Issue directed by chancery to try the question whether Hartshorne, as receiver [of Mandeville’s estate), be a creditor of the estate of Gillis, and to what amount. Moore-house & Company were indebted to Mande-ville, and gave him William Armstead & Company’s notes as collateral security. James Gillis, the bankrupt, was one of the house of Armstead & Company. Moorehouse was taken in Philadelphia, and gave Charles Young as special bail.

[This was a proceeding in admiralty by A. Hartupee against the steam tug Coal Bluff No. 2.] Thos.

The relator [J. F. Hartwell] was convicted in the circuit court of the United States of a crime, and was sentenced on 28th June, 1870, “to pay a fine of one hundred thousand dollars, and to be imprisoned and confined in our state’s jail at Lenox in the county of Berkshire in this district for the term of five years, and to stand committed till this sentence be performed.” The warrant or mit-timus was directed to the marshal and the keeper of the jail at Lenox, and commands…

<p>Case No. 6,174.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Dissolution op Partnership— Joinder in Application.</p> <p>1. Parties cannot apply jointly for a decree in bankruptcy after a dissolution of their partnership.</p> <p>2. A decree in bankruptcy cannot .be rendered against a firm on a voluntary application therefor, unless the whole of the partners unite therein.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Crockett, Case No. 3,402; Re Sheppard, Id. 12,753.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,175.</p> <p>Services and Compensation op Ship-Keeper.</p> <p>1. Services rendered in taking care of a ship in port are, under the statutes of the state, protected by a lien upon the shin, in cases where the sum of fifty dollars is due for such service.</p> <p>2. A ship-keeper, by night or day, is not obliged, without an engagement to that end, to pump the ship, wash her decks, &c. His sleeping on board nights, unless specially stipulated, does not impart a right to extra compensation therefor.</p> <p>3. -No abatement of wages will be made for occasional absence from the ship, if no objection is made thereto until the whole period of service has expired.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,176.</p> <p>Salvage — Seamen—Compensation.</p> <p>Where seamen belonging to a ship of war of the United States, were- discharged therefrom at sea, in order that they might go on board of a whaling ship, which had received damage, and was short-handed, to render assistance, and they did so, and aided in bringing her safely into port, held, that their compensation was not to be limited to the then highest rate of seamen’s wages, but that they might recover as for a salvage service.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,177.</p> <p>Attachment — National Banks — State Courts— Reoei vees — Pasties—Costs.</p> <p>1. After a circulating note of a national bank, which it had failed to redeem in lawful money, had been protested, under section 46 of the act of June 3, 1864 (13 Stat. 113), an attachment from a state court was levied on moneys of said bank on deposit in another national bank, to secure a debt from it to A. Subsequently, a receiver of the bank was appointed, under section 50 of said act. Held, that, under section 52 of said act, said levy was void.</p> <p>[Cited in Roberts v. Hill, 24 Fed. 572.]</p> <p>2. The receiver, having applied to the state court to dissolve such attachment, without becoming a party to the suit in the state court, and such motion being denied, and he having then immediately brought this suit against A., and the bank in which the moneys were on deposit, and the sheriff who levied the attachment, to assert his title to such moneys. Eeld, that he was entitled to such relief. •</p> <p>3. A. having, after process in this suit was served on the defendants, obtained a judgment in his suit in the state court, and collected it by execution against the moneys so attached, this court decreed that A. should pay directly to the plaintiff the money he had so collected, and the bank in which the moneys had been on deposit should pay such money if, and only if. it could not be collected from A.; that such bank should, pay costs to the plaintiff; that such bank should not have costs against A.; that A. should pay costs to the plaintiff; that the sheriff should not have costs against the plaintiff; that the plaintiff should recover from A. the costs of making the sheriff a party, and the costs of the sheriff’s defence, the latter costs to be paid over to the sheriff by the plaintiff, when collected; and that the bank in which the moneys had been on deposit should respond to the plaintiff for them, with interest from the time when process in this suit was served on it, subject to the said decree as to payment by A. of what he had received of such moneys.</p>

The bankrupt, W. G. Parr, a merchant at Normal, McLean county, Illinois, borrowed of the defendant, a resident of Chicago, four thousand dollars, in March, 1869, for which he gave a note payable April 1st, 1870, and a chattel mortgage on the goods in his store, purporting in terms to include such goods, wares and merchandise as the mortgagor should add to the stock during the time the debt was maturing.

Assumpsit for the breach of a special contract to transport merchandise at an agreed price, and to recover exorbitant charges exacted for the transportation of merchandise and paid by compulsion in order to obtain the same from the carrier. The case was tried upon the general issue, and the verdict was for plaintiff [William Harvey], whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial for misdirection by the court

<p>[This was an action at law by John B. Harvey against the Evansville, Cairo & Memphis Steam Packet Company.]</p>

Assumpsit for breach of a written contract by a carrier to transport lumber from Canada to the United States at a stipulated freight. Tried upon the general issue. The verdict was for plaintiff [William Harvey] for $11,000. The case is now heard upon a motion by defendant for a new trial and that the verdict be set aside because the damages assessed are excessive.

This was a bill in equity [by Mary Harvey against John Richards], in which the complainant sought from the defendant, who was administrator with the will annexed, of James Murray, alias Mowry, a discovery and distribution of the undevised estate of the testator, of whom she asserted herself to be heir at law.

<p>This was a bill in equity [by Mary Harvey] to compel the defendant [John Richards] who was administrator with the will annexed of James Murray, late of Calcutta, in the province of Bengal, deceased, to a distribution of the undevised estate of the testator in this country, among the next of kin residing here. The executors appointed by the will of the testator, resided in Calcutta, and the defendant was appointed by them an administrator for the purpose of collecting the testator’s effects here. The same parties had been heard in court, at two former terms on other points. [See Cases Nos. 6,182, 6,183.] The question that now came up was, whether the defendant should be ordered to distribute the effects in his hands among the next of kin in this country, or should send it to Calcutta to be distributed by the executors there.</p> <p>The first question is, whether this court has authority to distribute the undevised surplus among the next of kin, according to the law of the testator’s domicile? It is averred in the answer, “that this court has no authority to distribute the undevised surplus, but it ought to be transmitted to Bengal.” This principle we wholly deny. The law of the testator's domicile must be the rule; and it will be our duty to show, that this court can apply that rule. To decide this question, it may be useful to consider, whether this is substantially an original administration, or merely auxiliary to the principal one of the executors in India. If it be the former, there can be little doubt in relation to the authority of the court</p> <p>As to the facts, it is assumed, that there are no debts abroad, nor any specific trusts under the will to be executed. The testator by his will evidently intended to die intestate, as it regards this property. He says, “the property now going to America, I do not consider as belonging to any person.” And he then constitutes a mercantile partnership to be his executors. The next of kin are citizens of the United States. Now, from the decisions in England it is evident, that the appointment of an executor in India, is considered as merely constituting him an agent In Chetham v. Lord Audley, 4 Yes. 72, the lord chancellor says, “I think the appointment of an executor in India, no legacy being given to him, is the appointment of an agent for the management of the estate. They give him the character of executor.” The same doctrine is affirmed in De.Mazar v. Pybus, Id. 648, as it regards the appointment of a partnership to be executors. The place, where the will was made and proved, does not necessarily draw to the courts of that place the exclusive administration of the estate. In both these cases, although the wills were proved in India, the court of chancery in England ‘undertook to direct the settlement of the estates; and upon the principle of these cases we may safely rely, that this is, in reality, an original administration. But whether so or not, still on the grounds of public law and universal justice the complaint is well founded in asking relief from this court. A court of chancery being one of general jurisdiction, appears to be peculiarly fitted for the administration of foreign laws, when they affect property within its jurisdiction. It is a remark of Lord Kaimes (2 Pr. Eq. pp. 312-315, 318, 326; Id. b. 3, pp. 336-340, c. 8) that “it is of great importance to every nation, that justice have a free course everywhere; and to this end it is necessary, that in every country there be an extraordinary jurisdiction for foreign matters, as far as justice is concerned.” And under this title of “foreign matters,” he discusses the question as to the distribution of moveables, and lays down the position, that every question in relation to them must be determined by the judge of the place; but it must be according to the law, which governed the owner of them. Lord Hardwicke, 1 Atk. 19, asserts, that though foreigners are subject to the authority of the cotut of chancery only while in England, yet their property in England is under its control. 2 Coop. Eq. PI. pp. 123, 124. And Lord Ellenborough states, in Potter v. Brown, 5 East, 124, “that it is every day’s experience to recognize the laws of foreign countries as binding on personal property, as in the succession to personal property by will or intestacy of the subjects of foreign countries.” In conformity with this rule, a variety of decisions have taken place in Scotland and England. Bruce v. Bruce, in notes to Marsh v. Hutchinson, 2 Bos. & P. 229, is a case of distribution by the courts oi Scotland, according to the law of England. Balfour v. Scott, 6 Brown, Pari. Oas. 550 (St Distrib. 1793), was a decree of a Scotch court for distribution according to the law of England of personal estate in England; and it was affirmed in Dom. Proe. as to distribution. Hog v. Lashley, 6 Brown, Pari. Gas. 577 (St. Distrib. 1792), was the case of a Scotchman making his will in England, which was there proved. Distribution was according to the law of Scotland. Kil-patrick v. Kilpatrick, cited 6 Brown, Pari. Cas. 584 (1781), distribution by Lord Kenyon (master of the rolls) according to the law of Scotland of a legacy given by an Englishman to a Scotchman, which had not been received in the life-time of the latter. Drummond v. Drummond, 6 Brown, Pari. Gas. 601 (1799), is also a case, where the Scotch court decided on the distribution of property by the law of England, where the administration was originally granted in England. In Bempde v. Johnstone (1796) 3 Ves. 198 (The Marquis of Annandale’s Case), one of the bills filed was by Lady Graham for a distribution according to the Scotch law. The lord chancellor heard the arguments on the question of domicile, but finding it fixed in England, her bill was dismissed; and a decree according to the prayer of the other. Somerville v. Lord Somerville, 5 Ves. 791, is a case of distribution by the court of chancery, according to the Scotch law, “the •distribution arising from the place, where the property is situated.” F^om what may be gathered in the case of Bowaman v. Reeve, Finch, Prec. 577, it appears that the testator, executor, and legatee were natives of Holland, and there settled; nevertheless a bill brought by the legatee against the executor (who had proved the will in England) for a recompense out of the personal estate in lieu ■of a specific legacy taken by a creditor in Holland, was sustained by the lord chancellor. Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wms. 369, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 78, pi. 9, was a case where Tourton, a banker at Paris, made his will, and gave a legacy to one Theluson, which had been set aside in France in favor of the next of kin. The French executor being’ dead, administration with the will annexed was granted by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and a bill was brought by the mothers, who had taken administration in France on the estate of the next of kin, against the administrator with the will annexed for a discovery and account The defendants demurred, because there was no representative of the deceased Tourton in England, and the executor of the will might have left an executor. The lord chancellor said: “The administration being taken out here, I will look upon the same to be good.” But on demurrer ore tenus, because the mothers had not taken out administration to their sons in England, the bill was dismissed for want of proper parties.</p> <p>These are the cases in England. In our own country similar decisions have taken place. The case of Desesbats v. Berquier, 1 Bin. 330, was that of a will executed according to the forms of the law, where the property was, but not in conformity with the law of the testator’s domicile; and' it was held by the supreme court of Pennsylvania to be invalid. And from that case it is to be inferred, that the administrator was directed to distribute the property according to the laws of the testator’s domicile. However that may be, in the case cited in the note (Guier v. O’Daniel, Id. 349) it was expressly decreed in Pennsylvania, that distribution should be made according to the law of Delaware. In the ease of Selectmen of Boston v. Boylston, 2 Mass. 386, upon an interrogatory, as to what amount of property was received by the administrator in England, it was held, that he was not bound to answer. The counsel for the administrator in the course of their argument, to show the impropriety of accounting here, ask, how can our judges, if they undertake to distribute here, know the laws of foreign countries? Sedg-wick, J., replies, the same difficulty must arise in every administration of a foreigner’s estate originally taken here. The judge must distribute according to the laws of the intestate’s country. Thus it appears, that courts of justice will take cognizance of foreign laws affecting property within its jurisdiction, and deliver it to the party, to whom of right it appertains in cases of original administration. Still it is supposed by some mystical virtue, belonging to the species of administration, under which the defendant in this case acts, that the application of a different rule is required. That because this is an ancillary administration, the rights of the parties cannot be here established, and the court must turn a deaf ear to their application. Although this administration in form is auxiliary to the principal one, yet in substance it is not. The property here is not required for the execution of any trust confided to the executor under the will; for the testator, in relation to this property, never reposed in him. Let it, however, be considered as an ancillary administration.</p> <p>It is denied, that there is any general rule of public or municipal law, which requires that parties entitled to a foreigner’s property shall seek their rights only in the courts of his domicile. From Pipón v. Pipón, Amb. 25, and a class of cases somewhat resembling it, it will no doubt be attempted to derive such a rule. The party, who applied for the distribution of the bond debt found in London, was not entitled by the law of the intestate’s domicile, to a distributive share. That alone was sufficient to cause a dismissal of the bill. Lord Hardwieke declines going into the general question; but states his opinion, as it regards "the rule of distribution, that the property follows the person, and becomes distributable according to the law or custom of the place, where the intestate lived. This principle cannot be questioned. And his other remarks can only apply to a case, where the party having a right to the debt, ought not to call for a partial account, because the statute requires a distribution of the whole residue, &c. He however says, that that case differs from where a specific part consists of chattels here in England. The whole argument turned on the point, whether the taking out of an administration in England altered the course of descent. See Sill v. Worswick. 1 H. Bl. 690, Lord Loughborough’s opinion.</p> <p>The next case in order of time is Thome v. Watkins, 2 Ves. Sr. 35. Here the defendant was one of the executors of Richard Watkins, who resided in Scotland, died there, and left his estates among his nephews and nieces, of whom the defendant was one; and he was also administrator, and one of the next of kin of William Watkins, who was entitled to a share in Richard’s personal property, and who resided in England, and died there intestate. It was held, that William’s share in his estate should be distributed according to the law of England. Lord Hardwieke puts a case, “If a man dies here, and administration is taken out here, where ho has left personal-estate, and*he has debts abroad in France, Holland, or the plantations, which cannot be recovered abroad by virtue of the prerogative administration taken out. here, the administrator must invest himself with some right from the proper courts in that country, as administration must be from the governor of the plantation, if it arise there, which must be for form; and it is generally granted on the foundation of the administration granted here, and then it must be distributed as here.” The reason of the decision in IMpon v. Pipón, was, that, it called for a distribution of a part. Neither of these cases, and they turn upon their particular circumstances, establish the pretended rule. Still less support will it derive from the case of Burn v. Cole, Amb. 415. The marginal note, in fact, states the reverse of this proposition. “One dies, intestate having personal property in England and abroad; distribution must be according to the law of that country, where he was resident when he died.”</p> <p>The case of Jauncy v. Sealey, 1 Tern. 397, can have but little bearing .in favor of the defendant The plaintiff as administrator of T. S. deceased brought a bill for discovery. The defendant pleaded a nuncupative will made by the deceased according to the law of Naples, where he resided; by which he was appointed executor, and denied that he left any estate but what was at Naples. The court allowed the plea. No English authorities, it is believed, can be adduced, which maintain this general proposition. But it will be . said, that in this state decisions have taken place, which go to this length. The cases of Richards v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 514, and of Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 355, will be pressed unquestionably on the court, as decisive of this point. The first ease arose upon a motion for a new trial. There it was contended, that parol evidence ought not to have been admitted to give a construction to a clause in the will, under which the defendant claimed to hold the property; and if it had been properly admitted, still a legatee had no right to take a legacy without the assent of the executor. Upon the first ground, no lawyer could entertain a doubt; and on the second, as little: for no proposition is more clear, than that the bequest of a legacy transfers only an inchoate property to the legatee. Toll. Ex’rs, p. 30G. The decision of the court is stated in a very few words, and what is added by the reporter is extra-judicial. “That legatees, who claim only from the bounty of the testator, must resort to the country of the testator, where the will was originally proved, and by the laws of which his effects are to be distributed, to obtain the bounty they claim.” It does not appear however from the report, that this point was discussed. The case of Dawes v. Boylston, certainly affirms the position; and although, under the particular circumstances of the case, it may have been corre.et, yet it is limited to a claim of residuary legatees, for those were the only persons calling for the aid of the-court; and what was the residuum could be better ascertained by the prerogative court, of Canterbury, than by our courts. It is the decision of one judge only, and indeed a very respectable one; but it is apprehended, that its force is much weakened by a careful examination of the statute, and a subsequent decision of the whole court of Massachusetts. The statute provides for filing and recording wills proved out of the government; and enacts (1 St. 1785, p. 24G, c. 12) “that the judge may thereupon proceed to take bonds of the executor, or grant administration of the said testator’s estate lying in this government (with' the will annexed) and settle the said estate in the same way and manner, as by law he may or can, upon the estates of testators, whose wills may have been duly proved before him.” How this power, delegated to the judge of probate, was deemed inadequate for the purposes specified, it is difficult to imagine. To say, that these terms do not mean, what they evidently import, is rather to exercise the power of legislation, than of exposition. It is admitted by the judge, that the probate bond given here might be enforced to procure an inventory and an account from the administrators. Still to what beneficial purpose could this tend? The administrator is resident here. The process of the courts of England could not reach him; and no bond is there required of an executor or administrator with the will annexed; all that is exacted from him, is an oath to render an account. Even the bond of an administrator in England does not require him to do more; it does not afford security for the payment of the distributive shares of the next of kin. If the principle of the decision of the courts of Massachusetts be correct, the administrator might remain here with the property he has collected under the authority of our courts, and set at defiance the claims and rights of our citizens, unless these citizens were creditors. Such consequences, without doubt, led that court to qualify its decision, and to adjudge in the case of Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mass. 204, that'“if it appeared that the deceased had his home in Connecticut, they should cause the balance remaining in the hands of the administrator here to be distributed according to the laws of Connecticut, or transmitted there for distribution by their courts.” The decision, therefore, leaves the question in this state still open; and in every case, which may arise, the discretion of the court in relation to its particular circumstances, will, as it undoubtedly ought, be freely exercised.</p> <p>What principle of national justice can require our courts to send its citizens into foreign countries, there to establish those rights, which may be here ascertained? The same end can alone be effected abroad, which will be attained here. It is in effect to cause an useless expense and unnecessary delay, without any reasonable motive. 4 Mass. 324. Courts of chancery do not adopt such narrow rules for their government. In the language of the lord keeper, 2 Ch. Cas. 200, “when it can determine the matter, “it will not be an handmaid to other courts, nor beget a suit to be ended elsewhere.” And accordingly in the case of Alexander v. Alexander, 2 Ch. R. 37, where a bill was brought against an executor to discover assets and for satisfaction; and it was said for the defendant, that the plaintiff “ought not to have relief in chancery, for he had a proper remedy at law.” 1 Vern. 429. But the court being possessed of the cause, and the same being as proper for this court as at law, it was decreed to avoid a circuity of action, that the defendant should account and make the plaintiff satisfaction. If, then, in England, a party will not be turned out of a court of equity, because he can have redress in a court of law, is there not greater reason for not sending our own citizens to a foreign tribunal to vindicate their rights? Further, the administrator in this case being the agent of the executor, he ought to be considered like his principal, the trustee of the next of kin. And upon chancery principles he need not be a party;' for be who takes a trust estate, takes it subject to the trust, and is directly responsible to the cestui que trust. A trustee to another’s use made a letter of attorney to T. S. (Pollard v. Downes, 2 Ch. Cas. 121; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 6), to manage and receive the rents and profits of the trust estate, who did so, and accounted to the trustee; and now being sued by cestui que trust, insisted that the trustee, and not he, was to account; and that he, having already accounted, might be quiet as to the plaintiff, but he was decreed to account to the plaintiff. Where there was a demurrer to a bill for a legacy, Nicholson v. Sherman, 1 Ch. Cas. 57, because one of the defendants was not the executor, the court declared, that as he had got the estate, the demurrer should be overruled. The estate ought to be liable to legacies in whosesoever hands it may be found. Where there are two executors, and one is beyond the sea and the other in England, and a bill is brought against him that is in England, he having assets in his hands to answer the demand, it is held, that the other executor need not be made a party in such a case. 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 464. The rule appears to. be, that whosoever is in possession of the trust property, may be alone sued. But where the creditor, legatee, or next of kin, seeks an account against the debtor of the deceased, it cannot be done without joining the legal representative, and charging collusion. The principle is fully stated by Lord Hardwicke, in New-land v. Champion, 1 Ves. Sr. 105. The same is held in Doran v. Simpson, 4 Ves. 665.</p> <p>Thus it appears evident, that a court of chancery will dispose of property, without requiring all parties to be brought before them, who may be affected. When It is necessary, however, as in the case of Wilde v. Holtzmeyer, 5 Ves. 813, it will always afford time to parties abroad to come in and state their rights. This bill has been pending several years; the original executor has had an opportunity of becoming a party, if he chose. As he is out of the reach of the court, we could not compel him to join. What will be the consequence, should the court decree upon the principle contended for by the defendant? It appears, that M’Clintoch is not in India. If the property be remitted there, we have no redress; for the English law does not compel the executor to give security, and, according to the defendant’s rule, we have no other forum than that of Bengal to resort to. If we run a race after him in England and Ireland, through the medium of the high court of chancery; and if that court should not adopt the rule contended for- by the defendant; and if M’Clintoch should not then be bankrupt, that court will award to us nothing more than what we ask at the hands of this tribunal. Whether then this administration be considered as an original one, or merely ancillary to that of the executor; or whether this cause be regarded in relation to its own peculiar circumstances, we feel confident, that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of the court, as prayed for in the bill.</p> <p>There are two questions which arise out of this case. 1st. Is the residue of this estate to be distributed according to the law of the country, where the deceased was domiciled? 2dly. Is the administrator, appointed to collect the effects in this country, to remit the balance in his hands to the general administrator in India, or is he bound to make distribution of it here, if called upon so to do by persons rightfully entitled to it?</p> <p>The first of these questions is already well settled by authorities. 2 Hub. Praelect. lib. 1, tit. 3, § 18; Voet, Com. b. 3S, tit. 17, § 34; Bruce v. Bruce, 2 Bos. & P. 229. And the counsel for the plaintiff appear willing to concede that the law of the country, where the deceased was domiciled, is to regulate the distribution of his estate. We come then at once to the second question; and if upon this subject no precedents are to be found, the court will adopt such a rule as will prove most generally convenient.</p> <p>The interests of all who are in any way concerned in the estate of deceased persons, either as creditors, debtors, legatees or heirs, require, that such estate should be brought to a final settlement with as little delay, and as much after the manner, in which they would have been conducted by the deceased themselves, had they continued to live, as possible. This can only be effected' by appointing some one to represent the deceased, to whom authority shall be given to arrange and settle the estate; to carry into effect the engagements the deceased was under at the time of his death; to compel others to the •performance of their engagements towards him; and to distribute the remaining property among those, who have a legal title to it We find accordingly, that in all civilized eountries such persons are appointed. The representative enters into an obligation to the government under whose authority he acts, to execute the trust committed to him with fidelity and diligence; and the better to ensure this, he is called upon, at stated periods, to render an account of his doings to the proper authority, and explain the situation of the estate. How can these duties be performed with more justice to the debtors, creditors, and legatees; more beneficially to the estate; or more conveniently to all parties interested; than by having the funds collected together in one place, and put into the hands and at the disposal of one person. There will then be one general account rendered of all the estate by the same person, and the balance be distributed according to the laws, which are to regulate the distribution, in that place, where those laws are best known and most easily applied. We contend, therefore, that the administration in this country is merely ancillary to that in India. The administrator there must either come to this country himself to collect the effects here, or some person must be employed to do this for him. This state, influenced by the comity, which exists between different countries on this subject, invests the person pointed out by the original administrator with authority to collect these effects; and, in return for this indulgence, requires that the debts due to its own citizens shall be paid before these funds are withdrawn, either ratably or fully, according to the laws of that country. And it may be considered, perhaps, but reasonable, that as the administrator out of comity and favor is authorized to demand and collect the debts due from our own citizens to the estate, he should likewise be held to discharge out of the same fund such debts as are due from that estate to our citizens, although this may occasion some inconvenience and delay. But this reasoning can by no means apply to such persons, as claim from the bounty of the deceased merely; and the adoption of such a rule with regard to them, might, in some cases, become an insurmountable obstacle to the settlement of the estate. Supposing the estate of the deceased to be scattered in small portions throughout the whole of the United States, and the administrator in each state considered as an original and general administrator, liable to the demands of all the creditors, legatees, and heirs. What endless confusion would here be created! What a variety of accounts! What opportunities for fraud and embezzlement! In such case the administrator abroad, instead of calling in to himself the accounts of these numerous administrators, and collecting together the property thus dispersed, would be first obliged to render an account to each of them; and it would be necessary, too, that such an account should include in it the separate accounts of every other individual administrator; add to this, each of these administrators is to make himself acquainted with the laws of the country, in which the deceased was domiciled, in relation to this subject, and to distribute the property in his hands as that law prescribes. It seems hardly possible to conceive, how the difficulties, which would inevitably arise in such a state of things, could be surmounted at all; and if they could, It would certainly be at the expense of much time, and a great expenditure of the property. It seems to us but little consonant with justice, that such injury to the estate, and such difficulty to those who administer it, should be created by persons claiming merely from the bounty of the deceased. But we do not press the adoption of the rule, which we think the most proper and beneficial one in this case, merely on the ground of its greater convenience. We contend that it is already expressly laid down by some authorities; that it is fairly to be inferred from others; and will not be found to be contradicted by any. Whereas the rule contended for by the plaintiff is in no instance clearly recognized.</p> <p>In the cases cited by the plaintiff’s counsel, where a surplus has been distributed, it will be found, that the general administrator was before the court, and had submitted to the jurisdiction. The cases may be classed under two heads: 1st. Of applications to chancery. 2dly. Of appeals to the house of lords. Among the cases cited by the plaintiff, under the first class, are Bowaman v. Reeve, Finch, Prec. 577. Here a Dutch sub ject made his will; gave a part of his estate in charities, and the residue to his executor. The executor refused to prove the will in Holland, but proved it in England. The property given was taken for debts, and the legatees applied for relief. In this case the executor (who was a party in interest) and the property, were both in England under the jurisdiction of the court. Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wms. 360. This was a bill in chancery, brought by the administrators of the next of kin to the testator, against the administrator of the testator’s executor. The defendants demurred, because there was no representative of the testator before the court; for it did not appear that the executor .of the testator had not made a will and left an executor, in which case the administration granted to one of the defendants would have been void; and the case was decided in favor of the defendants. But there is nothing to show, that if it had been decided in favor of the plaintiffs, distribution would have been ordered in England. Kilpat-rick v. Kilpatrick, 6 Brown, Pari. Oas. 584, is a case in which the executor was before the court.</p> <p>In these cases, which come under the class of appeals, the whole case was brought before the court by the appeal. The cases found in Ambler, we think, support our position. In Burn v. Cole, Amb. 415, administration had been granted "in England, and Lord Mansfield held, that the judge in Jamaica was bound by the administration in England to grant the administration in Jamaica to the same person. So in the case cited in the note, administration had been granted to the widow in England and to the sister in Jamaica; the court of appeals reversed the administration to the sister, and held, that the widow appointed in England was entitled to the administration in Jamaica. The effect of this was to transfer the whole estate to one person. The administration in the plantation was ancillary only. Why is the administration granted to the same person in the colony as in the mother country, unless it be for the purpose of having one account only? The same reason would apply to an administration in an independent nation. Comity will effect with an independent nation, what the power of the appellate court compelled the colony to do. In Pipón v. Pipón, Amb. 25, the domicile of the deceased was in Jersey, and administration on his estate granted there. Administration was also taken out in England, for the purpose of collecting a bond debt of 5001.; the application was for a distribution of this sum according to the English law. The chancellor refused to order a distribution, because it ought to be distributed according to the laws of the deceased's domicile, in which case the plaintiffs would not be entitled; and also because this was but a part of the deceased’s estate, which remained to be distributed, and the general administrator not being before the court, the court could not direct an account of the whole. The same reason will apply for not granting the application of the plaintiff in this case. The general administrator is not before the court, .therefore the court cannot compel an account of the whole estate; and they will not grant an application for an account and distribution of a part only. In Somerville v. Lord Somerville, 5 Ves. 791, the chancellor seems very clearly to suppose, that the property was to be transferred to the place of the domicile.</p> <p>Three cases have arisen in our own state court, in two of which the rule we contend for was expressly laid down, and in the oth er it was unnecessary to consider it. In Richards v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 506, it is expressly stated, that those who claim from the bounty of the testator must resort to the country of the testator,, where the will was originally proved, and by the laws of which his effects are to be distributed. This case arose from the claim of a legatee under the will, and was very fully argued and considered. In the case of Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 337, in which, this was the principal question, the court say, that the personal effects are to be accounted for, and finally administered in the place, where the deceased was domiciled, wheresoever they may have been collected. That the administration in this country was justly entitled ancillary, in respect to the administration in the-jurisdiction of the prerogative court That the defendant had an authority to collect and pay debts, and was liable for the contracts, and duties of the testator, which were recoverable and might be efiforced within this jurisdiction; but that he was not liable in the court of probate to a decree, either off payment or of distribution, whether to a legatee or heir, upon any partial account to be-there rendered and adjusted.</p> <p>It is made a question by the plaintiff’s, counsel, whether the administration in India can be called the original or principal administration, in contradistinction to the administration in this country; and they assert, that, in England the India administrators or executors are considered as agents merely. This is so, because India is a province of Great Britain; and the Englishmen residing there usually remit their estates to England. Two sets of executors are appointed, one for England and one for India. The executor in England may then well be called the-principal, because the effects are there. The probate, which establishes the will, is the foundation of all the administrations after-wards granted.</p> <p>This argument proceeds on the ground, that no debts or legacies remain unsatisfied in% India; and that the executor there has no * beneficial, interest under the will. The case is presumed to be such, that if the plaintiff were before the proper court in Bengal, with, this bill, such court would be bound to decree distribution. It is no answer to the plaintiff, that her bill calls on the court to apply the laws of another country. Courts apply those laws in many cases. The sessions did this in Bruce v. Bruce. The master of the rolls did the same in Kilpatrick v. ICilpatrick, The court of Pennsylvania applied the law of Delaware in Guier v. O’Daniel, 1 Bin. 349. So far there can be no difficulty or doubt in the case. A decree for the plaintiff must be resisted, if it can be resisted at all, on the ground, that there being an existing administration, in loco domicilii, the effects collected elsewhere, must, in all cases, be remitted to the hands of the administrator or executor there, to be by him distributed. This is contended for as a universal rule; subject, however, to one exception, which is, that creditors here have a right to be paid here, out of the funds. Is there any such universal and inflexible rule? The plaintiff contends there is hot. The law on this subject may be considered as of modern origin. It arises from comity, and from the regard, which courts of one country pay to the private rights of the citizens or subjects of another country. But a rule, in the extent contended for, is not required by any of the reasons, in which the general doctrine or general practice is founded. The property is to be remitted, when any purpose »of substantial justice requires it. But if the rightful owner be here, why should it be sent abroad for no reason,but to send him after it? The case under discussion supposes the plaintiff entitled to this property, and that if sent to India, and she were to follow it thither, it could not be refused to her. If the fund were wanted in India for any purpose of the will; or if any person there had rights in it, or claims upon it, the case would be different. But as the fund is here, and as the plaintiff, a citizen of this country, is entitled to it; and as this court is competent to distribute it, comity cannot require from this court the compliment of deferring the cause to the jurisdiction of the court in India. This is not required by that regard to the rights of indi-yiduals, subjects of other countries, which has governed the decisions of courts in these cases. And, that regard to these rights, is the foundation, upon which courts proceed in such cases, is proved perhaps by the circumstance, that no case is mentioned, probably none exists, in which the government of one country claims property in another, as es-cheating to itself. The courts of this country would remit this property to England or to India, to answer the claims of legatees or next of kin there. But they would not remit it for the benefit of the British exchequer, if there were no legatees or next of kin.</p> <p>If, then, the question be not a technical one about the jurisdiction of the court, but of justice and private right, should it not appear, that some purpose of right or justice is to be answered by remitting the property to India? If there is no known and fixed principle, requiring the rule to be carried to the extent mentioned, the court will look to the consequences of adopting it in that extent. Many cases of inconveniences have been stated on the other side, which might happen, if the court should distribute personal property, found here, and belonging to one dying abroad. And no doubt there are cases, in which convenience, as well as justice would require the fund to be remitted. But the question is, whether this must be done, and in all cases? Or, on the other hand, whether the court may not do that, in each case, which the justice of that case shall require? A man might die in India, domiciled there, leaving the bulk of his property, and all his creditors, next of kin, and legatees, here. There may be nothing to be done in India, but collect debts due to the estate. Those may be here, who are entitled to the whole. Shall it all, nevertheless, be sent to India? If not, then there is no such universal rule as has been supposed. There are many cases, in which decisions have been made inconsistent with the existence of any such rule. One is, where persons dying abroad leave executors, both abroad and in England. The executor in England is bound to distribute what comes to his hands. He is not merely to collect the effects, and remit them to the executor acting in loco domicilii. Brooks v. Oliver, Amb. 40G, appears to be a case of this sort. So is Chetham v. Lord Audley, 4 Ves. 72. Another case is, where the will is proved in both countries. Nisbett v. Murray, 5 Ves. 149. Cooper says, “The municipal courts of this country will also, by a principle of the law of nations, in the case of strangers leaving property here, distribute that property, in the case of death, by the laws of their own country, provided such stranger is not domiciled here.” Coop. Eq. PI. 121. He makes no exception for the case of there being another administrator or executor in loco domicilii. All these cases and opinions seem to be wrong, if the law be, as stated in one of the cases relied on by the other side (Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 355); viz. that all effects and choses in action, wherever collected, must be accounted for and finally administered in the country, where the deceased had his domicile. The rule is not laid down to that extent, in any other case, or by any writer. The administration in loco domicilii may be, and in cases arising in the East and West Indies, very often is, considered as a mere agency. In Chetham v. Lord Audley, Lord Loughbor-ough says: “I think the appointment of an executor in India, no legacy being given to him, is the appointment of an agent for the management of the estate. They give them the character of executors.” In such a case, the creditors and legatees, or next of kin being in another country, the India administration should, from the nature of the ease, be considered as auxiliary to the uses of the property and the interest of those concerned. It should be accessory to that administration, which exists, where those are, who have a right to the property.</p> <p>In Jauncy v. Sealey, 1 Vern. 397, there seems to be no objection to calling the administrator loci domicilii to account to the administrator in England, provided there had been effects in England. Tourton v. Flower is to the same point These cases are incompatible with the existence of a rule, which renders the administration in loco domicilii in all cases the leading one, and treats the other as entirely subordinate. Indeed there will hardly be found to be any such rule, as that where there are two administrations on one estate, existing in different independent countries,' one must be considered in all cases as principal, and the-other as merely auxiliary and subordinate. Strictly speaking, no such relation can exist between authorities derived from different sources. Each administration is independent of the other; the power of administering issues from different and independent origins. Courts of law and equity will compel administrators, who act in an official capacity, so to act as to answer the ends of justice; and for this purpose they will, if necessary, hold an administrator in one country to be trustee of an executor or administrator in another country. But then a case must be made out, in which justice and equity require this. There may be administrations with equal claims'to be considered single and independent. Suppose a man domiciled in England, to make his will there, leaving property both there and here. He may give a legacy to a person hére, charged on the property here, and a legacy to a person in England, charged on the property there; and he may appoint executors in both countries. Should the legatee here be referred in such case to England for payment? Or suppose that there were, in such case, only the English executor, and he should come here, prove the will, and obtain the property by the aid of the laws of this country, could he not then be compelled to pay the legacy here? If we go one step further and suppose, that instead of coming with the will, he should send it, and it should be proved, and administration granted, at his request, to some one, with the will annexed, and then suppose further, that instead of a legatee applying for a legacy, the next of kin apply here for a surplus, we have the present case. A will might be made abroad, which could be only executed here. It might charge annuities or the maintenance of infants or relatives on the funds in this country, and be made payable on contingencies, which could be known and ascertained nowhere else. It might direct property to' be invested in stock here, for the purposes of the will. A testator in England, having property here, might bequeath it to charitably purposes here. Such a trust must be enforced here or nowhere; because the English court of chancery has declined to enforce the execution of a charity in favor of objects existing under a foreign government Attorney-General v. City of London, 3 Brown, Ch. 171.</p> <p>A principal case relied on by the counsel for the defendant is Pipón v. Pipón. As to that case, it may be remarked 1st. That the plaintiff there had clearly no right. 2dly. That the plaintiff did not ask for distribution according to the laws of Jersey. Lord Hardwicke seemed to think something remained to be done in Jersey. Nothing can be proved by that case, except that the succession is to be governed by the law of the domicile. It has been said, that from an expression of the master of the rolls in Somer-ville v. Lord Somerville, it may be inferred, that he would remit the funds for distribution to the court of the domicile, instead of distributing them himself. “The country,” he says, “in which the property is, would not let it go out of that, until it knew by what rule it is to be distributed.” But this expression cannot warrant the inference drawn from it And in the very cases in which it was used, the master of the rolls appears to have decreed distribution according to the laws of Scotland. In Dawes v. Boylston it is said, that creditors here are to be paid before the fund is to be remitted. This is stated without qualification, and without reference to the case of other creditors existing abroad. This exception opens a door to all the inconveniences, which have been stated, and to great injustice in many cases; because the greater part of the property might be here, while the greater amount of debts might be abroad, and the whole estate insufficient to pay all. And it is not easy to see, why the next of kin, there being no debts, have not as well founded a right to the property, as creditors, where there are debts. So also of legatees. It is not matter of favor, in courts of equity, to compel the payment of legacies, or to decree distribution; nor have they any broader discretion in such cases than in the payment of debts. It is difficult to perceive the reason, why debts are to be paid, and legacies not paid, or the surplus not distributed. By the law of England assets are to be marshalled, and judgments and bond debts are to be paid before debts by simple contract. If a simple contract creditor be found here, his debts having been contracted in India, and with reference to the laws of that country, may he obtain satisfaction out of the funds here, and leave judgment creditors and bond creditors unpaid in India? It would seem at least to be equitable, that debts contracted in India should be paid according to the laws of India, wherever the fund might be found. A general rule, that all debts asserted here, wherever contracted, should in all cases be paid out of the funds here, would seem to be as objectionable, as the supposed rule, that legatees and next of kin must, in all cases, resort to the forum of the domicile. It is possible, that the judges in Dawes v. Boylston might have felt themselves restrained by the nature of the jurisdiction, which they were exercising. They might not consider themselves as possessed of all the power of a court of equity. If there were no inconvenience of that sort, and if the merits of the case had required it, I am not able to see, why a decree might not have been made in that case in favor of the inhabitants of Boston. A conclusivo reason in favor of such decree would seem to be, that if the will of the testator could not be enforced in that particular, by the court here, it could not be enforced at all, and the testator’s object would be wholly defeated. In the subsequent case of Stevens v. Gay-lord, the same court appear not to have considered any rule established in Dawes v. Boylston. The court in that case says: “If it should appear upon due examination in our probate court, that Tilbalds had his home in Connecticut, we should cause the balance, remaining in the hands of the administrator here, to be distributed according to the laws of Connecticut, or transmitted for distribution by the administrator in Connecticut, under the decree of the court there.” This language is not consistent with the supposition, that the court had either found or made a rule, requiring a transmission of the fund in all cases. I consider, therefore, that the decisions in the supreme court of this state, taken together, have established no such rule as the defendant contends for.</p> <p>If no settled rule has been shown, by which the plaintiff must be referred to India for distribution, there is no principle of equity opposed to granting her relief here. The defendant professes to be trustee for the executors in India, and the case is such, that if the executors in India shall receive the money, they will be trustees for the plaintiff. Then why may not the plaintiff treat the defendant as her trustee, and claim the money directly from him? There is no question about sufficient parties. The executors in India have had notice of this suit, and the defendant represents them in it. A decree here will protect him against them. He has collected this fund through the assistance of the judicial tribunals of this country; and if he shall now distribute under their decree, he cannot be made further answerable to any body.</p>

This was a petition by one David Lapsley for permission to withdraw his proof of debt against Harwood, filed in this court.

[This v¡; a libel in rem by Richard S. Roberts and others against the cargo and materials of the bark Jane M. Harwood, for salvage.]

This was an action on'the case, tried by the court without a jury, and brought to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 36,603] for improvements in machinery for oiling or lubricating wool or other fibrous material, granted to William Clissold, October 7, 1862, assigned to plaintiffs [George S. Harwood and George H. Quincy] and reissued to them September 13, 1864 [No. 1,764], and again March 27, I860 [No. 2,213].

<p>Case No. 6,188.</p> <p>Promissort Notes — Assignees—Negotiability— “New York Funds.”</p> <p>1. A note executed in Michigan, payable in New York, in New York funds, or their equivalent, is not negotiable, within the statute.</p> <p>2. To bring a note within the statute it must be payable in money, and not in stocks, funds, or current paper.</p> <p>[Cited in Pry v. Rousseau, Case No. 5,141.]</p> <p>3. And it must be for a sum certain, subject to no conditions.</p> <p>4. What shall constitute New York funds, within the contract, is not clear. And ,what shall be held to be equivalent to New York funds, within the contract, is still less clear.</p> <p>[Cited in Capron v. Capron, 44 Yt. 411.]</p>

In this case, on the appearance of the bankrupt [Abraham E. Hasbrouck] before the register to whom the case was referred, he requested the register to take possession of his property, consisting of a store of goods at Lloyd, in Ulster county, set forth in the bankrupt’s schedules as of the value of $3,-336.08. The register declined to comply with the request of the bankrupt until he should be advised by the court of his duty to do so.

This was an action on the case tried before Judge Sherman and a jury, to recover damages, for the infringement of a patent [No. 42,126] for an “improvement in pumps.” granted to James Suggett, March 29, 1864, the exclusive right under which, for Montgomery county, Ohio, was assigned to plaintiff [Robert C. Haselden], The invention was entitled, by the patent, “a new and improved method of putting down and operating bored wells.” This method consisted in boring a well in the…

By the Register: I, Benjamin J. Brown, one of the registers of said court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify, that in the course of the proceedings in said matter before me, certain questions arose pertinent to the said proceedings, and were, with the facts upon which the same are based, stated and agreed to by the opposing parties, to wit: by Mar-ston and Hatch, attorneys for John Oliver, and Solomon B. Bliss, for assignee, which statement is hereto annexed; Upon the first…

<p>Case No. 6,192.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Act op June 22,1874 — Composition with Creditoks— Procedure.</p> <p>1. The amendment to the bankrupt act of June 22, 1874 [18 Stat. 178], does not require that there should be a written proposition from the bankrupt preceding the notice to creditors, to lay the foundation for their action in accepting or rejecting a composition, and to inform them what they were to be asked to accept.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Holmes, Case No. 6,632.]</p> <p>[Cited in Scott v. Olmstead, 52 "Vt. 212.]</p> <p>2. There is nothing in the mere words of the statute to require, in cases of composition, any other or different statement than is required in bankruptcy, and the most obvious course would be to make it as much like that schedule as possible.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Weber Furniture Co., Case No. 17,331.]</p> <p>[Cited in Cobbossee Nat. Bank v. Rich, 81 Me. 174, 16 Atl. 510; Home Nat. Bank v. Carpenter, 129 Mass. 5.]</p> <p>3. It is not the intention of the statute that no debtor can make a composition with his creditors, under section 17 of the amended bankrupt act, who, by reason of preference or otherwise, would not be able to obtain his discharge.</p> <p>[Followed in Re Becket, Case No. 1,210. Cited in Re Weber Furniture Co., Id. 17,330; Re Shafer, Id. 12,695.]</p>

In bankruptcy. Bill by [Thomas H. Has-kell] the ¿ssignee of a bankrupt, to restrain a judgment creditor from gaining a fraudulent preference by taking the land of the .bankrupt in execution, that had been seized thereon within four months of the bankrupt proceedings and not to perfect the lien of a valid attachment The respondent [Darwin Ingalls] by answer asserted that he was attempting to collect his debt by legal process in the usual course, and had obtained a seizure of…

[This was a bill in equity by David Has-kell' and others against the Shoe Machinery Manufacturing Company and others for an injunction and an account]

<p>Case Ho. 6,195.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Preference—Limitations.</p> <p>If an insolvent debtor conveys property to a creditor, to hold in trust to such uses as shall be designated before a certain time, in any composition between the debtor and the other creditors; but if no composition is made before that •time, then absolutely to his own use, whereby the debt is to be discharged, the limitation runs only from the time so stipulated, if no composition is made; for the title does not vest in the creditor, absolutely to his own use, until that time.</p>

The plaintiff is a judgment creditor of the Cambridge Gas Stove and Boiler Company, and files his motion for execution against certain stockholders in that company. The motion is based on section 11, c. 62, Gen. St. Mo. (1 Wag. St. p. 291, § 11).

[This was a suit by a judgment creditor against the stockholders of a manufacturing corporation to recover the amount of their unpaid subscriptions to the stock. A motion for execution had previously been denied. Case No. 6,196. Heard on demurrer to the answer.]

[This was a libel in rem by Henry Haslett and Henry Foster, partners, etc., against the barge Enterprise, etc., for repairs.]

This was a bill in chancery brought by Milas J. Hassell as administrator of Hillery M. Chaney, deceased, to recover from the defendant, Martin Basket, possession of a certificate of deposit, which had belonged to Chaney before his decease, and which the defendant claimed as donatio causa mortis.

W. Hastings, proctor in admiralty, brought a suit in the United States district court against the ship Gentoo, claiming damages for alleged ill treatment. Thé case was tried before Judge Hoffman, who delivered an opinion, and entered a decree dismissing the libel. An appeal was taken by Hr. Hastings to the circuit court, and the decree of the district court was affirmed by Judge Field.

<p>Case No. 6,201.</p> <p>Assignment for Benefit of Creditors — As-signee’s and Counsel Fees not Allowed when Fraudulent — Law of Rhode Island.</p> <p>Where an assignment, made by an insolvent debtor, was held voidable, as actually fraudulent as against creditors, and the assignee either had knowledge of the extraneous facts which rendered the assignment voidable by creditors or the means of knowing them, and was put upon inquiry, it was held, that he had no lien as against an attaching creditor, upon proceeds of the property assigned, for his services in partially executing the trusts, or for retainers paid to counsel.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Cohn, Case No. 2,966; Re Kurth, Id. 7,948.]</p> <p>[Cited in Therasson v. Hickok, 37 Vt. 456; Clark v. Sawyer, 151 Mass. 66, 23 N. E. 726.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,203.</p> <p>Banks — Personal Liability or Stockholdeks— Bills Issued in Aid of the Was of Rebel- • lion — Bona Pide Holder for Value.</p> <p>1. The stockholders of the Merchants and Planters’ Bank of Savannah, whose charter provides “that the persons and property of the stockholders shall be at all times liable, pledged and bound for the redemption of the bills and notes of the bank, at any time issued, in proportion to the number of shares that each individual may hold and possess,” are liable'as principals to redeem the bills of the bank at their face, after the bills have been presented to the bank and payment refused, although the as-signee of the bank has assets in his hands sufficient to pay the bills.</p> <p>2. Acts of the legislature of Georgia which show upon their face that they were passed in furtherance of the rebellion are void.</p> <p>3. No matter how illegal or immoral the consideration of a note or bill may be, it is valid in the hands of a bona fide holder for value, unless made absolutely void by statute. Notes, bills, or other securities issued in aid of the rebellion are valid in the hands of a bona fide holder, for value.</p> <p>[Cited in Third Nat Bank v. Harrison, 10 Fed. 247.]</p> <p>[Cited in Sondheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 77, 18 N. E. 6S7; Bank v. Portner, 46 Ohio St 385, 21 N. E. 0o-±.]</p> <p>4.The act of congress entitled “An act to admit the states of North Carolina, etc., to representation in congress,” passed June 25, 1868 [5 Stat. 73], did not attempt to reenact the constitutions of the states, but merely recognized the fact that they had been adopted by the people, and that the states were entitled to representation in congress.</p>

In equity. These suits [by Rufus Hatch against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company, John F. Tracy and others] were originally commenced in the supreme court of the state of New York. The parties plaintiff and defendant to both suits were the same, except that Edward W. Dunham was a party to the second suit, and was not a party to the first suit.

<p>Case No. 6,206.</p> <p>Execution — Supplementary Proceedings — Creditor’s Bill for Discovert — Change of Residence — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. A creditor’s bill [for discovery] is a continuation of the suit at law, as it merely seeks to obtain the fruits of the judgment, or to remove obstacles to the remedy at law.</p> <p>[Cited in Babcock v. Millard, Case No. 699. Distinguished. in Putnam v. New Albany, Id. 11,481. Cited in Arnold v. Frost, Id. 558; Re Sabin. Id. 12.195.]</p> <p>2. In such a case, a change of residence of the complainant to the state of Michigan does not oust the jurisdiction of this court.</p> <p>[Cited in Winter v. Swinburne, 8 Fed. 51; Claflin v. McDermott, 12 Fed. 376.]</p>

This was a motion, on behalf of the plaintiff [Edwin A. C. Hatch], for leave to issue execution on a judgment entered in his favor for $43,311, notwithstanding a writ of error had been sued out on the judgment, by the defendants [Thomas B. Coddington and others]. The bond on the writ of error was in the penalty of $45,000, and was executed by two sureties, each of whom justified in the sum of $90,000.

<p>[This was an action at law by Eliza Hatch, as executrix of Nathaniel Hatch, against George W. Eustis.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,208.</p> <p>Federad Courts — Jurisdiction — Effect of Prior Decree of State Courts upon the Same Matter.</p> <p>1. The fact that a suit is connected with and grows out of matters litigated in a state court, •does not prevent this court from' taking jurisdiction in the case, if otherwise within the 12th section of the act of 1789 [1 Stat. 79], for the removal of cases from the state to United States courts.</p> <p>2. A decree of the state court binds all parties before it, and this court will not reverse or alter it, but where a second suit is brought to connect other parties with the transaction and obtain a decree against them, there is no force in the objection that this is not an original proceeding, and that this court by assuming jurisdiction, would interfere with the decree of the state court.</p> <p>3. The defendants not being precluded from maintaining the main point in controversy here by anything appearing in the decree of the state court, it is within the meaning of the act a suit commenced against them.</p>

This was an action of debt on a judgment for 84,605.31 damages, and $36.03 costs of suit, recovered in the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts in September, 1810.

This was an action of ejectment to recover lands claimed by the plaintiff [Peter Hatfield], an alien and a subject of Great Britain. The plaintiff having died intestate pending the action, and letters of administration on his estate having been granted by the court of probate in Vermont, the administrator, a resident citizen of Vermont, appeared, and, the death being suggested on the record, moved for leave to enter and prosecute the action.

<p>Case No. 6,210.</p> <p>Bankrdptov — Petition — Effect of Failure of Petitioner to Appear — Dismissal.</p> <p>1.Where a petitioner in bankruptcy fails to attend before the register on the day fixed in the order of reference, he may, nevertheless, be adjudicated a bankrupt within a reasonable time thereafter.</p> <p>. 2. If he does not appear within a reasonable time, upon the fact being reported to the court by the register, the petition may be dismissed.</p>

<p>Case Ho. 6,212.</p> <p>Admikaltt — Whaling Yotage— Proportion op Profits of Discharged Seaman — Grievances— Foreign Consul.</p> <p>1.In whaling voyages, if a man who ships at home is discharged abroad for other cause than sickness, and without his own fault, he is to have the same pro rati settlement' that is provided in the articles for discharge by reason of sickness. This is not an absolute rule of law, but is adopted by this court, by analogy, and as most just and reasonable, and most consonant with the nature and purposes of the voyage. If other terms of discharge are fairly agreed upon, they are binding. If the circumstances of any particular case show the pro rata settlement to be inapplicable or unreasonable, it will not be enforced.</p> <p>[Cited in Jenks v. Cox, Case No. 7,277.]</p> <p>2. It is the duly of the master of a ship to hear complaints by inferiors against superiors, made in a reasonable manner, and to redress grievances found to exist; and he is not necessarily to sustain the superior because of his station.</p> <p>3. The discharge made in a foreign port must be before the consul, but the money settlement need not be; and the consul is not entitled to charge a commission on the amount paid, for merely witnessing the payment.</p>

This was an action [by Joshua G. Hathaway against William Roach) for a violation of a patent of the plaintiff for a two-flue stove for cooking. [Patent No. 505, granted Dec. 7,1837.] At the' trial here at this term, several rulings were made, and the cause not finished as to the testimony when the plaintiff became nonsuit.

The firm of Hathorn & Batchelor consisted of Fergus Hathorn, T. J. C. Batchelor and A. J. Reid. It was dissolved on the 13th of November, 1874, by the withdrawal of Hat-horn.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,216.</p> <p>Prize — Capture of Loyal Vessel — Restoration — Salvage.</p> <p>After condemnation of the vessel and cargo, the decree as to the vessel was opened, by consent, on the application of loyal owners of the vessel, who showed that she had been previously captured from them by a privateer of the enemy. The court ordered the vessel to be restored to such owners on payment of one-eighth of her value, as salvage, to the captors.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,217.</p> <p>Prize Commissioner — Costs — Compensation — Act op July 17, 1862.</p> <p>1. A charge by the prize commissioner, in his bill of costs, of one per cent, custody fee on the proceeds of the vessel and cargo, disallowed.</p> <p>2. The act of July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. 608, § 12), forbids the allowance to a prize commissioner in this district of any larger emolument than a salary of $3,000 a year.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,218.</p> <p>• Makitime Liens — Priorities—Adjustments.</p> <p>The relative priorities and dignities of many claims upon the same vessel asserted by libels and petitions, composed, adjusted, and settled in a careful opinion by the court.</p> <p>[Cited in The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 386; The Scotia, 35 Fed. 909.]</p>

[This was a libel for salvage, filed by Hat-trick and others against a Spanish bark, whereof Antonia Batet was claimant]

Petition of George H. French, assignee, against Deere & Co., for the recovery of money or property, alleged to have been received by them from said bankrupts, as preferred creditors, and in fraud of the bankrupt act.

[This was a libel by the bark Haugesund, Bartelson and others, claimants, against the schooner Bowdoin and the tug Cynthia, for damages caused by collision.]

[This was an action by Annie- Haugh, in her own right and as guardian of her infant son, James A. Haugh, against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to recover damages for the death of her husband, Wentworth C. Haugh, an engineer in charge of one of defendant’s trains.]

<p>Case No. 6,222.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Preference—When Void.</p> <p>1. Where a member of an insolvent firm executed a note to a creditor, payable one day after date, with a power of attorney to confess judgment, the creditor knowing the insolvency of the firm, and of the member of the firm giving the note and cognovit, and judgment was entered on the note and the property of the debtor seized on execution by the sheriff, and the debtor soon after applied for the benefit of the bankrupt law, and an assignee was appointed, held, in an action of replevin brought by the assignee in bankruptcy against the sheriff to recover possession of the property of the bankrupt, levied on to satisfy the execution. That the giving of the note by the bankrupt firm, with a cognovit to confess judgment, was a fraudulent preference of a creditor within the meaning of section 35 of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 534)].</p> <p>[Cited in Alderdice v. State Bank of Virginia, Case No. 154.]</p> <p>2. That such preference being in fraud of the act, the note, warrant of attorney, judgment, and execution were nullities, and that the title to the property levied on. vested in the assignee in bankruptcy, who had a right to its possession, to be disposed of for the equal benefit of all the creditors.</p> <p>[Cited in Graham v. Stark. Case No. 5,676; Martin v. Toof, Id. 9,167.]</p>

<p>[This was a proceeding in bankruptcy by Hill, Hardy & Whitfield against Joseph Haughton.]</p>

On the 14th day of March, 1842, Eustis & Co. attached on mesne process the goods of Rice & Boardman. At the May term of Windsor county court, in which the suit, commenced by said process, was entered, judgment was recovered by the plaintiffs. On the 23d of June, execution was taken out on said judgment and levied on the goods thus attached.

[This was a hearing on process of garnishment against W. L. Jeffries, under executions issued against Burgess, Popham & Co. on judgments obtained against them by Haust, Miller & Co. and Daniel Miller & Co.] There were judgments in these cases against the defendants, and executions in each case.

[This was a libel in admiralty against the bark Havana, William Davidson, claimant, for wages due to the libellant as master of the vessel.]

Demurrer to bill in equity. Suit brought [by James L. Haven & Co.] upon letters patent [No. 58,437], for “improvement in bedstead fastenings,” granted to John Lemmon, October 2, 180(5, assigned to complainants and reissued to them June 14,1870.

Assumpsit upon a policy of insurance upon merchandise on board of the ship Volant, from her port of lading in France, to her port of discharge in the United States. The policy was in the usual form, and the subscription of the defendant was for 1,000 dollars. The declaration contained two counts, in one of which the plaintiffs [Nathaniel Haven and another] aver a loss by capture, and in the other ask for a return of the premium. The facts were these.

[This was a petition by Joseph H. Havens, the depositor of a check for collection with the Central Bank of Brooklyn, for leave to withdraw from the assets of the bank the amount of the check collected by the bank after insolvency. A similar petition presented at a former term was denied for insufficiency of proofs. See Case No. 2,549.]

These two cases were cross libels, the one filed by J. H. Richardson, owner of the bark Scotland, against the Norwegian ship Havi-e, and the Other by Thomas Thommeseu and others, owners of the Havre, against the Scotland, to recover the damages occasioned to the two vessels by a collision between them, which took place on the night of January 20, 1860, at sea, about ten or fifteen miles southeast of Sandy Hook. Both vessels were bound to New York.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New iiork.] These were cross libels, filed in the district court, for a collision between the ship Havre and the bark Scotland. That court [Case No. 6.232] decreed that both vessels were in fault. The Havre appealed.

[This was a bill in equity by Charles L. Hawes against William W. Antisdel for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 63,-889, granted to plaintiff April 16, 1867, for an advertising hotel register. The defendant alleged that the idea patented was in common use before the date of the patent.)

<p>Case No. 6,285.</p> <p>State Statutes — Authoritative Constbuction-Obitek Dictum — Water Companies— Statute Construed.</p> <p>1. The construction by the highest court of a state of a statute of the state which does not trench upon any of the powers of the national government, or upon any right guaranteed or protected by the constitution of the United States, is authoritative and conclusive in the national courts.</p> <p>2. Where the record in an action of which the court has jurisdiction fairly presents two points, upon either of which the decision might turn, and the court fully considers and determines both, the decision of neither can be regarded as an obiter dictum, and the judgment is authoritative on both points.</p> <p>3. Under the clause of the statute of California authorizing the formation of water companies to supply cities with pure water, which requires the corporation to supply water free of charge for extinguishing fires, and other great necessities, corporations organized thereunder, after supplying certain preferred uses, are bound to the extent of their means, to furnish the cities supplied, with water free of charge, for irrigating public parks and squares, flushing sewers, and for all other municipal purposes, except for family and analogous uses.</p> <p>[Cited in Reclamation Dist. No. 108 v. Hagar, 4 Fed. 369.]</p> <p>[See note at end of ease.]</p> <p>[NOTE. From this decree the complainant appealed to the supreme court, where, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Miller, the decree of the ■circuit court was affirmed, upon the ground that the appellant had shown no standing in a court •of equity in himself to prosecute the suit. 104 U. S. 450. Conceding appellants’ construction of the company’s charter to be correct, there is nothing which forbids the corporation from dealing with the city in the manner it has done.” It was held that the directors were capable of acting more understanding^ upon the matter than a single stockholder, who did not even show to the court that any efforts had been made upon his part within the corporation itself. The injury, if any existed, was to the interests of the corporation, and that body alone had a right to suej</p>

[This was a suit by Charles L. Hawes against John L. Cook and others for the infringement of letters patent No. 03,889, granted to plaintiff April 10, 1807, for an advertising hotel register.)

[This was a bill in equity by Charles L. Hawes against William C. Gage for infringement of letters patent No. 63,889, grant•ed to plaintiff April 16, 1867, for an advertising hotel register.]

<p>Case No. 6,238.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Repairs — Contracted por bt Those in Possession.</p>

This is an action of debt on a bond for the prison limits. Among other pleas the defendants [Henry Marchant and others] have pleaded, that before Marchant, the debtor and principal obligor, was committed to jail on the execution of the plaintiffs, they promised that if he would deliver to them a negotiable promissory note, for the sum of five hundred dollars, indorsed by a third person, they would not have his body taken on that particular execution; and that afterwards. and…

In equity. Bill to foreclose a mortgage. The facts of this case were, that O. L. Mann had subscribed for $20,000 of the capital stock of the National Life Insurance Company, and gave his notes for the full amount, secured by a mortgage on his wife’s property. It appeared that she was unwilling to give the mortgage, but finally agreed to do so.

<p>This was an action [by John Hawes and others] on a policy of insurance on freight and cargo of tlie ship Golden Light, from Mira-machi to Liverpool, lost or not lost. The policy was obtained by a broker in Boston, under an order received from the owners by the telegraph, which instructed him to obtain insurance, and informed him, “the vessel sailed Wednesday last.” The broker received the despatch, dining the morning of Monday, the fifth day of December, showed it to the underwriter, and obtained the policy, which bore date that day. It appeared that the ship left the wharf at Miramachi, on Monday, the 28th of November, and was still in the river, when the despatch was sent by the owners, on the evening of the second of December, and was known to them, to be then aground at a bar, where it is not unusual for vessels of that size to take the ground when going out, and lie for a favorable wind and tide to float them over. But it also appeared that the ice usually makes in the river at about that date, that in point of fact it did make, and came down the river, and the ship was cut through and totally lost The defendants contended that there was a material misrepresentation and also a concealment of material facts, each of which avoided the policy. And to show that the facts, that the vessel was still aground, on a bar in the river, at that season, were material, the defendants’ counsel proposed to inquire of persons who were experienced in the business of insurance, whether these facts, if known to underwriters, generally, would influence the amount of the premium which would be demanded. This was objected to by the plaintiff’s counsel.</p>

[This was an action at law by Charles L. Hawes against Washburne to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent No. 63,889, granted to plaintiff April 16,1807, for an “advertising hotel-register.”]

The plaintiff is the assignee in bankruptcy of the Messrs. Sproat; the defendant is the First National Bank of Hastings. The controversy concerns the validity of a certain chattel mortgage, made by the bankrupts (under the circumstances mentioned in the opinion of the court) to the bank. '

This was an appeal from the district court In that court a bill was brought by the complainant, as assignee in bankruptcy, to set aside a mortgage made by the bankrupt to the respondent, and for an injunction to prevent proceedings under the mortgage. [Case No. 6,244.] The ground of the bill was that the mortgage is void because made in fraud of the bankrupt act.

<p>[This was an action at law by Hawkins and Davis against Samuel Thompson.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,249.</p> <p>Jurisdiction or Circuit Court — Construction of Act of 1875, and 11th Section of Judiciary Act — General Rule as to Negotiable Promissory Notes — Exception to Such Rule.</p> <p>1. The mere fact that the subject-matter of a suit has been transferred for the purpose of giving jurisdiction to this court, will not defeat jurisdiction, provided there has been a bo-na fide sale and transfer by which the transferee becomes the real owner and thereby the party to the suit.</p> <p>2. It is a general rule that suit may be maintained in the name of a person who is the holder of a negotiable promissoiy note, though he has no interest therein, provided it is brought for the benefit and by directon of the real owner.</p> <p>3.But such rule cannot be applied when the question of jurisdiction is to be determined under the act of congress in question.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,248.</p>

3 [This was a suit in equity for an injunction and an account brought against Eben Mitchell, Charles Butters, and Henry Rust, copartners under the firm-name of Mitchell, Butters & Rust, by the complainant Robert B. Hawley, assignee by mesne assignment, under date of March 19, 1870, of the extended term of letters patent No. 9,700, for certain new and useful improvements in machinery for sizing and felting hats, granted to James S. Taylor on the 3d day of May, 1853.

Sur demurrer to bill. Bill in equity, filed by Haworth against Nystrom, both citizens of Pennsylvania, averring that the defendant, who was a civil engineer, had contracted with the complainant to prepare and furnish a report upon the Philadelphia water supply, the MS. to be signed by the defendant and two associates, and to be delivered “ready for printing;” that the consideration agreed upon for such service was $600, all of which, except a balance of $6.60, had been paid…

In the matter of the bankruptcy of Jonathan Hay, of Freeport, Ill. On the petitions of Elizabeth and Ada Hay, wife and daughter of the bankrupt, for a return of an upright Steinway piano and several articles of personal property, which they claim as their private property, and which were taken under a warrant of seizure against the estate of the bankrupt.

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Ira Hay and others.]</p>

In chancery. The complainant [Alexander Hay] had purchased sundry judgments, which were all that were outstanding, against the defendant company [the Alexandria & Washington Railroad Company], which were duly recorded on the judgment docket in the proper clerk’s office designated by the laws of Virginia. These judgments were superior to a deed of trust subsequently executed upon the property of the company.

In chancery. [This was a suit, in the nature of a general creditor’s bill brought by Alexander Hay against the Alexandria and Washington Railroad Company and others.)

<p>Case No. 6,265.</p> <p>Foreign Seamen — Suits ron Wages — Consent op Foreign Consul.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Alexander Hay against the Washington & Alexandria Railroad Company for the purpose of again setting up certain judgments against the defendant, which he had previously marked cancelled, under a misapprehension .of his-rights.]

: [Appeal by Isaac Hayden from the decision of the commissioner of patents denying a patent to him for an improvement in cleaning cotton.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Texas. [This was a libel by John H. Hayden and others against the bark C. W. Cochrane and cargo.] On January 9, 1879, the bark C. W. Cochrane was lying off the bar at Galveston, in about six fathoms and a half of water, engaged in taking in a cargo of cotton from lighters. The bark was worth $70,000, and had taken aboard 2,600 bales of cotton, worth $104,000.

<p>Case No. 6,257.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Receipt op Money after Piling of Petition ano Service of Injunction-Contempt.</p> <p>1. A bankrupt, who receives' money from his debtor after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy and service on him of the usual injunction is guilty of contempt, but where he after-wards turns over to the assignee all his assets, the contempt is purged, even though he may have spent part of the money thus collected. Tlie estate loses nothing, because payments made to the bankrupt by his debtor after the filing of the petition, are invalid as against the assignee.</p> <p>2. Motion to punish the bankrupt for contempt, for violating injunction, denied.</p>

<p>Case Ho. 6,259.</p> <p>Bills and Notes — Void Instrument.</p> <p>1. Where a bank is prohibited by law from issuing any bill or note not payable on demand and without interest, under a penalty, any instrument issued in violation of the act is void.</p> <p>[Cited in Cooke v. State Nat. Bank of Boston, 52 N. Y. 103.]</p> <p>2. An acceptance of a draft is within the law.</p> <p>3. A parol bond to indemnify the person who signed such draft is void, because it is connect-; ed with a void instrument.</p> <p>4. The bond was executed in Michigan, but it related to a New York transaction, which was •void by the laws of that state, and this vitiates .the bond.</p> <p>[Cited in Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 N. Y. 26.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,260.</p> <p>Patents — Withdrawal under a Mistake — Abandonment — Disclaimer—Testimony as to Utility — Joinder op Improvements in One Pat'ENT.</p> <p>[Cited in Hussey v. Bradley, Case No. 6,-946.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 6,256.]</p>

<p>This was an action on the case, tried before Judge Sprague and a jury, which was originally brought to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 18,-742] for “improvement in long trunks for cleaning cotton,” granted to plaintiff [Isaac Hayden] December 1, 1857, and also of letters patent [No. 29,971] for “improvement in cotton cleaners,” granted to plaintiff, September 11, 1860.</p> <p>Upon the trial, the plaintiff having put these patents, marked “B” and “C” respectively, in evidence, and having introduced evidence tending to show an infringement of both, the defendants introduced, by way of defense, a copy of letters patent [No. 16,833] for machinery for cleaning and separating cotton, wool, fur, and other fibrous materials, marked “A,” also issued to the plaintiff, and bearing date March 17, 1857. It was agreed by the parties that these several letters patent were applied for in the following order:</p> <p>C, applied for December 11, 1854.</p> <p>A, “ for November 1, 1855.</p> <p>B, “ for June 15, 1857.</p> <p>Evidence was introduced on both sides, tending to show that, prior to the alleged invention or inventions of the plaintiff, cotton had been cleaned by blowing it from an opening machine, through long trunks of various lengths, from twenty to- one hundred feet long, provided with a screen or grating, sometimes consisting of wooden bars and sometimes of a plate of metal, perforated with holes half an inch wide and two inches long; that some portion of the dirt and waste fibre, as well as some of the good fibre of cotton, fell, through the openings in such screens or gratings, and descended into compartments below the screen, formed by cross partitions placed at varying distances, from three to five feet apart; but the plaintiff claimed, and offered evidence tending to show, that the improvement which he claimed effected the separation and retention of foreign substances and waste fibre more completely and successfully than the old trunks, and produced new results that had not been before produced, and thus produced the benefits and advantages set forth in his several specifications by means of the several improvements therein claimed. And thereupon the defendants requested the court to rule upon the several letters patent, A, B, and O, as follows: First, that the patent of December 1, 1837 (B), covered an elongated trunk, having partitions covered by a woven wire screen, whose crossings are filled with metal, cement, or shellac varnish, or any other varnish that will answer the purpose, such trunk to be used for the purpose of cleaning cotton, in connection with any opening and beating machine which can be made to produce either a blast or suction, with or without the aid of a fan, to assist in passing the cotton through the trunk over the screen. Second, that the patent B was inoperative and void; because the thing therein described and claimed was fully described, but not claimed, in patent A, and was, therefore, by the legal operation of patent A, surrendered to public use, if it was the invention of the plaintiff, before patent B was applied for. Third, that patent B was inoperative and void, because it described and claimed what was also embraced by the claim of patent O.</p> <p>The court, in accordance with the first prayer of the defendants’ counsel, did rule upon the construction of the said patent B as follows, namely, that the patent of December 1, 1857 (B), covered an elongated trunk, having partitions covered by a woven wire screen, whose crossings are filled with metal, cement, or shellac varnish, or any other varnish that will answer the purpose; such trunk to be used for the purpose of cleaning cotton, in connection with any opening and beating machine which can be made to produce either a blast or a suction, with or without the aid of a fan, to assist in passing the cotton through the trunk over the screen. But the court refused to rule the patent B to be inoperative and void by reason of the legal effect of the patent A. And the court further ruled, that the patent of September 11, 1860 (C), embraced what was already covered by the patent of December 1, 1857 (B), but refused to rule that patent B was inoperative and void by reason of the legal effect of patent C- And thereupon the patent C, after the evidence on both sides was closed, and before the case went to the jury, was withdrawn from the case by the plaintiff’s counsel, and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff upon the patent of December 1, 1857 (B).</p> <p>The claims of these several patents were as follows:</p> <p>Patent A, March 17,1857: “Increasing the area of the triink above the screen, or making it larger towards its rear end, by increasing its height or width, or both, as may be desirable, so that the blast of air which conveys the materials into or through the trunk will move gradually slower, so as to allow the light and fine, or such portions as are intended to be separated, time to be precipitated and pass through the screen before the air which holds them in suspension escapes from or passes out of the trunk. Second. And in combination with a trunk made gradually larger toward its rear end, as above claimed, I claim a screen of woven wire or twine arranged upon a series of partitions, as set forth.”</p> <p>Patent B, December 1,1857: “Covering the partitions of an elongated trunk or box for cleaning cotton and other fibrous substances with woven wire, having the scores formed by the weft crossing the warp of said wire screen filled with metal or cement; the whole combined in the manner and for the purposes set forth.”</p> <p>Patent C, September 11, I860: “A trunk for cleaning cotton and other substances, divided horizontally or centrally with a screen of woven wire or twine, with cells or compartments under said screen, so small as to prevent or break the current of air under said screen, substantially as described, in combination with a machine substantially such as is described in this specification, or its equivalent, for opening the cotton and blowing it through said trunk over the screen, substantially as described.”</p>

<p>Case lío. 6.261b.</p> <p>Patents — Equitt Pleading— Multifahiousness.</p> <p>[Bill for infringement of 33 claims, in 4 several patents, held demurrable for multifariousness. Hayes v. Dayton, 8 Fed. 702, followed.]</p>

<p>Case BTo. 6,261a.</p> <p>Akmt and Navy — Enlistment—Minor—Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>Enlistment in the naval service of the United States of a person twenty years of age without the consent of his parents is invalid, and his discharge will be ordered, upon habeas corpus proceedings, on refunding the advance made at the time of enlistment.</p>

In admiralty. This case arose upon a libel for wages and damages, allowed by the court upon the certificate of the British consul being filed, that there was, in his belief, sufficient cause for such process. The facts were, briefly stated, as follows: — Libellant was a British seaman, shipped in Great Britain for the round voyage to- Philadelphia and back to a port in Europe.

<p>Case No. 6,263.</p> <p>Admiralty — Appeal to Circuit Court — Security for Costs — Funds Belonging to Case.</p> <p>1. An appeal from a decree of the district court in admiralty to this court is not regular unless the appellant gives sufficient security to-answer the costs in case of affirmance.</p> <p>2. Such security is necessary to the regularity of the appeal, even though execution has been, issued on the decree in the district court, in the absence of the security required to operate as a. supersedeas.</p> <p>3. An appeal to this court from the districa court, when regular, brings with it into this court all the funds, if any, belonging to the case; and, in case of an appeal from this court to the supreme court, the funds still remain in. this court.</p>

<p>, [In bankruptcy. In the matter of David Haynes.]</p>

Debt on a promissory note for 214 dollars. Payments indorsed on the note, before the suit was brought, reduced the sum due on the note to eight dollars and ninety-four cents. The verdict was for the debt in the declaration, to be discharged on the payment of eight dollars and ninety-four cents. contended that a nonsuit ought to be entered, under Act Va. Dec. 3, 1792, p. 90, § 38. contended that this • cause could not have been heard on a petition in Virginia.

This was an action on the case tried before Judge Leavitt and a jury.

This was a motion for a rule to show cause why an exoneretur should not be entered upon the bail-piece. The defendant [James J. Wilkinson] had been discharged under the insolvent law of this state, enacted November, 1805, by the court of Calvert county, in May, 1808. The present action was instituted in the year 1806 by the plaintiff [Amos Hayton], a British subject, and residing in England. He was not returned by the defendant as a creditor.

Briefly stated, the material facts alleged in the bill are that the complainant [Charles L. Hayward] at the times mentioned in the record, borrowed of the respondents [the Eliot National Bank] the… Held: in fact, or were chargeable in law as holding, nine hundred shares of the capital stock of said 'new company for the complainant, and as collateral security for the payment of any balance due from him on account of said transactions.

The plaintiff [E. W. Hazard], on the 29th of June, 1860, was at Kewanee, a station on defendant’s railway, and purchased a passage ticket for Galesburg, where he then resided, and took passage in a freight train, which had, what is termed, a way or caboose car attached. The train consisted of twelve to ‘fifteen cars. The way car was in mqst respects like a freight car, with doors on each side. It had also a door at each end, and a platform with steps.

[This was an action at law by E. W. Hazard against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company to recover for injuries sustained through the negligence of defendant’s agents while a passenger on defendant’s railway train.]

<p>Case No. 6,278.</p> <p>Jail Bond — Escape—Lunatic—Liability op Surety.</p> <p>1. The condition of a bond that a prisoner “shall faithfully and absolutely remain within the limits of the jail, and not depart therefrom,’’ &c. is not broken by the escape of the prisoner, while in a state of insanity.</p> <p>2. The liability of the sureties for an escape is not coextensive with that of the sheriff. As it regards the latter, a prisoner on the limits is supposed to be in his immediate custody, and the escape of- an insane prisoner, therefore, as ■much a negligent escape as any other; and he is not allowed to excuse himself where he might so easily collude or be imposed upon. But there is no analogy in these respects between a sheriff and the sureties.</p> <p>[Cited in Taintor v. Taylor, 36 Conn. 248.]</p>

Bill in equity for the settlement of the accounts of an asserted partnership between the plaintiff [Thomas R. Hazard] and the defendant [Benjamin Hazard], and for a decree for payment of thé balance due to the plaintiff, &e. The answer denied the partnership, and stated expressly, that no partnership was intended between the parties; but that the defendant was, by an informal written instrument, annexed to the bill, and which was admitted to be the true agreement between the…

This was a libel in admiralty, originally brought against the other owners of a whaling bark by the libellant, who was himself one of the owners as well as master, to recover his lay, an alleged balance due on the disbursement account, and commissions on sale of slops. The respondent demurred to the jurisdiction of the court The demurrer was sustained as to so much of the claim as related to disbursements and-commissions, and overruled as to the matter of' the lay.

Case for obstruction to a mill and flowing back the water by means of a dam across the water-course lower down the stream (called Sauhatucket river) and thereby stopping the •operation of the plaintiff’s mill. Plea not guilty. At the trial, the facts appeared to be in substance as follows: The mill in question, which for the sake of distinction may be called the upper or Niles’s mill, was owned by one Ebenezer Niles in 1735, and sold by him in that year to Daniel M’Loone.

•Assumpsit on a policy of insurance, dated 26th December, 1827, whereby the defendants caused to be assured Josiah Bradiee & (3o., for Thomas Hazard, Junior, of New York, fifteen thousand dollars on the ship Dawn, and outfits, at and from New York to the Pacific Ocean and elsewhere, on a whaling voyage, during her stay and fishing, and until her return to New York, or port of discharge in the United States, with liberty, &c. The declaration contained various counts, stating…

Petition for review in bankruptcy. On July 25, 1877, Edgell, Chamberlain, & Co. filed a creditor’s petition in bankruptcy against James Hazens, alleging that they were creditors of bis in the sum of $10,608.25, that he had committed aets of bankruptcy, and praying that he be.adjudged a bankrupt.

Petition in the nature of a bill in equity, supported by affidavits, by which it appeared that in July. 1866, the petitioner [H. L. Hazle-ton) was arrested in St Johns, New Brunswick, for a debt alleged to be due the respondent, [L. Valentine], both being then and now citizens of Massachusetts; that he gave special bail to the action, and that judgment was afterwards recovered against him for a very considerable sum, and a capias issued, on which the sheriff made due…

[This was a libel by Hiram K. Hazlett and; others against Peter Conrad.] The case was one of collision between an ascending and descending steamer on the Ohio river. Respondents appeal from the decree, which found both steamers to be in fault, and divided the damages, and insist that the libellants’ boat was solely to blame.

The bill, originally filed in common pleas No. 2 of Philadelphia, in 1875, by Hazzard, on his own behalf and that of all other stockholders of the Credit Mobilier who might join, set forth that the Credit Mobilier had had large transactions with the Union Pacific R. R. Co.; that in 1868 the latter was indebted to the former in about $2,000,000; that on August 4, 1869, a note for that amount payable on demand was given by the railroad to the Credit Mobilier; that the noté…

This was a libel in rem, by Oroondates Mauran and others, the master and owners of the steamboat Samson, against the schooner H. B. Foster, to recover compensation for salvage services rendered to that vessel. I. The libellants have not established a case which entitles them to any extraordinary compensation for their services.

<p>Case No. 6,291.</p> <p>Hike of Vessel on Shakes — Liabilitt of Vessel for Supplies and Repairs.</p> <p>1. In a contract for the hire of a vessel on shares, that is, the hirer to victual, map, have the control of the vessel, and pay over to the proprietors a certain proportion of the net earnings as charter or hire, the general owners are not responsible for supplies or repairs furnished in a foreign port.</p> <p>2. But the vessel is liable whether the hirer navigate her himself or employ another master.</p> <p>8. Every person who furnishes such supplies or repairs to a foreign vessel is, by the maritime law, considered as contracting with the vessel herself as a principal debtor, as well as with the master and owners.</p> <p>[Cited in The Queen of the Pacific, 61 Fed. 215, 216.]</p> <p>4. The natural and legal presumption in such a case is that the creditor looks to the vessel as one of his securities, because no person is ever presumed without proof to renounce any of the securities provided for him by law.</p> <p>[Cited in The Illinois. Case No. 7,005; South-ard v. Brady, 36 Fed. 561.]</p>

This was a motion for a new trial, the case having been tried by the court without a jury, and the issues found for plaintiff [James Head]. The suit was brought on a guaranty by the defendant, Harley Green, upon a note for $500, made by A. King & Co., to plaintiff,' dated July 18,1867, payable on^ demand, with interest at ten per cent, and on which there was an indorsement of $100, paid January 30, 1869.

<p>Case No. 6,293.</p> <p>Trustees — Liabilities — Confederate Bonds — Non-Resident Beneficiaries — Confederate Currency.</p> <p>1. It being agreed that the most prudent and ■careful business men were in the constant habit of making investments in Confederate bonds, it would seem unreasonable to call in question the good faith or prudence of the administrator who does likewise.</p> <p>2. Especially is this so when such investment by an administrator is sanctioned by the state ■court. Even if there had been no such decision, this court will not say that the administrator •ought to be charged, if the investment were free from objection on other grounds.</p> <p>3. It would seem, however, that where a trustee held funds in the Confederacy, for the benefit of parties within and adhering to the United States, that an investment of such funds in 'Confederate bonds will not exonerate such trustee from accounting for the value of the funds Invested, to his non-resident cestui que trustees.</p> <p>4. Dealing in Confederate currency which was imposed on the community by irresistible force is essentially different from an actual advance •of money to the Confederacy itself. In this case there was an investment of trust funds, •entirely voluntary on the part of the administrator, on a loan to the Confederate government, to aid it in its efforts to dismember the Union.</p> <p>5. This administrator paid his trust fund actually into the treasury of the Confederate States, and received directly from the treasurer a Confederate bond for the amount so paid in. :Such an investment can not receive the sanction of a court of the United States. It is inoperative as a discharge from responsibility.</p>

<p>[This was a libel by John Healey, a seaman, against William Martin, master of the ship Hamilton, for personal injuries while in the service of the ship.]</p>

<p>[This was an action of ejectment by Healy & Whitney against Marcellus Mothershed and J. J. Allen.]</p>

Rule to remand cause to state court This was an action of assumpsit originally brought in the common pleas of Philadelphia by ■ Healy against the Jefferson Oil Company, both plaintiff and defendant being citizens of Pennsylvania. The declarations consisted of the common counts only, the damages claimed being $5,000.

<p>[This was an action -tíí assumpsit brought on a contract Of marine insurance by George Hearn against the Equitable Safety Insurance Company.]</p>

<p>This was a cause of subtraction of wages, promoted by the chief mate of the ship Columbia, of Salem, against the owners, one of whom was also the master. The voyage was from Boston to San Francisco, and thence to Calcutta, and back to the United States. The libellant left the vessel in San Francisco, and claimed wages to the time of leaving. The shipping articles contained this clause: 4‘With an .express condition, that if any of the crew desert, or leave the -ship, at California, or Calcutta, without a written discharge from the master, they shall forfeit all wages due them.” ' ■</p>

<p>Case No. 6,300.</p> <p>Courts or Equity — Power to Reform Policy of Insurance — Settled Form op Charter — Underwriters — Representations — Warranties.</p> <p>1. Courts of equity possess the power to correct mistakes in policies of insurance, even to the extent of changing the most material clauses; but the power should be exercised with great caution, and only when the proof is entirely satisfactory.</p> <p>2. Where an instrument is intended to carry into effect an agreement, whether in writing or by parol, but by mistake of the draftsman, either of law or fact, does not fulfil, or violates, the manifest intention of the parties, equity will correct the mistake so as to produce conformity of the instrument to the agreement.</p> <p>3. When there is a settled form of charter in a particular trade, underwriters are bound to know the customary stipulations of a charter in that trade, and when informed by an applicant that the vessel is chartered in such trade, the contract of insurance must be considered to be made with the understanding that the. charter is framed in the usual way, unless the correspondence leads to a different conclusion.</p> <p>4. In their letter of acceptance of the proposed insurance, the underwriters said that it was worth something to cover the risk at the port of loading. Edd, this implied that it was not to be the same as the port of discharge, and knowing that the outward cargo was coal, the underwriters were bound to know that charters for. such voyages usually contained a stipulation allowing a second port for loading the return cargo.</p> <p>5. Equity will reform a policy not containing such a permission when, as in this case, the antecedent correspondence of the parties showed that the complainant intended to secure such protection, and that the respondent knew such to be his understanding.</p> <p>6. When the contract is agreed to, whatever it, by fair interpretation, includes, the underwriters are bound to insert in the policy, and if they omit to do so, the insured has a right to insist upon strict conformity to the original agreement.</p> <p>7. A misrepresentation in insurance is a false representation of a material fact by one of the parties to the other, tending directly to induce such other to enter into the contract, or to do so on less favorable terms to himself, when without the misrepresentation such other party might not have entered into the contract at all, or done so on different terms.</p> <p>8. Applicant’s, letters to the underwriters stated that the vessel would take, on her outward voyage, her register tonnage of coal, but she did carry more than that quantity. Edd, not a material misrepresentation. 1. Because the letters, when properly construed, did not amount to a representation that the cargo did not exceed that amount. 2. Because the representation was not material to the risk, she was not overloaded, nor was the voyage prolonged or risk increased thereby. 3. Because the representation had no effect in determining the underwriters whether to insure or not.</p> <p>9. Representations are collateral and incidental to the contract of insurance; warranties are stipulations forming part of it, and are construed as conditions.</p> <p>10. Extraneous statements, not introduced into the policy, are regarded as collateral to the contract, unless expressly referred to in the same. If so referred to, they acquire the character of warranties.</p> <p>11. When a provision was made in a policy to indemnify the respondents, if the cargo of coal exceeded the registered tonnage, and where it was clear that the insurers did not regard the applicant’s statement, as to quantity, as founded on positive knowledge. Edd, that the stipulation, “outward cargo of coal not to exceed registered tonnage,” was not a material misrepresentation.</p> <p>12. Policy reformed to agree with the correspondence of the parties.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. An appeal was then taken by the insurance company to the supreme court, where the decree was affirmed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Swayne, who said that “the clear terms of the preliminary agreement warranted the court below in overruling the departure from it found in the policy.” 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 494. See, also, Id. 488, and Cases Nos. 6,299, 6,301, and 6,302.]</p>

<p>[This was an action of assumpsit by G.eorge Hearn against the New England Mutual Marine Insurance Company.]</p>

<p>This was a bill in equity [by George Hearn], to reform a policy of insurance. A prior action of assumpsit was brought on the policy, in which judgment was entered for the defendants. [Case No. 6,301:]</p>

[This was a suit by Eugene A. Heath against Theodore P. Austin. The suit was originally brought in a court of the state of New York, and was removed to this court by the defendant, Theodore P. Austin. Plaintiff moves to remand.]

<p>Case No. 6,306.</p> <p>Private Corporation — Rig hts • op. Stock holder —Issuance of Shares — Ultra Vires — Demurrer to Bill — :-Parties—Amendment.</p> <p>1. The cases reviewed, on the question as to when a stockholder in a private corporation will be allowed to file a bill in his own name, on behalf of himself and all others standing in 'the same situation, making the corporation a party defendant, to compel the ministerial officers of the corporation to account for breach of official duty or misapplication of corporate funds.</p> <p>[Cited in Hardon v. Newton, Case No. 6,054; Ranger v. Champion Cotton-Press Co., 52 Fed. 615.J</p> <p>[Cited in Bulkley v: Big Muddy Iron Co., -77 Mo. 106; BrinekerhofE v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 5G, 60; Byers v. Rollins, 13 Colo. 22, .21 Pac. 896.]</p> <p>2. Where the bill sets out acts ultra vires, in issuing shares of stock, and .breaches.of trust, which are frauds on the stockholders, inasmuch as such acts and breaches of trust are beyond the power of the corporation to affirm or sanction, it is not necessary that the stockholder, .should aver that he’has applied to the corporation or its board of directors to bring the suit, and that they have refused.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Union Pac. R. Co., Case No. 16,598.]</p> <p>3. If a demurrer to a bill in equity covers-the whole bill, when it'is good to a .part only, it will be overruled.</p> <p>4. Where the corporation is under the control of the defendants who must be sued, and an excuse is given for the bringing of the suit by the stockholder, which is equivalent to a refusal by the directors, .on request, to bring the suit, the suit may be brought by the stockholder, without showing such request and refusal.</p> <p>5. A person not a stockholder cannot be joined as plaintiff, in such a bill, with persons who are stockholders, and, if the suit is a joint one, his want of interest is a good ground of demurrer to the whole bill.</p> <p>[Cited in Brown v. Duluth. M. & N. Ry. Co., 53 Fed. 894.]</p> <p>6. A person who has no shares- standing in his name on the books of the corporation, is not a stockholder, although he holds certificates of stock issued to other persons by the corporation, with powers of attorney authorizing the transfer of such shares to him. executed by the persons in whose names the shares stand registered on the books of the corporation, and although the corporation has, on demand, wrongfully refused to allow such transfer to be made; to him.</p> <p>7. If several trustees are all of them implicated in a common breach of trust, for which the cestui que trust seeks relief in .equity, he may ;bring his suit against all of them, or against any of them separately, at his election, the .tort being treated .as several as well as joint.</p> <p>[Cited in Trustees of Mutual Building Fund v. Bosseiux, 3 Fed. 836; Boyd v. Gill, 19 Fed. 146; Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co.. 20 Fed. 582; Wall v. Thomas, 41 Fed. 621.]</p> <p>8. The same doctrine applies to any wrongdoer who is confederated with a fraudulent trustee.</p> <p>9. A general demurrer to the whole of a bill cannot be sustained as a demurrer to relief prayed in respect of persons-who-are not made parties to the bill.</p> <p>10. It is not necessary-that the directors of the corporation should be made parties to the bill, although the bill prays for an injunction against the corporation, and for a receiver of the corporation, if no relief is asked as against such directors.</p> <p>11. If the plaintiff waives an answer on oath, the defendant has a right to answer on • oath, notwithstanding such waiver, and the tender of the waiver is no ground of demurrer to the'bill. If the tender is not accepted, the defendant is still bound to .answer the .bill, -either .without oath or on oath.</p> <p>[Cited in Amory v. Lawrence, Case'No. 336.]</p> <p>12. The bill, in this ease, was allowed ‘to 'be-amended by striking out the name of a-person improperly joined .as plaintiff.</p> <p>[NOTE. The defendants having brought a cross bill, moved that the subpoena to ¿ppear and answer might be directed to be served on the solicitors of the plaintiffs, the latter being out of the jurisdiction. The motion was denied. Case No. 6,307. In Case No. 4,513 a motion was granted for an attachment against Jay Gould, the president of the defendant company, for contempt of court in refusing to produce certain books and documents. In Case No. 4,514 sundry questions in a petition for relief for stock abstracted by Jay Gould were answered by the court, and a motion by the company to open a default taken was denied. In Case No. 4,515 a petition by Jay Gould to take proof of the title to said stock was denied, and an order for the suspension of the delivery of. certain shares to Heath and Raphael was var eated. In Case Wo. 4,516 the commission of the master was fixed by the court.]</p>

<p>' [Motion by complainant, the Erie Railway Company, that the subpoena to appear and answer to a cross bill filed by It against John Benjamin Heath and seven others (who were complainants in a bill filed in Case No. 6,306) might be directed to be served upon their solicitors, the proper parties being aliens, and out of the jurisdiction.]</p>

This was an application by the complainant for an injunction to restrain the defendant from using the name “Kathairon” for a compound for toilet purposes, manufactured and vended by both parties.

In equity. This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs, of a suit [by Charles W. S. Heaton and William H. Webb against George W. Quintard and others] founded on letters patent [No. 38,206], of the United States granted April 14th, 1863, to the plaintiff Heaton, for a “system of defensive armor for marine and land batteries.” Such system was described in the specification of the patent as consisting of iron armor plates laid in the usual way against the longitudinal or…

Mr. Thomas P. Fenlon, an attorney of this court,' presented the petition of Samuel Heb-ard for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was charged with larceny, committed in 1877, on the military reservation of Fort Leavenworth, and was held to answer by a commissioner of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, and committed for want of bail.

[This was an appeal by Alonzo Hebbard from the refusal of the commissioner to grant him a patent for a water-cooling pitcher. The patent was issued to Hebbard in accordance with this decision, November 3, 1857,— No. 18,546.]

■ This was an action of assumpsit in several counts, describing the plaintiff as a citizen of New York, and the defendant as a citizen of Massachusetts. One was a special count in the usual form, as indorsee of a promissory note given to Thwing & Co., or order, and by them indorsed to hfm, without any averments as to their residence.

<p>Case No. 6,317.</p> <p>Collision — Tow.</p> <p>Where a tow is under the exclusive command and direction of the master of a steam-tug which is towing her, her owners are not liable for damages caused by a collision occurring through mismanagement in the navigation of the tug.</p> <p>[Cited in The Atlas, Case No. 633; The Bel-knap, Id. 1,244.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. From this decree the claimants of the tug appealed to the supreme court, and the libellants also appealed from so much of the decree as pronounced the ship not liable. The opinion of the court was delivered'by Mr: Justice Clifford (24 How. [65 U. S.] 110), in which he held that whenever the tug, under the charge of her own master and crew, and in the usual and ordinary course of such an employment, undertakes to transport another vessel, which, for the time being, has neither her master nor crew on board, from one point to another, over waters where such accessory motive power is necessarily or usually employed, she must be held responsible for the proper navigation of both vessels. By their employment the master and crew of the tug do not necessarily become the agents of the owners of the tow; they are still responsible to the owners of the tug. The decree of the circuit court was affirmed.]</p>

Bill for infringement of patent of March 7th, 1876, reissue No. 6,982, for improvement in ferrotype plates and ferrotypes. Claim 1. A ferrotype plate covered by a coating composed of linseed oil and India red, substantially as and for the purpose set forth. 2. A ferrotype when taken upon a reddish brown or chocolate colored plate prepared substantially as described. Infringement of 1st claim was proved, and the question was whether the patent is void for want of nov- ■ elty.

<p>Case No. 6,319.</p> <p>Titee Under Statutes of Limitation.</p> <p>Where a party claims land under the Illinois, limitation laws, he must deduce a title directly from a specified source, and by a chain, each link of which is a genuine conveyance.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of P. H. Heffron.]</p>

The amount of debt which the holders of certain bills of exchange should prove against the estate of the bankrupt was submitted to the court upon agreed facts. Hei-delback, Frank, & Co., of New York, hold two similar bills, of one of which the following is a copy: “£2,500. Boston, May 6, 1875.

<p>Case No. 6,323.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Fugitive from Justice.</p> <p>1. Under the treaty between Great Britain and the United States, of 1842, for the reciprocal rendition of fugitive criminals, the act of congress passed August 12, 1848 [9 Stat. 302], and the opinion in Case of Kaine, 14 How. [55 U. S.] 145, held, that the requisition had been properly made through the executive of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Henrich, Case No. 6,369. Approved in Re Stupp, Id. 13,563.]</p> <p>2. That the documentary evidence, before the United States commissioner, of the prisoner having committed the offence charged, was sufficient. both in form and substance, to warrant the commissioner's commitment of the fugitive for extradition.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Macdonnell, Case No. S,772.]</p>

In equity. This was an application for a provisional injunction. The plaintiff [William Heine], by profession an artist, accompanied the late expedition to Japan and the China seas, which was fitted out by the government of the United States, and was under the command of Commodore Perry, of the United States navy. He was' shipped as a master’s mate, and served as such, on board of one of the public ships which accompanied the expedition.

[This was a bill in equity by Amand Heine, Michael Heine, Hippolite Piquet, and A. Tattet, bondholders, against the board of levee commissioners for the levee district parishes of Madison and Carroll. Heard on demurrer to the bill.]

[This was an action by Rochus Heinrich against John Luther for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 1.092, granted to the plaintiff, February 27, 1839.]

[This was a libel in rem by . Edgar Caste and others against the cargo and materials of the ship Helen E. Booker, for salvage.]

<p>Case No. 6,331.</p> <p>Collision in Chesapeake Bat — Sailing Vessels Crossing — Evidence—Pleading.</p> <p>1. Two schooners, the H. and the M., came in collision at night in Chesapeake Bay. The M. alleged that the wind was east-northeast and she was sailing south; that she saw both lights of the H. a little to windward of her course, coming up the bay, heading north, and close-hauled; that the M. ported, but the H.. instead of keeping her course, as she was bound to do. starboarded and caused the collision. The H. alleged that the wind was north-northeast, and that she was heading northwest by north half north, close-hauled, and that the M. was coming down about south, on a course which would have carried her astern of the H., but she ported and caused the collision, and that the H. kept her course, as she was bound to do, till the collision was inevitable, when she ported, in order to ease the blow: Held, that the evidence from the H., that she was close-hauled, and as to her course by compass, was more reliable than that of the M„ which was sailing free in any event.</p> <p>2. The M. mistook the course of the H.</p> <p>3. The courses of the vessels were crossing, and the case fell under the 12th and 18th rules, and the M. was bound to keep out of the way, and the H. was bound to keep her course.</p> <p>4. On the pleadings, the M. could not claim that the H. was in fault for not porting.</p> <p>5. The M. was responsible for the collision.</p> <p>C. Whether, if the vessels had been meeting end on, or nearly so, the case would have been one requiring the H. to port her helm, quaere.</p>

Libel in rem by the master and cook of a porgy steamer to recover their wages and the wages of the cook’s son, who served at all-work aboard the vessel. The master was to serve during the fishing season for $600, and the cook for $60 per month, and the minor for $20 per month.

This was an action brought by the owners of the ship J. F. Chapman against the ship Helen R. Cooper and the tug R. L. Mabey, to recover the sum of $1S,500 damages caused by a collision which occurred in the harbor of New York, on the 17th of January, 1S66. At the time of the accident, the Chapman was moored at pier 45 in the East river, inside the pier, and while there was run into by the Cooper, then being towed to sea by the Mabey, at the end of a hawser.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of New York.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,385.</p> <p>Decree in Admiralty — Order op Execution against Two Vessels — Suretyship.</p> <p>A libellant, in a suit in admiralty, had a decree against two vessels, for damages, which contained no provision for an apportionment of the damages between the two vessels, or otherwise settling the equities between their claimants. After decree, it being shown that the claimant of one vessel, and his sureties, stood in the relation of sureties for the claimant of the other vessel and his sureties, and that the latter had assumed the litigation and agreed to indemnify the former, the court, on the application of the former, made an order that the libellant first issue execution against the latter, and that proceedings against the former be stayed until the return of such execution.</p>

The bankrupt, a- merchant, being insolvent and knowing his insolvency, was sued in August, 1870, by Van Steenwyk, his banker, and by Hendrickson, his father-in-law, by the service of a summons only, in the state court, for amounts exceeding the value of his property, and shortly afterwards was sued by Levi Feigel, another creditor. No papers were filed in the cases until the day before judgments were entered, in November following.

Heilman & Cahn, partners, sued Holladay for $10.114, for gold dust of that value, lost while being transported on the defendant’s stages. The circumstances, as detailed in the petition, were, briefly stated, these: The defendant was the proprietor of a line of stages and of a treasure express, running from Great Salt Lake in Utah via Denver in Colorado, to Omaha in Nebraska.

<p>Case No. 6,341.</p> <p>Tax ox Legacies.</p> <p>Under the provisions of sections 124 and 125 of the act of June 30, 1804 (13 Stat. 285-287), as amended by section 9 of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 140), in relation to a tax on lega-cíes and distributive shares of personal property, the tax on a pecuniary legacy accrues on the death of the testator, though not payable until the legatee becomes entitled to the benefit of the legacy. Therefore, where a testator died in 1869, leaving a will making pecuniary legacies, arising out of personal property, but the legatees did not become entitled to the benefit of the legacies until 1875, it was held, that the executor became liable at the latter date to pay the tax on the legacies, although the tax on legacies was. repealed by section 3 of the act of .Tuly 14. 3870 (16 Stat. 256), from and after October 1, 1870, the liability of such executor being preserved by section 17 of said act of 1870.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of F. L. Hellmar.] Exceptions by assignee to marshal’s bill of fees.</p>

Assumpsit for $466.25, for work and labor as overseer, gardener, carpenter, &c. Plea, non assumpsit and set-off, and account in bar, consisting of cash payments, and cash received for vegetables sold, &c. Verdict for plaintiff, for $23.12. moved for a non-suit, because the damages found are below the jurisdiction of this court and cited Maitland v. McDearman, 1 Va.

<p>Case No. 6,346.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Penalty—Goods not on Manifest.</p> <p>A steamship arrived in the port of New York from England. Certain articles subject to duty were found on board of her after her arrival, concealed in the purser’s room and in the ship’s storeroom, which had been brought in her from England, and which were not entered on the ship’s manifest. The master of the vessel testified that he made up the manifest; that he had no knowledge or information, at any time, that the goods were in the vessel; and that he took all precautions in his power to prevent smuggling. A libel was filed against the ship and the master to recover the value of the goods, but the suit was discontinued against the master: Held, that under the 23d and 24th sections of the act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 644), and the 8th section of the act of July 18, 1866 (14 Stat. 180), the vessel had incurred a penalty to the amount of the value of the goods, which could be enforced against the vessel, even though it had not been enforced against the master; and that the facts stated by the master did not bring the case within the proviso in the 24th section of the act of 1799.</p> <p>[Cited in The Sidonian, 38 Fed. 442.]</p>

A special case was- submitted to the court respecting the title to certain gas fixtures and bar-room fixtures, situated in the Marlborough Hotel, on Washington street, as between the landlord and the tenant’s assignee in bankruptcy.

<p>Case No. 6,346a.</p> <p>Biia or Sai.e — Subscribing Witness — Proof of Signature — Evidence.</p> <p>Where there were two subscribing witnesses to a bill of sale, and the handwriting of one beyond the jurisdiction of the court was proved, and the other testified to the genuineness of his own signature, although he said he had no recollection of the bill of sale, held, that it should have been admitted in evidence.</p>

<p>[This was an action by Samuel R. Henck-ley against William H. Hendrickson and Campbell for ■ damages for breach of contract]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,349.</p> <p>Courts-Martial— Jurisdiction over Contractors for Militart Supplies — Constitutional Law — Construction of Statutes — Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>[1. The act of March 2,1863, “to prevent and punish frauds upon the government,” and which declares that certain persons therein enumerated, including “contractors,” agents, paymasters, etc., shall be subject to trial by court-martial for the frauds therein specified, is expressly limited to persons in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, in tbe actual service of the United States; and it gives no power to try by court-martial a mere contractor to furnish supplies to the government for the use of the military service.]</p> <p>[2. The provision contained in the sixteenth section of the act of July 17, 1862. that “any person who shall contract to furnish supplies of any kind or description for the army or navy, shall be deemed and taken as a part of the ■land or naval forces of the United States for which he shall contract to furnish said supplies,” is unconstitutional, in so far as it would operate to subject a contractor to trial by court-martial.]</p> <p>[3. If not unconstitutional, the provision, by its terms, only makes contractors subject to trial by court-martial for fraud or willful neglect of duty in connection with their contracts, and not for offenses unconnected therewith.]</p> <p>[4. The expressions “army and navy” and '“land and naval forces” are used in this section, :in their strictly constitutional and legal sense, and mean the regular army and navy, and do not include the militia; and hence a charge that •defendant was engaged in furnishing supplies “for the military services” is indefinite, and states no offense, for it does not exclude the Idea that he may have been engaged in furnishing supplies for the militia, in which case he would not come within the terms of the act.]</p> <p>[5. In a trial by court-martial the charges ■cannot be so amended after arraignment as to •entirely obliterate the original specifications and insert new ones describing wholly different of-fences; and hence, where the prisoner, pending his trial, seeks relief from a civil court by habeas corpus, and the charges are found wholly insufficient to show jurisdiction in the court-martial, a discharge will be granted.]</p>

[This was a suit in equity for the infringement of a patent. The bill set forth that the complainants [Joseph C. Henderson and others] were the owners of a patent improvement in coal-stoves, covered by reissued patent- No. 3,523, bearing date June 29, 1869, extended seven years from May 28th, 1S74.2 and charged that defendants had infringed the several claims of said patent, the 6th, 6th, and 7th of which are in the following language: “5.

<p>Case No. 6,350.</p> <p>Replevin — Flea op Property, Trial — Right to Open and Close.</p> <p>1. Where the plaintiff holds the affirmative of any of the issues in a cause, he has a right to open and close the whole case.</p> <p>2. Upon the plea of property, the plaintiff in replevin has the burden of proof, and the right to open and close;</p>

<p>Case No. 6,351a.</p> <p>Debt — Interest—Usury.</p> <p>Judgment may be rendered for ten per cent, interest until paid, where that rate is expressed in the contract.</p> <p>[Overruled in Byrd v. Gasquet, Case No. 2,-268a.]</p>

The plaintiff' [Henderson’s lessee) claimed under the elder grant.

<p>Case No. 6,355.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Salvage—A Floating Hotel-Costs.</p> <p>1. A steamboat had been dismantled, and" stripped of her boiler, engine, and paddle-wheels, and fitted up as a saloon and hotel, and used as such for some months, and was being towed to-another place, to be there used in a similar way, and, while so being towed, got ashore, and it was necessary to lighten her by pumping, and a steam propeller was employed for that purpose, whose owner afterwards filed a libel against the-hulk, to recover compensation for such pumping, as a salvage service: Held, that the hulk was not, at the time, engaged in commerce and' navigation, in such a sense as to be liable in rem, in admiralty.</p> <p>[Approved in The Old Natchez, 9 Fed. 477. Cited in Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock, 10 Fed. 145; S. C., 16 Fed. 925; Snyder v. A Floating Dry-Dock, 22 Fed. 686; The Pulaski, 33 Fed. 384: Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform, 38 Fed. 159; The City of Pittsburgh, 45 Fed. 702.]</p> <p>' 2. Whether it would be liable for a tort or injury committed by it, quere.</p> <p>3. The libel must be dismissed, for want of’ jurisdiction, without costs.</p> <p>[Cited in Salvor Wrecking Co. v. Sectional Dock Co., Case No. 12,273.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,356.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Domestic Vessels.</p> <p>[No lien arises under the maritime law for supplies furnished a vessel in the state in which she is owned.]</p>

<p>Case No. 6,35?.</p> <p>Equitable Relief from Judgment at Law — When Exercisable — Surprise—Set-Off.</p> <p>1. Where a case was properly examinable at :law, and a trial at law has been had, and no exception to the ruling of the court, chancery can «ive no relief.</p> <p>[Cited in Lyme v. Allen, 51 N. H. 245.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. Chancery cannot revise a case at law, where there was no obstruction to a full investigation of the merits.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>3. Even if a party neglects to make a full .defense, as might have been done, it is no ground for the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>4. A party, in such a case, can obtain a remedy by a bill of exception to the ruling of the court, or a motion for a new trial.</p> <p>[NOTE. Prom this decree the complainant appealed to the supreme court, where the decree of the circuit court was affirmed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Curtis. 17 How. 158 U. S.) 443. It was held that a court of equity does not interfere with judgments at law unless the complainant has an equitable defense of which he could not avail himself at law, or had a good defense at law, which he was prevented from availing himself of by fraud or accident, unmixed with negligence of himself or his agents. When a party sued at law has his election to set off his claim or resort to his separate action, and selects the last, he cannot come into a court of equity and ask to be allowed to make a different determination, and to be restored to the right which he has once voluntarily waived.]</p>

The steamboat Hendrik Hudson, her tackle, apparel and furniture, were libelled by the Michigan Southern Railroad Company, for the recovery of the amount due them for certain charges of transportation, which were a lien upon sundry different packages, parcels, articles of merchandise, and other properly, which the libellants, in the ordinary course of their business, had received ■and transported upon their railroad while such merchandise and property were It is deemed…

[This was an action at law by Joshua Hen-dy against Frank Soule, a collector of internal revenue, to recover the amount of a tax paid under protest.]

A charge delivered by the Honourable JOHN JAX, Esquire, Chief Justice of the United States, to the grand jury impannelled for the court of the United States, holden for the Middle circuit in the… Held: and that grand and traverse jurors should be summoned to attend it. As the court however is authorized generally to try criminal causes, if any other crimes or offences cognizable in it be laid before you or are in your knowledge, it is your duty to present them.

<p>Case No. 6,361.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Involuntary—Homestead—Exemption.</p> <p>,1. The homestead act of California [Hitt. Dig. § 3541] contemplates the selection of a homestead out from an entire estate, which was sufficient to pay all the just debts of its owner, and leave.a surplus equal to the value of the homestead declared.</p> <p>2. The declaration of the homestead is not to be held operative to prevent creditors from converting the homestead into a fund for their benefit, when such declaration is made in fraud of their rights as creditors of the bankrupt.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Boothroyd, Case No. 1,652.]</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of William Henkel. Heard on exceptions to the finding of the register. Case No. 6,361.)</p>

This was an appeal from a decree of the district court, dismissing the libel [Case No. 6,363], in a suit in personam, in admiralty.

<p>This was a libel by Alpheus Henley, master of the schooner Marcus Hunter, to recover $390, as demurrage for thirteen days’ detention of the vessel. The vessel brought a cargo of ice from Dresden, Maine, to New York, under a bill of lading, by which it appeared that the cargo was shipped by the Dresden Ice Company, and was to be delivered at New York to George E. Holyoke, agent of the Brooklyn Ice Company. The libel alleged that the vessel arrived in New York on September 27th, 1874, and gave notice to the respondent on the 29th that she was ready to deliver cargo, that twodays’time would have been sufficient for the discharge of the cargo, but that it was not received by the respondent till the 12th of October. The answer averred, that, when the vessel arrived, there were already several vessels with similar cargoes consigned to the respondent, which had arrived before the Hunter; that it was customary to discharge vessels in the order in which their arrival had been reported; that these vessels were so discharged; that, when the turn of the Hunter came, she was discharged in a day; and that, therefore, no demurrage was due.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel by Richard Hennessey and others against the ship Versailles and cargo, for compensation for salvage.]

In this cause an amended declaration was filed to the October term, 1871. The defendant filed pleas of non-assumpsit, and the statute of limitations of five years. To this there was a replication, confessing and avoiding, and defendant demurred. The court, on argument, overruled the demurrer, and the defendant rejoined, tendering an issue. Plaintiff [Hening & Pearce, surviving partners] joined issue. Two additional counts were filed to the April term.

<p>Case "No. 6,367.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Time When Debt is Provable.</p> <p>1. A debt, existing at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, but- not existing at the time of the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, is provable in bankruptcy. The case of In re Crawford [Case No. 8,363], dissented from.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Lachemeyer, Case No. 7,966; In re Boston & Fairhaven Iron Works, 23 Fed. 881, 29 Fed. 784.]</p> <p>2. A suit for assault and battery, having been commenced against the bankrupts prior to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, was continued to judgment before the adjudication, no leave of the bankruptcy court having been obtained: Edd, that, as the claim was not provable until the judgment was obtained, it was not necessary to obtain such leave.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Broieh, Case No. 1,921.]</p> <p>[Cited in Howland v. Carson, 28 Ohio St. 628.]</p> <p>[See In re Bailey, Case No. 729.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the Unit-' ed States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

On the 4th of December, 1866, the president of the United States, upon the application of the Baron Von Gerolt, accredited to the… Held: by Judge Ship-man, after consultation with Mr. Justice Nelson, that it had such power, and, on the 23d of May, 1867, a writ of habeas corpus was issued to the marshal, to bring the body of Henrich before this court, and a writ of certiorari was directed to the commissioner, to send up all the papers and proofs upon which he had acted…

<p>Case No. 6,370.</p> <p>Bankruptcy— Composition — Second Meeting— Regularity — Failure op Partner to Sign Petition — Effect of Mistake.</p> <p>1. "Where objection was made to the regularity of composition proceedings in the case of a bankrupt firm, because by mistake the member who was considered to be-a special partner took no part in the proceedings; nor even signed the petition for composition, because liabilities alleged to be fictitious were included in the schedules — one being the amount put in by said special partner, and others notes of the firm held by parties who on other accounts were indebted to the firm — and because the composition did not provide how and when the bankrupts should be re-invested with their property when the composition was fulfilled: Held, that none of these irregularities, being the effects of mistake and not of fraud, would be considered fatal to.the validity of the proceedings; but that, the special partner being in fact a general partner, and not entitled to vote as a creditor, it must appear that the requisite number had signed the composition without counting him.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Griffith, Case No. 5,820.]</p> <p>2. Refusal or neglect to sign a petition for a composition by one of the partners, unless fraudulent, will not render the proceeding invalid as against the other partners, though it may well deprive the one who fails to sign of all benefit of it</p>

This was a possessory action. The libel-lants were owners of the brig Henry, and, in April, 1832, despatched her to Matamoros, in Mexico, with Daniel Moss as master, and Jason St. John as supercargo and agent, giving a power of attorney to St. John “to employ the vessel, or to make sale of her, in the name, place and stead of the libellants, in case a fair price could be obtained.” Moss was unable, from sickness, to return with the vessel, and one Titterton was substituted…

In admiralty. Libel in rem by the United States claiming a forfeiture of the schooner Henry, because she was owned in part by a citizen of the United States resident in a foreign country. The owners made claim to the vessel, and demurred to the libel as insufficient in law.

<p>Case No. 6,374.</p> <p>Pkize — Condemnation—Caugo—Costs.</p> <p>1. Vessel bavins been used by the enemy without the knowledge of her owners, and recaptured from the enemy, restored, by consent, with costs to the libellants.</p> <p>2. Cargo condemned as enemy property, employed in aiding the insurrection on foot at the place of its capture, and as shipped with intent to run the blockade.- ✓</p> <p>3. The subject of the rate of costs in prize cases deferred, to await the action of congress.</p>

In admiralty. [The following charge to the grand jury in relation to the law of the United States for the punishment of offenders who might cause the loss of life by negligence or inattention to their duties on board of steamboats, was delivered by]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel for salvage against the ship Henry Ewbank, the Charleston Fire and Marine Insurance Company and others, claimants.]

<p>Case No. 6,377.</p> <p>Prize — Violation of Blockade — Condemnation.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,379.</p> <p>Supplies to a Whaler — Lien—Specification.</p> <p>1. Casks, furnished to a whaler, to be stowed on board to receive the oil, are necessary for the vessel, and, by the law of the state of New York, a lien attaches to the vessel for the amount of the debt incurred therefor.</p> <p>2. It is not necessary to file a specification of such lien, where the vessel has not left the state before her seizure under process issued to enforce such lien [The John Earron, Case No. 7,-341, followed].</p>

<p>Case No. 6,378.</p> <p>Prize-Violation of Blockade — Condemnation.</p> <p>1. Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property, and for a violation of the blockade.</p> <p>2. None of the officers or crew of the vessel were sent into this port with her, or produced with her to be examined as witnesses, but the master subsequently appeared and was examined in preparatorio.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,381.</p> <p>Admiraltt — Libel for Wages — Misnomer—Certified Copt of Shipping Articles.</p> <p>1. In defence to a libel for wages as cook and steward by one William Henry, respondent put in shipping articles executed by William Henderson as cook and steward. Hdd, that the presumption was that the libellant'was the person who had entered into the articles.</p> <p>2. Maritime courts will not lay much stress on an objection of misnomer, unsupported by evidence that the party was in fact not known by the name ascribed to him.</p> <p>3. It seems, that where original shipping articles are proved before a commissioner, and redelivered to the vessel, who thereupon pursues her voyage, a copy certified by the commissioner is competent evidence upon the hearing.</p>

<p>Case No. 6,882.</p> <p>Patents — Improper Rejection of Application— New Petition — Issuance of Patent — Or What Date — Public Use — Assignment—Assignor as Paett to Suit — claim for Damages.</p> <p>1.An application for a patent was improperly rejected. A new petition was filed renewing the first petition, whereupon the patent issued: fletó, that the date of the application for the patent is the date of the first application which was rejected.</p> <p>2. The date, from which the time of prior use or sale is to be reckoned, is the date of the earliest application.</p> <p>3. Public use in good faith for experimental purposes, while the inventor is perfecting his invention, and for a reasonable period even before the beginning of the two years of limitation, cannot affect the rights of the inventor.</p> <p>[Cited in Graham v. Geneva Lake Crawford Manuf’g Go., 11 Fed. 142; Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U. ■ S. 712, 8 Sup. Ct. 682.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>4.Where a patent is assigned, and in connection therewith and incidental thereto, a claim for past damages and profits for the infringement of the patent is also assigned, it is not necessary, in a suit by the assignee to recover such damages and profits together with those accruing since the assignment, to make the assignor a party to the bill.</p> <p>[Cited in Consolidated Oil-Well Packer Co. v. Eaton, 12 Fed. 870; Nellis v. Pennock Manuf’g Co., 38 Fed. 380.]</p> <p>[NOTE. In February, 1879, a rehearing was granted upon affidavits tending to show that Dodge had sold two of his stoves to two different persons more than two years before his application. Evidence having been taken, the rehearing took place before Lowell. Circuit Judge, who held that a single sale of an invention, more than two years before the application, works a forfeiture of the patent. This having been shown in the present case, the patent is thereby avoided. 2 Fed. 78.]</p>

Ejectment for eleven hundred acres of land, situate in Livingston and Will counties, Illinois. Plaintiff [John Snowden Henry] claims under a warranty deed from defendant [James Henry].

[This was a bill in equity by Alexander Henry against the Providence Tool Company, for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 119,846, granted to plaintiff October 10, 1871.]

In an action upon the acceptance of a bill of exchange drawn by W. Hartshome upon the defendants [Ricketts, Newton & Co.] in favor of Ashley, and by him indorsed to Henry; the defence was that the ship Rose was transferred to Hartshome in payment of the bill, under a contract signed by Ashley.

Assumpsit on a policy of marine insurance. The declaration averred, in some of Its counts, that on the 15th of July, 1846, at New 1'ork, the Norwich and Worcester Railroad Company, according to the usage and custom of merchants, caused a policy of insurance to be issued by the defendants, purporting and containing that the said railroad company, on account of whom it might concern, loss payable to the plaintiffs. [David Henshaw and others], insured, from the 15th of August,…

[Action at law .by Henry’s executors against Ricketts, Newton & Co.] moved for a rule on James Taylor to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him for a contempt in not obeying a summons! to appear and testify as a witness, and to bring with him certain papers. The witness resided in Norfolk, Virginia, more than one hundred miles from the place of trial.

[Libels in admiralty by John Heppard against the barges General Cadwalader and Major Ringgold, and William L. Ashmead and Theodore Birely, owners.] The libels in these cases were in rem et personam; and a decree pro confesso having passed against William L. Ashmead, a decree was asked, upon hearing, against the barges and against Theodore Birely.

This was a libel by Louis Mayer, owner of the canal-boat Late and Early, to recover for the damages sustained by her being sunk on the night of the 1st of August, 1874, in the Hudson river, just below Hudson. The Late and Early was one of twenty-five boats which were being towed up the river by the steamer Connecticut, arranged in five or sis tiers, the Late and Early being the outside boat on the port side of the second tier.

<p>Case No. 6,393.</p> <p>Possession — Sale of Vessel by Master.</p> <p>Where a vessel, in a foreign port, was in such a condition that nothing better could be done for her owner than to sell her, and her master could not within a reasonable time have consulted with the owner, and he called to his aid disinterested persons of skill and experience, who. after survey, advised her sale, the master having no means and no credit and it not being possible to make the necessary repairs at that port, and the master thereupon, acting in honesty and good faith, sold the vessel: Edd, that the sale must be sustained and that a libel for possession in behalf of her former owner must he dismissed.</p>