Volume 101 — United States Reports

This is & suit by the United States to recover from the Merchants’ National Bank of Little Rock, Ark., $160,000, being ten per cent on $1,600,000 of certain notes of the City of Little Rock, which it was alleged the bank had paid out during the years 1870, 1871, 1872, and 1873. The notes were issued and put in circulation by the city, and used in business and commercial transactions as money.

Held: That their liability was fixed by the judgment of the Circuit Court, and was not diminished by the subsequent proceedings. 2. That they are not chargeable with the costs incurred by reason of those proceedings. 3. That the issue of an execution against A. was not essential to B.'s right to recover. Ebbob to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that this adjustment of appellate jurisdiction is not forbidden by any thing contained in the said amendment. *23 Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.

Held: that, under sects. 2503 and 2504 of the Revised Statutes, said articles were dutiable at only ninety per cent of that rate. 2. Davies v. Arthur ( 96 U. S. 148 ) and United States v. Bowen (100 id. 508) cited and approved. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States rfor the Southern District of New York.

Held: that the libel was properly dismissed. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Co-, lumbia. On the night of the 7th of October, 1864, the United States steamer “ Wachusett,” under the command of Commander Collins, captured the rebel steamer “ Florida,” in the port of Bahia, in the empire of Brazil. The “ Florida” had gone there to supply herself with provisions and for the repair of her *38 engine.

Held: That the letters constitute no contract, and the bank is not responsible to the firm for cashing the drafts without bills of lading attached. 2.

<p>1. Letters or figures affixed to merchandise by a manufacturer, for the purpose of denoting its quality only, cannot be appropriated by him to his exclusive use as a trade-mark.</p> <p>2. An injunction will not be granted at his suit to restrain another manufacturer from using a label bearing no resemblance to the complainant’s, except that certain letters, which alone convey no meaning, are inserted in the centre of each, the dissimilarity of the labels being such that no one will be misled as to the true origin or ownership of the merchandise.</p>

<p>1. Thfe defences of the mater of a promispoiy note can be cut off only by the payee’s indorsement of it before maturity.</p> <p>2. A guaranty written upon it by the payee is not such an indorsement.</p>

Ekkob to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.' This was an action of covenant, by George W. Thomas, Alfred S, Porter, and Nathaniel F. Chew, against the West Jersey Railroad Company, and they, to maintain the issue on their part, offered to prove the following facts: - On the eighth day of October, 1863, the Millville and Glassboro Railroad Company, a corporation incorporated by the legislature of New Jersey, March 9, 1859, entered…

Held: That the power of the township to subscribe to the capital stock of the company was not exhausted by the subscription first made after the election held *88 June 3, 1807. 2. That under said section the power of the township to subscribe was limited in amount only. 3. That the consolidation of the company was authorized by the general statute of Illinois of Feb. 28, 1854. 4.

Held: That B. was not bound by the terms of the assignment to take steps for the collection of the judgment before the maturity of the notes. 2. That, in the absence of accident, mistake, or fraud, evidence was not admissible to show his parol agreement, made contemporaneously with the assignment and as part of the transaction, to issue execution and collect the judgment whenever the money could be made thereon.

<p>Error to tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe District of Colorado.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), is a leading Supreme Court of the United States copyright case cited to explain the idea-expression dichotomy. The court held that a book did not give an author the right to exclude others from practicing what was described in the book, only right to exclude reproduction of the material in the book. Exclusive rights to a "useful art" described in a book was only available by patent.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that A.’s right of occupancy ceased with the-term, and that the company had the right to offer the stall for sale to the highest bidder. 2. Where a number of bidders filed such a bill, the value of the right to sell, which the company claimed and the court below denied, determines the jurisdiction here.

Held: that, independently of that act, the bonds are not, in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, rendered invalid by reason of the departure from the statutory provisions touching the application for, and the notice of, the election. 3.

Held: that, independently of the question of authority to convene that extra session, or of the validity of the laws enacted thereat, the bonds are binding on the county, inasmuch as the act of Congress is eauivalent to a direct grant of power to issue them. Error to the Supreme Court of Dakota Territory. The facts are stated in the

Held: that the Statute of Limitations commenced running when the alleged fraud was perpetrated, and that it is not avoided by a replication averring that B. fraudulently concealed the facts in the declaration mentioned, touching the incumbering or the conveying of the property, the confession of judgments, and his real ownex-ship of the property, and that A. had no knowledge of them until a short time before the suit was…

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe Northern District of Ohio.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Eastern District of Arkansas. This was an action brought by Martha W. Mason against Edward T. Worthington and Isaac M. Worthington, administrators of Elisha Worthington, deceased, to recover for work ■and labor done and services rendered to the intestate. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $12,000, for which there was judgment, and the administrators sued out this writ of error.. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: That the statute creating *154 the board for equalizing bank shares is not void as a violation of the Constitution of Ohio, because if the local assessors would discharge their duty by assessing all property at its actual cash value the operation of the equalizing board would work no inequality of taxation, and a statute cannot be held to be unconstitutional which in itself does not conflict with the Constitution,…

Held: That in addition to his salary A. was entitled to the fees and emoluments allowed to such officers by pre-existing legislation. 2. That having paid them into the treasury pursuant to a peremptory order of his superior officer he was not thereby precluded from recovering them in a suit against the United States. Appeal from the Court of Claims. The facts are stated in the

<p>Appeal from tlie Court of Claims.</p> <p>The facts are seated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That the bank was not prohibited by law from guaranteeing the payment of the note. 2. That it is to be presumed that C. had rightfully the power lie assumed to exercise, and the bank is estopped to" deny it. 3. That the bank by its retention and enjoyment of the proceeds of the note, rendered the act of C. as binding as if it had been expressly authorized.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That the statute is penal, and must be strictly construed.. 2. That the defendant is not liable, if the debt was contracted by the corporation before, although it may remain unpaid during, the period when he neglected or refused to comply with the requirements of the statute. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.

Held: That the commissioners being the sole judges upon the question of disposing of the bonds, their decision was conclusive. 2. That the fact that under the act of 1869, Pompton, instead of being a terminal township, became thereafter a township “ along the route of the road,” cannot affect the previously vested rights of a bona fide transferee of the securities. 3.

Held: since which time various transfers of portions of the new or substituted stock have been made, but the respondents do not know to whom or by whom they have been made; state the names of certain persons who, together with the defendants, are holders and owners of. portions of the stock; and ask that all said persons be made parties, and that an accounting be had, in conformity with the prayer of the bill.

Held: That a suit in equity by or 1 for all creditors is the appropriate mode of enforcing the liability incurred on such failure. 2. That, were an action at law maintainable by one creditor, the stockholders must be separately sued, as their liability is several. 2. Pollard v. Bailey ( 20 Wall. 520 ) cited and approved. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina.

Held: that the city is not liable to the company for the amount so paid. Error to tbe Supreme Court of tbe State of Pennsylvania. Tbis was a suit brought by tbe Pittsburgh Gas Company against tbe city of Pittsburgh, to recover certain moneys paid by tbe company to tbe United States.

This was an action of assumpsit by Jerome B. Pollard, a citizen of Illinois, against the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company, a general carrier of passengers, for damages sustained by him in consequence of an injury to his wife, Sarah H. Pollard, caused by the negligence of,, the defendant while she was a passenger on its road, having a tifiket from New York to Chicago, purchased for her by her husband.

Held: after an extended consideration of the authorities, that as the husband was at the time free from debt, the conveyance was to be deemed a voluntary settlement upon her; and as it was not made with any fraudulent intent, it was valid against subsequent creditors; and that the improvements upon the property stood upon the same footing as the conveyance, it appearing that they had been made before the debts were…

Held: that a sale by A. to B. of a portion of the lands, which was known to C., and evidenced by an instrument under seal, was a trade within the meaning of the agreement. 3.

<p>1. Lands in Mississippi belonging to a married woman, which she, at a stipulated rent, leased to her husband, who entered thereon and cultivated them in his own name and for his own benefit, are not, during the term, her plantation, within the meaning of the statute of that State which enacts that alt contracts of the husband and wife or either of them for supplies for her plantation may be “ enforced, and satisfaction secured out of her separate estate.”</p> <p>2. A contract for such supplies will not bind the separate property of the wife, unless she be the beneficiary of the cultivation, and they in fact are purchased for her account and benefit.</p> <p>3. A parol lease of lands in Mississippi for one year, made by a woman to her husband, is not invalid.</p> <p>4. The recital in a deed of trust of her separate estate, executed by her and her husband, that it is given to secure her indebtedness, evidenced by her and his notes, does not estop her from showing that they were given for supplies furnished for a plantation, which he cultivated in his name and for his benefit.</p> <p>5. In order to work an estoppel, the parties to a deed must he sui juris competent to make it effectual as a contract.</p>

Held: in the case of Johnson v. Harmon ( 94 U. S. 371 ), that a bill of exceptions cannot be taken on the trial of a feigned issue directed by a court of equity, or, if taken, can only be used on a motion for a new trial.' We are still of that opinion, for the reasons then stated. The court below may have been abundantly satisfied from the evidence taken at the trial that the complainant had no case.

Held: that, if in a second reissue the disclaimed inventions are embraced, he cannot sustain a bill to enjoin the infringement of them. 2. Quaere, are reissued letters-patent valid, if they contain any thing which the patentee disclaimed, or in the reieotion of which he acquiesced, in order to obtain the original letters 1 Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky.

Held: that the plaintifE is not entitled to recover. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois. The facts are stated in the

Held: that the answer was properly admitted. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut. The facts are stated in the

Held: That B.’s title under the pre-emption laws is subject to A.’s right of way under said act of 1866. 2. That said act expressly, confirmed to the owners of such canals a pre-existing right, which the government had by its policy theretofore recognized.

Held: that the instruction was proper. 2. The changes of classification and phraseology made in the act of 1862 show an intention to take out of the mixed-material clause of the act of 1861 (which was limited to manufactures not otherwise provided for) some . descriptions of goods which the act placed there, and, by transferring them to another class, subject them to the additional duty prescribed for that class. 3.

Held: That by the law of Ohio a judgment is a Hen from “ the first day of the . term at which the judgment is rendered,” and as before that day the road had been sold and the sale confirmed, no lien by the judgment existed: 2.

Held: and all the several trustees of the prior mortgages filed answers, setting up in form their respective mortgages and stating the amounts due. Each answer concluded with the statement that the answering defendant knew of no reason why the prayer of the bill should not be granted.

Held: that the court erred in rendering any other than a personal judgment against the defendant. Ebbor to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. The facts are stated in the

Held: should supply the amount necessary to that end. In this connection we may notice another important difference between the act in the form in which it was submitted to the legislature and that in which it finally passed.

Held: That, assuming the identity of the firm remained after the change of its members and name, the authority Of B., as executor, to continue a specifically designated existing interest in the firm did not extend to the use in its business of any other funds or property of the estate. 2.

<p>Appeal from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe District of Massachusetts.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court.</p>

Held: that the repealing statute of 1865 did not impair the obligation of a contract, within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States. *338 Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. The facts"' are stated in the

Held: after delivering part of the amount, been legally released from the obligation to deliver the balance. He was, however, carried before the military authority in a state of fear and trepidation, and to save himself further trouble agreed to and did deliver the remainder of the oats.

Held: that the commissioners are not entitled to relief. Appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The Freedman’s Savings and TrusiTCompany, and John A. J. Creswell and others, its commissioners,-filed, June 26, 1875, two bills in equity in the court-Below against Thomas M. Lanahan and others.

Held: or which may be held, in perpetuity. It can also be sustained, without violating the main proposition laid down in the Starkweather case; viz., that a foreign corporation, forbidden by the' laws of the State creating it, to acquire lands there, by devise, could’ not, by that mode, take lands in Illinois, in the absence of a statute of that State assenting thereto.

Held: That the bequest, conceding it to be for charitable uses, is invalid. '2. That the legislation of Virginia touching devises or bequests for the establishment or endowment of unincorporated schools or validating conveyances for the use and benefit of any religious society does not apply to this béquest. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for tbe Western District of Virginia.

Held: that the decree did not render the main controversy res judicata, as the court merely decided in effect that the billwoulcl not lie. 2. A power to “ sell and exchange ” lands includes the power to make partition of them. 8.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. Where an appeal has been taken to this court the condition of the bond that the appellants “ shall duly prosecute their said appeal with effect, and, moreover, pay the amount of costs and damages rendered and to be rendered in case the decree shall be affirmed in said court,” meets all the requirements of Sect. 1000 Rev. Stat.</p> <p>2. In such a case the court will not entertain a motion by the appellee to affirm the decree appealed from.</p>

Held: that its subsequent recognition of the validity of the contract, was binding upon it although the statute declares that a corporation so organized shall not commence business before such articles are so filed. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan. The facts are stated in the

• Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for tiie District of New Jersey. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: That the continuity of the proceedings in bankruptcy was unbroken and that the assignment was operative, according to its terms, although the act upon which the adjudication was iiad was first alleged in said amendment to the petition. 2. That C.’s suit was not barred by the Statute of Limitations. *404 Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

Held: upon the authority of Burr v. City of Carbondale, that a county tax levied in payment of bonds issued, under legislative authority, to secure the location, within that county, of a State Industrial university, was a tax for a corporate purpose.

Held: as far back as 1844, after deliberate consideration, that the absence of such notice from the record, or the fact that no such notice was given, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court, but was merely a matter of error, to be corrected by an appellate tribunal; and this decision has been repeatedly recognized as correctly marking the distinction between matters of error and matters of jurisdiction in…

<p>A. and B. in November, 1846, entered into an agreement under seal, providing for the settlement of long standing and disputed accounts. A balance from B. to A. was ascertained and the mode of payment and security agreed upon. A. released property of B. from the lien of judgments. B. among other things stipulated that he would obtain partition of certain lands wherein he had an undivided interest, and convey in fee the part assigned to him in severalty to A. at such price as should he adjudged by three appraisers, one to he appointed by A., one by B. and one by the other two. Such price to be credited on the judgments held by A. against B. and that the latter would give good security for the balance remaining due. B. died in 1849. There was no partition until 1866, when it was. effected by his devisees, a fact not known .to A. until 1872. They have made to A. no conveyance of the part of said lands assigned to them in severalty. A. filed his bill in 1876, alleging that he had performed all the stipulations on his part to be performed, and that $40,000 of ' the original debt with accruing interest remains unpaid, and praying for such a conveyance, for the ascertainment of the balance under the order of the court and for general relief. The devisees demurred. Meld, 1. That upon the case made by the bill, A’s remedy was not barred by the lapse of time. 2.-That A. having under the agreement parted with rights, and B. received value, the consideration of which was in part the stipulation concerning the lands, the-agreement for the conveyance can be specifically enforced and -tbe court will, if it be necessary, provide a mode for ascertaining the value of the lands.</p>

The facts of this case are as follows: — In December, 1812, the State of South Carolina established a bank in the name and for the benefit of the State, and pledged the faith of the State to supply any deficiency in the funds specially set apart as its capital, and to make good any losses arising from such deficiency.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that on filing his claim within the time, and in the mode prescribed by the statute, he has, as against the mortgagees, a paramount lien upon the entire road. 2.

Held: that the district courts of the Territory have jurisdiction in admiralty cases. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington.

Held: that A. is not entitled to recover. Appeals from the Court of Claims.

<p>1. The court announces its determination to insist upon a strict observance by counsel of all rules intended to facilitate the examination of causes, especially those submitted.</p> <p>2. The submission of a cause under the 20th rule set aside for non-compliance with paragraph 4, subdivision 3, of Rule 21, which provides that “when a statute of a State is cited, so much thereof as may be deemed necessary to the decision of the case shall be printed at length,” either in or with the brief.</p>

Held: that the bill was properly dismissed. Error to tbe Supreme Court of tbe State of California. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court. Tbe case was argued by Mr. Richard T. Merrick for tbe plaintiff in error. No counsel appeared for tbe defendant in error.

Held: that his inaction, delay, and siience for more than six *480 teen years were such as encouraged such manufacture and sale of it, and that the circumstances showed his abandonment of it. 6.

Held: that the facts made a complete case of estoppel in pais, and that nothing passed by B.’s deed. 2. An attorney employed by both parties to an- agreement for the purchase of land for the sum of $8,000, upon discovering a defect in the title, concealed the fact from one of the parties, and in accordance with a secret agreement with the other procured a conveyance by quitclaim for the sum of $25 to E., his own brother.

Held: that he had no devisable interest in the land. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon. The facts are stated in the

This is a suit in equity commenced on the 24th of December, 1877. The case made by the bill is as follows : — On the 20th of July, 1848, Lemuel Scott, a married man, settled on six hundred and forty acres of land in Oregon, and became a claimant thereof under the laws of the provisional government. On the 27th of September, 1850, Congress passed the “ Donation Act ” (9 Stat. 496), the provisions of which are fully stated in Hall v, Mussell, supra, p. 508.

<p>The terms of a contract under seal may be varied by a subsequent parol agreement.</p>

Held: that the charter did not amount to a contract that the company should never be required to pay a license fee greater than that required of such companies at the date when the company was incorporated. 2.

Held: that there was no error in the instruction. 2. The charter-party fixed no definite time for the vessel to be at New Orleans ready to receive her cargo. Held, that if the master used reasonable diligence in bringing her to that port, the defendants were bound by the contract. 3. Where the bill of exceptions does not show what answer was made to a question put to a witness, error cannot be assigned upon the question.

Held: That the law implies that a contract was entered into prior to Aug. 1,1866. 2. That the company'is liable for that tax. 3. A. railroad company paid, Aug. 1, 1870, to the holders of its bonds $61,495 as interest then due. Held, that the company was liable to the United States to a tax of five per cent on that amount. 4.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. The Circuit Court, when its decree is affirmed and the mandate filed there, must record the order of this court and proceed with the execution of the decree.</p> <p>2. For all the purposes of the case, a judgment of affirmance here by d divided court is as effectual as if all the judges had concurred therein.</p>

<p>1. Statutes are not to be construed as altering the common' law, or as making any innovation therein, further than their words import.</p> <p>2. Although a statute makes bills of lading negotiable by indorsement, and delivery, it does not follow that all the consequences incident to the indorsement of bills and notes before maturity ensue or are intended to result from such negotiation.</p> <p>3. The rule that a bona fide purchaser of a lost or stolen bill or note indorsed in</p> <p>blank or payable to bearer is not bound to look beyond the instrument, has - no application to the case of a lost or stolen bill of lading. i. The purchaser of a bill of lading who has reason to believe that his vendor was not the owner thereof, or that it was held to secure an outstanding draft, is not a bona fide purchaser, nor entitled to hold the merchandise covered by the bill against its true owner.</p> <p>5. Where the judgment below was entered properly, this court will not remand the case for a new trial because of the verbal mistake of the clerk in using a superfluous word in entering the verdict. As the verdict was amendable in the court below, the amendment will be regarded as made.</p>

<p>1. Where it appears by the complainant’s bill that the remedy is barred by lapse of time, or that by reason of his laches he is not entitled to relief, the'defendant may by demurrer avail himself of the objection.</p> <p>2. Under the rules of equity practice established by this court, the complainant is not entitled, as a matter of right, to amend his bill after a demurrer there-, to has been sustained; but the court may, in its discretion, grant him leave to do so upon such terms as it shall deem reasonable.</p> <p>3. The order refusing him such leave cannot be reviewed here, if the record does not show what amendment he desired to make.</p> <p>4. Wood v. Carpenter (supra, p. 135) reaffirmed.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland.</p>

Held: That the probate record showing the inventory and the order for distributing the assets of the testator is not conclusive evidence that the note has been paid. 2. That an executor’s settlement when adjudicated binds only the parties thereto. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.

This was a bill in equity, filed by J. W. Y. Y&ndenburgh, H. L. Crawford, and L. S. Filbert, trading as J. W. V. Vandenburgh & Co., against Rudolph Blumenburgh, to compel the surrender of a certain certificate, of which the following is a copy: — “No. 4441.] Office of Auditor, Board of Public Works, “ Washington, D. C., Dec. 6, 1873. “ I hereby certify that I have this day audited and allowed the account of J. Y. W. Yandenburgh & Co., for work on Columbia Stre.et, amounting…

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the action of the court was proper. Error to the Circuit Court of . the United States for the Western District of Texas. This was an action of trespass to try the title to certain lands in Texas, brought by Thomas J. Hollingsworth against John T. Flint and D. T. Chamberlain. Flint filed a disclaimer of title.

Held: That the papers were competent evidence. 2. That the refusal of the court to charge as requested by the defendant was proper. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The facts are stated in the

Held: that they were entitled to the relief prayed for.

Held: that a petition for its removal filed thereafter should not be granted. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri. The facts are stated in the

Held: that he had the right to collect rents belonging to a citizen who had gone and remained within the lines of the enemy, and hold them subject to such disposition as might thereafter be made of them by the decisions of the proper tribunals. 5.

Held: That it was the debt of B. and not that of A. which was intended, to be, and'is, secured by the mortgage. 2. That parol evidence was admissible to show such intent. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for tbe Eastern District of blew York.

Held: That A.’s grant of permission to C. to cut and remove the timber was the release of an important security to him against possible loss if payment were not made on the contract, and that the guaranty was a reasonable exaction from C. therefor. 2. That said representations not coming from A., nor relating to the permission to cut and remove the timber, did not release C. from liability on the guaranty. 2.

Held: that the judgment, having been rendered upon the finding of a referee that such representations were not made, is conclusive, as to the facts found, in all sub* ~uent controversies between the parties on the contract. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan. The facts are stated in the

Held: that inasmuch as the claim of B. does not arise out of the decree, and the United States is not liable to suit thereon, except in the Court of Claims, B. is not entitled to the relief prayed for. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee. The facts are stated in the

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the' court.</p>

This is a suit, commenced July 5, 1872, by Jacob E. Buerk against William Imhaeuser, Theodore Hahn, and Charles Keinath doing business as Imhaeuser & Co., for the alleged infringement by them of letters-patent No. 48,048, granted to him June 6, 1866, for an improvement in watchman’s time detectors.

Held: that the tax-payers were not thereby required to “ express ” (that is, designate) the company by name; and that an ass snt authorizing the money to be paid “ to the president and directors of a railroad company organized according to the requirements of the general railroad laws for the purpose of constructing a railroad connecting Lake Ontario with the Susquehanna and Cayuga Railroad and passing through the city of…

Eastern District of Missouri. This was an action by Joseph M. Douglass on three hundred and twenty-one overdue coupons detached from bonds issued by the county of Pike, Missouri. The bonds are in the following form: —' “ No.-.] State oe Missouri. [$500.00.

Held: that the former decree is as res judicata a bar to the suit. 2. Whenever a creditor has a trust in his favor, or a lien upon property for the debt due him, he may go into equity without exhausting his remedy at law. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. The facts out of which this case arises are stated in Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119 .

Held: that unless the bonds are so indorsed, a holder of them cannot maintain an action thereon. 3. A township in. Missouri voted to subscribe for stock in a railroad company. The proper county court, March 28, 1872, mad., the subscription, and, June 4, ordered that the bonds in payment therefor be issued. They were issued in October following, but bore date the day of the subscription.

Held: that the petition was properly dismissed.' 2. United, States v. D’Auterieve ( 14 How. 14 ), in which the same grant was under consideration, cited and approved. Appeal from tbe District Court of tbe United States for tbe District of Louisiana. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court. Mr. Edward Janin for tbe appellants. The Solicitor- General, contra.. *701

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>This action was brought by Eniilie Moulor, widow of Louis Moulor, against the American' Life Insurance Company, upon a policy of insurance upon his life issued June 17, 1872. The instrument contains the following stipulation: “ And it is hereby declared and agreed that if the representations and answers made to this company in the application for this policy, upon the full faith of which it is issued, shall be found to be untrue in any respect, or that there has been any concealment of facts, then, and in such case, this policy shall be null and void.” The application contains the following interrogatories and answers, among others : “ Seventh. Has the party ” (Louis Moulor) “ ever been afflicted with any of the following diseases ? Answer ‘ yes ’ or ‘ no ’ to each. Insanity ? No. — Gout? No. — Rheumatism? No. — Palsy? No. — Scrofula? No. — Convulsions? No. — Dropsy?. No..— Small-pox? No. Yellow fever ? Yes. — Fistula ? No. ■— Rupture ? No. — Asthma? No.— Spitting of blood? No. — Consumption? No. — Any diseases of the lungs or throat ? No. — Or of the heart ? No. — Or of the urinary organs ? No.”</p> <p>Interrogatory twelfth. “ How long since the party was attended by a physician ? For what disease or diseases? ” Answer. “ Not since the year 1847, when he had the yellow fever.”</p> <p>After these answers the application contained the following: “ It is hereby declared and warranted that the above are fair and true answers to the foregoing questions, and it is acknowledged and agreed by the undersigned ” (Louis Moulor) “ that this application shall form a part of the contract of insurance, and that if there be in any of the answers herein made any untrue or evasive statements, or any misrepresentations, or concealment of facts, then any policy granted upon this application shall be null and void.”</p> <p>The defence set up at the trial was that some of the answers to the interrogatories contained in the application were untrue, and this defence was attempted to be supported by the testimony of a single witness, Dr. Mathieu. He testified that he had been the family physician of Moulor since 1855; that in 1858 and 1859 he attended Moulor for chronic asthma, manifestations of the first stage of consumption, and also treated him for scrofula. The witness did not testify positively that Moulor had the diseases- for which he treated'him, but his testimony was that Moulor never learned from him or any other physician, and . that he never suspected or had the remotest idea that he was affected with any such diseases; on the contrary, that he always boasted of himself as being a strong, healthy, and robust man. The witness further testified that the asthma Moulor had was the dry, nervous asthma, attended by no expectoration; that there was nothing connected with it to make the patient believe he had it.' As to the first stage of consumption, there was no softening of the tubercles, and, therefore, no expectoration of the tuberculous matter. As to the scrofula, that his was very mild diathesis.</p> <p>This was all the testimony adduced, and now relied upon to prove that the answers in the application were untrue.</p> <p>There was, however, in evidence the statement of two medical examiners attending the application. They represented the assured as in perfect health, and as having never had any constitutional disease except yellow fever, and a curvature of the spine in his early youth, and as having no predisposition, either hereditary or acquired, to any constitutional disease.</p> <p>The court instructed the jury to find for the defendant. Judgment having been rendered accordingly, the plaintiff sued out this writ.</p>

Held: that the case is not one which caUs for interposition by mandamus. Petition for mandamus. The facts are stated in the

Held: that he did not lose his lien because his notice claimed it upon the property as an entirety, without specifically setting forth the amount claimed upon each building. 2.

This was an action brought by the United States upon the bond of a collector of internal revenue. The breach assigned was his failure to pay over the balance alleged to be due July 1, 1871, for stamps and other property transmitted to him by the proper officers of the government, and for public moneys which he had collected. The plaintiff put in evidence a certified account from the books of the Treasury Department showing the balance due.

Held: that he was not thereby estopped from setting up his lien, as against the mortgagee. 3. If the holders of the bonds sustained any loss by reason of the guaranty, the company which gave it is liable in damages. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States .for the District of Iowa. The facts are sufficiently stated in the

Held: that the creditors are entitled to payment, and that the residue of the fund, the same not being more than sufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt, belongs to the mortgagee, and is not chargeable with any expense incurred by the assignee in the execution of his trust. 4.

Held: That the motion prolonged the suit, and the parties thereto were in'court until it should be finally disposed of. 2. That under such circumstances it was competent for the court at the, ensuing term, to grant the motion, vacate the allowance of an appeal to this court, and pass a decree of reversal. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The facts are stated in the

Held: that the land in controversy having been certified as part of the lands granted to Iowa for the improvement of the Des Moines River, the governor of the State was authorized to convey it to said company. Appeal from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for the District of Iowa. Tbe facts are stated in the opinion of tbe court.

Held: that the statutory interest, which is in the nature of a penalty, cannot be exacted for non-payment of them within the time prescribed by law, where the owner, on the adjustment of the title, offered to pay so much of them as was actually due, with interest thereon at the rate allowed by law f<jr delay in the payment of ordinary debts, and his offer was refused. 4.

Held: That at the time B. undertook to sell the property to E., the trust estate created in him by the will of A. had become extinct. 2. That his powers as trustee having ceased, his conveyance to E. was void. Appeal from the Supreme.Court of the District of Columbia.

This suit was brought by Powers & Weightman, of Philadelphia, against the collector of that port to recover the additional duty of ten per cent ad valorem, exacted by him under the third section of the act of June 6,1872 (17 Stat. 282; Rev. Stat., sect. 2501), upon certain opium imported by them in 1874 from Liverpool, it having previously been exported from Persia to England, by way of the Isthmus of Suéz and the Mediterranean.

<p>1. This court follows the decision of thé Supreme Court of Georgia, that authority to grant the franchise of establishing and maintaining a toll-bridge over a river where it crosses a public highway in that State, is vested solely in the legislature, and may be exercised by it, or be committed to such agencies as it may select.</p> <p>2. The construction by the State court of a statute under which a court made an exclusive grant of such franchise within designated limits, upon conditions which the grantee performed, is not conclusive here upon the question whether a subsequent conflicting grant impairs the obligation of a contract.</p> <p>3. The statutes of Georgia confer upon certain courts the power to establish such bridges, but not to bind the public in respect to its future necessities. The legislature could, therefore, authorize the erection and maintenance of another bridge within the limits of the original grant.</p>

This was an action of ejectment brought by the defendants in error in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, for the recovery, of a parcel of land on Mon Louis Island, a triangular tract of over 14,000 acres of land in the lower part of •that county, bounded on the east by Mobile Bay, on the northwest by Fowl River, and on the south by the waters of the sound which separates the mainland, of which Mon Louis Island is a part, from Dauphin Island.

Held: that the Circuit Court, the cause having been thereto removed, properly ruled that the parties, as to the rights litigated and disposed of, were concluded by the judgment. /AUREAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.

Held: That this provision is not in conflict with sect. 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from “ passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts.” 2. That such a charter is in legal effect nothing more than a license to enjoy the privilege conferred for the time, and on the terms specified, subject to future legislative or constitutional control or withdrawal. 2.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Held: that the repeal of the statute deprives the court . of jurisdiction to proceed, and is not in violation of the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama. The Revised Code of Alabama contains the following provisions : — “ Sect. 2534." State may be sued by citizens, or domestic corporations.

Held: that the decree so afiirmed hears interest at that rate. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The facts are stated in the

Held: That the junior judgment creditor was not a necessary party, although, before the bill was filed, he had put on record in the proper office the sheriff’s deed conveying the road to him pursuant to a sale under an execution sued out upon his judgment. 2. That he could not maintain ejectment against the purchasers, under the decree directing the sale of the road to' satisfy the older judgment.