Volume 100 — United States Reports

Held: that a mandamus directing that the judgment be carried into execution against all the defendants would not lie. Petition for a mandamus against the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.

Held: that that sum was the amount actually in dispute, and although judgment was rendered below for the entire claini, being, more than $5,000, the writ of error must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. ' •Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of'Pennsylvania. The facts are stated in the

Motion io dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Held: That the audit of his accounts was the duty of the First Auditor. 2. That the settlement of them, as the same appears by the transcript from the books of the Treasury Department, duly certified and authenticated, is prima facie evidence of the balance thereby shown, and it is competent for the accounting officer to correct mistakes and restate the balance. 8.

Held: that the court-martial had jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter, and was competent to pass the sentence whereof A. complained.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Certificate of division in opinion between tbe judges of tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for the Southern District of New York. • An indictment, consisting of four counts, was found, Feb. 8, 1877, against Hiram Hirsch and others, who pleaded'that the offences therein charged had been committed more than three years before the finding of the indictment.

This was an action of ejectment brought Dec. 23, 1874, by-James D. Taylor against Tbe Union Consolidated Silver Mining Company, to recover the possession of an undivided interest, equal to five feet, of a mining claim and lode, part of the • Comstock lode, situate in the Virginia Mining District, in Storey County, State of Nevada.

<p>Where the record has not been printed, a motion to dismiss an appeal or a writ. of error will not be considered where there is any question about the facts on which the motion rests.</p>

Held: that the rules of law applicable to the adjudication of claims by that court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction must govern, and. that interest, not having been stipulated for in the contracts, cannot be allowed thereon. Appeal from the Court of Claims. This was a suit brought by Robert Tillson & Co. against the United States.

Held: though it appeared that prior to the decision the chancellor of the State had refused to enjoin a judgment at law recovered upon a bond for the purchase of slaves brought into the State for sale after May 1, 1833, and the Court of Errors, two judges against one, had affirmed the refusal of the chancellor.

<p>1. A condition in a deed conveying land that intoxicating liquors shall never be manufactured, sold, or otherwise disposed of as a beverage in any place of public resort thereon, and that if this condition be broken by the grantee, his assigns or legal representatives, the deed shall become null and void, and the title to the premises revert to the grantor, is not repugnant to the estate granted, nor is it unlawful or against public policy.</p> <p>2. Upon breach of the condition, the grantor has a right to treat the estate as having reverted, and, under a statute of Colorado, can maintain ejectment without a previous entry or a demand.</p> <p>3. In such a suit, the grantee is estopped from denying the validity of the title conveyed by the deed whereunder he took possession of the land.</p> <p>4. When a patent issued by the United States adds to the name of the patentee the word “ trustee,” without mention of any trust upon which he is to hold the land, such addition does not prevent the legal title from passing by the patentee's conveyance. If a trust be in fact created, it is for the cestui que trust, and no one else, to complain of the non-execution thereof.</p> <p>5. By the general comity which, in the absence of positive direction to the contrary, obtains through the States and Territories of the United States, corporations created in one State or Territory are permitted to carry on any lawful business in another, and to acquire, hold, and transfer property there equally as individuals.</p> <p>6. When a corporation is authorized by statute to hold real property necessary to enable it to carry on its business, the inquiry whether any particular real property is necessary for that business is a matter between the State and the corporation, which does not concern third parties.</p>

<p>1. Though the grant by the act of Congress of Sept. 28,1850 !(9 Stat. 519), of the swamp and overflowed lands to the States in which they lie, is declared tq be made for the exclusive purpose of enabling such States, with the pro1 ceeds thereof, to reclaim the lands by means of levees and drains, it is questionable whether the security for the due application of the proceeds does not wholly rest upon the good faith of the several States, and whether they may not exercise their discretion in this behalf -without being liable to be called to account, and without affecting the title to the lands: at all events, it seems that Congress alone has the power, in a clear ease of violation of the trust, to enforce the conditions of the grant, by revocation or otherwise; and since, by the act, the-proceeds are to be applied to the designated purposes only “as-far as necessary,” each State has, at least, a large discretion as to the “ necessity ” of employing the proceeds to the reclamation of the lands. •</p> <p>2. A grant, subject to the conditions of that act, made by a State of its. swamp and overflowed lands to the several counties in which they are situated, to be disposed of for general county purposes, is valid, and the county which has disposed of them in pursuance of the State grant cannot rescind its contract on the ground of its being a violation of the act of Congress.</p> <p>3. In Iowa, such a contract, if approved by a vote of the people of the county, under the act of the legislature of that State passed in 1858, is valid, though the lands be disposed of for less than one dollar and a quarter per acre; and, if it includes also $ sale of the claim of the county against the United States for indemnity for swamp lands sold by the latter, the county cannot maintain a bill in equity to set it aside, though such sale be within the law prohibiting the assignment of claims against the go vnment.</p> <p>4. If the purchaser from the county under such a contract was bound thereby to do certain acts, such as to introdúcela certain number of settlers within a certain period, or to reclaim the lands, his obligation, if not made a condition of the sale, lies,in covenant merely, and,if unperformed, does not avoid the sale. It is only when covenants are mutual and dependent, or when their performance is made an express condition, that a breach of them involves an avoidance of the contract.</p>

Held: that interest should be computed at that rate up to the maturity of the note, and thereafter at six per cent. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The facts are stated in the

This was an action -brought by Herold against Arthur, collector of customs of the port of New York, for an alleged illegal exaction of a duty of five cents per pound upon chicory imported in 1873.

Held: that, .as he did not at the time except to the ruling of the court in regard to the instructions, they cannot be reviewed by the appellate court, although they are incorporated in the bill of exceptions allowed on the refusal of the court of original jurisdiction to grant a new trial. 2.

The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), were a set of three cases consolidated into a single appeal before the United States Supreme Court, which in 1879 unanimously ruled that the Copyright Clause of the Constitution gave Congress no power to protect or regulate trademarks. Congress then passed the Trade Mark Act of 1881, which was based on the Commerce Clause power, and therefore passed constitutional muster.

Held: in a case refnoved, under the act of Congress,, to the Circuit Court from a court of Texas, where such a union is, by the laws of that State, allowed. .Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern-District of Texas. The facts are stated in the

Held: that leave to file the bill rested in the discretion of the court below, and was properly refused. *105 Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The facts are stated in the

Held: that sect. 4922, Eev. Stat., has no application to the case, and that he is entitled to costs. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.

Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Trook, in an action in the court below against the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad Company, recovered judgment, Feb. 19, 1877, for $4,000 and costs of suit. A motion for a new trial was then made on exceptions taken during the progress of the cause, and on account of excessive damages. Trook entered a remittitur of $1,500, and the judgment-was ultimately affirmed at a .hearing in general term.

<p>A settler upon unsurveyed public lands in California, who filed no declaratory statement after the return of the plat of the survey to the proper local land-office, could not, under the act of March 3,1853 (10 Stat. 244), acquire by his settlement a right of pre-emption.</p>

Held: that the United States is entitled to recover that sum, but with interest only from the date of such service. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.

Held: that the title to the staves was in C., and they were not subject to the execution. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for , the Eastern District of Michigan.

Held: that, in an action for the same lands commenced within the year by the former defendant against the grantees of the former plaintiff, *139 the latter are not precluded by that judgment from setting up their claim to them. 4.

Held: that the defect may, under sect. 1005, Rev. Stat., be cured by an amendment substituting their names. 2. A mortgage of a vessel of the United States is not, as against the parties, and sucn persons as have actual notice thereof, rendered invalid by the failure to record it. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. Motion to dismiss the appeal and to affirm the decree below.

Held: that, as the recovery, if any, must be against the defendants severally, and as the amount claimed • from each does not exceed $2,500, this court has no jurisdiction. Motion to dismiss an appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The facts' are stated in the

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the Circuit Court had authority to require him to account for the fund, and that he is chargeable with interest on so much thereof as he on receiving deposited in a bank to his credit as receiver, and then withdrew and deposited on his private account in another bank, he declining to explain the transaction, when he was examined as a witness by the master to whom the court had referred his accounts.

Held: on demurrer to the plea, that the State court had no jurisdiction of the cause of action, and that the judgment was void. ■ Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maine. The facts are stated in the

Held: That there being neither fraud, collusion, or falsehood by A., nor privity of contract between him and C., he is not liable to the latter for any loss sustained by reason of the certificate. 2. That usage cannot make a contract where none was made by the parties. Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The facts are stated in the

Held: after a full and elaborate consideration, that the conveyance was not absolutely void, but that the grantor by it was devested of the property which he had undertaken to convey, and the grantee invested with a defeasible estate therein, which he would hold until devested by the supreme authority, or by an inquisition had upon its denouncement.

Held: in that case, to have himself risked the dangers which might result from the use of the engine in such defective condition.

Held: that certain affidavits sent here, but not copied into the transcript, although they had been filed as “ exhibits ” with the bill and the answer thereto, and by consent treated and read as deposi *227 tions on the hearing below, cannot be considered here as proofs in the canse, as they are not embraced by the order, the purpose of which was to send what liad been exhibited below, as contradistinguished from what had…

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: 1st, that the former was itself sufficient to sustain the contract of extension and transfer, and to constitute the bank a holder for value; 2d, that the National Banking Act subjects the bank to liability for taking usurious interest, but does not declare the contract of indorsement void, and that no such penalty being prescribed, the courts cannot superadd it.

Held: that trespasser’s then in possession of the lands, who were afterwards ejected therefrom at the suit of those upon whose prior possession they had intruded, are not beneficiaries under the act; but that the parties who so recovered the possession are entitled to a conveyance from the city. 8.

Held: that the petition was in conformity with the statute, and, upon being filed, the prosecution was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for that district. 3. The United States is a government with authority extending over the whole territory of the Union, acting upon the States and the people of the States. While limited in the number of its powers, it is, so far as its sovereignty *258 extends, supreme.

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States about racial discrimination and United States constitutional criminal procedure. Strauder was the first instance where the Supreme Court reversed a state court decision denying a defendant's motion to remove his criminal trial to federal court pursuant to Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Its holding, along with those of its companion cases of Virginia v. Rives (1880) and Ex parte Virginia (1880) established the proposition that it is a denial to criminal defendants of the equal protection of the law for a state to exclude persons from service on a grand or petit jury on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), was a United States Supreme Court case about race discrimination in jury selection. Two black teenagers accused of murdering a white man in Patrick County, Virginia in autumn 1878 were convicted by an all-white jury. Their defense attorneys accused local officials of systematically excluding blacks from the jury pool in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court unanimously ruled that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th prohibited facially discriminatory laws and intentional discrimination but did not guarantee a mixed-race jury. Rives has not been formally overturned but is no longer considered "good law" because it is effectively superseded by more recent cases.

Held: that while a writ of habeascorpus cannot generally be made to subserve the purposes of a writ of error, y.et jvlmn a prisoner isdield without any lawinl authority, and by an order which an inferior court of the United States had no jurisdiction to make, this court will, in favor of liberty, grant the writ, not to review the whole case, but to examine the authority of the court below to act at all. 2.

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the separation of powers and the Appointments Clause.

Held: according to the decision in Ex parte Siebold (supra, p. 371), that Congress had power to pass the law under which the conviction was had, and that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the offence. 2.

Held: that the ordinance, interpreted in the light of the admitted condition of the river and its banks within the city, imposed a duty of tonnage for the mere privilege of stopping, mooring, or landing at the port of New Orleans, and that the charges exacted could not, in view of the special circumstances disclosed by the evidence, be regarded or supported, as compensation simply for the use of the city’s wharves.

<p>1. The ordinance of the city of Vicksburg passed July 12, 1865, entitled " An ordinance establishing the rate of wharfage to be collected from steamboats and other water-craft landing and lying at the City of Vicksburg,” is not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>2. Packet Company v. St. Louis (supra, p. 423), affirmed.</p>

Section 4 of an act of tbe General Assembly of Maryland of 1827, chapter 162, entitled “ An Act to appoint State wharfingers in tbe city of Baltimore, and to authorize tbe collection of wharfage in certain cases in said city” (Maryland Code of Public Local Laws, art. 4, sect. 945), provides as follows : — “The mayor and city council of Baltimore shall.be, and they are hereby, empowered and authorized to regulate, establish, charge and collect, to the use of the said mayor…

Held: that the writ must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas. The facts are stated in the

Held: That the action is not prescribed by the limitation of one year. 2. That the cashier having been intrusted by the directors of the bank with the transfers of stock, his refusal to permit the transfer was the refusal of the bank. 3. That judgment having been rendered, the court below had power to order C. to pay the claim, or certify it to the comptroller.

The first case is here in error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. The remaining cases are appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa. These cases present the following facts: On the 6th of August,'1870, the Delaware and St. Paul Railroad Company, an Iowa corporation, contracted with the Delaware Railroad Construction Company, also an Iowa corporation, for the construction of that part of its railroad lying in Delaware County, Iowa.

Held: That the treaty is the supreme law of the land, and by its terms the incapacity of B. as an alien was so far removed as to entitle him to recover and sell the lands and “withdraw and export the proceeds thereof.” 2. That his rights thus ■ secured are not barred by the lapse of time, inasmuch as no statute of Virginia prescribes the term within which they must be asserted. 3.

Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491 (1879), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a state may tax a debt held by a resident upon a resident of another State. That is, the situs of the debt is with the creditor, not the debtor. This ignores the possibility of multiple taxation.

<p>■Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Charles Bowen filed in the court below his petition alleging that the United States unlawfully withheld from him §270, being the amount due him from Sept. 13, 1876, when he was admitted as an inmate of the “ Soldiers’ Home,” to Dec. 4, 1877, upon his pension theretofore granted, by reason of a wound received by him in the military service of the United States. That court found the following facts: — 1.

Held: that a subsequent act of the legislature authorizing a sale of a portion of the park,, free of all liens existing by virtue of the original act, was in violation of the Federal Constitution, as impairing the obligation of contracts.

Held: that he has no claim against the United States after the last-mentioned date. • 2. The joint resolution approved June 23,1874 (18 Stat., part 3, p. 289), providing for two months’ pay to clerks and employes of the executive departments at Washington, applied to such only as should be discharged at the close of the fiscal year by reason of the reductions made necessary by the legislation of that session of Congress.

Held: to the whole amount of the capital stock of said bank or banking association.

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.</p> <p>The facts are- stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That no such contract existed. 2. That the act of 1840 was a public law relating to a public subject with respect to which the legislature which enacted it had no power to bind a subsequent one. 3. That if that act and the proceedings under it constituted a contract, it was satisfied on the part of the State by establishing the county seat at Canfield, u ith the *549 intent that it should remain there. 4.

<p>Error to tbe Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That B.’s letter of April 1,1856, operates as an estoppel in pais which precludes him from setting up a claim to them, and is an available defence to the action’. 2. That F. was not a bona fide purchaser, and that whatever title he acquired was subject to the legal and equitable rights of D. and those claiming under the latter. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan.

Held: that the branch being thus organized and invested with the powers and privileges conferred by the charter of the company to enable it to prosecute the work, a subscription by a county through which such road passed is not rendered invalid by the fact that when made such partial assignment by the company of its franchises had taken place.

the Circuit Court of the United States for thfe District of Massachusetts.

' This action was brought by Blackwell against Stockdale, collector of internal revenue for the first collection district of Louisiana, and, on his death, revived against Jones, his executrix. Judgment having been rendered against her, she sued ou this writ of error. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: subsequently to the decree, and upon full notice, a meeting, at which a committee was appointed to purchase the property for the benefit of the bondholders. The committee accordingly purchased it at the sale.

Held: That the instruction was proper. 2. That, to maintain its defence, the company was bound to prove, not only the insanity of B., but that it was hereditary, and that both facts were known to A. when he answered the question. 2. National Bank v. Insurance Company ( 95 U. S. 673 ) cited and approved. Error to tbe Circuit Court of tbe . United States for tbe Eastern District of New York.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the instruction was proper. . Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for tbe District of Massachusetts. .This was an action brought by Willis, Edmands, & Co., against Thomas Russell, a former collector of customs for the port of Boston, to recover certain duties paidT under protest upon an importation from India of jute rejections, made in September, 1872.

On June 20, 1870, the firm of S. P. Brown & Son made to Samuel P. Brown its promissory note for $10,000, payable to his order one year thereafter, which he duly indorsed to the Freedman’s Saving and Trust Company. To secure its payment, he executed to Daniel L. Eaton, the actuary of the company, a deed of trust for certain lots of ground in Mount Pleasant, in the District of Columbia.

Motion to vacate the supersedeas, and dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida. The facts are. stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that the company was, within the meaning of the ninth section of the act of July 13, 1866 ( 14 Stat. 138 ), a railroad company, and as such, for the year 1870, liable to the tax of five per cent on coupons thereby imposed. Error to the Circuit Court of tbe United States for the District of Massachusetts.

<p>Ebbob to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that he is entitled to recover their commuted value. Appeal from the Court of Claims. This was a claim of Lippitt for $1,742, to which 'he alleged that he was entitled as commutation for fuel and quarters while he was in the military service of the United States. It was referred to the court below by the Department of War. He thereupon filed his petition.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That the deposit by the clerk was not a payment into the treasury of the United States. 2. That said proceeds belonged for the time being to the court, and were, pending the proceedings, held as a trust fund. 3. That A. was not entitled to recover. Appeal from tbe Court of Claims. The facts are stated in the

Nagle v. Rutledge, 100 U.S. 675 (1880), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the amount in controversy in an appeal is determined by the actual amount disputed in the issues on appeal, not the total amount sought by the parties in the proceeding below.

Held: that the law, so construed, is not in violation of ithe Constitution of the United States. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. The facts are stated in the

Held: that he was not entitled to recover. Appeal from the Court of Claims. This was a suit in the court below by Bowling Embry-to recover $4,644.75 as the amount of salary claimed to be due him as deputy postmaster at Nashville, Tenn., from May 27, 1869, to July 25, 1870. The court found the following facts: — 1.

Held: That the charge was not erroneous. 2. That the jury having found that said check was so offered and received, it was not a debt due ■ byB. within the meaning of A.’s undertaking. 3. That in view of such finding the question of-usage was immaterial.. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. The facts are stated in the

Held: That A. had no just ground of exception to the charge. 2. That the burden was on him to prove that the premiums had been actually paid to the company. 2. It is error to submit to the jury to find a fact of which there is no competent evidence. 3. The only presumptions of fact which the law recognizes are immediate inferences from the facts proved.

<p>1. A national bank is liable for' damages occasioned by the loss, through gross negligence, of a special deposit made in it with the knowledge and acquiescence of its officers and directors.</p> <p>2. Gross negligence on the part of a gratuitous bailee, though not a fraud, is in legal effect the same thing.</p> <p>3. The doctrine of ultra vires has no application in favor of corporations for < wrongs committed by them.</p> <p>4. Sect. 5228 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that it shall be lawful for a national bank after its failure to “ deliver special deposits;” is as effectual a recognition of its power to receive them as an express declaration to that effect would have been.</p> <p>5. The phrase “ special deposits,” so employed, embraces the public securities of the United States.</p>

Held: That the bill was in law payable at that city. 2. That the presentment and demand were sufficient. 3. That the requisite steps to bind A. and B. were taken. Ebbob to the Circuit Court of tbe United States for the District of Kentucky.