¶1ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW- YORK.
¶2' The plaintiff had a place of business, indicated’ by a sign Over the door, where his mail matter was received, and where he could be met by his clients, and where the latter could deliver to him stocks to be sold by him or under his supervision, and he was engaged there, in the business of buying and selling-stocks for his customers, in which business he regularly employed capital, by the use of which interest was earned upon moneys advanced by him for his customers; Held, that he was a “ banker” within the meaning of that term as used in Rev. Stat. § 3407, and subject to taxation as such under the provisions of § 3408.
¶3The case is stated in the opinion.
¶4Mr'. Henry F. Tremain (with whom was Mr. Mason W. Tyler on the brief) for plaintiff in error.
¶5Mr. Alphonso Hart, Solicitor of Internal Revenue (with whom was Mr. Solicitor General on the brief) for defendant in error.
¶7delivered th'e opinion of the court.
¶8This action was brought to recover certain sums of money paid under protest by the plaintiff in error to the United States in the years 1881, 1882 and 1883, -and which he alleged were exacted from him' under an illegal assessment made upon capital employed in his business.
¶9If within the meaning of the statutes under which the assess*593ment was made the plaintiff was a hanker, and if the capital assessed was employed in the business of banking, the judgment must be affirmed.
¶10' By section 3407 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, it is provided that “ every incorporated or other bank, and every person, firm or company having a place of business where credits are opened by the deposit or collection of money or currency, subject to be paid or remitted upon draft, check, or order, or where money is advanced or loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange or promissory notes or where stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange or promissory notes are received for discount or .for sale, shall be regarded as a bank or a banker.” 13 Stat. 251, c. 173 § 79; 14 Stat. 115, c. 184, § 9.
¶11Section 3408 provides that there shall be levied, collected and paid a tax of one twenty-fourth of one per centum each month upon the average amount'of the deposits of money, subject to payment by check or draft, or represented by certificates of deposit or otherwise, whether payable on demand or at some future day, with any person, bank, association, company or corporation, engaged in the business of banking; also “ a tax of one twenty-fourth of one per centum each month upon the capital of any bank, association, company, corporation, and on the capital employed by any person in the business of banking beyond the average amount invested in United States bonds : Provided, That the words ‘capital' employed’ shall not include money borrowed or received from day to day, in the usual course of business, from any person not a partner of, or interested in the said bank, assoc’ ation or firm.” 13 Stat. 277, c. 173, § 110; 14 Stat. 137, 146, c. 184, § 9; 17 Stat. 256, c. 315, § 37; 18 Stat. 311, c. 36, § 19.
¶12That the plaintiff, during the period covered by the assessment against him, employed a capital in his business is beyond dispute; for he distinctly states that the capital used by him in his business ranged from $30,000 to $50,00Q. Upon that basis he made his returns for taxation. But did he, during that period, have a place of business where stocks were received for sale? If he did, then, by the Very terms of the *594statute, be was a banker' under the definition given in section 3407.
¶13It is contended by him that he was' only a stock broker, and, within the true meaning of .section 3407, did not have “ a place of business,” nor “ receive ” stocks for sale. That he had a room or place, indicated by a sign over the door, where his mail matter was received, and where he was, or could be, met by his’ clients, and where the latter could deliver'stocks to be sold by him, or finder his supervision, and that he bought and sold stocks for his customers, is abundantly shown by his own testimony.1 Still, he insists that when stocks were delivered *595to him at this place of business for sale they were .not “ received ” by him “ for sale,” within the meaning of the statute. ¥e cannot assent to this view.
¶14*596In support of this position the plaintiff cites Warren v. Shook, 91 U. S. 704, and Selden v. Equitable Trust Co., 94 U. S. 419. In the first of those cases the question was whether a firm, holding a special license as bankers, was liable to the tax imposed by section 99 of the act of June 30, 1864. 13 Stat. 273. That statute imposed a tax of one twentieth of one per centum upon the par value of stock and bonds sold by “ brokers and bankers doing business as brokers.” It *597was held that Congress intended to impose the' duty prescribed by section 99 upon bankers doing business as brokers, although a person, firm or companjq having a license as a banker, might be exempted by subdivision. nine of section 79 of the act of 1864, as amended by the act of March 3, 1865,13 Stat. 472, from paying the special tax imposed upon brokers. Nothing more is decided in that case.
¶15In Selden v. Equitable Trust Co., the question was whether corporations whose business was to invest their own capital — not that of others — in bonds secured by mortgage upon real estate, and to negotiate, sell and guarantee such bonds, were banks or bankers within the meaning of section 3407 of the Revised Statutes. It was held that they were not; that Congress did not intend that a person or corporation selling its own property, not that received from other owners for sale, should be classed as a banker or bank for the purposes of taxation. The court, in that case, referred to section 3407 as describing three distinct classes of artificial and natural persons, distinguished by the nature of their business; first, those who have a place of business where credits are opened by the deposit or collection of money or currency, subject to be paid or remitted upon draft, check or order; second, those having a- place of business where money is advanced or. loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange or promissory notes; third, those having a.place of business where stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes are received for discount or for sale. In respect to the third class it was.said: “ The language of the statute is, where ’ such property is ‘received’ ‘for discount or for sale.’ The use of the word ‘ received ’ is significant. In no proper .sense can it be understood that one receives his own stocks and bonds, or bills or notes, for discount or for sale. He receives the bonds, bills, or notes belonging to him as evidences of debt, though he may sell them afterwards. Nobody would understand that to-be banking business. But when a corporation or natural person receives from another person, for discount, bills of exchange or promissory, notes belonging to that other, he is acting as a banker; and when a .customer brings bonds, bullion or stocks *598for sale, and they are received for the purpose for which they are brought, that is, to be sold, the, case is presented which we think was contemplated .by the statute. In common understanding, he who receives goods for sale is one who receives them as agent for a principal who is the owner. He is not one who buys and sells on his own account.”
¶16This language embraces the present case. The plaintiff was not a ■ broker who,, without employing capital of his own, simply negotiated purchases and sales of stocks for others, receiving, only the usual commissions for services of that character. In his business of buying and selling stocks for others, he regularly employed capital, by the . use of which interest wets earned upon moneys advanced by him for his customers, substantially as it would be earned by á bank upon, money loaned to its customers. In the parlance of the Stock Exchange, he might be called a stock broker; yet, here were all the conditions, which, under the statute, made the case of a banker, whose capital, employed in his business, was liable to a tax of one twenty-fourth of one per centum each month. It is not a sufficient answer to this view to say that the business of a stock broker is ordinarily distinct from the business of a banker, or that according to the common understanding a stock broker is not a banker. A stock broker may do some of the kinds of business that are usually done by bankers, and many banks and bankers do business which, as a general rule, is only done by stock brokers. Congress did" not intend , that the question of taxation upon capital employed in the business of banking, should depend upon the mere name given to such business, either by those engaged in it or by others.' When the plaintiff admits, as he does, that his business was that of buying and selling stocks for his customers, and that in such^ business he employed capital, he proves that he was a banker within the statutory definition, and that, within the meaning of section 3408, his capital was employed- in the business \of banking. He brings himself within the rule that Congress prescribed for determining who, for the purposes of the tax's-' tion in question — though not necessarily .in the commercial sense — were bankers and what was banking business. That *599rule is expressed in words that leave no doubt as to what was the intention of Congress. The judgment below',gives effect to that intention, and it is
¶17Affirmed.-
¶18Mr. Justice Field, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Miller, dissented.