Volume 12 — North Carolina Reports

From Sampson. Detinue for negro slaves, pleas non deiinet, statute of limitations. — On the trial, before Norwood, Judge, the Plaintiffs claimed title by a parol gift made in 1802 from the Defendant to the Plaintiff, Ann bis daughter, and offered evidence of such gift.

From Moore. Case for speaking of the Plaintiff these words, “you swore to a lie to-day, in a case tried before Josiah Tyson, Esquire, against Daniel McDonald, for killing a dog, and you offered to swear to a lie before.” On the trial before Norwood, Judge, tiie Plaintiff not being able to produce the warrant, on which the proceedings before Tyson were had, nor to account for its absence, the Judge directed a nonsuit, holding such proof to be a necessary part of the…

From Rockingham. This was an action on the Case for verbal Slander. The words charged in the declaration to have been spoken were, that the Plaintiff had broken the Defendant’ house and stolen bis gun, or that lie (the Plaintiff) had caused Iiis negVo slave to do it. The Defendant pleaded not guilty, and a justification.

From Moore, In 1822, one Isham Sheffield obtained judgment and sued out execution thereon against Hussey, the Defendant’s intestate, one Garner, and others. The execution was levied by M’Neil, the Sheriff, upon the personal property of Hussey, who was the principal debtor.

From Iredell, Assumpsit for goods sold by the Plaintiff, as administrator of William Hutchinson. Plea infancy. Replication, that the Defendant promised after he came of age. On the trial, a witness, who had been the Guardian of the Defendant, proved that the Defendant, after he cameof age, together with the other distributees of Wm.

From Cumberland. This cause was bought op to this Court by certiorari, awarded on a rule made absolute, without notice to the Defendant, the Plaintiff swearing that be prayed an appeal to this Court, but that the Superior Court adjourned before he could get his sureties to the Court-House, for the purpose of giving bond.

From Burke. Assumpsit upon a written contract, dated in the year 1803, to convey three hundred acres of land on the Mississippi $ “ the titles to be made as soon as the Indian claim to said land, shall be extinguished.” The declaration contained an averment that the Defendant’s intestate died before the Indian claim was extinguished, and the breach assigned was, “ that the Defendant’s had not made to the Plaintiff a title to the land.” Pleas non assumpsit, and the statute of…

From Davidson. Case for a deceit in the sale of land. The Defendant carried the Plaintiff upon the land, and shewed him a bottom containing about two acres, which lie represented asa part of the land: a bargain was made, and the Plaintiff paid the purchase-money. The Defendant tendered the Plaintiff a deed, which did not include the bottom, and which the latter refused.

<p>An intermeddling for which there is a colourable right, will not malee a wrongful executorship.</p> <p>Where A sold the property of B, as his agent, and after the death of B, collected the proceeds : this does not make him an executor de son tort.</p> <p>Where there is an administration, acts for which the agent is responsible to the administrator, will not make him an executor de son tort.</p>

From Currituck. Petition for dower. The only question presented to the Court, was that decided in Hodges v. JtPCdbe, (3 Hawks, 78) viz. whether the wife is dowable of lands sold after the husband’s death, under an execution tested and levied before. The case was argued at June Term, 1825, by Leonard Martin for the Petitioner, and Gaston for the Defendant. No note of this argument is in the possession of the Reporters.

<p>From Iredell.</p> <p>Debt on a single bond, made by the Defendant to JV*oa/i Partee, and assigned to the Plaintiff after it be came due.</p> <p>On the trial the Defendant offered to prove, that the bond was given to satisfy three others, made by the Defendant’s brother, James M’Lean to Partee, one of which was fraudulently obtained by Partee, having been executed when James was drunk, and did not know what he was doing, and that this was unknown to the Defendant, when he delivered the bond in suit.</p> <p>His honor Judge Daniei, rejected the evidence, as not constituting a defence in a court of law. A verdict was rendered for the Plaintiff; a rule for a new trial being discharged, and Judgment entered up according to the verdict, Defendant appealed.</p>

From Wake. At Spring Term 1823, before Basgek, Judge, judgment was, on motion, entered up against the present appellants, sureties of A. McAlister, sheriff of Sampson, upon the following certificate : I Joseph Ifaiekins, Comptroller, of the Treasury of the State of North-Carolina, do hereby certify the above and foregoing account to be raised from documents filed in this office, except as to the fine, which is charged agreeably to law.

From Stokes. Debt upon a bond, conditioned that William Barr should “ well and truly execute, and due return make, of all process, &c. and pay and satisfy alt fees and sums of money by him received, &c. and in all other things well, truly and faithfully execute the office of Sheriff, &c.” The breach assigned was that Barr had not paid over certain County taxes, which “ he liad collected and received by virtue of bis office as Sheriff.1” After oyer, the Defendants plead, ist.…

<p>Devise “ that the residue of my estate, Teal and personal, be equally divided between the heirs of my brother John Ford, (he being noticed as living,) the heirs of my sister Nancy Stow, the heirs of my sister Sully Ward, and nephew Levi Ward.”</p> <p>Held, that the real estate must-be divided per stirpes, and that Levi Ward takes one fourth under the devise to him byname, anda share of the fourth devised to the heirs of Sally Ward.</p> <p>Devise “ to the heirs of A," they take in the same proportion as if the estate had descended to them from A.</p>

From Caswell. A deed from Solomon Graves to Sarah B. Carter having been produced on the trial of a former suit between these parties, under a subpoena duces tecum directed to the. agent of Sarah B, Carter, and. having been left among the papers of that cause, the clerk, under the instruction of Solomon Graves’ counsel refusing to deliver it up, Mrs. Carter applied for permission to withdraw it from the office.

From Rutherford. Trover for a horse, tried before Daniex Judge.

From Stokes. Assumpsit on an accountable receipt given by the Defendant, a constable, for two notes, expressing that the notes were received from the Plaintiff/or collection. On the trial before Daniex, Judge, a verdict was taken for the Plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court, whether, upon the following facts, the Plaintiff had any cause of action. The Plaintiff resided in the State of Massachusetts, and had no agent residing in this State.

From Bancombe. Assumpsit. — The declaration contained a count for work and labor done, and also a special count stating, in substance, that the Plaintiff had contracted with one Jason W. Wilson to build a house upon bis land, and the house not being entirely finished within the time specified in the contract, it was agreed between the Plaintiff and Defendant, that the latter should take the house in its Unfinished state, for the price agreed to be paid by Wilson, deducting…

From Rowan. Covenant upon the following instrument: “ The condition on which Henry Williams and Daniel Wood settled is this : — The said Wood is to pay to the said Williams three hundred and sixty dollars ; one hundred dollars of which sum, was paid at or before the signing of this ; and the balance to be paid as soon as they can conveniently get James Brooks to testify, what money was returned by him, to the said Wood, for George Williams, out of the two hundred and seven…

From Montgomery. This was a sci.fa. against the Defendants, as bail of one Cooper. The Defendants pleaded several pleas, and among them, a surrender by them of their principal to the Sheriff; and on the trial before Daniel Judge, the case turned wholly upon this last plea.

From Beaufort. In July 1792, Elias Godley and others, heirs of Nathan Godley, entered into a written agreement with Mary Godley, his widow, by which it was recited, that the said Nathan had by his will made no provision for his widow, and that she had taken the same into consideration, and that it had been mutually agreed between the parties that she should receive from the heirs a negro girl named Lucy, for her natural life, in full satisfaction of her dower and other…

From Nash. An action had been pending in this Court, in which one Dempsey Taylor was the Plaintiff, and Hanan & Zealous Taylor were the Defendants — Dempsey died, and in consequence of his death, the action abated some terms ago, and the Defendants took out letters on his estate. ' At last term, Badger, on behalf of the officers of the Court below, and of the witnesses who had attended in that Court, obtained a rule upon the Defendants in their own right, and also as…

From Edgecombe. The Plaintiffs declared in debt on a single bond executed by Henry Hunter, Peter .Evans and Gray Little, for 3870 dollars, payable to the Plaintiffs, dated December 28th 1819, and due eighty-eight .days thereafter,- fto which the Defendants pleaded usury.

<p>From Orange.</p> <p>The Plaintiff proved that F. Child had bought of Young and Turner a wagon of the value charged.</p> <p>It was then proved by another witness, that at the request of 'Young, the deceased partner, he drew off the above account, that F. Child was in the room while this was doing, hut the account was not presented to him for payment, nor did he declare his approval of it. This witness also stated that Young, in directing him how to state'the account, informed him that the amount of the wagon had been settled by the mother of Mr. Child, and directed credits to be given, and the account to be. stated shewing the above balance to be due. On this proof, the Defendant’s counsel insisted, that the wagon being the only article proved to have been delivered, am! Young having acknowledged payment for that, the Plaintiff couj¿ not recover.</p> <p>On the other side, it was said that the instructions to the witness and the account stated in pursuance thereof were all one transaction, and the account though in writ, ing, part of the declarations of Young, that the whole, when offered in evidence, should be submitted to the Jury, to bo judged of by them ,• and the Defendant was not at liberty to select the particular declaration which served his purpose, and offer that to the Jury to discharge himself, separated from the written statement then made, by which he was charged — and of this opinion was the presiding Judge.</p>

From Edgecomb. Tifo Defendants were indicted for an assault and battery; On the trial the prosecutor proved that he had'kept a school for three weeks, in a house on the land of one Cely Weeks, and that he had her permission to use it, as long as he pleased, if he prevented the boys from hurting the orchard.

From Granville. ThE INDICTMENT charged that the Defendant “ fe-loniously did steal, take and carry away, a parcel o oats of .the goods and chattels of one J. R, .Eaton.” After a verdict for the State, the Defendant Counsel move(^ *n am5S His honor Judge Daniel, overruled the motion, and passed sentence upon the Defendant, from which he appealed to this Court.

From New-Hanover. The prisoner was tried upon the following indictment: “ The Jurors for the State upon their oath present, that Curtis… Held: to, against, and upon the said Penelope Orrell, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did shoot and discharge, and that the said Curtis Orrell, with the leaden shot aforesaid, out of the gun aforesaid, then and there by the force of the gunpowder, shot and sent forth as aforesaid, the said Penelope…

From New-Hanover. The Defendant was indicted under the act of 1823 for making an assault “ in and upon the body of one M. J. a white female, with intent her the said M. J. then and there feloniously to ravish, and carnally know, &c.” In making up the Jury, the Counsel for the Defendant challenged for cause those Jurors who were not owners of slaves, which was overruled by the presiding Judge.

From Lincoln. Lockman recovered judgment, in the Court below against one Mien, and the Sheriff retinoid “ NuMa bo-na” to a fieri facias issuing thereon, and the lees due the officers of the Court for services rendered at the instance of Lockman, the Plaintiff, remaining unpaid, a notice was served on iiitn to shew cause why execution should not issue against him for 1 he amount of those fees.

From Lincoln. Debt upon a sealed note, or single bill, tried before Danier Judge. On the trial, the case was that Shannon had been arrested upon a charge of burning a house belonging to one Caldwell, and after ids arrest he gave, his bond, with the other defendant as his surety, payable to Caldwell, for the purpose of compounding the prosecution, upon which the warrant was dismissed.

From Wayne. By the second section of an act of Assembly, passed .in 1810, entitled “ an act to compel persons to give security in certain cases,” it is enacted, “ that iu all cases where certioraris are directed to the County Courts, the derk of the court is hereby required to take security, in the same manner, &c. that security is taken on appeals from the County to the Superior Court.” In 1821, one Jernigan, against whom Edmondson had obtained a judgment in Wayne County…

<p>From Rutherford.</p> <p>The writ and declaration were in debt in the name of t( Gabriel Holmes, Governor, &c. ami successor of John Branch, hue Governor* he.” lor the sum of five thousand pounds, and the action was brought on the official bond given by one Alley, and the Defendants his sureties, upon Alley’s appointment to the office of Sheriff of Rutherford in the year 1820,</p> <p>On the trial before his honor Judge Ruffin-, in order to prove a breach of the condition of the bond, the Plaintiff showed that the State Bank' obtained judgment against one Ledbetter and others, in March 1820, and issued execution thereon directed to Alley, which was by him returned “ satisfied in part by the payment to him of eight hundred dollars and it was proved that Alley refused to pay any part of the money either to the Plaintiffs in the execution, or into Court. .</p> <p>On the part of the Defendants, it was proved that no part of the §300 was actually received by Alley after the execution came into his hands j but that Ledbetter not intending to defend the action, had on being served with the capias ad respondendum, paid that sum to Alley, to be applied to the payment of the judgment, when execution should issue, and the counsel for the Defendants insisted that this was not a receipt by Alley, in his official capacity, and that consequently,' there was no breach shown to support the action. The presiding Judge being of opinion, that this evidence had not varied the case, directed a verdict for the Plaintiff, and a motion for a new trial being overruled, the Defendants appealed.</p> <p>In this Court, the case was considered not only upon the motion for a new trial, but also upon a motion in arrest of judgment made here, and was argued by Gaston, for the Appellants, and by Wilson, contra. s</p> <p>I. The breach assigned, is not for making a false return, but for the non payment of money received on an execution. This distinction is not nominal, for if the Defendant in the execution was insolvent, it would affect the amount of damages.</p> <p>The sureties are liable only according to their engage». nicnt, not for any tiling whirl) may be tantamount to if. . They are bound only tor the official acts of the Sheriff; ^his «as not an official act, as there was no process in the Sheriff’s hands, auth ¿rising him to receive the money as Sheriff.</p> <p>Had no money been paid by Ledbetter, but the Sheriff being his debtor, bad engaged to satisfy the execution, this engagement would not bind the sureties. (Codwise v. Field, 9 Johns. Rep. 263. Turner v. Findali, 1 Crunch. 1 ¡7.)</p> <p>A return is only prima facie evidence of the facts contained in it, if Ihc return had stated the facts now proved, it would not prevent the Plaiujfcff from taking out an alias. (Gyjford v. Woodgate, \ 1 East. 297.</p> <p>If. The verdict cannot be sustained ; 'be bond is made payable to John Branch. Governor, See. not being taken according to the requisites of the art of 1777, it must be regarded as a bond given to an individual. (2 Hawks 4.) Independent of that act, the successor cannot, in case of a sole corporation, take personalty either in possession or in action. The Chamberlain of London is an excep-ceptiou to this rule, founded on the custom of that city ; and the rule is the same, although the grant is to the successors. (Termes déla ley ¡67-68. Com. Dig. Franchise F. 15. Dyer 48 a. Fuhoood’s case 4 Reports 65 a. 1 Rol, M. 515. Co. Litt. 46 b.)</p> <p>1. This question lias already been decided in favor of the Plaintiffs. (State Bank v. Twitty & Ledbetter, 2 Hawks 1.) if there is any error in the charge of the Judge, it is in favor of the Defendants, for it is questionable whether the evidence offered to exculpate them, ought to have been received ; the return, being a matter of record, is not only prima facie evidence, but couctu-sive upon all the partios, unless attacked by the sure-tics, upon the. around of fraud and collusion.between the ’ Plaintiffs and the Sheriff; this is not pretended.</p> <p>2. it is objected, that the suit being brought upon a bond which is good at common law only, ougiit to be brought in the name of John Branch, and not in (but of Gabriel Holmes, as ids successor — non coastal here, but that these are the words of the bond.</p> <p>If however, the Court will presume that Branch is the obligee, then this is a proper case for this Court to a-jnend. (Taylor's Revised 68. Justices of Camden v.</p> <p>Sawyer, 2 Hawks 61. Wilcox v. Hawkins, 3 Ditto 84.)</p>

From Greene. James Eastwood, was Sheriff of Greene, from May, 1819 until May, 1820 ; at which time lie was reappointed and ga»e with the other Defendants, his sureties, the bond on which this anion is bought, dated May 1820, ami conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties.

From Pasquotank. EjectmeNT. — The Jury iri the Court below, found a special verdict, the material facts of which are — that the premises in dispute were devised in 1791, by the will of Thomas Davis to his wife Rebecca, who afterwards intermarried with one Robertson Seville, liad issue by hita a son called William, and died in 1804, leaving the son surviving, upon whom the premises descended.

From Stokes. Case for words tried before Norwood, Judge, and on the ¡rial, the only question was, whether the Plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations. Tbe entry in the margin of tbe writ was in these words, “issued the 18th day of July 1823,” and the Defendant offi-red to prove that in Fact the writ was not issued until the 28th of September, 1823.

From Randolph. Trespass for taking a negro slave out of the posses-sion of the Plaintiff, tried before Norwood, Judge. The Plaintiff claimed title to the negro under a purchase at a Constable’s sale, and should a pluries execution and sale, and a purchase by himself.

From Robeson. By the act of 1777, c. 1A, commonly called “the Court law” at section 63, it is provided that either parly dissatisfied with the judgment of a Justice of the Peace, may appeal to the next County Court, Jirst giving security for prosecuting- his appeal with effect; and by an act passed in 1794, (Rev. c. 414,) the same provision is re enacted.

From Hertford. The Defendant had a boat commanded by one of his slaves, plying for freight on the river Roanoke, and a quantity of corn was shipped on board and delivered to the slave by one John Wilkes, to be carried to Plymouth f*>*’ the customary freight.

From Richmond. This action was commenced the 20th of April, 1824, by warrant from a Justice, to recover the amount of a former Justice’s judgment, arid was brought by appeal to the Superior Court of Richmond, where it was tried at Spring term, 1827.

From Lincoln. The Plaintiff declared in trespass vi et armis, and on the trial before Strange ( Judge, offered to prove that, as he was passing with his wagon on the highway, the Defendants came into the road (but not so as’ to interrupt the Plaintiff’s progress) and commenced beating a drum for the purpose of frightening his horses, whereupon they took fright, ran away, and damageththe PljunfjfT’s wagon, &c. hut the*presiding Judge being of opinion that case, and not…

From Burke. Dj^bt — The Plaintiffs declared upon a jndgment recovered in the State of Tennessee, and the Defendant pleaded “ nul tiel recordOn the trial, before Strange Judge, the Plaintiff produced a duly certified transcript of proceedings had in Bedford county, in Tennessee, by which it appeared on an affidavit made by the Plaintiffs, thát the Defendant had absconded or concealed himself so tlmt process could not be served on him, a writ fef attachment issued, against bis…

<p>By the act of 1796, religious societies or their trustees, have not a general capacity of acquisition, they can only take for the use of the society.</p> <p>Hence, by a conveyance of slaves to the trustees, for purposes forbidden by the policy of the law, nothing passes, and in an action brought in their name to recover such slaves against a stranger, he may, by parol, show the unlawful purpose in contradiction of the deed.</p> <p>It see?jis, that even a party might offer such proof, for, as deeds conclude the parties only when valid, they cannot exclude proof of an unlawful design, which avoids them.</p>

From Northampton. Ejectment, tried before Rueein, Judge, when a verdict was taken subject to the opinion of the Court upon the following case: One Jesse W ebb being seised, and in the actual possession of the premises in dispute, on the 16th March, 1817, conveyed to one John B..Amis in fee upon trust, to sell and pay a debt due to one William, Amis, if Webb should fail to pay.

From Burke. Case for slanderous words. The Plaintiff declared that she being a person of good fame and reputation and so esteemed by all persons, and never having been guilty of any of the infamous acts imputed to her by the Defendant, &c. nevertheless the Defendant being an evil minded person and intending to slander her in her good name, fame and character, on &c. at &c.'“ did falsely and maliciously publish of her the Plaintiff, the'following scan-daloiis words, to-wit…

<p>From Rockingham.</p> <p>The Defendant Matlock, on being appointed Sheriff of Rockingham, entered into a penal’bond in the sum of SOOOl. wjth the other Defendanls as his .sureties, payable to the Governor and his successors, the condition of which was, that he should well ami truly execute all process and precepts to liiin directed, and pay and satisfy all sums of money by him received or levied by virtue of any process into the proper office by which the same by the tenor thereof ought to be paid, on. to the person o.r persons to whom the same should be due, his, her or their executors, &c. and “ in all other things well and truly and faithfully execute the said office of Sheriff during liis continuance therein.” No other bond was given by him, and the county contingent tax having been collected and unaccounted for, the present' action was brought upon this bond to recover the amount of that tax.</p> <p>A verdict having been taken below for the Plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court whether there was any breach of the condition before set forth, his honor Judge Norwood, who presided, directed the verdict to be set aside, and gave judgment for the Defendant p whereupou the Plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>1. That tha Sheriff was always bound, in this State, to collect the public taxes : that this was as much a part of |jis official duty as Sheriff as the execution of the pre* cepts of a Court of law. The office of Sheriff was ere-ated by the act of 1738, c. 3, which abolished that of Provost Marshall, before that time existing. (Swan’s Eevisal, 47).</p> <p>It was the.duty of that officer (the Marshall) to collect and account for taxes, and the Sheriff succeeded to all his duties. This duty of the Sheriff is declared in many public and private laws. He was required to give a bond, and this bond secured the due collection of taxes fJlct of 1738, c. 3. s. 4. Jld of 1740, s. 12, Swan’s Eevisal, 86, 122).</p> <p>To prove the legislative exposition of acts imposing this duty upon the Sheriff before the year 1777, he cited the act of 1741, c. 15, "c. 23, s. 8 & 13; 1743, c. 2; 1745, c. 2, s.4 & 10, c. 10, s. 15,- 1749, C. 2; 1756, c. 1. (Swan’s Eevisal).</p> <p>The bond given under the act of 1777, c. 118, s. 1, (Eevisal 327) is very similar in its provisions to that required under the act of 1738 (Swan’s Eevisal 47)---un-der the last mentioned bond the sureties were uniformly held responsible for the taxes ; and if the condition of that required under the act of 1777 is broad enough to cover the taxes, the sureties to that also ought to be held liable.</p> <p>The several acts of Assembly requiring the Sheriff to give distinct bonds can make no difference ; the distinct bonds are cumulative, giving several securities for the same purpose, but do not affect the one originally given.</p> <p>2. The words of the bonds sued on in this case are sufficiently broad to cover the collection of the taxes. It has been shown that this was a part of his official duty, and if so, must be covered by the words “ shall in all things well and truly execute the said office.” If the collection of taxes is an official duty of the Sheriff, this result must follow, for human ingenuity cannot mention in the human language every possible ami. supposable duty of a Sheriff, f Crummier v. the Governor, Mender-J ' r ■ son’s opinion, ante p. 52).</p> <p>, The case of the Governor v. Barr (antep. 65) is dis-tinguisbable from this. There the sum sought to be recovered, had been remitted — there also several bonds had been given. In both of which particulars it differs from this. . ■'</p> <p>Those cases usually cited against the Plaintiff in questions of-this kind f Liverpool Water-works^ in Atkinson, 6 East 507, Wardens of St. Savior, in Bojstock, 2 «TV. R. 503) have no.application. The question in those cases was, whether the general words of a condition cover a case not within its purview and object. Here the question is, whether there has been a breach of official duty —if there has, a breach of the condition follows of course. '</p> <p>stated the question to he .the very samé which had been decided in this Court at the last term, in the cases Grumpier v. the Governor and the Governor v. Barr upon which be relied as decisive of the present CilSC*</p>

From Stokes. The' Plaintiff was appointed Sheriff of Stokes in June, 1813, and in January, 1814, appointed the Defendant McMurray, one of his deputies, who with the other Defendants as his sureties, executed a penal bond to the Plaintiff, “in which he was called Charles Banner, now Sheriff of Stokes,” with a condition, which after reciting that the Plaintiff had appointed McMurray one of iiis deputies, provided, that if McMurray should ably and faithfully demean himself in…

From Onslow. This was an action of trespass Q. C. F. tried before Daniee, Judge, the Plaintiff deduced title under a grant for 640 acres of- land to one Joel Martin in 1.713, a conveyance to John Starkey in 1759, and subsequent descents and devises to himself.

From Wake. Error from the Superior to the County Court, and upon the return the case was, that the Plaintiff in error had in the County Court plead non assumpsit, payment, a set-off and plene administraron, to an action brought by the Defendant in error. Thp Jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff below upon the three first pleas, and for the Defendant upon the last.

From Pasquotank. Debt for an escape. —On the trial, before Paxton Judge, the case was, that the Plaintiff and one Cluff, had obtained severally judgments against one Wilde, who was arrested by the Defendant as Sheriff of the county, on writs of ca. sa. issued tlicreon, and was duly discharged out of custody, upon giving the bonds required by the act of 1822 ('Taylor’s Rev. c. 1131) for his appearance at the next County Court, to take the benefit of the act, as an insolvent…

From Pitt. Petition for partition, to which the Defendant plead that “ he was not tenant in common with the demandant.” On the trial of this issue the jury returned a special verdict. the material facts of which, were as follows: The laud in question belonged to one Jemima Smith, who conveyed it in fee, to her son Charles.

From Martin. Assumpsit against the Defendant, as indorser of a single bill or obligation* of which one Best was the maker, and the Defendant the payee.

From Burke. Debt for g472, due November, 1799, and secured by bond.

From Lincoln. The prisoner was indicted for a burglary, and on the trial before his honor Judge Strange, the breaking proved, was of the door of a store opening into the street, the store was within three feet of the dweliing-house of the owner, and was inclosed by the same fence — but there was no entrance common to both. His honor instructed the jury, that if they believed the breaking as proved, it was a burglarious one, and the prisoner was guilty.

From Buncombe. The prisoner was indicted of a burglary, and on the trial before Strange Judge, Mr. Solidfor fVilson offered in evidence confessions made by the prisoner, under the following circumstances.

<p>From Buncombe.</p> <p>The Defendant was indicted for perjury alleged to have been committed on a trial before a Justice of the Peace, in which the prisoner was the Plaintiff, and one McGehee the Defendant, for “a debt of one dollar due by account.” Upon the trial, the prisoner was sworn as a witness for himseif, and proved an account for one sifter or .sieve, swearing that it “was just and true.” The prisoner was then asked by the Justice, whether he had not given the sifter to McGehee, to which he replied that he had not given it, but that McGehee then owed him for it. The prisoner was not asked whether the matter in dispute was a book account, nor whether he could prove the delivery of the sifter by other means than his own hook and oath. Neither was the book debt oath exhibi-bed to him, but he was admitted to prove the sale and delivery, without any objections by McGehee, or the Justice. On the trial of the indictment, before his honor Judge Ruppjn, the falsity of the oath was proved by McGehee, who swore that the prisoner had given him the sifter, and by four other witnesses, two of whom sw ore that a short time before the delivery of it, they had heard the prisoner say that he intended to give it to McGehee, and the other two swore, that a short time thereafter, they had heard him say that he had so given it.</p> <p>The Counsel for the prisoner contended, that he could not be convictedfirst, because the falsity of the oath was proved by one witness only •, the other witnesses proving declarations of the prisoner, which although inconsistent with his oath, might be false. Second, that if the oath was false, it was not perjury, as it was taken extrajudicially — a Justice of the Peace not having jurisdiction to swear a party to prove his own account, unless he made the declaration prescribed by the act “ ascertaining the method of proving book debts.” Both of these objections, were overruled by the presiding Judge, who instructed the jury, that if they were satisfied by the oaths of two witnesses, tiiat the prisoner had deliberately, knowingly and corruptly, taken a false oath, they ought to find him.guilty. And that the rule of law requiring two witnesses to convict, was well satisfied by the proof of the declarations made by the prisoner, provided they believed the witnesses who swore to them.</p> <p>The Jury found the prisoner guilty, and his Counsel moved, first for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, and second in arrest of judgment, because the word sieve, was spelt sive. Both of which being overruled, and judgment pronounced for the State, the prisoner appealed.</p>

From Ashe. The indictment charged, that the Defendant being an evil disposed person, “ did, in the public street of Jefferson, profanely curse and swear, and take the name of God in vain, to the evil example, &c. and to the common nuisance of the good citizens of the State.” After a verdict for the State, the Counsel for the Defendant moved in arrest of judgment, upon the ground that the offence was not indictable.

From Davidson. The prisoner was indicted for the murder of his wife, and tried before his honor Judge Daniel, on the Fall Circuit of 1826.

This was ait action on th? caso for a libe!, tried at the November Term, i8¿6, of the- Circuit Court for ihe district of North-Carolina, before the Honorable Joxnsr Marshal!,, Chief-Justice of the United States.

<p>1 he act of 1802, c. 29, regulating the town of Hillsborough, enables the Treasurer of the Corporation to sue, in his o\vn name, for penalties incurred under the by-laws authorised by that act, as well as for those incurred under the act itself.</p>

From Northampton. This was an action commenced before a Justice of the Peace against the Defendant, as endorse** of a single bond, dated February 13, 1825, and payable one day after date. The endorsement was stated to be for value received of the Plaintiff’s testator, and was dated February 16, 1825.

From Bertie. Ejectment, and on the trial the case was, that the lessors of the Plaintiff claimed the premises under a deed from the Sheriff of Bertie. The judgment and execution were regular ; but the sale was made by the Sheriff on the second Monday of August, 1825, which was, the return day of the writ.

From Beaufort. Ejectment, tried before Donneel, Judge, on the last Fall Circuit. The lessors of the Plaintiff claimed by descent from Thomas Fates; the Defendant, as bis devisee, and the only question was, whether the will was properly proved.

From Franklin. Debt tipoh the single bond of the Defendant Hunt, payable to the-Defend ant Hawkins, and by him assigned to the Plaintiffs. The action was commenced in the County Court on the 28th of May, 1822. At June Term following, the Defendants jointly pleaded “payment and a set off,” to which there was a replication to the contrary.

From Burke. This was a petition to vacate a grant. From the petition it appeared, that the grant to the ancestor of the Defendants, issued in November, 1802 ; that in July,' 1820, a grant for a part of (he same land issued to the Plaintiff. The petition charged, that William Tate, the grantee in rhe first grant, surveyed and located his warrant of survey himself. From the petition and answer, the following issues were made up, and submitted to a Jury : 1.

<p>The act of 1806, requiring gifts of slaves (o be authenticated by writing, cannot be evaded by a fictitious sale; therefore where the donor gave the donee the purchase money, and then sold and delivered the slave, receiving bade the money — this was held to be a gift, and void without a deed.</p> <p>It seems, that a writing conveying a slave, is void as a bill of salei or a deed of gift, unless attested by a subscribing witness.</p> <p>It also seems, that the sale and delivery of a slave, is good without a bill of sale, notwithstanding the act of 1821.</p>

From Mecklenburg. The Plaintiff, on (lie Spring Circuit of 1827, obtained a rule upon the Defendant to show cause why a former Sheriff of Mecklenburg should not amend his return toa writ of Fieri facias against one David Cowan, which issued on the. 21st of June,. 1810, and was returnable to the ensuing term of the Superior Court for that county.

From Washington. Trover for a horse, and on the trial, before Martin Judge, the facts were, that the horse had belonged to the Plaintiff, who sold him to one Coakley, upon condition, that if the money was not paid by a specified time, that the title should return to the Plaintiff. Before the day of payment, Coakley died, and administration upon' his estate was committed to the Defendant, who set up the horse at public vendue and bought it himself.

From Washington. Debt, upon the single bond of the Defendant, payable to the Plaintiff’s intestate. On the trial, before Marxist Judge, the Jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the following facts. After the bond became due, the Plaintiff’s intestate voluntarily, and without consideration, drew a» order on his agent, in whose, hands the bond was placed for collection, directing him to deliver it up to the Defendant.

From Halifax. Detinue for a negro, and on the trial, the Jury found specially, the following facts. The slave in question was the. property of Elizabeth Whitaker, and was hy her hired out for the year 1825» she being of full age and unmarried. During the term, Elizabeth inlmnar-ried with the Defendant’s testator, who died before its expiration.

From Hertford. This action was originally commenced by a warrant, and was founded upon the following instrument: “ I llave 111 i.r; day transferred to Thomas 0. Dwyer, a note of Arthur Lawrence for ninety-five dollars, dated the 30th day of August last, and payable the 5tti of September, 1826, which note I guarantee unto the said Thomas O. Dwyer, or his assigns, for value received. Wit» ness my hand and seal, October 12,1826. “ HENRY 6.

From Moore. This was a special action on the case, in which the Plaintiff declared, that, he had brought an action of debt against one.

From Rowan. Richmond Pearson appointed the present Plaintiff, and Jesse A Pearjson, executor and executrix of his will. At the time of his death, h* was indebted to Alexander Nes-hil & Company, which consisted of the present Defend-am, and the same Jesse A. Pearson, whom he had appointed one of his executors.

From Burke. Assumpsit, commenced originally by warrant in September, 1808, and tried on the last Fail Circuit, before Norwooo, Judge.

From Guilford. A- ,-'r Assumpsit for work and 1 about doíüvcíofomenred in (be lifoiitito of the testatrix, and -upon jibe death, the Defendant was made a party. A^the■■iriaiff the will of Lucy Pxibles was offered in evidence bj\ dhivjnDcfendant, who.contended that a bequest therein- was Accepted by the Plaintiff in satisfaction of theiciaiai,-;. it. There .was no plea of this ''satisfact \mii-PMs darrein continuance. Neither wa.sjhe reáding.-'-pF ihc will objected, to by the.

From Mecklenburg. Ejectment on the joint demise of Winston .7.

From Wake. Debt tor an escape, in which the following case agreed was made up by the Counsel. The Plaintiff was a resident of Virginia, and there in September, 1823, obtained a judgment against one Belo-ny, for his debt, with interest from the 10th of April, 1821.

From Orange. After the new trial had iti this cause at a former term of this Court, (ante 25) it came on again before his Honor Judge Strange, on the last Circuit, when it appeared that there was no rightful personal representative of Francis Child, and that the Defendant had inter-meddled witn his effects under the following circumstances : Francis Child had appointed one Clancy his agent, who authorised the Defendant to sell on a credit, the property of Francis, for the…

From Currituck. This was an action of Waste, tried before Nash Judge, at the Spring term, 1826, of the Court below, when a verdict was taken and damages assessed for the Plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the Court as to the right of the Plaintiffs to sustain the action, upon the following case.

From Hertford. Troyer. tor catxXiE, in which the usual memoran-tlurn of “ not guilty,” was entered on the Clerk’s docket. Ou the trial before Martin Judge, on the last Circuit, it was proved by the Plaintiff; that the cattle in dispute were levied on as the property of Bridget Weaver, by the Defendant Moo%c, wSto was a Constable, and -bought by tfie Defendant Cryer, and that Bridget Weaver had before the levy, sold them to the Plaintiff.

<p>From Halifax.</p> <p>Assumpsit for work and labour as- an overseer. Oil the trial, the Plaintiff proved his services as an overseer for eight years. The Defendant introduced an account in the handwriting of the Plaintiff, and endorsed by him, “ settlement between James Gee and John Peebles.” This account after showing the time of the Plaintiff’s service, and the terms per annum, together with sundry payments made by the Defendant, exhibited a balance exclusive of interest, of §740, 62 due the, Plaintiff. The Defendant then proved payments to the amount of that balance.</p> <p>His Honor Judge Daniee instructed the Jury, that where partial payments were made upon bonds, bills, notes or signed accounts, sqch payments are to be applied first to the interest $ and after its discharge, then, to the extinguishment, of the 'principal ; because, in these cases, the interest being given by law, the creditor lias the same right to demand it, as to demand the principal ; and therefore, when payments a made, without any direction from the debtor as to their appii-cation, the creditor may apply it as he pleases — and that hence, such payments are always applied to that debt, which does not bear interest. But that the present claim, not being one on which the law allowed interest as a debt, thp Plaintiff had no right to demand it, although Juries might, and usually did give it. But that the payments made, were to be applied to the principal, because that was the only debt existing at the time they were made ; and that Ibis application being made, iu the present case, by the law, they were not at liberty to apply them otherwise — and that, if they found the whole principal to be paid, their verdict ought to be for the Defendant.</p> <p>A verdict being returned according to the charge of the. Judge, the Plaintiff appealed.</p>

From Halifax. Trespass for killing the negro of the Plaintiff.

From Wayne. Detinue, tried before his itonor, Judge Donnere, and aft, r a verdict for the Defendant, the Plaintiff moved for a new trial upon the following grounds : 1st. That one Cooke, who had been examined as a witness .for the Defendant, was interested in the event of the cause, and that this interest was not discovered by the Plaintiff, until after the Jury had returned their verdict. • 2d. That the Deposition of oue Rebecca.

<p>From Lincoln.</p> <p>Tills \Vas a petition for partition of land, devised by Mason Huson deceased, to his ¡yx children.</p> <p>The wili of Mason Huson, was attached to the petition, and made part of it.' By it, the land of which partition was demanded, was devised as follows : “ Í will “ that my wife Mary Huson, shall have such a part of “ my land as she with her children and negroes, which “ are left to her, can attend under crop annually, during “ her natural life or widowhood, and the balance of clear “ land, I will that it be rented out annually by my exe- “ cutors, until my children come of age to take it into “ their own possession.”</p> <p>The petition charged that Mary Huson, the wife of the Devisor, had marrricd ; that the Plaintiff had purchased the interest of Elizabeth Huson, one of the devisees, and that Ridley Huson, another of them, had died intestate, after the Devisor.</p> <p>No answer or plea was filed ; hut from the orders made in the cause in the Court below, it appeared that some of the Devisees were infants when the petition was filed.</p> <p>On the last Circuit, the cause was heard before his honor Judge Norwood, upon the motion of the Demand-ant, for a writ of partition, when tiis honor, thinking that the devisor had carved out of the inheritance a term for years, which had not expired, and which vested in his executors, in trust for the maintenance of his children, until the full age of the youngest, dismissed the petition — from which the Demandant appealed.</p>

From Rutherford. Case for a deceit in the sale of a female slave. On the, trial, it appeared that the negro had belonged to one Rutherford, who died intestate, in the year'1819. Letters of administration upon his estate, did not issue until January, 1823, when the Defendant being appointed administrator, took the personal property into his possession, and sold the negro in dispute to the Plaintiff, in February 1823, at public auction.

From Rutherford. The County Court of Rutherford, on the, Monday of March Term, 1827, ordered that letters of administration upon the estate of Rebecca Flecker, should issue to Lemuel Moore. The next day those letters were revoked, and administration committed to Joseph Moore.

From Stokes. Gaston and Badger moved lot- a certiorari .to bring up {lie record of a case lately pending in Stores Superior Court, between Hairston, as Plaintiff, and Estes, as Defendant.

From Rutherford. The Defendants were tried before his honor Judge Norwood, upon the following indictment: “ The Jurors for the State upon their oath present, that William Gr.

From New-Hanover. The prisoner was tried upon an indictment consisting of four counts — upon the first and third of which only, he was convicted.

<p>From Cabarrus.</p> <p>An indictment against the prisoner, for Grand Larceny, was found in the Superior Court of Lincoln County, which, on the affidavit of the prisoner, was removed for trial to Iredell County. Upon' the canse being called in the Superior Court of Iredell, it,was removed again, on the affidavit of the prisoner, to Cabar-rus County, where it was tried on the last Circuit before his honor Judge, Norwood.</p> <p>The transcript from Lincoln, did not state that a foreman to the Grand Jury had been appointed. The entry» after stating the term, and the Judge who held the Court, set forth that, * The following Grand Jury was impanelled, sworn and charged, to wit, A. B.foreman, &c. who returned a bill of indictment, &< .’ The indictment was also endorsed “A tjue bill, A. B. foreman.” Neither did the transcript, from Lincoln, set out any motion made by the prisoner, for the removal of the cause to Iredell 5 but his affidavit of ¡ho.se facts upon which such orders are usually made, was”copied into, and formed a part of the record.</p> <p>0» the trial, the Solicitor introduced a witness in behalf of the State, one Jones, who was objected to by the prisoner, on the ground that he was an accomplice. ~> His Honor however overruled the. objection, and the witness was examined before the Jury, He swore, that while one Kenedy and himself were at the house of the prisoner, making preparations to carry off several stolen ne-groes, the prisoner gave them the form of a bill of sale for a slave, and directed them to draw by that form, fonr others — that Kenedy accordingly drew four bills of sale to him, the witness each for a slave, signed them as an attesting witness, and put two other names to them, as witnesses also, — that these hills of sale were given to the prisoner, without any name being to them as a vendor — that tin* prisoner took them, and in about three hours returned them, with the name of John Moore, signed as the vendor. After the examination of Jones, the Solicitor offered, for the purpose of supporting his testimony, to read to the Jury the four bills of sale. The Counsel for the prisoner objected to the introduction of these, papers, unless they were proved by the subscribing witnesses. This objection was also overruled by his Honor, and the papers were read to the Jury.</p> <p>After a verdict for the State, the Counsel for the prisoner obtained a rule for a new trial, on account of Ihe introduction of incompetent testimony; whicli being discharged, they moved in arrest of judgment, for the fol* lowing reasons:</p> <p>1. Because the record did not show that a foreman to the Grand Jury had been appointed by the Superior Court of Lincoln.</p> <p>2. Because it did not appear upon the record, that the cause was removed from Lincoln on the motion of the prisoner.-</p> <p>The presiding Judge overruled the motion, and awarded judgment of death ; from which the prisoner appealed.</p>

From Wilkes. Ejectment, tried on the last circuit, before his Honor Judge DonNEXX. At the term before the trial, the Defendant had applied for a continuance, which was granted, upon condition that several depositions then filed in the cause, and among them that of one Ford, should be read absolutely.

From Washington. Covenant upon articles for the sale of land, the material part of which is as follows : “ And I do agree to make the payments in the following manner, one-third “ on the 1st of March 1820, in your own (the Plaintiff’s) “ notes qr cash, one-third on tito 1st of March, 1821, in “ notes of hand such as I will be responsible for the pay- “ ment of,” with a stipulation precisely similar as to the residue of the purchase money.

From Davidson. The Plaintiff declared in trespass for an assault and battery and false imprisonment, the object of the suit being to ascertain whether the Plaintiff', a negro held in slavery by the Defendant, was not, in truth, free.

From Richmond. The Defendant was warranted in debt, as surety for the stay of execution on a judgment against one Neill Bide. After a verdict for the Plaintiff, the Defendant moved in arrest of judgment for the following reasons : 1st. Because debt would not lie against a surety for the stay of execution. 2d. Because of the non joinder of Neill Bide. 3d. Because neither the original warrant or the judgment thereon, or the stay of execution, were under the sea! of the Justice.

From Robeson. Trover for a colt, and on the trial, the Plaintiff proved a sale and delivery of the property to her by one Barnes, and a subsequent conversion by. the Defendant. ¶1}^ Defendant produced a judgment and execution therc-on against Barnes and himself in favor of one Ward, the date of which was prior to the sale to the Plaintiff, and w}jeil (¡,ftt was made, the execution was in force and might have been levied on the property.

From Edgecomb. COVENANT upon a deed executed by the Defendants’ intestate, whereby he had assigned severa] notes to the Plaintiff, and bound himself “ for the money due on them provided said Battle failed to get it after a due course of law.” The breach assigned was ‘Ghat Use Plaintiff had failed to get, after a due course of law, the money called for in a note made isy one John Drummond,” which was one of those assigned by the deed on which the action was brought.

From Martin. Ejectment tried before Dantee, Judge, on the last Fall circuit. The lessors of the Plaintiff claimed by de-scentfrotn William Darlet, the Defendants as his devisees, and the only question was, whether the land of which lie died seised, passed by his will.

From Beaufort. The Plaintiff declared in Assumpsit for money had and received, and on the trial, produced an accountable receipt given to hint by the Defendant’s intestate, for a Justice’s judgment against one Bowen. He. then proved by one Judkins, that the amount of ihe judgment liad been collected from Buwen, and paid to the Defendant’s intestate. The witness was ask' d what had become of the judgment, and answered that it had been delivered to Bowen.

From Randolph. The Plaintiff warranted the Defendant for work and labor in carrying goods from Petersburg to Randolph county, and on the trial a letter from the Defendant to the Plaintiff was read, of which the following are the material parts : “It is understood that I am to furnish you with five “ thousand weight and pay you one dollar and fifty cents The Plaintiff then proved tliaf he, in pursuance of these instructions wen! to Petersburg with two waggons where he arrived…

From Beaufort. This was a warrant, in which i( ilie sum of twenty-five dollars due by account, to his damage ten dollars” was claimed by the Plaintiff.

From Franklin. This was an original attachment commenced in the County Court, 'flic Defendants filed .special bail and pleaded in abatement as follows : “And the said J II. and S. C. B- in their own proper persons, “ come and defend the wrong and injury which, &.o. and pray judg- “ ment of the said original attachment of the said President, &c. Dc- “ caust they say that the Justice o'{ the Peace of tile County, &e. who “ granted the said original attachment, did not before…

From Chowan. The Plain!,iff declared in Assumpsit, and on the trial on the Fall Circuit of 1826, read the following letter: “ William G. Burgess and Josiah Jordan, of Elizabeth City, being desirous of entering into the commercial business, and W. G. Burgess, for the purpose of purchasing goods for the said concern, is about goitjg to the North, the subscribers having been long acquainted witli (hem, and having full faith in their honesty and integrity, recommend them as…

From Rockingham. This was an action brought upon the covenant of quiet enjoyment, contained in a deed of bargain and sale executed fay the Defendant and - another to the Plaintiff, which was as follows ; “ and we the said Robert-Marlin, &c. do warrant unto the said Alexander 8. Martin, his heirs, &c. the aforesaid land, against the claim or claims of any person whatsoever.” On the tria!, the Plaintiff produced a bill in equity filed by one Thomas Overton, against the.

From Granville. This action was originally commenced before a Justice of the Peace. Ori (he trial, the Plaintiff produced a judgment in his favor confessed by one Gideon Wright, dated the 12th day of October, 1821, which was stayed by the Defendant, but there was no date of the time when the stay was entered.

From Randolph. Debt upon bond, to which fhe pleas were nonestfac-tum, payment, and a set off. There had been two trials in the Court below $ at the first, the Plaintiff obtained a verdict, which was set aside and leate given him to reply the statute of limitations to the plea of set off — there was no entry of any other replication to either of the pleas.

From Johnston. Assumpsit for money had and received, and goods sold and delivered. On the trial, it appeared that the Defendant, a resident of Johnston, bought a horse of the Plaintiff, a resident of Surry, and in payment delivered him a note made by one Hill, then residing in Wilkes, but before that time, in Johnston.

From Franklin. Debt upon the official bond of one Jordan Hill, given before the act of 1823, (Taylor’s Eevisal, ch. 1212) as Clerk of the Superior Court of Franklin. The condition of the bond was, “ that tiie said J. H. should well and The breach assigned, was tiie non payment by Hill, of money paid into his office by the Sheriff, upon a writ of fieri facias, which issued in favor of the Relator.

From Rutherford. This was a petition to vacate a grant, which issued to Jlndrew and David Millet'. Thd petition charged, that the Defendants were in possession of the land covered by the grant, claiming it untier mesne conveyances from the patentees, but neither the latter nor their heirs, were made parties Defendant.

<p>The wife of a sole executor of a will, her husband having renounced, is a competent witness to prove its execution as a will of land.</p> <p>A wife is an incompetent witness when her husband is interested, upon principles of policy arising from the relation of husband and wife, not because she is interested in the suit, nor on account of her legal identity with her husband. Whether an executor is entitled to commissions on the sales of land directed by the will to be sold. Q.u ?</p>

From Perquimons. Trover for a negro, and on tlie trial the Defendant claimed under a sale made by the Sheriff upon a ji. fa* which issued against the Plaintiff for the cost of a suit wherein he had been nonsuited. The Plaintiff was an infant at the commencement of that suit, and prosecuted it by his prochein amy.

From Granville. The Plaintiff warranted the Defendant “for the nonpayment of the sum of sixty dollars due by account,” and recovered judgment for fourteen dollars, from which the Defendant appealed. The memorandum of the pleas in the County Court was, “general issue, tender often dollars and fifty cents, money paid into,-. Court.” In the County Court, the Defendant obtained a verdict, and the Plaintiff appealed.

From Pitt. Trespass quare cuausum ere git, and on the trial the case was, that the Plaintiffs by their Attorneys, had sealed and delivered the following instrument to one John C. Stanly. “ Know all men by these presents, that we, Richard 13.

From Halifax. In this case, (vide 1 Law Repos. 100 — 2 Murph. 250-_ 2 Law Repos. 116 — 1 Hawks 394,J the Plaintiff on the Spring Circuit of 1825, obtained a verdict for ¿©8i 8s. 5d. She fixed the Defendant, with assets to the amount >f ten shillings, for which, and all costs, execution v¡as awarded ; but there was no entry of judgment quando for the residue of the sum found by the Jury.

<p>A levy upon land under a Justice’s judgment, mad? more than three months after the date of the execution, being void, &sd. fa. against heirs founded on it was dismissed.</p>

From Franklin. After the trial had in this case, (3 Hawks 568,) it came on to be'tried before his honor Judge Martin, on the last circuit, when the question was, whether the Defendant had not refused to guaranty, as genuine, a bank bill he bad passed to the agent of the Plaintiff, anti which had turned out to be forged.

From Wilkes. Debt upon the official bom! of George G. Witherspoon, as Sheriff of Wilkes. The condition of whirl) was “ that the said G. G. W. Sheriff, &c. shall settle with the County Trustee for the County, Jail, and Poor taxes for the year 1821, in (he time prescribed by law.” The breach assigned was, that G. G. Witherspoon, had not collected the taxes imposed in the year 1820.

From Burke. Debt upon the official bond of Frederick F. Alley, Sheriff of Rutherford, dated the 12lh of January, 1820, with a condition that he-should collect the “ County taxes due for the year 1819.” The breach .assigned was the non-payment of those taxes.

From Northampton. Detinue for several slaves, tried before his honor Judge Daniel, on the Fall circuit of 1827. The Plaintiff claimed as executor of John II. Frazier, and on the trial, produced the following instrument: “ It having been certified to us, that John II.

From Washington. This was an issue of devisavit vel non. On the trial it appeared that the supposed will had been offered for probate at the October term, 1804, of Tyrrell County Court, when an issue was made up. which by appeal was finally tried in the Superior Court, for the District of Edenton, where the will was established.

From Perquimons. Debt upon a bond for three thousand dollars, dated April 21st, 1824, will) the following condition : “ that “ £V. B. Shepard shall as soon as the thing is practica- “ ble, and the situation of the country will admit, convey “ in fee simple, to R. IL Smith, one equal and fair por- “ tion, a half of a tract of land of three thousand acres “ belonging to said Shepard, and lying on Obian River, “ in the State of Tennessee.

From Johnston. This was an issue of Devisavit vel non, as to the supposed will of one Burchet Lee. The cause originated in Sampson, and had been removed to Johnston. On the. trial, the Plaintiff offered to read absofutefy the deposition of one John Lindsey, taken in the State of .Tennessee, which was objected to by the Defendant, as the notice of taking it liad not been served upon him, but upon one Caleb Lindsey, who was no party to the suit.

<p>From Hertford.</p> <p>Detinüe for several slaves, tried before his honor Judge Rueein, on the last circuit. The Defendant pleaded non detinet and the Statute of Limitations.</p> <p>The writ issued on the 1st of October, 1825, and on the trial tne case was, that the slaves, being a woman and four small children, belonged to one Robert Flinn, who died in September, 1820. In November ensuing, letters of administration upon the estate of Flinn, issued to the Plaiutiff, who took the slaves into his possession, and kept them until January, 1822, when they were placed by him with one Wiggins, to be kept for the year 1822, at a stipulated price. Martha Flinn, who was the widow of the Plaintiff’s intestate, and the sister of Wiggins, resided with the latter during that.year. In the fall of the year 1822, Martha Flinn left her brother’s, and W'ent to reside on her own plantation, in the neighborhood. Early in the year 1823, the slaves in dispute, were in the actual possession of Martha Flinn, and so continued until July, 1825, when they were found in the possession of the Defendant. On the 20th of September, 1825, the Plaintiff demanded the slaves of the Defendant who refused to give them up, alleging that he had bought them from Martha Flinn, and declaring that he should hold them as his own. It did not appear with certainty, at what time Martha Flinn left her brother’s house and took the slaves into her possession. • The Defendant contended, that it was before the 1st day of October, 1822, and the Plaintiff, that it was after. Both parties called witnesses to tiiis point; those called by the Defendant, stated that it was in the fall of 1822, lint whether in the month'of September, October or November, none of them could say. The witnesses called by the Plaintiff, stated that the negroes remained with Wiggins until January, 1823, when the Plaintiff settled with him for keeping them, the year then passed, and advised Martha Flinn, who was present, to take them home with her, and keep them herself for him, which she agreed to do.</p> <p>His Honor instructed the Jury, that an adverse possession continued for three years, would not only bar Use Plaintiff's right of action, but extinguish his title to the slaves. But that the Plaintiff’s original right ought to prevail, unless the Defendant showed such adverse possession in himself, or those under whom he claimed; and that the burthen of proving this length of possession, was on the Defendant, because he alleged it, either as a part of his title, or in bar of the Plaintiff’s remedy, upon a clear and admitted previous right. The Jury were further .instructed, that every possession is in law presumed to be on the title, and for the exclusive benefit of. the possessor, until the contrary be shown — that if Martha Flinn did in fact, receive the slaves from the Plaintiff, or hold them upon a bargain made by him with her, then her possession was not adverse to tito Plaintiff, hut under him, and for his benefit — and although this possession might continue for more than three years, the Plaintiff would not thereby be defeated of his right of action, upon a demand and refusal: but that in relation to such a contract of bailment, the burthen of proof was upon the Plaintiff, who alleged it.</p> <p>A verdict was returned for the Plaintiff, and the Defendant appealed. ,</p> <p>The cause was submitted without argument, by Hogg, for the Plaintiff. No Counsel appeared for the Defendant.</p>

<p>From Wake.</p> <p>Detinue for a female, slave. On the trial, the case was, that the slave liad belonged to one High, whose daughter the Plaintiff had married. Upon the marriage of the Plaintiff^ High sent the slate to his house, where she remained six or seven years, until ffie Plaintiff’s daughter intermarried with one Fallen, since the year 1806, when she was sent to the House of the latter, where she remained for many years, and was used and claimed by him as his own. No bill of sale, or deed of gift from High to tiie Plaintiff, or from the Plaintiff to Pullen, was produced. It appeared that High died in the year 1813, having duly made his will — but none of its provisions were given in evidence. The Defendants claimed under* Pullen, by a Sheriff’s deed, with notice of the Plaintiff’s title, and relied upon the possession of Pullen UiU]ei. d!e iU-t of 1820 (jRev. ch. 1055) and the Statute of Limitations.</p> <p>His honor Judge Martin informed the Jury, that if the Plaintiff’s title was derived from High by a parol gift, before the act of 1806, it was complete. That if so derived since that act, it was possessory only ; but in either event, it was sufficient to enable the Plaintiff to maintain this action. As to the statute of limitations, the Judge instructed the Jury, that since the act of 1806, a parol gift of a slave operated as a bailment only; that in cases of bailment, the statute of limitations did not run until the termination of that contract, and that the fact, that the bailee claimed and used the property as his own, would not terminate the contract of bailment. And further, that if Pullen claimed by a loan or parol gift from' the Plaintiff since the act of 1806, the Defendants claiming under him with notice of the Plaintiff’s title, were estopped to deny it.</p> <p>The Jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff, and the Defendants appealed.</p> <p>1. That since the act of 1806, a parol gift transfers no title, general or special, to the donee, and therefore that Justice had not such an ¡merest as would enable him to maintain this action. For this they cited Bull. JV. P. .50. 2 StarMe’s Ev. 4 part, 493. Com. Dig. Detinue J}, and commented upon the cases of Wilbraham v. Snow, (l Mod. SO. 1 Lev. 282, S. C. l Vent. 52, S. C.) and Jlyer v. Men, CFelv. 44, Cro. J. 73, S. C. 2 Sand. 47, S. C.) which are cited by Bacon, (Detinue Ji.J and Danvers, (Detinue C. pi. 6) for the contrary, and endea-voured to prove that those cases had been misconceived.</p> <p>■2. That the Plaintiff was barred by the statute of H-mitations. For this they cited Elmore v. Mills (1 Hay,. 360) Whitbeck v. Deyo (3 John. Rep. 422) Roe ex dem. of Pellatt v. Ferrare (2 B. & P, 542) IS East ¿09.</p> <p>3. That no estate passed to the Defendants, to which an estoppel was annexed. For which was cited Bacon, Bailment A. Rolls’ Ab. 607.</p> <p>Badger, for the Plaintiff, submitted the cause without argument.</p>

From Rutherford. Covenant upon the, following instrument, on which a credit of seven hundred dollars was endorsed : “ April lOih, 1822, received of George Bird, an order to the Sheriff “ of Rutherford county, for the amount of Peter Fisher’s judgment, “ that he obtained for Mark Bird, deceased, for thirteen hundred dol- “ lars, and for six months interest, which we will account for. “ARTHUR CLARKE, [L. S.] “SAMUEL J. ROSS, [L. S.]” The statement of the case was rendered…

From Warren. Debt upon the bone! given by one John Brodie, upon taking out letters of administration on the estate of one Alexander Brodie, to which bond the Defendant’s testator was surety. The condition of the administration bond was in the usual form, and the bread» assigned was the non-payment of a debt due the relator by the intestate, upon which he had obtained a judgment against the administrator,-and nulla bona intestati was returned.

From Haywood. This was a petition to vacate a grant which issued to the ancestor of the Defendants, upon the ground that it had been fraudulently obtained.. The matters alleged in' the peiition were : I. That the. land had been surveyed by an?.

From Wake. Assumpsit, and upon the trial, the Plaintiff offered to read Ihe deposition of one Richard Bedell.

The Chief-Justice issued a 'Habeas Corpusto bring the applicant before him, upon the following affidavit: “Robert Spier maketh oath, that an indictment was found against him for the alleged crime of murder, at the Spring Term, 1827, of Beaufort Superior Court, which was traversed by this affiant, and at his instance, and upon his affidavit, the issue of traverse was removed to Craven Superior Court, for trial; that to insure a trial and the punctual attendance of all the…

From Bladen. The Defendants were indicted for that they “ wit!» force and arms, and with strong hand, in &c. into a certain corn fi, Id. there &r. in the peaceable possession of one Sarah McDaniel, did enter, and one bushel of corn, then and (here with force and arms, and with strong hand from the possession of the said S. M. did take and carry away.” On ihe trial the case was, (hat the prosecutrix Sarah McDaniel, and her sister were gathering the corn, when the Defendants…

From Guilford. The Defendant, a free negro, was convicted of an assault and battery, before his honor Judge Danted, on the last Circuit. Being unable to pay the costs of the prosecution, the Defendant prayed that he might be discharged, upon taking the oath prescribed for insolvent debtors. The Solicitor General moved his Honor to direct the Sheriff ro hire out the Defendant to any person, who would take him for the shortest term, and pay the rosts of the prosecution.

From Brunswick. The prisoner was indicted under the act of 1823 (Taylor’s Revisal. eh. 1229) for an assault with an intent to commit a rape upon a white female. On the trial, the only witness who directly proved the assault, was one Mary Rittenhouse, whose general moral character wras soiiously imps ;>> !>. d : bul theie was no evidence of her character for truth when upon oath.

From Guilford. After the new trial granted in this case, (ante 268,) the cause was removed to .Guilford, where it was again tried on the last Cir cuit before his honor Judge Damei. The only point made in the Court below, arose from the entry of the verdict, which was in the following words: “ Look on the prisoner ye that be sworn, what say ye ? “ is lie guilty or not gniliy of the felony and murder “ whereof he stands indicted? When 6?.

From Wayne. The Defendant was indicted for Petty Larceny, in stealing a bag of cotton. On the trial a witness stated, without any objection on the part of the Defendant, that he was informed by a negro, that the cotton was in a house, on the \ remises of the Defendant — that he searched that .house, and found the information of the negro to be correct.

From Anson. The Defendant was tried on the last Circuit before his honor Judge Norwood, upon the following indictment : “ The Jurors &c. that heretofore &c. in &c. K. M. late &c. came before Hugh McKenzie, Esq then and yet being one of the Justices, &c. and then and there upon her oath, charged one. Alfred JVoble before the said H. M. the Justice &c. with having assaulted, stricken, and bruised one Henry Mumford.

From Burke. The. Defendant was tried upon the Fall Circuit of 1827, before his honor Judge Norwood, on an indictment consisting of two counts, the second of which only is material, and is as follows : “ And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present, that the said John JM.