Volume 138 — Louisiana Reports

Ellis, Judge. Suit by the American Lumber Company against the Day Brick & Lumber Company, for the appointment of a receiver and for an injunction. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Olivier Gueriniere pleaded guilty to arson, and his motion, made after sentence, for rehearing and new trial, having been denied, he appeals.

<p>Action by E. Pilsburry, trustee, against A. Frickie, Sr. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant applies for writ of mandamus.</p>

Henry J. Fleddermann was sentenced to prison by court-martial, and applied for writ of habeas corpus. There was judgment dismissing his application, and he applies for writs of prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus to review it.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Homestead <&wkey;95 — Acquisition oe Homestead Bight — Exemption — Unrecorded Judgment.</p> <p>An ordinary debt, though in the form of an unrecorded judgment, does not prevent the acquisition of a right of homestead which will protect the property, occupied and claimed as a homestead, from seizure in satisfaction of such judgment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. §§ 141-146; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;>95.j</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Charles Phelps was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

K. Schwing, Judge. Peter Latino was convicted of purchasing merchandise on credit with intent to cheat and defraud, and appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberville; Jos. E. Le Blanc, Jr., Judge.</p> <p>Action by Lewis B. Hart against Charles I. Dupont. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Bowling S. Leathers against the Odd Fellows’ Rest. From judgment dismissing plaintiff’s suit, she appeals.</p>

<p>Action by T. F. Wells against A. G. Honeycutt, wherein S. J. Dillard filed third opposition. Third opposition dismissed, and the third opponent applies for certiorari and mandamus.</p>

F. Bell, Judge. W. H. Boylston was indicted for embezzlement, a motion to quash the indictment was sustained and the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Cov/rt.) </p> <p>1. Public Lands &wkey;>51 — School Lands.</p> <p>“The practice of setting apart section No. 16 of every township of public lands for the maintenance of public schools is traceable to the ordinance of 1785, being the first enactment for the disposal by sale of the public lands in the western territory. The appropriation of public lands for that object became a fundamental principle by the ordinance of 1787, which settled terms of compact between the people and states of the northwestern territory, and the original states, unalterable except by consent. One of the articles affirmed that ‘religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessarj' for good government and the happiness of mankind,’ and ordained that ‘schools, as a means of education, should be forever encouraged.’ ”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 138, 146; Dec. Dig. <@=^51.]</p> <p>2. Public Lands <&wkey;53 — School Lands— Sale oe Section 16.</p> <p>Another provision of law is to the effect that for section No. 16 in every township which has been sold, granted, or disposed of, other lands equivalent thereto and most contiguous to the same shall be granted to the inhabitants of the township for the use of schools.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Ror other cases, see Public Lands, Gent. Dig. §§ 143-145; Dec. Dig. i&wkey;> 53.]</p> <p>3. Public Lands &wkey;>51 — School Lands— Title — Province of Courts.</p> <p>“Until the survey of the township and the designation of the specific section, the right of the state rests in compact — binding, it is true, the public faith, and dependent for execution upon the political authorities. Courts of justice have no authority to mark out and define the land * *. * subject to the grant. But when the political authorities have performed this duty, the compact has an object, upon which it can attach, and if there is no legal impediment the title of the state becomes a legal title. The jus ad rem by the performance of that executive act becomes a jus in re, judicial in its nature, and under the cognizance and protection of the judicial authorities, as well as the others.” Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 179, 15 L. Ed. 338.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Ror other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 138, 146; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey;51.]</p> <p>4. Public Lands <&wkey;25, 51 — School Lands —Title—Government Survey.</p> <p>A survey made by the government must be held conclusive against any collateral attack in controversies between individuals. After a survey of the township has been made by the proper United States authorities and section 16 of a named township has been made and placed, the said section becomes the property of the state for school purposes from the date of such survey.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Ror other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 33, 34, 138, 146; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 25, 51.]</p> <p>5. Evidence <&wkey;83 — Power of Officer-Grant of Land.</p> <p>A grant or concession of land made by an officer duly authorized carries with it prima facie evidence that the grant was within his power.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Gent. Dig. § 105; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;83.]</p> <p>6. Public Lands <&wkey;198 — Transfer of Title-Treaty.</p> <p>Where land was not severed from the public domain by the French or Spanish authorities, and set apart as private property, it passed to the United States by the treaty which ceded to them all the public and appropriated land.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Dee. Dig. <@=3198.]</p> <p>7. Public Lands <&wkey;199 — Grant—'Validity.</p> <p>By the treaty of Fontainebleau, of the 3d day of November, 1762, the King of France ceded to the King of Spain the province of Louisiana, and a grant of land in that province made by the French authorities after that date was void.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — -For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 625-633, 638; Dec. Dig. &wkey;199.]</p> <p>S. Drains <&wkey;70 — Taxes and Assessments— Liens — Public Property.</p> <p>The law which granted liens and privileges upon property for drainage assessments and taxes in New Orleans did not refer to public property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. § 74; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>70.]</p> <p>9. Public Lands <&wkey;54 — School Lands— Right to Sell.</p> <p>School lands in the state of Louisiana cannot be sold without the consent of the inhabitants of the township or district.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Public Lands, Cent. Dig. §§ 152-164, 166-169; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 54.]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>10. Schools and School Districts <&wkey;114rSchool Lands — Action to Recover — Parties.</p> <p>A parish board of school directors had no right of action to recover a sixteenth section or school section from one in possession as owner before the adoption of the Act No. 158 of 1910; and this statute expressly provides that the suit shall be brought in the name of the state of Louisiana.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 314r-322; Dec. Dig. &wkey;3ll4.]</p>

Action by the Hibernia Bank & Trust Company against John M. Dresser, in which the Atchafalaya Land Company, Limited, and others, were made garnishees. From a judgment denying motion for judgment pro confesso, against the named garnishee, plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Constitutional Law <&wkey;205 — Gaming <&wkey;79 —• Ordinances — Special Privilege or Immunity.</p> <p>The “Ordinance No. 3 of 1914, Commission Series,” of the city of Baton Rouge, penalizes betting or wagering, “upon anything, in any place where people resort for the purpose of wagering or betting,” and declares that a “place or device shall be considered as used for gambling, or to gamble with, or for betting or for wagering, if any fees, or money, or anything of value, is bet therein, or if the same is resorted to for the purpose of gambling or betting,” and section 4 of the ordinance further declares:</p> <p>“That none of the sections of this ordinance shall apply to any person found playing games of dominoes or cards at a private residence, occupied by a family (and used as such only), or to any person found playing games with dominoes or cards in the clubhouse of, and conducted by, any fraternal organization, duly incorporated, * * * providing, that the by-laws of such fraternal organization prohibit gambling for money, within such clubhouse, and that such games be not played for money or anything redeemable in money; provided, further, that this exemption shall not apply to any organization, fraternal or otherwise, organized for tho purpose of, or solely engaged in, conducting games, of chance for money or any other consideration, and this section shall not apply to any private residence or clubhouse commonly resorted to for the purpose of gambling, and that no banking game, played with cards or dominoes, shall be exempted from the provisions, of this ordinance on account of being played at a private residence or club.”</p> <p>Held, if section 4 can be interpreted as conferring any exemption whatever, from the prohibition against betting or wagering, it confers such exemption only on persons who are “found playing games of dominoes or cards in “a private residence, occupied by a family (and used as such only),” and that, whether it exempts such persons found gambling at such games, it is unnecessary, for the purposes of this case, to inquire, since the exemption applies to every one, including the defendants, and affords no just ground for their complaint that it confers a “special, or exclusive, right, privilege or immunity” within the meaning of article 48 of the Constitution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 591-624; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 205 ; Gaming, Cent. Dig. §§ 206-217; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;>79.]</p>

John the Baptist; P. E. Edrington, Judge. Action by Pernand Reynaud against the Police Jury of the Parish of St. John the Baptist and another. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jefferson; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Paul S. Wichers and others against Benedict M. Wichers. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.</p>

' King, Judge. Action by Mrs. Iska Murff, wife of George T. McCloskey, against George T. McCloskey, her husband. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals, and defendant moves to dismiss the appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist; Prentice E. Edrington, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Jake Reno against the Yazoo & Mississippi Yalley Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

Action by the Burkenroad Goldsmith Company, Limited, against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeal, and defendant applies for certiorari or writ of review.

Action by R. W. Davis against the Safety First Oil Company, Incorporated. An 'order dissolving injunction was rescinded, and defendant applies for writ of mandamus to compel granting of suspensive appeal.

Action by R- W. Davis against Orr & String-fellow. Injunction granted, and defendants apply for writ of mandamus to compel granting of suspensive appeal.

<p>Action by the Standard Oil Company of Louisiana and others against the Drummers’ Oil Company, Incorporated. Injunction granted, and defendant applies for writ of mandamus to compel gi-anting of suspensive appeal.</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Action by P. J. Jallans against Geo. Rohm. From a judgment making absolute a rule taken by Gassie & Beary, official stenographers, in which they claimed and were allowed a sum for services rendered, the National Surety Company appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Master and Servant <&wkey;101, 102, 153, 163 —Injury to Servant — Negligence— Saee Place to Work — Failure to Warn.</p> <p>An employer was guilty of negligence: (1) In assigning two inexperienced employés to a job which, ■ for its safe and proper execution, required, and had theretofore been executed by three, one of whom was a man of experience; (2) in failing to provide such employés with a reasonably safe place to work; (3) in failing to instruct and warn an employé, wholly without experience in- the work to which he was assigned and in the use of the implement with which he was furnished, as to the danger by which he was threatened; and, as by reason of such negligence, the employé was injured, the employer is liable in damages.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 135, 171, 174, 178-184, 192, 314-317, 328-330; Dec. Dig. &wkey;101, 102, 153, 163.]</p> <p>2. Damages &wkey;jl32 — Personal Injuries — Excessive Recovery.</p> <p>Where, by reason of the negligence of his employer, an able-bodied working man, 32 years of age, having a wife and children, was so crippled in both arms and a leg that he will never again be able to do manual labor, and will have difficulty in even feeding and dressing himself, an award, in damages, of $15,000 is not excessive.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 372-385, 396; Dee. Dig. &wkey;132.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Joseph Cojoe against Hampton Reynolds. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Action by C. C. Hardeman Company, Limited, against the Caddo Concrete Construction Company and others. An appeal from a judgment for plaintiff was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, and the Southwestern Surety Company, defendant, applies for writ of mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Bed Biver; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Jim Xenos was convicted of keeping a grog shop or tippling shop and retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Mabel Persche against John Persche. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans; J. G. Baker, Judge.</p> <p>Frank Taylor was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District Court, Parish of Webster; J. N. Sandlin, Judge.</p> <p>Action by James Braley against the PineWood Lumber Company, Limited. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial-District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>C. E. Dunson was charged with illegally practicing law, and from a judgment sustaining a motion to quash, the State appeals.</p>

Théard, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Grace Norton Hernandez. Action by Mrs. Grace Hernandez Voorhies against Walter Hernandez to annul the will of Grace Norton Hernandez. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff! appeals.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Action by O. E. Guillory against Dr. E. A. Latour. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Gourt.) </p> <p>1. Constitutional Law <&wkey;81 — Validity — Invasion oe Rights.</p> <p>Although the courts must uphold the police regulations that are enacted by the Legislature in good faith and with reasonable and appropriate regard for the protection, which the state owes to the life, morals, health, and property of her citizens, nevertheless, a statute that invades the fundamental rights of the citizens, under the pretense of promoting public health or safety, but having no reasonable relation to its pretended object, is an abusé of the police power of the state; and it is the province and duty of the courts to adjudge such a subterfuge invalid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 148; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>81.]</p> <p>2. Constitutional Law <&wkey;238, 275 — Master and Servant <&wkey;13 — Hours oe Labor-Validity oe Regulation.</p> <p>Act No. 201 of 1914, providing that a full day’s labor shall be eight hours and no more, and declaring it unlawful to employ a fireman to work longer than eight consecutive hours at a stationary boiler, using coal for fuel, in a city having a population of 50,000 or more, discriminates arbitrarily against the class of employers and employés embraced within its provisions; it invades the fundamental right of freedom of contract; and, having no real or reasonable relation to pubic morals, public health or public safety, is beyond the police power of the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 6SS-690, 695, 706-708, 830, 835, 839, 843-846; Dec. Dig. &wkey;238, 275; Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;13.]</p>

E. Reynolds, Special Judge. Suits by the Leidigh-Dalton Lumber Company, Limited, against J. H. Houck and others, liquidators, and by the C. P. Petty Stave Company against the same defendants, consolidated with the matter of the receivership of the Gibsland State Bank. From a judgment dismissing the rule requiring defendants to furnish an account, rejecting the opposition to their account and homologating it, the Leidigh Dalton Lumber Company appeals.

In the matter of the succession of Capt. John Schlumbrecht and his wife, Mary Condley. Suit by Mrs. Elizabeth Schlumbrecht, wife of James C. Peyton, and another, to annul the will of Capt. John Schlumbrecht, deceased, and for other relief, against John Francis Roth. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal from Eirst Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. E. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>An indictment against W. H. Boylston was quashed, and the State appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eirst Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. E. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>An indictment against W. H. Boylston was quashed, and the State appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Henry M. Russell and others against the Producers’ Oil Company and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p> <p>The following is the sketch referred to in the opinion:</p> <p> </p>

Action by Albert Jackson against George Cousin. Judgment for defendant, and, plaintiff’s appeal without bond being refused, he applies for writ of mandamus directing that appeal be granted without bond.

<p>Appeal from Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Landry; B. H. Pavy, Judge.</p> <p>Joseph Rather was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

Suit by the State, on the relation of C. B. De Bellevue, District Attorney, against Wm. M. Egan. A judgment dismissing the petition was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and relator applies for certiorari.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Libel and Slander &wkey;>140 — Jactitation Suit — Possession—Bight to Judgment.</p> <p>Where plaintiff in a jactitation suit shows actual possession, for many years, as owner, of land of which the defendant in such suit has claimed to be the owner, he (plaintiff) is entitled to judgment protecting such possession.</p> <p>[Ed. ¡Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 397-401; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 140.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fourth District Court, Parish of Union; J. B. Holstead, Judge.</p> <p>Action by JohnN. Elkins and others against the Board of School Directors of the Parish of Union. Prom a decree for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District" Court, Parish of Orleans; E. K. Skinner, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Stella Wise against Michael Lavigne. Prom judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Edward P. Foley against the Democratic Parish Committee of the Parish of Orleans. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Qourt.) </p> <p>1. Jury <&wkey;72 — Drawing op Jurors — Tales Jurors.</p> <p>Act No. 182 of 1914 does not contemplate that a jury commission shall necessarily “select 100 tales jurors” each time that it draws jurors for service on petit juries in criminal cases, since the later provisions authorize the supplementing of the names in the tales jury box “until the full complement of 100 is reached.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 333-347; Dec. Dig. &wkey;s72.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law &wkey;>1166% — Ground fob Reversal — Depletion of Jury List — Neglect of Jury Commission.</p> <p>Where 100 names are placed in the “tales jury box,” at a sitting of the court at which no criminal cases are called for trial, and no names are drawn therefrom until the next sitting of the court, several months later, at which criminal cases are called, the failure of the jury commission to ascertain in advance that the list had not in the meanwhile been depleted by deaths or removals, etc., is not necessarily reversible error, though it would be better practice fpr the commission to take the precaution mentioned, and also to make a precise record of its proceedings in the matter of selecting tales jurors and supplementing the list as required by law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3114r-3123; Dec. Dig. <@=> 1166%.]</p>

D. D. Pool was charged with murder. From a judgment making absolute a rule requiring him to show cause why a corrected copy of the minutes should not be received in evidence, defendant appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Electricity &wkey;>16 — Death — Proximate Cause.</p> <p>Where a boy of 17, taller than the average, was killed by an electric shock when reaching up to jerk the wire depending from an arc light to brighten it, which wire was obviously insulated through a porcelain knob, and was fastened above the reach of persons of ordinary height, indicating that the company did not wish it tampered with, the light company was not liable for the death, since the boy’s act was an independent trespass contributing thereto, while the voluntary illegal conduct of plaintiff, when a proximate or concurring cause of an injury, is a bar to recovery, though, had the trespass been slighter, there would have been liability.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Electricity, Cent. Dig. § 9; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;16.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Injunction by Hoa De Blanc and others against the City -of New Orleans. Injunction granted, and the City applies for a writ of prohibition.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Francis D. Gharbonnet against Philip Forschler. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Feliciana; Jos. L. Golsan, Judge.</p> <p>Action by George L. Caufield against J. L. Cravens, Registrar, wherein George G. Keller and another intervened. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Clementine Karcher, wife of Andrew J. Wild, and others, .against John Karcher and others. From judgment for plaintiffs, the defendant named appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Taxation <&wkey;764^-TAX Deed — Sufficiency of Description.</p> <p>A description in a tax deed which will reasonably identify the property is sufficient.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1519-1522; Dec. Dig. &wkey;764.]</p> <p>2. Taxation <&wkey;775 — Description in Tax Deed — Completion by Proof Aliunde.</p> <p>A description in a tax deed which makes a good .beginning of proof may be completed by proof aliunde of possession or other relevant facts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 1543; Dec. Dig. 4&wkey;775.]</p> <p>3. Taxation <&wkey;743 — Tax Sale — Subsequent Bona Fide Purchasers — Limitations.</p> <p>The fact that a purchaser at a tax sale in his own name holds for himself and co-owners cannot affect subsequent bona fide purchasers, who may successfully plead the constitutional prescription of three years.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1485-1488; Dec. Dig. &wkey;743.]</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error <&wkey;1011 — Findings of Fact — Evidence.</p> <p>Where an issue of fact hinges on the credit to be attached to the testimony of witnesses, the findings of the judge below will not be disturbed, unless clearly wrong on the face of the evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3983-3989; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 1011.]</p>

Case Certified from Court of Appeal, First Circuit. Action by Leon Dreyfous against Overtoin Cade and others. Case certified from the-court of appeal, First circuit, by the judges thereof, applying for instructions.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <@=>600 — Continuance — Absence oe Witness.</p> <p>Where a defendant in a criminal case moves for a continuance on account of the absence of an alleged material witness, but fails to allege what he expects to prove, and the state oilers to admit that the witness, if present, will testify as defendant expects, and defendant thereupon announces that he will stand trial without such admission, there is no error in refusing the continuance.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1342-1347, 1604; Dec. Dig. <S=>600.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;1159 — Appeal — Scope oe Review — Sueeicienoy oe Evidence.</p> <p>The jurisdiction of this court, in criminal cases, is confined to questions of law, and does not therefore extend to the question of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a defendant was convicted, which is one of fact.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — E'or other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074-3083; Dec. Dig. <@=></p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish, of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Alfred Hiller Company, Limited, against the Hotel Grünewald Company, Limited. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Executors and Administrators <&wkey;528— Succession — Liability oe Bondsmen — Extent.</p> <p>A judicial bond will be construed with reference to the law in pursuance of which it was given; and in case of a dative testamentary executor, the bondsman will be liable, to the extent of the bond, for the assets of the succession coming into the hands of the said testamentary executor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 2375-2394; Dec. Dig. &wkey;528.]</p> <p>2. Executors and Administrators <&wkey;537— Succession — Administration Bond — Liability oe Sureties — Fraud.</p> <p>The liability of sureties on an administration bond is not affected by the fact that they were induced to sign the bond through the fraud or misrepresentation of their principal, of which the beneficiaries of the estate in whose interest. the liability is sought to be enforced are innocent; but they will not be liable to any beneficiary who participated in the fraud.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 2453, 2485-2581; Dec. Dig. <«&wkey;537.]</p> <p>3. Executors and Administrators &wkey;>529— Succession — Executor’s Bond — Liability oe Sureties — Extent.</p> <p>“The sureties are liable, not only for such property of the estate as actually came to the hands of the executor or administrator, but for all property or assets that he might have collected in the exercise of due and reasonable diligence; and so as to assets received before, as well as after, the execution of the bond.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 2395-2403; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>529.]</p> <p>4. Executors and Administrators <&wkey;529— Succession — Executor’s Bond — Liability oe Sureties — Extent.</p> <p>“Administrators are liable for debts due the succession no longer collectible, which they might have collected by proper diligence.” And their sureties are liable in their stead’ for such neglect.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 2395-2403; Dee. Dig. &wkey;j529.j</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Banks and Banking &wkey;>5&wkey;lMPAiRMENT of Capital — Gift.</p> <p>When the directors of a bank, in response to a demand of the state bank examiner to make good an impairment of the capital stock, sign and discount their personal note and deposit the proceeds to the credit of the bank, the transaction is a donation or gift to the bank.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Banks and Banking, Cent. Dig. §§ 92-98, 105-107; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>54.]</p> <p>2. Bills and Notes &wkey;>92 — Consideration-Banks — Impairment of Capital.</p> <p>The interest which bank directors, as stockholders, have in saving the bank from failure, and their natural obligation to make good an impairment of its capital stock, are sufficient and valid considerations for a promissory note, signed and issued by them individually for that purpose.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 166-173,175-205, 208-212; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>92.]</p> <p>3. Bills and Notes &wkey;>356 — Holder for Value — Banks and Banking.</p> <p>The doctrine that a bank that discounts a note and credits the proceeds to the account of the maker is not a holder for value unless the amount is absorbed by an antecedent debt, or until it is withdrawn, can have no application to a case where the proceeds of the discount were credited to the account of some one else with the consent of the maker of the note.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other eases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. § 908; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;356J</p> <p>4. Bills and Notes &wkey;>310 — Sale of Note— Payment by Third Person.</p> <p>When one who is not the maker of a note tenders to the holder the amount due, expressing his intention and purpose to be to “take up the note and carry it,” and requests that the note be not stamped “'paid,” and the holder thereupon accepts the money and delivers the note uncanceled, without expressing any objection to transferring it, the transaction is a sale of the note. It is of no consequence that the transferor did not know that the legal definition and effect of the transaction was that of a sale, so long as he understood the facts of the transaction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. §§ 742, 743; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 310.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Homicide &wkey;>190 — Manslaughter — Evidence — Threats and Conduct of Deceased.</p> <p>In a prosecution for the crime of manslaughter, where the testimony of the defendant and of all other witnesses in the case shows affirmatively that he committed the homicide feloniously, and the plea of self-defense is not legally sustained by the facts acknowledged by the defendant, the previous threats or hostile conduct on the part of the deceased person towards the defendant, not forming part of the fatal difficulty, are not admissible in evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 399-413; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>190.] Provosty, J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Municipal Corporations &wkey;>706 — Streets— Automobile Accident — Negligence—Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>Where, in an action for damages for personal injuries, the evidence fails to establish the negligence attributed to the defendant, but, to the contrary, shows that the facts were quite otherwise than as alleged, the demands of the plaintiff are properly rejected.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1518; Dec. Dig. 706.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Schools and School Districts <&wkey;103 — Special Tax por School Purposes — Election — -Validity.</p> <p>Errors and omissions, amounting to a nonobservance of essential requirements of the law providing for the holding of elections to obtain the consensus of property taxpayers upon the question of voting special taxes for school purposes, place an election assumed to have been held thereunder outside of the law, and it is therefore without legal effect, and must be so decreed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Schools and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 114, 115, 117, 240-245, 252; Dec. Dig &wkey;103.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Officers <&wkey;55 — Dual Office Holding— Jury Commissioner Delegate to Constitutional Convention — “Office of Trust oe Profit.”</p> <p>A jury commissioner who was elected and served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1913, did not thereby vacate his office of commissioner, because such a delegate does not hold or exercise an “office of trust or profit” in the sense of article 170 of the Constitution.</p> <p>[It'd. Note. — For other cases, see Officers, Cent. Dig. §§ 76-84; Dec. Dig. &wkey;so5.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Office of Trust.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;942 — Denial of New Trial — Discretion—Perjury.</p> <p>The overruling of a motion for a new trial based on the uncorroborated testimony of a state witness, that he had perjured himself in his testimony before the jury, and was forced to do so by the threats of two other state witnesses, is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2316, 2331, 2332; Dec. Dig. &wkey;s942.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Livingston; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Alex Hutchinson & Son against the Riggs-Terrell Lumber Company and others. From judgment for plaintiff, the defendant named appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; N. M. Calhoun, Judge.</p> <p>P. A. B. Warren, Jr., and another were convicted of manslaughter, and they appeal-</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth. Judicial District Court, Parish of.Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Asa Higginbotham was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Prohibition <&wkey;20 —Petition —Amend - KENT AFTER DISMISSAL.</p> <p>Where suit was dismissed for plaintiffs’ failure to comply with an order to make bond for costs, defendant’s “supplemental and amended petition,” filed thereafter for certiorari and prohibition, was without efficacy, since a supplemental and amended petition in a defunct suit is a legal impossibility.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prohibition, Cent. Dig. § 69; Dec. Dig. <@=?20.]</p> <p>2. Prohibition <&wkey;3 — Remedy .by Abbeal.</p> <p>Where the defendant in the civil district court of the parish of Orleans requested the judge to appoint a stenographer as required by Acts 1914, No. 141, and, upon refusal, applied for prohibition to prevent the judge’s going on with the case until a stenographer should have been appointed, the writ could not issue, since the trial court had jurisdiction of the case, which was an appealable one, so that the remedy was by appeal, and not by prohibition.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prohibition, Cent. Dig. §§ -4-19; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>3.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;1092 — Presentation for Review — Bill of Exceptions.</p> <p>Unsigned hills of exceptions, copied in the transcript, are, in legal contemplation, no bills at all. Questions of law in a criminal case must be presented in bills of exceptions to be reviewed by the Supreme Court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2829, 2834-2861, 2919 ; Dec. Dig. &wkey;1092.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;1090 — Presentation for Review — Evidence—Bill of Exceptions.</p> <p>“On appeal in a criminal case, evidence found in the transcript, but not coming up as a part of a bill of exceptions, will not be noticed.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2653, 2789, 2803-2822, 2825-2827, 2927, 2928, 2948, 3204; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;1090.]</p> <p>3. Criminal Law &wkey;>1092 — Presentation for Review — “Bill of Exceptions.”</p> <p>“A notation hy the clerk of court in a criminal ease that the defendant excepted and reserved a bill cannot be considered a ‘bill of exceptions.’ ”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803,2829, 2834-2861,2919; Dee. Dig. @=31092.</p> <p>Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, .First and Second Series, Bill of Exceptions.]</p> <p>4. Criminal Law @=31092 — Presentation for Review — Bill of Exceptions.</p> <p>“A bill of exceptions must be drawn, submitted to the district attorney and the judge, signed by the judge, and filed by the clerk.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2829, 2834-2861, 2919; Dec. Dig. @=31092.]</p>

<p>Action by Christian Ruppert against Louis Fontenot, sheriff, and others. Injunction dissolved, and plaintiff applies for a writ of mandamus ordering the district judge to fix the amount of bond for a suspensive appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Constitutional Law &wkey;>186 — Retrospective Legislation — Validity.</p> <p>The Constitution of the state of Louisiana does not prohibit retrospective legislation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 526-529; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 186.]</p> <p>2. Railroads &wkey;>9 — Order oe Railroad Commission — Review by Court — Procedure — Statute .</p> <p>Act No. 132 of 1914, “to provide for the manner in which suits to contest any decision * * * or order of the Railroad Commission of Louisiana, shall be tried,” applies to untried suits pending at date of its passage.</p> <p>. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 12-19; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;9.]</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>3. Railroads <&wkey;9 — Decision oe Railroad Commission — Review by Court —Procedure — Statute—“Whenever.”</p> <p>As used in Act No. 132 of 1914, § 1, providing the manner of trial whenever any suit is filed to contest any decision of the railroad commission, the word “whenever” means at whatever time.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 12-19; Dec. Dig. &wkey;9.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Whenever.]</p>

Théard, Judge. In the matter of the succession of David Williams and another. Rule by certain children of deceased, to require David F. Williams and the National Surety Company to show cause why property which had been sequestered and released should not be produced. Judgment for plaintiffs in rule, and the defendant surety company appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>Statutes <&wkey;lliL-TiTLEs — License Tax — Constitutionality.</p> <p>Act No. 178 of 1912, entitled “An act to increase the revenues of the state of Louisiana by levying an annual license tax on the sale of malt liquors containing less than 2 per cent, of alcohol, and providing penalties for the nonpayment of such license,” imposing a state license upon the sale of such liquors, making it an offense to sell them, without having paid, and also making it a like offense to sell them without having' paid the license which the municipality or parish where the sale is made may have imposed for their sale, is violative of Const, art. 31, requiring the subject of an act to be .expressed in its title, since the title of the act does not cover the provision as to municipal and parish licenses.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 145, 147-149; Dec. Dig. &wkey;114.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Divorce &wkey;>227 — Separation prom Bed and Board — Temporary Alimony — Limitation on Amount.</p> <p>The limitation in article 160 of the Civil Code, that the alimony which the court may, in its discretion, allow a divorced wife, payable out of the property of the husband, shall not exceed one-third of his income, does not apply to the sum which, under article 148 of the Code, the judge shall allow for the support of a wife who has not sufficient income for her maintenance during the suit for separation or divorce.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. §§ 653, 654; Dec. Dig. &wkey;227.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of St. James; Charles T. Wortham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Clara May Madeline Meunier, wife, against Henry Joseph Thibodeaux, husband. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Ellis, Judge. Edward T. Cullom, president of the Springfield Lumber Company, was indicted for violating the statute requiring manufactories employing 10 or more persons to pay them in full every 2 weeks. Motion to quash indictment sustained, and the State appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Aippeal and Error <&wkey;364 — Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>That the return day was fixed for a date more than 60 days after the date of the granting of the order of appeal, if there is nothing to show that such error is appellant’s fault, is not ground for a dismissal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent.Dig. §§ 1969-1976; Dec.Dig. <@=364.]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error <@^36A-Return Day —Prayer eor Fixing — Propriety—“Fixed According to Law” — “Fixed by the Judge.”</p> <p>Where the return day in an appeal was fixed for a day more than 60 days after the date of granting the order of appeal, such error was not chargeable to the fault of appellant, because of appellant’s prayer that such day be “fixed by the judge,” instead of “fixed according to law,” the meaning of the two terms being legally synonymous.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other oases, see Appeal and Error, C'ent.Dig. §§ 1969-1976; Dee.Dig. <&wkey;364.]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>3. Taxation <&wkey;805 — Delinquency— !Tax Sale — Title—Necessity—Possession.</p> <p>Where a tax deed was annullable for failure to advertise the sale in the official journal, and because notice of the delinquency was not given to the debtor but he did not bring his action to annul within 3 years, as required by Const, art. 233, such action will not lie because of the want of possession either actual or constructive by the tax purchaser, since possession is not essential to the title by prescription liberandi causa obtained through the tax deed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1593-1597; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>805.]</p> <p>4. Taxation <S=»805 — Tax Sale — Pkesceiption.</p> <p>Such constitutional provision creates a prescription liberandi causa, and not one acquirandi causa.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1593-1597; Dec. Dig. &wkey;805.]</p> <p>5. Taxation &wkey;>805 — Tax Sales — Nullity Suits — Constitutional Pbovision — Exceptions.</p> <p>Aside from those specifically provided, the only exceptions to the operation of Const, art. 233, requiring tax debtors to bring nullity suits to set aside tax deeds within 3 years are (1) where the tax debtor has been in actual possession since the sale, and (2) where the sale is vitiated by fraud.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1593-1597; Dec. Dig. &wkey;805.]</p> <p>6. Taxation <&wkey;805 — Tax Sale — Pbima Eaoie Validity.</p> <p>Where, in an action to annul a tax deed, the deed was not introduced in evidence or its contents otherwise proved it stood as prima facie valid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1593-1597; Dec. Dig. &wkey;805.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Dave Celestin was convicted of burglary, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twentieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Terrebonne; W. E. Howell, Judge.</p> <p>Stephen Dorsey, Jr., was convicted of assault by willfully shooting at another, and he appeals.</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Action by the City of Shreveport against J. C. Simon and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. The following is the sketch referred to in the opinion:

<p>Appeal from Eleventh. Judicial District. Court, Parish of Natchitoches; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. W. Adams against J. M. McCoy. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Motions <&wkey;36 — Hearing—Injunction.</p> <p>A motion by plaintiff to strike out an exception to citations and service thereof, and a motion to dissolve the injunction, filed by the defendants, on the ground among others that the matters in dispute had been amicably settled by prior agreement between the parties, should be tried before the exception and motion are heard and decided.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Motions, Cent. Dig. §§ 45, 46; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;36J</p> <p>2. Witnesses <&wkey;255 — Examination—Right to Reebesii Memory — Best oe Secondary Evidence.</p> <p>The best evidence rule does not apply to letters referred to by a witness to refresh his memory as to the presence or absence of the plaintiff from the parish at the date of the filing of the suit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. m 874-890: Dec. Dig. &wkey;255.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus Toy the Court.) </p> <p>Appeal and Error <&wkey;19 — Moot Question— What Constitutes.</p> <p>The question whether a proclamation of martial law, within the limits of a certain parish, ipso facto divests the functions of a district judge becomes a moot question, when the Governor and ex officio commander in chief of the state troops, formally requests such judge to hold court and discharge the duties of his office.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 63-80; Dec. Dig. <@^19.]</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by C. M. Bender and others against Mrs. M. E. Bailey. From the judgment, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Mines and Minerals <&wkey;47 — Oil and Gas-Title — Owner of Surface Rights.</p> <p>The doctrine that the owner of land has no property right in the oil or gas beneath the surface until he has reduced it to possession in no manner denies to such owner the exclusive right to the use of the surface for the purposes of such reduction, or for any other purpose not prohibited by law, but, to the contrary, concedes that right, as inherent in the title to the land, and subject only to the control of the state, in the exercise of its police power; and the right may be sold, as may any other right, and may carry with it the right to the oil and gas that may be found and reduced to possession.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig-. § 133; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;47.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District ■Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman, -Judge.</p> <p>Action by Yerna Murphy Sterkx against •Joseph Sterkx. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Constitutional Law <&wkey;83, 206, 208, 238, 275 — Master and Servant &wkey;>69 — Payment eor Services — Class Legislation— Imprisonment for Debt.</p> <p>Act No. 25, p. 80, of 1914, requiring all manufacturers employing ten or more employes to pay them every two weeks, or twice each month, held 'to be not repugnant to the federal or state Constitution.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 150-151%, 625-077, 6SS-690, 695, 706-708, 830, 835, 839, 843-846; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;83, 206, 208, 238, 275; Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 78-81; Dec. Dig. «&wkey; 69.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquors <&wkey;223 — Unlawful Sale — Allegation and Proof — Date of Offense.</p> <p>As time is not of the essence of the offense of retailing intoxicating liquor without a parish or municipal license, where the indictment charges that the offense was committed “on or about the 4th of April, 1915,” and the defendant has not asked for a bill of particulars, the state should be permitted to prove that the accused retailed intoxicating liquor “just before or just after” the date mentioned in the indictment, notwithstanding the witness first testified that he had bought intoxicating liquor near the defendant’s place of business on the date specified, and the district attorney had acknowledged that he could not connect the defendant with that transaction.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 263-274; Dec. Dig. <&wkey; 223.]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>2. Intoxicating Liquors <&wkey;223 — Sale without License — Date of Offense — Proof of Other Sales.</p> <p>In a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors without a license on or about a certain date, where the district attorney adduced evidence to prove a sale by defendant on said date, he committed himself to such sale as being the one for which the defendant was prosecuted, and concluded the prosecution from adducing evidence to prove another sale at a different date.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 263-274; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 223.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>William Torris was convicted of rape, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>I-Iusband and Wife <&wkey;273 — Accounting by Surviving Husband — Funds Received from Wife.</p> <p>When the heirs of a deceased wife demand of her surviving husband an accounting of her separate funds received by him, he is only required to prove that the funds wore expended for the account and benefit of .her separate estate, e. g., for the purchase and improvement of her separate property. In such case, the doctrine, that the husband is not entitled to be reimbursed his separate funds contributed to the community except to the extent that the property of the community is thereby enhanced in value at the time of its dissolution, has no application.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.' — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. § 566; Dec. Dig. <§=>273.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;>1166% — Appeal — Reconsideration of Ruling.</p> <p>The refusal of the trial judge to issue attachments for absent witnesses summoned on behalf of the defendant will not be reviewed where the record shows that the judge reconsidered his ruling and issued attachments for said witnesses during the trial; and the witnesses were in court and testified on behalf of the defendants.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see ’ Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3114-3123; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 1166%.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law &wkey;>586, 1151 — Appeal — Discretionary Ruling — Continuance.</p> <p>An application for a continuance is within the discretion of the trial judge; as a general rule it will not he reviewed by the appellate court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1311, 3045-3049; Dec. Dig. &wkey;5S6, 1151.]</p> <p>3. Jury <&wkey;131 — Examination Voir Dire — Instructions.</p> <p>A request on behalf of defendant that the judge charge the juror, who is under examination on his voir dire, as to the law of self-defense, was properly refused; the charge should be made after the case has been tried, and the arguments heard.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 561-582; Dec. Dig. &wkey;131.]</p> <p>4. Witnesses <&wkey;289 — Examination—Irrelevant Testimony.</p> <p>Where defendant opens the door for irrelevant testimony on the cross-examination of a witness, he cannot be heard to complain of the redirect examination of the witness on such irrelevant matter.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1004; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>289.]</p> <p>5. Criminal Law <&wkey;1120 — Appeal—Presentation for Review — Cross-Examination.</p> <p>Where testimony on cross-examination is objected to on the ground of irrelevancy, and on the further ground that it referred to matters not brought out in the examination in chief, the Supreme Court will not reverse the ruling of the trial court, to the effect that the testimony was relevant, in the absence of the testimony in chief of the witness.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2931-2937; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 1120.]</p> <p>6. Criminal Law <&wkey;730 — Remarks of Counsel-Cure of Error — Instructions.</p> <p>Verdicts will not be reversed for every improper remark made by counsel for the state during the trial of a cause; particularly where such statement is corrected by the judge in the charge to the jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1693 ; Dec. Dig. <©=730.]</p> <p>7. Criminal Law <&wkey;721 — Ground for Reversal — Remarks of Counsel — Failure of Accused to Testify.</p> <p>But a comment to the jury by a prosecuting officer upon the fact that the defendant has not taken the witness stand is reversible error.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1672; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>721.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Railroads &wkey;>390 — Trespasser—Contributory Negligence — Negligence oe Trainmen.</p> <p>A trespasser on a railroad track, who fails to make use of his eyes, to keep himself informed of the approach of trains, will, in case of injury, be held guilty of such contributory negligence as to bar recovery, notwithstanding the concurrent failure of the servants of the railway company to keep a proper lookout.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 1324, 1325; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>390.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; Ben C. Dawkins, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Eula W. Rice and husband against P. J. Key, administrator, and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Municipal Corporations «&wkey;426 — Street Paving — Liability op City.</p> <p>A municipality has authority to set apart and leave unpaved ornamental spaces in the center of a street that is wider than the traffic roquires, and the governing authority does not thereby make the city liable as a property owner for one-half of the cost of paving the street on either side of such ornamental spaces, under a statute requiring the owners of the property abutting the paved street to pay the cost of the pavement according to the front-foot rule of apportionment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1035-1037; Dee. Dig. @=426.]</p> <p>2. Municipal Corporations @=469 — Paving op Streets — “Front-Foot Rule.”</p> <p>The front-foot rule of apportionment for assessing a local tax for street pavement means this: The total cost of the work, including the cost of grading, filling, culverts, headers, gut-, ters, curbing, engineering, labor, material, etc., is to be divided by the total number of square feet of paving done under the contract; and the quotient multiplied by one-half of the number of linear feet in the width of the pavement opposite the property lines, is the basis or rate of assessment of the property per front foot.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113-1117; Dec. Dig. @=469.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Front Foot.]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p> (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations @=469 — Street Paving — Assessment op Cost — Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 131 of 1904; § 5, providing that the cost of street paving is to be borne by the owners of the property abutting the street to be paved “according to the front-foot rule provided for in section 5,” means that the cost shall be borne according to the rule provided in section 4; the reference to section 5 being clearly a mistake, in view of the fact that such rule is contained in section 4 and in no other section.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113-1117; Dec. Dig. @=469.]</p> <p>4. Municipal Corporations @=465 — Street Paving — Assessment — Apportionment op Costs — Requisites op Statute.</p> <p>The Legislature cannot impose a charge on the property of an individual for the cost of street paving without at the same time providing a mode of apportioning it among those upon whom it is imposed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1108; Dec. Dig. @= 465.]</p> <p>5. Statutes @=201 — Construction—Verbal Inaccuracies.</p> <p>Mere verbal inaccuracies or clerical errors in statutes in the use of words or numbers, or íd grammar, spelling or punctuation, will be corrected by the court when necessary to carry out the legislative intent as gathered from the entire act.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 279; Dec. Dig. @=201.]</p> <p>6. Municipal Corporations @=469 — Paving Assessment — Uniformity —Validity of Statute.</p> <p>Act No. 131 of 1904, § 4, under which the cost of paving must be paid by the owners of the realty abutting on the street, on the basis of the respective frontage of the property, so that the property owner pays not according to the square feet of pavement in front of his property, but according to the frontage of his property, regardless of whether the street be wider there than elsewhere, is not violative of Const, art. 224, requiring that assessments be equal and uniform throughout the territorial limits of the authority levying same.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For .other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113-1117; Dec. Dig. @=469.]</p> <p>7. Municipal Corporations @=469 — Street Paving — Contracts — Operation op Statute.</p> <p>A construction of Act No. 131 of 1904, §§ 4, 5, requiring that the cost of paving be assessed to property owners under the front-foot rule, so that it will operate equally and equitably, does not require that streets of different widths be contracted for separately.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113-1117; Dec. Dig. @=469.]</p> <p>8. Municipal Corporations @=488, 489 — Paving Contract-Time poe Objection.</p> <p>Where the owners of lots, subject to assessment for the cost of street paving, for which a petition by the majority of the property owners has been filed under Act No. 131 of 1904, § 2, fail to object, until after the work has been done, that the paving of streets of different widths has been contracted for in one contract, it is then too late to make such objection, even if it were sustainable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1147-1152; Dec. Dig. @=48S, 489.]</p> <p>9. Municipal Corporations @=469 — Street Paving — Apportionment op Costs —Ignorance op Law.</p> <p>Under the rule that one cannot plead ignorance of the law, the fact that the signers of a petition for street paving under Act No. 131 of 1904, § 2, relating to such petition, believed that the cost of the work would be apportioned otherwise than in accordance with the front-foot rule as required by sections 4, 5, did not invalidate an assessment apportioned in accordance with such rule.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113-1117; Dec. Dig. @=469.]</p> <p>10. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;469 — Street Paving-Apportionment oe Costs —“Intersection.”</p> <p>Under Act No. 131 of 1904, § 5, providing that the cost of street paving shall be paid by the abutting property owners after there shall have been deducted from the total cost the cost of street intersections — the space occupied by two streets at the point where they cross each other — where a street opens into, but does not cross, the street on which the work has been done, one-half of the space where the streets apparently overlap should be considered as an intersection to be paid for by the city, and the other half as part of the street to be paid for by the lot owners.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1113-1117; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>469.</p> <p>For other-definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Intersection.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting in part.</p>

Action by the Baldwin Lumber Company against Max D. Dalferes, wherein the Mermentau Shingle Mill filed intervention and third opposition. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Action by Rev. A. Maisonneuve against Max D. Dalferes, wherein Adolph Thibodaux and others intervened, and the Mermentau Shingle Mill filed a third opposition. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Judgment <&wkey;572 —Res Judicata — Sustaining of Exception.</p> <p>A judgment, sustaining an exception of no cause of action on the technical ground that the plaintiff omitted a necessary allegation, is, in effect, a judgment of nonsuit, and does not prevent the plaintiff’s renewing his demand on sufficient allegations. On the other hand, a judgment, sustaining an exception of no right of action, attacking the merits of the plaintiff’s demand, assuming that his case is stated completely in his petition, and denying that the law affords the relief prayed for, is as conclusive of the issues presented as if the judgment had been rendered after an answer was filed and evidence heard.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1041, 1047-1049; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 572.]</p> <p>2. Judgment &wkey;>572 — Res Judicata — 'Voluntary Dismissal.</p> <p>A judgment, dismissing a suit on motion of the plaintiff’s counsel after an exception of no cause or right of action was filed, but before an answer was filed or any issue submitted to the court for decision, has the same effect only as if the plaintiff’s counsel had discontinued his suit, and has not the force or effect of res judicata.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1041, 1047-1049; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 572.]</p> <p>3. Vendor and Purchaser <&wkey;37 — Sales — Annulment of Oontraci> — Pleading.</p> <p>The allegation that the plaintiff was induced to transfer his property to the defendant by the latter’s false and fraudulent representation that the plaintiff was mismanaging, jeopardizing", and wasting his estate does not support an action to annul the sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 54-60; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 37.]</p> <p>4. Pleading <&wkey;36 — Admissions — Conclusiveness.</p> <p>Where, in an action to annul a contract of sale made by the plaintiff to the defendant, the plaintiff alleges that he received no consideration for the sale, but subsequently in his petition acknowledges that the defendant paid part of the credit portion of the price stated in the act of sale, he cannot maintain that the transfer was a mere simulation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 81-86; Dec. Dig. <^336.]</p> <p>5. Limitation oe Actions <&wkey;180 — Prescription — Contract otf Sale — Action to annul — Plea in Bab.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff, in an action of nullity for lesion, alleges in his petition that the contract of sale was made and dated more than four years before the filing of his suit, an exception of no cause or right of action is an appropriate plea in' bar of the action of nullity for lesion, under the provision of the Civil Code that actions for lesion are limited to four years from the date of the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 670-675, 681; Dec. Dig. &wkey;180J</p>

King, Judge. In the matter of the succession of Mary Percival. An opposition filed by the Free Church of the Annunciation to the account of Peter J. Flanagan, dative executor, was overruled in part, and the church appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;73 — Gas and Oil Leases — Nature — Statutes — “Sale” — “Lease.”</p> <p>Gas and oil leases and contracts are apart by themselves. They partake of the nature of both “sale” and “lease”; and they have features which may not be applied to either. The law referring to sales and leases found in the Code cannot be unreservedly applied to them.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 201, 210; Dec. Dig. <§=> 73.</p> <p>Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Pirst and Second Series, Sale; Lease.]</p> <p>2. Mines and Minerals &wkey;>73 — Gas and Oil Leases — Application ox Statutes.</p> <p>But the law in the Code will be applied to them by the courts in cases where it can be applied.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 201, 210; Dec. Dig. &wkey;73.]</p> <p>3.Mines and Minerals <S&wkey;73 — Lease—Title ox Lessor.</p> <p>A lessee under a mineral contract may not contest the title of his lessor as an owner in indivisión with others, and compel him and his co-owners to make a judicial partition in kind of the property leased.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 201, 210; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 73.]</p> <p>4.Partition <&wkey;77 — Oil Lands — Co-owners.</p> <p>Known oil lands, like mines, cannot be judicially partitioned in kind, at the suit of one of the co-owners; or by a creditor of a co-owner.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Partition, Cent. Dig. §§ 211-223; Dec. Dig. &wkey;j77.] Provosty and O’Niell, JJ., dissenting.</p>

John the Baptist; John E. Pleury, Judge. ’ Mandamus by the State, on the relation of J. Ovide Millet, against the Democratic Parish Executive Committee of the Parish of St. John the Baptist and others. Prom judgment for respondents, relator appeals.

John the Baptist; John E. Fleury, Judge. Mandamus by the State, on the relation of Dr. Sidney Montegut, against the Democratic Parish Executive Committee of the Parish of St. John the Baptist and others. From judgment for respondents, relator appeals.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. John the Baptist; John E. Fleury, Judge.</p> <p>Mandamus by the State, on the relation of Hamilton Bodin, against the Democratic Parish Executive Committee of the .Parish of St. John the Baptist and others. Prom judgment for respondents, relator appeals.</p>

C. Barnette, Judge. Mandamus by the State, on the relation of Julius S. Williams, against the Democratic Executive Committee of Bienville Parish, Louisiana. The mandamus was made peremptory, and the committee appeals.

<p>Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by B. W. Marston, Jr., against W. I-I. Elliott, Sheriff, and others. Prom a judgment for defendants plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Com-t.) </p> <p>Evidence <&wkey;523 — Amount of Fees — Question of Law — Expert Testimony.</p> <p>Although the value of legal services rendered by an attorney is a matter which the judge may decide from the proceedings conducted before him or from the record of the proceedings for which a law fee is demanded, nevertheless the testimony of lawyers as experts on the value of their professional services is admissible in evidence, and must be considered by the court, with such precedents as jurisprudence has established in fixing attorney’s fees.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 2331; Dec. Dig. &wkey;523.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Assault and Battery &wkey;26, 35 — Burden oe Proof — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>The burden of proof is on the plaintiff.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assault and Battery, Cent. Dig. §§ 36, 51; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 26, 35.]</p> <p>Monroe, O. J., dissenting.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the OourtJ </p> <p>Schools and School Districts <&wkey;106 — Taxation — Collection — Commissions — “Parish Taxes.”</p> <p>Under section 1, Act No. 181 of 1908, a sheriff and ex officio tax collector has no legal right to commissions for collecting special school taxes, when his total collections of all other taxes, including special taxes for the construction of a courthouse and jail, amount to $50,-000 or over. Special taxes for the construction of a courthouse and jail in a parish are necessarily parish taxes.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Schools 'and School Districts, Cent. Dig. §§ 149, 248-252; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>106.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;640 — Grounds for Dismissal — Defective Transcript.</p> <p>Where the clerk of the district court has returned a transcript as directed by appellant, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 229 of 1910, the appeal will not be dismissed on the ground of the transcript being defective.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2788, 2829; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 640.]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Mortgages <&wkey;151 — Lien of Contractor —Priority.</p> <p>The recording of a building contract and bond in the mortgage office within 7 days after the date of the contract and before the date fixed for commencing the work, as required by Act No. 134 of 1906, preserves a lien in favor of the contractor, superior to a pre-existent mortgage on the property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 307, 309-311, 314r-329, 332-336; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>151.]</p> <p>3. Mechanics’ Liens @=3127, 132 — Mechanics’ Privileges — Subrogation to Contractor’s Lien.</p> <p>If the contract for the construction of a building be not recorded in the mortgage office, e. g., if it be for an amount too small to require registry, the only lien that a workman or furnisher of material can acquire on the property is that. which results from recording his sworn account or other evidence of the debt in the mortgage office, according to article 3272, Rev. Civ. Code; and, in this event, the sworn account or other evidence of the debt must be recorded within 7 days from the date of the obligation if the property be situated in the parish where the obligation originated, or within 15 days if it be situated in another parish, in order to give the lien a preference over a pre-existent mortgage. But, if the building contract, with bond attached, was recorded in the mortgage office within 7 days after the date of the contract and before the date fixed for commencing the work, a workman or furnisher of material becomes subrogated to the lien of the contractor, to the extent of any balance due him, by filing a sworn statement of the work done or material furnished with the owner of the building and having it recorded in the mortgage office within 45 days after the completion of the building contract, according to the provisions of Act No. 134 of 1906.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Mechanics’ Liens, Cent. Dig. §§ 174-176, 190, 192-207; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;127, 132.]</p> <p>4. Subrogation <&wkey;7 — Principal and Surety-Payment of Debt.</p> <p>Payment of the debt of the principal obligor by his surety subrogates the latter to all of the rights of the creditor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Subrogation, Cent. Dig. §§ 17, 18, 21-29, 58, 77, 83, 92; Dee. Dig. &wkey;37.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.</p> <p>1.Appeal and Error <&wkey;801 — Motion to Dismiss — Disposition.</p> <p>Where appellee prayed the appeal be dismissed or that the omitted evidence be sent up on allegations that appellant had not produced a complete transcript of the evidence below, and, after the motion to dismiss was filed, appellant applied for certiorari -to correct the record, and the clerk below made his return supplementing the transcript and certifying that the record then contained all the evidence which was filed in the case, reciting however, that some offerings by appellee, made by reference, were not included in the transcript because copies were not furnished or the originals filed, the motion to dismiss will be referred to the merits, with leave to the parties to supplement the transcript by the production of all documents offered below, as shown by the notes of evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3161-3164; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;> SOI.]</p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>2. Taxation <&wkey;679 — Sale by State — Objections.</p> <p>Defendant in a petitory action was without standing to raise the question that in making the transfer from- the state, under which the plaintiff claimed, to the plaintiff; the forms of law were not complied with, since the state alone had an interest in the matter.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1361, 1362; Dec. Dig. &wkey;679.]</p> <p>3. Real Actions <&wkey;7 — Petitory Action — Title.</p> <p>As against a trespasser a plaintiff in a petitory action need not show a title good against the whole world.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Real Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 21-25; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>7.]</p> <p>4. Taxation <&wkey;679 — Sale by State — Objections — Standing to Raise.</p> <p>In a petitory action by a plaintiff claiming under the state against a defendant who had title by adverse possession, defendant was without standing to raise the question that the transfer from the state to plaintiff was invalid because the forms of law were not complied with, since such transfer as to defendant, was res inter alios acta.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1361, 1362; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>679.]</p> <p>5. Adverse Possession <&wkey;4^-PBESCRiPTioN —Running Against State.</p> <p>Prescription acquirendi causa does not run against the state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-10, 12-57; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;4.]</p> <p>6. Estoppel <&wkey;15 — Deeds.</p> <p>Whatever title the state acquired through forfeiture of realty passed to the state’s grantee, though not mentioned in the state’s deed, as a vendor cannot set up against his vendee any title which he held at the time of the sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 19-21; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>15'.]</p> <p>7. Real Actions <&wkey;8 — Petitory Action-Reliance upon Title Not Specially Pleaded.</p> <p>In a petitory action, where plaintiff, claiming under the state, deraigned his title only through tax sales and failed to mention forfeitures to the state, such forfeitures could nevertheless be considered as forming part of plaintiff’s chain of title, since plaintiff could support Ms allegation of ownership by any supporting evidence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Real Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 26-35) Dec. Dig. <&wkey;SJ</p> <p>8. Appeal and Error <&wkey;837 — Review—Evidence.</p> <p>In a petitory action, where plaintiff, deraigning title from the state, did not mention certain forfeitures to the state in the petition, but alleged ownership generally, and, in support of such general allegation, introduced evidence regarding the forfeitures, to which defendant did not plead surprise, the evidence, admitted without objection, will be considered even though not properly admissible under the pleadings.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3262-3272, 3274-3277, 3289; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>837.]</p> <p>9. Taxation <&wkey;679-Forfeiture to State-Statute.</p> <p>Under the Revenue Act of April 20, 1877 (Act No. 96 of 1877), superseding Act No. 42 of 1871, providing, in section 53, that on the first Monday of December the properties posted for delinquent taxes were to be offered for sale at public auction, and, if the required amount was not bid on any particular property, it was to be adjudicated to the state, certificates of forfeiture for delinquent taxes, not reciting that the property was ever adjudicated to the state, but only that a list of delinquent taxpayers was filed and recorded, did not show that the property was transferred to the state for nonpayment of taxes.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1361, 1362; Dec. Dig. &wkey;679.)</p> <p>10. Taxation <&wkey;421 — Tax Sales — Description oe Land.</p> <p>In a petitory action by a plaintiff deraigning title from the state through tax sales, where it was not suggested that the owners of the land owned any other property in the square than what was assessed to them by the descriptions in the acts of the tax sales, nor that the measurements and the numbers there given for the lots were not exact according to some plan of the city, the description of the land in the acts was sufficient.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 720-727, 729-735; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 421.]</p> <p>11. Taxation <&wkey;415 — Tax Sales — Validity —Assessment After Death of Owner-Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>In a petitory action'where plaintiff claimed from the state, which acquired title through tax sales, evidence held insufficient to show that the assessment for which the lots were sold was made in the names of deceased owners, so that the sales were void.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 695-698, 700-703; Dec. Dig. &wkey; ■415.]</p> <p>12. Taxation <&wkey;788 — Tax Sale — Conclusive Evidence of Advertisement — Statute.</p> <p>By direct provision of Act No. 82 of 1884, § 3, a tax collector’s deed is conclusive evidence that the sale was advertised according to law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1555, 1557, 1559-1569; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>788.]</p> <p>13. Taxation <&wkey;745 — Tax Sale — Conclusiveness of Deed as to Advertisemeni-Statute — Constitutionality.</p> <p>Act No. 82 of 1884, § 3, ipaking a tax collector’s deed conclusive evidence of a tax sale’s having been advertised according to law, was within the authority of the Legislature to pass.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Dec. Dig. &wkey;>745.]</p> <p>14. Taxation <&wkey;693 — Tax Sale — Presumption of Regularity — Effect.</p> <p>In a petitory action where plaintiff claimed through the state, which acquired title through tax sales, the presumption of regularity attaching to ■ such a , sale, in the absence of contrary proof, led to the conclusion that the lands in question, part of a square containing 13 or 16 lots, in which 29 were assessed, were not among those doubly assessed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 1388; Dec. Dig. <i&wkey;693.]</p> <p>15. Adverse Possession <&wkey;57 — Prescription — Sufficiency of Evidence.</p> <p>In a petitory action by plaintiff deraigning title from the state, which held under tax sales, evidence held insufficient to show that defendant or her authors in title acquired title by 30 years’ prescription.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 277, 278, 655, 667, 687; Dec. Dig-. &wkey;>57.]</p> <p>16. Judgment &wkey;>654^-DisMissAL — Conclusiveness.</p> <p>In a petitory action the judgment of dismissal in plaintiff’s prior suit in ejectment against defendant’s predecessors in title did not bar evidence showing that a lease was executed by plaintiff to such predecessors as tenants, since the judgment did not settle that the execution of the lease did not exist as a fact.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1165; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>654.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staf.) </p> <p>1. Vendor and Purchaser <&wkey;239 — Bona Bide Purchasers — Fraudulent Cancellation oe Record — Effect.</p> <p>Where the records of mortgages were fraudulently canceled without the consent of the mortgagees, such cancellations had no effect to free the lands, in the hands of third persons who acquired the property in good faith relying upon the clear record, from subjection to the mortgages.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Bor other eases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 583-600; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;239; Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 368.]</p> <p>2. Estoppel <&wkey;>30 — Denial of Title.</p> <p>In a suit to enforce mortgages, defendants v^ere improperly permitted, in attempting to make a defense, to introduce evidence to show that a -person other than those under whom they held had been the true owner of the lands when the mortgages were created, since a party cannot impugn the title under which he holds.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Bor other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. § 74; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>30.]</p> <p>3. Vendor and Purchaser <&wkey;239 — Bona Bide Purchasers — Validity — Successive Mortgages.</p> <p>Where the owner of lands created successive mortgages thereon, through successive persons interposed as straw owners, after having fraudulently caused each - preceding mortgage to be canceled of record to make room for each succeeding one, the rights of the holders of the mortgage paper against the lands in the hands of bona fide purchasers were perfect, except that the several mortgages ranked in the order in which they were created and recorded, as owners subsequent to the fraudulent owner took the property burdened with the mortgages.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Bor other eases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 583-600; Dec. Dig. <§=j239 ; Mortgages, Gent. Dig. § 368.]</p> <p>4. Vendor and Purchaser <&wkey;239 — Bona Bide Purchasers — Mortgages by Straw Owners — Validity of Mortgage Paper.</p> <p>Where the owner of lands created successive mortgages upon his property through successive straw owners after having fraudulently caused each preceding mortgage to be canceled of record to make room for each succeeding one, the mortgage paper, though without vitality in the hands of the owner, acquired vitality by negotiation, and no act of the owner after negotiation could create equities in favor of third persons as against the holders of the paper, since an owner may make a mortgage in favor of a mere nominal mortgagee, or even dispense altogether with a present mortgagee and consent the mortgage in favor of any future holder of a note he has made to his own order and secured by the mortgage.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Bor other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 583-600; Dec. Dig. <§=>239; Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 368.]</p> <p>5. Vendor and Purchaser <&wkey;>239 — Bona Bide Purohasers — Rights of Third Persons — Equities.</p> <p>Where the owner of land successively mortgaged it through straw mortgagors, fraudulently procuring each preceding mortgage to be canceled of record to make room for the next, the fact that third persons purchased the mortgage paper from the owner without causing the record to be examined and without investigation aliunde the record, while purchasers of the land consented to buy only after counsel had found the title clear of record, created no equities in favor of such purchasers of the land against the holders of the mortgage paper, since equity can be invoked only in the absence of positive law, while the case was governed by legal principles.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Bor other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 583-600; Dec. Dig. <§=3239; Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 368.]</p> <p>6. Vendor and Purchaser <&wkey;239 — Bona Bide Purchasers — Rights of Third Persons — Equities.</p> <p>Where the owner of land mortgaged it successively through straw mortgagors, each preceding mortgage being canceled of record to make room for the next, the purchasers of the lands, when the persons to whom the mortgage paper had been negotiated sought to enforce it, had no defense in the fact that the owner’s frauds were committed, not upon them, who at the time were entire strangers to the property, but upon the mortgage creditors, and that the latter should be the ones to suffer.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 583-600; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>239; Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 368.]</p> <p>7. Mortgage? <&wkey;463 — Forgery oe Mortgage Note — Sufficiency oe Evidence.</p> <p>In a suit to enforce mortgages, evidence held insufficient to show that a mortgage note was a forgery.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 1361, 1363-1368; Dee. Dig. &wkey; 463.]</p> <p>8. Payment <&wkey;8 — Imputed Payment.</p> <p>Where the agent of the mortgagors of land received the mortgage note from the holder with mandate to collect it, only after the agent had embezzled from the mortgagors the funds which they had previously placed in his hands to pay the note, there was no payment thereof imputed against the holder, since a payment can be imputed only when the reception of the mandate to collect and the reception of the money wherewith to make the payment coincide.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Payment, Cent. Dig. §§ 17, 18, 20, 21, 24-27; Dec. Dig.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Payment]</p> <p>9. Vendor and Purchaser <&wkey;239 — Bona Fide Purchasers — Negotiation — Sham Notes — Effect.</p> <p>Where an agent to invest money in notes, upon an accounting with his successor as agent, turned over, as representing an investment of the funds of the principal, purported mortgage notes, which, to the agent’s knowledge, were mere shams, having been executed by straw men, purported owners of his own land, secured by mortgages, the negotiation of the notes, worthless so long as they remained in the hands of the makers, rendered them good and valid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 583-600; Dec. Dig. <@=»239.]</p> <p>10. Alteration of Instruments <&wkey;29 — Evidence — Sufficiency.</p> <p>Where mortgage notes were identified by the notary’s paraph with the act of mortgage, and answered the description given of them in the act, the showing that they had not been altered was sufficient.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 259-263; Dee. Dig. &wkey;>29.]</p> <p>11. Mortgages <&wkey;58 — Consent under Private Signature — Statute.</p> <p>By direct provision of Civ. Code, art. 3305, a conventional mortgage can be contracted by an act under private signature.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 153, 154; Dec. Dig. &wkey;5&]</p> <p>12. Acknowledgment <&wkey;53 — Recordation without Acknowledgment — Validity.</p> <p>A mortgage may be validly recorded' without previous acknowledgment of signature.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Acknowledgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 270-277; Dec. Dig. &wkey;53.]</p> <p>13. Estoppel <&wkey;>58 — Equitable Estoppel— Necessity of Reliance.</p> <p>Rev. St. § 171, provides that it shall not be lawful for any auctioneer to sell any realty without reading a certificate of mortgages recorded against the property offered. An auctioneer who held an unrecorded mortgage note in pledge sold the land covered by the mortgage without knowledge that it was security for his note and without reading any certificate of mortgages. The purchasers of the property, who made full investigation of the title, before buying, contended the auctioneer was estopped to enforce his note against the land. Held that, since the auctioneer’s procuring and reading a certificate of recorded mortgages would not have advised the purchasers of the existence of his unrecorded incumbrance, he was not estopped to enforce it, for to have an estoppel en pais or an equitable estoppel the party invoking it must show that he was misled to his prejudice by the act or conduct on which he seeks to found the estoppel.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 144, 145; Dec. Dig. @^58.]</p> <p>14. Estoppel &wkey;>9iL-EQUiTABLE EstoppelFailure to Assert Title.</p> <p>An owner of land who stands by and remains silent while his property is sold to a purchaser in good faith, who believes the seller to be the owner, is estopped from thereafter asserting title.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For' other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 245-247, 276-284; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 94.]</p> <p>15. Estoppel c&wkey;94 — Grounds — Acquiescence.</p> <p>Where an auctioneer, holding a mortgage note in pledge secured by land which he was selling, but without knowledge of the fact, sold such land as free of incumbrances, there was no duty upon him to proceed against the price of the sale to collect his note, since such duty could have rested only upon him if he had known that the property which he sold was the one on which he had a mortgage, and he, as a mortgage creditor, was also without right to proceed against the price of a private sale of the mortgaged property.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 245-247, 276-284; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 94.]</p> <p>16. Auctions and Auctioneers <&wkey;10 — Sales — Accounting eor Proceeds.</p> <p>Where an actioneer sold land under one'of several mortgages given through straw owners by the owner to defraud purchasers at the sale, the 10 per cent, of the price which the auctioneer received had to be accounted for by him to the purchasers either by way of offset against the mortgage note, secured by the land, which he held without knowledge of the fact when he sold the land.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Auctions and Auctioneers, Cent. Dig. §§ 44r-47; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;10.]</p> <p>O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

Land, Judge. Action by Mrs. Indiana Roe, tutrix, and another, against W. T. Caldwell. From the judgment, defendant appeals. On motion to dismiss the appeal.

<p>Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; N. M. Calhoun, Judge.</p> <p>Robert Bacon was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

F. Brunot, Judge. Ed. Sharp was convicted of violating a police jury ordinance requiring the dipping of cattle exposed to or infected with the cattle fever tick, and appeals.

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Libel and Slandeb <S&wkey;51 — Actionable Words — Defamatory Judicial Allegations.</p> <p>Defamatory judicial allegations are hot libelous and actionable, unless shown to have been false, malicious, and without probable cause.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. § 149; Dec. Dig. <g¿o51.]</p> <p>2. Libel and Slander @=^38 — Actionable Words — Statements of Attorney.</p> <p>A client is not responsible for slanderous or libelous words uttered by his attorney at law; but attorneys themselves are responsible for slanderous or libelout words uttered by them. Rev. St. 1870, § 123.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 117-123; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 38.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. E. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Oscar H. Jones against the J. F. Ball & Bro. Lumber Company, Limited. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

C. W. Ellis, Judge. Action by William F. Krone and others against Robert H. Krone, dative testamentary executor, and others. From the judgment plaintiffs appeal.

F. Bell, Judge. Sam Serio and another were convicted of selling intoxicating liquor without a license. A demurrer to their application for suspension of sentence was sustained, and they appeal.

<p>Appeal from Twelfth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Vernon; James 6. Palmer, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Spicey R. Mclnnis and others against T. C. Wingate and others. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant Dr. J. W. Nichols appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Intoxicating Liquors &wkey;>213 — Keeping of “Blind Tiger” — Element of Offense-Information.</p> <p>The first clause of section 1 of Act No. 8 of 1915 (Ex. Sess.) defines a “blind tiger” to be “any place in those subdivisions of the state where the sale of spirituous, malt or intoxicating liquors is prohibited, where such spirituous, malt or intoxicating liquors are kept for sale, barter, or exchange or habitual giving away,” and it contains no reference to the sale, etc., of the liquors mentioned in connection with another business. Hence, under that clause, a connection with another business is n'ot an ingredient of the offense of keeping a “blind tiger,” and need not be alleged in the bill of information.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 255-257; Dec. Dig. «&wkey; 213.</p> <p>Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Blind Tiger.]</p> <p>2. Indictment and Information &wkey;>72 — Disjunctive Allegations — Keeping of Blind Tiger.</p> <p>Act No. 8 of 1915 (Ex. Sess.) is framed in language susceptible of the interpretation that it may be violated in either of several ways; and, as the different offenses which may arise out of the same transaction and be committed by the same act are enumerated in the disjunctive, they must be prosecuted either under separate. counts, or else, if cumulated in one count, must he charged conjunctively.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 195-199; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>72.]</p> <p>3. Intoxicating Liquors <&wkey;213 — Keeping of Blind Tiger — Information — Sufficiency.</p> <p>A bill of information which charges merely that the defendant kept a “blind tiger” (in prohibition territory) does not inform the defendant whether it intends to charge the keeping of the particular “blind tiger” defined by the statute, or one of another variety, and, as it is only the keeping of the defined variety that is denounced as an offense, it follows that a motion to quash, on the ground that no offense is charged, should be sustained.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 255-257; Dec. Dig. i&wkey; 213.]</p> <p>4.Indictment and Information <&wkey;109 — Statutory Offense — Requisites of Information.</p> <p>In order to charge the commission of a statutory offense, a bill of information must allege the commission of the particular act_ or acts necessary, under the statute, to constitute the offense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 286-288; Dec. Dig. <§^»109.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Patout Bros, against the Mayor and Board of Trustees of the City of New Iberia. Erom a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.</p>

K. Skinner, Judge. Proceedings in the matter of the liquidation of the J. D. Connell Iron Works Company, in which Otto J. Mayer and another claimed a lien for attorney's fees. From an order allowing the fees and preferring them to other debts, the claimant Robert P. I-Iyams Coal Company, Limited, appeals, and the Metropolitan Bank also appeals from the account of the receivers.

<p> (Syllabus by Bditorial Staff.) </p> <p>1.Master and Servant &wkey;>236 — Injuries to Servant — Recovery.</p> <p>A servant injured in riding on a logging train, which he knew to be dangerous, cannot establish a right to recovery by showing that other trains intended for servants’ use were as dangerous as the logging train.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 681, 723-742; Dec. Dig. &wkey;236.]</p> <p>2. Master and Servant <&wkey;lll — Injuries to Servant — Evidence.</p> <p>A servant injured in riding on a logging train cannot predicate negligence of the master on the fact that but one toggle was used instead of two, where custom and usage establish that the use of one toggle is a safer method than the use of two.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 215-217, 255; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>lll.]</p> <p>3. Master and Servant <&wkey;lll — Injuries to Servant — Liability oe Master.</p> <p>Negligence of the master cannot be predicated on the absence of brakes from a logging-train where the evidence shows that brakes on such trains are unusual.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent, Dig. §§ 215-217, 255; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>lll.]</p> <p>4. Master and Servant <&wkey;280 — Injuries to Servant — Liability oe Master — Assumption oe Risk — Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence in a logger’s action for injuries received in riding on a logging train after warning held to show that his injury resulted from the assumed risk of displacement of a log loosely laid on top of the load, and not from the master’s negligence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 981-986; Dec. Dig. 280.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; A. M. Barbe,, Judge.</p> <p>Action by tbe State, on tbe relation of tbe City of Lake Charles, against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. From judgment for relator, respondent appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Action by William N. McClendon against the Busch-Everett Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1..Libel and Slander <@=530 — Newspaper Publication — Inaccuracies.</p> <p>A newspaper publication is not false merely because it contains inaccuracies not affecting its purport.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Dec. Dig. <@=530.]</p> <p>2. Libel and Slander <@=>10 — Newspaper Publication — Criticism oe Detective — Malice.</p> <p>The conduct of a detective performing the duties of a policeman is a legitimate subject of newspaper comment and criticism; and, although such criticism be severe, it does not render the publisher liable in damages, without proof of actual malice, if the publication was made in support of a public contention and in condemnation of what the publisher had good reason to regard as a public wrong.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 41, 91-96; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;</p> <p>3. Libel and Slander <@=>10 — Newspaper Publication — Actionable Words.</p> <p>.As newspaper accounts of police court proceedings and detectives’ escapades are not required to be written in a dignified style, it is not slanderous per se for the reporter to call a detective a “fly cop,” to characterize his ruthless and unwarranted arrest of a man as “spearing” him, and describe the officer’s blunder as “pulling off a bonehead stunt.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see -Libel and Slander, Cent. Dig. §§ 41, 91-96; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Habeas Corpus <&wkey;54 — Application — Release on Bond.</p> <p>The applicant for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, and to be released from custody on bond, must show that he made application to the magistrate to fix the amount of bond on which he might be released from custody, and that the justice of the peace has refused.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.' — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. § 51; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>54.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Habeas Oobptjs <&wkey;44^-Juna:sDiCTiON — Paboled Convict.</p> <p>The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and its members, to issue the writ of habeas corpus, being confined to cases in which the court may have appellate jurisdiction, and the appellate jurisdiction not extending to cases arising under Act No. 149 of 1914, known as the “Parole Act,” the application for habeas corpus of a paroled convict who is held in custody by a sheriff, at the instance of the president of the board of control of the penitentiary, must be denied.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. § 85; Dec. Dig. &wkey;j44.]</p>

F. Bell, Judge. Action by Leopold Wolff against the Shreveport Gas, Electric Light & Power Company and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. The following is the diagram referred to in the opinion:

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1.Landlord and Tenant <&wkey;50 — Lease — Validity — Ownership.</p> <p>Ownership is not essential to make a valid lease.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 120, 121; Dee. Dig. <S&wkey; 50.]</p> <p>2. Mines and Minerals <&wkey;56 — Mineral ‘ ‘Lease” — Construction.</p> <p>A mineral lease which partakes of the nature of a lease as well as that of a sale, and which does not appear to have been provided for by the laws of the state, will be considered as a lease; and the laws with reference to leases will be applied to such mineral lease in so far as they may be applied.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. § 166; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>56.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Lease.]</p> <p>3. Tenancy in Common <&wkey;43 — Lease by Co-owner — Eefeot.</p> <p>A lease of the whole property made by a co-owner, duly registered, bears upon the property sold in the hands of a transferee.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Tenancy in Common, Cent. Dig. §§ 130-132, 136, 137; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;43.]</p> <p>4. Partition <&wkey;lll — Proceeds oe Sale — Lease by Co-owner.</p> <p>But in a judicial partition of the property by licitation the lease ceases to exist as to the land; and it cannot be referred to the proceeds of the sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Partition, Cent. Dig. §§ 401-418; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>lll.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of Ouachita; John J. Potts, Judge ad hoc.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Azema T. Breard against the New York Life Insurance Company. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;1023 — Decisions Appealable-Motion to Correct Minutes.</p> <p>The judgment on a motion to correct the minutes of the court is, at most, interlocutory, and no appeal lies therefrom, except that the ruling may be reviewed on an appeal from the judgment which finally disposes of the case.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2583-2598; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 1023.]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;1023 — Decisions Appealable — Final Judgment.</p> <p>“If final judgment has been rendered upon •any indictment where the punishment of death, or imprisonment at hard labor, may be inflicted, ■or where a fine exceeding $300 is actually imposed, an appeal may be taken on behalf of the ■accused. * * * ”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2583-2598; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey; 1023.]</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. B. Slattery against the Arkansas Natural Gas Company and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Second Judicial District. Court, Parish of Webster; John N. Sandlin,, .Judge.</p> <p>Action by John F. Vincent against theSibley, Lake Bisteneau & Southern Bailway Company. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Carmelo Fulco and wife against the Shreveport Traction Company. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin; James Simon, Judge. Action by Charles O. Mouton against the Southern Sawmill Company for the use and benefit of the Exchange Bank of Natchitoches. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Wortham, Judge. Proceeding by Milliken & Farwell to foreclose a mortgage against S. E. Roger, with third oppositions by defendant, and by M. E. Roger, Clay Roger, and William H. Jeffries. From a judgment sustaining the oppositions of defendant and Jeffries, plaintiffs appeal; M. E. Roger and Clay Roger also appealing from the sustaining of Jeffries’ opposition.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany; J. B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. Adele Sumral Martin against Edgar J. Pichón, wherein Mrs. Magdalene Centlivre, wife of Edgar J. Pichón, filed intervention and third opposition. Prom the judgment, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of Union; John B. Holstead, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Farmerville State Bank against the Police Jury of Union Parish, wherein the Board of Directors of the Public Schools intervened. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Action by Joseph O. Schwartz, receiver of the American Spring Manufacturing Company, against Joseph Dennis. A judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and A. F. Marks, vice receiver, etc., applies for certiorari or writ of review.

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany; J. B. Lancaster, Judge.</p> <p>Action by George Koepp, Jr., against A. D. Crawford. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Teutonia Bank & Trust Company (Wm. L. Young, Examiner of State Banks, liquidator) against Samuel F. Heaslip and others. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Beauregard; Alfred M. Barbe, Judge.</p> <p>Ed. Rogers was convicted of perjury, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Thirteenth. Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides; W. F. Blackman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. D. Pace & Co. against the Alexandria Electric Railways Company and others. From the judgment, plaintiff and defendant Kent Company, Limited, appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; George H. TMard, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Orleans Plantation Company, Limited, against the Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Btaff.) </p> <p>1. Elections <&wkey;154 — Primary Election Contest — Pleading.</p> <p>Allegations in the petition in a primary election contest, that one of the clerks solicited a number of voters capable of preparing their own ballots and assisted them in preparing the ballots, and also that the clerk assisted 22 persons in preparing their ballots, which were cast for defendant, failed to state a cause of action where it was not alleged that the 22 voters were among those who did not make oath that they were unable to prepare their ballots or request that the clerk assist them, or who were unable to prepare their ballots.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec. Dig. <©==154.]</p> <p>2. Elections <&wkey;154 — Primary Election Contest — Pleading—Ballot Boxes.</p> <p>Allegations of the petition in a primary election contest, that a ballot box was not sealed by the commissioners, stated no cause of action where it did not appear that defendant, though clerk of the district court, was responsible for the omission.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>154.]</p> <p>3. Elections <&wkey;154 —> Primary Election Contest — Pleading — Custody of Ballot Boxes.</p> <p>Allegations in such petition, that' a ballot box was delivered to defendant, stated no cause of action where it appeared that he was clerk of the district court and legal custodian of the ballot boxes.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — -For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec. Dig. &wkey;?154.]</p> <p>4. Elections &wkey;>154 — Primary Election Contest — Pleading—Marked Ballots.</p> <p>Allegations in such petition, that at least 12 of the ballots cast in a certain ward for defendant were marked by writing on them, and also that in addition to these 12 at least half of all the ballots in the box were marked by failure to detach numbered slips from-them, failed to state any cause of action where it was not alleged that the ballots bearing the numbered slips were cast for defendant, or what was the total of the votes cast in the ward or the number cast for each.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 136; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>154.]</p> <p>5. Elections <&wkey;126 — Primary Election-Ballots.</p> <p>Where the primary election commissioners had counted and tabulated the ballots cast for parish officers, they properly refused to count a ballot cast for parish officers, thereafter found in the box provided for ballots cast for state officers.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 118; Dec. Dig. &wkey;126.]</p> <p>6. Elections <&wkey;126 — Primary Election Contest — Illegal Ballots.</p> <p>That two sample ballots were used by voters voting for defendant at a primary election, could not invalidate his nomination where it appeared that such votes did not affect the result of the election.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 118; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>126.]</p> <p>7. Elections <&wkey;126 — Primary Election Contest — Recount of Ballots — Estoppel.</p> <p>Where, in a primary election contest, it appeared that the ballot boxes, unsealed, were properly delivered and deposited in the office of the clerk of the district court in his absence, and that thereafter the boxes containing the ballots cast for parish officers were left by the chairman, and later by the secretary, of the Democratic executive committee, in places readily accessible to the public, in the mistaken belief that they contained the ballots cast for state officers, defendant, though the incumbent of the office of clerk of the district court and custodian of the ballot boxes, was not estopped from objecting to the ballots being recounted in court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Elections, Cent. Dig. § 118; Dec.-Dig. &wkey;126.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Recorder’s Court of New Orleans; J. J. Fogarty, Recorder.</p> <p>Charles Kaufman was convicted of violating an ordinance of the City of New Orleans, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Fred A. Wall against the BrooksScanlon Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Carriers <&wkey;44 — Dama&es—Failure to Furnish Cars — Shipment Contract.</p> <p>Damages for alleged failure to furnish sufficient cars to transport cane will not be allowed, where the cane lost by freezing was never offered or delivered at the place designated in the contract.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 120-122, 230; Dec. Dig. &wkey;44.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Claiborne; William C. Barnette, Judge.</p> <p>Action by W. Albert Gray against the Edgar Lumber Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Parish of Point Coupee; C. K. Scbwing, Judge.</p> <p>Frank Curtis was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Drains <&wkey;91 — Drainage District Bonds —Validity—Right to Attack-.</p> <p>A constitutional provision, which declares “that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any contest wherein ‘is questioned the validity of bonds issued by any of the political subdivisions of the state, where such bonds have not been declared invalid by judgment of the court of last resort in the state, and where more than 00 days have elapsed since the promulgation of the -proceedings evidencing the issuance of such bonds,’ ” is to be construed strictly. and, so construed, does not divest the courts of jurisdiction of a pending suit in which a litigant, making no attack upon the validity of such bonds, seeks to prevent the sheriff from selling his property for a tax, thought by the sheriff to have been levied for, and pledged to, the payment of the bonds, but the levying and pledging of which, for that purpose, the litigant denies.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Fox- other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 53, 82, 102, 103; Dec. Dig. &wkey;91.]</p> <p>2. Pleading <&wkey;36 — Conflicting Allegations — Evidence.</p> <p>Conflicting pleadings are construed against the pleader; and where, in the same paper, a -defendant denies and admits that plaintiff is the owner of property of which he alleges himself to be the owner, he should not be permitted to introduce evidence in support of his denial of that which he also admits.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 81-86; Dec. Dig. &wkey;36.]</p> <p>3. Drains &wkey;>71 — Drainage Districts — Validity of Bonds — Right to Attack — Benefits.</p> <p>Where the Constitution authorizes a drainage hoard to levy a uniform acreage tax upon “all lands” situated in its district, and the tax is so levied, and bonds are issued and sold upon the basis of the levy, one who thereafter acquires land in the district has no standing to complain that the tax is invalid, on the ground that his property derives no benefit from the drainage, since the framers of a Constitution are not required to consider that view, though a. Legislature may be. Moreover, it has frequently been held by this court that the creation of a drainage district is a legislative, and not a judicial, function, and that the courts will not readily substitute their judgments for the judgments of drainage commissioners, upon complaints that particular property is not benefited, qr is not immediately or directly benefited, save in cases where fraud or gross oppression is alleged and proved.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. § 74; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;71.]</p> <p>4. Drains <&wkey;66 — Powers—Debts of Subdivisions — Levy of Taxes.</p> <p>The state, through its Legislature, and a fortiori through the people, acting directly in their sovereign capacity, may compel its political subdivisions to pay debts legitimately contracted, and for that purpose to levy taxes upon the property within their jurisdictions.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. § 72; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>66.]</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>5. Constitutional Law <&wkey;70 — Drains <&wkey; 71 — Legislative Question — Assessment— “Taxing Power.”</p> <p>“The courts are very generally agreed that the authority to require the property specially benefited to bear the expense of local improvements is a branch of the ‘taxing power,’ or included within it. * * * Whether the expense of making such improvements shall be paid out of the general treasury, or be assessed upon the abutting or other property specially benefited, and, if in the latter mode, whether the assessment shall be upon all property found to be benefited, or alone upon the abutters, according to frontage or according to the area of their lots, is, according to the present weight of authority, considered to be a question of legislative expediency.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Daw, Cent. Dig. §§ 129-132, 137; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>70; Drains, Cent. Dig. § 74; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 71.</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Taxing Power.]</p> <p>6. Drains <&wkey;15 — Drainage Districts— . Property Included — Confiscation.</p> <p>A drainage distinct has the special purpose of the improvement of particular property, and when it is so formed to include property which is not and cannot be benefited directly or indirectly, including it only that it may pay for the benefit to other property, there is an abuse of power and an act of confiscation.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-10; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;15.]</p> <p>T: Drains <&wkey;91 — Drainage Districts — Illegal Assessment — Injunction.</p> <p>And an injunction will issue to prevent the collection of taxes upon property thus illegally included in a drainage district.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Drains, Cent. Dig. §§ 53, 82, 102, 103; Dec. Dig. &wkey;91J</p> <p>Monroe, C. J., and O’Niell, J., dissenting.</p>

P. Martin, Judge. Action by the German-American National Bank against the Front Lawn Company, wherein R. R. Barrow sought to enjoin proceedings under executory process which plaintiff caused to be issued. From a judgment dismissing the injunction, Barrow appeals.

<p>Appeal from Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia; James Simon, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Gabriel Gonsoulin and others against Antoine Gonsoulin. From the judgment, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the New Orleans Railway & Light Company against Albert Lavergne and others. Prom the judgment, plaintiff and certain defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans; Joshua G. Baker, Judge.</p> <p>George T. McLaughlin was convicted of murder, and appeals.</p>

E. Bell, Judge. Sam Eeducia was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors without a license, and from a refusal to grant him a new trial, he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Thirtieth Judicial District Court, Parish of Caldwell; George Wear, Sr., Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the tutorship of James Dawson Bennett and another, minors. From a judgment homologating the advice and recommendation of a family meeting, the under-tutor ad hoc appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second. Judicial Dis'triet Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Harney O’Neal was convicted of crime, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Acadia; William Campbell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Crowley Bank & Trust Company against Charles H. 1-Iurd. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Oaddo; John R. Land, Judge.</p> <p>Action by J. O. Triehel and another against R. F. Donovan and another. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo ; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Mike Milano was convicted of retailing spirituous liquor without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>F. A. Nejim was convicted of retailing spirituous liquor without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Philip Maroun was convicted of retailing spirituous liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <&wkey;1134(3) — Appeal—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to questions of law.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2989, 2990, 3056; Dec. Dig. &wkey;1134(3).]</p> <p>2. Cbiminal Law &wkey;>1151 — Appeal—Discretionary Buling — Continuance.</p> <p>Motions to continue are largely left to the discretion of the trial judge; and, unless it appears that the accused has been in some way prejudiced by the ruling, usually the verdict will not be set aside.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3045-3049; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 1151.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Pirst Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. P. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>John Pulco was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquors without a license, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Action <&wkey;70 — Abandonment oe Suit — Stay by Injunction — Operation oe Statute.</p> <p>If Act No. 107 of 1898, which provides that a plaintiff is to be considered to have abandoned his suit when he allows five years to elapse without taking any step in its prosecution, could properly be applied in a case where a seizure under executory process is stayed by injunction and the judge delays his decision for five years after the submission of the matter, such application would result in a judgment to the effect that plaintiff in injunction had abandoned his suit, and not plaintiff in seizure, the execution of whose judgment was enjoined, but in such case the statute mentioned is inapplicable to either litigant, since, having submitted their case to the judge, they should not be held responsible for his delay in the discharge of his duty; the idea of the statute being to hold a plaintiff responsible for delay, attributable to his nonaction in and failure to prosecute his suit up to the point at which the court is placed in a position to render judgment.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Action, Cent. Dig. §§ 752-755; Dec. Dig. &wkey;70.]</p> <p>2. Judges &wkey;>32 — Rendition oe Judgment-Successor oe Trial Judge — Evidence.</p> <p>Where a ease has been tried and submitted, with full opportunity for the cross-examination of witnesses, but the judge before whom it was tried retires from the office before giving judgment, there is no reason why his successor in office should not give such judgment, after hearing argument and without hearing further testimony.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judges, Cent. Dig. §§ 158-164; Dec. Dig. &wkey;32.]</p> <p>3. Executors and Administrators &wkey;>438— Succession — Mortgages — Enforcement against Succession — Loss oe Right.</p> <p>The holder of a note, secured by mortgage, does not lose the right to proceed against the succession of the maker, contradictorily with the administrator, because of subsequent transactions in which the heirs co-operate with the administrator in borrowing other money from such holder for carrying on the plantation, constituting the main asset of the succession upon which the original mortgage was imposed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. §§ 1765-1785, 1790; Dec. Dig. &wkey;438.]</p>

King, Judge. Actions by the State against the American Sugar Refining Company. From a judgment overruling its exceptions to plaintiff’s original and supplemental petitions, and denying its motion to strike from the petitions certain records, documents, and letters, defendant appeals, and from a judgment dismissing the rule taken by plaintiff for writs of injunction and sequestration and for the appointment of a receiver, plaintiff appeals.

Appeals from Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Franklin; R. J. Wilson, Judge. • Action by the Colonial Trust Company, trustee, against the St. John Lumber Company. From an order of seizure and sale, defendant and certain alleged stockholders and unsecured creditors appeal.

<p> (Syllabus l)y the Oourt.) </p> <p>1. Homestead <&wkey;46 — Registry oe Declaration — Constitutional Daw.</p> <p>Act No. 114 of 1880, requiring the registry of a declaration of the homestead exemption under the Constitution of 1879, remained in force in the parish of Orleans under the Constitutions of 1898 and 1913.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. § 63; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>46.]</p> <p>2. Homestead <&wkey;55 — Exemption—Registry oe Declaration.</p> <p>The right to acquire the homestead exemption, by recording the declaration required by law, is not itself an exemption and does not affect the rights of those who become creditors of the owner of the homestead before the registry of the declaration.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homestead, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-SO; Dec. Dig. &wkey;55.]</p> <p>3. Guardian and Ward &wkey;>130 — Tutorship —Petition-t-Parties—Executory Proceedings.</p> <p>One who sues individually and as tutrix of her minor children to enjoin a seizure and sale, without stating the names of the children, nor their interest in the property, and without praying that their claims be recognized, does not disclose a cause or right of action in their behalf.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Guardian and Ward, Cent. Dig. §§ 440-446; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 130.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Evidence <&wkey;588 — Probative Effect — Physical Facts.</p> <p>In an action for damages for the death of a trespasser on a railroad track, killed by a fast passenger train, the testimony of the engineer, fireman, and station agent, that the deceased ■was in such a position as not to be visible, in time to avert the accident, cannot be disregarded on a hypothesis of visibility, based on the location of the wound on the head of the deceased.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 2437; Dec. Dig. <@¿»588; Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1164.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; R. S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Mrs. F. O. Eldridge and others against Chesbrough & Graves. From judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;154(l) — Grounds for Dismissal — Acquiescence in Judgment.</p> <p>That plaintiff pending his appeal from an adverse judgment in a suit to annul an oil and mineral lease sold to a third party an undivided one-half of the oils and minerals under a part of the land and conveyed same by an instrument specifying that the land was leased- to defendant, and that the sale was made subject to such lease and included an undivided half interest in all royalties due under such lease, did not require the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that plaintiff had acquiesced therein, even though it be deemed an express admission of the validity of the lease and the correctness of the judgment appealed from; an admission of the correctness of a judgment, though good ground for affirming a judgment, constituting no ground for. dismissing the appeal on the ground of acquiescence.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent. Dig. §§ 957, 958, 961, 962; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;154(l).]</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error &wkey;>154(l) — Grounds for Dismissal — ‘ ‘Acquiescence’ ‘ ‘Admission.”</p> <p>“Acquiescence,” in a judgment such as will authorize dismissal of an appeal implies consent, and is not the same as an “admission” of the correctness of the judgment. A candid person admits a thing not because he wants to do so, but because truth compels him to do so, whereas it is the element of consent in acquiescence that furnishes the ground for dismissing an appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 957, 958, 961, 962; Dec. Dig. &wkey;154(l).</p> <p>For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Acquiescence; Admission.]</p> <p>3. Appeal and Error <&wkey;154(l), 805 — Ratification of Judgment — Abandonment of Appeal.</p> <p>That plaintiff pending his appeal from an adverse judgment in a suit to annul a duly recorded oil and mineral lease stated in an instrument whereby he conveyed an interest in the oil and mineral to a third person, that the land was leased to defendant, and that the sale was made subject to the lease and covered an interest in royalties and rents due under it, did not amount to a ratification of the judgment by plaintiff and a consequential abandonment of his appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 957, 3174, 3175; Dec. Dig. &wkey;154(l), 805.]</p> <p>4. Estoppel &wkey;>56 — Admission—Inducement to Action.</p> <p>Such alleged admission by plaintiff of the correctness of the judgment could not serve as a basis for estoppel where it was not acted on by defendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Gent. Dig. § 142; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey;56.]</p> <p>5. Estoppel <&wkey;25 — Deeds — Rights of Strangers.</p> <p>Strangers to a deed, cannot avail themselves of an estoppel arising from it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 61, 62; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>25.]</p> <p>6. Appeal and Error <&wkey;780(2) — Dismissal-Right — Transfer of Interest.</p> <p>That one to whom plaintiff had sold an interest in property and royalties pending his appeal from an adverse judgment in a suit to annul an oil and mineral lease, could, by setting up the sale, have prevented plaintiff from further prosecuting the suit, did not entitle defendant to a dismissal of the appeal because of the sale.</p> <p>[Ed. Note — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, D,ee. Dig. <&wkey;780(2).]</p> <p>7. Appeal and Error <&wkey;154(l) — Right of Appeal — Abandonment—Acquiescence in Judgment.</p> <p>For an acquiescence in a judgment to take away the right of appeal, there must he an unconditional, voluntary, and absolute acquiescence by appellant, and he must have intended to acquiesce and abandon his right of appeal.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent..Dig. §§ 957, 958, 961, 962; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;154(l).]</p> <p> (Syllabus'by the Court.) </p> <p>On the Merits.</p> <p>8. Mines and Minerals &wkey;>58 — Option to Drill for Oil and Gas — “Potestative Condition.”</p> <p>A contract whereby the owner of land grants to another, in consideration of payments, made and to be made, of certain agreed sums of money and other considerations which are to arise in a certain contingency, his right, or option, to drill for oil or gas within a year, and to extend the time thus granted, quarter by quarter, until it reaches a limit of 5 years, contains no potestative condition by reason of its failure to impose upon the grantee any obligation to drill, since it is not within the contemplation of the contract that he should drill, unless he so elects. The purpose is to confer the right to drill without imposing the obligation, and there is nothing in that purpose or in the nature of the contract which contravenes any law of this state.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 168, 169; Dec. Dig. &wkey;?58.</p> <p>Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst Series, Potestative Condition.]</p> <p>9. Mires and Minerals <&wkey;58 — Option to Drill eor Oil and Gas — Consideration— “Serious Consideration.”</p> <p>Where, as a consideration for an option to drill for oil and gas upon lands in improved territory, the grantee pays, cash in advance, an amount equal to 3 per cent, on the market value of the lands for one year’s time within which to exercise his option, and a like amount, in quarterly payments, in advance, during four years for quarterly extensions of the time, it cannot be said, either that the price (if the transaction be considered a sale) is not “serious” or that it is “out of all proportion to the value of the thing,” within the meaning of Civ. Code, art. 2464. Whether it is adequate or inadequate is a question with which the courts have no concern, where neither error nor fraud are alleged and shown.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 168, 169; Dec. Dig. 58.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) </p> <p>1. Navigable Waters <&wkey;43(2) — Riparian-Rights — Roads and Levees — Encroachment.</p> <p>Although the owner of land abutting on a navigable bayou must leave a sufficient space for a road and a levee, he is under no obligation to remove buildings which encroach upon the road, but do not interfere seriously with traffic thereon, since Oiv. Code, art. 862, provides that if buildings which cannot be destroyed without signal damage to the owner, encroach on public soil, but do not prevent its use, they may remain, but if rebuilt, the owner must relinquish the public land on which they stood.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. § 257; Dec. Dig. <@=543(2).]</p> <p>2.Municipal Corporations <&wkey;647 — Streets —Authority of Council.</p> <p>Under Act No. 136 of 1898, authorizing incorporation of towns, and section 15 thereof, empowering their boards of aldermen to exercise full jurisdiction in laying out streets, when a public road along a navigable stream was included within the legal limits of a town, it became one of its streets, the aldermen had authority to lay it out, and Rev. St. § 3369, requiring roads to be laid out by a jury of freeholders appointed by the police jury, did not apply.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1420; Dec. Dig. <$=></p> <p>3. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;655 — Streets —Establishment—Width—Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence that the traveled part of a public road in an incorporated town was but 12 to 15 feet, where there was in the record a photograph showing a buggy, a two-horse carriage, a two-horse wagon, six horsemen, and one man on foot abreast in the 25-foot space, shows no imperative need for greater space and none could be taken.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. <$=>055.]</p> <p>4. Navigable Waters <&wkey;41 — Riparian Rights — Shores .</p> <p>The servitude on the estate abutting a navigable bayou for the purpose of levee and road construction ere'ated by Civ. Code, art. 455, declaring the use of the banks of navigable streams to be public, does not require that space be also left for a sidewalk and adornment and embellishment of the way, nor for a drain.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Navigable Waters, Cent. Dig. §§ 178, 246-252; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;41.]</p> <p>5. Eminent Domain &wkey;>69 — Riparian' Rights — Shores—Power of Legislature.</p> <p>The Legislature is without power to impose an additional servitude upon the land abutting a navigable bayou, but if land is desired to be taken in addition to that provided for in Rev. St. § 3371, requiring roads to be 25 feet wide, for the purpose of constructing a sidewalk or for beautification or adornment, it must be expropriated after compensation paid.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. §§ 171-179; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 69.]</p> <p>6. Municipal Corporations <&wkey;655 — Streets —Establishment—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>The determination of the width of a public road belongs to the local authorities and not to the courts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. <$=>655.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>Cbiminai, Law <&wkey;1182 — Appeal—Reooed— Sueficienct.</p> <p>Where the transcript in a criminal case contains no bill of exception, and there has been no assignment of error, and no error is patent upon the face of the record, the conviction and sentence will be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3203-3214; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 1182.]</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Court.) </p> <p>1. Criminal Law <@=^1104(3) — Appeal—Bill op Exceptions — Assignment op Errors— Necessity.</p> <p>When the transcript of appeal in a criminal case does not contain a bill of exceptions or assignment of errors, the judgment will be affirmed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2776, 28S6; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 1104(3).]</p> <p>2. Criminal Law <&wkey;1091(l) — Appeal — “Bill op Exceptions’’ — Requisites.</p> <p>“A notation by the clerk of court in a criminal case that the defendant excepted and reserved a bill cannot be considered a ‘bill of exceptions.’ ”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2828-2830; Dec. Dig. &wkey;1091(l).]</p>

<p>Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Matassa was convicted of retailing intoxicating liquor, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Red Cross Lumber Company against the Frank I. Abbott Lumber Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus by the Oourt.J </p> <p>Criminal Law <&wkey;101(4) — Jurisdiction — Transfer oe Causes.</p> <p>When a criminal prosecution is commenced in a court having jurisdiction, there is no process by which it can be transferred to another court of concurrent jurisdiction; and, what the prosecuting attorney cannot do, directly, he should not do indirectly, as, by entering a nol. pros, in the court first seized of jurisdiction and lodging the same charge in the other court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 202; Dec. Dig. <5&wkey;101(4).]</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge; H. F. Brunot, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by John P. Salassi and another against Mrs. Lillie McConnell Dougherty and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa; Robert S. Ellis, Judge.</p> <p>Ed Banks was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.</p>

<p> (Syllabus ly the Court.) </p> <p>Criminal Law &wkey;>982 — Sentence — Admission 03? Evidence.</p> <p>Under section 7, Act No. 74 of 1914, p. 192, and in order to place himself in a position to obtain the benefit of the provisions of that statute, authorizing suspension of sentence in certain cases, a defendant, charged with a misdemeanor, is entitled, after conviction, to introduce evidence showing that he had not theretofore been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other cases,' see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2500, 2501; Dee. Dig. &wkey;> 982.]</p>

<p>Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred D. King, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Catherine Morere Lynch against Thomas Lynch. From a judgment sustaining an exception, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Certiorari on the relation of the Thomas Cusack Company, to review a judgment rendered for the defendant in an action by the relator against Frank B. Ford, doing business as Ford Brothers.