137 La.
Volume 137 — Louisiana Reports
186 opinions
- 137 La. 1Bryceland Lumber Co. v. Kerlin (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Bills and Notes <®=>444t-Actions — Defenses.</p> <p>Recovery on a note cannot be defeated be cause plaintiff failed to deliver collateral where, though the maker had given plaintiff an order for the collateral, the holder of it refused, for an undisclosed reason, to honor the order.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 1287-1293; Dec. Dig. 444.]</p> <p>2. Account, Action on <§=>7 — Evidence — Sufficiency.</p> <p>In a suit on an open account, evidence held to support a judgment for plaintiff.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Account, Action on, Cent. Dig. §§ 13-17; Dee. Dig. 7.]</p>
- 137 La. 4Cahn v. Baccich & De Montluzin (1915)Motion to dismiss sustained as to the suspensive appeal,…
C. W. Ellis, Judge. Action by Bertrand I. Cahn and others against Baccich & De Montluzin. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendants took a dievolutive and a suspensive appeal, and plaintiffs move to dismiss.
- 137 La. 5Teutonia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buhler (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Teutonia Bank & Trust Company against Eugene E. Buhler. Erom judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 7Netter v. Sullivan (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Uourt.) </p> <p>Insane Persons <@=335 — Tutorship— Mortgages — Foreclosure—Title op Purchaser.</p> <p>Where a person who is eligible to appointment as undercurator of an interdict takes the oath in that capacity on the same day and before the same notary as the curator, and is thereafter mentioned as undercurator in a petition for family meeting and in the order for its convocation, and attends such meeting, and approves its proceedings, and property mortgaged by the advice of such meeting is subsequently sold in foreclosure of the mortgage, the fact that no order of court appointing the under-curator is to be found will not invalidate the title acquired at such sale. In the absence of suggestion of fraud, or of prejudice to the interdict, the negative fact is controlled by the presumption in favor of the regularity of judicial proceedings; and in any event the acts of the party and of the court gave to the former a status as undercurator de facto which should protect the title.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 52, 53; Dec. Dig. @=335.]</p>
- 137 La. 9Brock v. Automobile Livery & Sales Co. (1915)Affirmed
Action by Richard Brock against the Automobile Livery & Sales Company. From a judgment rejecting oppositions to the final account of a receiver, certain parties appeal.
- 137 La. 13Thompson v. McCausland (1915)Decided that Const, art
Case Certified from Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Action by J. W. Thompson against William MeCausland. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal applies for instructions as to right of appeal.
- 137 La. 16Ballard v. Kimberlin (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Licenses <S=^7 — License Tax — Exemption-Clerks.</p> <p>The provision of Act No. 295 of 1908, p. 438, imposing a license tax on clerk% of peddlers, is a glaring violation of article 229 of the Constitution, exempting “clerks, laborers,” etc., from license taxation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-15, 19; Dec. Dig. <@=»7.]</p>
- 137 La. 18Ballard v. Jenkins (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District-Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; R. S. Ellis,. Judge.</p> <p>Action by John A. Ballard, Sheriff and Tax Collector for the Parish of Tangipahoa, against Hardy Jenkins. Prom judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 19State v. Wilson (1915)Conviction and sentence set aside, and case remanded
<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; Ben C. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Helen Wilson was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 25Pons v. Pons (1914)Remanded
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Josephine Pons, wife of Salvadore Ruiz, and others against Marie Madeline Pons, widow. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 52State v. Joseph (1915)Reversed and remanded
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Constitutional Law &wkey;83 — Criminal Law &wkey;>1206 — Prohibition—Imprisonment for Crime.</p> <p>The thirteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States has reference to slavery; and does not refer to imprisonment for conviction for prime.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 150-151%; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 83; Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3271-3277, 3279, 3280; Dec. Dig. &wkey;1206.]</p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors <&wkey;221 — Indictment— Sufficiency;</p> <p>An indictment for retailing liquors without having previously obtained a license therefor from the police jury of the parish of Caddo and the municipal authorities of the city of Shreveport is good under an act which forbids the retailing of spirituous or intoxicating liquors without having previously obtained a license from the police jury, town, or city authorities.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 240-248; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 221.]</p> <p>3. Intoxicating Liquors &wkey;>219 — Indictment-Requisites.</p> <p>An indictment for retailing liquors without previously obtaining a license need not set forth the name of the purchaser of the liquors or of the witnesses.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 237-239; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey; 219.]</p> <p>4. Witnesses &wkey;>350 — Cross-examination-Impeachment.</p> <p>The prosecutor or the defendant in a criminal prosecution who tenders a witness thereby, in effect, vouches for his credibility, and asks the court and the jury to accept him as a person to be believed; and the opposite party has the right to elicit further information about him than is conveyed by the mere name that he chooses to give, and may ask him such questions as, “Are you not an escaped convict?” “Are you not a fugitive from justice?” etc.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1140-1149; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>350.]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>•5. Words and Phrases — “Debt.”</p> <p>• Fines and costs of the court in criminal proceedings are not generally recognized as “debts”; they are allowances or legal charges authorized by statute (citing Words and Phrases Debt; Imprisonment for Debt).</p>
- 137 La. 58Town of Hammond v. Badeau (1915)Reversed with directions
G. T. Badeau was convicted in the mayor’s court of the city of Hammond and, on appeal, in the district court, of violating a municipal ordinance, and applies for certiorari and mandamus.
- 137 La. 65Arent v. Bank of Monroe (1915)Reversed, and suit dismissed
<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; B. C. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Abe Arent, liquidator of the E. C. Drew Investment Company, against the Bank of Monroe, in liquidation, and others. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 72State v. Southern States Alcohol Mfg. Co. (1914)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Costs &wkey;>109 — Security—Appeal by State —License Suit.</p> <p>The state owes no costs in license suits and cannot be required to furnish bonds therefor in taking appeals.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Costs, Cent. Dig. §§ 439-461; Dec. Dig. &wkey;109.]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Licenses <&wkey;7 — License Tax — Discrimination — Validity oe Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 171 of 1898, § 11, imposing license taxes, is void because discriminatory in that, though it imposes no license tax on those persons, firms, or corporations whose receipts are exactly $20,000 or between $100,000 and $150,-000, it imposes a license tax on those in the same line of business whose receipts fall either below or above those figures.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-15, 19; Dec. Dig. &wkey;7.]</p> <p>3. Licenses <&wkey;7 — License Tax — “Grading” —Validity of Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 171 of 1898, § 11, imposing license taxes, is void for failure to make a complete gradation or classification, as required by Const, art. 229, requiring that license taxes be graduated; the “grading” contemplated by sucb article requiring a complete gradation or classification, whicb embraces all 'the persons, firms, and corporations subject to the license.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-15, 19; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>7.]</p> <p>4. Statutes <&wkey;64 — License Statute — Right to Attack — Effect of Partial Invaliditf.</p> <p>That a company sued by the state for license taxes owed by it did not come within any defective paragraph of the License Act (Acts No. 171, of 1898, § 11) did not preclude it from defending on the ground that such section was unconstitutional, since the section as a whole, not merely the defective paragraphs, is void.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 58-66, 195; Dec. Dig. &wkey;64.]</p>
- 137 La. 79Thompson v. Miller (1915)Judgment reversed so far as against plaintiff, and rendered
Action by John F. B. Thompson against Dennis Miller and others. Judgment for plaintiff against the defendant named, and against plaintiff as to other defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
- 137 La. 83State v. Sehon (1915)Affirmed on rehearing
<p>Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Union; J. B. Holstead, Judge.</p> <p>W. T. Sehon and others were convicted of manslaughter, and appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 92City of Lafayette v. Bank of Lafayette (1915)Reversed and rendered
<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the City of Lafayette, La., against the Bank of Lafayette, La., and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 102State v. Young (1915)Reversed and rendered
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Banks and Banking <&wkey;17 — Officers— B-ank Examiner — Term of Office — Commencement.</p> <p>When a statute putting into effect an article of the Constitution that provided for an appointive office and fixed the term at four years declares that the appointee shall serve for a term of four years from the date of his induction into office, it fixes the beginning of the term of office. And the date of the induction into office of the first appointee determines the limits of the terms of the succeeding appointees; so that one who is appointed during a term of office is only appointed for the unexpired portion of the term.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 21, 22; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 17.]</p> <p>2. Officers &wkey;>54 — “Term of Office” — “Tenure of Officers.”</p> <p>The term of an office, as fixed in the Constitution or statute creating the office, is not to be confused with the tenure of an officer, and is not affected by the holding over of an incumbent beyond the expiration of the term for which he was appointed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. §§ 74, 75; Dec. Dig. &wkey;54.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Term of Office; Tenure.]</p> <p>3. Officers <&wkey;49 — Term of Office — Legislative Power — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>When an office is created, and the length of the term of office is fixed by an article of the Constitution, it being left to the Legislature merely to define the duties and fix the compensation of the officer, and an act is thereafter passed, putting the article of the Constitution into effect and fixing the date of the beginning of the term of office, the Legislature cannot thereafter alter the length of the term by adopting a statute purporting to give effect to the article of the Constitution, ignoring the fact that it had already been put into effect.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. § 70; Dec. Dig. &wkey;49.]</p> <p>4. Oeeicers <&wkey;58 — Vacancy—Appointment by Governor.</p> <p>The expiration of the term of an appointive office causes a vacancy which the Governor may fill by appointment during a recess of the senate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. § 87; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;58.]</p> <p>5. Oeeicers <@=>54t — Right to Oeeice.</p> <p>The right of an officer whose term has expired during a recess of the Senate to continue to discharge the duties of the office until his successor is inducted into office cannot interfere with the authority of the Governor to appoint his successor, nor with the right of the successor to be inducted into office as soon as he has taken the oath and qualified in the manner required by law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. §§ 74, 75; Dec. Dig. &wkey;54.]</p> <p>6. Oeeicers <&wkey;5S — Person Appointed to Fill Vacancy — Right to Take Oeeice.</p> <p>One who is appointed to fill a vacancy caused by the expiration of a term of office during a recess of the Senate is not required to wait until the Senate meets and confirms his appointment, but may enter upon the discharge of his official duties as soon as he has taken the oath and qualified in the manner required by law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. § 87; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;58.]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>7. Oeeicers <&wkey;55 —Term oe Oeeice — “Vacancy.”</p> <p>The word “vacancy,” in its literal and precise sense, means a place that is empty or unoccupied, but, as applied to the expiration of a term of office, it is ordinarily given a more liberal, figurative meaning conforming to the intention of the lawmaker and the purpose to be accomplished. According to the latter meaning, the expiration of the term of office creates a vacancy, though the incumbent is willing to continue performing the duties of the office.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-84; Dec. Dig. <@=>55.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Vacancy.]</p>
- 137 La. 121Jones v. Mackay Telegraph Cable Co. (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Negligence <S=>74 — Contributory Negligence — Rescue—Emergency.</p> <p>One who suffers personal injury by risking his life to save the lives of others in danger is not to be charged with contributory. negligence for failing to exercise his best judgment in the emergency.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other eases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. § 102; Dee. Dig. c^»74.]</p> <p>2. Railroads <®=390 — Negligence oe Engineer-Last Clear Chance — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>A railroad company is liable in damages for personal injuries resulting from the negligence of its engineer, who had the last'clear-chance to avoid the accident, even if the person injured was originally guilty of negligence in creating the situation of danger to himself and others.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Railroads, -Cent. Dig. §§ 1324, 1325; Dee. Dig. <®^390.]</p>
- 137 La. 130State v. Vige (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Allen; Winston' Overton, Judge.</p> <p>J. P. Vige was convicted of crime, and ap-peals.</p>
- 137 La. 132Loeb v. Fischer (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Courts <§==>504t — Jurisdiction—Possession of Property.</p> <p>When a court of competent jurisdiction has, by appropriate proceedings, taken property into its possession through its officers, the property is thereby withdrawn from the jurisdiction of all other courts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1399-1403; Dec. Dig. <@^504.]</p>
- 137 La. 137Hanmore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. (1915)Application denied
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Insurance <§=^291 — Lire Insurance Policy —Validity—Warranty Against Disease.</p> <p>An insurance policy containing the warranty that, “This policy is void if the insured * * * has had before its date any pulmonary disease,” is binding, and it will be enforced where the evidence shows that the insurance company had a medical examination made of the applicant before the policy was issued, and where it also showed that the applicant had pulmonary disease prior to the date of the examination, although the medical examiner for the insurance company failed to discover the presence of said disease.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 681-690, 694-696; Dec. Dig. 291.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 139American Trust Co. v. Crescent Ice Co. (1915)Appeal dismissed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Ereob <®^>395 — Sepaeate Appeals — Bonds—Dismissal.</p> <p>Where plaintiff moved for, and was granted, separate appeals from separate decrees, but filed bond only under one order, the other appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see App'eal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2058, 2064-2070, 20S5, 2086, 3127; Dec. Dig. <§=»395.]</p>
- 137 La. 144State v. Hollingsworth (1915)Writ allowed on petition for amendment of decree
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Bail @=344^-Right to Release — Pendency oe Application eob Review.</p> <p>A defendant convicted of a misdemeanor, in an unappealable ease, is entitled to be released on bail during the pendency, in this court, of his application for a review of such conviction; but whether such defendant should be so released upon his giving notice of his intention to apply to this court is largely within the discretion of the trial judge, who, however, should accept bail, unless he has reason to believe, and does believe, that the notice is not given in good faith and will not at once, be followed by the application to this court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bail, Cent, Dig. § 145; Dec. Dig. <g^44J</p> <p>2. Mandamus <@=^16 — Right — Accomplishment oe Act.</p> <p>A writ of mandamus will not issue from this to an inferior court, when the occasion for it has passed and it can no longer -have any function to discharge.</p> <p>' [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mandamus, Cent. Dig. §§ 48, 59, 60; Dec. Dig. <§==>16.]</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 148Ash v. Hale (1915)Affirmed
Boone, Judge. Two actions by W. D. Ash, one against Newton M. Hale, the other-against Goodwyn H. Harris and others, consolidated. Prom judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
- 137 La. 157Walsh v. Walsh (1915)Judgment of Court of Appeal affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Husband and Wijte &wkey;>229 — Pleading— What Law Governs — Amendment.</p> <p>Where a nonresident married woman was sued by attachment on a note executed by herself and husband in the city of Dublin, Ireland, for a loan of money for the purpose of meeting-certain necessary family expenses, the note being payable three months after date in said city, held that the petition disclosed on its face that plaintiff’s cause of action arose under, and must be determined by, the laws of Ireland. Held. further, that the trial court properly allowed plaintiff to amend, during the trial, so as to allege that the defendant was bound on the note under the laws of Ireland. Held), further, that the trial judge erred in thereafter reversing his ruling and dismissing the amended petition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 816-835, 838, 840-843, 979, 980; Dee. Dig. <i&wkey;229.).</p> <p>2. Evidence <@=3517 — Parol—Foreign Law.</p> <p>Parol evidence is admissible to prove the law of a foreign country on a particular subject-matter, where the evidence does not affirmatively show that such law is in writing.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 2327; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>517.]</p> <p>Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 162Gilmore v. Gilmore (1914)Affirmed
<p> {Ryllahus Tiy the Court.} </p> <p>1. Descent and Distribution <&wkey;79 — Succession — Possession oe Property — Liability eor Rent — Notice.</p> <p>Where a married woman and her husband are occupying, jointly with her mother, at the time of the mother’s death, a residence which had belonged to the community between the decedent and her predeceased husband; the executor of the mother cannot, merely by notifying the daughter and heir that an exorbitant rent will be charged if she continues to occupy the premises until the sale or partition, fix upon her any liability^ for such rent; and, when it appears that her husband has'acquired an interest in the property by purchase from another heir, the question of the amount of rent for which he may be held liable in the partition will be determined by the value received.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see D'escent and Distribution, Cent. Dig. §§ 276-279; Dec. Dig. <®=79J</p> <p>2. Principal and Agent <&wkey;66, 79 — Mandate — Duty oe Agent — Presumption.</p> <p>The obligation of an agent to keep and render a correct account of money and property received and disposed of for his principal, the presumption of neglect or infidelity in the event of his failure so to do, and the rule that, in such case, every doubt will be resolved against the agent and in favor of the principal, are of almost universal recognition in jurisprudence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Principal and- Agent, Cent. Dig. §§ 124-126, 178-193; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey;66, 79.]</p> <p>3. Descent and Distribution <&wkey;117 — Succession — Advancement — PRooe — Donation.</p> <p>Where one of several heirs has received money from the deceased parent under circumstances which indicate that it was a disguised donation, and the amount involved is as much as $1,000, he must sustain his theory that the money was paid as compensation for services previously rendered by something more than his own uncorroborated testimony; otherwise he may be required to collate for the benefit of the heir who demands it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Descent and Distribution, Cent. Dig. § 428; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 117.]</p>
- 137 La. 178Jones v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (1915)Affirmed, and rehearing denied
<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Removal oe Causes <&wkey;S — State and Federal Courts — Action under Employers’ Liability Act — Citizens oe Dipperent States.</p> <p>The act of Congress of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. 291, c. 143, § 1), amending the Employers’ Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65, c. 149, § 6 [U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 8662]), expressly provides that a case within the provisions of that statute, filed in a state court having jurisdiction, shall not be removed to any federal court. There is no exception of a case in which the plaintiff and defendant are domiciled in different states.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. §§ 4, 5; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>3.]</p> <p>2. Master and Servant <5&wkey;137 — Death oe Railway Engineer — Collision — Gross Negligence.</p> <p>It is gross negligence on ..the part of the employes of a railroad company to attempt to make a flying or running switch with a loaded box car, known to be out of repair, at the crest of a grade on the main line of track, when a passenger train is nearly due. And if the box car runs away down the grade, collides with the incoming passenger train, and kills the engineer, the railroad is liable in damages to his widow and children.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §J 269, 270, 273, 274, 277, 278; Dec. Dig. <®^>137.]</p> <p>On Application for Rehearing.</p> <p>3. Master and Servant <&wkey;228, 264^-Trial <&wkey;46 — Injury to Employ# — Federal Employers’ Liability Act — Evidence oe Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Under the federal Employers’ Liability Act, evidence of contributory negligence is inadmissible to defeat recovery, and even though admissible in mitigation of damages, is properly excluded, when not pleaded, and when offered generally and without restriction as to its intended effect.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 670, 671, 861-876; Dec. Dig. &wkey;228, 264; Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 115-117; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>46.]</p> <p>4. Death <&wkey;60 —Action by Widow — Evidence — Engagement to Marry.</p> <p>In an action for damages, by a widow, for herself and minor children, for the negligent killing of the husband and father, evidence that the widow is engaged to be married again is irrelevant and inadmissible.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. § 79; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;60.j</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 190Succession of Palmer (1915)Judgment set aside, and judgment rendered for opponent
Succession of Rev. Magin Palmer on the opposition of Mrs. Marie Hess to the account of the testamentary executor. From the executor’s refusal to allow her claim, the opponent appeals.
- 137 La. 197State v. Walker (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans; Joshua G. Baker, Judge.</p> <p>Thompson B. Walker was convicted of forgery, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 203Succession of Percival (1915)Reversed in part and affirmed in part
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Ohabities <&wkey;13 — Bequest — Donation fob Pious Uses.</p> <p>The following bequest in a will is a donation of the property described therein for pious uses, favored by the laws of Louisiana, viz.:</p> <p>“To the Free Church of the Annunciation, situated at the corner of Camp and Race streets, New Orleans, La., I leave my building, corner of St. Charles street and Gravier street, now occupied by the Western Union Telegraph Company. The income only from this property can be used for the benefit and improvement of said church. If it be sold, the amount obtained from the sale must be invested and the income from said investment only must be used. The capital must never be touched.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. § 37; Dee. Dig. &wkey;?13.]</p> <p>2. Ohabities &wkey;>13 — Legacy to Religious ORGANIZATION — OPEBATION OP STATUTE.</p> <p>The fact that the legatee is a religious organization, and, as such, a charitable institution, brings the case within the terms and provisions of Act No. 124 of 1882, encouraging donations for educational, charitable, or literary purposes, or to such institutions, and ex^ empting them from the laws relating to fidei commissa and prohibited substitutions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Charities, Cent. Dig. § 37; Dec. Dig. <®=^13.]</p> <p>3. Wills <&wkey;473 — Bequest—'Validity—Substitution.</p> <p>Stipulations in a will requiring the legatee, a religious and charitable institution, to pay a certain sum per month to a faithful maid of the testatrix, and to pay her doctor's bills, etc., as long as the beneficiary shall live, and requiring the payment of a stated sum of money to another beneficiary from the income of the legacy before the legatee can receive any benefit from such income, do not create a substitution. In so far as such charges may be regarded as fidei commissa, they are to be reputed not written, but they do not invalidate the main bequest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 992-995; Dec. Dig. &wkey;473.]</p> <p>4. Wills <&wkey;350 — Suit to Annul — Judgment-Issues.</p> <p>In a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit to annul a will, rejecting the demand on the grounds that the charges imposed upon the legatee do not create a substitution, and that fidei commissa do not annul the testament, the court has no authority to annul the stipulations, when there is no contest between or among the defendants as to the rights of the defendant beneficiaries or obligations of the defendant legatee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 807; Dec. Dig. &wkey;350.]</p>
- 137 La. 210Roth v. Town of Thibodaux (1915)Affirmed
Worthan, Judge ad hoc. Action by E. N. Roth and others against the Town of Thibodaux and others. From judgment fon defendants, plaintiffs appeal.
- 137 La. 217Landry v. Migues (1915)Affirmed
In the matter of the succession of Adelaide Landry, deceased, wife of Louis Delcambre, on petition by Louis Delcambre and others against Dominique Migues, administrator. From an order terminating the administration on conditions, the administrator appeals.
- 137 La. 219In re Poland's Estate (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Wills &wkey;>133 — Ologeaphic Wills — Signature.</p> <p>Where testatrix left an unsigned olographic will inclosed in an envelope bearing the superscription, “The Will of Ellen E. Poland,” such superscription did not constitute a valid signature to the will, although in the handwriting of testatrix, since a will must be signed at the end thereof.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 342-344; Dec. Dig. &wkey;133.]</p>
- 137 La. 223Nosacka v. Schmidt (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of ■Orleans; George H. Théard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Emily Nosacka against Paul •Schmidt. Prom judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 223Pearson v. Levy Carpet Co. (1915)Order set aside, and case remanded
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Acting Judge.</p> <p>Petition for receivership by Edward Pearson against the Levy Carpet Compariy, Limited. Prom an order appointing a receiver, creditors of the corporation appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 227State v. Boudreaux (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Fifteenth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>O. L. Boudreaux was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 236Succession of Romero (1915)Modified
<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the succession of M. C. Romero, deceased, in which the Segura Sugar Company, Limited, and others intervene as third opponents. From a judgment for the Segura Sugar Company, Limited, the administratrix of the succession appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 254Marable v. Barhan (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Byllab%is hy the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <@=>430 — Dismissal— Citation.</p> <p>Where, in case of an appeal by petition, the failure of the appellee to receive citation is attributable to the fault of the appellant, the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2173, 2174, 3126; . Dec. Dig'. <@=>430.)</p> <p>2. Waters and Water Courses <@=>119 — Natural Drainage — Ditching op Lands — Damages — Liability.</p> <p>Defendants in this case were within their rights in ditching their lands in order to facilitate the natural drainage. They thereby imposed no heavier burden upon the adjoining estate, of which plaintiff was the owner, than it was otherwise bound to bear, and plaintiff has no just cause of action for damages.</p> <p>FEd. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 131-134; Dec. Dig. ®=»119.]</p>
- 137 La. 263Kuhlman v. Kuhlman (1915)Amended and affirmed
<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; Joseph B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Bernard J. Kuhlman against Walter J. Kuhlman. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.'</p>
- 137 La. 266State v. Doremus (1915)Judgment reversed, and accused discharged
<p> (¡Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Statutes <©=» 109 — Title oe Act.</p> <p>The constitutional requirement that a statute shall embrace only one object does not mean that each and every means necessary to accomplish an object in the law must be provided for by a separate act relating to it alone. A statute that deals with several branches of one subject does not thereby violate the constitutional requirement that the act must have only one object.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 136-139; Dec. Dig. <§=^>109.]</p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors <©=^>143 — Illegal Sale — “Blind Tiger.”</p> <p>Under the definition of a ‘“blind tiger,” in the first section of Act No. 146 of 1914, the statute applies only to a place where some business is conducted in prohibition territory, and not to a private residence where no business is carried on.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other, eases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 152; Dec. Dig. <§¿?143.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Blind Tiger.]</p> <p>3. Intoxicating Liquors <S=^20 — Searches and Seizures <®=>7 — Blind Tiger.</p> <p>The provision in the statute, that any place suspected of being a blind tiger shall be searched by an officer designated in a search warrant, issued on an affidavit that the affiant believes the place to be a blind tiger and on such additional evidence as the court may require to make out a prima facie case, and that any intoxicating liquors found therein shall be seized by the officer and brought before the court along with all persons found in the place, is not violative of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure and the issuance of a warrant without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors; Cent. Dig. § 26; Dec. Dig. @=>20; Searches and Seizures, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. @=>7.]</p> <p>4. Indictment and Information @=>109 — Statutory Offense — Sufficiency.</p> <p>A bill of indictment for the violation of a statutory crime, to be valid, must contain every essential element of the crime charged.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 286-2S8; Dec. Dig. @=>109.]</p>
- 137 La. 272Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. Breaux (1915)Dismissed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error <@=>336 — Dismissai>-Defeot of Parties.</p> <p>This court is obliged to take notice of a want of necessary parties to an appeal; and where an appellant fails to pray for citation, on the appeal, of one who was a necessary party to the judgment appealed from, and such one is not cited and is not otherwise made a party to the appeal, the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent.' Dig. §§ 1868-1876; Dec. Dig. <©=> 336.]</p>
- 137 La. 277State v. Schwartz (1915)Conviction set aside, demurrer sustained, and defendant…
<p> (Syllabus by the Vourt.) </p> <p>1. Indictment and Information @=>110 — Sufficiency — Description of Offense.</p> <p>It is sufficient that an indictment follow the words of a statute or use language of equivalent import, when those words describe the act constituting the offense with such precision as fully to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge against which he is to prepare his defense; but, if the mere 'words of the statute do not give that information, it must be furnished by the indictment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 289-294; Dec. Dig. @=>110.]</p> <p>2. Elections @=>328 — Indictment and Information @=>110 — False Registration-Indictment.</p> <p>The only person to whom section 32 of Act No. 49 of 1906 applies is described in the first six words, which declare, “That any person offering to vote,” etc. Hence, an indictment which charges the giving of a false answer, or making of a misstatement, with intent to mislead, etc., does not charge the offense denounced by the section in question if it fails to allege that the answer was given, or the misstatement made, by a person offering to vote._ So, in order to charge the offense in question, it must appear that the answer alleged to be false was made under oath, administered by a commissioner of election, not any commissioner of any election, but a commissioner of a primary election, authorized by the statute, and then being held.</p> <p>And it is not sufficient to charge, in the language of the statute, that the defendant gave a false answer to a pertinent question, or made a misstatement, with intent to mislead, but the indictment must go beyond the statute and set forth the question and the language constituting the false answer or misstatement.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. §§ 355, 357-363; Dec. Dig. @=>328; Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 289-294; Dec. Dig. @=>110.]</p>
- 137 La. 282First Nat. Bank v. Garlick (1914)Amended and affirmed
<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis; Winston. Overton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the First National Bank of Jennings against George W. Garlick, in which Mrs. Martha E. Garlick intervenes. From a judgment denying relief to the intervener,, she appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 291State v. Gremillion (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Juby <&wkey;66 — Pbogés Verbal — Validity.</p> <p>It is not legally necessary, in the procés verbal of a jury drawing, to recite the names of those stricken from the jury list for the several causes enumerated in the law, although it may be better practice to do so.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 283-290, 306; Dec. Dig. &wkey;66.]</p> <p>2. Indictment and Information <&wkey;87— Sufficiency-Time of Offense.</p> <p>No indictment for any offense shaü be held insufficient for omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed in any case where time is not of the essence of the offense, or for stating the time imperfectly.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 24A-255; Dec. Dig. &wkey;87.j</p> <p>3. Ckiminal Law <&wkey;1153 — Appeal—Review —Examination op Witness.</p> <p>The discretion vested in the trial judge in permitting leading questions will not be reviewed, except in extreme cases.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3061-3066; Dee. Dig. 1153.]</p> <p>4. Witnesses <©=v245 — Examination—Repetition op Question.</p> <p>An objection to a question repeated a number of times which had called for the same answer from the witness is properly sustained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 827, 823; Dec. Dig. &wkey;245.]</p>
- 137 La. 295Succession of McDermott (1915)Affirmed
King, Judge. In the matter of the Succession of Kate McDermott. Bill by Edward I-Iealy and others against William P. Burke and another, executors, to annul the wills of decedent, and from a judgment sustaining the wills, he appeals and Thomas Gilmore, testamentary executor, also appeals.
- 137 La. 302Succession of Block (1915)Reversed, with directions
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Leon Dreyfus against the universal legatees of Charles B. Block, deceased. Prom a judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 308State v. Bain (1915)Affirmed
McIntosh, Judge. H. T. Bain was charged with misdemeanor as president of the police jury. From a judgment sustaining the demurrer to the information, the State appeals.
- 137 La. 310McCune v. White (1915)Affirmed in part, and case transferred to the Court of…
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;957 — Assessment of Tax — Valuation of Property — Constitutional Provisions.</p> <p>That portion of section 35 of Act No. 136 of 1898 which authorizes the mayor and board of aldermen of- a city, town, or village to increase or diminish the valuation of property as assessed for taxation, held to be null and void, as in contravention of article 225 of the state Constitution, declaring that valuations for the purpose of state taxation shall be taken as the proper valuation for the purposes of local taxation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations. Cent. Dig. §§ 2015-2022; Dec. Dig. &wkey;957J</p> <p>2. Courts <&wkey;224 — Supreme Court — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in all cases wherein a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. &wkey;224.]</p>
- 137 La. 320Gore v. Barrow (1915)Reversed and remanded
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Insane Peesons <&wkey;14r — Interdiction—Triad —REPRESENTATION OE INTERDICT.</p> <p>No judgment which is predicated upon allegation, and evidence in support thereof, that a person is insane, and which pronounces the interdiction of such person, can be sustained, under any circumstances or for any purposes, where it appears that no answer was filed on behalf of, and no counsel represented, or was named by the court to represent, the person thus sought to be interdicted.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. § 22; Dec Dig. <@^14.]</p>
- 137 La. 323Becker v. Hampton (1915)Reversed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Evidence <&wkey;419 — Pabol Evidence — CONSIDERATION OE DEED.</p> <p>An allegation in a petition or answer that a deed purporting to be a sale for cash with the right of redemption was made to secure an existing debt, and that the purpose of making it in the form of a sale was to defeat the homestead exemption, is an allegation that the contract was made in fraudum legis, and permits the introduction of parol evidence to prove the true consideration and motive of the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1912-1928; Dec. Dig. &wkey;419.]</p> <p>2. Homestead &wkey;3ll7 — Exemption—Waiver.</p> <p>The exemption from seizure of the homestead is a law of public policy. The constitutional prohibition that a married man shall not waive the homestead exemption without the concurrence of his wife cannot be obviated by disguising an act of mortgage in the form of a sale with the right of redemption.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. §§ 191-262; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>117.]</p>
- 137 La. 331Lemoine v. Police Jury of Avoyelles Parish (1915)Affirmed
J. Lafargue, Judge. Action by Ignatius B. Lemoine against the Police Jury of Avoyelles Parish. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal, which transfers the case to the Supreme Court.
- 137 La. 334Peck v. Board of Directors of Public Schools for Parish of Catahoula (1915)Reversed and rendered
Wilson, Judge. Suit by W. S. Peck and others against the Board of Directors of the Public Schools for the Parish of Catahoula. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.
- 137 La. 342Town of Eros v. Powell (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Mayor’s Court, Town of Eros; W. A. Calhoun, Mayor.</p> <p>Ben Powell was convicted of operating a pool room for gambling purposes, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 352Flash v. Louisiana Western R. (1915)Reversed, and suit dismissed
<p>Appeal from Eighteenth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph Flash against the Louisiana Western Railroad Company. Judgment, for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 364Kyle v. Bayou Sale Planting & Drainage Co. (1915)Reversed
Mary; Thomas M. Milling, Judge. Action by William Kyle against the Bayou Sale Planting & Drainage Company, in which the South Bend Company applied for injunctive relief, which was granted. From this judgment, plaintiff appeals.
- 137 La. 379State v. Evans (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Jury <&wkey;7&wkey;VENiRE — Statute.</p> <p>Under Act No. 135 of 1898, § 11, as amended by Act No. 182 of 1914, reading that it shall be the duty of the jury commission when it draws a regular petit jury for the trial of criminal cases to select 100 tales jurors, etc., and that such jurors shall possess the qualifications of regular jurors, and section 15, providing that no irregularity in the manner of selecting the jury shall be sufficient cause for setting aside the venire, unless some fraud was practiced or some great wrong committed in the selection, where the tales jurors were all selected from one ward of the parish in which the city, of A. was situated, and not from different portions of the parish, such venire was proper, in the absence of any fraud or wrong on the part of the commissioners.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 333-347; Dec. Dig. &wkey;72J</p>
- 137 La. 382J. B. Levert Co. v. John T. Moore Planting Co. (1915)Appeal dismissed
<p>Appeal from Twentieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne; W. E. Howell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the J. B. Levert Company, Limited, against the John T. Moore Planting Company, Limited. Prom an order of seizure and sale after judgment for plaintiff as against defendant, Mary and Louise Tobyn, junior mortgagees, appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 383Lancaster v. Hansbrough (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Execution <&wkey;172 — Injunction — Partial Payment — Burden op Proop.</p> <p>Where a defendant in an executory proceeding sues out an injunction on a plea of partial payment, the burden is upon him to prove his allegation.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 519-539; Dee. Dig. &wkey;>172.]</p>
- 137 La. 388State v. Helle (1915)Affirmed
Baker, Judge. Hans Helle was charged with preparing and placing combustibles and explosives in violation of Rev. St. § 846, as amended by Act No. 153 of 1898, and from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the information, the state appeals.
- 137 La. 392State v. Ransburg (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Indictment and Information &wkey;>28 — Sufficiency — Swearing of Grand Jurors.</p> <p>The language, “the grand jurors, duly impaneled and sworn, * * * upon their oath present,” is not obnoxious to the objection that it “only shows that one of the grand jurors was sworn.'”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Gent. Dig. §§ 117, 118; Dec. Dig. 4&wkey;28.] ,</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;970 — Motion in Arrest-Defects in Indictment.</p> <p>The complaint, that defendant was inducted for the murder of “Lon Rhodes,” but was tried for and convicted of the murder of “Lun Rhodes,” is not admissible, in a motion in arrest of judgment, which must be addressed to defectsi patent upon the face of the indictment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2445-2462; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 970.}</p>
- 137 La. 393Hayne v. Edenborn (1915)Ordered that writs of mandamus and prohibition issue
Action by W. P. Hayne and others against William Edenborn and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company and others, defendants, apply for writs of mandamus and certiorari.
- 137 La. 397Paepcke Leicht Lumber Co. v. Clack (1915)Judgment of Court of Appeal reversed, and judgment of…
Action by the Paepcke Leicht Lumber Company against John H. Clack, Tax Collector. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.
- 137 La. 400Orleans v. State Board of Appraisers (1915)Amended and affirmed
<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railroad (Company against the State Board of Appraisers and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 403State v. Stovall (1915)Reversed and remanded
<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District' Court, Parish of Winn; Oas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>R. F. Stovall was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquor without a license, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 407State v. American Sugar Refining Co. (1915)Amended and affirmed
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the State against the American Sugar Refining ..Company. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 419Carr v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co. (1915)Rule dismissed
Certiorari from Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Caldwell; George Wear, Judge. Action by P. W. Carr and others against the Louisiana Central Lumber Company and others. A preliminary default was entered, and defendant Lumber Company applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.
- 137 La. 422Board of Health v. Teutonia Bank & Trust Co. (1915)Affirmed in part, and reversed and rendered in part
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Board of Health of the State of Louisiana against the Teutonia Bank & Trust Company, in liquidation, and others. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 435State v. Southern Pac. Co. (1915)Affirmed in part
K. Skinner, Judge. Consolidated actions by the State against the Southern Pacific Company and against the United Fruit Company. From a judgment for defendants, the State appeals.
- 137 La. 451Basey v. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co. (1915)Judgment set aside, and suit dismissed
<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Carriers <&wkey;>339 — Carriage or Passengers —Contributory Negligence — Warning by Carrier.</p> <p>Where some_ of the passengers on a crowded tram were riding in an open gondola car, which was part of the mixed accommodation train, because of the crowded condition of the cars furnished for passengers, it was the carrier’s duty to warn them of the danger of riding in that car, if there was any special danger, and failure to give'- such warning- renders the carrier liable notwithstanding the passengers’ negligence in riding in such a place.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1353; Dec. Dig. &wkey;339.]</p> <p>2. Carriers <S&wkey;298 — Carriage or Passengers — Negligence—J out.</p> <p>A severe jolt to a train carrying passengers, caused by the slackening of speed to avoid running over -horses on the track, was unavoidable in the operation of the train and does not show negligence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1192, 1205, 1206; Dec. Dig. &wkey;</p> <p>3. Carriers <s&wkey;296 — Carriage oe Passengers — Negligence—Extra Travel.</p> <p>Where a carrier has reason to anticipate extra travel, and especially where such travel results from the carrier’s own efforts, it is negligence not to provide extra accommodations sufficient to give all the passengers a seat, and thereby expose some of the passengers to the added danger of injury to which persons standing in the aisles are exposed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1200-1203; Dec. Dig. &wkey;296.j</p> <p>4. Death &wkey;>76 — Actions ror Causing — Sueeiciency or Evidence — Cause or Death.</p> <p>In an action against a passenger carrier for the death of plaintiff’s son, evidence held not to show that the death resulted from an injury on defendant’s train, received some time before, and not from tuberculosis.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. § 94; Dec. Dig. <@=^76.]</p>
- 137 La. 469Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Southern Wood Distillates & Fiber Co. (1915)Reversed and rendered
- 137 La. 478State v. Hollingsworth (1915)Rule discharged, demand of relator rejected, and…
J. j. Hollingsworth was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license, and applies for .writs oif certiorari and prohibition.
- 137 La. 487State v. Hollingsworth (1915)Rule discharged, demands of relator rejected, and…
J. J. Hollingsworth was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license, and applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.
- 137 La. 487State v. Hollingsworth (1915)
- 137 La. 488State v. Hollingsworth (1915)Rule discharged, demands of relator rejected, and…
J. J. Hollingsworth was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license, and applies for W'i'its of certiorari and prohibition.
- 137 La. 489State v. Mines (1915)Reversed and remanded
<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish, of Bossier; J. N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Jake Mines was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeafls.</p>
- 137 La. 505State v. Johnson (1915)Affirmed
Em-met Hingle, Judge. Whitney Johnson and others were convicted of killing an ox with intent to steal same, and Johnson and another appeal.
- 137 La. 508Pons v. Yazoo & M. V. R. (1915)Ordered that writ' of prohibition be perpetuated
Action by Mrs. Carmelite Pons, wife of George A. Louque, against the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants apply for writs of certiorari and prohibition.
- 137 La. 512Bryan v. Holland (1915)Judgment for plaintiffs reversed, and plaintiffs’ suit…
C. Barnette, Judge. Action by tbe partnership of A. L. Bryan and J. E. Reynolds against G. W. Holland. Judgment for each party for a stated sum, and defendant appeals.
- 137 La. 517State v. Serio (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo ; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Sam Serio and others were convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 520Dorcheat Valley R. R. v. Clement (1915)Amended and affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Taxation <@=3231 — Exemption—Tempobaey Logging Road.</p> <p>The constitutional exemption from taxation of railroads constructed and completed within certain years was intended to encourage the building of railroads as public carriers. It has no application to a temporary logging road for a sawmill that is to be abandoned when the limited supply of timber is gone.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 371-378; Dec. Dig. &wkey;231J</p> <p>2. Taxation <&wkey;528 — Delinquent Taxes— Computation op Interest.</p> <p>The interest at 10 per cent, per annum on back taxes runs from the end of the year in which the tax roll is filed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 981; Dec. Dig. <@==>528.]</p>
- 137 La. 525State v. Butler (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law <&wkey;1092— Appeal — Bill op Exceptions — Presentation and Signing.</p> <p>In criminal cases, bills of exception must be presented to and signed by. the judge before an appeal is taken.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2829, 2834-2861, 2919; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>1092.]</p>
- 137 La. 526Louisville & N. R. v. Penn (1914)Affirmed on rehearing
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Public Lands <&wkey;>59 — Confirmed Land Grant — Effect of State Selection and Approval.</p> <p>. A land grant confirmed by Congress in 1820 (Act May 11, 1820, c. 87, 3 Stat. 573) cannot be affected by a state selection of the same land in 1850, under the swamp land grant of March 2, 1849 (Act March 2, 1849, c. 87, 9 Stat. 352), and the approval of the selection by the Commissioners of General Land Ofiice.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 184, 185; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>59.]</p> <p>2. Confirmed Land Grant —'Subsequent Excessive Location.</p> <p>Where such confirmation was restricted to 2,000 acres, a subsequent location and patent covering much more than that quantity are void as to the excess, as against a confirmed state selection of the whole tract.</p> <p> (Additional Syllables by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>3. Public Lands <&wkey;>59 — Approval op List— Lands Claimed and Held by Individuals.</p> <p>Under Act Cong. March 2, 1849, c. 87, 9 Stat. 352, in accordance with which the approval by the Secretary of the Treasury of a list containing lands “not claimed or held bv individuals” vests the fee simple to the lands in the state, the approval of such a list did not vest title in the state to lands both claimed and held by individuals.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 184, 185; Dec. Dig. <@=359.].</p> <p>4. Public Lands'@=^59 — Claim under Grant —Suppiciency op Evidence — Selection by State and Approval.</p> <p>Evidence in a jactitation suit which by defendant’s answer was converted into a petitory action wherein plaintiff claimed under a state selection made in 1850 under the swamp land grant (Act Cong. March 2, 1849, c. 87, 9 Stat. 352), and the approval of the selection by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and defendants claimed under a land grant confirmed by Congress in 1820 (Act May 11, 1820, c. 87, 3 Stat. 573), held to show that the land in controversy, though unsurveyed, had been claimed continuously by the heirs of the original grantee, and that hence the title thereto never passed to the state or to the state’s assigns.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 184, 185; Dec. Dig. &wkey;59.]</p> <p>5. Public Lands &wkey;>106 — Confirmation op Claim — Effeoo>-Patent.</p> <p>That commissioners acting under Act Cong. March 3, 1807, c. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 440, providing that persons who on December 20, 1803, had for ten years been in possession of land not claimed by others, and not exceeding 2,000 acres, shall be confirmed in their title, mistakenly believed that they had power to confirm a claim only to the amount of 2,000 acres, and limited their confirmation of the title to an unsurveyed island to such acreage thereof, did not operate as a rejection of the claim for the remainder or invalidate the government patent subsequently issued to the claimant’s heirs for the entire island.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 104, 301, 302; Dec. Dig. &wkey;106.]</p> <p>6. Public Lands <&wkey;106 — Issuance op Patent — Existence op Facts — Determination op Land Department — Conclusiveness.</p> <p>Where Congress has provided for the disposition of public lands of a particular character and authorized the Land Department to issue a patent for same on ascertainment of certain facts, such department has jurisdiction to inquire into and determine the existence of such facts, and,' in the absence of fraud, imposition, or- mistake, its determination is conclusive against collateral attack.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 104, 301, 302; Dec. Dig. &wkey;106.j</p>
- 137 La. 535State v. Barrett (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court,) </p> <p>Criminal Law <&wkey;1092 — Appeal — Biles op Exceptions — Peesentation and Signing.</p> <p>In criminal cases bills of exceptions must be presented to and be signed by the judge of the trial court before an appeal is taken.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2829, 2834-2861, 2919; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>1092.]</p>
- 137 La. 536Williams v. Police Jury of Morehouse Parish (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Counties <&wkey;195 — Debts oe Parish — Payment — Revenues.</p> <p>The law does not require that the debts of a parish, shall be paid out of the revenues of the year in which they are paid, but requires that they .shall be paid out of the revenues of the year in which they were contracted. Any excess of the revenues over the statutory, necessary and usual charges of any year may be applied to the payment of debts remaining due and unpaid out of the revenues of former years.</p> <p>Liva. jxote. — nor otner cases, see Counties, Cent. Dig. § 307; Dec. Dig. <@^>195.]</p>
- 137 La. 540State v. Stiles (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the State against W. P. Stiles. From a judgment of dismissal, the State appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 545State v. Stephney (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Washington; Joseph B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Seggie Stephney was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 547State v. Thompson (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Juey &wkey;>72 — Names in Jury Box — Secrecy — Attesting Witnesses.</p> <p>The provision of Act No. 182 of 1914, relative to the secrecy to be observed as to the names of tales jurors placed in the box, has no reference to the two or more disinterested witnesses required by law to attend the meeting of the jury commission, and to attest the procSs verbal of the selection of jurors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 333-347; Dee. Dig. &wkey;72.]</p> <p>2. Indictment and Information <@=>161— Correction of Date — Time.</p> <p>An impossible date in an information may be corrected by amendment at any time, with leave of the court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 516-523; Dec. Dig. <@=>161.]</p> <p>3. Grand Jury <&wkey;41 — Confession before Grand Jury — Testimony of Grand Juror.</p> <p>A voluntary confession of the accused before the grand jury may be proved by any member of that body, without a disclosure of the secrets of the grand jury room.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Grand Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 86, 87; Dec. Dig. <@=>41J</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <&wkey;829 — Refusal of Instructions Covered.</p> <p>Requested instructions on a subject-matter covered by the general charge may be refused by the judge.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. <@=>829.]</p>
- 137 La. 552City of Shreveport v. Stringfellow (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from City Court of Shreveport; L. C. Blanchard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the City of Shreveport against R. L. Stringfellow. Prom a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 557Fenner v. Board of Com'rs of Red River (1915)From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals
<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Guy C. Fenner against the Board of Commissioners of Red River, Atchafalaya and Bayou Bceuf Levee District.</p>
- 137 La. 567Succession of Le Besque (1915)Affirmed
King, Judge. In the matter of the succession of A. B. Le Besque. Action by Ovide Le Besque, as administrator of the succession,'joined by a community creditor, to set aside a donation of a piece of realty belonging to the community and donated by intestate to L. A. Dupont. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.
- 137 La. 570Amrhein v. Nylka Land Co. (1915)Judgment affirmed, and proceedings in the Supreme Court…
Action by Anna Maria Amrhein against the Nylka Land Company, Limited. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.
- 137 La. 574Bank of Webster v. McDonald (1915)Appeal dismissed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Absentees <&wkey;5 — Executory Proceedings — Notice to Attorney.</p> <p>Under article 737 of the Code of Practice, service of the three days’ notice on the attorney appointed to represent the absent debt- or in executory proceedings is sufficient, al"though the notice be addressed to him as curator ad hoc, instead of attorney.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Absentees, Cent. Dig. §§ 3-11; Dee. Dig. <@^5.]</p> <p>"2. Absentees' <&wkey;5 — Executory Proceedings — Notice to Attorney— Sufficiency.</p> <p>Where a resident attorney at a parish seat was appointed by the court to represent an absent defendant in foreclosure proceedings, and the caption of the notice of demand served on him as curator ad hoc set forth the title and number of the suit and the name of the court, and notified him to pay the sums sued for by the petitioner, held, that the notice sufficiently informed the attorney that was notified as the representative of the defendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Absentees, Cent. Dig. §§ 3-11; Dec. Dig. &wkey;s5.]</p> <p>3. Absentees &wkey;>7 — Time for Appeal.</p> <p>■ In case of absentees, no appeal will lie after two years have expired, to be computed from the day on which final judgment was rendered.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Absentees, Oent. Dig. §§ 14-19; Dec. Dig. -&wkey;>7.]</p>
- 137 La. 579Algiers Ry. & Lighting Co. v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. (1915)Application denied, and intervention dismissed
Injunction by the Algiers Railway & Lighting Company against the New Orleans Railway & Light Company; the Gretna Light & Power Company filing a petition of intervention. Preliminary injunction denied, and plaintiff applies for a writ of mandamus.
- 137 La. 586Merritt v. Progress Blue Ribbon Farms (1915)Judgment set aside, and case remanded
<p>Appeal from Fifteenth - Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson Davis; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Birdella Merritt against the Progress Blue Ribbon Farms. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 588Flanagan v. Nicholson Pub. Co. (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action for libel by Thomas Flanagan against the Nicholson Publishing Company. Judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 603Board of Control for Lepers' Home v. Benedictine Fathers (1915)Affirmed
F. Briinot, Judge. Suit by the Board of Control for the Lepers’ Home of Louisiana against the Benedictine Fathers of Covington and others, to set aside a codicil of the will of Mrs. J. M. Parker, deceased. Judgment for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
- 137 La. 613Succession of Stevens (1915)Judgment set aside, and case remanded for judgment
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Rule by the heirs of H. B. Stevens, Sr., against Thomas Connell, Clerk and ex officio Inheritance Tax Collector. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 616Roussel v. Railways Realty Co. (1915)Motion denied, and judgment reversed, with directions
Action by Willis J. Roussel and another against the Railways Realty Company, From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs-appeal, and defendant moves to dismiss the appeal.
- 137 La. 628City of New Orleans v. Sanford (1915)Judgment set aside, and prosecution dismissed
<p> (Syllabus by Bditorial 8taf.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;G42 — -Violations op Obdinances — Appeal—Scope op Review.</p> <p>On appeal from a conviction in the recorder’s court of the city of New Orleans for violating a municipal ordinance, only the legality of the fine imposed can be considered by the Supreme Court, and it has no jurisdiction to determine the question as to the jurisdiction of the recorder’s court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1412-1415; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;642.]</p> <p>2. Municipal Coedokations <&wkey;592 — Health Ordinances — Authority to xYdopt.</p> <p>New Orleans City Charter (Act No.. 159 of 1912) § 19, provides that the powers of the board of health shall be the same as those of municipal and parish boards of health under Act No. 192 of 1S9S, which act, as amended by Act No. 173 of 1912, authorizes such bo.ards to pass health and sanitary ordinances for defining- and abating nuisances dangerous to the public health, etc. Section 4 (R) of the charter gives the commission council all the powers and duties theretofore possessed by all the executive, legislative, and administrative officers of the city. Section 6 gives the commission council power and makes it its duty to pass such ordinances as may be necessary to maintain the cleanliness and health of the city, and to adopt such ordinances and regulations as shall be necessary or expedient for the protection of health and to prevent the spread of disease; and section 70, in repealing inconsistent acts, provides that the provisions of Act No. 192-of 1898, among others, with all the amendments thereto, are continued in force, and that. the. commission council is vested with all the powers granted and provided for under such .acts. Held that, while the charter confers power on the commission council and the board of health’ to enact ordinances covering the same subject-matter, it must be assumed that it was so intended, and hence the board of health had authority to enact an ordinance providing for the rat-proofing of all premises and buildings, to prevent the introduction and spread of the bubonic plague.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1311-1314;- Dec.Dig. &wkey;592.]</p> <p>8. Municipal Cobpoeations <&wkey;642 — Violations of Ordinances — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Act No. 173 of 1912 authorizes boards of health to pass health ordinances, and provides that any person violating any such ordinance shall be punished as therein provided. New Orleans City Charter, § 21, provides for recorders’ courts; and Const, art. 141, authorizing the General Assembly to provide for recorders’ courts in such city, provides that they shall liave no jurisdiction, except for the trial of offenses against city ordinances. Held, that the violation of an ordinance of the board of health may be prosecuted only in a state court as for a violation of the statute, while violations of-health ordinances adopted by the commission council may be prosecuted in the municipal courts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1412-1415; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>642.] '</p> <p>4. Health <&wkey;8 — Health Ordinances — Va.- . LIDITY.</p> <p>. An ordinance of the New Orleans hoard of health, enacted to prevent the introduction and spread of -the bubonic plague, requires that fj;om and after its promulgation every building and other superstructure then erected or thereafter to be erected shall be rat-proofed as therein provided, makes it the duty of every owner, agent, and occupant of premises to comply therewith, and provides that each day’s violation of any provision thereof shall constitute a separate offense, punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both. It divides buildings into classes •A and B, and contains more onerous provisions as to class A, the floors of the buildings in which class are required to be of concrete; but it further provides that where, from- any cause, a building may become a menace or dangerous to public health, the health officer of the city may require any such building therein required to be rat-proofed as a building of class B to he rat-proofed as a building of class A, and that upon written permit from the health officer wooden floors and removable gratings may be laid upon the concrete floors, and that upon such permit tar-cinder composition floors may be substituted for concrete floors. Its conditions are such that a partial reconstruction of some buildings, a rehabilitation of others almost as expensive as rebuilding, and the complete demolition of others would be required, and in all cases a heavy expense would be necessary. Held, that buildings constructed in conformity with the rules and regulations theretofore prescribed cannot by such an ordinance be converted into unlawful structures, and the fact that the ordinance has not been enforced with strictness cannot save it from being a nullity, as the validity of a law must depend upon its terms, and not upon the condescension or consideration of the officers of the law in not enforcing it.</p> <p>, [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Health, Gent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>8.]</p> <p>5. Health <&wkey;8 — Health Ordinances — Validity.</p> <p>It does not affect the validity of the ordinance that it is inapplicable to buildings and structures of the federal, state, and city governments, over which the board of health had no control, including wharves and garbage dumps, admittedly the greatest sources of danger, as it was proper for the board to go as far as the circumstances allowed it to go.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Health, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;8.]</p> <p>6. Health <&wkey;8 — Health Ordinances — Validity.</p> <p>While the board of health might clothe the health officer with authority to ascertain and determine whether any particular building fell within one class or the other, it could not invest him with authority to withdraw any _particular building from one class and place it in the other, and the ordinance, so far as it attempted to authorize him to do so, and to determine whether floors should be tar-cindered or concreted, was invalid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Health, Cent. Dig. § 7; Dec, Dig. <&wkey;>8J</p> <p>7. Health <&wkey;8 — Health ORDINANCES — Partial Invalidity — Effect.</p> <p>While the provision authorizing the health officer to transfer a building from class B to class A could not be complained of by any one excepting the owner of the building so transferred, the authority to allow the use of tar-cinders instead of concrete left it optional with him whether the ordinance should be enforced or not according ‘to its terms against persons whose buildings fell in class A, and this discrimination rendered the ordinance void as to class A, and, it being apparent that it would not have been passed as applicable to class B buildings alone, it was wholly void.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Health, Cent. Dig, § 7; Dec. Dig.</p> <p>Land, J., dissenting in part.</p>
- 137 La. 652City of New Orleans v. Stein (1915)Judgment set aside, and prosecution dismissed
Mrs. A. Stein was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and she applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition. .
- 137 La. 659City of New Orleans v. Lacaze (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from Second Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; Ben P. Tiller, Recorder.</p> <p>Henry Lacaze was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 659City of New Orleans v. Jumonville (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; J. J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>Miss A. Jumonville was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 660City of New Orleans v. Fos (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from Second Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; Ben P. Tiller, Recorder.</p> <p>Joe Fos was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 660City of New Orleans v. Monte (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from Second Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; Ben P. Tiller, Recorder.</p> <p>Sam Monte was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 661City of New Orleans v. Walker (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Oourt of New Orleans; John J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>Mrs. Ella Walker was convicted of violating nn ordinance of the B'oard of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 661City of New Orleans v. Throunk (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; John J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>Philip Throunk was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 661City of New Orleans v. Sanford (1916)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; J. J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>Miss M. Sanford and others were convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 662City of New Orleans v. Stock (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; J. J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>Jake Stock was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 662City of New Orleans v. Schoeffner (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; John J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>E. Schoeffner was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 663City Of New Orleans v. O'Rouke (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; John J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>W. J. O’Rouke was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 663City of New Orleans v. Richter (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from Second Recorder’s Court of New-Orleans; Ben P. Tiller, Recorder.</p> <p>Hy. Richter was convicted of violating- an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of' New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 663City of New Orleans v. Rolfs (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of NewOrlcans; John J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>H. W. Rolfs was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 663City of New Orleans v. Mallu (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from Second Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; Ben P. Tiller, Recorder.</p> <p>John Mallu was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 665City of New Orleans v. Schmitt (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; John J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>Emile Schmitt was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 665City of New Orleans v. Kuhlman (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; J. J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>O. Kuhlman was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 666City of New Orleans v. Kieran (1915)Reversed, and prosecutions dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; J. J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>L. A. Kieran was convicted on five complaints of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 666City of New Orleans v. Fischer (1915)Reversed, and prosecution dismissed
<p>Appeal from First Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; J. J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>John Fischer was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 667Henderson v. City of Shreveport (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllables by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Coepobations <&wkey;918 — .Bond Election — Publication op Notice.</p> <p>A notice of election by a municipality, to issue bonds under article 281 of the Constitution for the purpose of purchasing and constructing a system of waterworks, etc., must be published for 30 days in the official journal of the municipal corporation, if there is one.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1919-1923; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>918.]</p> <p>2. Municipal Cokpokations &wkey;>918 — Bond Election — Publication ■ op Notice — Computation op Time.</p> <p>Four weeks’ publication in a newspaper constitutes a publication for 30 days, provided 30 days intervene from the date on which the publication is first inserted and the day on which the election takes place.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1919-1923; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;9J.8.J</p> <p>3. Municipal Coepobations &wkey;»918 — Municipal Bond Election — Questions Submitted.</p> <p>There is but one definite proposition submitted to property taxpayers where the vote is taken as to whether the municipality will or will not purchase and extend an existing system or construct a waterworks and sewer system for the city.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1919-1923; Dee. Dig. <@^>91'8.]</p>
- 137 La. 670Strong v. Robbins (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; Ben C. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Edward M. Strong against Frank E. Robbins and others. From a judgment dismissing a suit, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 671Henderson v. City of Shreveport (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Action by W. K. Henderson, Jr., and others, against the City of Shreveport. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 673State v. Coile (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish, of Bossier; J. N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>J. M. Coile was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors, and he appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 674Feliciana Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Feliciana Bank & Trust Company, in liquidation, against the Union Central Life; Insurance Company, of Cincinnati, Ohio. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 677Ballard v. Ponchatoula Homestead Ass'n (1915)Reversed, and cause dismissed'
<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by John A. Ballard, Tax Collector, against the Ponchatoula Homestead Association. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 682Costa v. Illinois Cent. R. (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Levees <&wkey;>36 — Railroads <&wkey;276 — Operation — Injuries to Trespassing Child.</p> <p>Where defendant railroad, in entering a city, passed through a gap left for the purpose in a levee, which gap during an unusually high stage of the river, was filled up as much as possible while yet allowing the passage of trains, and plaintiff’s child was killed while stealing a ride on a train by being- carried against a plank which projected to within a foot of the side of the train in the gap, plaintiff had no cause of action for the death against the railroad or the board of levee .commissioners.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Levees, Cent. Dig. § 11; Dec. Dig. <@=^36; Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 878-886; Dec. Dig. &wkey;276J</p>
- 137 La. 683State v. Hollingsworth (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Oowrt.) </p> <p>Criminal- Law &wkey;>1032 — Objections not Raised Below.</p> <p>Judgment affirmed for reasons stated in State ex rel. J. J. Hollingsworth v. Judge (No. 21196) 68 South. 834, ante, p. 478, recently decided.</p> <p>[Ed. Note, — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2627, 2628, 2642; Dec. Dig. <§=»1032.]</p> <p>Provosty and O’Niell, JJ., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 686Ethredge v. Watts (1915)Reversed, and suit dismissed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Tenancy in Common <&wkey;15 — Adverse Possession-Prescription.</p> <p>The owner of an undivided interest in real estate may acquire the share belonging to the 'co-owners by the prescription of 30 years. Rev. Oiv. Code, art. 3515.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Tenancy in Common, Cent. Dig. §§ 42-52; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey; 15.]</p>
- 137 La. 691Elias v. Mayor of New Iberia (1915)Affirmed in part, set aside in part, and judgment…
<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Electricity <&wkey;19 —Cause of Death — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>In an action against defendant city for death of plaintiff’s wife by an electric shock from defendant’s power wire in contact with a wire clothesline, evidence held sufficient to show the cause of death as charged.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Electricity, Cent. Dig. § 11; Dec. Dig. &wkey;H9.]</p> <p>2. Electricity &wkey;>16 — Duty of City to Wire House — Neglect.</p> <p>Where a city is responsible for seeing that a house wired for electricity is properly connected to its power line, it cannot relieve itself of such duty by neglecting to give any attention to the matter, .and is liable for defective work unless the property owner voluntarily undertakes to do the work himself.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases,, see Electricity, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>16.]</p> <p>3.Municipal Corporations <&wkey;751 — Torts —Duty of City to Wire House — Independent Contractors.</p> <p>The charter of defendant city provided that, except in the case of a public building, no one, save by authority of the department of public properties, should be permitted to tap or connect with any of the water mains, light or power wires, nor should the trustee permit the connecting of water mains or wires with those of any such buildings or places wherein the plumbing or wiring has been done, extended, repaired, or tampered with by other parties. Plaintiff’s wife was killed by an electric current which reached her through a wire clothesline in contact with defendant city’s power wire, which supplied plaintiff’s house, and which had been negligently installed by a claimed independent contractor. Held, that the city was responsible for the wire coming in contact with the clothesline, since the ordinance imposed on it an absolute obligation to attend to the wiring, giving plaintiff the right to assume that the person installing it was the agent of the city for doing the wiring, so that the responsibility for any 'defect in the work rested on the city, not on the .plaintiff.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1580-1582; Dec. Dig. &wkey;3751.] *</p> <p>4. Electricity <&wkey;16 — Defective Wiring-Negligence.</p> <p>Where a wire connecting a house with the city’s power line was so strung that a wire clothesline, when raised by a pole, as is customary, would come in contact with it, such wire connection with the power line was negligently defective, since due care requires that conductors of electricity be so placed with reference to similar conducting agencies that dangerous contacts are nob probable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Electricity, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>16.]</p> <p>5. Electricity &wkey;>18 — Injuries—Contribu- . Tory Negligence.</p> <p>Where defendant city, in connecting plaintiff’s house with its electric light line, strung its wire in such a position that, when plaintiff’s wire clothesline was raised by a pole after the clothes were hung out, it would come in contact with the light wire, plaintiff’s wife, in so raising the clothesline, incurring a shock resulting in death, was not guilty of contributory negligence, since a person incurring an unknown danger, which he is not bound to know of, is not negligent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Electricity, Cent. Dig. § 10'; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>18.]</p> <p>6. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;733 — Supply of Electricity — Liability of City.</p> <p>The liability of a municipal corporation, which lawfully engages in the business of operating an electric light plant to light streets and public places and to sell current to its inhabitants, is governed by the rules applicable to any private corporation or individual conducting .a similar enterprise.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1547-1549, 1561; Dec. Dig. &wkey;733.]</p> <p>7. Death <&wkey;31 — Death of Wife — Husband’s Right of Action.</p> <p>A husband has no right of action on his own behalf for the death of his wife.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. §§ 25, 37-46„ 48; Dec. Dig. &wkey;31.]</p> <p>8. Death <&wkey;107 — Damages — Death of Mother.</p> <p>In an action by a husband on behalf of his children against defendant city for death of his wife, electrocuted through defendant’s negligence, judgment for $1,000 in favor of each of her eight children, ranging from 5 months to 17 years, was proper.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. § 152; Dec. Dig. &wkey;107.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 702In re Coreil's Estate (1915)Reversed, and suit dismissed
<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the Estate of L. Marius Coreil. Application of Amelie Yidrine, surviving widow in community, to be put in possession of one half of the estate as owner and as usufructuary of the other half inherited by her children. Judgment for petitioner, and from the latter half of the judgment the tax collector appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 705Natalie Oil Co. v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. (1915)Writ of mandamus granted
Action by the Natalie Oil Company and others against the Louisiana Railway & Navigation Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant applies for writs of certiorari and prohibition.
- 137 La. 713Sibley, L. B. & S. Ry. Co. v. Currie (1915)Amended and affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Taxation <&wkey;20A — Bailroads—Exemption —“Completed.”</p> <p>Under article 230 of Constitution of 1898, exempting from taxation, for ten years from the date of its completion, any railroad or part of such railroad that might thereafter be constructed and completed prior to January 1, 1904, a railroad must be considered as “completed” from the date of the regular operation of trains on its roadbed, although the same be not entirely surfaced and ditched.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 321-323, 325, 332, 333; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>204.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Complete.]</p> <p>2. Taxation &wkey;527% — Tender ox Part ox Tax.</p> <p>• Where a taxpayer, intending to institute an action to reduce or to cancel in part his assessment, tenders to the tax collector the amount of taxes which he admits is due, it becomes the duty of the tax collector to accept the tender and to issue a receipt to the taxpayer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 979, 980; Dec. Dig. &wkey;527y2.]</p> <p>3.Taxation <&wkey;549 — Attorney xor Tax Collector — Commissions.</p> <p>The attorney for the tax collector is entitled to his statutory commissions for defending an action by a taxpayer to cancel an assessment on the ground of the exemption of the property, in whole or in part, from taxation; but such commissions should not be allowed on that part of the taxes admitted to be due, and tendered to the tax collector previous to suit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1043-1050; Dec. Dig. &wkey;549.]</p>
- 137 La. 719Succession of Morris (1915)Reversed
In the matter of the succession of George J. Morris. The account of the executrix Mrs. Annie Mallory Morris' opposed. Opposition dismissed, and opponent appeals.
- 137 La. 722Zavaglia v. Notarbartolo (1915)Reversed and dismissed
<p>Appeal from Oivil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred. D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by F. M. Zavaglia against N. Notarbartolo. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 741State v. Jackson (1915)Affirmed
Baker, Judge. V, T. Jackson was accused of crime, and from a judgment holding unconstitutional the statute under which he was prosecuted, the State, appeals.
- 137 La. 743Paepcke Leicht Lumber Co. v. Vantrompt (1915)Judgment of the Court of Appeals set aside and a…
Suit for injunction by Paepcke Leicht Lumber Company against Mose Vantrompt, Tax Collector. The decree of the district court, dismissing' the writ, was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and the case remanded for trial on its merits, and the defendant applies for a writ of review.
- 137 La. 747Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Carriers <&wkey;189 — Preferential Rates — Unfavorable Location.</p> <p>There is no rule, of reason or of law, which imposes upon a carrier.the burden of compensating, by preferential rates, the disadvantage, re-' suiting from unfavorable location, under which either a community or a particular shipper may labor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 162, 854, 855, 859-865; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>189.]</p> <p>2. Carriers &wkey;>12 — Preferential Rates — Order of Railroad Commission — Unfavoriable Location.</p> <p>An order of the Railroad Commission, which throws upon one carrier, of several, the entire burden of putting an unfavorably situated place on a parity, as to freight rates, with a place that is favorably situated, declares certain handling of freight cars, between different stations, which is necessary to the delivery of the freight at its destination, to be “switch movements,” and fixes a fiat rate therefor, which is below the cost of the movement, is unreasonable, and is properly annulled.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-11, 15-20; Dec. Dig. &wkey;12.]</p> <p>3. Carriers <&wkey;189 — Through Shipment — Rates.</p> <p>Where freight is received for transportation, and delivered by the same carrier, or by a connecting carrier, who is a party to a through contract, the charge for transportation and delivery is largely regulated by the character of the commodity; and as some classes of goods are more valuable and involve greater responsibility, and some are more difficult to handle and involve greater expense, than others, the charge for carriage, handling, and delivery is determined accordingly, and includes the entire service. But there is no rational theory upon which one of the carriers, in any such case, can be entitled to the highest rate, and another be required to accept the lowest.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 162, 854, 855, 859-865; Dec. Dig. ®=»189.]</p> <p>4. Carriers <&wkey;193 — Connecting Carriers— Through Shipment — Switching Service.</p> <p>Switching service, as between railroad companies, is usually -reciprocal, and it is inconceivable that, when a particular company has hauled a car load of high class freight to the end of its road, it should have the right to require a connecting company to continue the haul and deliver the car at its ultimate destination, as a switch movement, at a fixed price, without regard to the character of the contents of the car; and especially is that true where there is no possibility of its rendering a reciprocal service to such connecting company.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 348, 868, 869; Dec. Dig. &wkey;193.]</p> <p>5. Carriers <&wkey;12 — Terminal Facilities — Charges — Reasonableness.</p> <p>It is unreasonable to suppose that a railroad company can afford to acquire extensive terminal facilities, build, maintain, and operate a drawbridge, at an original cost of $276,-662.70, and an annual expense exceeding $2,-000, and charge no more for the use of such facilities, in the loading, unloading, and handling of cars, than for ordinary switching operations upon a track costing $11,000 per mile.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-11, 15-20; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;12.]</p>
- 137 La. 760New York Life Ins. v. Murtagh (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish <jf Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the New York Life Insurance Company against William H. Murtagh, testamentary executor, and others. From judgment for defendant Miss Lulu Delery, the executor appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 765State v. Anderson (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Com't.) </p> <p>1. Indictment and Information &wkey;M59— Amendment.</p> <p>A certain warehouse was burglarized on the night of the 21st, and again on the night of the 22d, of January, 1914. The defendant was charged in the indictment with burglary of that warehouse on the night of the 22d of January, 1914; and, when the state offered evidence to prove the burglary on the night of the 21st of January, his counsel objected to the evidence being admitted unless and until the indictment should be amended as to the date of the alleged commission of the crime. The objection was overruled, the evidence introduced, and the defendant convicted, and on appeal the conviction was set aside and the case remanded to be proceeded with according to law. The defendant’s counsel thereafter objected to an amendment of the indictment, on the 'ground that it would then charge the commission of another crime than that for which he was indicted. Held, the amendment was not as to a material part of the indictment, did not prejudice the accused in his defense and was properly allowed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 505-514; Dec. Dig. <§=^159J</p> <p>2. Criminal Law &wkey;>594, 600 — Continuance —Absent Witness.</p> <p>Where the sheriff’s return shows that an absent witness summoned for the defense could not be found, and the record shows that he was present at a former trial of the ease and was not called as a witness, and the district attorney admitted that if the witness were present he would testify to the facts alleged in the motion for a continuance, there is no error in overruling the motion.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1821,1322,1332, 1342-1347, 1604; Dec. Dig. &wkey;594, 600.]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law <&wkey;1163 — Remarks of Jud ge — Prejudice—Presumption .</p> <p>As jurors are supposed to give a reasonable construction to the remarks of the trial judge, it is presumed that his remarks which could not reasonably cause the jurors to be prejudiced against the defendant did not cause them to be prejudiced against him.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3090-3099; Dec. Dig. &wkey;* 1163.]</p> <p>4. Indictment and Information <&wkey;176 — Pleading and Proof — Date of Offense.</p> <p>In a criminal prosecution, the proof need not correspond precisely with the allegation in the indictment as to the date of the commission of the crime, unless the date is of the essence of the offense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. § 548; Dee. Dig. &wkey;176.]</p> <p>5. Witnesses <&wkey;287 — Cross-Examination— Re-Examination — Other Offenses.</p> <p>Although, as a general rule, evidence of the commission of another crime than that charged in the indictment is not admissible; nevertheless, if the defendant’s counsel cross-examines a state witness with regard to another crime than that charged in the indictment, about which the witness was not examined by the district attorney, the latter may then re-examine the witness on the subject as far as is necessary for a proper explanation of the testimony given on the cross-examination regarding the other crime.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 930, 1000-1002; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 287.]</p> <p>6. Burglary &wkey;>46 — Indictment — Instructions.</p> <p>The trial judge is not required to give a special charge requested by the defendant if it is not appropriate to the crime charged in the indictment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Burglary, Cent. Dig. §§ 111-120; Dec. Dig. &wkey;46.]</p>
- 137 La. 772Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co. v. Lafleur (1915)Reversed and rendered
H. Pavy, Judge. Suits by the Crowell & Spencer Lumber Company, by the Pawnee Land & Lumber Company, and by the Forest Lumber Company against Adraste Lafleur, Assessor, and others. From judgments for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. The suits were consolidated in the Supreme Court.
- 137 La. 778Fried v. Marrero (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Guardian and Ward <&wkey;10iti-TuTOESHiP — Family Meeting — Sale of Property — Objection.</p> <p>After sale and acceptance of title, it is too late for minor heirs to be heard to allege that there was no proof before the family meeting or the court authorizing the sale, which wont to show that the property was indivisible in kind.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. § 382; Dec. Dig. <^=>104.]</p> <p>2. Partition <&wkey;13 — Conflict of Interest-Owners in Common.</p> <p>A conflict of interest between heirs in the sale of their property under judgment in a partition suit does not result from the mere fact that they are owners in common.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Partition, Cent. Dig. §§ 36, 81; Dec. Dig. &wkey;ti3J</p> <p>3. Guardian and Ward <&wkey;104^-TuTORSHiP —Sale of Property — Irregularities—Objection.</p> <p>Where a dative tutor is administering a succession with the consent of the major heirs and with the apparent consent of creditors, and where he has applied to the court, and the court has ordered the sale of the property to pay the debts of the succession, as a regularly appointed administrator might have done, and title has been accepted and the price paid by a purchaser in.good faith, the heirs, after five#years, cannot be heard to complain of irregularities.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. § 382; Dec. Dig. <@=»104.]</p> <p>4. Guardian and Ward <&wkey;108 — Sale oe Property — Purchaser—Good Faith.</p> <p>In such case, the purchaser is not required to look back of the judgment of the court recognizing the necessity for the sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 369, 395-398; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>108.]</p> <p>5. Judicial Sales <&wkey;33% — Irregularities —Time to Object — Limitations.</p> <p>All informalities connected with or growing out of any public sale, made by any person authorized to sell at public auction, shah be prescribed against by those claiming under such sale, after the lapse of five years from the time of making it, whether against minors, married women, or interdicted persons.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Judicial Sales, Dec. Dig. &wkey;>33%.]</p>
- 137 La. 784Lamport & Holt, Ltd. v. Board of Com'rs of Port (1915)Judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside, and that of…
Writ of Review to Court of Appeal, Parish of Orleans. Action by Lamport & Holt, Limited, against the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans. Judgment for defendants in the city court, which was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and defendants apply for writ of review.
- 137 La. 787Crowley Bank & Trust Co. v. Hurd (1915)Motion denied, and judgment reversed, with directions
<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Crowley Bank & Trust Company against Charles H. Hurd. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals, and plaintiff moves to dismiss.</p>
- 137 La. 792Dunlap v. Whitmer (1914)Modified and affirmed
Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. Proceeding. in nature of a concursus, by James E. Dunlap against Robert E. Whitmer and others. From the judgment, the Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Company, trustee, and others, defendants, appeal.
- 137 La. 807Brooklyn Cooperage Co. v. Cora Planting & Mfg. Co. (1915)Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, and…
Le Blanc, Judge. Separate suits by the Brooklyn Cooperage Company and Ozark Cooperage & Lumber Company against the Cora Planting & Manufacturing Company, in which J. Watts Kearney & Sons and others intervened, claiming certain liens against the property seized under writ of sequestration. Judgment for the plaintiffs and certain of the interveners, and plaintiffs and other interveners appeal.
- 137 La. 818Succession of Powers v. Howcott (1915)Affirmed
K. Skinner, Judge. Action by Frank Zengel, administrator of the'succession of Samuel Powers, against W. H. Howcott, in which Samuel S. Labouisse and others were cited. From the judgment, Charles Louque, substituted plaintiff, appeals.
- 137 La. 828Town of Hammond v. Badeau (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Courts <&wkey;224^-Jurisdiction — 'Violation or Ordinance.</p> <p>In a case that is appealable to this court only on the ground that the constitutionality or-legality of a fine or other penalty imposed by a municipal corporation is in contestation, our jurisdiction extends only to the question of constitutionality or legality of the ordinance imposing the fine or other penalty, and not to questions of' guilt or innocence or of the regularity or legality-of the proceedings in the court below.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. &wkey;224.]</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;116 — Ordinances — Repeal.</p> <p>Where the violation of one of two municipal ordinances on the same subject would not necessarily be a violation of the other, the ordinance of earlier date is not repealed, unless the-repeal be expressed in the ordinance of later-date.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For. other eases, see Municipal. Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 268-271; Dec. Dig. <i&wkey;116.]</p>
- 137 La. 830McShane v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish, of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. James McShane against the' New Orleans Railway & Light Company. Prom a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 833Wolf v. Thomas (1915)From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Courts <&wkey;224 — Jurisdiction of Appeai>— Amount Involved — Determination .</p> <p>The appellate jurisdiction of the courts is determined by the amount in contest at the time the judgment appealed from was rendered in the lower court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 487, 608, 609, 614, 616, 617; Dec. Dig. &wkey;s224.]</p>
- 137 La. 835Farmerville State Bank v. Police Jury of Union Parish (1915)Rule made absolute, and ordered that the writs issue…
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Mandamus <&wkey;10, 57 — Suspensive Appeal-Existence oe Right.</p> <p>If it appears, in an application for mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant a suspensive appeal, that, without regard for the correctness or incorrectness of the judgment from which the appeal was demanded, the applicant has no right to a suspensive appeal, the writ must be denied. But, when it appears that the suspensive appeal was denied by the trial judge on the ground that the judgment from which the appeal was demanded was correct, the writ of mandamus must issue.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mandamus, Cent. Dig. §§ 37, 68, 114-120; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 10, 57.]</p>
- 137 La. 838Sicard v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. (1913)On motion to dismiss
<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Appeal and Ebrob <&wkey;327 — Parties—Citation.</p> <p>Where a married woman who joined her •husband as plaintiff recovered a judgment for personal injuries, alleged to be her separate property, and the judgment did not name the husband, the defendant may appeal without citing the husband to answer the appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1795, 1814-1820, 1822-1835; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;>327.]</p>
- 137 La. 839Landry v. Duplantis (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Appeal and -Error &wkey;>1008 — Judgment-Evidence — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>Contributory negligence is largely a question of fact, and on such an issue the judgment below will be affirmed, when not contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3955-3960, 3962-3969; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>1008.]</p> <p>2. Navigable Waters <&wkey;20 — Vessels—Collision with Drawbridge.</p> <p>Where a police jury ordinance provided that drawbridges on certain bayous should remain open during the night, but might be temporarily closed at night for the purpose of crossing, the navigator of a lugger approaching one of such bridges on a very dark night has no right to assume that the draw is open.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. §§ 73-99; Dec. Dig. <$=v>20.]</p>
- 137 La. 843City of New Orleans v. Ricker (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;1090 — Appeal—Presentation por Review — Evidence.</p> <p>On appeal in a criminal case, evidence found in the transcript, but not coming up as a part of a bill of exception, will not be noticed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other, cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2653, 27S9, 2803-2822, 2825-2827, 2927, 2928, 2948, 3204; Dec. Dig. &wkey;U090.]</p> <p>2. Health &wkey;>21 — Municipal Corporations <&wkey;122 — Ordinance — Validity — Presumption.</p> <p>A demurrer to an affidavit based on an ordinance of the board of health of the city of New Orleans, on the ground that the same is illegal .and unconstitutional, must be tried on the face of the ordinance. Held, that the ordinance of the board of health of the city of New Orleans providing for the rat-proofing of all houses, buildings, superstructures, etc., in said city, for the purpose of suppressing and eradicating the bubonic plague, is a valid and constitutional exercise of the police power of the state, in the interest of the safety of the people. Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of such an ordinance, until the contrary be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Health, Cent. Dig. § 25; Dec.- Dig. <&wkey;>21; Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 281-2S9; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>122.]</p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations t&wkey;63 — Existence op Plague — Ordinance.</p> <p>Whether the existence of bubonic plague in the city of New Orleans involved such a danger to the public health as to require the rat-proofing of all buildings and structures in said city was one .of fact and of public policy which belongs to the legislative department of the government.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 155, 1378, 1879; Dec. Dig. <S=^63.]</p>
- 137 La. 854State v. Hammons (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Daw <&wkey;371, 372 — Evidence—Prior1 Misappropriation of Funds.</p> <p>In the prosecution of a clerk of court and ex officio recorder and notary for the embezzlement of a particular sum of money received by him in his official capacity, evidence of the conversion by him, to his own use, upon a previous occasion, though several months before, of a sum similarly received, was properly admitted, as tending to show criminal intent, or system, or both, in the misappropriation charged in the indictment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Daw, Cent. Dig. §§.907, 972-979; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 371, 372.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 861Long v. Louisiana Creosoting Co. (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Waters and Water Courses <@=>69 — Pollution oe Stream — Reasonableness oe Use — Question oe Fact.</p> <p>In an action for damages by one riparian owner against another for the pollution of a water course, the question, whether the use that polluted the stream was a reasonable or an unreasonable use is for the judge or jury to determine from all of the circumstances of the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 60, 61; Dec. Dig. @=>69.]</p> <p>2. Injunction @=>10 — Right to Reliee.</p> <p>A perpetual injunction will not be granted to prevent the defendant from doing that which he does not threaten nor claim a right to do.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Dec. Dig. @=>10.]</p>
- 137 La. 863Robinson v. Britton (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Evidence @=>441 — Pakol—Contract to Convey Land.</p> <p>In the absence of allegation of error, fraud, violence, or threats, in giving or obtaining consent to a sale of real estate by authentic act for a stated price in cash, which the act recites was paid and received, parol evidence is inadmissible, as between the parties, to annul the title so vested, and show that the real contract was an oral one, whereby the parties agreed to exchange tracts of land, and that, after plaintiff had conveyed his tract to defendant, defendant refused to comply with his part of said oral contract by conveying his tract to plaintiff.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1719, 1723-1763, 1765-1845, 2030-2047; Dec. Dig. @=>441.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 869Henry Byrnes & Co. v. Concrete Construction & Contracting Co. (1915)Judgment set aside, and judgment rendered for plaintiff…
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; F. D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Henry Byrnes & Co. against the Concrete Construction & Contracting Company and others. Judgment for defendants and plaintiff appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 871State v. Posey (1915)Affirmed,
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Jury <@=133 — Acceptance op Juror — Discretion.</p> <p>It is not reversible error for the trial judge in a criminal case to refuse to require the prosecuting officer to determine, finally, whether he accepts a juror, examined on his voir dire, before turning him over to defendant’s counsel, when the latter is allowed a re-examination, after the re-examination of the prosecuting officer. There is no law regulating the matter, and it is therefore within the discretion of the judge, or the rules of his court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 586-598; Dec. Dig. <@=133.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <@=730 — Witnesses <@= 277, 337 — Examination op Accused — Ground for Reversal.</p> <p>A conviction in a criminal case will not be set aside because the defendant, having taken the stand as a witness in his own behalf, was asked, on cross-examination, “if he had not killed a man in Arkansas,” and “how many men he had killed before,” when the questions are excluded, on objection of defendant’s counsel, the prosecuting officer reprimanded for asking them, and the jury instructed to. consider them not asked. A defendant in a criminal case, who takes the stand as a witness, is subject to cross-examination as any other witness; and, though the particular form of the questions asked in this instance may have been objectionable, it was competent, for the purpose of impugning the credibility of the defendant, to show that ho had been convicted of, or prosecuted for, offenses other than that for which he was being tried.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1693; Dec. Dig. <@=730; Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 925, 979-983, 1113, 1129-1132, 1140-1142, 1146-1148; Dec. Dig. <@=277, 337.]</p> <p>8. Criminal Law <@=1120 — Evidence in Rebuttal — Con clusiveness of Ruling — Presentation for Review.</p> <p>The ruling of the trial judge, in a criminal case, that evidence offered in rebuttal is properly rebutting evidence, is conclusive in this court when the evidence offered for the defense is not brought up with the bill of exception.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2931-2937; Dec. Dig. <@= 1120.]</p> <p>4. Criminal Law <©=1119 — Presentation for Review — Argument op Counsel.</p> <p>A conviction in a prosecution for manslaughter will not be set aside because of inferences drawn by the prosecuting officer, in his argument before the jury, to the effect that a pistol, found on the person of the deceased, was put there by the friends of the accused, where the bill of exception does not state the ground of objection and the statement per curiam is that the prosecuting officer did not go beyond the record nor clearly beyond what was a legitimate discussion of the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2927-2930; Dec. Dig. <@= 1119.]</p> <p>5. Homicide <@=174^ — Evidence—Statements of Accused.</p> <p>Statements concerning a homicide, afterward made by the person prosecuted therefor, are admissible against him whether in chief or in rebuttal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 359-371; Dec. Dig. <@=174.]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <@=940, 941 — New Trial —Grounds—Newly Discovered Evidence.</p> <p>A conviction of manslaughter will not be set aside because of the refusal of the trial judge to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence as to a collateral fact, having no material bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant, or on the ground of the failure of the defendant to offer the testimony of his child, a boy five years of age, whom he knew to have been present at the killing and to have been in and out of the courtroom during the trial, and whose testimony would have been cumulative, in the extreme and adverse sense, that it would have been additional to the same point, but less credible than that given by other witnesses, by reason of the boy’s tender age and his relationship to defendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2324-2330; Dec. Dig. <@= 940, 941,]</p>
- 137 La. 878Faulk v. Vincent (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Suit for divorce by John O. Faulk, husband, against Marie Vincent, wife. Judgment- for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 879King v. First Methodist Church (1915)Dismissed
Land, Judge. Action by C. W. King and another against the First Methodist Church. There was a judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appeal.
- 137 La. 880State v. Creech (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <@=>1032 — Appeal—Objections Not Made Below.</p> <p>An objection made for the first time in the Supreme Court, in argument and brief, to the effect that an information charging the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors without first seeming- a license from the police jury, which had refused to issue a license, is fatally defective, because of the omisfeion of the words “town or city authorities” after the words “police jury,” comes too late, as raising merely a question of double pleading.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2627; Dec. Dig. <@=>1032.]</p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors <@=>200 — Illegal Sale — I neoemation .</p> <p>Such an information charges an offense, as intoxicating liquors cannot be sold in a “wet” parish without a license, and no license can issue in a “dry parish.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 219; Dec. Dig. <@=>200.]</p> <p>Provosty and O’Niell, JJ., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 883Jones v. Squire (1915)Judgment set aside, new judgment entered, and cause…
<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second. Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge: Harney F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Amelia Jones and another against Pompey Squire. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 883State v. Creech (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of De Soto; John H. Boone, Judge.</p> <p>Josh Creech was convicted of an illegal sale of intoxicating liquors, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 894Edenborn v. Blacksher (1915)Reversed and rendered
Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge. Actions by Wm. Edenborn and Henry P. Dart, joint receivers of the Union Irrigation Company, against Patton T. Blacksher and others, and by Patton T. Blacksher against R. R. Leh. From the judgment, Wm. Edenborn and others appeal.
- 137 La. 899Acme Lumber Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Port (1915)Modified and affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Sales <@=>166 — Sale oe Lumber — Compliance with Contract.</p> <p>Under a contract for the sale of “B grade” lumber, to be delivered and unloaded by and at the expense of the seller, and measured and graded by the purchaser’s inspectors, whose decision is final as to grade and measurement, it is not unfair for the seller to ship and tender for inspection a grade of lumber called “square edge and sound,” containing principally “B grade” and some higher and some lower grade of lumber ; the seller allowing the purchaser to take all the “B grade” and better, and removing the rejected lumber promptly at his own expense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 391-400, 402; Dec. Dig. <@=>166.]</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations <@=>253 — Purchase oe Lumber — Inspection—Liability eor Price.</p> <p>When the lumber purchased by a municipal board has been inspected, measured, and accepted by 'the inspectors employed by the superintendent of the board, under a contract of sale stipulating that the superintendent or his authorized representative shall be the sole judge of the quality and measurement of the lumber, the board cannot legally withhold the price on the ground that “its inspectors were inexperienced and incompetent, and' made faulty, imperfect, and erroneous inspections,” unless there was dishonesty on the part of the seller or collusion with the board’s superintendent or inspectors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 695; Dec. Dig. <@=> 253.]</p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations <@=>167 — Acts of Representatives — Liability.</p> <p>A municipal corporation or board is responsible for the acts of its authorized representatives within the scope of their authority.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 375, 379; Dec. Dig. <@=>167.]</p> <p>4. Sales <@=>372 — Sale of Lumber — Breach of Contract — Evidence.</p> <p>In an action to recover the profits which should have been made on lumber sold, but not delivered, on account of a breach of the contract, at the rate of profit made on the lumber which was delivered, the defendant may prove that his inspectors were incompetent, and that the profit made by the seller on the lumber that was delivered was due to the acceptance of lumber below the grade called for by the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. § 1089; Dec. Dig. <@=>372.]</p>
- 137 La. 910Thomas v. Planters' Lumber Co. (1915)Reversed and rendered
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Master and Servant <&wkey;91 — Injury to Servant — Gross Negligence.</p> <p>It is gross negligence for the foreman of a mill to order a 14 year old boy with a disabled arm to operate a machine that requires the use of both arms to operate it safely.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 141; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>91.j</p> <p>2. -Master and Servant &wkey;>107 — Injury to Servant — Liability oe Master — Failure to Repair Machine.</p> <p>The proprietor of a mill is liable in an action for damages for personal injuries inflicted upon an employé as the result of the neglect of the foreman to repair a machine which he knew was out of repair and dangerous to the employé operating it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig-. §§ 199-202, 212, 254, 255; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;107.]</p> <p>3. Master and Servant <&wkey;276 — Injury to Servant — Defective Machinery — Pro<of.</p> <p>Although it might otherwise be doubtful whether a certain accident was the result of a defect in the machine which the injured person was operating at the time of the accident, the fact that similar accidents had happened to other operators in, the same position with relation to the machine and were reasonably attributable and attributed to the defect in the machine, proves with reasonable certainty that the defect in the machine was the cause of the last accident.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 950-952, 954, 959, 970, 976; Dec. Dig. t&wkey;>276.]</p>
- 137 La. 918Scovel v. Shadyside Co. (1914)Affirmed
<p>(Syllabus by the Oowrt.)</p> <p>1. Fixtures <&wkey;18 — What Constitute.</p> <p>Combination gas and electric light chandeliers and brackets, mantels, stationary washstands, bathtubs, etc., attached to a building by the owner thereof for the service and exploitation of said building, are immovable by destination, and pass with the house when it is mortgaged or sold, if not reserved by the owner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. §§ 32-46; Dec. Dig. &wkey;18.]</p> <p>2. FIXTURES <&wkey;l — Immovables by Destination.</p> <p>The instances given in article 468, Civil Code, of immovables by destination are merely illustrative, and are not restrictive.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 6; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;l.]</p> <p>3. Fixtures <&wkey;4^-lMM0VABLEs by Destination — Deimmobilization.</p> <p>After movables have become immobilized by destination the mere change of mind on the part of the former owner cannot, of itself, deimmobilize them as against a purchaser without notice. It is the same with reference to a mortgage. (</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. §§ 3, 6; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>4.]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>4. Fixtures <&wkey;l — Matters Determinative— Method of Attachment.</p> <p>Whilst the purpose for which things are placed, by the owner,,on “a tract of land,” ordinarily determines whether or not they acquire the immobility of the land, the immobility vei non of things placed in a tenement or building (other, perhaps, than a manufacturing establishment which, legally speaking, has become part of the tract of land upon which it is erected) depends, finally, upon the manner in which they are attached thereto.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. §§ 1, 6; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;l.]</p> <p>5. Fixtures <&wkey;21 — What Constitute — Reclamation by Vendor.</p> <p>Combination gas and electric light chandeliers and brackets which form parts or accessories of gas and electric light plants established, the one, in the cellar of the residence on a plantation, and the other, in the sugar house, and without which those plants would be unable to render the service for which they were established, partake of the immobility of the plants, and cannot be reclaimed by the vendor of the plantation, on the ground that they are not permanently attached to the house, but may be unscrewed without injury to it or themselves.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. §§ 47-B6; Dec. Dig. &wkey;21.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>
- 137 La. 931State v. C. S. Jackson & Co. (1915)Judgment set aside in part, and affirmed in part
H. Boone, Judge. Suit by the State and another against C. S. Jackson & Co. and others. From the decree, the defendants O. S. Jackson & Co. and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company appeal.
- 137 La. 948A. Marx & Sons v. N. Frey, Ltd. (1915)Reversed and rendered
<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by A. Marx & Sons against N. Frey, Limited. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 959Adler v. Adler (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal fr'om Oivil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. ThSard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Jacob Adler and others against Raoul J. Adler and others. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.</p>
- 137 La. 970Holloman v. Alexandria & Pineville Building & Loan Ass'n (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Husband and Wife <&wkey;84 — Contracts of Married Women — Building and Loan Associations.</p> <p>Under Act No. 120 of 1902, a married woman may subscribe for and borrow upon stock in building and loan and homestead associations, without the consent or authorization of her husband, for her separate benefit.</p> <p>(Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 326, 796, 798; Dec. Dig. &wkey;384.]</p> <p>2. Building and Loan Associations <&wkey;26 —Vendor and Purchaser — Vendor’s Lien —Mortgage.</p> <p>Under Act No. 120 of 1902, a purchase of property by an association from a member, and the resale of such property at the same time, cannot be considered or dealt with as a loan secured by mortgage, but as a purchase, and a sale with vendor’s right and privileges.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Building and Loan Associations, Dec. Dig. <S^26.]</p> <p>3. Husband and Wife <&wkey;70 — Contracts of Married Women — Binding Effect.</p> <p>Under Act No. 120 of 1902, a sale and purchase by a married woman, in the absence of fraud, binds her, when she permits her husband to receive and use the price for his own purposes.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 301, 302, 304; Dec. Dig. &wkey;70.]</p>
- 137 La. 975Wheeler v. Britton (1915)Motion denied, and judgment affirmed
Théard, Judge. Action by Augustin B. Wheeler against Eliza M. Britton, his wife. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals, and moves to rescind order fixing case for trial by preference.
- 137 La. 982Bull v. Andrus (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Kxeotjtors and Administrators <&wkey;129 — Succession — Real Estate — Suit by Administrator-Pleading — Proof.</p> <p>A suit by an administrator to have an act of sale set aside as simulated must allege and show the insolvency of the succession which he represents. He must allege fraud, or injury to creditors.</p> <p>, [Ed. Note. — Eor other eases, see Executors and Administrators, Gent. Dig. §§ 533-536; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;129.j</p>
- 137 La. 985Coguenhem v. Trosclair (1915)Affirmed, and on rehearing reaffirmed
<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Estoppel <&wkey;98 — Equitable Estoppei>Silence — Foreclosure Sale — Property not Mortgaged.</p> <p>Where a mortgagor permits property to be sold under foreclosure, he is estopped from thereafter questioning collaterally the legality of the sale, but his creditors are not so estopped, and if property not covered by the mortgage he sold under it, it does not pass as against •creditors.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. § 290; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>98.]</p> <p>2. Mortgages <&wkey;133 — Appurtenances — Immovables — Tramway.</p> <p>Where two plantations connected by a tramway on a servitude of way over other plantations are mortgaged, they are mortgaged together with the servitude and the tramway, which is an immovable adjunct, and a foreclosure of the mortgage takes with it the tramway.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 260, 264, 265; Dec. Dig. &wkey;133.]</p> <p>3. Easements <&wkey;3 — Servitude of Way-Character.</p> <p>A servitude of way is an accessory of the plantation to which it is attached, and can pass only by means of the plantation, and is an adjunct of the estate, and not of its owner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Easements, Cent. Dig. §§ 8-12; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>3.]</p> <p>4. Easements &wkey;>24 — Servitude of Way-Tramway — Immobility.</p> <p>Although a servitude of way is not perpetual. a tramway laid upon it is an immovable, as is the servitude, for the period of the servitude.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Easements, Cent. Dig. §§ 64M59; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;24.]</p> <p>5. Fixtures &wkey;>26 — Tramway—Location.</p> <p>. Under Civ. Code, art. 468, to become an immovable, and pass with the estate, it is not essential that the tramway be laid upon the land of the estate, but it is sufficient if it be attached by attachment to a servitude running to the ,estate.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Fixtures, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>26.]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p> (Syllabus by .the. Court.) </p> <p>6. Easements <&wkey;3, 38 — Servitude of Pas- ■ sage — Accessories—Conveyance.</p> <p>Where two sugar plantations, some distance apart, having the same owner, are operated as one, with but one factory, and are connected by a train built upon a right of way, secured by contracts from the owners of the intervening lands, such contracts create a servitude of passage or way which passes with the plantations when sold, and the ties and rails pass also as the accessories provided for and necessary to the enjoyment of the servitude.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Easements, Cent. Dig. §§ 8-12, 61, 62, 114-116; Dec. Dig. <S=^3, 38.]</p> <p>7. Easements <&wkey;38 — Servitude of Passage —Accessories—Title.</p> <p>.The creation of a servitude of passage is an alienation of one of the elements of ownership of the estate upon which the servitude is imposed, and, whore the owner of the estate to which the servitude is due places upon the physical property, called the “right of way,” the means or accessories which are necessary to the enjoyment of the servitude, it cannot be said that he has placed them upon the property of another, in the sense that, when so placed, they are not covered by and included in the title of the estate to which the servitude is due.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Easements, Cent. Dig. §§ 61, 62, 114r-116; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 38.]</p>
- 137 La. 997Fuller v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1915)Affirmed
B. Holsteacl, Judge. Two actions consolidated, one by Charles C. Fuller, the other by Mrs. Emma Smith and others, both against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. From judgments for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
- 137 La. 1007State v. Lebleu (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;917 — New Trial — Grounds — Denial of Continuance — Absent Witness.</p> <p>Where, in a motion for continuance on account of the absence of a witness, a defendant, charged with larceny, alleged that he expected to prove by the witness a fact which, if established, would have been of vital importance, as constituting an alibi, and also that he had another witness by whom he might be able to prove the same fact, and, the continuance having been refused and the witness who was present having failed to testify as expected, the defendant was convicted, and thereafter moved for a new trial, but failed to attach to his motion the affidavit of the absent witness, to the effect that he would have testified as expected, and failed, upon the hearing of the motion, to produce such witness, or to account for his absence, the conviction will not be set aside, on account of the refusal of the trial court to grant the continuance; the presumption; in default of any explanation, being that the witness would not have testified as alleged in the motion for continuance, and hence that defendant suffered no prejudice from his absence.</p> <p>[Ed. >Nqte. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2161, 2162; Dec. Dig. <@=3 917.]</p> <p>2. Witnesses <@=333(L-Cross-Examination— Discretion — Foundation for Impeachment.</p> <p>The extent to which cross-examination, upon collateral matters and immaterial issues, may be carried, with the view of testing the credibility of a witness, is within the disraetion of the trial court,, though the propounding of questions with a view of laying the foundation for the impeachment of a witness is a matter of. right.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1106-1108; Dec. Dig. &wkey;330.]</p> <p>3. Indictment and Information <&wkey;160 — Amendment — Conforming to Proof.</p> <p>Where there is a variance between the testimony, describing the brand of cattle alleged to have been stolen, and the description as given in the bill of indictment, the bill may be amended to conform to the testimony.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. § 515; Dec. Dig. <@=>160.]</p> <p>4. Larceny <&wkey;31 — Stealing of Cattle — Indictment — Allegation of Value.</p> <p>The stealing of cattle is a felony, without regard to value, and the value need not be alleged in the indictment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Larceny, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-80; Dec. Dig. <@=>31.]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law <@=3508 — Witnesses <&wkey;88 I —Competency—Accused.</p> <p>I Under the > law as it now stands, a defendant in a criminal prosecution is a competent witness, and his testimony is admissible not only in His own behalf, but for or against his codefendant, with whom he is being jointly tried.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1099-1123; Dec. Dig. <@=> 508; Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 243, 244; Dee. Dig. <@=>88.]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <&wkey;686 — Order of Proof —Discretion.</p> <p>In a case where several defendants, being charged with conspiracy to steal and stealing, are prosecuted jointly, the state rests, and one of the defendants closes, without offering evidence, and another then offers evidence in his own behalf and tending to incriminate his co-defendant, first mentioned, the objection of the latter that, the state having closed, and he having offered no evidence to be rebutted, no further evidence against him was admissible, was properly overruled. It was within the discretion of the trial judge to admit any competent evidence, at any stage of the trial, if necessary to further the ends of justice. .</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1619, 1620, 1625, 1626; Dec. Dig. <@=^686.]</p> <p>7. Criminal Law <&wkey;649 — Jury <&wkey;72 — Tales Jurors — Determination of Number. —Delay of Trial — Discretion.</p> <p>It is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine how many tales jurors shall be ordered for a particular occasion, and equally within his discretion to determine whether a case on trial shall be delayed until the whole number ordered shall have reported or been accounted for, or whether the jury for such case shall be completed from the tales jurors who may have appeared when the court is ready to proceed with its business.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — -For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1512-1515; Dec. Dig.</p> <p>649; Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 333-347; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;72.]</p> <p>8. Conspiracy <&wkey;45 — Criminal Law <&wkey; 417, 427 — Evidence—Admissibility—Order of Proof.</p> <p>Where several persons are prosecuted jointly upon a charge of conspiring to steal and stealing cattle, and it appears that the sheriff and his deputy had visited the pasture of one, and there found another, the hired man of the first, engaged in skinning one of the stolen cattle ; that' the skinner said to his wife, “They have got me; let him know, right away;” that a boy was started, on the run, to the house of the first mentioned defendant, and, passing the sheriff and' his deputy en route, entered the house; that, upon being interrogated, he said that he had delivered a note, sent by the wife of the second mentioned defendant to the first mentioned; that the first mentioned defendant, upon being interrogated within a few minutes, admitted that the boy had delivered the note, “in front of him, but he didn’t see it, didn’t know what became of it, didn’t look at it;” and, on being asked to show it, said that “he didn’t know what became of it” — the testimony of the sheriff and his deputy to those facts was properly admitted, as tending to show conspiracy between the two parties defendant, and directly to connect them with the stealing of the cattle,- and (save, perhaps, the statement of the boy) was not obnoxious to thé objection that the doings of third persons, not charged with the conspiracy, or the larceny, were being brought into the matter; the wife and the boy having been merely the instruments used by the others in the conduct of their operations. “Where the conspiracy is to be established by inference, drawn from a number of facts and circumstances, the order of proof is discretionary with the court, and evidence of the acts and declarations of the supposed conspirators may be admitted at any time, dependent, for effect, under the charge of the judge, upon the ultimate establishment of the conspiracy, and of the accused’s connection therewith, to the satisfaction of the jury.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Conspiracy, Cent. Dig. §§ 100-104; Dee. Dig. <@^45: Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 950-967, 1012-1017; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>417, 427.]</p> <p>9. Criminal Law <&wkey;413 — Evidence—Self-Serving Declaration.</p> <p>A statement, said to have been made by a defendant, prosecuted jointly with others, for an alleged conspiracy to steal and stealing cattle, to his hired man, similarly prosecuted, which concerned the acquisition of the cattle, but was not part of the res gestee, and was not made by way of explanation, to a person to whom an explanation was due, of his possession of the cattle, was properly excluded, as self-serving.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 928-935; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;413.}</p>
- 137 La. 1032Police Jury of Caddo Parish v. Mayor of Shreveport (1915)Reversed, with directions
<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquors <&wkey;lll — Statutes @=>225% — Amendment—Construction.</p> <p>The amendment and re-enactment of a section of the Revised Statutes of Louisiana has the effect of substituting the new act for that section, of putting it in the place and stead of the original section, and of taking its number; and it must be read and considered in connection with other sections bearing on the same subject-matter.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent.' Dig. § 121; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>lll; Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 306; Dee. Dig. @=> 225%.]</p> <p>2. Statutes @=>148 — Amendatory Act — Reference to Intervening Act.</p> <p>It is not necessary, in a subsequent amendment and re-enactment of the section, to refer to the intervening act, or first amendment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig § 217; Dec. Dig. @=>148.]</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law @=>48 — Statutes— Construction Favoring Constitutionality.</p> <p>Before a law can be pronounced unconstitutional, its incompatibility with the Constitution must be clear.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. @=>48; Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 56.]</p> <p>4. Statutes @=>121 — Title and Subject-Matter — Intoxicating Liquors.</p> <p>“An act * * * relative to the granting or withholding of licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors” is sufficient to cover all subdivisions of the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For othe other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 146, 173, 174; Dec. Dig. &wkey;121.]</p> <p>5. Intoxicating Liquors @=>14 — Local Option-Validity oe Statute.</p> <p>Such legislative act does not, in any manner, involve the liberties or immunities of a municipality, when it provides that the vote of a parish shall control all the subdivisions of the parish.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 16; Dee. Dig. @=>14.]</p>
- 137 La. 1046Teutonia Bank & Trust Co. v. Security Brewing Co. (1915)Affirmed
King, Judge. Action by the Teutonia Bank & Trust Company against the Security Brewing Company, wherein a number of oppositions were-filed. From the judgment, plaintiff, as well as J. J. Russell and others, opponents, appeal.
- 137 La. 1059Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission (1915)Affirmed
<p> (Syllabus by the Qowt.) </p> <p>1. Carriers <&wkey; 12 — Unseasonable Rates— Award oe Damages — Power oe Railroad Commission.</p> <p>Neither the Constitution, nor any statute, whether directly or by fair implication, confers upon the Railroad Commission of Louisiana jurisdiction to assess, or award, against a railroad company, damages, alleged to have been sustained by a shipper or consignee by reason of its observance of a freight rate authorized by the Commission, but subsequently declared to be unreasonable. Whether such damages are recoverable in an ordinary action in a court is a question which is not involved in this case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-11, 15-20; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>12.]</p> <p>2. Railroads &wkey;>9 — Findings oe Railroad Commission — Review by Courts.</p> <p>The Interstate Commerce Commission is vested with judicial power and a certain jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States; whereas such power is withheld, from the Railroad Commission of Louisiana, the findings of which are inconclusive, and reviewable in the court of ordinary jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 12-19; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;9.]</p>
- 137 La. 1067Peter v. Owl Bayou Cypress Co. (1915)Affirmed
Action by George Peter and others against the Owl Bayou Cypress Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.
- 137 La. 1074Castagnos Cane Loader Co. v. David (1915)Affirmed
F. Blackman, Judge. Actions by the Castagnos Cane Loader Company, Limited, and Mrs. Lee Porterfield Bradshaw and others, against F. E. David,. Sheriff, and others. From judgments for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.
- 137 La. 1081Chatham Drug Co. v. Anders (1915)Application granted, and judgment reversed
<p>Original application by the Chatham Drug Company for writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against W. D. Anders, Judge of the District Court.</p>
- 137 La. 1087Pietri v. McLoughlin (1915)Affirmed
Consolidated suits by Gaspar Pietri and Mrs. P. J. O’Reilly against John Wells, wherein James J. McLoughlin, trustee in bankruptcy of James J. McLoughlin, filed third opposition. Judgment for plaintiffs and third opponent was amended on appeal to the Court of Appeal, and third opponent applies for certiorari or writ of review.
- 137 La. 1092Coleman v. Forsythe (1915)A judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Court of…
<p>Certiorari to Court of Appeal, Parish of La Salle.</p> <p>Suit by James N. Coleman against James Forsythe.</p>
- 137 La. 1096Corporation of Town of Hammond v. Badeau (1915)Conviction and sentence set aside, and defendant discharged
<p>Appeal from Mayor’s Court of Town of Hammond; John W. Skinner, Mayor.</p> <p>George T. Badeau was convicted of violating an ordinance of the Town of Hammond, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 1098State v. Mitchell (1915)Appeal dismissed
<p>Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Winn; Cas Moss, Judge.</p> <p>Bill Mitchell was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>
- 137 La. 1100Percy v. Ewing (1915)Affirmed
<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Natchitoches; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Maude Percy against A. E. Ewing, with the People’s Bank as warrantor. From the judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>