Volume 14 — Federal Cases

This was a motion by the defendants in a suit pending in the circuit court for the district of Massachusetts, brought by Horace H. Day against the Boston Belting Company, ror the issuing of an attachment againt William Judson, for refusing to obey a subpoena issued by this court, requiring him to appear before a United States commissioner, to be examined, de bene esse, as a witness in that suit, under the 30th section of the act of September 24. 1789 (1 Stat. 88), on the…

<p>Case No. 7,562.</p> <p>Bankrupt’s Examination — Consultation with Counsel.</p> <p>A bankrupt under examination as a witness, has no absolute right to consult with his counsel respecting the answer to be made to a question propounded to him, and to put in, as such answer, an answer' prepared by such counsel, as the result of such consultation; but he may advise with his counsel concerning his answers when the register can see cause therefor.</p>

.This was a motion for an attachment to compel one William Judson to answer a question put to him on his examination before a commissioner of this court, as a witness de. bene esse under the provisions of the 30th section of the act of congress of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. 88, 89), in a suit pending in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [The witness had previously been brought in by an attachment.

[This was an action against E. P. Bradford and others to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent No. 173,124, granted to Catherine Judson February 8,1876, and reissued June 12, 1877 (No. 7,729).]

This was an action on the case tried before Judge Leavitt and a jury. The suit was brought upon the patent for “improved, valves for governors,” granted to Junius and Alfred Judson, and more fully set forth in the report of the case of Judson [v. Moore, Case No. 7,569]. In the present action, the manufacturers and patentees of the infringing valve were sued.

<p>Case No. 7,567.</p> <p>Involuntary Bankruptcy — Corporation— Fraudulent Transfer.</p> <p>1. A corporation, having sold the stock, &c. of a store, received in payment therefor two mortgages amounting to $10,000. The vice-president of the corporation, having been authorized by vote of the trustees to negotiate a sale of or effect a loan on the mortgages, on the best terms possible, endeavored to sell’them, and finally sold them for the best offer he could get, being $7,000. The corporation having been put in bankruptcy within six months, the assignee filed a bill against the purchasers to recover back the mortgages. Held, that the facts were not sufficient to show that the defendants had reasonable cause to believe that the transfer was made with a view to prevent the property from being distributed under the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)]. or to defeat its object, or to impair, hinder, impede, or delay its effect.</p> <p>2. In order to show that a transfer was made out of the usual and ordinary course of business, and was thus prima facie evidence of fraud, un-<ler the thirty-fifth section of the bankruptcy net. it is necessary to show that the transfer was out of such usual and ordinary course of business in respect to articles of the description of that transferred.</p> <p>[This was a suit by Charles N. Judson, assignee of the Eagle Gas-Stove Manufacturing Company, bankrupt, against Gibbons L. Kelty and others.]</p>

This is an action by the plaintiff, a citizen of New York, against Macon county in this state, upon eleven coupons of $50 each. The petition contains eleven counts, that is, a count upon each coupon, and each count asks for judgment for $50 and interest.

[This was an action on the case tried before Judge LEAVITT and a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 7,755] for “improved valves for governors,” granted to Junius and Alfred Judson, November 5, 1850, and reissued to Jun-ius Judson, January 10, 1854 [No. 255].

Action on coupons originally attached to negotiable bonds issued by the defendant: city under its seal, and reciting the neces- ; sary vote. An answer set up the defense, referred to in the opinion of the court, but did not allege that the plaintiff [David C. Judson] was not a bona fide holder of the bonds or coupons for value. The plaintiff demurred.

<p>Case No. 7,571.</p> <p>Usury — What Constitutes.</p> <p>1. The purchase of promissory notes signed by an individual or issued by a bank, if made bona fide is not usurious.</p> <p>2. If the purchase, however, was a device, to charge a higher rate of interest than the law authorizes, it is usurious.</p> <p>3. Depreciated bank notes may be sold in the market at a greater or less price, as may be agreed upon between the parties. Like any commodity, they can be bought and sold without usury. But any device or cover which may be resorted to. to evade the statute of usury, is corrupt and usurious.</p> <p>[Cited in Cornell v. Barnes, 26 Wis. 487.]</p> <p>[Note. Cases cited under this title will he found arranged in alphabetical order under the •quantity or number of jugs; e. g. “Jugs of Brandy. See Five Jugs of Brand^.”]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel by the United States against the Julia (Deland, claimant).]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was an information, filed on the 17th June, 1812, and contained three counts, the first of which was founded on the non-importation law; the second, on the coasting act; the third, on the act regulating the collection of duties.

<p>Case No. 7,575.</p> <p>Prize — Intercourse with Enemy — License.</p> <p>1. A license or protection from the enemy, found on board an American vessel, on a voyage to a neutral port in alliance with the enemy, the terms of which were such, as to prove an intercourse with the enemy and a direct sub-serviency to his interests, was held to subject the vessel and cargo to confiscation, as prize of war.</p> <p>[Cited in Maisonnaire v. Keating. Case No. 8,-978; Caldwell v. Express Co., Id. 2,303.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[Cited in Coolidge v. Inglee, 13 Mass. 41; Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 566, 571.]</p> <p>2. Semble, that such a license or protection, without any such peculiar terms,- would be illegal, and subject the property to confiscation as prize.</p> <p>3. Important documents, which were the cause of capture, having been surreptitiously taken from the possession of the prize-master; exact copies taken by him and verified by his affidavit, were, under the circumstances, admitted as good evidence.</p>

In this cause there were no claimants, after j the usual notice. ! demanded a condemnation of vessel and cargo, on the grounds of intended breach of blockade, and of false papers; and to the point that, although this vessel was under neutral flag and papers, she was not entitled to a year and a day for claimants to appear, he cited 1 Wheat. [14 U. S.] App. 501; The Avery [Case No. 672]; The Staadt Embden, 1 C. Kob. Adm. 20.

This was a libel to obtain possession of the schooner Julia Ann, lately of Orrinton, Maine, and asserting title thereto.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a libel in rem, in admiralty, filed in the district court against a vessel and her freight and… Held: and, for effecting repairs, &c., the cargo is being discharged. Captain Knowlton tells us- that he has cabled the casualty to the United States. As the cargo is consigned ‘to order,’ we have been unable to acquaint the New York consignees of the misfortune.

This was a cause of collision. The libel alleged that, on the 25th of October, 1851, the libellants’ barque Mary, of about 200 tons burden, was lying in Holmes’ Hole, and at about 7 or S o’clock, a. m., the wind blowing quite fresh from west south-west, the crew were beginning to get her under way, when they perceived the Julia M. Hallock, (a schooner of about 300 tons,) drifting rapidly toward them; that the first mate hailed the schooner, to throw over her starboard…

The following statement of facts is given by the libellants’ counsel: The vessel was chartered by S. & W. Welsh, for a voyage from Philadelphia to Trinidad de Cuba and return.

<p>[This was an action of assumpsit by the Juneau Bank against Thomas McSpedau.]</p>

This was an action [by Edmund Jungbluth] against [Heman J. Redfield] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an additional duty or penalty of 50 per cent, imposed on certain goods, for undervaluation, under section 17 of the act of August 30, 1842 (5 Stat. 565), under these circumstances: After the goods were entered, the collector seized them for a violation of the revenue laws.

<p>Case No. 7,584.</p> <p>Carrier, when Relieved from Dangers of Navigation — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>1. Where a bill of lading contains the clause “dangers of navigation excepted,” the carrier brings himself within the clause, when he shows that, on a dark and stormy night, at the entrance of a harbor difficult of access, he mistook a light on shore in a fine with the pier-light, for the latter, whereby the vessel went ashore and damaged a portion of the cargo.</p> <p>[Cited in The Rocket, Case No. 11.975.] '</p> <p>2. The carrier, in order to avail himself of the benefit of this restrictive clause, must bring his case strictly within the words of the exception. and for this purpose, the burden of proof is upon him.</p> <p>[Cited in The Rocket, Case No. 11,975.]</p> <p>3. A master may enter a harbor on a dark night, with a heavy sea and high wind, notwithstanding access be difficult, but not unusually dangerous or difficult, without incurring the imputation of negligence.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,685.</p> <p>Collision — Sailing Vessels — Jukisdiction—Ves-sel Close-Hauled on Starboard Tack— Change op Course in Extremis.</p> <p>1. A Dutch schooner and a Russian bark came in collision in the North Sea, by which the schooner was sunk. Each vessel claimed that she was close-hauled, and that the other had the wind free. The bark was on the port tack, and the schooner on the starboard tack. Both vessels kept their courses, till so near that a collision was inevitable if they held on, when the schooner ported her helm, and shortly afterward the bark also ported, but too late. The direction of the wind was disputed on the evidence. The bark was going about eight knots an hour, and the schooner about two knots and a half. Held, that on the evidence, the-schooner was close-hauled — as close as she could be.</p> <p>2. It was the duty of the bark to have ported earlier than she did, and to have kept out of the schooner’s way.</p> <p>3. It was not a fault in the schooner that she luffed when she did. instead of starboarding her helm, for she had the right to assume that the bark would port, which she did do. when too late; but, for an act done under the circumstances in question, even if it had not been judicious. the schooner would not be responsible as for a fault, because it was done in a moment of peril, into which she had been brought by the fault of the bark.</p> <p>[Cited in The Havilali. 33 Fed. 877; The Athabasca, 45 Fed. 656.]</p> <p>4. The bark was in fault in not keeping a vigilant lookout.</p> <p>5. This court had jurisdiction of the action.</p> <p>[Cited in Bernhard v. Creene, Case No. 1,349; The Belgenlaud, 114 U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. 866.]</p>

[Motion for provisional injunction. Suit brought [by Jules Jurgensen against Elise Magnin and others] upon letters patent [No. 61.207] for an “improvement in stem-setting watches,” granted to complainant January 15, 1867, and reissued April 11. 1S71 [No. 4.334].

[This was a libel by Justi Pon and Ransom Palanca against the proceeds of the brig Arbustci for loss of cargo. Petition of Fairbanks & Co. against the same to recover upon a mortgage.]

The libel alleges that on the 14th of October, 1S54, the schooner J. W. Brown received on board at Chicago, to be carried to Buffalo, 10,097 bushels of wheat, and that the captain of the schooner contracted to deliver the same to the libellants, or order, in Buffalo, and gave a bill of lading to that effect; that the libellants accounted with J. S. Root, from whose warehouse it was delivered, for that quantity, and that the captain knew the libellants would account with Root…

[These were libels by Joseph Pauli and E. G. Pallot against the steamer J. W. Ever-man, by B. G. Arnold against the samé, by the Orient Mutual Insurance Company against the same, and by the Merchants’ & People's Line against Joseph Pauli, E. G. Pallot, and others, for damages sustained in a collision.]

<p>Case No. 7,692.</p> <p>Prize — Okew Escaped — False Loo — Change op Name — Papers Found on Board.</p> <p>[A schooner was captured about twelve miles to east of Mobile Point, while appearing to be attempting to enter the port of Mobile. The crew escaped to shore and fired upon the captors. No documents were found upon the captured vessel as to its destination or title, but certain papers were found showing that she was named and navigated under another name, and the log-book showed a manifest intention to deceive as to her destination. It was held in this case that the vessel and cargo be adjudged a prize of war.]</p>

This was an involuntary petition in bankruptcy filed against Joseph Kahley and others, partners doing business in Janesville, Wisconsin. The proceedings were commenced on the 20th of October, 1870, and the customary warrant issued to take possession of the bankrupts’ property. The marshal, on the 21st, seized by virtue of his warrant a stock of goods consisting of toys, candies and cigars, and the fixtures in the store or salesroom used for the business.

Application by Joseph ICahley. one of the bankrupts, for a discharge. In this case the assignee received from the estate of the bankrupts a sum exceeding fifty per centum of the debts proven, without deducting the costs and expenses of the proceedings, but after paying the costs and expenses it did not equal fifty per centum of the debts. The debts were all contracted since the 1st of January, 1869.

[This was a bill in equity by Richard V. Wheelan, bishop of Wheeling, against E. G. Gibboney, executrix of Robert Gibboney, deceased. The plaintiff having died pending suit, it was revived in the name of his successor, the present plaintiff, John J. ICain, as bishop of Wheeling.]

<p>Case No. 7,596.</p> <p>Motion to Remand — Irregularities in Procuring Order of Removal — Sufficiency of Petition — Defence Arising under Law of United States — Practice — Want of Jurisdiction, When Shown — Acts of 1875 and 1868.</p> <p>1. Where a cause has been removed. from a state court to the proper federal circuit court, the federal court will not. if it otherwise would have jurisdiction, remand the cause on account of erroneous steps in the mode, in which the cause ivas removed; as where it was alleged that the petition to remove was not filed in time: that it was not sworn to by the person properly authorized, and that the bond was not signed by the defendant (a corporation), in its corporate capacity.</p> <p>2. A petition which showed that the defendant was a corporation organized under certain acts of congress (naming them), and that it had “a defence to the plaintiffs action arising under and by virtue of a law of the United States,” was held sufficient — especially where, in answer to the motion to remand, the defendant showed that its domicil and chief office were in another state. It is not required that the petition for removal should show the particular part of the constitution, or the particular act of congress, under which the defence exists, or that any averment be made as to how or in what manner 1he defence arises.</p> <p>3. The court, in this case was of opinion, on motion to remand, that it had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, but said that the want of jurisdiction might be shown at the trial — since the act of 1S75 [18 Stat. 470]. makes it the duty of the federal court to remand the cause, if at any time after removal a want of jurisdiction shall appear.</p> <p>4. The act of 1S75 relating to the removal of causes docs not repeal that part of the act of 1868 [15 Stat. 227], upon the same subject which refers to corporations.</p>

This was a habeas corpus before Mr. Justice Nelson, at chambers [on the part of Thomas Kaine]. For the report of the case in the supreme court, see In re Kaine, 14 How. [55 U. S.] 103.

[Application by Thomas Kaine for a writ of habeas corpus.] In the matter of Thomas Kaine, claimed as a fugitive from justice, under the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, of the 9th August, 1842.

On the 1st day of July, inst.. a habeas corpus was allowed by the United States district judge, directing the marshal to have the body of Thomas Kaine, by him imprisoned and detained, as it is said, with the cause of such imprisonment and detention, before the United States circuit court for the Southern district of New York, forthwith to do and receive, &e., &c. On the same day, the marshal returned the writ into court, stating that he held and detained the prisoner by…

<p>[In the matter of J. M. George Kallish, a bankrupt.]</p>

[These were libels in the matter of the Kal-listo and by C. A. Pettitt and others against the Kallisto for damages sustained in a collision.] The Norwegian bark Kallisto, 460 tons, and the American schooner Hattie L. Fuller, 260 tons, collided at 3 a. m. on the morning of April 13th, 1877, at sea, about eighteen miles northeastwardly off Body Island, the light there being in sight. The Fuller was bound for Washington, D. C., with a load of hard pine lumber.

<p>Case No. 7,601.</p> <p>Half Pilotage — Lien —Vessel Bound Theough Hell Gate.</p> <p>1. A claim for half pilotage by a Hell-Gate pilot, under +he statute of the state of New York, constitutes a lien upon the vessel.</p> <p>2. But to establish such claim it must be shown at the time of the tender of the pilot’s services, the vessel was in the prosecution of a voyage which would carry her through Hell Gate.</p>

On petition of Hector Cameron, of Toronto, Canada, that the sale of the Kaloolah be set. aside; that certain decrees, upon which she had been sold, be vacated, and that he be permitted to intervene and defend.

This was a motion [by Jacob Kamm against Benjamin Stark] for a provisional injunction to stay proceedings at law, and for an order directing service of the subpoena in the suit upon the attorney of the defendant in the action at law, he being a non-resident of the state.

<p>Case No. 7,605.</p> <p>Statute of Limitations — Revivai. of Actions.</p> <p>1. There are two modes by which an action may be revived, after the statute has barred it.</p> <p>2. A clear and an unconditional acknowledgment of the debt, from which the law implies a promise to pay.</p> <p>3. If the acknowledgment be conditional, the liability attaches, under the conditions.</p> <p>4. But if the acknowledgment be connected with any condition which shows there was no intention to pay the debt, it does not take the case out of the statute. The action must be on the new promise, the indebtment is considered a sufficient consideration to support the promise.</p> <p>5. But the remedy is on the new promise. If the acknowledgment of the debt, be coupled with a proposition to pay it, partly in money and partly in property, the payment can only be enforced as the terms propose. The original debt is not revived, and it is considered only as affording a good consideration on the new promise.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,606.</p> <p>Power or Sale — Deed or Tkust — Incorporation —Non User — War of the Rebellion — Unlawful Intercourse — Compensation for Improvements on Land under Supposition of Ownership.</p> <p>1. Where both of the parties to a suit in equity affirm a deed, and allege, in their pleadings, that a certain party executed it. who ought to have executed it, but did not, the fact that he did not is immaterial.</p> <p>2. Defects in the proceedings to incorporate a corporation are cured by the subsequent recognition of the existence of the corporation by the legislature of the state under whose authority it claims to have been incorporated.</p> <p>[Cited in Koch v. North Ave. Ry. Co., 75 Md. 226, 23 Atl. 464.]</p> <p>3. In a suit by a corporation, the defendant cannot raise the objection that the corporation had, before the suit was commenced, forfeited its rights hv non user.</p> <p>4. Notwithstanding the erection of the state of West Virginia, a corporation previously ere-ated by the state of Virginia continued to be a corporation of Virginia, so long as it did not become affirmatively a corporation of West Virginia, by complying with the provisions of the act of the legislature of West Virginia, passed October 26, 1863 (Acts 1863, c. 86).</p> <p>5. Where the power of sale under a deed of trust of lands in Kanawha county, Virginia, executed October 1st, 1854, was suspended by the injunction of a competent court, issued in November, 1857, and which continued in force until December, 1863: Held, that the grantors in the deed of trust were not in default, during that period, in not paying the debt secured by such deed of trust.</p> <p>6. While war was flagrant between the United States and the so-called Confederate States, such war having broken out before such injunction was dissolved, and the creditor to whom the debt secured by the deed of trust was due having been domiciled and resident in the United States during such war. and the grantors in the deed of trust, who were the real debtors to the creditor, having been domiciled and resident in the so-called Confederate States during such war, proceedings were taken, whereby, during such war, the lands covered by such deed of trust purported to be sold under the power of sale contained therein, and to be purchased at such sale by the creditor: Held, that the sale was void.</p> <p>7. The right to a sale could not exist in favor of the creditor unless there existed at the same time a corresponding duty and capacity on the part of the debtors to pay the debt to the creditor.</p> <p>8. the late war between the so-called Confederate States and the United States was a public war. and a war not only between the respective governments, but between all the inhabitants of the one territory on one side, and all the inhabitants of the other territory on the other side, so that all the people of each must be regarded as having been enemies of all the people of the other, during the continuance of the war.</p> <p>9. The payment, in this case, of the debt by the debtors to the creditor during the war, would have been business and commercial intercourse, and, therefore, unlawful, under the 5th section of the act of July 13. 1861 (12 Stat. 257). and the proclamation of the president, of August 16, 1861. (Id., 1262); and, therefore, the remedy for the recovery of the debt, by a sale of the lands under the trust deed, was suspended during the war.</p> <p>[Cited in Haymond v. Camden. 22 W. Va. 190; Tracey v. Shumate. Id. 512.]</p> <p>10. The trust deed in this case having provided that, in case of a sale thereunder, the trustees should give at least sixty days’ notice of the time and place of sale, such notice, when given, was. so far as it was intended to notify the debtors, unlawful intercourse, under said act and proclamation, the persons who acted ns trustees in publishing the notice having been domiciled at the time in the territory of the enemies of the debtors.</p> <p>11. The war suspended not only the right of the creditor to resort to proceedings to enforce the contract, but also his right to procure from a judge in the United States the appointment of a person as trustee under the deed of trust, in place of one of the trustees named therein, who was still living, and the right of the persons assuming to act as trustees to lay the foundation for exercising the power of sale, by giving the notice of sale.</p> <p>[Cited in Brooke v. Filer. 35 Ind. 408.]</p> <p>12. The sale having been unlawful, the creditor. who purchased the lands on the sale, and his grantees, acquired no title to them as against the debtors and their grantees of the equity of redemption, and the right of the latter to redeem the lands from the lien of the trust deed, by paying the debt, remains, and they can enforce such right by a suit in equity in their own names against the grantees of the creditor.</p> <p>[Cited in Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 30 Pac. 215.]</p> <p>13. Such grantees of the creditor, although their title to the land fails, possess all the rights of the creditor under the deed of trust, and in and to the debt secured thereby.</p> <p>[Cited in Johnson v. Sandhoff, 30 Minn. 201, 14 N. W. 891.]</p> <p>14. The fact that the lands lie in the state of West Virginia does not deprive this court of jurisdiction of such suit.</p> <p>15. Neither the creditor nor the grantors in the deed of trust, nor the trustees named therein, nor the substituted trustee, are necessary parties to such suit</p> <p>16. The plaintiffs having taken title to the lands by deeds recorded in Kanawha county in 1S56, and the grantors to them, who were the grantors in the deed of trust and the real debtors. having instituted legal proceedings in 1857 and thereafter, against the creditor and others, in respect to the title to such lands, to which proceedings the plaintiffs were not parties, the plaintiffs were not bound by such proceedings.</p> <p>17. The defendants held to have purchased the lands from the creditor with notice of the claim of the plaintiffs thereto, and of their equity of redemption therein.</p> <p>18. The law stated in respect to making compensation for improvements on land to an innocent person who has made such improvements supposing himself to be the absolute owner of it.</p> <p>19. Form of the decree in this case.</p> <p>NOTE. The following was the decree in the cause: “This case having come on to be heard upon the pleadings therein, and a stipulation of the respective parties, .and James M. Carlisle and William A. Maury having been heard on the part of the plaintiffs, and John Slosson and Benjamin H. Smith on the part of the defendants, and the plaintiffs having applied to the court to strike out William H. Edwards, as a defendant, and to dismiss the bill in respect to him, upon the ground that the said Edwards is a citizen of the state of West "Virginia, as is averred in the defendants’ answer, it is ordered, that such application be, and the same is hereby granted. It is also ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the sale, made on the twenty-fifth of February. 1864, by William J. Rand and Isaac N. Smith, as trustees, of the lands covered by the deed of trust to James F. Hansford and Isaac N. Smith, trustees, mentioned in the pleadings herein, and the deed thereof by said Smith and Rand to said Edwards, and the deed thereof by said Edwards to the defendants, were all and each of them null and void, so far as respects the conveyance of every and all of the said lands, as against the plaintiffs, and that the defendants acquired no title thereby, as against the plaintiffs, to the said lands, and that the defendants have a lien on said lands, to secure the payment of the amount due and unpaid on the debt secured by the said deed of trust, they being the owners of the said debt, and that the plaintiffs have the right to redeem the said lands from such lien; and that it be, and is hereby referred to John Sedgwick, Esquire, of the city of New York, counsellor at law, as master, pro hac vice, with the usual powers of a master, to take and state an account of the amount due on said debt, and an account of the amount of the rents, issues, profits, proceeds, and productions of the said lands, with which the defendants are properly chargeable, and an account of the improvements made on said lands, through expenditures made by the defendants, which improvements remain as benefits to be received by the plaintiffs, as owners of said lands, and their value at the time of making his report: and, the said master is directed to enquire and report as to the circumstances under which such improvements were made, and whether the same were made in good faith or not. and whether with or without notice of defect of title, and whether the plaintiffs ought to render compensation for the same to the defendants, and. if so, in what amount. And the court doth further direct, that, in taking such accounts, and making such inquiries, the said master may call for the production of such books and papers as it may seem to him fitting, and may examine such witnesses, and ■ ot such places, as shall seem to him proper, and receive and consider such depositions as shall be offered in evidence by either of the said parties, and may inspect the said lands; and that he return,' with his report, all such testimony as shall be adduced before him, and that he, with all convenient speed, make report to the court of his proceedings in the premises. All other questions are reserved until the coming in of said report.”</p>

On the 12th day of April, 1S72, John and ■Charles Parkes. partners, under the firm name of J. & C. Parkes, of whose estate in bankruptcy the plaintiff [Edward E. Kane] is assignee, entered into a contract in writing with the defendant, as follows; “Agreed April 12th, 1872, between William Jenkinson, of Port Huron, in the county of St. Clair, and state of Michigan, and J. & C. Parkes. of Detroit, Wayne county, and state aforesaid, as follows: The said William Jenkinson agrees…

<p>This is an action of trover [by Edward E. Kane, assignee, against Delos E. Rice] for a quantity of lumber and other personal property alleged to have been unlawfully converted by the defendant. On the 4th day of January, 1871, John F. Parkes and Charles R. Parkes, then partners in trade in the firm name of J. & C. Parkes, executed and delivered to the defendant a chattel mortgage on the property in question with other property, conditioned to indemnify and save the defendant harmless from all indorsements theretofore or thereafter made by him for the accommodation of the mortgagors, with the usual power to take possession and sell in case of default, but with the express provision that until default the mortgaged property should remain in the possession of the mortgagors. The mortgagors remained in possession of the mortgaged property, treating it and dealing with it in all respects as their own, and selling portions of it in the usual course of their business, with the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee, until the mortgagee took possession of what remained, being the property in question, as hereafter stated. At the time of the execution and delivery of the mortgage, and up to their bankruptcy. John F. Parkes resided in the city of Detroit, in this state, and Charles K. Parkes resided in the township of Oscoda, in the county of Iosco, in this state. As partners they owned and occupied a saw mill at Os-coda, and dealt in lumber and building materials at Detroit. The property covered by the mortgage was situated wholly in Detroit. The mortgage was not filed in the proper office in either Detroit or Oscoda until July 18th, .1S72, when it was filed in Detroit; but it was never filed in Oscoda, and no affidavit of renewal has ever been filed in either place. Soon after the filing in Detroit, and on the 5th day of August, 1S72, the defendant took possession of the property in question by consent of the Parkeses, and caused the same to be sold at public auction on the 15th day of October, 1872, himself becoming the purchaser of a large portion of it. At or about the time of the filing of the mortgage in De-triot, the mortgagors failed to pay certain of their notes and a draft, and defendant’s liability as indorser thereon became fixed, and he was afterwards obliged to pay, and did pay the same, amounting in the aggregate to much more than the proceeds of the property, or the value thereof. At the times of the filing of the mortgage in Detroit, of the taking possession of the property by the defendant, and ot the sale of it by him, the Parkeses were notoriously insolvent, and defendant knew them to be so. Although not expressly stated in the agreed statement of facts that the Parkeses were indebted during those times, yet such was ascertained to be the fact, and the case was argued and submitted upon that hypothesis. The bankruptcy proceedings were commenced on the 24th day of September, 1872, and the plaintiff herein having been appointed assignee, and qualified as such, brought this action to recover for the property so taken possession of and sold by defendant. A jury having been waived the case was tried by the court, and it was submitted on an agreed statement of facts (except as to values, which was left to oral proofs), substantially as above set forth, and containing a further statement that the mortgage was given and received in good faith, and without any actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of the mortgagors.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[This was a suit by the Kansas Valley National Bank of Topeka against Milo Row ell, assignee in bankruptcy of P. C. Schuyler & Son, bankrupts.] The bill of the complainant is for relief, and asks the decree of this court for the reformation of a mortgage executed by Philip C. Schuyler, one of the bankrupts, upon the ground that, by mistake, the instrument was so drawn as not to embrace the particular property which had been agreed upon, and which it was intended between…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Western district of Missouri.] This is an appeal by the defendant from so much of the decree of the district court in bankruptcy as declares void a second mortgage held by them upon the St. Louis & St. Joseph Railroad, and cancels the $1,000.000 of bonds secured thereby.

<p>Case No. 7,613.</p> <p>Involuntary Bankruptcy — Death of B\xkucpt —Averment of — Service of Injunction-Parties.</p> <p>A. was adjudicated a bankrupt <on the petition of creditors. Some time thereafter the brother of the bankrupt filed his petition, alleging that the bankrupt died before the adjudication; that the petitioner had. been served with an injunction restraining him from interfering with, or disposing of. the property of the said bankrupt. This petition was answered by alleging, among other things, that the bankrupt had absconded and that the petitioner and others had undertaken to conceal the property from creditors, and demanding proof of death. The court decided that the petition must be dismissed. That there was no party to a. creditor’s petition except the petitioning creditor and the bankrupt: that the service of an injunction on any person or any number of persons, did not make them parties to the proceedings. although any one served might, by petition or on motion, have a wrongful injunction dissolved; this, however, did not give him the right to contest or vacate the adjudication, that being a matter in which he could have no inter-</p> <p>[Cited in Re Bergeron. Case No. 1,342; Re Donnelly. 5 Fed. 785.]</p>

This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff, Mary Karrahoo, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas. There is no allegation in the petition respecting the residence or citizenship of the defendant.

This was an action, instituted [by Charles W. Karthaus] on the 6th of April, 1S40, against [William Frick] the collector of the port of Baltimore, to recover back certain duties paid under protest.

<p>Case No. 7,617.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Act of — Assignment for Benefit of Creditors.</p> <p>1. A voluntary general assignment for the benefit of creditors bears conclusive evidence upon its face of the intent of the assignor to prevent the property transferred by it from being distributed under the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)].</p> <p>[Cited in Re Kraft. 4 Fed. 525.]</p> <p>2. Such an assignment, although made in good faith and without preferences, is an act of bankruptcy, and will defeat a discharge, irrespective of the time when it was made.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Wolf skill, Case No. 17,930; Re Diehl, 15 Fed. 236.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,619.</p> <p>FoBFEITUBE OF VESSEL — RULE AT COMMON liAW— “Liable to Forfeitcke” — Bona Fide Pckchaseb.</p> <p>1. Whether a forfeiture given by statute takes effect upon the commission of the act on account of which it is given, or upon the seizure or condemnation of the property, depends primarily upon the intention of congress as evidenced by the language of the statute; but when that is doubtful or uncertain, resort may be had to the rules of the common law relating to forfeitures.</p> <p>2. A forfeiture of lands at common law related to the time of the commission of the offense; but in case of chattels, the forfeiture did not take effect until the conviction of the offender, or a finding that he had fled.</p> <p>3. Section 4189 of the Revised Statutes, which declares that for the commission of a certain act a vessel “shall be liable to forfeiture,” does not effect a present absolute forfeiture, but only gives a right to have the vessel declared forfeited upon due process of law, and the property in the same remains in the owner until seizure and condemnation, which latter relates back to the time of seizure, and invalidates all intermediate sales.</p> <p>4. A purchaser in good faith of a vessel liable to forfeiture under said section 4189, and before seizure, acquires the title thereto, and may hold the same against the United States.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,618.</p> <p>Pbize — Violation of Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,620.</p> <p>■DlSTIUBUTION OF PliOCEEDS OX SAI.E OF VESSEL.</p> <p>Where a vessel has been sold under a libel for wages and the proceeds paid into the registry, they should be distributed as follows: (1) The. libel for wages and costs thereof. (2) A regular and duly recorded mortgage. (3) The clerk’s, marshal’s, and proctor’s fees in the various petitions filed, limiting proctors’ fees where they have filed more petitions than necessary. (4) The balance pro rata among material and supply men, they being at the home port. These have not, since the Lotta-wanna Case. 20 Wall. [S7 ü. S.] 201. 21 Wall. [88 U. S.] 558, a prior lien, even though so .stated in the state statutes.</p> <p>[Cited in The Alice Getty. Case No. 193: The Theodore Perry, Id. 13,879; Baldwin v. The Bradish Johnson, Id. 798; The Illinois, Id. 7.005; The E. A. Barnard, 2 Fed. 722; The Josephine Spangler, 9 Fed. 775; The J. W. Tucker, 20 Fed. 131; The Lady Boone, 21 Fed. 733; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 4, 13 Sup. Ct. 502.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois.] The original libel in this case, under which the schooner was sold, was filed by seamen, and the sale took place December 16, 1874. On that day the petitioners, Miller Brothers, and Gilbert Hubbard & Co., filed intervening claims for a portion of the proceeds of the vessel arising from the sale.

<p>Case No. 7,622.</p> <p>Wharfage — Maritime Li ex — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. There is a maritime lien upon a domestic vessel for wharfage, which is enforceable in the admiralty.</p> <p>[Cited in The General Cass. Case No. 5.307. Followed in The Ann Ryan. Id. 428. Cited in Ex parte Easton. 95 U. S. 7(i: The John M. Welch, Case No. 7,359; The Esteban de Antunano. 31 Fed. 924; The Main. 2 C. C. A. 509, 51 Fed. 956: The Allianca. 50 Fed. 013: The Seguranca. 58 Fed. 910; The Advance. 60 Fed. 707; The Starbuek. 01 Fed. 503.]</p> <p>2. The jurisdiction of the admiralty depends upon the subject matter alone.</p> <p>[Cited in The General Cass. Case No. 5.307.]</p> <p>3. A contract for the wharfage of a canal-boat is a maritime contract.</p> <p>[Cited in The General Cass. Case No. 5.307; The W. J. Walsh. Id. 17.922; Emlnor v. Greco. 3 Fed. 413; The Wivanhoe. 26 Fed. 928; The Gilbert Knapp. 37 Fed. 213; The Wilmington, 48 Fed. 567.]</p> <p>4. The maritime law implies a lien on the ship from every lawful contract of the master, made for the benefit of the ship.</p> <p>5. The rule of the case of The General Smith, 4 Wheat. [17 U. S.] 431, is not one to be extended.</p> <p>6. A wharfinger is not a material man.</p> <p>7. Nature of a maritime lien considered.</p>

At the time the tug was seized upon the attachment, most of her apparel and furniture was in the hands of one Demass, and was never taken possession of by the marshal. A decree having passed upon the original libel, a writ of venditioni exponas was issued, commanding that the tug, “her boats, tackle, apparel and furniture,” be sold on the 26th day of December, 1876.

<p>Case No. 7,624.</p> <p>Bottomry — Authority op Master — Necessity por Repairs.</p> <p>1 Where a British vessel, bound to New York, put into Ship Harbor. Nova Scotia, in distress, and her master, who was half owner, had her repaired, and. having no means to pay for the repairs, borrowed money at Halifax, on a bot-tomry of the vessel, having telegraphed to the other part owner of the vessel in Canada, but not having been able to procure the funds he needed except by the bottomry: Hdtl. that the master had the right to create a bottomry on his own interest in the vessel, without the existence of any necessity for doing so.</p> <p>2. As to the interest of his co-owner, it was no objection to the bottomry, that the loan was effected after the repairs were made and the supplies furnished.</p> <p>3. Tlie necessity for tlie repairs being shown, it was for the claimant to show that the money could have been obtained otherwise than by bot-tomry. if he would defend against tbe bond.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,625.</p> <p>Delivery of Cargo — Storage axd Cartage— Bill of Lading — Notice—Costs.</p> <p>1. Tlie steamer K. M. brought to New York from London 992 pieces of boxwood, under a bill of lading containing this clause: “The goods to be taken from alongside by the consignee immediately the vessel is ready to discharge. or otherwise they will be landed by the master, and deposited, at the expense of the consignee, and at his risk of fire, loss or injur}-, in the warehouse provided forthat purpose, or in the public store, as the collector of the port of New York shall direct, and. when deposited in the warehouse or store, to be subject to storage.’’ The consignees, having seen in the newspaper the announcement of the arrival of the steamer, entered their goods at the custom house on Saturday. February 8th. 1873. obtained a permit to land them, and sent it on board the vessel. The boxwood was scattered through the cargo, having been used as dun-nage. On Monday the eartman of the consignees went on board the steamer. It was raining, and she was not discharging. She began to discharge on Tuesday. The eartman was on board on that day. but saw none of the wood, although some of it came out that day. On Wednesday he went again, and then saw twenty-two pieces which had been discharged. On Thursday he went again, and was told that he could probably have two truck-loads of the wood on Friday, and that it would probably be all out on Saturday, and he said he would like to get it all at one time. He did not go to tlie vessel on Friday. The freight was paid on Thursday. By Friday afternoon 718 pieces had been discharged, and on that afternoon they were sent by the ship to a warehouse for storage. On Saturday morning the eartman went again, and found 271 other pieces, which he took and receipted for. Tne consignees refused to pay either cartage or storage on the 71S pieces, and filed a libel against the vessel to recover the value of 721 pieces of the wood. What became of the three pieces besides the 718 did not appear: Held, that the libel-lant had full notice that the vessel was discharging cargo, and that some of the wood had been discharged, and that the rest was likely to come out at uncertain times</p> <p>2. The vessel was not bound, under the bill of lading, to keep the wood on the wharf for the consignees until it was all discharged, but she was bound to give the consignees a reasonable opportunity to take the goods: and. after affording such opportunity, she had the right to store the goods under the bill of lading.</p> <p>[('¡tod in Ennevehr v. The Hindoo. 1 Fed. 629; Gronstadi v. Witthoff. 15 Fed. 275; Henderson v. 300 Tons Iron Ore, 38 Fed. 38.]</p> <p>3. Such reasonable opportunity was afforded in this case, and tlie libellants were, therefore, not entitled to recover the value of the 718 pieces of wood, and the claimants of the vessel must have a decree for their costs, less the value of the three pieces.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,626.</p> <p>Bankruptcy —Withdrawing Proof of Claim— Mistake.</p> <p>N. & Co. filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings of K. & Co., on a bill of exchange drawn by K. & Co. for fSOO. N. & Co. at the time were indebted to K. & Co., in a balance of account on gold transactions, amounting to $3,250. A dividend was after-wards declared in the bankruptcy proceedings and X. & Co. received their dividend on the amount of the bill of exchange. A suit being then brought h.v the trustees of the bankrupts against X. & Co. to recover the $3,250, N. & Co. applied to withdraw the proof of claim and file a new one for the difference between the $3.250 and the £800, averring that they had never intended to claim any more than that, and tendering back the dividend, which they had received: Held, that X. & Oo. might he allowed to withdraw the proof of claim filed by them, and file a new one on the bill of exchange as a secured claim, secured by the amount of the debt due from X. & Co., to the bankrupts, and setting forth the dividend received: the permission granted, however, not to affect the question of set-off. or the rights of the trustees or of X. & Co.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,627.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Sale by Mortgagee — Fraudulent Preference — Suit by Assignee.</p> <p>The claimant, who had for several years held a chattel mortgage executed by the bankrupts. took possession under the mortgage upon learning of their insolvency, and, within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. sold the property and became the purchaser at the sale. The assignee in bankruptcy brought suit against him. and recovered judgment. for the value of the property, the jury finding that the claimant was guilty of actual fraud in obtaining and holding the preference. The judgment having been paid, the claimant proved his claim in full. On motion to expunge, held, that claimant could not prove his whole claim, but could prove a moiety thereof.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Reed, 3 Fed. 800; Re Cadwell. 17 Fed. 694.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 7,629»</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Books op Account op Cash Business— Disch auge.</p> <p>1. Where one had carried on a small trade wholly for cash, and had discontinued it for some months before his bankruptcy, and there was nothing in the way of debts, assets, or capital outstanding; held, his failure to keep proper books of that trade would not prevent his discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Ee Broekway. Case No. 1.917. Followed in. Ee Friedberg, Id. 5,11G.]</p> <p>2. The fact that there was nothing connected with his old trade remaining of interest to. his creditors in bankruptcy can be proved by other evidence than that of the books themselves.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,630.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Constitutionality of Bankrupt Amendment — Application for Homestead —Time for Filing Petition.</p> <p>1. Amendment of March 3d, 1S73, to bankrupt act [17 Stat. 577], considered, and held constitutional in cases where petition is filed after passage of act; and in such cases wherein the petition is filed before passage of the amendment to the act, where, after the passage of the amendment to the act. there remains in the hands of the court an unappropriated fund.</p> <p>' [Cited in Re Smith, Case No. 12,980. Overruled in Re Dillard, Id. 3,912. Cited in Re Jordan. Id. 7,515; Darling v. Berry, 13 Fed. 670.]</p> <p>[Cited in Wooster v. Bullock, 52 Vt. 51.]</p> <p>2. The application for the exemption allowed by the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 5171] can only be made by bankrupt previous to obtaining his discharge.</p> <p>[See, contra, In re Deekert, Case No. 3,728.]</p>

This is an action [by Charles H. Keane] upon coupons attached to bonds issued by the city of Fort Scott, dated December 1, 1S70, in payment of a subscription to the stock of the Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company.

<p>Case No. 7,634.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Construction or Vessel — Material Furnished —Waiver or Lien by Giving Credit — Lien for Insurance — Material Used in Two Vessels — Creditor of Builder.</p> <p>1. The lien given to material men, mechanics, and laborers, by chapter 125, § 35, of the Revised Statutes of Maine, for materials furnished and labor performed for and on account of a vessel, is not restricted to mechanics and laborers, but extends to merchants and all persons who render like services.</p> <p>2. It does not cover charges for tools or other articles used by the workmen in doing the work, but only materials which go into the ship and make part of it when finished.</p> <p>[Cited in Woolly v. The Peruvian, Case No. 18,031.]</p> <p>[Cited in Barstow v. Robinson, 2 Allen, 60G.]</p> <p>3. It does not extend to a merchant who procures insurance on a cargo of timber purchased for and used in the construction of the ship, such a person not being in the sense of the law a furnisher of materials.</p> <p>4. A credit given to the builder is not necessarily a waiver of tfie lien, but is only so when it is inconsistent with it.</p> <p>5. If the lien is limited in time, and the credit extends beyond the duration of the lien, it is an absolute waiver; but if the terms of credit may expire before the lien does, then whether the lien is waived or not is a question of intention.</p> <p>6. If the owner is building two vessels at the same time, and materials are furnished generally for both, the material man has a lien on both the vessels, and may enforce it against either of them.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>7. A creditor, who advances money to the builder on a mortgage of the vessel, succeeds to the place of the owner, and takes an interest in the vessel subject to the liens of the material men and mechanics.</p> <p>NOTE. The decree in this case was reversed by the circuit court on appeal [Case No. 7,762], on the ground that the statute, giving a lien where materials are furnished for a vessel, is to be strictly construed, and does not apply, if they are furnished for two vessels together, and it does not appear to which they were appropriated. It was further held, that the purchaser, by afterwards using them in either vessel, made an appropriation, which gave the seller a lien, under the statute, on that vessel. And the case was sent to an assessor to ascertain what part of the materials were used in building the Kear-sarge.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Michigan.] Bill to obtain a conveyance and delivery to the assignee of certain assets of the bankrupt, Henry M. Keefer, alleged to be held by the defendant in fraud of creditors. Answer on oath, replication and process.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

Habeas corpus. The application of Lewis Keeler, representing himself to be the father of George B. Keeler, was presented to the Honorable Benjamin Johnson, district judge at chambers, in vacation, stating that George B. Keeler was his son, and had, without his permission or consent, enlisted as a soldier in the 2d regiment of United States dragoons, and was then in Company A of that regiment, at Fort Washita, in service; and after stating the time and place of enlistment, it…

<p>Case No. 7,638.</p> <p>Involuntary Bankruptcy — Petition op Creditor — Proper Allegations — Amount op Debts in Petition — Number op Creditors Petitioning — Admission op Regularity by Debtor.</p> <p>A single creditor filed a petition July 23, 1874. which contained no allegation that the creditor constitutes one-fourth, at least, in number of the creditors of the debtor, and that the aggregate of his debts provable under the act amounts to at least one-third of the debts so provable. The petition was accompanied by a paper purporting to be signed by the debtor to the effect, “That the debtor admits that the requisite number and amount of his creditors have joined in the petition herein, and consents that proceedings shall be had under said petition as a petition signed by the requisite number and amount of his creditors." There was no authentication of the genuineness of the signature to this paper, nor was it verified by the oath of the signer. Held, that the absence of the allegation as to the number and amount of the creditors in the petition is not supplied by the admission of the debtor now presented. That even after such admission is made in writing the court must be satisfied that the admission was made in good faith. Order to show cause refused.</p> <p>[Cited in Re MeKibben, Case No. S,859; Re Mann, Id. 9,033.]</p>

<p>Iu bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,639.</p> <p>Demurrage— Lay Days — Furnishing Towage-Awaiting Turn in Discharge.</p> <p>1. A vessel was chartered to carry a load of coal from Baltimore to Pawtucket, R. I. The charterers were to pay $3 a ton. “with towage from Providence to Pawtucket.” Held, that the charterers were not bound to furnish the tow-boat, to take the vessel from Providence to Pawtucket, but only to pay for it.</p> <p>[Cited in Barrett v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 22 Fed. 454.]</p> <p>2. Where a charter provided, that a vessel was to have “dispatch in discharging.” held, that she was not obliged to await her turn, in re. speet of any other vessels which the consignees of such cargo were d’seharging, but was entitled to demurrage for delay caused by so waiting.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Henley v. Brooklyn Ice Co., Case No. 6.363. Cited in Sleeper v. Puig, Id. 12.941; Thacher v. Boston Gas-Light Co., Id. 13.850; Moody v. Five Hundred Thousand Laths. 2 Fed. 608; Johanssen v. The Eloiua. 4 Fed. 575: Lindsay v. Cusi-mano, 12 Fed. 507; Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. 470; Smith v. Harrison, 50 Fed. 556.]</p>

[This was an application by Laura Keene for an injunction to restrain the defendants, Wheatley & Clarke, from the public performance and dramatic representation of a play called “Our American Cousin.”]

[This was a libel by Anne Keene against the bark Whistler, etc., for damages to cargo, caused by the alleged negligence of the master.]

<p>Case No. 7,646.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — Services of Stevedore — Liens not Maritime — Costs—Jurisdiction.</p> <p>[1. The services of stevedores in loading or unloading a vessel are not maritime in their nature, and they have no lien therefor enforceable in admiralty.]</p> <p>[2. A lien on a vessel given by state statute for services not maritime in their nature — such as that of stevedores — is not enforceable in admiralty.] t</p> <p>[3. A successful respondent should not be denied costs because libellant has mistakenly sued in admiralty instead of in the state courts in disregard of a long-settled law.]</p>

<p>Case Mo. 7,648.</p> <p>Bankruftct — Composition —Objections—Collusion.</p> <p>1. In composition proceedings, when objections are interposed by the minority, whose claims will be discharged against their will, it is the duty of the court to examine those objections fully and carefully.</p> <p>2. The court will not hesitate to interfere when the debtor has deceived the creditors into a vote which they would not have given had the facts been honestly and fairly before them; nor to withhold its assent to the composition, if it is satisfied that the proceedings are collusive, although there is only one dissenting creditor. But the court must act on evidence, not suspicion.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Keller. Case No. 7,654.]</p> <p>3. Where it appears that the creditor can receive no more than the amount proposed if ordinary administration be had, and there is no adequate proof of collusion, the composition should be confirmed.</p>

[The plaintiff consigned to the defendants [Graff & Co.], who were commission merchants, cheese for sale. The defendants sold the cheese and rendered an account. The plaintiff then drew on them for the amount. The draft was not paid, and was taken up by the plaintiff at the defendants' request, and another draft drawn.

This was an action brought to recover the freight earned by the ship John, from Havana to Philadelphia, upon .sundry goods brought in her, belonging to different merchants. The bills of lading expressed, that the goods were shipped on account and at the risk of the respective owners, and were consigned to them.

2[This was a bill in equity [by Patrick Kelleher and James C. Randlett against Joseph O. Darling] founded upon two patents for improvements in the manufacture of moccasin boot and shoe pacs, and charging infringement of the same upon the respondent. [The original patent, No. 122,030, was granted to Kelleher and Randlett December 19, 1871, and reissued October 27, 1S74, Nos. 6,09S and 6,099.] [As to the fourth claim of the reissue No. 6,098, it is claimed that this is for an…

<p>Case No. 7,654.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition — Meeting op Creditors — Creditors Entitled to Attend — False Statements Made by Debtor — Claims Passed on by Register.</p> <p>1. At a composition meeting only those creditors who prove their claims are competent to engage in or take part in its proceedings.</p> <p>2. At the second meeting in composition either party may furnish competent testimony, oral or written, on the question whether the composition is for the best interest of all concerned.</p> <p>3. It is competent to produce any creditor and prove by him that he has been induced or biased to sign the resolution by any false statement. or by any evil practice of the debtor.</p> <p>4. If a claim is disputed on its merits, the register who presides at a composition meeting may examine and pass upon it subject to review by the court. His power is not limited to the postponement of the claim, as in the case of a general meeting of creditors to elect an as-signee.</p>

Extradition. Hearing before the district, judge upon a complaint charging Peter Kelley with murder committed on board a British vessel on the high seas, and asking for his extradition.

<p>Case No. 7,656.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Member of Insolvent Firm — Petition to Bring Other Members in — Power of Court to Grant Relief.</p> <p>The bankrupt was adjudicated upon creditors’ petition. A petition was subsequently filed by the bankrupt and lus assignee, alleging that at the time of the filing of the creditors’ petition the bankrupt uras a member of a' firm which had debts exceeding three hundred dollars, and that it had assets to be administered, and prayed that the other members might be brought in and the firm adjudicated. Held, that the relief asked was not so obviously beyond the power of the court to grant that the petition should be summarily dismissed.</p>

Bill in equity. The present bill was filed by Morris Kelley, the surviving partner of Osgood Hoyt, against the administrator, widow and heirs of the said Hoyt, certain persons having an interest in… Held: enjoyed and managed as a part of the copartnership stock; that in the year 1S37 a granite stone building was erected by them on the land in Charlestown square out of the copartnership funds, and for copartnership use.

[Action of assumpsit by Ann Kelley against the Home Insurance Company of New York for the nonperformance of an insurance contract. Upon a verdict for plaintiff in the district court, the defendant moved for a new trial.]

<p>Case No. 7,659.</p> <p>Ejectment — Plaintiff’s Title — Plaintiff’s Right to Have Gkantoks made Les-soits in Suit. •</p> <p>In ejectment, in order to make persons lessors in the action, an interest or subsisting title in the premises need not he shown. It is sufficient that the circumstances of the plaintiff’s case require that they should be made lessors.</p>

This was an action on the case, tried before the court without a jury. The court found the following facts: The plaintiffs are merchants, and dealers in wool, at Hartford, Connecticut, and the defendant [George M. Barnard] was a commission merchant, and an importer of and dealer in foreign wool, at Boston, Massachusetts. George W. Bond & Co. were wool brokers at Boston.

In 1S72 the plaintiff [S. J. Kellogg] commenced this suit in the state district court for the county of Otoe. The action was at law, to recover damages for the breach of a contract. An answer was filed, and at the March term, 1872, a trial was had, and verdict rendered for the plaintiff and judgment entered thereon.

This was a libel in personam by James B. Kellogg [against the La Crosse and Minnesota Packet Company] to recover for a cargo of wheat shipped at Winona. Minnesota, by Kellogg & Mann, on board the defendant’s barge Victor, to be forwarded tó La Crosse, in the state of Wisconsin, on the Mississippi river, in good order, unavoidable dangers of the river and fire excepted.

It appears from the pleadings and the undisputed evidence in the cause that the plaintiff [Timothy Kellogg], on the 3d day of October, 1871, was in the possession of a sawmill on the bank of the Mississippi river, situate on certain lots in an addition to the town of McGregor, in Iowa, upon which there was a large quantity of lumber.

[This was a bill in equity by Justin Kellogg, as assignee in bankruptcy of Gates H. Barnard. and Isaac F. Quinby, marshal of the United States for the Northern district of New York, against William Russell and Gates H. Barnard.]

[This was a bill in equity to preserve evidence to enable the complainant to prosecute a suit at law, by William Pitt Kellogg against Henry C. Warmouth and others, alleging the suppression of votes on account of race, color, and previous condition of servitude.]

Hearing upon a bill of review. Hairison Johnson, under the act of September 4, 1841 (5 Stat. 453), pre-empted, and in 1S57 entered, by virtue of that act, the… Held: at which Johnson proposed, in substance, that the creditors should surrender and cancel their claims against him; that they might then bid in, without opposition from him, eighty acres of this land; and that his mother should then be allowed to bid in the other eighty acres without opposition from the creditors.

<p>Case No. 7,669.</p> <p>Practice in Admiralty — Libel to Assert Equitable Title — Part Owner — Libel for an Account.</p> <p>1. The admiralty has not jurisdiction over a libel which asserts an equitable title to one fourth of a vessel, and claims an account of its earnings, and of the proceeds of its sale, although the part owners sailed the vessel, and the libellant worked, as a carpenter, on board.</p> <p>[Cited in The Larch. Case No. 8.085; Hill v. The Golden Gate, Id. 6,491; The Marengo, Id. 9.065; Hill v. The Amelia, Id. 6,487; The Mary Zephyr, 2 Fed. 826; Daily v. Doe, 3 Fed. 922; The C. C. Trowbridge, 14 Fed. 876; Wenberg v. Cargo of Mineral Phosphate, 15 Fed. 288; The Amelia. 23 Fed. 406; The Ella J. Slaymaker. 28 Fed. 768; Paterson v. Dakin, 31 Fed. 683; The Eclipse, 135 U. S. 608, 10 Sup. Ct. 876; The H. E. Willard, 52 Fed. 388, 53 Fed. 600.]</p> <p>[Cited in Swain v. Knapp, 32 Minn. 429, 21 N. W. 414.]</p> <p>2. Extent of the jurisdiction to take an account, examined.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,670.</p> <p>Jurisdiction— Citizenship or Parties — Neither ClTIZEX WHERE SUIT BROUGHT — HOW CITIZENSHIP must Appear.</p> <p>1. This court has no jurisdiction of a suit where one party is a citizen of Georgia and the other party is a citizen of Massachusetts.</p> <p>2. The jurisdiction of this court must appear affirmatively by the record, and the want of jurisdiction need not be pleaded.</p> <p>3. This court has no jurisdiction whatever over controversies between parties, all of whom, plaintiffs as well as defendants, are citizens of states other than that in which the suit is brought.</p>

Exception to the report of referees. The ease was, that Warder, of this city, on the 24th of December, 1807, shipped on board of a vessel belonging to the defendants [Johnson & M’Kean], a quantity of flaxseed, to be carried to the plaintiff in Ireland; and the day after, and before the vessel had broke ground, notice of the embargo was received at Philadelphia.

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] This is a contest between Kelly & Co. and M. H. Phelan, assignee in bankruptcy of the Central Savings Bank, and the substantial question is whether Kelly & Co. are entitled to a banker’s lien on certain bonds and stocks owned by the bankrupt and held by Kelly & Co. at the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Michigan.] [This was a libel in rein to recover the amount alleged to be due the libellant Ann Kelly for supplies furnished the propeller Pittsburgh, the Western Transportation Company, claimants.]

<p>[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Connecticut.]</p> <p>The action there was book debt, brought by Erastus Smith of Hartford, as assignee in bankruptcy of Henry Pomeroy, a voluntary bankrupt, and John H. Preston, who was not a bankrupt when the suit was commenced, against Norman Kelly & Co., manufacturers of printing cloths in Killingly, Conn. The plaintiffs sought to recover $2000 as due from the defendants to Preston and Pomeroy, late partners, at the time Pomeroy's petition in bankruptcy was presented. The action was reumable to the term of the district court held in May, 1843. Both parties having appeared, an auditor was appointed by the court in March, 1845, to adjust the accounts between them. In May, 1S45, the auditor made his report, finding due to the plaintiffs the sum of 81,817 27. The defendants excepted to the report, and in September, 1845, on a hearing of the exceptions, the court made a special finding as to the facts as follows: The defendants put into the hands of Preston & Pomeroy 96 bales of printing cloths under the following circumstances: Preston & Pomeroy were commission merchants in Hartford, and also made sales as such in the city of New-York. In the winter and spring of 1842, Preston & Pomeroy applied to the defendants for their business, and represented to them that they had a large capital and great facilities for disposing of cloths; that they made most of their sales in New-York; that Preston was there every week and made the sales there; and that their terms were five per cent, for commission and guaranty, with other usual charges, they advancing on the goods to nearly their value. The defendants, accordingly, consigned to them 96 bales of printing cloths, and sent them, by their directions, to Buck & Co. of New-York, agents of Preston & Pomeroy to receive and store cloths and deliver them to order when sold. In May, 1842, Preston & romeroy represented to the defendants that they had made arrangements to print a quantity of printing cloths for themselves, and that they would sell better in that form; and, as the sale of the defendants’ cloths in their hands was dull, they proposed and recommended to the defendants to consent that they should print their 96 bales, to which the defendants consented. Thereupon, Preston & Pomeroy, on the Sth of June, 1S42. before any of their acceptances became payable, delivered the 96 bales to D. H. Arnold & Co., of New-York, a commission house, upon an agreement then made between them, that the latter should take the cloths and procure them to be printed a.t three cents a yard, and sell them on commission, when printed, for account of Preston & Pomeroy, who should pay for the printing, and that Arnold & Co. should accept the drafts of Preston & Pomeroy to half the value of the goods. Arnold & Co. had no knowledge that the goods belonged to the defendants. but received them as the goods of Preston & Pomeroy under the above arrangement. Arnold & Co. had in their hands, at the same time, other goods to á considerable amount, actually owned by Preston & Pom-eroy, and the latter drew on Arnold & Co. against all the goods, including the 96 bales, without any discrimination. The amount of the bills drawn was $10,658 32, of which $5,-20S 32 was accepted by Arnold & Co. before the 96 bales were printed, and the residue before they were sold. The contract between Preston & Pomeroy and Arnold & Co. was not communicated to the defendants, and although they knew that the goods were to be placed in the hands of some one besides Preston & Pomeroy to be printed, they did not know where they had been placed till the fall of 1812. after said drafts were all made. They then saw them at the store of Arnold & Co., but the latter did not recognize the defendants as the owners of the goods, and the defendants did not attempt to control them. The defendants had no knowledge till the fall of 1S12, and after their goods were all sold, that drafts had been made against them. The bills for printing them amounted to $2.143 41 and the nett amount of sales was $5.571 97. The auditor allowed 2*4 per cent, commission to Preston & Pomeroy for getting the goods printed, together with the charges of Arnold & Co. The defendants had drawn on Preston & Pomeroy against their goods, and the drafts were accepted. There was a heavy depression on printed goods after these goods were consigned by the defendants to Preston & Pomeroy and before they were sold. The difference in the actual value of the goods, between the time of the first consignment and the time of their actual sale, exceeded $1000. When sold, they were sold at their fair market value. The defendants claimed a credit for the value of the cloths on the Sth of June, 1S42, which was much larger than either the actual sales by Arnold & Co., or the value at the times of such sales. The auditor disallowed this claim, and allowed only the nett sales as made by Arnold & Co. The court, on the foregoing facts, confirmed the report of the auditor, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs for the amount reported. with costs. The defendants then sued out a writ of error.</p> <p>(1) Preston & Pomeroy should have been charged with the value of the 96 bales of goods on the 8th of June, 1842, when they were pledged to Arnold & Co. for the drafts drawn against them. They were then worth much more than they were actually sold for by Arnold & Co. (2) The district court had no jurisdiction of a suit against the defendants in favor of Preston, and Smith as as-signee in bankruptcy of Pomeroy. (3) The district court had no power to appoint an auditor to try the case; it should have been tried by a jury.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,676.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Dower or Wive — When Alpowep.</p> <p>Wife of bankrupt not entitled to claim dower out of lands owned by bankrupt when he filed his petition in bankruptcy — the bankrupt being still alive.</p>

Action on a policy of life insurance issued by the defendant company, a corporation chartered by the state of Virginia, to one Hathaway, a resident of North Carolina. The plaintiff is a resident of North Carolina. The action was brought in the corporation court of Norfolk, and the original process was served in that city, on one Childrey, agent of the company, who resided there, and through whose agency the policy was issued.

<p>[This was an action at law • by John Kelsey against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.]</p>

In the case of Charles Kelsey against Francis L. Dallon, the plaintiff sued defendant in the state courts for rent of premises from May, 18G7, in which the defendant held the appurtenances of a distillery he had seized therein the previous month of April, the ease having expired on the above date, and the marshal holding over in possession of such premises.

<p>[This was a libel in rem by Charles E. Kelsey and another against the schooner William Kallahan for collision.]</p>

In bankruptcy. The petitioners [J. B. ICelty and others], merchants of New York, lent eight thousand dollars to one Blake, and took his note for that sum. and at the same time received from him ■ as collateral security five notes of W. R. Storms & Co., in all amounting to considerably more than eight thousand dollars.

<p>Case No. 7,682.</p> <p>Pleading at Law — Opening or Default — Filing of Plea.</p> <p>The plea to the declaration not having been filed within the rule, a default was entered; and a motion was made by Mr. Powers to open the default and for leave to file a plea.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,683.</p> <p>Bill op Exchange — Acceptance—Evidence— Akkest op Judgment.</p> <p>1. Where an order is drawn on A, in favor of B. If in funds, its acceptance by A, is evidence that he had in his hands funds of the drawer.</p> <p>[Cited in McCormick v. Buckner, Case No. 8,718.]</p> <p>[Cited in Pilkington v. Woods, 10 Ind. 434; Corbett v. Clark, 45 Wis. 411.]</p> <p>2. On such an order B may maintain an action against A, and his admission of funds in his hands by the acceptance, shows a consideration.</p> <p>3. Parol proof is not admissible to show the meaning given by the parties, to certain words in a written instrument, the words being free from ambiguity.</p> <p>[Cited in Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 210.]</p> <p>4. It is too late to offer evidence in chief after the testimony has closed.</p> <p>5. Judgment will not be arrested where no consideration is specially alleged, if the instrument declared on purports a consideration, or shows upon its face that the assumpsit was for a valuable consideration.</p> <p>[Cited in Loeber v. Moore, 20 D. C. 2.]</p>

Action on a promissory note for ?1519, given by the defendant to the plaintiff.

In equity. The bill alleged; (1) That complainant was a citizen of New York, and the Wilmington and Northern Railroad Company was the successor of the Wilmington and Reading Railroad Company, and a corporation of Pennsylvania. That said last mentioned company had duly made, executed, and delivered a certain mortgage or deed of trust to trustees therein named, to secure certain bonds of said company, which were duly issued.

The lessor of the plaintiff, deduced a regular title to the land in question to herself. She was the wife of John T. Kemp, formerly of New York; and it appeared that he and his wife, continued to reside in that province, from a period anterior to 1773, until the evacuation of the city by the British in 1783; when they removed to Great Britain, where the lessor of the plaintiff has always continued to reside.

<p>Case No. 7,688.</p> <p>Lien of Judgment — Effect of on Land — Conveyance. ,</p> <p>1. The lien of a judgment is not a title to the land, against which the statute of limitations can operate. It is a security, and not a claim of title.</p> <p>[Cited in Metz v. State Bank of Brownville, 7 Neb. 171: Bowen v. Billings, 13 Neb. 442. 14 N. W. 152.]</p> <p>2. The conveyance of the land, after the judgment, does not affect the lien.</p>

Bill in equity, by Timothy C. Kendall, of the city of Boston, in the district of Massachusetts, and a citizen of the state of Massachusetts [against S. Almy and others]. The substance of the bill was as follows: On the 3d of March.

<p>Case No. 7,691.</p> <p>Promissory Note — Demand of Patment — Aver-ments.</p> <p>1. In an action against a party primarily liable on a promissory note made payable at a particular place, demand for payment at that place need not be averred.</p> <p>[See Bank of U. S. v. Bussard, Case No. 911.]</p> <p>2. If the maker was ready at the time and place to pay, it is matter of defense.</p> <p>3. A discharge of a defendant, a citizen of this state, from a foreign contract is no bar to an action brought against him upon it.</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by Hugh R. Kendall against Joseph L. Freeman and S. Sibley.]</p>

[Motion for provisional injunction. Suit brought [by John Kendrick against Thomas A. Emmons] upon reissued letters patent [No. 5.282] for “improvement in machines for making weavers’ harnesses,” granted February 11, 1873. The original patent [No. 12.175] was granted to Joseph S. Winsor, January 2, 18S5, and extended seven years from the expiration of the original term.] 2

[These were bills in equity by John Kendrick against Thomas A. Emmons and by the same plaintiff against John F. Nichols for ap injunction and an account.]

[This was a bill in equity by John Kendrick against Thomas A. Emmons for an infringement of certain letters patent. On a motion for an interlocutory decree, an injunction was ordered to issue unless the defendant should render- an account to the court. See Case No. 7,694. An injunction and an accounting were subsequently decreed (Id. 7,695), a reference being made to a master to assess the damages. The case is now heard on exceptions to the master’s report.]

On demurrer to the petition. The petition seeks to recover on a large number of coupons.

By BENJAMIN J. BROWN, Register: In this case some questions arose pertinent to the proceedings which the undersigned certifies for the opinion of the court. The clerk transmitted to me a certified copy of the adjudication of bankruptcy, which, 1 am unofficially advised, has been served upon only one of the bankrupts; the other, a single man, being, at the time, absent from the state.

This was a libel in personam, brought by [James Kennedy and others] the owners of the ship Jeremiah Thompson, to recover the freight money on a considerable quantity of tin plate and iron rods, shipped on board the Thompson at Liverpool, by Phelps, James & Co., and consigned to the respondents [William E. Dodge and others] in New York.

<p>[This was an action by Robert F. Kennedy and others against the First National Bank of Monticello to recover money.]</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by John S. Kennedy and others, trustees, against the city of Indianapolis and others.]</p>

Libel for salvage for rescuing the brigantine from the French captors, November 2S, 1800. Plea denying right to salvage. William Kennedy, the libelant, deposes that he was a mariner on board the brigantine Washington [Ebenezer Ricker, Hiram Rollins, and John Lord, owners.] The brig was taken by a French privateer between St. Vincent and St. Lucia.

This was a motion by complainants [John S. Kennedy & Co.] upon bill and affidavits for the appointment of a receiver. The complainants are holders of certain railroad mortgage bonds, and sue for themselves and all other bondholders who may come in and seek relief by the suit. The defendants are, ‘The St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company,” “The First Division of the St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company” (both corporations under tile laws of Minnesota), George L. Becker, lVm.

The cause is now before the court on the application of the receiver for authority to construct the unfinished portions of the road, and to issue debentures to raise money for that purpose. Shortly, the material facts are these: A suit was originally instituted by and in behalf of mortgage bondholders against the railroad company and others, including the trustees in the mortgage. See Kennedy v. St. Paul & P. R. Co. [Case No. 7,70G].

<p>Case No. 7,709.</p> <p>Vessel — Bill of Sale Intended as a Mortgage —Liability of Grantee — Wages.</p> <p>[A grantee in an absolute bill of sale of a vessel intended as a mortgage is bound by his admission of liability and express promise to pay wages earned during the time he held such title, made after he had taken possession, and while she was under arrest for such wages.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by John W. Kennicott and others against the board of supervisors of Wayne county.] These were exceptions to a master’s report, finding certain claimants to be bona fide holders of bonds issued by the supervisors of Wayne county, Illinois, to the Mount Vernon Railroad Company, which bonds had been contested by the county, and had been declared valid by the United States supreme court.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by John W. Ken-nicott and others against filie board of supervisors of "Wayne county.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,712.</p> <p>Mortgages — Foreclosure by Scire Facias — Defective Acknowledgment.</p> <p>1. Under the statute of Illinois, scire facias does not lie to foreclose a mortgage not duly acknowledged.</p> <p>2. The statute only applies to mortgages “duly executed and recorded.”</p> <p>3. Defects in acknowledgment cannot be cured, and where the requirements of the statute in these respects have not been fulfilled, it cannot be cured by testimony aliunde; nor docs the statute making instruments not acknowledged or proved according to law. notice to subsequent purchasers or creditors, cure the defect. Rev. St. Ill. c. 24, § 28; Gross’ St. 1872, p. 88.</p> <p>[Cited in Hunt v. U. S., 10 C. C. A. 74, 61 Fed. 797.]</p>

[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] The plaintiff in error [Mulford Kenrick] was attached to answer to the United States of America, “in a plea of debt, for that during the continuance of an act of congress of the United States [2 Stat. 453] entitled, ‘An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States,' and of the several acts supplementary thereto, to wit, on the second day of…

<p>[This was an action at law by Elmore A. Kent against the Dawson Bank.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,715.</p> <p>Attachment — Levy by Sheriff outside His County — Adthoritt to Review Decision of State Court — Creditors—Priority.</p> <p>1.In a suit brought by A. an attachment was made of lands lying in Penobscot county; but before execution issued, the portion of this county, containing the said lands, was set off, as Aroostook county. The execution was directed to the sheriff of Penobscot county and was levied by his deputy, who was also a deputy of the sheriff of Aroostook county. In a suit, brought by B. an attachment on the same lands was made subsequent to the attachment by A., but execution was levied under the second suit and attachment before the county was set off. The present is a writ of entry brought by the de-mandant, who claims through A. against the tenant, who claims through B. It was held, that the levy of B. was not to be postponed to that of A.; that the deputy of the sheriff of Penob-scot county had no authority to levy the execution of A. on lands without his county; and that, although the levy was made by a deputy of Aroostook county, yet, since it vas not directed to the proper officer, and not made by the deputy in behalf of such officer, it was utterly void.</p> <p>2. An application was made to the supreme court of Maine to allow the execution to be amended by inserting a direction to the sheriff of Aroostook county, on the ground, that the clerk had accidentally omitted it, which application the court refused to grant: and it was held, that this court had no authority to review or overrule the decision by the state court, it being in respect of a matter solely of. local law.</p> <p>3. At the common law, if a sheriff seize goods on execution, and go out of office before the sale thereof is completed, he may proceed to sell them.</p> <p>[Cited in Hayford v. Everett, 68 Me. 507.]</p> <p>4. It seems, that where an attachment is made by a sheriff, who resigns his office before execution issues, he is not the proper officer to levy it.</p> <p>5. Upon general principles, a sheriff can only levy upon such real estate as is within his county.</p> <p>6. The rule, applicable to a purchaser claiming land, with notice of a prior unrecorded attachment, does not govern the case of two creditors, proceeding bv suit, in invitum, with a knowledge of the attachments of each other. In the latter case, each is entitled to any priority which he can, through his diligence, lawfully obtain over the other.</p>

This was a motion on the part of the li-bellant, Lucius H. Pratt, to vacate an order made by Mr. Justice Nelson, at chambers, on the 26th of August, 1859, discharging stipulators or sureties from imprisonment.

[This was a bill in equity by the Kentucky Improvement Company against Charles W. Slack, collector of internal revenue.] This suit was brought, May 13, 1873, in the state court, after appeal duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue, to recover the amount of an internal revenue tax of seven hundred and fifty dollars, paid to the defendant, as collector of internal revenue for the Third Massachusetts internal revenue district, on the 24th May, 1870.

<p>Case No. 7,719.</p> <p>Parties — Subpoena—Service op — Appearance.</p> <p>1. Persons cannot be made parties to a bill in equity in the United States courts by designating them by a fictitious name in the introductory part of the bill, and in the prayer for process.</p> <p>2. A service of subpoena upon persons so designated is void, and will be set aside.</p> <p>[Cited in Romaine v. Union Ins. Co., 28 Fed. 636.]</p> <p>3. An appearance does not cure such defects in the writ and its service, or make such persons parties on the record.</p> <p>[Cited in Romaine v. Union Ins. Co., 28 Fed. 638.]</p>

The petitioner for habeas corpus in this case was, upon the 21st day of February, 187S, convicted in the circuit court for Coo-wees-coowee district, Cherokee Nation, for the crime of larceny, and upon said conviction he was sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary of the Cherokee Nation, at Tal-lequah. for the period of five years.

In admiralty. The contract of affreightment in this case, was for the transportation of wheat in bulk in the barge Pat Brady, towed by the steamboat Keokuk, from Hastings, Minnesota, to La Crosse on the Mississippi river, to be delivered in good order, “the unavoidable dangers of river and fire only excepted.” It is propounded in the libel, that by reason of the unseaworthiness of the boat and barge, and of the decayed condition of the barge, and its utter insufficiency to…

Keppel was the owner of stock in the Pe-tersburg Railroad Company, to the amount of thirty thousand four hundred dollars, prior to the year 1801. Held: were incapable ot making terms of capitulation, as enemies could have done. Townly’s Case, Post..Crown Law, 7, IS How. State Tr. 34S. What has been held in regard to the capitulation of General Lee’s and General Johnston’s armies in the late Civil War the court knows.

[This was a bill in equity by the Kerosene Lamp Heater Company against Aaron P. Littell for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 7,069, granted to complainant April 18, 1876.]

<p>On motion for a rehearing upon affidavits of newly discovered evidence.</p>

This was a proceeding, on behalf of the as-signee in bankruptcy, against the New York Guaranty and Indemnity Company, to prevent them from enforcing, in the supreme court of the state of New York, a mortgage upon the real estate of the bankrupt. The facts were as follows; The N. Y. Kerosene Oil Company was a manufacturing company existing under the “General Manufacturing Law” of New York.

This was a petition by the New York Guaranty and Indemnity Company, for the review ol‘ an order of the district court, sitting in bankruptcy. The case was this: The Kerosene Oil Company, a corporation, was adjudged a bankrupt on the 10th of June, 1SGS, and Charles Joneswas appointed its assignee.

[This was a bill for foreclosure and for the appointment of a receiver, by Albert Kerp and Chester Warner, trustees, and Jeptha H. Wade, against the Michigan Lake Shore Railroad Company and the Continental Improvement Company.)

W. W. Kerr was a merchant of Jefferson City.- A. Johnson & Co., of St. Louis, obtained a judgment against him on the Sth of August, ltrtiS. Other large claims were held against him in St. Louis, upon which suit was threatened. In his embarrassment, Kerr went to St. Louis and called a meeting of his creditors, including A. Johnson & Co. All attended and heard from him a statement of his condition, financially.

<p>[In the matter of Kerr & Roach, bankrupts.]</p>

Assumpsit for money paid, and money bad and received. Plea, discharge under' tbe bankrupt law [of 1800 (2 Stat. 19)]. Replication, mat tbe money paid for tbe defendant [Robert ■ Hamilton] by tbe plaintiff [Alexander Kerr] was paid by bim to tbe United States in discharge of tbe defendant’s bond given for duties in wbicb the plaintiff was bis surety. General demurrer and joinder.

<p>Case No. 7,732.</p> <p>Carriers of Goods — Liability for Injury' — Condition when Shipped — Effect of Reshipment.</p> <p>1. Where it was shown by the bill of lading and the testimony of the shippers that a cargo of coffee was in good order when it left the port of Boston, and it was proven to be in a damaged state when it reached the consignees in New Orleans, the necessary conclusión must be that the damage was caused while it was on board the ship.</p> <p>2. The coffee having been rggbipped in its damaged state to the owners iifot. Louis and subjected to an examination there, the report of the witnesses who made that examination may be relied on in ascertaining the extent of the damage in the quality of the coffee, when it arrived at its ultimate destination; and it may also serve as a fair criterion in fixing the amount of damage it had sustained when it was received at this port.</p>

This case involved the title to about 196 acres in the South Park of Chicago. It presented several important questions under the execution and homestead statutes of Illinois. Defendant Charles B. Phillips became the owner in fee of this land about the year 1849. All parties claim under him, as a common source of title.

[In equity. Edwin L. Kerrison and Herman Leiding, partners as Kerrison & Leid-ing, made an assignment for the benefit of certain creditors to Charles Kerrison, trustee. Subsequent to the assignment, A. T. Stewart & Co. obtained a judgment in the United States district court against Kerri-son & Leiding, and then brought suit in the state courts to set aside the deed of assignment as fraudulent. In this suit Stewart & Co. were successful.

<p>Case No. 7,735.</p> <p>Pleading in Equity — Demurkek to Bill— Grounds of Demurrer.</p> <p>1. A demurrer, to a bill praying an injunction, must be decided, before a motion for the injunction can be heard.</p> <p>2. A defective allegation of citizenship is a good ground of demurrer.</p> <p>3. The court gave leave to amend the bill, and also time to the defendant to put in a voluntary answer, and file affidavits.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,736.</p> <p>Courts — Grounds of Federal Jurisdiction — Citizens of Same State — Jurisdiction by Consent.</p> <p>1. The court have no jurisdiction of a case where the complainant, and one of the party defendants, reside in the same state.</p> <p>2. In such a case, consent can not give jurisdiction, and a decree so entered, will be set aside on bill of review.</p> <p>[Cited in Brigham v. Luddington, Case No. 1.874; Kelly v. Milan. 21 Fed. SG3.]</p> <p>3.To give jurisdiction, the citizenship of the stockholders of a bank need not be averred, but the place where the bank is located must be stated.</p> <p>[NOTE. The Canal Bank, apon amendment, was made a co-complainant, and a motion was afterwards made to set aside the former stipulation, upon the ground that it was made before the reversal of the decree, when the parties to the record stood in a different relation than they now do after amendment, and because counsel for the Canal Bank was not authorized to make the stipulation. The motion was overruled. See Case No. 4,670.]</p>

Heard on motion for the appointment of a receiver of the property and effects of the defendant railroad company. The facts, so far as necessary to the decision of the motion, were as follows: The Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company was an Alabama corporation, having its principal office at Mobile.

<p>Case No. 7,' 3 ).</p> <p>Tax Bills-Presumption — Constitutional Law —Boakd of Equalization — Powek of Boakd of Equalization— Case in Judgment — Law Governing — Power of Court over Wrong Assessment — Mistake of Pact — Penalties under Act of March 15, 1S75 — Attornet’s Pees under Act of March 29, 1875.</p> <p>1. In a suit to collect taxes, tax bills, purporting to be certified by duly authorized officers, are presumed to be correct, and the burden of proof as to their illegality lies upon those contesting them.</p> <p>2. Under the new constitution of Missouri, the board of equalization created by section 18, art. 10, became at once the only board for those purposes, and was clothed with all the powers of the previous board.</p> <p>3. The board of equalization, under the new constitution, has power to act as an original assessing body.</p> <p>4. Section 11, of article 10, of the new constitution of Missouri, which took effect November 30, 1875, limits the rate of taxation for local purposes to an amount less than that allowed under the previous law. The levies in controversy were not ascertained until the summer of 1S7G, although the date at which the assessments were made relates back to the first of August, 1873. Hold, that the rates prescribed by the new constitution must control.</p> <p>5. Section 12 of the act of March 24, 1873, provides that, for the purpose of levying school taxes in counties on railroad property, the county courts shall ascertain from the returns in the office of the clerk of the county court, the average rate levied' for school purposes by the school boards, and shell charge to the railroad companies taxes at said rates on the proportionate value of their property, certified to the clerk by the state auditor. Section 65 of the act of March 2G, 1S74. requires the district boards to ascertain and report to the county court the amount they will require for school purposes for the ensuing year, and thereupon the county clerk shall assess the amount so returned, on all taxable property in said districts, as shown by the last annual'assessment. The defendants offered to prove, by the records of the county courts, that the rate for school purposes had been ascertained by taking the amount required by each school board, and dividing it by the total property in the district, exclusive of railroad property, as shown by the last assessment, and that in extending this rate upon the taxable property, the valuation of the railroad property within the district was included. Held, inadmissible. A court cannot assume the functions of an assess- or. and reduce the assessable value, nor include omitted property ■which is taxable. It must rely upon the assessment. If it exceeds the legal or constitutional limit, the court must cut it down. The functions of the court are not to value or assess, but simply to decide whether the rate is in excess, and at that point its functions cease.</p> <p>6. In a suit for the recovery of taxes, the court cannot go behind the assessment and valuation made by the board of equalization as to the number of miles of a railroad in a specified county. It cannot equalize and adjust the amount of taxable property in a county, nor correct mistakes of fact made by the board of equalization.</p> <p>7. Receivers appointed by the court being in possession of the defendant road, during vacation, the tax bills in question were presented to them for payment. Doubts existing as to the legality of some of the levies, an arrangement was entered into between the attorneys of the receivers and petitioners, that the advice of the court should be taken upon the question. Held. that the defendant company did not come within the terms of the act of March 15.1S75, which provides a penalty of two and one-half per cen-tum where any railroad shall fail to pay taxes levied upon it, but that the court would award interest at the rate of ten per cent, per annum from the day the taxes became due, in lieu of a penalty.</p> <p>8. Section 4 of the act of March 29, 1875. allows a sum equivalent to five per cent, of the sum recovered, to be sued for as attorneys’ fees “whenever any railroad company shall fail or shall have heretofore failed, within the time prescribed by law, to pay any taxes assessed and levied against it, etc.” Held, that the petitions in. this suit were not suits for the recovery of taxes, within the meaning of said act. Held. further, that the amicable arrangement entered into between the parties to settle the amount of raxes due. by asking the advice of the court, did not come within the act.</p> <p>[NOTE. This case is published in 4 Dill. 41, as a note to Paul v. Pacific R. Co.. Case No. 10.845. Upon the question of the foreclosure of the mortgages of the Pacific Railroad Company, see 3 Fed. 772: 12 Fed. 641: 95 U. S. 1; 101 U. S. 289; 111 U. S. 505, 4 Sup. Ct. 583. For the litigation involving the right of the county of St. Uouis to have the earnings of the railroad applied to payment of interest on certain bonds of the county, see Cases Nos. 7,739, 7,740, and notes.]</p>

Petition by the county of St. Louis to establish a lien or charge on the fund in court. A general demurrer to the petition was submitted.

[This was an intervening petition of St. Louis county in the chancery suit of George E. Ketchum and others against the Pacific Railroad Company. The intervener seeks to establish a charge against the railroad to have the earnings of the same appropriated to the payment of the interest on certain bonds of the county of St. Louis issued under authority of the legislature of Missouri, which bonds were loaned to the railroad company.

<p>Patents — Want of Novelty — Variance between Original Patent and Reissue.</p> <p>The reissued patents, viz: one dated July ^ó, 1S71, number 4,484, granted to W. F. Ketchum, for “improvement in single-wheel grain and grass cutting machines,” and two dated December 12, 1871, numbered respectively 4,672 and 4,673, granted to W. F. Ketchum for “improvements in attachments for harvesters,” held, to be valid.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,742.</p> <p>Practice at Law — Depositions—Incomplete Ans w bus — Gen eral Interrogatory.</p> <p>1. The character of the defendant not being impeached, evidence to support it cannot be admitted.</p> <p>[Cited in Fahey v. Crotty, 03 Mich. 388, 29 N. W. 878.]</p> <p>2. It seems that depositions sworn to, but not signed by the -witness, may be read in evidence.</p> <p>3. Each interrogatory in a commission should be answered separately, at least in substance; and the omission of such answers is fatal to the whole commission; although the witness in answering the general interrogatory, says that he knows nothing further material to either party.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,741a.</p> <p>Salvage — Right to Salvage Compensation.</p> <p>[Towing a raft of timber to a place of safety, and securing it there, so preventing its drifting out to sea, is salvage service.]</p>

■ This was an appeal from the district court. The libel stated, that John Lebering was shipped on board of the Mercury, at Philadelphia, upon a voyage to the river La Plata, and back: that he performed his duty as a mariner on board the said vessel, until she was captured by a British cruiser, when the said Lebering was taken from the said vessel, by the captors, and that the vessel was condemned as prize, by the vice admiralty court at Halifax; which sentence was reversed…

This bill is filed to enjoin the defendants [the Bank of the United States, Richard Smith, and others] from demanding, claiming or recovering from the officers of the government an amount due the complainant [Francis S. Key] for services rendered to the assignor of the defendants in prosecuting a claim before the war department. The substance of the claim will appear in the following power of attorney: “December 12, 1838.

<p>Case No. 7,747.</p> <p>Collision — Rules of Navigation —Hide Watee —Conflict of Testimony.</p> <p>1. During a high stage of water in the Ohio river, a descending boat should keep near the middle of the river without any regard to the channel.</p> <p>2. A descending boat on the Ohio river, two hundred yards from the Indiana shore, has no right to signal by one tap of the bell and attempt to take the starboard side of another boat near that shore.</p> <p>3. The rule requiring the up-stream boat to give the first signal to indicate its choice of sides does not apply when there is eighteen feet of water above the bars.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,749.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Notice op Dissatisfaction— Time within which to File.</p> <p>[A protest within ten days after the collector has liquidated the duties upon goods imported, and an appeal within thirty days thereafter, is valid as to time, although the liquidation is subsequently revised.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,748.</p> <p>Bankruptcy— Pb'Oof op Debt — Attorney por Bankrupt.</p> <p>A proof of debt taken before a notary public who is the attorney and solicitor of record for the bankrupt will not be allowed to be filed.</p>

Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [by the Keystone Bridge Company against the Phoenix Iron Company, Samuel J. Reeves, and George H. Sellers] on two several letters patent, for improvements in iron truss-bridges, one granted to J. H. Lin-ville, assignor to himself and J. L. Piper, January 14, 1862, and the other to the said Linville and Piper, as joint inventors, October 31, 1865.

[This was an action of ejectment for the recovery of a quarter section of land in Mercer county, Ill., brought by George A. Kibbe .against Amos Dunn. William M. O’Hara, the owner of the fee of the tract in controversy, died intestate in 1S21, leaving four .children. Three of them died intestate, and Helen, the surviving daughter, inherited •their respective interests. She intermarried in 1840 with Abram D. Harrel, who died in 1871.

Ejectment [by George A. Kibbe against Alfred Thompson and Joseph H. Dana] for the recovery of the northwest quarter of section II, township 14, north of range 8, east of 3d P. M., situated in Bureau county, in this district. The fact that the mortgaged lands are not specially described in the decree does not affect the jurisdiction, if the lands can be identified by extrinsic evidence. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 15 Ill. 84; Bellingall v. Duncan, 3 Gilman, 477-481.

This was an action on the case, tried by Judge Ingersoll and a jury, to recover damages [from Jasper Spence and others] for the infringement of letters patent [No. 19,-932] for an “improvement in bonnet frames,” granted to plaintiff [Whitten E. Kidd] April 13, 1858.

Heard upon demurrer to the declaration. The plaintiff [William A. Kidwell] being a servant of defendant [the Houston & Great Northern Railway Company] as an assistant yard master, sued for injuries alleged to have been received by him by reason of the neglect of the defendant in keeping in use and running a certain defective car, which he attended to, etc. He admitted that he knew of the defect alleged to exist therein, but averred that before the accident happened the car…

<p>[This was an action by Benjamin Kidd and others against Samuel Swartwout, collector, to recover duties wrongfully exacted.]</p>

Bill in equity to stay a judgment at law [Case No. 9,269] rendered upon an award of arbitrators. An injunction had been granted by one of the judges in vacation; and Mr. Marbury, having given notice to the complainant, now moved to dissolve the injunction, for want of equity in the bill.

The libelants [Kief and Long] were two seamen who served upon the steamboat London; who had been discharged at the port of Detroit. They made application to the clerk of this court as a commissioner, for summons against the master of the vessel to show cause why admiralty process should not issue against the steamboat, under the summary provisions of the 0th section of the act of 1790.

This is a demurrer to the complaint in a suit to recover damages for personal injuries.

Action [by James T. Kielley] against the owner of a mine for injuries sustained in the mine through the negligence of a fellow-workman in setting off a blast without giving sufficient notice to the plaintiff.

<p>Case No. 7,762.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Local Law — Matekials Furnished — Two Vessels.</p> <p>1. The local law of Maine does not give to material men, a hen on one vessel for the price of materials furnished for it and another vessel, though both are of the same size and model.— but only, in such case, for what was used in the vessel proceeded against.</p> <p>[Cited in The Richard Busteed. Case No. 11.-764; The Young Sam, Id. 18,186; The .lames H. Prentice, 30 Fed. 781; The J. R. Rum-bell. 14S U. S. 1, 13 Sup. Ot. 499.]</p> <p>[Cited in Perkins v. Pike, 42 Me. 14S: Briggs v. A Light Boat. 89 Mass. 295; Foster v. The Richard Busteed. 100 Mass. 410; Jones v. Keen, 115 Mass. 181.]</p> <p>2. Privileged liens are matters stricti juris. They cannot be extended argumentatively, from one case or person to another.</p> <p>[Cited in The Larch. Case No. 8.085; The Sam Slick. Id. 12.2S2; Yandewater v. Mills, 19 How. (60 U. S.) 90; Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Proceeds of Sale of Barge Waubaushene. 24 Fed. 559; The Barges 2 and 4. 58 Fed. 426.]</p> <p>[Cited in Rogers v. Currier, 79 Mass. 134.]</p> <p>[3. Cited in The Hiawatha, Case Ño. 6.453, and The Guiding Star. 9 Fed. 524, to the point that the lien of a domestic material man has priority over that of a mortgagee.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,763.</p> <p>Pleading at Law — Suit on Note — Demurrer for Variance — Payable on or Before.</p> <p>The legal effect of a bond or note, payable on or before the day, is different from one payable on the day. In the one ease the obligor has a right to pay before the day. but not-'in the other. And this difference is material, when the instrument is described according to its legal effect.</p>

In equity. Heard on demurrer to the bill. The case was as follow's: The hill was filed by complainant [Charles H. Kilgour], who is a citizen of Ohio, against the New Orleans Gas Light Company, Thomas L. Wibray and John M. Conway, citizens of Louisiana, and Henry X. Attrill, a citizen of New York.

[Appeal from tlie district court of tlie United States for the district of Maine.] Libel in rem [against Obed B. Boyce and others, claimants and appellants] in a cause of collision. Decree in the district court for libellant. Decree affirmed.

<p>Case Wo. 7,767.</p> <p>Arrest of Bankrupt under State Process — Privilege of Witness — Debt Contracted by Fraud.</p> <p>1.Where a suit was commenced against a bankrupt in a state court, the complaint being simply for goods sold and delivered, but, on affidavits showing a fraudulent contracting of the debt, an order of arrest was issued against him, and he was arrested: Held. that the bankrupt was not exempt from such arrest, under the twenty-sixth section of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 529)1. The words “the same,” in that section, refer to the arrest, and not to the action.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Dcvoe.-Case No. 3.843: Re Kim-ball, Id. 7,768; Re Alsberg, Id. 261.]</p> <p>[Cited in Young v. Grau, 14 R. I. 342.]</p> <p>2. But as the bankrupt, when arrested, was on his way to the register's office, for the purpose of being examined, under an order (form No. 45) which had been'served upon him: Held, that that order was substantially a subpoena, and that the bankrupt was entitled to be considered as a witness.</p> <p>3. As such witness, and also as being a party to the bankruptcy proceedings, he was entitled to protection from arrest at the hands of any other tribunal.</p> <p>4. This court, whose process had been interrupted, had power to give him that protection, and he must be discharged from this arrest, on the ground that it was a breach of his privilege; but. as soon as the privilege should cease, he would be liable to be rearrested.</p> <p>[Cited in Ex parte Schulenburg, 25 Fed. 212.)</p>

This was an application to discharge the bankrupt [John H. Kimball] from arrest, lie filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy in this court on the 21st of May, 1868, and was adjudicated a bankrupt on the 261 h of May. tin or about the 5th of June following. he was arrested on an order of arrest. made on that day by the supreme court of New York, in a civil action brought against him in that court, by James Beaty and others.

This was a petition for a review of an order of the district court refusing to discharge the bankrupt [John I-I. Kimball] from arrest, and. also, refusing to discharge the hail given by him thereon. [Case No. 7,768.] He was adjudged a bankrupt on the 26th of May, 186S. The arrest was made on or about the 5th of June thereafter, in an action brought in a state, court, and on an order of arrest founded on an affidavit setting forth that, on the 23d of December, 1867, the…

[In the matter of Kimball, Austin & Co., bankrupts.] Case made by the common law assignee and the assignee in bankruptcy as to the right to possession of assets.

On the 16th day of July, A. D. 1877, the debtor executed and delivered to one Hammond Stoddart a conveyance of all his estate, real and personal, in trust for the equal benefit of liis creditors, under the state assignment act. The said assignee took possession of the property on the same day, and gave notice by publication in tbe newspapers required by tbe third section of the act.

■ Appeal in admiralty from a decree of the district court for the district of Massachusetts. The libellant was the owner of the ship Anna Kimball.

<p>Case No. 7,773.</p> <p>Shipping — Foweks op Master and op Ship’s Husband — Towage Contract.</p> <p>[1. The master of a merchant steamer engaged in the transportation of merchandise has no authority to bind the ship by entering into a contract to tow another vessel on a long ocean voyage, as from Nassau to New York; and for breach of such a contract when made and entered upon, he alone is liable.]</p> <p>[2. A ship’s husband cannot delegate his powers to the master; and if the latter, in his own name, enter into a contract of towage which is beyond his authority, the fact that the ship's husband assumed to authorize him to do so does not validate the contract so as to make it bind the ship.]</p>

In equity. [Bill by Seth N. Kimball and Slaughter against the county of Mobile.] Heard on pleadings and evidence for final decree.

<p>[This was an action at law by Samuel S. Ivimball against Charlotte H. Taylor.]</p>

In the matter of the proceedings of the United States marshal under the search warrant issued upon this petition [by R. M. Kimball], The warrant was issued under the second section of the act of March 2, 1867 [14 Stat 547].

2 [This case, removed into this court from the superior court of Baltimore city, in an action of assumpsit, brought [by Kimberly & Bro.] to recover from the defendant [Benjamin F.] Butler, money illegally exacted by him as rent from the plaintiff, while he was commandant at Fortress Monroe, during the late war. [The defendant pleads: (1) His privilege from arrest as a member of congress under the constitution.

This was a demurrer to a declaration. The declaration averred, that, on the 26th of October, 1863, the defendants [James B. Colgate and Charles B. Hoffman] contracted with the plaintiff [Roily P. S. Kimbro] to sell him gold or silver bullion, and to buy from him gold or silver-bullion; that the contract was, by its terms,- not to be performed till after three days from the making of it; that it was not in writing and not stamped, as required by the internal revenue act of…

<p>[In the matter of David J. King and William King, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,780.</p> <p>Attorney's Fees Allowed Petitioning Creditor.</p> <p>In a case of involuntary bankruptcy, the creditor on whose petition the debtor is adjudged a bankrupt, and who pays his attorney a reasonable fee for prosecuting the proceeding, is entitled to receive the amount so paid out of the assets of the bankrupt before a dividend is made among the creditors. But he is not entitled to such preference for time and money spent in travelling to and from the court, and in attending it during the trial of the case.</p> <p>NOTE. The rule in equity that a solicitor has a lien upon the fund recovered or realized, ■which must be satisfied before distribution among claimants, is well stated in 2 Daniel. Oh. Prac. 1845-1847; Turwin v. Gibson, 3 Atk. 720. Consult, also, Barnesley v. Powell, Amb. 102; Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 275. The reasonable expenses incurred by the petitioning creditor in the prosecution of the petition may be allowed out of the fund. In re Schwab [Case No. 12,-498]. But no allowance can be made to the petitioning creditor for his time and services. In re Mead [Id. 9,364], As to what is an allowance of reasonable counsel fees, is considered in the following eases: In re Williams [Id. 17,-704]; In re Mitteldorfer [Id. 9,675].</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] The bankrupts applied to the district court for a certificate of final discharge, upon the following facts: On August 19th, 1870, a creditor’s petition was filed against said bankrupts as co-partners, on which, August 26th, 1870, an adjudication in bankruptcy was made, upon the ground of suspension of payment of commercial paper, more than fourteen days.

A creditor’s petition in bankruptcy was filed against [Robert G.] King, March 17, 1874. Denial of acts of bankruptcy, and trial to jury May 4, 1874, who returned a special verdict.

<p>Case No. 7,783.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Preference.</p> <p>1. The burden of nroof is on the creditor to show that the creditor procured or suffered his property to be taken on legal process with intent thereby to give a preference.</p> <p>2. The case of Wilson v. City Bank of St. Paul [17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 473], cited and followed.</p> <p>This is an involuntary proceeding for adjudication of bankruptcy, and the single act of bankruptcy alleged in the petition is, that the debtor, Dwight B. King, on the 2d of February, A. D. 1874, being insolvent, and in contemplation of bankruptcy, procured and suffered his property to be taken on legal process, in favor of one Thomas W. Maires, with intent thereby to give a preference to said Maires, and by such disposition. of his property to delay and defeat the operation of the act.</p>

In this case the bankrupt [Brown King] had filed his petition for a discharge and certificate, and the case was referred to Commissioner Cambreleng on the objections filed. A preliminary objection was raised by the counsel for the bankrupt, as to the competency of the opposing party to appear and interpose objections in the character of a creditor, inasmuch as he had not proved any debt.

<p>Case No. 7,785.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Debt Payable in the Future — "Whether will Support a Decree — Bankrupt as a Witness.</p> <p>1. A petitioning creditor’s debt, which is certain and liquidated though payable in future, will support a decree in bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in Linn v. Smith, Case No. 8,375.]</p> <p>2. The bankrupt cannot be examined as a witness, either to support the petition for a decree, or to defeat it.</p>

<p>[Action of ejectment by Maria B. King against Richard Ackerman.]</p>

[This was an action on the case by King and Baker, survivors, etc., against the American Transportation Company. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and interposed four special pleas. Plaintiffs demur to the special pleas.]

This was an action founded on a policy of insurance, dated the 5th of December, 1807, on the freight of the ship Venus, valued at eight thousand dollars, at and from Philadelphia to the Isle of Prance. The policy was in the usual form. The jury, at the last term, found a special verdict as follows: That the plaintiff chartered the ship Venus to L. D. Carpentier, on the 10th of November 1807, as per charter party.

Assumpsit for use and occupation. Mr. Daniel Kurtz, being offered as a witness. upon his solemn affirmation, stated that he agrees in principles with the Society of Quakers; has applied to be admitted as a member of the Society of Friends, who have the matter under consideration; and that he done all in his power to be admitted. objects, that the witness is not within the words of the act of Maryland of 1797 (chapter 118), nor of the bill of rights (section 36).

This was an issue from chancery, to try the complainant’s title to a map of the city of Washington. Mr. Key and Mr. Caldwell, offered to read the bill and answer in evidence to the jury; and stated that in the case of Peter’s will, the libel and answer in the orphans’ court had been read in evidence.

<p>[Bill by Estelle King against Joseph M. French.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,794.</p> <p>Patents — Method of Compressixg and Packing Merchandise.</p> <p>The method of compressing and packing merchandise into convenient packages for sale and transportation, set forth in the complainant’s patent of June 30, 1874, is not patentable.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. An appeal was then taken by the eemplainant to the supreme court, where the decree was affirmed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Woods, who said that all that the patent can cover is simply an article of manufacture resulting from the compression and tying together in one bale of several similar parcels or packages of plasterer’s hair. This does not describe a patentable invention. Moreover, the compression of several packages of the same thing into larger packages or bundles is not new, and has long been commonly practiced. The case of plug tobacco is a familiar instance. 109 U. S. 99, 3 Sup. Ct. 85.]</p>

This is an action on the case, tried by submission before Judge SHERMAN, and brought to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 33,384,] for an improvement in bridges, granted to Zenas King and P. M. Freese, October 1, 1861, assigned to plaintiff, and reissued to him July 30, 1867 [No. 2,707].

In equity. Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent for an “improvement in baling-presses,” granted to Wendell R. Ring, December 4, 1S66, [antedated] August 28, 1866, No. 60,196. The invention consisted in the arrangement, in an apparatus, of two presses, operated alternately by a single screw, so that turning the screw in one direction, to compress the bale in one compartment, retracts the screw and releases the bale in the other.

<p>[This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain the defendant [Lehman H. Maudelbaum] from infringing letters patent [No. 62,492] for “improvement in fluting machine,” granted to George E. King, February 26, 1867, and reissued in two divisions, one numbered 3,000, for “improvement in fluting machine,” and one numbered 3,001, for “improvement in fluted puffing,” both dated June 23, 1868. The machine consisted of two rollers meshing together in certain portions of their periphery, and having curved guides to present the material in a proper manner, and pressing arms which fitted depressions in the rollers. The claim of the original patent and of reissue 3,000 was as follows: “The guide E, constructed with one or more curved or arched portions a', in combination with suitable fluting rollers, substantially as herein set forth, for the purpose specified.” The claim of reissue 3,001 was as follows: “The within described puffing as a new article of manufacture, the same being formed by crinkling, gathering, or irregularly waving one portion of the strip of muslin or other material, simultaneously with fluting it along the edges of such portion as at g, and forming flattened borders or portions h, outside of the flutes, or between two next adjacent rows of them, to receive stitching, substantially as specified.” The defendant was manufacturing fluting under letters patent for “improvement in fluted trimming,” granted to him December 1. 1S6S. In the fluting de‘scribed in this patent, the row or rows of large flutes were bounded on either side by parallel rows of small flutes_having marginal flattened borders. The claim was as follows: “The with n described compovnd fluting m .de of muslin, or other suitable material, and composed of large, regularly formed flutes c c, divided by straight line depressions e e, and bounded on either side by more numerous and smaller flutes b b, having flattened borders a a, exterior to them, substantially as shown and described.”] 2</p> <p>[For drawings of reissued letters patent Nos. 3,000 and 3,001, see Case No. 7,809.]</p>

[This was a suit by John King. Jr., and others against the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company and several other defendants.] The Ohio &… Held: as in the case of Secor v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. [Case No. 12,605], that the decree of the court appointing a receiver of a railroad, and authorizing and requiring him to take possession and to operate the same, was exclusive of all other persons; that it was a matter of public record, of which all persons were to take notice; and…

<p>[Suit brought by William King and others against the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company.]</p> <p>In the matter of the intervening petition of the Cleveland Rolling-Mill Company.</p>

Judgment was confessed, subject to the opinion of the court, whether the defendant, the acceptor of a bill of exchange, is liable to the plaintiffs [King and Jones], the payees and indorsers of the bill, for the damages and costs of suit which were recovered against them by the indorsee?

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was a suit in the admiralty in. per-sonam, with an accompanying foreign attachment. The libel set forth in substance, that the libellants [James G. King and others] were the owners of a certain quantity of gold coin of the value of $10,000.

These were two suits brought against the defendant [C. MeKnight Smith], the collector of customs at Perth Amboy, N. J., to recover duties paid under protest by the plaintiffs [William King and others], upon importations by them from Seville, Spain, of articles known as “cork squares” or “cork quarters.” Under the tariff of 1864 [13 Stat. 202], “cork wood or cork bark, unmanufactured,” was dutiable at thirty per cent, ad valorem, while “cork wood or cork bark, manufactured,”…

The Tuscumb'ia, Courtland and Decatur Railroad Company borrowed in 1833 of the complainants [James King and John Ward] ninety-six thousand dollars, and gave their bonds for the repayment of the same, each in the sum of one thousand dollars, payable in the year 184S, but the interest to be paid semi-annually at the Phoenix Bank in New York.

[This was a bill in equity by George E. King against Robert Werner, praying for an injunction, to restrain the infringement of certain patents.]

On motion for injunction. — This is a bill in •equity filed in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Iowa, asking for an injunction to restrain the collection of a railroad tax on the property of the complainants, situate in Marion township, Linn county, Iowa. The plaintiffs, several in number, .allege that they are, respectively, citizens of Kansas, Indiana, Ohio, and Missouri.

<p>This was a cause in equity which was submitted for final decree on the pleadings and proofs.</p>

In this case a motion was made for a continuance, founded on the affidavit of the Spanish minister, stating as reasons therefor, the following circumstances: First, that Mr. Sarmiento and Mr. Fatio are material witnesses for the plaintiff, without whose testimony, it would be unsafe for the plaintiff to go to trial.

<p>Case No. 7,813.</p> <p>Action by Creditor against Debtor or His Debtor — Whether Maintainable.</p> <p>1. Action for the recovery of the duties, payable to the crown of Spain, upon the importation of merchandize into La Vera Cruz, under royal licenses. There is no principle of law, which will sanction an action by the creditor, against the debtor of his debtor, upon the ground of contract; for there is no privity between them.</p> <p>2. During the reign of Charles IV. of Spain, Hope and Company of Amsterdam negotiated a loan, for. and on his account, for the repayment of which, the revenues of Spain were pledged. Duties, which were payable to the king of Spain, on the export of merchandize to the Spanish possessions in America, came, legally. into the hands of Hope and Company, and were by them applied to the liquidation of the loan. Hcid, that these duties, were a part of the revenues of the crown of Spain, pledged for thd repayment of the loan; and such an appropriation by Hope and Company, was proper.</p> <p>[Cited in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 290, 8 Sup. Ct. 1374.]</p>

Two rules were obtained by the defendant; the one for the plaintiff’s attorney to file his warrant of attorney; and the second, to show cause why the proceedings should not be stayed, the plaintiff not being qualified to sue in this court.

[In the matter of James Kingon, a bankrupt.] By JOHN FITCH, Register: The above entitled cause is now pending before me. That it appears by the schedules annexed to the petition of the above-named petitioner for adjudication of bankruptcy, and the amendments to the same, •that the assets consist of a small Amount of money, a few notes, and a large number of book accounts, amounting in the aggregate -to about seventeen thousand dollars.

<p>Case No. 7,816.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proof of Debt — Preference— Fraud.</p> <p>1. Bankrupts owed about ten thousand dollars on ten promissory notes given to creditor at one transaction, and subsequently became unable to-pay their debts in the ordinary course of business. as men usually do. Creditor having reason to believe this pressed his claim, and (l) re-cen ed an account from debtors against a third party to collect and apply on the indebtedness; (2) gave another party an order on the debtors for money, part of which they paid, to apply on the indebtedness; (3) obtained and received goods from the debtors to be applied in like manner: (3) indorsed the several sums so received, on three of the notes, as of a date different from that on which the indorsement was made and the amounts received, and (5) failed to surrender the property and money so received to the as-signee in bankruptcy. Creditor sought to prove claim in bankruptcy for the balance of the indebtedness. EcW, that proof of debt be disallowed. The creditor received a preference contrary to the provisions of the bankruptcy statute.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Jacobs. Case No. 7,159.]</p> <p>2. An act which the bankruptcy statute declares shall be prima facie evidence of fraud, must be deemed to be contrary to its provisions, unless the presumption is repelled by opposing proofs.</p> <p>[Cited in Walbrun v. Babbitt. 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 577; Martin v. Toof, Case No. 9.167.]</p> <p>3. Where a creditor has before him what the statute declares shall be prima facie evidence of fraud, he must, in law. be deemed to have reasonable cause to believe the existence of such fraud, until the legal presumption is overborne by opposing evidence.</p> <p>4. The said payments not having been applied at the time on any or either of the said ten notes, the creditor cannot avoid the effect of accepting the preference by a subsequent indorsement, on three of the notes. The preference was made on creditor’s debt as an entirety.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Aspinwall, 11 Fed. 138.]</p>

The record in this case was transferred by stipulation of parties from the circuit court of Cook county to this court. The complainant, Jane C. Kingsbury, filed her bill in 186S against the defendants, Henry W. Kings-bury, and Eva Lawrence, his mother, and A. G. Lawrence, the husband of said Eva Lawrence, praying for an assignment of dower in certain real estate situated in Chicago, of which Julius J. B. Kingsbury, husband of said complainant, died seized.

[The questions certified and argued in this c-ase are whether a debt which is barred by the statute of limitations of Massachusetts, where the bankrupt has resided for the last ten years, and where these proceedings are had, but not barred by the statute of limitations of Vermont, where the creditors reside, and where both parties resided when the contracts were made, can be proved against his estate in bankruptcy.] 2

This cause came on upon exceptions to a report, made under a rule of court, referring the cause to three referees, or any two of them.

<p>Case Wo. 7,820.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Further Examination — Departure from District — Refusal of Discharge.</p> <p>Where a bankrupt has been ordered to submit himself to further examination, a departure from the district before the time appointed, without examination, is such a violation of the order that no discharge will be granted until it is rectified by submission to such examination.</p>

The award in this case, having been set aside last term [Case No. 7,821], the cause came on now, to be tried on the general issue. The following short statement, will be sufficient to explain the principal points, which arose in the cause; the particular facts on which these points rested, will be noticed in the charge.

This was an action brought against the defendant, a London merchant, to recover damages for'unfaithful conduct in the sale of a cargo of hides, by the Three Sisters, Ansley, master, carried from the river La Plata to London, in the year 1803.

In bankruptcy. This was an application by Miles Manser, an individual creditor of Joseph D. Kinkead, to be paid a dividend on his claims, amounting to $15,000, out of the assets of the firm of Kinkead & Co. On the 7th of December, 1871, J. V. Harwell & Co., of Chicago, filed their petition in this court, setting forth that they were creditors of Joseph D. Kinkead and A. E. Kinkead, his wife, who were then doing business as co-partners under the firm name of Kinkead & Co., at…

On petition praying that the writ of habeas corpus be addressed to Samuel A. Swann, superintendent of the penitentiary, of Virginia, in whose custody the petitioner [Edmund Kinney] is detained.

In equity. This was a suit [against Allen & Co.] to restrain the infringement of a trademark. The trade-mark consisted of a representation of one-half, and had been duly registered in the patent office of the United States, pursuant to the Revised Statutes. The following is a fac-simile of it as shown by the proofs: The defences relied upon are as follows: (1.) That the symbol is not a trade-mark because it is composed of numerals.

<p>Case No. 7,827.</p> <p>Mixing Laws and Claims — Decree without Al-LEQ1TIONS TO SUPPORT It— MISTAKES FOR AND against Grantor — Unstamped Convetances and Subsequent Stamped Convetances — Unstamped Conveyance Repudiated — Equitt— Conveyance to Defraud Creditors — Equity —Inferential or Argumentative Pleading— Conscious Ignorance — Mistake, When Corrected in Equity — Negligence — Mistake— Laches — Mistake — Statu Quo — Effect of Conveyance, Pendente Lite, without Actual Notice of Prior Unstamped Deeds — Parol Conveyance of a Mining Claim Valid — The Utah Statute of Conveyance — No Mistake.</p> <p>1. Where a mining claim is made and actually possessed and worked for several years, the claim and location being generally recognized as valid by the miners in the vicinity, the title of the claimant is good, even though the location may not have been originally made in strict accordance with the mining rules in force at the time, especially so as between the co-claimants and their grantees.</p> <p>2. Where, in an action under the statute of Nevada, by a portion of the owners in possession of a mining claim against parties out of possession, to determine an adverse claim on a complaint alleging only title and possession in plaintiffs, and the adverse claim of defendants, a decree had been rendered in favor of the complainants; and at a subsequent term of the court, without further intermediate proceedings, a supplemental decree was entered, purporting to be by consent, adjudging the title to the nortn twenty feet to be in two of the plaintiffs, and that the title to the remaining portion of the claim remained in all the plaintiffs, according to their respective rights: Held, that the supplemental decree is void, as a decree of the court, on the grounds: 1. That there are no allegation in the pleadings or record upon which to base it; 2. That it was made after the rights of the parties had been adjudicated, and the ease had been fully ended, and the term of the court thereafter finally adjourned; 3. That a portion of the co-owners were not parties to the proceeding, and their interests could not be affected.</p> <p>3. Such supplemental decree, where treated as valid, and subsequently acquiesced in for several years by the parties interested, may possibly be regarded as written evidence of an agreement to partition upon the terms specified in the decree.</p> <p>4. Kinney, the principal plaintiff in the case, since said decree; and Kinney and the defendants in this case in the transaction now in question, having acted upon the hypothesis that twenty feet were set off to Kinney and Welton in severalty, by said supplemental decree, without any mistake of fact on Kinney’s part, and this being the only hypothesis upon which defendants can obtain all the interest in said mine, which they have purchased from Kinney and his grantees, and paid for, equity requires that the court should act upon the same hypothesis, and there is no such mistake as a court of equity will correct.</p> <p>5. If a party, in making a conveyance of one part of a mining claim, makes a mistake against himself as to the amount conveyed, and in another part of the same conveyance makes a mistake in his favor of a corresponding amount in another portion of the same mine, and the grantee obtains no more in the aggregate than he purchased and paid for. the equities are equal, and a court of equity will not, on the application of the grantor, reform the conveyance by correcting the mistake against him, to the injury of the other party upon the entire transaction.</p> <p>6. Where a party, while the acts of congress requiring conveyances to be stamped are in force, makes a conveyance without affixing a stamp thereto, and the grantee in such unstamped conveyance conveys subsequently by deed, duly stamped and in all respects valid, the grantee under the deed properly stamped takes the title unaffected by the failure to stamp the prior deed.</p> <p>7. Where K. conveyed interests in a mining claim to W. and M., respectively,’ by unstamped conveyances, who afterward conveyed the same to C. by conveyances good in form; and K. afterward conveyed his remaining interest to C., and then filed a bill in equity against C. to correct an alleged mistake in the latter conveyance, on the ground that he conveyed more than was intended; and in order to make out the mistake it is necessary to repudiate his former unstamped conveyances to W. and M., a court of equity will not correct the mistake in order to allow him to avail himself of the advantages to result from repudiating his prior unstamped conveyances. Equity requires that he should make good his prior void conveyances, and he who asks equity must do equity.</p> <p>8. A conveyance given for the purpose of putting property beyond the reach of creditors is fraudulent, and a court of equity will leave the parties where it finds them. It will refuse the fraudulent grantor any relief founded upon the idea that the grantee holds the property thus fraudulently conveyed in trust for his benefit; and no such trust will be recognized in equity for the purpose of working out a mistake,to serve as tile foundation for reforming a subsequent conveyance from the grantor to parties taking through the fraudulent grantee, without notice of the fraud, and holding the property fraudulently conveyed.</p> <p>0. Inferential or argumentative pleading is inadmissible. A fact can only be put in issue by a direct allegation in such form that the other party can take issue directly upon it.</p> <p>10. Where parties deal with each other with the knowledge, and in view of the fact, that something is uncertain as to the amount or condition of the subject-matter of their dealings, and the contract relating thereto is in the form intended, there is no ground for correcting a mistake in a court of equity, if it should finally turn out that one has intervened.</p> <p>11. Relief on the ground of mistake in cases of written instruments will only be granted where there is a plain mistake clearly made out by satisfactory proofs.</p> <p>12. Mistake, to be available in equity, must not have arisen from negligence where the means of knowledge are clearly accessible. The party complaining must have exercised at least the degree of diligence which may be fairly expected from a reasonabJe person.</p> <p>13. Whore a party desires relief in equity on the ground of mistake, he must act promptly on discovery of the mistake, or he will be regarded as waiving the objection, and be bound by the contract to the same extent as if no mistake had occurred. This is specially true in the case of speculative property which is liable to large and constant fluctuations in value.</p> <p>[Cited in Great West. Min. Co. v. Woodmas of Alston Min. Co., 23 Pac. 911.]</p> <p>14. A court of equity is reluctant to grant relief on the ground of mistake, unless the parties can he put in statu quo. If this cannot be done, it will grant such relief oniy where the clearest and strongest equity imperatively demands it.</p> <p>15. K. conveyed portions of a mining claim by unstamped and unrecorded deeds to W., M. and L., who. together with their grantees, by various deeds, conveyed the same to C. K. subsequently conveyed to C. all his interest in the same mining claims by valid deeds duly recorded, and C. went into possession under said several conveyances. K. afterward filed a bill in equity against C. to correct a mistake in his said conveyance to C., and, pendente lite, conveyed all his interest in said mine to one of his counsel of record in the case and another, without actual notice of the said prior unstamped and unrecorded deeds, and said parties were made parties by supplemental bill simply alleging the conveyance pendente lite: Held-. — 1. That C., having a good conveyance upon record from K., of aU his interest in the mine, and being in possession, there was nothing left in K. which he could convey to his said grantees, pendente lite, except such equity as he had as against O. to have his prior conveyance reformed on the ground of mistake; 2. That if K. had no equity to reform his said deed, and K.’s said grantees, pendente lite, took any equities as against K.’s prior grantees under said unstamped and unrecorded deed, then C. having before obtained conveyances from said prior grantees in the unstamped and unrecorded deeds, had -their equities, which were at least equal to the equities of K.’s said grantees pen-dente lite: and O. being in possession his possession is best, and a court of equity will not interfere to disturb it; 3. That by purchasing the subject-matter of the suit, pendente lite, the said grantees of K. took with notice of all the rights of defendants, and subject to any judgment or decree that might be entered in the case; and since no new equities were alleged, but only a transfer of the subject-matter of the action, with a prayer for the same relief, the decree must be the same as it would have been between the original parties; 4. That the actual sole possession of the defendants of the mine at the time of the said conveyance, pendente lite, imparted notice to the purchasers of the title and all equities of defendants: 5. That the purchasers pendente lite, Smith and Bryant, are in no better position than the complainant, their grantor.</p> <p>16. In early days, in Nevada, the actual transfer of the possession of a mining claim with a view of passing the title followed by an actual possession of the transferee, acquiesced in by the party transferring it. was a valid transfer of such claim. Any other ruling would disturb many old and valuable titles on the Comstock lode.</p> <p>17. The Utah statute of conveyance of January 18, 1855, had no application to mining claims.</p> <p>18. There was no mistake in the conveyance in question.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,829.</p> <p>Authority to County to Appropriate Money, Etc. — Means Prescribed Alone to be Followed— Negotiability of County Warrants —Defenses—Right of Action against County for Money Borrowed, though without Authority.</p> <p>1. When the law of the state gives the authorities of a county the power to erect public buildings, and the same law provides the present means of executing that power, such provision is an inhibition against the adoption of any other means than those prescribed by the law.</p> <p>2. When the law of the state provides that the county sujjervisors may erect a court-house, when there is money in the treasury or when they may deem it expedient to levy a tax for such purpose, they are thereby, by implication, inhibited from resorting to any other means to raise money that will work a charge upon the county. They must resort alone to the means prescribed.</p> <p>3. County warrants may be negotiable in the sense of being transferable 'by delivery; but they are neither commercial paper, nor do they possess the attributes of such paper. They are always open to any defense which might have been made against the payee or original holder, no matter at what time purchased, and whether with or without notice.</p> <p>4. Although a county m'ny have no right to borrow money, yet if she does negotiate a loan and thereby obtains money, and tne same is appropriated to her use and benefit, an action for money had and received may be maintained by the lender for the recovery of the money actually borrowed, with legal interest on the same.</p>

This is an action by the plaintiff as a holder of a large number of county warrants issued in the form specified by the statute. Gould’s Dig. p. 923, § 46.

Writ of error to the district court for the Eastern district of Missouri. The plaintiff [William C. Bean] is the assignee in bankruptcy of Charles S. Kinsing, who was a merchant, and the defendants were his bankers. This was an action commenced in the district court under the 35th section of the bankrupt act to recover the amount of a promissory note paid to the defendants by the bankrupts shortly before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy.

<p>[In the matter of Israel Kinsman, a bankrupt].</p>

2[Hearing upon bill and answer; Bill in equity, filed by Elizabeth L. Kintzing, a citizen of New York, against Mahlon Hutchinson. a citizen of the state of New Jersey, and Samuel J. Sharpless.

Petitioning creditors filed their petition to adjudge Kintzing a bankrupt, alleging as acts of bankruptcy, that, being a merchant, he had suspended payment of his commercial paper and had not resumed within fourteen days; that he had made payments to divers creditors with a view to give them a preference, and that he had made a general assignment of all his estate to John W. Pritchard for the benefit of all his creditors under the statute of the state, with a view to avoid…

<p>Case No. 7,835.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Title of Assignee — Fee Subject to Public Easement — Accretions — Easement Abandoned — Right of Purchaser from As- ' SIGNEE.</p> <p>The plaintiff, immediately previous to his bankruptcy in March, 1842, had a fee-simple title in Sand street, subject to the public easement, which street then terminated in Lake Michigan, but more than four hundred and fifty feet of accretion now exists between Sand street and the present lake shore. Held, that the interest of Kinzie at the time of his decree in bankruptcy, in Sand street, was property within the meaning of the bankrupt act of 18-11 [5 Stat. 440], which passed by the decree to the assignee, and by mesne conveyances came from him to the defendant, and that the right of accretion was a vested right inseparably connected with the legal title, and passed with it to the assignee.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. This is a state case, reported in 4 N. B. R. It was taken on appeal to the supreme court of Illinois by the plaintiff, and there affirmed. Mr. Justice Breese delivered the opinion of the court. He says: “It is not denied that the fee in Sand street was in Kinzie at the time of the decree in bankruptcy. That title and ail its incidents passed to the assignee.” The conflict in evidénce between the plaintiff and defendant as to whether the accretions began at or before 1842 he does not consider material, and says: “But it matters not when these accretions commenced. The fee in the street passing to the assignee became the fee of the purchaser, and. as Sand street, whether dedicated or not. was vacated in 1869, the use and enjoyment of the fee with all its incidents — of which accretion was one — became the absolute and unqualified property of the purchaser. If Kinzie had n.ot become bankrupt, and assigned his estate in this land, it would have been in him. there is no question. The theory of all bankrupt laws is to place the assignee in the same position the bankrupt occupied, or might occupy, in regard to his estate.” 56 Ill. 56.]</p>

“It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between William Jennison, attorney for John N. McDonald, survivor, etc., and Cleveland Hunt, attorney for William F. Linn, assignee of said Joseph S. Kipp, that the following facts are admitted to be true in this cause: That said Joseph S. Kipp was, on or before the 4th day of May.

2 [This was a bill in equity filed [by William A. Kirby and David M. Osborne] to restrain the defendants [Alonzo G. Beardsley and others] from infringing letters patent [No. 26,114], for “improvements in combined harvesting machines,” granted to William A. Kirby, November 15, 1859, assigned to complainants and reissued to them, July 9, 1861 [No. 1,211], [The specification annexed to the original patent, after referring to the different parts of the drawings, says: “My…

[Suit brought on letters patent [No. 8,720] for “improvement in grain harvesters,” granted to Byron Densmore, February 10, 1852, assigned to D. M. Osborne and William A. Kirby, and reissued to them January 28, 1862, as No. 1,262, and extended for seven years from February 10, 1866. [The main question in the present case related to the interpretation to be given to the first claim of the reissued patent.

<p>Error to Hempstead circuit court.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] The bankrupt, a retail druggist, made a chattel moitgage upon his stock of drugs and the fixtures in the store to secure the purchase money of the establishment. It was duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded. The grantor remained in possession, making sales from the stock in trade in the usual manner by retail.

[This was an action by Jonathan Kirk-bride to enforce the payment of certain interest coupons on bonds, issued by the county of Lafayette.]

<p>Case No. 7,841.</p> <p>Deeds — Warrantt—Covenants of Seizin— Usage.</p> <p>1. In a deed of general warranty it is not necessary to use the word “warrant,” if other words of equal import shall be used.</p> <p>2. Under a covenant to convey a certain tract by “a good general warranty deed, with the fee simple annexed,” a covenant of seisen is not essential.</p> <p>[Cited in Scott v. Twiss. 4 Neb. 138.]</p> <p>3. Usage, as to the forms of deeds, cannot be disregarded.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,842.</p> <p>Shipping — Liens pok Repairs — Remedial Statutes —Rules in Admiralty.</p> <p>1. Ship carpenters have a lien for repairs made to a domestic vessel which may be enforced by a proceeding in rem.</p> <p>[Cited in Rodd v. Hcartt, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 591.]</p> <p>2. The “rules of practice,” of the supreme court in admiralty proceedings, are merely intended to regulate the remedy, and have no relation to the question of jurisdiction.</p> <p>3. The amendment to the 12th rule, providing that material-men furnishing supplies or repairs may proceed against the ship and freight in rem, is applicable to all suits instituted since May, 1872, for supplies or repairs, no matter whether they were furnished before or since the adoption of the amendment.</p> <p>4. Remedial statutes which do not impair contracts nor disturb absolute vested rights, may be retroactive in their effect without being'unconstitutional.</p>

.[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] On the 7th day of September, 1872, D. J. Foley.

At various times during the year 1872 William Bayne & Co. purchased sugar in bond from the bankrupts, amounting in the aggregate to one hundred and eighty hogsheads. duty free. In payment for this they gave notes to the bankrupts to the amount of fifty thousand dollars, which were indorsed by the bankrupts and passed for value to bona fide holders. The bankrupts paid duty on the sugar from time to time until their failure, when a balance still remained unpaid.

<p>Case No. 7,845.</p> <p>Bills of Lading — “Pekil of the Sea” — Damage by Bats — Liability of Caiiuieks.</p> <p>[1. Damage by rats is not a “peril of seas and navigation” within the clause of a bill of lading exempting the carrier from liability for such perils.]</p> <p>[Cited in The Isabella, Case No. 7,009; The Carlotta, Id. 2.413.]</p> <p>[2. In a voyage from a port known by the master to be iniested with rats, the keeping of cats on board is not a sufficient exercise of diligence to excuse the carrier from liability for damage from that cause.]</p>

Sur libel and answer. The libel set forth that the libellants [Kirkpatrick, Kinsey & Co.], being desirous of shipping sixty-two rolls of leather to consignees in Liverpool, on the 30th June, 1875, delivered to respondents at their wharf, in Philadelphia, the said goods, and requested them to forward the same by the steamship Indiana, a vessel of respondents’ line, then freighting for a voyage from Philadelphia to Liverpool, and advertised to sail July 1, 1875.

<p>[This was a suit by James M. Kirkpatrick against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,848.</p> <p>Administrators — Refunding Bonds— Re-enactment of English Statutes — Effect of.</p> <p>1. The amount of the security which the act of assembly of Virginia, adopting the provision of the 28 and 29, c. 2. authorizes an administrator to take, before he makes distribution of his intestate’s estate, conditioned "to refund due proportions of any debts or demands, which may afterwards appear against the intestate, and the costs attending the recovery of such debts.” is within the sound discretion of the court, and need not cover the. whole amount distributed. This discretion extends, it seems, to executors, though not specially named in the act.</p> <p>2. Where a British statute is re-enacted in this country, it is reasonable to suppose that the legislature designed to adopt, as well the settled construction which had been given to the act by the British courts, as the act itself.</p> <p>[Cited in The Devonshire. 13 Fed. 43.]</p> <p>[Cited in Com. v. Hartnett. 3 Gray. 451.] NOTE. From the following extract from the decree, which was rendered in this cause, it would seem, that in the exercise of its sound discretion, the court may dispense entirely with refunding bonds from the legatees, in all cases in which the circumstances of the case would justify such an exercise of power. “And the court doth further order and decree that the defendant Spence,” (the surviving executor of John Gibson) "do pay and distribute the proceeds of the certificates for $4300, United States six per cent, stock, yet undisposed of, to and among the several plaintiffs, according to their respective rights, without their giving bond, with sureties, to refund the same, as insisted on for the defendant Spence.” It is no longer material to inquire. whether the section of our law, quoted by the chief justice, applied by fair construction to executors as well as administrators, for by a late act, the right to require refunding bonds of distributees. &c. is given expressly to the “executor or executrix, administrator or administratrix, or other person to whom any estate shall have been committed for administration.” Sess. Acts 1S22-23, p. 39, e. 37, § 2.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,850.</p> <p>EQUITY Pl.EADING — Px-EA TO JURISDICTION.</p> <p>1. Bill in equity by A. a citizen of New Jersey. against B, and the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, an incorporated body. Plea to the jurisdiction “that four of the corporators, naming them, were citizens of New Jersey.” The plea was sustained; the corporators being real defendants, by their corporate name, and represented by their officers.</p> <p>[Cited in Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 16 How. (57 U. S.) 349, 350.]</p> <p>[Cited in Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 206; Childs v. Bank of Missouri, 17 Mo. 214.]</p> <p>2. A plea to a bill in equity may be good in part, and not so in the whole; and the court will allow it as to so much of the bill as it is properly applicable to, unless it has the vice of duplicity in it.</p> <p>[Cited in Wythe v. Palmer. Case No. 18,120; Hardon v. Newton, Id. 6,054.]</p> <p>[Cited in Bell v. Woodward, 42 N. H. 193.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] This was a petition by Frederick Butter-field, for the review and reversal of an order directing the assignee to sell certain real estate, which the petitioner claimed to own, subject to the right of the bankrupt [Frederick S. Kirtland] to redeem the same by the payment of certain moneys due to the petitioner.

This was a case [by John P. Kissinger], brought in the state court, the defendants [Irving M. Bean and another], being collector and deputy collector of internal revenue for the district, and removed to the U. S. circuit court, where a motion was made on the part of the government to dissolve an injunction granted in the cause by the state court.

<p>Case No. 7,852.</p>

This case came before the court upon a rule to show cause, why the judgment against Sullivan should not be set aside. In the year 1800, an amicable action of account render, was entered in this court by the plaintiff against the defendants. The agreement on the part of the defendants was signed by Strawbridge, and a judgment quod computet was entered on the 21st of October, in the same year.

<p>Case No. 7,855.</p> <p>Execution — Commission on Monet Collected— Bt Whom Paid.</p> <p>1. Under the laws of North Carolina, where money collected on execution is directed by the state law to be paid by the sheriff to the clerk, the clerk receives it as agent .of the law, and not as agent of either party to the suit, unless made so by express agreement, or by acts from which such agreement may be fairly implied, and therefore, the clerk’s commissions on the money so received are part of the costs of a suit, to be paid by the defendant, for which execution may issue.</p> <p>[Cited in Blake v. Hawkins, 19' Fed. 205; Fagan v. Cullen, 28 Fed. 844.]</p> <p>2. The same is true as to the commissions of the sheriff, and (under section 829. Rev. St.) it is true also as to clerks' and marshals’ commissions in the federal courts.</p> <p>[Cited in The Vernon, 36 Fed. 114; The Ser-apis, 37 Fed. 443.]</p>

[This was a bill by Samuel P. Kittle and Frederick C. Payne against Richard W. Frost, James Black, and George Snyder.] [Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon, letters patent [No. 44,960] for an improvement in “spring mattresses,” granted to Samuel P. Kittle. November S, 1SG4, and reissued October 17, 1865 [No. 2,-092], [The above engraving illustrates the invention, the bed being shown both as extended and folded.

This was an action [against Joseph H. Merriam,] on the case for the infringement of letters patent [Xo. 9.705,] granted to the plaintiff on the 7th day of June. 1853, for an “improved door-fastening.’’ The specification was as follows: “To all Whom it may Concern: Be it known that I, Samuel P. Kittle, of Buffalo, in the county of Erie, and state ,of Xew York, have invented a new and improved mode of fastening or locking doors, so that they cannot be opened or unlocked from…

Bill in equity. The bill In substance stated as follows: That on or about the 22nd day of December, A. D. 1835, one James H. Bingham procured a loan from the Claremont Bank, for the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars, and for the security thereof • signed a note with the said Bingham for the said sum, made payable to the president, directors and company of the Claremont Bank, on demand.

This was a bill in chancery, alleging, among other things, that the plaintiff [Thomas B. Kittredge] had become surety in a promissory note to said bank, on the 12th of December, 1S37, for one James H. Bing-ham, In the sum of $1,250. It was averred, that Bingham was indebted to the bank, August 12th, 1837, in the sum of $13,563, to secure which he then assigned to the bank Samuel Partridge’s note of $10,784, and Asa Wentworth’s note of $5,000.

<p>[In the matter of Henry Kitzinger anil Moritz Kitzinger, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>[In the matter of Henry ICitzinger and Moritz ICitzinger, bankrupts.]</p>

[In the matter of Henry Kitzinger and others, bankrupts. The cause first came before the court upon a motion to expunge a proof of debt against The said estate. The motion was denied. Case No. 7.SG1. An order was also made allowing the claimant, Goldman, interest upon his dividend. Case No. 7.SG2.]

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[This was an action at law by Emma Klaiber against the Illinois Benevolent Masonic Society to recover upon a policy of insurance issued upon the life of plaintiff’s husband.)

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Missouri.</p> <p>[In the matter of Edward Klein, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,866.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Bankrupt Acts — Ex Post . Facto Laws.</p> <p>The act of congress [5 Stat. 440], so far as it undertakes to discharge a debtor from debts contracted before the passage of the act. without payment, and to discharge his future acquisitions of property from liability to those debts, without the consent of a given majority of his creditors, is unconstitutional.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Re Reiman, Case No. 11,673; Re California Pac. R. Co., Id. 2,815.]</p>

This was a suit [by John C. Klein against Kloman Park and others] for the infringement of reissued letters patent No. 6,951, granted to complainant February 29th, 1S76. [The original letters patent, No. 146,597, were granted to the complainant January 20,1874.] The claims were for “(1) The within-described method of forming the eye of picks, consisting in first punching the bar; second, in setting down the metal on either end around the eye; and, lastly, drawing down on a…

The material facts in this case were as follows: Catara was owner of the Greek ship Jerusalem, which arrived at New York with a cargo of wine. On the 16th of May, 1813, a charter party was entered into between the plaintiff, and the master of the ship on behalf of Catara, whereby the whole tonnage of the hold and between decks of the ship was let to the plaintiff from the port of Havana to New York, or, in case of a blockade of that port, to Fairfield in Connecticut.

<p>Case No. 7,870.</p> <p>Partnership Propertt and Debts — Real Estate Held bt Partners — How Held for Payment op Debts — Effect of Death of One Partner —Power of Surviving Partner.</p> <p>1. Real estate held by partners, either as capital stock for partnership purposes, or as purchased with partnership means, is for the purpose of paying the debts due by the partnership, or the balance due its members, considered as personal assets of the partnership; the legal title being vested in the partners as tenants in common. in trust for the creditors and members of the firm. Upon the death of one of the members, the title so vested in him descends to his heirs or devisees subject to the same trust.</p> <p>■ 2. The surviving partner has the right to control and manage the estate for the purpose of satisfying the trusts which rest upon it. and he may to this end rent it, receive the rents, sell it and receive the purchase money, and convey to the purchaser not only the legal and equitable title in himself, but the equitable title which he holds as such surviving partner, and if the sale be bona fide the court will compel the party holding the legal title under the deceased partner to convey such legal title to the holder of the equitable title, and thereby make the title complete.</p> <p>[NOTE. This decree, on defendant’s appeal, was affirmed by the supreme court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Miller. 104 U. S. 18. It was held that the right of the surviving partner and the creditors was an equitable right, accompanied by an equitable title. “It is an interest in the property which courts of chancery will recognize and support.” The court will, when necessary, “see that the real estate so situated is appropriated to the satisfaction of the partnership debts, but that for that purpose, and to that extent, it shall be treated as personal property of the partnership, and, like other personal property, pass under the control of the surviving partner.” This is the doctrine of the English court of chancery, and the American courts preponderate upon that side. The Mississippi cases disclose nothing in contravention of this doctrine.]</p>

This case was a libel filed by the owners of the schooner Henry Ransom to recover the damages occasioned to her by a collision with the steamer on June 2, 1860. The libelant alleged that the schooner was bound from Elizabethport, New Jersey, to Pawtucket, Rhode Island, with a cargo of coal.

<p>Case No. 7,872.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Forfeiture—Entet in Log Book.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel arrives at the last port of delivery and is moored at the wharf, if a seaman leaves her before the discharge of the cargo, a deduction from his wages is allowed, but not a forfeiture of the -whole.</p> <p>2. To subject a seaman to the forfeiture of his wages according to the provisions of the act of 20th July, 1790 [1 Stat. 131], the entry in the log book is indispensable, although the absence was permanent, and although it occurred after the vessel arrived at the last port of delivery.</p> <p>[Cited in The John Martin. Case No. 7,357; The Lilian M. Virgus, Id. 8,346.]</p>

The plaintiff [J. P. Knaresborough] sues for injuries received while in defendant’s employment. The injuries were caused by a defective floor or platform upon which he was at work, and it is alleged in the complaint that the defendant provided this insecure and defective platform negligently. There is no allegation in’the complaint that the plaintiff did not know, or that the defendant did know, that the floor was defective and insecure.

The mate [Reuben Knap], with two hands, were sent from the ship on a special mission, in the boat. The mate detached one of the hands from the boat lying at the quay, on the business of the ship. He, the mate, and the other seaman, ought to have taken care and charge of the boat: but he first, and then the seaman, left the boat, on their own affairs. The boat was stolen.

<p>Case No. 7,875.</p> <p>Patents — Violation—General Issue — Mistake in Specification — Copper-Plate Printing on Bank Notes.</p> <p>1. Quaere. If printing on the back of bank notes with steel plates, is an infringement of a patent for copper-plate printing on the bank notes.</p> <p>[Cited in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. (52 U. S.) 271; Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 486.]</p> <p>2. In actions for violating a patent right, the defendant on the general issue, without notice, may give in evidence the act of congress without pleading it; also alienage, and a license to use the machine may be so given in evidence.</p> <p>, s, 3. Copper-plate printing on the back of bank notes, is an art for which a patent may issue.</p> <p>[Cited in O’Reilly v. Morse. 15 How. (56 U. S.) 131.]</p> <p>4. Under the general issue, without notice, the defendant cannot give in evidence any matters mentioned in the sixth section of the act of congress [1 Stat. 111].</p> <p>5. The meaning of the term “useful” in the act of congress.</p> <p>[Cited in Whitney v. Emmett. Case No. 17,-5S5; Smith v. Downing. Id. 13,036; Andrews v. Wright, Id. 382.]</p> <p>[Cited in Fowler v. Swift, 3 Ind. 190; Dunbar v. Marden. 13 N. H. 318; Rowe v. Blanchard. 18 Wis. 442; Tod v. Wick. 36 Ohio St. 393. Cited in brief in Dickinson v. Hall. 14 Pick. 219; Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 62.]</p> <p>6. On the general issue without notice, the defendant may object to the plaintiff’s recovery, on the ground that there is no specification, or that it is unintelligible; that the patent is broader than the discovery; that it is for an improvement which is not distinguished from the original invention; and that the suggestions of the petition are not recited in the specification.</p> <p>[Cited in Whitney v. Emmett. Case No. 17,585; Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 484.]</p> <p>7. A mistake in an expression, proved to be so by other parts of the specification, will not vitiate the patent.</p> <p>8. It is unnecessary to describe in the specification what is in common use, and well known.</p> <p>9. Merely describing in the specification the parts of the rolling press, and the modus oper-uudi, do not make them parts of the thing granted.</p>

[This was an action for infringement of a patent. There was a verdict in favor of plaintiff for three cents damages. Case No. 7,875.] The plaintiff obtained a rule upon the defendants to show cause why the costs in this suit should not be trebled.

Libellant shipped on respondent’s steamship Pennsylvania, at Philadelphia, June 25, and signed articles as “second pantryman,” at 823 per month. When four or five days out at sea, the chief steward put him in the place of the “second baker,” who had proved incompetent, saying that the second baker had been disrated $10 per month, which would be added to his (libellant’s) wages. The wages of second baker were $30 per month.

<p>In error to district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois.</p> <p>' In bankruptcy.</p>

Peter Knight, bankrupt to be paid from the individual assets of the bankrupt, in preference to the creditors of the firm, there being no firm assets. The bankrupt, Knight, and one Hilke, were engaged in business in March, 1869, at Water-town, Wisconsin, as partners, and filed their petition in bankruptcy. Their assets were about $8,000 and their debts about $9,000. In May, 1869, Knight effected a compromise with the creditors of the firm at fifty cents on a' dollar.

This was a libel for bottomry. The libel was filed on the 30th April, 183S, and was, in effect, as follows: That the Commonwealth Insurance Company, chartered by the legislature of Massachusetts, on the 21st December, 1836, loaned and advanced to Fessenden, Thompson and Company, two' thousand dollars, on bottomry, on the body, tackle, and furniture of one-third of the brig Attila, of Boston; the said Fessenden, Thompson and Company being sole owners of said one-third part,…

<p>Case No. 7,883.</p> <p>Patents — Pbima Facie Right or Patentee — Useful — Op Value —Corrected Patent — Reissue.</p> <p>1. A patent is prima facie evidence that the pat-entee is the inventor of the improvement described, and casts on persons infringing -it, the burden of proving that such improvement was not the invention of the patentee, or that it was in public use before he applied for a patent.</p> <p>[Cited in Milligan & Higgins Glue Co. v. Upton, Case No. 9,607; Alcott v. Young, Id. 149.]</p> <p>2. The patentee cannot recover damages for the infringement of his patent, unless the jury find his improvement to be useful, and of some value.</p> <p>3. The original patent may be surrendered, and a corrected one taken out, for the purpose of giving a more perfect description of the invention intended to be claimed in the original patent, or for the purpose of narrowing the claim, so as to leave out parts of the machinery claimed as new in the first patent, and afterwards found to be the invention of others: provided, the error arose from inadvertence or mistake, and was attempted to be corrected within a reasonable time after its discovery.</p> <p>4. The improvement intended to be described in the re-issued patent must, in principle and mode of operation, be substantially the same with the one intended to be described in the original patent.</p> <p>[Cited in Giant Powder Co. v. California Powder Works. Case No. 5,379; Kane v. Huggins Cracker & Candy Co., 44 Fed. 290.]</p> <p>■ 5. It is not necessary to include, in the re-issued patent, all of the improvements claimed by the patentee, and to which he may have been actually entitled under the original patent.</p> <p>[Cited in McWilliams Manuf’g Co. v. Blundell, 11 Fed. 420.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.]</p> <p>In bankruptcy.</p>

Between forty and fifty witnesses were examined. After the evidence was closed, the plaintiff contended that the specification showed that his patent was for a machine to finish paper by repeated contact of heated metallic cylinders, acting with graduated temperature and pressure, on the naked sheet, while damp, in successive stages of the drying process, with an intermediate adaptation of former modes of alternately shifting the side next to the drying surface of the…

[Amasa] Mantón became the proprietor and holder of eighty shares of the capital stock of the Old National Bank [of Providence] In the place of eighty shares of stock previously held by him in the state bank of that name, and continued to be such proprietor and holder from the organization of the bank as an association for banking, under the acts of congress, until he transferred the same to the plaintiffs [Benjamin B. Knight and Albert S. Gallup] as his assignees.

This was a suit in personam, in admiralty. The libellant was a fisherman on board the schooner Avon, of Gloucester, of which the respondent was skipper and part owner. The Avon was enrolled and licensed for the mackerel fishery, and was engaged in mackerel fishing in the Gulf of St Lawrence.

[This was a libel by Amos Knight against Isaac. Stone and trustee to recover damages for goods lost by a collision between the schooner Lydia .and the brigantine Sewell.]

This was a motion by the defendant in this suit to set aside an execution Issued upon a judgment rendered in the suit The suit was brought [by Michael Knoedler] to recover back an excess of duties illegally exacted by the defendant [Augustus Schell], as collector of the port of New York, on the importation of merchandise, and paid under protest. [Case No. 7,890.]

<p>Case No. 7,891.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Appearance op Creditors — Power op Attornet — Evidence.</p> <p>Where an attorney claimed to act for a firm at the first meeting of the creditors of a bankrupt, under a letter of attorney executed for the firm, all the members of which were in Europe, by one K. as’attorney for the firm, but K.’s at-torneyship was not proved by the oath of any witness, nor was any power of attorney to him produced, but he had verified the proof of debt, swearing that he was duly authorized to make the affidavit: Held, that the authority of K. to give the letter of attorney was not sufficiently established to entitle the attorney to appear for the firm under the twenty-third section of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 528)].</p>

These actions were brought to recover the difference between S per cent, and 15 per cent., exacted of the plaintiff [Michael Knoedler] as duties on colored engravings. The tariff act of 1846 [9 Stát. 42] levied a duty of 10 per cent, on “engravings or plates bound or unbound.” The act of 1857 [11 Stat. 192] levied a duty of 8 per cent.

In this case, at an adjourned meeting of the creditors, held August 7th, 1867, Mr. G. A. Seixas, of counsel for Gourd, Freres & Co., creditors, produced a letter of attorney in due form, authorizing him to appear at the meeting and vote on their behalf, in the choice of assignee. This letter was executed by August Loeffler, as attorney in fact, for Gourd, Freres & Co., under a power of attorney executed by them to Loeffler, dated May 17th. 1864.

This cause was heard upon the motion of defendant to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

In the matter of Knott, Roney, and Dibest, sur individual estate of S. C. Roney. Petition of assignees for leave to sell undivided interest in lands at private sale.

<p>Case No. 7,896.</p> <p>Corporations — Powers — Imposing Taxes — Sale for Taxes — Ultra Vires.</p> <p>1. A corporation in the exercise of its powers, is limited to those which are especially conferred on it.</p> <p>[Cited in Mott v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 20; Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Inst, for Savings, 68 Me. 45.]</p> <p>2. A power to impose a tax for certain objects, and to meet “all other necessary expenses of the company,” does not authorize the corporation to levy a tax, to pay a tax to the state.</p> <p>3. The expenses contemplated in the act, are those incurred by the corporation in the exercise of its granted powers.</p> <p>[NOTE. This case was affirmed by the supreme court in error, Mr. Justice McLean delivering the opinion. Upon the first question involved, — the authority of the directors to assess-the tax, — says the learned justice: “The exercise of the corporate franchise, being restrictive of individual rights, cannot be extended beyond the letter and spirit of the act of incorporation. * * * As the power to tax for the purpose of paying a tax to the state is not found among the enumerated powers of the directors, it must be derived, if it exist, under the words, ‘all other necessary expenses of said company;’ or under the tenth section, which provides that ‘the directors shall have power to do whatever to them shall appear neeessarj’ and proper to be done for the well ordering and interest of the proprietors, not contrary to the laws of the state.’ * * * Was the tax imposed a ‘necessary expense of said company.’ within the meaning of the act?” The learned justice here shows that under the state laws ample provision is made for the collection of state taxes, and á lien reserved upon the land for nonpayment. Continuing, he says: “It appears, therefore, that it is not the intention of the legislature to look to the corporation for-the payment of the tax assessed under the law, but to the land, as in all other cases;’’ and further he continues: “The power to impose a tax on real estate. and to sell it where there is failure to pay the tax, is a high prerogative, and should never be exercised where the right is doubtful.” In summing up, says the learned justice: “A tax to the state is not a necessary expense of the company within the meaning of the act,” and “the provision that the ‘directors shall have power to do whatever shall appear to them to be necessary and proper’ was not intended to give unlimited power, but the exercise of'a discretion within the scope of the authority conferred.” Upon the second proposition. — the question of the minor proprietors, — the learned justice does not deliver any opinion; the affirmation of the lower court upon the first proposition rendering this unnecessary. 4 Pet. (29 U. S.) 152.]</p>

<p>[This was an action by Benjamin Knowles against John Nichols.]</p>

Assumpsit, against the indorser of Vincent King’s note. The defendant pleaded usury between the maker and the payee; and offered the maker of the note as a witness to prove the usury. objected. Although the books differ upon the question of competency, yet the case of Walton v. Shelley, 1 Term R. 290, is supported by the best authorities, although .it was overruled by the case of Jordaine v. Laslibrooke, 7 Term R. 001.

<p>[This was an action at law by Levi Knowles and J. Edwards Addicks against the Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Railroad Company.]</p>

This was a libel in the admiralty, by [James J. Knowlton] a carpenter of a merchant ship, against the master [R. P. Boss]. The allegations were, that the master flogged and imprisoned the libellant, without sufficient cause; refused him leave to see the American consul, when reasonably demanded; and compelled him to leave the vessel, whereby he lost his wages for the return voyage. Besides damages, the libel claimed the fine of $100,' imposed by the act of 1840, c. 4S, § 19.

<p>[This was an action at law by Dexter A. Knowlton against the Congress & Empire Spring Company. The cause is now heard upon a motion to remand.]</p>

<p>[This was an action first brought in 1869 by Dexter A. Ivnowlton in the supreme court of the state for Kings county, N. Y., against the Congress & Empire Spring Company, to recover the sum of $13,9S0, with interest; this being the amount paid on subscriptions to shares of reissued stock, which the plaintiff claimed should be paid back to him. A pe-tición for removal was filed in April, 1875. A motion to remand the case was made in the circuit court for the Eastern district of New York, and the case was remanded to the state supreme- court. Case No. 7,902. There was a verdict in the supreme court for the plaintiff, but this was reversed by the court of appeals of New York, and a new trial ordered. 57 N. Y. 51S. Upon the new trial a motion was made to remove the case to this court. This was done, and the case is now heard by the court, a jury having been waived.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,904.</p> <p>Patents — Anticipation—Sewing Silk.</p> <p>[The Knowlton patent (No. 173.125) for an improvement in putting up sewing silk for sale and use is void because of anticipation.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,904a.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Machinery— Useless Experiment.</p> <p>[The fact that machinery is ordered for a vessel. as an experiment, and proves useless, does not destroy the lien of one who furnishes labor and materials in putting it in.]</p>

Assumpsit upon the money counts. The parties agreed upon the following special statement of facts: Mr. Thomas Battelle of the island of St. Croix, having sold some property for the defendant, Mr. [Richard] Devens, on a credit, remitted the proceeds, as he collected them, in bills of exchange and the produce of the island.

[This was a suit in equity by Richard F. Knox and Joseph Osborn against the Great Western Quicksilver Mining Company for infringement of patent No. 104,323, for an improvement in ore roasting furnaces. The suit was brought in 1874. Upon the application of defendant, the proceedings were stayed, and the complainants required to bring their action at law to establish their rights under their patents, which was accordingly done.

This was a motion to discharge the defendant [James Greenleaf] on common bail, on the following case: The defendant had been arrested at the suit of the plaintiffs [Knox & Co.], on the 2üth of Januarj-, 1801, as a citizen of Marj-land, to recover from him, as endorser, the amount of an inlaid bill drawn in May, 1798, by Nicholson, of Philadelphia, on Morris, of the same place, in favor of the defendant, and by him endorsed, after acceptance, to the plaintiffs, citizens of…

[This was a suit in equity brought by* Susan E. Knox and others against Arthur H. Loweree and others for the alleged infringement of certain patents.]

<p>2 [Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent for an “improved smut-mill and separator,” granted to Daniel Shaw, April 6, 1S52; reissued November 3, 1863; extended for seven years from April 6, 1866; again reissued January 11, 1870, as reissue No. 3794, and assigned to complainant</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>[The above engraving illustrates the Shaw machine. The specification states:</p> <p>[“Figure 1 represents, in perspective, an external view of the combined smut-mill and grain-separator; and figure 2 represents a vertical section through the same. Previous to my invention, the smutting and scouring of grain were done in one machine, and the separating of the grain into qualities, according to the specific gravity, and further separating of grain from the screenings or lighter impurities, and from the dust, chaff, etc., were done in another machine, thus requiring two machines, two handlings, and two operations. I lay no claim to any such separated machines or operations. Nor do-I claim any machine where a separation is attempted through the smutting-cj-linder, or wherein less than three distinct and separate divisions of the material, according to their values and specific gravities, are made, and separately deposited in separate places. The object and purpose of my invention are to so devise, as, that by one machine, one handling of the grain, and one operation, the grain shall be divested of the smut, or scoured, separated into qualities of heavy and lighter grain, and separated from the dust, chaff, and light impurities, by once passing through such machine; ‘ and, secondly, my object and purpose are to so construct such a machine as that it would be simple in its construction, not liable to get out of order, efficient in its operation, and, from its cheapness of construction, within the reach of any one.”</p> <p>*********</p> <p>[“a, a, etc., represent a main frame for containing and supporting the entire machine. Upon this main frame is supported a vertical shaft, which may be driven by a belt from any first moving-power, and upon the lower end of this shaft is arranged a fan, c, and upon the upper end thereof a smutting or scouring-cylinder, b, both the fan and the smutting-cylinder being arranged within suitable cases, that have proper inlet and exit-openings, as will be explained. Over the smutter and fan-cases passes an inverted bow or U-shaped wind-trunk, d, which is common to the smutter by the pipe or passage d', and to the fan by or through a passage underneath the smutter-case, that leads into the eye of the fan. A sliding regulator, g, commands the passage leading from the wind-trunk to the eye of the .fan, so that, without interfering with the speed of the smutter-cylinder or the fan, the force of the blast or current of air through the wind-trunk to the fan may be regulated. Within the wind-trunk is arranged a screen, e, where a separation of the lighter grains or impurities may be made from the smut, dirt, chaff, etc., said lighter grains dropping from the edge of the screen into the opening at f, and thence passing out of the machine, while the smut, dirt, and chaff are drawn into and through the fan, and driven out through the trank (Fig. 1) leading from the fan-case out of the building, if necessary. The heavy wheat, or that which is fully cleaned and divested of all its impurities, when, or the instant after, it is passed from the smutter through the passage into the wind-trank, falls out of the open end of said trank, while all the remaining particles of light grain, chaff, short straw, smut, dirt, etc., are taken by the ascending current of air, and carried up and over to where the succeeding separation takes place, as above mentioned. The grain, with all the impurities mixed with it, as it comes from the thresher, or in a partially-screened state, is thrown into the smut-ter, through an opening in its top. where the smut-balls are broken or loosened, and the grain scoured by attrition, and by the beater-arms throwing it against the enclosing-case or shell. No separation takes place in the smutter, as there is no operative-blast within the outer case. The whole contents of the smutter, including the dirt shoveled in with the grain, and everything loosened from the grain, pass from the smutter or scourer into the wind-trunk, and the moment they enter the wind-trunk, then the separating begins; the heavy wheat, by its specific gravity, dropping down and out of the wind-trunk, while all the iighter particles are carried up and over to the final separation. There are three different places of deposit for the three different things separated from each other, viz., the heavy, plump, cleaned wheat, at the end of the wind-trunk, where the air enters; the lighter grains and particles are carried out through f; and the dirt, smut, and chaff are drawn through the fan, and out through the trunk or passage leading therefrom, and out of the building, if necessary. Having thus fully described my invention, and shown how it is operated, what I claim therein as new, and desire to secure by letters patent, is: 1. The combination of a smutter or scourer, with an independent suction separating fan-blast or current of air, so that the separation of the dust, chaff, and other impurities from the grain, shall take place after the grain has been scoured, and after leaving the scouring-cylinder, and the dust separated from the lighter impurities, and deposited apart from the chaff and other impurities, and independent of any action of the smutter, substantially as described. 2. In combination with a smutter or scourer and a separating suction-blast, the separating and depositing in separate places of, first, the heavy or very clean wheat; second, the lighter grains or screenings, freed from dust; and third, the smut, dust, and chaff, substantially as described. 3. In combination with a smutter or scourer and a suction-fan, both arranged on a'nd driven by the same shaft, and an air-trunk for directing the course of the blast, a regulator for changing the force or volume of the current of air, without changing the speed or motion of the smutting or scouring-cylinder. substantially as described. 4. The combination of a smut-ter or scourer and a suction separating-fan, with a wind or air-trunk, common to both the smutter and the fan-blast, and so that the contents off the smutter may pass into the column of air that rushes through the trunk to the fan, and the entire separation take place therein by the action of the fan-blast alone, after leaving the scourer, substantially as described. 5. The arranging of the smutter or scourer and the suction separating-fan within or between the legs of the blast or air-trunk in which the entire separation is made, and which passes over or around them, for the purpose of economic-ing space and cheapening the construction of the machine, substantially as described.”] 3</p>

This was a libel for damages arising from breach of contract.

Debt against [Lewis] Summers and others. Both defendants were taken by the marshal, and after office judgment, appeared by attorney and set aside the office judgment; whereupon the cause was sent back to the Tules for further proceedings, when the defendant, Summers, in proper person, pleaded in abatement that he was one of the marshal's deputies, and that the capias was not served on him by a disinterested person, as required by the 28th section of the judiciary act of 1789…

<p>Case No. 7,916.</p>

In this case, certain creditors of the bankrupt [Jacob A. Koch] having obtained an order for his examination before Mr. Register Husbands, at Rochester, the counsel for the creditors asked the bankrupt this question: “State whether or not, on your purchase of goods of O. & M., in November, 1864, you made any representations to them of, or concerning, your pecuniary condition at that time?” The counsel for the creditors offered to show, by the bankrupt, that this debt was…

<p>Case No. 7,917.</p>

<p>In. bankruptcy.</p>

This was an action of trover for a policy of insurance. It was admitted on both sides, that if the agreement for insurance was perfected, and the plaintiff would have recovered upon the policy, that the want of it should produce no difficulty. The case was, that the plaintiff directed his agent to effect an insurance on goods on board the ship Gadsden, from Newport in Rhode Island, to Port Passage in Spain.

<p>[This was a suit by John C. Kohlsaat against Henry L. Hoguet and others.]</p>

[This was an action of trover by the plaintiff against the Insurance Company of North America for a policy of insurance. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. Case No. 7,920.] This case came on upon a motion for a new trial; upon the ground that the verdict was against evidence. The former contended, that upon a just interpretation of the British order, the Gadsden was not engaged in a trade contemplated by the order.

[This was an action of trover by Kohne against the Insurance Company of North America for a policy of insurance. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. Case No. 7.920. A motion for a new trial was made by defendant, and granted. Case No. 7,921. It is now heard upon the new trial.] This cause came on to be re-tried at this term.

<p>Case No. 7,923.</p> <p>Maritime Liexs — Carriers—Damage by Axcbok at Bow — Al’PORTIOXMENT.</p> <p>1. Where a schooner lying across the end of a pier left her inshore anchor hanging at the bow. with the flukes under water, and a canal boat that had occasion to haul up to the pier in the slip caught her stem on the anchor and was damaged so that she sunk with her cargo on board: Held, that it was negligence for the schooner so to leave her anchor, and that it was negligence for the canal boat to haul in as she did, when she knew the anchor hung in a dangerous way, without any precaution to keep herself clear of it.</p> <p>[Cited in Price v. The Sontag. 40 Fed. 176.]</p> <p>2. The fault being mutual, the damages must be apportioned: and there being no damage to the schooner, the owner of the canal boat is entitled to a decree for half his damages, and the owner of the cargo for the whole of his damages against the schooner.</p>

<p>[This was a scire facias by William Iioning against William Bayard, Jr., and others, to revive judgment against William Bayard, deceased, and for execution on the lands and tenements of said William Bayard, deceased. William Renwick, terre tenant, pleads specially. The case is now heard on demurrer to plea.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Christian Konold and others against John C. Klein and' others for an alleged infringement of patent No. 68,446.]

In an action of assumpsit, for boarding, lodging, and liquors, brought by the plaintiff, who was a tavern-keeper. moved the court to instruct the jury, that the plaintiff cannot .recover more than $5 a year for liquors sold to be drank in the house.

This is a bill to restrain the sale of lands belonging to the plaintiff [Augustus Ivountze] for taxes levied thereon by the city of Omaha for municipal purposes.

[This was a libel by Peter Kramme and others against the master and owners of the ship New England for damages for breach of contract.]

This was a proceeding in admiralty to recover damages for a personal tort committed by the respondent [James B. Ames, master of the American brig Rebecca] against the libellant [William Krauskopp] on the high seas. The libel asserted that the libellant, while a passenger on board the Rebecca, during a voyage from Rotterdam to Philadelphia in the month of June, 1846, was assaulted and severely beaten by the respondent, then in command as master.

The Carlisle Bank, in Pennsylvania, was incorporated in 1814 (Act Assem. Pa. March 21, 1814); its capital was “not to exceed 8300,-OOO,” and was divided into 0000 shares, of S50 each. Held: that no stockholder can be liable for more than one hundred dollars on each share held by him, and that each share must lose an equal amount on the final liquidation of the bank.

<p>Cas No. 7,933.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Protest—Form and Sufficiency of.</p> <p>1. Under the act of February 25, 1845 (5 Stat. 727). requiring a protest in writing, at or before the payment of duties, to enable the party paying to maintain an action, no substantive ground of ■objection to the payment, not contained in the protest, can be taken at the trial.</p> <p>[Cited in Burgess v. Converse, Case No. 2,-154.]</p> <p>2. A protest having stated only, that the invoice value was correct, the plaintiff was not allowed to show that the appraisement was not made in conformity to law.</p> <p>[Cited in Burgess v. Converse, Case No. 2.-154.]</p> <p>[See Bangs v. Maxwell. Case No. 841.]</p> <p>3. The fact that the deputy collector dictated the form of the protest, does not estop the collector from denying its sufficiency for a purpose. which doe's not appear to have been brought to the notice of the deputy collector.</p> <p>[Cited in Frazee v. Moffitt, IS Fed. 586: Herman v. Schell, Id. 892: Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U. S. 501, 5 Sup. Ct. 244.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,935.</p> <p>Salvage — Injury beyond Repair.</p> <p>[1. The cargo should not be charged with the salvage of the vessel when it appears that she is injured beyond the possibility of temporary repairs, and her master prays that she be sold to pay the salvage.]</p> <p>[2. The total amount of salvage should vary with the peril from which the property was saved.]</p> <p>[Cited in Baker v. Cargo and Materials of The Slobodna, 35 Fed. 542.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,934.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Protest—When Required.</p> <p>The act of February 26. 1845 (5 Stat 727), requires a protest to sustain an action to recover back the additional duty of twenty per centum, assessed by way of penalty under the eighth section of the tariff act of 1S46 (9 Stat 43).</p>

Petition of Henry M. Duffield, assignee, against Gardner K. Grout to recover certain property and books of account alleged to have come to his possession under a fraudulent and void voluntary assignment for benefit of creditors, and on account of which P. H. Krogman was adjudged a bankrupt. Assignment to Grout alleged to have been made October fourteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven.

General indebitatus assumpsit and quantum valebat for 418 pounds of beef sold and delivered. The defendant offered to prove a special agreement between the plaintiffs [Ivrouse & Gloyd] and defendant, on which the beef was delivered. moved the court to instruct the jury, that he was entitled to recover for the beef delivered, although a special agreement should be proved.

Petition against Krueger, Loud & Bailey, alleged to be partners in trade under the firm of Krueger, Loud & Co., and to have stopped payment of their commercial paper. Krue-ger defended on the ground that he had left the firm before the note held by the petitioners was given. The firm had carried on the lumber business at Boston for about three years, and in September, 1870, there was a verbal agreement for a dissolution.

Special action on the case by a landlord against his tenant for removing a wooden shed during the term, which the defendant had erected during the term upon posts inserted into the ground to the depth of two feet, and leaning against the wall of a house situated on an adjoining lot not belonging to the plaintiff. contended that it was a general rule that, between landlord and tenant, things annexed by the tenant to the freeholder building, and which can be removed without…

<p>[In the matter of Krueger, Loud & Go., and ex parte Bugbee, bankrupts.] :</p>

This matter was presented to the judge on a statement of facts agreed upon between the assignee in bankruptcy and creditors who held a judgment. The judgment was recovered on March 26th, 1872, against [Uriah] Krum, the bankrupt, and was on the same , day docketed in the county clerk’s office of Ulster county. The judgment was recovered on a promissory note given for merchandise.

In September, 1785, Adam Holt made his last will and testament, whereby he devised as follows: “I give and bequeath unto Mary Christine, my beloved wife, all my real estate, to and for her use, during her natural life, for her dowry; and after her decease, I direct the whole to be let out for a yearly rent, the one-third part of which, or if necessary, the one-half, shall be applied by my executors for fencing, and for repairing the buildings, if necessary, and the rest of…

In 1866 the present plaintiffs [Kuhn, Netter & Co.] commenced in a court in Tennessee an attachment suit against Fessenden & Co. and the sheriff levied the writ of attachment upon property worth twice the amount of their claim against Fessenden & Co. Under the statute of that state, Fessenden & Co. as principals, and the present defendant as surety, executed to the plaintiffs a'delivery bond in the sum of $1,800, reciting the plaintiffs’ suit, the levy of the attachment,…

<p>Case Wo. 7,947.</p> <p>Patents — “Improvements in Fluting Machines. ”</p> <p>1. The claim of reissued letters patent granted to George E. King, June 23d, 1868, for an “improvement in fluting machines,” the original letters patent having heen granted to him, as inventor, February 26th, 1807, namely, “The guide B, constructed with one or more curved or arched portions, a', in combination with suitable fluting rollers, substantially as set forth, for the purpose specified,” defined.</p> <p>2. Although the specification describes the guide E as being composed of two pieces of .metal, one over the other, at such a distance apart as to permit the passage of the fabric between them, and although, at the arched part of the guide, both pieces of metal are arched, and the part of the fabric which is to be crinkled passes between such arched parts, while the other parts of the fabric pass between the two pieces of metal of the guide, although not between the arched portions, yet the fact, that the part of the fabric which is not to be crinkled passes between two pieces of metal, is immaterial to the invention claimed, and the fact that the part of the fabric which is to be crinkled'has, at the time it passes over the arched part of the guide, a correspondingly arched piece of metal over it, is immaterial to the invention claimed.</p> <p>3. The arched portion of the lower piece of metal is what is alone effective, in combination with the rollers, in producing the result of which the specification speaks.</p> <p>4. It is the raising up of the fabric, or the deflection from the general plane of the fabric, or from the general course of the fabric, of that part of the fabric which is to be crinkled, by an interposed deflector, which is the essence of the patentee’s invention.</p> <p>5. The expression in the claim — the guide, constructed with a curved or arched portion — is the same thing as saying, the curved or arched portion of the guide.</p> <p>6. The claim is infringed by a machine in which there are rollers with plain parts between fluting parts, and an arched projection raised up in front of the plain parts, whereby an extra width of material is taken up. by causing the material to ride over, and to be raised by. the arched projection, such extra width being crinkled as and because the adjacent parts are fluted.</p>

[In the matter of Frederick A. Kurth, a bankrupt.] On petition of the assignee for the proceeds of property in the hands of Charles E. Letts, voluntary assignee.

Bill in equity to set up a lost deed of trust not recorded in due time. The complainant [Daniel Kurtz] was the trustee named in two deeds of trust made on the 17th of August, 1814, one by John Hol- • lingshead and Adam King, and the other by John Hollingshead, to secure a debt of $8,-112.50 due by the latter to the Bank of Columbia.

Assumpsit for goods and money delivered to defendants, to be transported from Detroit to Chicago. The first count alleges a delivery, specifying the articles, to defendants as common carriers. The second, alleges a delivery of the property for transportation, to be delivered to plaintiff at. Chicago within a reasonable time. The .third, alleges a general bailment.

[In the matter of Morris Kyler, a bankrupt.] In this case, on petition of the assignee, stating that James Houghton, Jr., had made proof of debt herein, according to form 22 of the general orders in bankruptcy, and that the assignee had reason to believe that the debt so proved was founded in illegality, and was not entitled to be proved, or to participate in any dividend herein, the court made an order, pursuant to section 22 of the bankruptcy act [of 1807 (14 Stat. 527)],…

This was a motion to dismiss appeals taken to this court from a decision made by the district court on the 8th of May, 1869, rejecting and expunging from the proceedings herein certain debts, and the proofs thereof. [See Case No. 7,956.]

Tne libel was filed August Gth, 1850, and sets forth that on the 9th day of May, 1856, the claimant, Wm.

One of the complainants, [Henry D.] Dunbar, having invented an improvement in pistons and piston-packing for steam engines, on August 14th, 1860, obtained letters patent [No. 29,570] therefor, and on March 19th, 1801, conveyed to one Parker Wineman his rights in the patent, so far as concerned its use upon locomotives on railroads having their principal offices in the state of Illinois for the full term of the patent, subject to a royalty of $25, reserved by the inventor,…

<p>Case No. 7,960.</p> <p>Patents — Reissue Improperly Granted — Variance prom Original — Determination by the Court — Mitre Machine — Novelty.</p> <p>1. In a suit for the infringement of a reissued patent, upon an allegation of the answer that the reissue was improperly granted, the court will determine only, and as a matter of construction, from inspection of the specifications, claims and drawings of the original and reissue patents, whether the reissue is for the same invention as that described in the original patent.</p> <p>2. The reissued patent, granted to George W. La Baw, May 18, 1869, for improvement in mitre machines, held not to be void for repug-nancy between the invention therein described, and that described in the original letters patent.</p> <p>3. Evidence upon the question of novelty, of which notice was not given in the answer, will not, when taken under complainant’s objection, be considered by the court ns bearing upon the question whether the patentee was the first inventor; such evidence is admissible only for the purpose of showing the state of the art at the date of the “invention.”</p> <p>4. Where an inventor has perfected his invention nnd obtained letters patent therefor, the patent cannot be invalidated by evidence showing that crude and unsuccessful experiments were made by others previous to his invention.</p> <p>[Cited in Edison Electric Light Co. v. Beacon, etc.. Co.. 54 Ved. 693.]</p> <p>5. The machine for cutting mitres, patented to Stephen W. Hall, August 17, 1858, held to infringe the reissued patent granted to George W. La Baw, May IS, 1869, for improvement in mi-tre machines.</p> <p>6. The reissued patent, granted May 18, 1869, to George W. La Baw, for improvement in mi-tre machines, held valid.</p> <p>[This was a bill in equity by George W. La Baw and others against William Hawkins and others for the alleged infringement of reissued patent No. 3,443.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by George W. La Baw and others against William Hawkins and others for the alleged infringement of reissued patent No. 3,445, of original patent No. 12,950. There was a decree in favor of complainants for an injunction, and ordering an account to be taken. Case No. 7,-900. The case is now heard upon exceptions to the master’s report.]

This was a bill in equity. The case was heard upon demurrer to the bill for want of equity, and upon a motion to continue a preliminary injunction.

<p>Case No. 7,963.</p> <p>Salvage — Taking Possession op Vessel against Mastep.’s Protest — Brought into Nearest Port.</p> <p>[Cited in The El Dorado. 50 Fed. 956. to the point that if the master insists on having the vessel taken by its salvors into a distant port, inconvenient for the salvors, without first satisfying their demands, then they are justified in going so far as to resist him. take control of the ship, take it into a convenient port, and place it in the custody of the law.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the district of Connecticut.] 3 [Lacey, Downs & Co. were, on the 2d day of June. 1S78, engaged in manufacturing felt hats in Danbury, Conn., and were indebted about seventy thousand dollars, and had assets of about thirty thousand dollars.

<p>Case No. 7,964,</p> <p>Prize — Restoration.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo restored. The question of .costs and damages reserved.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Frederick Lachemeyer, a bankrupt] *</p>

June 15th. Otto Lachenmeyer filed his bill against the schooner for a balance of 8390.65. on account of advances made to her for necessary disbursements and repairs in foreign ports, amounting to 816.39. This libel was allowed, and the vessel arrested. June 17th, an amendment to the libel was filed, striking out two bills claimed for, amounting to 8174.39. Eo die, Messrs.

. This was a motion to dismiss a libel of information filed against the steamer Lac La Belle, for not being provided with a proper-steam registering gauge.

This was a bill in chancery by the plaintiffs, to foreclose two certain mortgages given by the defendant, to secure some five mil-, lion dollars of its bonds, on about one hundred and eighty miles of its road, and franchises and property appertaining thereto. The road commences on the west bank of the Mississippi river, opposite La Crosse, and is completed westward one hundred and sixty-seven miles.

<p>Case No. 7,970.</p> <p>Liens — Record of Priority — Mortgage Recorded Puiok to Judgment Recovered Prior to the Execution of the Mortgage — Prefer-exce.</p> <p>Where a creditor claims a lien by virtue of a judgment against the bankrupt, recovered on 5th November, 1800, but which was not recorded in the clerk’s office until 10th October, 1807: and another creditor holds a mortgage executed by bankrupt, and recorded 7th April, 1807, held, the mortgage lien has priority over the judgment.</p>

This was an action for money paid, laid out. and expended, in tlie purchase oí plank in Boston to he shipped here for the defendant.

Bill in equity by Joseph B. Ladd, against the widow, legatees, and devisees, of John G. Ladd, deceased.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Hermon W. Ladd against the Tuc-ker Manufacturing Company for the alleged infringement of a patent.]</p>

<p>Case No. 7,973.</p> <p>Tender — Production op Moxet — Offek to Pat.</p> <p>Upon a plea of tender, it is not sufficient to prove that the defendant asked the plaintiff if he would take the money, and said he was ready to pay it, and would give his check for it.</p>

This was a petition, setting forth the following facts: An action at law was instituted by Tudor v. Ladd [unreported] on the 17th of August last, in the court of common pleas, of the state of Massachusetts, to recover damages for not furnishing a ship, as agreed on. for the transportation of ice. The damages in the writ were laid at $700. Ladd is a citizen of Portsmouth, N. H., and Tudor a citizen of Boston, Mass.

Covenant, on a charter-party, for non-payment of demurrage. The plaintiff agreed to allow twenty working lay days for the loading at Alexandria. The cargo was to be wheat.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Nevada.] Motion of a creditor [Ely Johnson], having a lien by… Held: 1st. That the board of trustees had no power to authorize the secretary to file the petition, and that such filing gave the court no jurisdiction to adjudge the corporation a bankrupt. 2d. That the only reasonable construction of the words majority of the cor-porators” in the thirty-seventh section of the bankrupt act, is, that…

W. T. Cummings, sheriff of Storey county, and Ely Johnson, moved to dissolve the injunction issued herein upon the following state of facts: On the twelfth day of August, eighteen hundred and seventy, said Ely Johnson commenced a suit in the first district court for Storey county, Nevada, against the Lady Bryan Mining Co., to recover the sum of about two thousand eight hundred dollars. [Upon his motion the court also vacated its order malting the company a bankrupt, upon the…

<p>Case No. 7,981.</p> <p>Colusión in New Yokk Hahbok — Steamboat AND SCHOONElt.</p> <p>1. A collision occurred in New York harbor, in the evening, between a steamboat and a schooner. Tne schooner, with a free wind from north of west, was going down the harbor, and the steamboat was coming up. The schooner’s stem struck the port side of the steamer, angling aft, at an angle of about forty-five degrees. It was claimed, on behalf of the steamer, that the schooner changed her course, by star-hoarding her helm, when the vessels were a few hundred feet apart, whereupon the helm of the steamer was put to port. The schooner, on her part, claimed that her course was not altered. Bold, that, on the evidence, the schooner made no change of her course.</p> <p>2. As it was admitted that the steamboat ported her helm, the conclusion, that the schooner did not starboard, established that it was tbe porting of the steamboat which caused the collision, and, as the case was not one of inevitable accident, the steamboat was solely responsible for the collision.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the ■United States for the Northern district of Illinois.] This was a libel filed by Lyons and Finney for supplies, materials and repairs furnished to the propeller Lady Franklin in the summer of 18G4, at Oswego, New York.

In admiralty. The Lady Franklin was, during the year 1868, the property of the Lake Michigan Transportation Company, a corporation of the state of Michigan. Several seamen employed on board during the season of navigation of 186S, filed libels in this court for the payment of their wages.

The libellant’s case was, that his schooner, the Ida J., was anchored in the harbor of ‘Boston, in a lawful and proper place, at about noon of the 22d July, 1872; and that the Lady Franklin, a schooner of about ninety tons register, was running out light-making about eight knots, with a free wind and favorable tide, and ran so near the Ida J. that the jib-boom of the latter was caught in the leach of the Lady Franklin’s foresail. and the vessels were entangled for a time,…

This steamboat was contracted with to proceed up the Mississippi and Minnesota rivers to Shakopee, in the state of Minnesota. with three barges; and there to take on board the barges’ wheat in bulk, and to transport the same to Saranac, on the first named river, in the state of Illinois. The wheat was put aboard the barges to be delivered in good order, “unavoidable dangers of the river” and fire only excepted.

<p>Case No. 7,987.</p> <p>Banks and Banking — Bills of Exchange — Custom — Di-tv of Cashier — Usury.</p> <p>1. A cashier of a bank which, by its charter, is authorized to deal in bills of exchange, may assign or accept such bills as the agent of the bank. This is the general custom of banks.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Houghton v. First Nat. Bank of Elkhorn. 20 Wis. 605. Cited in Donnell v. Lewis Co. Sav. Bank, 80 Mo. 171.]</p> <p>2. .Where a bank agrees to pay the face of its bills, there can be no usury.</p> <p>8. To constitute usury there must be a corrupt loan of money.</p> <p>4. A purchase of notes of a bank or of individuals. at a discount, is not usury. A bank would destroy its credit by purchasing its own bills at a discount.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,986.</p> <p>Prize — Violation of Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>This was a libel filed by the owner of the British bark Water Lily, 'to recover the damages occasioned to her by being run into by the brigantine on the night of Jan. 21, 1861. The bark had come in over the bar at Sandy Hook in charge of a pilot, and anchored in the channel. The brigantine came in during the night without a pilot, and ran into the bark while lying at anchor. The bark had lights set and burning in her rigging, and an anchor-watch on deck. The evidence for the libelant was that the- night was clear and bright moon-light, and that vessels could be seen at anchor three miles off. The evidence for the brigantine was directly contradictory on these points. The master and mate of each vessel were examined. The master of the brigantine was also part owner. The claimant alleged that the collision was caused by fault of the bark. He claimed also to be a bona fide purchaser of the brigantine before her seizure in the cause without notice of the libelant’s claim. His alleged purchase was on Jan. 29, and the vessel wáfe seized under the process in the suit on Jan. 30. He first saw the vessel a day or two after he purchased her. He also urged that the libel-ant could not recover because he had not filed his libel within the time limited by the state law as to liens on vessels.</p>

[George] Lains failed in business and made an assignment December 21, 1876, to Frank Keogh for the equal benefit of his creditors. This assignment was made at the suggestion of a firm of creditors, of which the assignee was a member. On January 18, 1877, the debtor was adjudged a bankrupt on his own petition. An assignee in bankruptcy was appointed.

In September, 1S73, William C. Tebbetts and Charles Haley demised certain chambers on the corner of Summer and Kingston streets, in Boston, to F. J. Bake, Sidney Cushing, Franklin B. Daniels, and J. E. K. Herrick, for the term of five years from Oct. 1, 1S73, by an indenture under seal; and the lessees entered into the usual covenants for payment of rent, &c. The lessees composed the mercantile firm of Lake, Daniels, & Cushing, to whom was soon after added one Bliss, and…

This was a petition by W,m. B. Dwight, the assignee of John J. Lake, to compel the respondents, Charles Commerford and J. W. Lawrence, to deliver to him certain promissory notes alleged to belong to the bankrupt’s estate. On the 24th of July, 186S, certain creditors of Lake filed their petition in this court, charging him with acts of bankruptcy, and the usual rule was entered requiring him to show cause why he should not be adjudged a bankrupt.

In equity. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 4,266] fof “improvement in vault-covers,” granted Thaddeus Hyatt, November 12, 1845; reissued to same April 3, 1855 [No. 303]; extended seven years from November 12, 1859, by the commissioner of patents; extended again for seven years from November 12, 1866, by act of congress [5 Stat. 117], and assigned to complainant August 9, 1866.

On the sixth of February, 1874, the board of trustees of the town of Lake, by a vote of four out of five members constituting the board, entered into a contract with Charles E. Hequembourg, for the laying of water pipes in the streets of the town, without advertising for bids. The work under the contract was performed during the summer and fall of 1874, and payments were made from time to time by the town upon estimates presented by the contractor.

<p>Case No. 7,995.</p> <p>Collision — Interest in Vessel Sufficient to Maintain Libel — Steamer and Sail Vessel —Avoidance of Accident.</p> <p>[1. One who holds a vessel under a charter party has such a special property therein that he may maintain a libel against another vessel for damages on account of collision.]</p> <p>[2. A collision occurred upon Lake Erie in the daytime, with fair wind and water, between a steamer coming into the port of Cleveland and a schooner. The steamer rounded and stood in for her pier in the outer harbor. At this time the schooner was some way ahead, and apparently bound for the inner harbor. Very soon after the steamer rounded, the schooner suddenly came around, and made across the steamer’s bow. She was warned off. It was then too late for the steamer to avoid the collision by stopping or backing. It might have been avoided had the schooner, after coming around, luffed or cast anchor. Eeld, that the collision was entirely the fault of the schooner.] •</p>

<p>In admiralty. Libel for collision.</p>

<p>Case No. 7,997.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Voting por Assignee — Creditors —Who mat Vote.</p> <p>1. As no particular manner of voting is presented by the bankrupt act [of 1867 (Í4 Stat. 517)], it may be taken by ballot or viva voce or it may be taken by calling the name of each creditor, or by calling upon the person or persons representing creditors by power of attorney to name the choice of the creditor or creditors so represented.</p> <p>2. The bankrupt act nowhere directs, nor does it seem to contemplate a postponement of the vote for assignee where some of the creditors have proven their claims, in order to enable others to do so. Contra it contemplates the utmost practicable expedition in choosing the assignee.</p> <p>3. Creditors who have proved their claims and are entitled to vote for an assignee, may, if they see fit, consent to wait for others to prove before proceeding to elect an assignee, but it is optional with them.</p> <p>4. The taking of a vote pending a contest over the postponement of proof of claims approved.</p> <p>5. Creditors whose proof of claims has been postponed by a register, and who have not been allowed to vote for the assignee, if dissatisfied with the result of the vote, and if they deem the postponement of their claims erroneous, may have the proceedings certified to the court and if the postponement is shown to have been erroneous, the court may set aside the result of the vote and direct a new vote to be taken.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Northern Iron Co., Case No.* 10,-322; Re Jackson, Id. 7,124.]</p> <p>6. The postponement of proof of claims affects no right of the creditor except the right to vote for assignee.</p> <p>7. Proof of claims filed after election for an assignee will not entitle claimants to a vote thereon to change the result of an election appealed from.</p>

The register certifies, that Theodore M. Davis, as receiver of the Ocean National Bank, offered as proof of debt against said bankrupt’s estate a deposition setting forth certain loans or advances of money to sundry persons, at different times, In the months of May, July, August, September, and October, 1871, to wit: to William L. Avery to the sum of eighteen thousand eight hundred and fifty dollars; to Perez J. Avery to the sum of eighteen thousand nine hundred and…

In equity. This suit was brought [by Henry O. Lakin] to recover certain notes in the hands of the defendants, claimed to have been taken and to be held in violation of the provisions of the bankruptcy act It was heard on pleadings and proofs..

<p>Case No. 8,000.</p> <p>Navigable Waters — Obstruction op — Rapt— Action for Destruction op.</p> <p>1. All navigable streams should be left open, and no one has a right to obstruct the path of vessels along their channels.</p> <p>[Cited in The Athabasca, 45 Fed. 654.]</p> <p>2. Where a raft had bee^ driven by the vis major into a channel of the river, and obstructed it, and had remained there an unreasonable length of time, and no anxiety had been exhibited by the party in charge, and no exertion made by him to extricate it, that would afford ample grounds for the master of a steamboat to take the necessary steps for its removal.</p> <p>S. But when every effort was made to remove the raft from the channel, no apprehensions of a pecuniary loss on the part of the steamboat from a reasonable delay would afford an excuse or justification for the violent and summary destruction of the raft by the master of the steamboat.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,001.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Petition op Creditors— Collusion — Petition to .Set Aside Adjudication-Bankrupt in Contempt of Court —Laches in Filing Petition to Set Aside.</p> <p>1. The bankrupt was adjudicated by default April 6.1878, upon petition of his creditors. The act of bankruptcy charged was the suspension of commercial paper made or passed in his business as merchant or trader. In December, 1878, a petition to set aside the adjudication was filed, which alleged that the bankrupt himself procured the original petition to be executed and filed, well knowing that its statement as to the petitioners constituting the requisite number and amount was untrue, and that he was not a merchant or trader, with intent to procure a discharge without obtaining the assent of his creditors, requisite in voluntary proceedings, and charged collusion between him and the petitioning creditors in executing and causing to be filed a false petition. The bankrupt answered, denying all fraud or intention to deceive the court. It appeared that the bankrupt caused the petition to be prepared and presented to the jje-titioning creditors, who signed and verified it, and returned it to the bankrupt’s attorney without making any inquiry into its truth. Held. that the papers made out a prima facie case against the bankrupt, so as to warrant a reference to take the proofs.</p> <p>2. Where a bankrupt procures a false and fraudulent petition to be filed by his creditors, with intent to procure a discharge which he could not obtain by voluntary proceedings, every movement he makes upon the basis of such petition is in contempt of court, and his proceedings to obtain a discharge will be perpetually stayed unless he shall comply with such reasonable terms for purging himself of the contempt as shall be imposed upon him.</p> <p>3. The creditor who seeks to set aside the adjudication proved his debt in June, 1878. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not discover the alleged fraud and collusion before September 28th. The petition was filed December 9, 1878. Held, that there was no presumption, from his being a party to the proceedings, that he knew of the .fraud before that time, and that the delay in filing the petition from September 28th to December 9th was not necessarily laches.</p>

This was an action for money had and received, by one partner against another, for the balance of a particular shipment, in which they were jointly interested in profit and loss;. and the proceeds, when remitted by defendant, from St. Thomas, were to be invested in another cargo, to be sent out on the same account The defence at the trial was, that 1,100 dollars, which was more than the balance of the cargo not remitted, was sent in a certain vessel, which was lost, and with…

<p>Case No. 8,004.</p> <p>Damages — Prize—Action against Captor— Probable Cause for Capture.</p> <p>1. Captors are not liable for damages in a case where the vessel captured presents probable cause for the capture, even though she was led into the predicament in which she is found, involuntarily, and by the mistakes of the revenue officers of the captors’ own government.</p> <p>2. What constitutes probable cause, which will justify a capture.</p> <p>NOTE. After the decision in this case, from which no appeal was taken, the United States attorney, Mr. Dana, at the request of the owners of the vessel, and with the approval of Judge Sprague, represented the facts to the secretary of state; and on application by the owners, sustained by the French ambassador, the United States made to the owners a full and satisfactory compensation for their loss of time. &c.. on the ground that the defect in the papers put on board at New Orleans, which led to, or contributed to, the capture and detention of the vessel, was the mistake of the military officers of the United States, who were acting as revenue officers at the time in that city.</p>

<p>[This action by Gaza way B. Lamar against Charles A. Dana was heard on motion of plaintiff to remand the cause to the state court.]</p>

<p>[This was an action brought in the state court by Gazzaway B. Lamar against Charles A. Dana for damages on account of false imprisonment. The case was removed to the circuit court, which afterwards denied a motion of plaintiff to remand. Case No. 8,005. The case is now heard in the circuit court before a jury.]</p>

[This was a libel in rem by C. A. L. Lamar, owner, and Eben T. Sears, master, of the bark Rawlins, against the bark Penelope, for salvage.]

This was an action brought by [AVilmer S. Lamb] the assignee of the AVinnesheik Insurance Company on a premium note.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Indiana.] This was a suit brought in the district court by [Wilmer S. Lamb] the assignee of the Win-nesheik Insurance Company against Barton Bowser, on a premium note given on a policy of insurance. The insurance company was a corporation created and doing business under the laws of the state of Illinois.

<p>Case No. 8,010.</p> <p>Seamen's Wages — Discharge in Foreign Port —Consent of Seaman — Consul’s Certificate.</p> <p>The certificate of a consul of the United States in a foreign port, under the act of July. 1840 [5 Stat. 394], that the discharge of a seaman was granted upon the SPaman’s consent, is conclusive upon that fact, unless it is shown that the conduct of the consul was corrupt or fraudulent.</p> <p>[Cited in Callón v. Williams, Case No. 2,324; Cofiin v. Weld, Id. 2,933; The Paul Revere, 10 Fed. 158.]</p> <p>Case No. 8,009a. LAMB v. BEIAND. [See Case No. 8,010.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,011.</p> <p>• Bankruptcy — Discharge—Creditor without Notice — Debt Barred.</p> <p>The debt of a creditor is barred by a discharge, although his name was not placed on the schedule, and he received no notice of the proceeding in bankruptcy, or of the petition for a discharge.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by John R. Lamb and Emma Lamb, his wife, and Ida Squires, against A. R. Burbank, J. P. O. Lownsdale, Millard O. Lownsdale, Ruth A. Lownsdale, and Mary E. Cooper, for a partition of real property. Heard on demurrer.]

[This was a suit in equity for partition of certain real estate in the city of Portland, Or., brought by John R. Lamb and Emma, his wife, and Ida Squires, heirs of Nancy Lownsdale and D. H. Lownsdale, against T. J.Carter, Isaac B. Smith, and the following heirs, other than plaintiffs, of D. H. Lowns-dale, J. P. O. Lownsdale, Millard O. Lowns-dale (by guardian), Ruth A. Lownsdale. (by guardian), Mary E. Cooper, Hiram Smith, and Hannah Smith.

The complaint in this action alleges that the plaintiff [Wilmer S. Lamb] is a citizen of the state of Illinois; that he is assignee in bankruptcy of the “Winneshiek Insurance Company,” a corporation of the state of Illinois, which has been duly adjudged a bankrupt by the district court of the United States, for the Northern district of Illinois; that the defendant [N. F. Damron] gave to the said corporation his promissory note for a sum specified therein, and that such note…

Bill in equity [by John R. Lamb and others against I. A. Davenport and others,] and cross-bill [by Isaac A. Davenport and others against J. It. Lamb and others).

<p>Case No. 8,016.</p> <p>Tax Title — Deed Prima Facie Good — Parol Proof of Matters not of Record — Presumption in Favor of Regularity,</p> <p>1. A claim of title under a tax sale, can only be sustained by showing a substantial compliance with the statute.</p> <p>2. Under the tax law of Ohio, of the 14th of March, 1831 [Laws Ohio 1829-31, p. 288], which declares that the deed of a county auditor for land sold for taxes shall vest a good and valid title in the grantee, both in law and equity, and shall be received in all courts as prima facie evidence of a good and valid title, the deed is admissible in evidence, without proof of the preliminary proceedings.</p> <p>3. The deed being received in evidence, the onus of impugning its validity, by showing that the prior proceedings were irregular or illegal, rests on the other party.</p> <p>4. The recitals in the county auditor’s deed, being made under the sanction of his official oath, are presumed to be true till the contrary is proved.</p> <p>5. In proof of the proceedings, preliminary to the sale, it is only necessary to show by the county auditor’s record, such facts as the statute expressly requires to be of record; and parol proof is admissible of any facts, not required to be recorded.</p> <p>6. The doctrine of presumption in favor of the acts of sworn public officers, applies in cases involving the validity of tax proceedings.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,017.</p> <p>Covenants in Deeds — Estate in Expectancy— Okegon Donation Act — Possessohy Rights.</p> <p>1. No covenant is implied from the use of the words in a deed, “bargain, sell and quitclaim.”</p> <p>[Cited in Traver v. Baker, 15 Fed. 190.]</p> <p>2. A bargain, sale and quitclaim of all a party’s “right, title or interest” m real property, “whether in possession or expectancy,” passes nothing but what is then vested in the bargainor.</p> <p>[Cited in Traver v. Baker, 15 Fed. 192; Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. 8. 317, 12 Sup. Ct. 806.]</p> <p>3. An estate in expectancy does not include a mere hope or possibility, without present interest.</p> <p>4. A covenant, that the bargained premises are free from encumbrances caused by the grantor, is not prospective, and is limited to the acts of the grantor.</p> <p>5. A covenant asrainst the claim, right or title of any person claiming through the grantor, is equivalent to a special covenant of non-claim or warranty.</p> <p>6. Such a covenant only operates upon the estate which the grantor then.had in the premises, and does not prevent him or his heirs from asserting an after-acquired title to the same premises.</p> <p>[NOTE. For a similar case, brought by the same plaintiffs against different defendants upon subs!antially the same facts, see Lamb v. Burbank, Case No. 8.012. For other suits by the same plaintiffs against other claimants of interest in the “Portland Land Claim,” see Cases Nos. 8,024, S,015, 8,023. For suits brought against these plaintiffs in the same matters, see Cases Ncs. 4.769. 4,775, 4,7'<0. For suits brought by the plaintiffs for their interest under Nancy Lownsdale, see Cases Nos. 8,021, 8,022, 8,013.]</p>

This was an action brought by Wilmer S. Lamb, assignee of the Winnishiek Insurance Company, against Michael Lamb.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [This was a libel in admiralty by Thomas Lamb and others against Povyell M. Parkman to recover a balance of freight. From a decree of the district court for libelants (Case No. 8,020) respondent appealed. The case is now heard upon motion by respondent to file an amended answer.]

This was a libel in admiralty, by [Thomas Lamb] the owner of the ship Napoleon, to recover a balance of freight due on a charter-party from Calcutta to Boston. The contract was in the usual form, and contained the clause, “dangers of the seas, fire and navigation excepted.” The owners were to victual and man the vessel, appoint the master, keep the vessel tight and stanch, and stow the cargo, and deliver it to the respondent in Boston.

[This is a suit in equity for partition of certain real estate in the city of Portland, Oregon, brought by John R. Lamb and Emma, his wife, and Ida Squires, heirs of Nancy Lownsdale and D. H. Lownsdale, against Lewis M. Starr and the heirs other than plaintiff of D. H. Lownsdale, to wit, J. P. O. Lownsdale, Millard O. Lownsdale (by guardian), Ruth A. Lownsdale (by guardian), Mary E. Cooper, Hiram Smith, and Hannah Smith. The ease is now heard upon demurrer and pleas to bill.]

[This was a suit in equity for partition of certain real estate in the city of Portland, Or., brought by John R. Lamb and Emma, his wife, and Ida Squires, heirs of Nancy Lownsdale and D. H. Lownsdale, against Lewis itf. Starr and the heirs other than plaintiff of D. H. Lownsdale, to wit, J. P. O. Lownsdale, Millard O. Lownsdale (by guardian), Ruth A. Lownsdale (by guardian), Mary E. Cooper, Hiram Smith, and Hannah Smith. A demurrer and three pleas to the bill were overruled.

The original bill in this case was filed by a portion of the heirs-at-law of Daniel H. Lownsdale, late of Portland, deceased, against the other heirs-at-law and defendant, George W. Vaughn, to obtain a partition of lots 1 and 3, block 5; and lots 2 and S, in block 15, in the city of Portland, Oregon.

[This was a bill in equity by John R. Lamb and Emma Lamb, his wife, and Ida Squires against L. H. Wakefield, Henry W. Corbett, John Connor, J. P. O. Lownsdale, Ruth A. Lownsdale, and Mary E. Cooper, for partition of certain real estate. The case is heard upon bill, answer, and proofs taken.]

[This was a bill in equity by Killelum H. Lambell against the corporation of Washington and A. B. McClean to enjoin the execution of a by-law.] Upon filing the bill of complaint an injunction was issued, enjoining and prohibiting the defendants from demanding or exacting any of the penalties mentioned in either of the said by-laws of the said corporation, or from suing for, or otherwise recovering the said penalties, until further order of the court submitted the following…

<p>Case No. 8,026.</p> <p>Bankkuptct — Duty of Assignee as to Heavilt Moktgaged Peusonaltt.</p> <p>It is not necessary for the assignee to take any proceedings whatever in regard to personal property of the bankrupt, so heavily mortgaged that it will not sell for enough to pay off such encumbrance, and the assignee has nothing to do but to designate the bankrupt exempt property, under section fourteen of the bankrupt act of 1867 [14 Stat. 522].</p> <p>[Cited in Re Brinkman, Case No. 1,884; Fhelps v. Sellick, Id. 11.079; Re Hufnagel, Id. 6.887; ICimberling v. Hartly, 1 Fed. 575.]</p>

Assumpsit [by Lambert & Co.] on a policy on goods on board the brig Celia, from Alexandria to Bourdeaux, and at and from thence to St. Bartholomews, with leave to attempt to get into Guadaloupe; but if, in attempting to get in, they should be warned off, and register indorsed, they should desist from any further attempt.

<p>Case No. 8,029.</p> <p>Homestead Exemption — Head of Family — Householder with Adopted Child.</p> <p>The adoption of another’s child by an unmarried person, and the maintenance of servants and a household, does not, under the statutes of South Carolina, constitute that person, the head of a family entitled to a homestead exemption.</p>

The bankrupt, when he filed his petition, was the owner of lot 5, block 118, in the village of Menominee, 44x132 feet in size, upon which was a new brick block just finished, and an old house which had formerly stood on the site of the new block, and had been used as a dwelling house. When the block was built, the house was moved onto the back part of the lot, and placed on blocks fronting on a side street, the new block being on the front.

<p>Case No. 8,032.</p> <p>Personae Property — Levy and Sale — Injunction- — Equity Jurisdiction — Adequate Remedy at Law.</p> <p>1. A mortgagee of ordinary chattels, in possession under his- mortgage, is not entitled to an injunction against the marshal, restraining him irom levying upon and selling such chattels, under an execution against the mortgagor.</p> <p>2. The mortgagee has an adequate remedy at law, and equity should not interfere.</p> <p>3. “Adequate remedy at law” does not mean ability to resort to (‘very form of legal procedure. If any form of action at law will give such remedy, equity will not interfere.</p> <p>4. Discussion of jurisdiction of chancery over articles of personal property; and many cases cited and distinguished.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,033.</p> <p>Removal of Causes — Repeal op Statute — Corporation — Sufficient Appearance — Aver-ments for Removal — Relief Prated for.</p> <p>1. Subdivision one of section 639 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in regard to the removal of causes from state courts, is superseded and repealed by the act of March 3, 1875 (18 >Stat. 470), in respect to a case which is covered both by said subdivision and by section 2 of said act.</p> <p>2. What is a sufficient appearance by a defendant corporation, to give to a court jurisdiction over it, so as to make its proceedings to remove the cause to a federal court valid.</p> <p>3. What are sufficient averments in a petition for the removal of a cause.</p> <p>4. Where a complaint put in, in the state court, before the removal of a cause, prays for relief purely equitable, and, also, for relief purely legal, the plaintiff must replead, in the federal court.</p> <p>[Cited in Phelps v. Elliott, 26 Fed. 8S2; Schneider v. Foote. 27 Fed. 585; Doe v. Koe. 31 Fed. 99; Potts v. Accident Ins. Co. of North America, 35 Fed. 567.]</p>

In equity. A judgment was recovered in the circuit court at law in favor of the complainant, against three of the defendants.

<p>Case No. 8,035.</p> <p>Seamen — Liability op Vessel fob Medical Attendance.</p> <p>[Expenses incurred for board, physician’s attendance and medicine for a sick seaman, who voluntarily goes ashore to be treated for yellow fever, cannot be deducted from that seaman’s wages. The maritime law makes these chargeable to the ship, and this is not changed by statute.]</p> <p>[Cited in The Forest, Case No. 4.936; Richardson v. The Juillette, Id. 11,784; Howe v. The Lexington, Id. 6,767a; The Leonidas, Id. 8,262; Knox v. The Ninetta, Id. 7.912; Ringgold v. Crocker. Id. 11,843; The North America, Id. 10,314.]</p>

One P. S. Lanahan arranged to have a lottery drawn in the state of Missouri, and for the purpose of disposing of his tickets appointed agents to sell the same. Among others, he gave into the hands of one Jno. H. Pattison, a lot of these tickets to be sold, which Pattison disposed of, but not being able, or unwilling,. to pay over the money realized from the sales, agreed to give and did give his due bill to Lanahan for the amount claimed by the former.

The plaintiff claimed to be the ‘owner of certain lands in Page county which had been sold for taxes in 1864, and for which a deed was given to the purchaser. In 1867 the land was again sold for taxes, to one Cal-lanan.

The defendant [Frederick W. Lander] was indicted at the present term, with several others [under Act March 3, 1835 (4 Stat. 776)], for unlawfully» confining the master of the American barque Le Grange, on the high seas. He was tried on the 6th inst., and convicted. The other defendants were all acquitted. The defendants were also charged in the same indictment with an endeav- or to make a revolt on board, and a verdict of not guilty was rendered in their favor on that charge.

On the 16th day of March, 1870 [Adolph] Landsberg was arrested and brought before Commissioner Wm. D. Wilkins, on a warrant charging him with having, in the spring, summer and fall of 1864, and in the winter of 1865, smuggled a quantity of whiskey, and also during the same time haying received, concealed, etc., the same whiskey, knowing the same to have been smuggled.

Charles and Jacob Dreyfus, composing the mercantile firm of Dreyfus & Co., proved a debt of 81,047.14, against the estate of the bankrupts [George H. Lane, Brett & Co.], at the first meeting of the creditors. After-wards the assignee of the estate applied to the register, in the mode pointed out by general order No. 34, to have the claim re-examined and' disallowed. The issues and evidence were certified to the court.

<p>Case No. 8,044.</p> <p>Bankruptct — Partnership—Monet Drawn out bv One Partner — Creditors Entitled to Share — Exchange of Notes with Bankrupt’s Firm.</p> <p>1. No proof can be made in bankruptcy between the joint and separate estates, in respect either of money drawn out, without fraud, by one partner, or of goods sold to him by the firm, though he was to sell them again.</p> <p>[Cited in Re McEwen, Case No. 8.783. Criti-cised in Re McLean, Id. 8.879. Cited in Re Hamilton, 1 Fed. 811: Re Lloyd. 22 Fed. 91; Re Boston & Fairhaven Iron-Works, 29 Fed. 784.]</p> <p>2. Where money was advanced by A. to B.. for capital in trade, with the understanding that B. should not be pressed for payment, but with no binding contract delaying or deferring payment, and no misrepresentation was made to B.’s creditors, A. was held entitled to share in the dividends of B.’s estate, under a composition deed in the usual form.</p> <p>3. Where A., holding several notes of B., exchanged some of them for notes of like amount of a firm in which B. was a partner, — semble, this arrangement, if made in contemplation of bankruptcy, would be a fraud on the joint creditors; but, held, it could not be set aside when the bankruptcy of the firm occurred more than four months afterwards.</p>

[Appeal from tbe district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] The cause of action was a collision on the high seas, .and the defence was, that the disaster was occasioned by the mismanagement and negligence of those in charge of the libellant’s vessel. The respondent filed a cross-libel.

[This was a libel in rem by Robert L. Lane and others against the steamboat Bedford for collision.] This was a libel filed by the owners of the schooner Mary D. Lane to recover damages occasioned to her by a collision with the steamboat, which occurred near the Wall street ferry, upon which the steamboat was running, on the morning of December 17, 1853.

<p>Case No. 8,047.</p> <p>Process of Court — Fieri Facias after Death of One Plaintiff — Amendment.</p> <p>A fieri facias issued in the names of two plaintiffs, after one of them is dead, is irregular and defective; but such defect may he amended, under the authority given by the 32d section of the act of 1789, c. 20 [1 Stat. 91], if the matter be regularly brought before the court</p>

<p>Case No. 8,048.</p> <p>"Witness — Co-Claimant — Liability Paid for Pdrpose of Becoming Witness — Discharge by Court of Claimant.</p> <p>[1. A person, while remaining a party claimant upon the proceedings in court, cannot, by an arrangement with his co-claimants, discharge himself from liability to the libelant, so as to become a competent witness for them.]</p> <p>[2. The court can, against the consent of the libelant, discharge a claimant from the action, and render him admissible as a witness, where he has parted with all his interest, holds security from his co-claimants against liability for costs, and new stipulators are substituted.]</p>

<p>[Action by Margaret B. Lane against Charles Dolick and others.]</p>

[These were bills filed by Mathis 'Lane, Robert B. Dorr, Robert Wilson, William Hamilton, Owen Reddy, and Thomas Me-Sorly, each against Thomas W. Ludlow, administrator, &c., for injunction and other relief.]

<p>Case No. 8,061.</p> <p>Notes — What is Promissory Note — Special Agreement — Pleading at Law — Declaration on Special Agreement.</p> <p>[A paper writing containing a promise to do anything more than to pay a certain sum of money at a certain time and at all events is not a promissory note, but a special agreement, and must be declared on as such.]</p>

Merchandise was imported by the plaintiff [David Lane] into the port of Boston, consisting of silk and cotton velvet ribbons, silk being the component material of chief value, and the defendant [Thomas Russell], as the collector of the port, levied a duty thereon of sixty per cent ad valorem.

This was a scire facias, or a proceeding in the nature of a scire facias, against bail. The plaintiff, Lane, obtained a decree upon a libel on the admiralty side of the court, for $100 damages and costs, against John M. Jordan, on the 27th of June, 1S33. On the 12th of December following, he took out execution and delivered it to the deputy marshal, returnable at the next February term of the court.

<p>Case No. 8,055.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Stopping Patment op Commercial Paper — Fourteen Days’ Stoppage — Assignment in Meantime.</p> <p>A merchant who stops the payment of his commercial, paper cannot prevent the running of the fourteen days, necessary to make this stoppage an act of bankruptcy, by the execution of an assignment for the benefit of all his creditors, previous to the expiration of said period.</p> <p>[Cited in Riley v. Carter (Md.) 25 Atl. 673.]</p>

This was a suit for wages. It appeared that the libellant [Richard Lang] shipped, as first mate, on board the ship John, of which the respondent [Benjamin Holbrook] was master, on the 12th August, 1836, at Philadelphia, for a voyage to St. Thomas and elsewhere; that in the shipping articles there was the following clause: — “Provided, that if any of the crew disobey the orders of the master, or other officer of 'the vessel, or absent himself at any time without liberty, his…

<p>The adjudication of bankruptcy in the case of J. H. B. Lang was made November 26, 1867. The bankrupt filed in court his application for a discharge November 27, 1868, and the question was raised ex parte whether his application was within one year from the adjudication, as required by section twenty-nine of the bankrupt act.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,059.</p> <p>Patents — Usefulness — Whether Usefulness Matter for Jury — Ornamental Mode of Puttino up Thread.</p> <p>1. An invention or improvement for which a patent has been obtained, must be useful within the meaning of the patent law [1 Stat. 318], or the patent is void.</p> <p>[Cited in Blake v. Smith, Case No. 1,502; Milligan & Higgins Glue Co. v. Upton, Id. 9,607; Heed v. Reed, Id. 11,650.]</p> <p>[Cited in Dickinson v. Hall, 14 Pick. 219; Rowe v. Blanchard. 18 Wis. 442; Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 62.]</p> <p>2. Whether the usefulness of an invention be matter of fact to be left to the jury, or whether the court are to decide it as matter of law? Quere.</p> <p>3. But, it seems, that if on the plaintiff’s own showing, the invention appears to be useless, and an imposition on the public, the court should so direct the jury.</p> <p>[Cited in Whitney v. Emmett, Case No. 17,* 585.]</p> <p>4. An invention of an ornamental mode of putting up thread, which gave it no additional value, but merely made it sell more readily at retail, and for a larger price, was held not useful, within the meaning of the patent law.</p> <p>[Cited in Alcott v. Young, Case No. 149; Pratt v. Rosenfeld, 3 Fed. 336; Faulks v. Ivamp, Id. 900.]</p> <p>5. Specification held bad for uncertainty.</p>

Bill in equity. The bill alleges that the complainants [Paul Langdon and another] were appointed executors of Elizabeth Sew-all by her will, dated July 25th, 1834. That she died Sept. 8th, 1838; that the said Elizabeth, by her will, and the codicils thereunto annexed, devised all. her estate to certain devisees therein named, which will was proved on December 3d, 183S, and letters testamentary were granted on May 6th, 1S39.

[The bill in this case was originally filed by the plaintiffs against William Goddard and another. The bill was dismissed for want of certainty and other reasons after answer. Case No. 8,060.

James F. Joy commenced in this court an action of ejectment against the present complainant for one hundred and sixty acres embraced in the purchase by Joy of the Cherokee neutral lands.

[The brig Langdon Cheves sailed from the United States on a voyage to Lisbon, with a cargo of provisions, in May, 1813, and was captured by a British vessel, and sent into Bermuda. After a detention of about six weeks, she was permitted to proceed on her voyage.

[The brig Langdon Cheves sailed from the United States on a voyage to Lisbon, with a cargo of provisions in May, 1818, and was captured by a British vessel, and sent into Bermuda. After a detention of about six weeks, she was permitted to proceed on her voyage.

This was a hill in equity, filed by [William H.] Langley against [Lemuel] Perry, to revise and reverse an adjudication of bankruptcy, by the district court, on the petition of Perry against Langley. Held: First That the circuit court, under the second section of the bankrupt act, had jurisdiction in tjiis matter to revise and correct and reverse the rulings and judgment of the district court, in proceedings in bankruptcy. Second.

<p>Case No. 8,068.</p> <p>[1. While it is entirely competent for the parties to yary the responsibility of the towing boat as a common carrier under the maritime law, the words in the towage contract “at the risk of” her master and owners, do not discharge the towing boat from the exercise of all reasonable skill, attention, fidelity, and precaution in the performance of the contract]</p> <p>[ 2. A steamboat is liable for the loss of one of her tows in collision with a vessel at anchor, while endeavoring to round the Battery in New York harbor, against a strong ebb tide, with a large tow, where it was apparent that she had not sufficient force to make the maneuver.]</p> <p>[Cited in The Brooklyn, Case No. 1,938.]</p> <p>[NOTE. An appeal was taken by the claimants to the circuit court, which affirmed the decree, Circuit Justice Nelson delivering the opinion. Case No. 13,717. The claimants then appealed to the supreme court. Mr. Justice Davis, in delivering the opinion, reviewed the evidence, and found that the steamer was guilty of great negligence in attempting, with so large a tow, to pass the Battery into East river. She should have divided her tow, or not made the attempt until the tide slacked. Upon the law involved, the learned justice remarked,that: “It is unnecessary to consider the evidence relating to the alleged contract of towage, because, if it be true, as the appellant says, that, by special agreement, the canalboat was being towed at her own risk, nevertheless, the steamer is liable if, through the negligence of those in charge of her, the canalboat has suffered loss.” And further, that: “Although the policy of the law has not imposed on the towing boat the obligation resting on a common carrier, it does require, on the part of the persons engaged iu her management, the exercise of reasonable care, caution, and maritime skill; and if these are neglected. and disaster occurs, the towing boat must be visited with the consequences.” The decree of the circuit court was affirmed. 12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 167.]</p>

On the 8th of July, 1868, the register in this case allowed and issued, on the written application of the assignee, an order for the examination of the bankrupt under the twenty-sixth section of the act, returnable on the 5th of August, 1868.

<p>Case No. 8,069.</p> <p>Note Gives for Lottery Tickets — Illegal Contract.</p> <p>1. Held, that no action can be maintained on a contract, the consideration of which is either wicked in itself or prohibited by law.</p> <p>2. A due bill given for money claimed to be due from the sale of lottery tickets is void.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,072.</p> <p>Evidence — Party to Suit — Hearsay — Report of Surveyor.</p> <p>1. What a witness has heard two settlers say as to one having sold his right to another, is but hearsay, and cannot be given in evidence.</p> <p>2. How far, and to prove what facts, the report of the surveyor under an order of court to survey and plot the land in dispute, may be given in evidence.</p> <p>3. If there be two or more defendants in ejectment, and no evidence be given of the possession of one of them, the jury may find a verdict for him at the bar; and he may be examined by the other defendants.</p>

<p>Cáse No. 8,071.</p> <p>Creditor’s Bill — Powers of Chancery — New Remedy by State — Fraudulent Conveyances.</p> <p>1. The general chancery powers of a court of the United States, are derived under the laws of the United States, and not under the laws of a state.</p> <p>2. But where a new remedy is authorized by a state, which may be appropriate to the exercise of a chancery jurisdiction, this court will give relief in the mode provided.</p> <p>3. On this ground, a creditor’s bill will he sustained to reach all the rights and credits which a judgment debtor may have, although they can not he reached by execution.</p> <p>[Cited in Wilkinson v. Tale, Case No. 17,678; Shainwald v. Lewis, 6 Fed. 774.]</p> <p>. 4. Fraudulent conveyances, for this purpose will be set aside.</p>

This ejectment [by Lanning against Moses Dolph, John Ferris, and Samuel Ferris] was to recover four hundred and thirty acres of land in Luzerne county, surveyed in the name of David Brown. It is one of the sixteen surveys mentioned in the case of Lan-ning v. London [Case No. 8,074], and the same, or nearly the same evidence was given in both cases.

Ejectment for lands lying in Luzerne county [brought by Lanning against I. London, Samuel Perris, John Perris, and Moses Dolph]. The lessor of the plaintiff claimed under an application made on the 11th of October, 1792, in the name of Seth Pearce, .•and a warrant founded thereon, dated the 16th, for four hundred acres of land, including Lackawanna river, and adjoining land ■granted this day to David Brown, in Lu-zerne county.

[This was an action in ejectment by Lan-ning against J. London, Samuel Ferris, John Ferris, and Moses Kolph. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiff against all the defendants except London. Case No. 8,074.

<p>Case Wo. 8,076.</p> <p>Evidence — Documents—Sheriff’s Deed — Sale under Judgment.</p> <p>To entitle a party to give a sheriff’s deed in •evidence, a copy of the record of the judgment under which the sale was made must be produced.</p>

<p>[This was a suit in bankruptcy by Livingston Lansing, receiver, against Sarah L. Man-ton.]</p>

For several years previous to June, 1873, [George] Lanz was engaged in partnership with B. H. Randall, of Saint Peter, in the manufacture and sale of boots and shoes.

On motion by the defendant to remand the cause to the state court. It was removed to this court by the plaintiff, on the ground that he was an alien, being a subject of the grand duke of Mecklenburg. The defendants are citizens of Minnesota. The removal was under the act of March 3, 1875 [18 Stat. 470].

A receiver was appointed of the rents and profits of certain real estate in this case, under the following circumstances: There had been a mortgage on the property, and a decree of foreclosure and sale, the sale Deing subject to the right of redemption. The property was sold for considerably less than the amount due on the mortgage. This was a motion to rescind the order appointing the receiver.

Harwood had been decreed a bankrupt, and, on the 17th of May, Lapsley, one of his creditors, appeared before the commissioner, in… Held: was of considerable value. So, as to what was said by Eden (page 104), viz. that a creditor holding security was not suffered to prove, unless he surrendered the security, &c. Had the commissioner, in this case, been familiar with bankruptcy proceedings, he would have refused to let Lapsley prove, except on a surrender of his stock.

2 [The plaintiff [Ephraim Larabee] sued the defendants [James Cortlan and James Cort-lan, Jr.] for an infringement of his patent-right [No. 5,993] for an improvement in shower-baths. The defendants also held a patent for the bath constructed by them.

This was an appeal from a decree of the district court which established a lien on the brig Larch for expenditures made by the master and part owner. [Case No. 8,086.] The facts briefly were, that Haskell, being master and owner of one half of the brig, contracted, in the autumn of 1853, with his co-owner to take and employ her, on shares, in the business of freighting. From the autumn of 1853 the brig was variously employed and carried freight.

<p>Case Mo. 8,086.</p> <p>Maritime Liex — Part Owner and Master’s Advances and Disbursements — Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Accounts — Libel to Settle Account.</p> <p>1. A part owner of a vessel, when the other part owners are present, has no authority to charge them by ordering repairs without their consent.</p> <p>2. But when a part owner is in possession he has that authority, when the vessel is in a foreign port and the other owners are absent.</p> <p>3. In the latter case, he has a lien for his disbursements on the other owners’ shares which he may enforce by a libel in rem in the admiralty.</p> <p>[Cited in Pettit v. The Charles Hemje. Case No. 11,047a. Disapproved in The H. E. Willard, 52 Fed. 388.]</p> <p>4. The admiralty has no jurisdiction over matters of account, merely as accounts, although it max have jurisdiction oxer all the items in the account.</p> <p>[Cited in The C C. Trowbridge, 14 Fed. 876.]</p> <p>[Cited in Swain v. Knapp, 32 Minn. 432, 21 N. W. 416.]</p> <p>5. If it is apparent from the pleadings, that the main object of the libel is the settlement of the account, the libel will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Cited in The Saginaw, 32 Fed. 176.]</p> <p>6. If the accounts arise incidentally in the cause, then it is a question of sound discretion, whether the court will proceed with the cause. If the accounts are simple, consisting merely of offsets, the court will strike the balance and give judgment fon that. If they are multifarious and involve the settlement of intricate questions of law or equity, which more properly belong to another forum, the libel will be dismissed.</p> <p>[Cited in The John E. Mulford, 18 Fed. 458, 459.]</p> <p>NOTE. Another view may be taken of this case which may be thought entitled to some consideration, and which leads to the same conclusion. The prime cause of all these disasters, was the uuseaworthiness of the vessel when she started on her voyage. Now, it is a principle of natural justice incorporated into all systems of jurisprudence. that every voluntary and responsible agent shall be held answerable for damages caused by his own fault. The correlative rule, deduced from the same principle of universal justice, is that no one shall be responsible for an injury not caused by his fault or that of some one for whose acts he is responsible. The Román jurisconsults, who were as profoundly versed in the philosophy of morals and the abstract principles of justice as they were in the positive laws of their own country, carried out these principles to their last results. By the noxal action the owner was responsible for an injury caused by the unlawful action of his slave. But when the will of the master did not concur with that of the slave in his act, as was ordinarily the ease, he might exempt himself from personal responsibility by abandoning to the injured party the slave, or noxa as he was called, with his peculium, the private property of the slave, which custom and the humanity of the Roman masters allowed their slaves to possess. This followed the slave as an accessory. Instit. Just. 4, 8, in principio. The same principle was applied to damages done by an animal. The owner could exempt himself from farther responsibility in abandoning the animal when no fault was imputable to him. Instit. Just. 4. 9, in principio; Dig. 39, 2, 7, 5L And following out still more vigorously the logical conclusion of the noxal action, the jurisconsults allowed an abandonment when the injury was caused by inanimate things, as a building. When the owner left it in a ruinous condition, so as to be dangerous to neighbors and others who might be exposed to it in falling, the owner was liable for the damage, but he could withdraw himself' from personal liability bv abandoning the materials. Rudera. Dig. 39, 2. 6; Dig. 39, 2. 7. § 2. With such curious logical consistency did the great Roman jurisconsults follow out this radical idea, that the responsibility for damage should rest only on that which was the cause of the damage, that the analogy of the noxal action was carried into the praetorian action damnum infectum. When a building was in a ruinous condition, and by its dilapidation dangerous to a neighbor, he might have a praetorian action to compel the owner to give security for future damages. Damnum infectum. If the owner refused, the praetor put the petitioner in possession either of the whole building or such part as threatened damage to him. Yoet ad Pand. 39. 2. 10. And when this possession was confirmed by a second decree, he substantially became the proprietor. He did not indeed acquire the dominium civile but only the dominium praetorium. But the praetorian or equitable dominion was a possession under which the absolute or civil dominion could be gained by usucaption or prescription. And by one of these fictions and subtleties, which so abound in the Roman law, he was presumed, under a second decree, to have had the possession under a just title, that is the praetor’s decree, for the time which was required to perfect his dominion by prescription, and, therefore, under the second decree it became its own absolutely. Dig. 39. 2. 15. 516; Yoet ad Pand. 39. 2. 12.</p> <p>Toullier, the most learned commentator on the French Civil Code, and one of the most profound jurisconsults of the last age, says that the noxal action was founded in justice, and he quotes with approbation the reason given for the limitation of responsibility in the institute. “Namque erat ini-quum nequitiam eorum ultra ipsorum corpora dominis damnosam esse.” Int. 4. S, 2. We find something like the principle of the noxal action in the original elements of the maritime law, in the limitation of the responsibility of owners to their interest in the ship, and her accessory the freight for any damage occasioned by the fault or insufficiency of the ship. The maritime law, from considerations of public policy, and in the interest of navigation and maritime commerce, extends the principle, and limits their responsibility, also, to cases of damage arising from the acts of the master or any of the ship’s company, to the same measure. In all this, so far as it follows the principles, of the noxal action, there seems to be at least a specious semblance of natural justice. If an owner lets his ship by a charter party, knowing her to be unseaworthy and unfit for the voyage, he may justly be held responsible for all the consequences on the ground of fraud. But these defects of vessels are often latent and unknown. It then seems neither to be unnatural nor unjust, that the employer should take some part of the risk. The just and natural consequence of such a limitation of a creditor’s right and remedy to a particular part of the debtor’s property, is to give him a lien and preference against that property, over all other creditors. This is done by the maritime law in the most direct and simple mode, by allowing him to proceed in rem, and to take the thing itself into custody for security. In the Roman law this lien on the thing, if in that law it may be so called, was enforced in a more indirect circuitous and inconvenient way. There the party injured brought a personal action against the owner, according to the nature of the tort or delictum, and the owner might either pay the damages or abandon the slave. But though the noxai action followed the delinquent slave into the hands of a new master, if he had been transferred, yet there does not appear to be anything like a direct lien, amounting, as in the maritime law, to a tacit hypothecation. Inst. 4, 8, 6.</p> <p>In this case, as the damage was caused by the fault or insufficiency of the ship without any absolute fault of the owner, by the principles of the noxal action, he might abandon the ship and freight for the damage, and, by the principles of the maritime law, these became hypothecated for an indemnity.</p>

[This was a libel by Andrea Larco against the schooner Martha and Elizabeth for the recovery of damages caused by collision.]

•[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.j This was an information against the sloop Lark and cargo, for an alleged violation of the laws of the United States.

<p>Case No. 8,089.</p> <p>Admiralty — Jurisdiction — Action for Sum Agreed to be Paid on Discharge— Seamen’s Wages.</p> <p>An agreement by the captain of a vessel to pay wages is sueable in the admiralty. But another stipulation in the same contract to pay a sum of money, if the voyage should be altered or discontinued, must be enforced at common law.</p> <p>[Cited in Plummer v. Webb, Case No. 11.233; Cox v. Murray. Id. 3.304; Grant v. Poillon, 20 How. (61 U. S.) 1C8; Peck v. Laughlin, Case No. 10,890.]</p>

Claim for about fifteen acres of land [part of the orchard of Santa Clara] in Santa Clara county, rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimant [Thomas O. Larkin],

<p>Matthew Wright, by his will, dated May 15, 1847, after devising parts of his real estate, gave to his three nephews “$500 of the scrip or' stock in the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company standing in my name; also the stock standing in my name in the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank of Georgetown, said stock being for $2,500; also $1,000 of the stock of the Franklin Insurance Fire Company of Washington standing in iny name.” He then gave the sum of “$2,000 to A., and $1,500 to B., and $300 to C.” All these pecuniary legacies to be paid within three months after his death. Then follows this bequest: “I give and bequeath, after the payment of the foregoing bequests and legacies, unto the mayor, etc., of Washington, in their corporate character and as a body politic, the sum of $20,000 out of the 6 per cent, stock of that corporation standing in my name, if so much should remain, out of my personal estate after satisfying all previous bequests, in trust to the said corporate body, and by whatever name it shall at any time be known, to apply the interest thereof to and in aid of supporting the several now incorporated orphans’ asylums in Washington, and in trust that upon the expiration of the time for redemption of said stock, or any part thereof, the said mayor, etc., for the time being shall, by a public act of legislation or by a municipal act. reinvest or direct the reinvestment of said sum of $20,000, or such part of it as has been or may be redeemed, in good and sufficient security, yielding an interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum if practicable, so that such interest on said sum of $20,000 may be distributed and continue to be in equal shares to said orphans’ asylums that are now incorporated, to the end of their corporate existence; and upon the determination of such corporate existence in or to said asylums, then to the said mayor, etc., for the time being for the general purposes of said corporate bodies of said city, and to increase its general forever.” He then devises all the residue of his estate to his three nephews in fee, and provides that if his Irish devisees could not take, his executors should sell and carry the proceeds to the general fund of his assets in their hands, and that a sum equal to the amount of such proceeds of sale shall be taken from his personal property, stocks and assets, and paid by his executors to said devisees. He then declares his estate to be a trust property for the payment of such devisees, and gave all his said property of every kind unto [James] Adams and [Matthew] Trimble in trust (until the real estate shall be conveyed to the several devisees and the pecuniary bequests and stocks are paid or transferred to the legatees), to stand seized for said devisees and legatees, and convey and pay and transfer said legacies and real estate to them. Adams and Trim-ble were appointed executors. The testator died May 23, 1847; the dividends were payable April 1 and July 1.</p> <p>Orphans’ Court, July 18, 1848. In this case it appears that the said Wright died in May, 1847, giving and bequeathing, after the payment of certain legacies mentioned, “unto the mayor, board of aldermen and board of common council of the city of Washington, in their corporate character and as a body politic, the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), out of the six (6) per cent, stock of that corporation, standing in my name, &e., in trust to the said corporate body, &e., to apply the interest thereto, and in aid of supporting the several now incorporated orphan asylums in the city of Washington in the District of Columbia, &c., &e.;” and it is urged by the said [James] Larned and [Thomas] Carbery, in behalf of said asylums that the said institutions are entitled not only to the interest accruing on the said stock from and after the death of the said testator, but also to the interest thereon for the. portion of the quarter which had expired at his decease. Pecuniary legacies in general, where no time is designated in the will for payment, are not necessarily payable till the expiration of a year after the testator’s death, that being the time allowed the executor for getting in the effects; and, therefore, in such case, interest does not begin to be payable till the year expired, and it has even been held in a case where the will directed that a legacy should be paid “as soon as possible,” that interest upon it was only due from the end of the year from the testator’s death. This general rule of giving interest to the legatee from the expiration of the year is not to be extended or contracted upon slight inferences of intention. If, however, the interest is to come out of an estate devised for that purpose; or should the phraseology of the will be such as to contribute a “specific” legacy, then, in each of these, cases, interest will be due from the testator’s death.</p> <p>The legacy under consideration does not come out of an estate devised for that purpose. It remains to be seen whether or not it is “specific,” and the courts appearing to have been generally averse to construe legacies “specific” except on clear intention, it will be necessary to look into the decisions as to what has been held to constitute a “specific” legacy, and then weigh well the language of the will. A “specific” legacy has been defined to be “the bequest of a particular thing or money specified and distinguished from all others of the same kind, as a piece of plate, stock in the public funds, a security for money which would immediately vest with the assent of the testator.” It is “an immediate gift of the fund with all its produce., and is therefore an exception to the general rule, that a legacy does not carry interest till the end of a year after the testator’s death.” It seems to be settled that mere possession by the testator, at the date of the will, of stock or annuities of equal or larger amount than the bequest will not, without words of reference or an intention appearing on the will, that the testator meant the identical stock of which he was possessed, make such bequest “specific,” and it has been held that where legacies are given “out” of stock which the testator was possessed of at the date of the will, “they are not prima facie ‘specific,’ though, in the nature of ‘specific’ legacies, and their character will be determined by a regard to the intention of the testator.” The intention of the testator on the subject has always, in the construction of wills, principally to be recognized. Thus the word “my” preceding the word “stock” has been on several occasions adjudged sufficient to render the legacy “specific,” for a bequest of “ten shares in the Bank of -,” the testator owning at the time that amount, is a general, and not a “specific" legacy; insert the word “my” before the word “ten,” so as to make the testator bequeath “my ten shares in the Bank of-,” and the bequest becomes “specific.” Again, it has been also held, that if a testator bequeath a sum of stock “standing in my name,” this is a “specific” bequest. The testator in this case gives twenty thousand dollars ($20,-000) “out” of the six (6) per cent, stock of the corporation, &c. Thus far, as we have seen, the bequest, although not prima facie “specific,” is in the nature of a specific legacy, it being given “out” of stock. In continuation, the testator has not used the word “my,” it is true, before the word “stock,” but we find the bequest to be of stock “standing in my name,” the expression necessary (in the absence of the word “my”) under the decision last herein alluded to, to constitute a “specific” legacy. I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that the language used evidences an intention to bequeath the identical stock of which the testator was possessed at the time of making the will; and therefore the bequest is “specific.”</p> <p>The postponement of payment of this legacy until after payment of other legacies and bequests mentioned prior thereto in the will, should not, I think, operate against the enuring to the benefit of the specific legatee, if the interest accruing between the death of the testator and the time specified for the payment of the legacy, for the following reason: When legacies are given out of personal estate consisting of outstanding securities, although these legacies cannot be actually paid until the money due upon such securities is actually gotten in, yet, by a rule that has been adopted for the sake of general convenience, the personal estate is held to be reduced into possession within a year after the death of the testator; interest is payable upon such legacies from that time unless some other period is fixed by the will. Payment of the legacy may be actually impracticable within the year, yet, in legal contemplation, the right to payment exists and carries with it the right to interest until actual payment. Such, I apprehend, would be the legitimate conclusion in this case. The bequest being “specific,” the right to it vests upon the death of the testator, the right to the principal carries with it the right to the interest, therefore the right to the interest vests at that time, the payment, however, of both principal and interest to be deferred under the will un til the legacies named shall have been satisfied. In reference to the claim alleged in behalf of the said asylums to the interest accruing on the said stock, for the portion of the quarter prior to the testator’s death, the court can only remark, that the right to the interest cannot be older or extend farther back than the right to the principal; and that, as a “bequest” or “legacy” can have no legal existence prior to the death of the testator, the right to interest cannot extend beyond that period. It is, therefore, adjudged that the said asylums are entitled to and shall receive said stock from and after the death of the testator. Nath’l Pope Causin, Judge of O. C.</p> <p>The legatees appealed.</p> <p>The executors contend that upon appeal from the orphans’ court, the appellate court shall not only affirm the order of the court below, but shall “direct in what manner it shall be changed or amended.” Act Md. 177$, c. 101, sube. 14, § IS. If the orphans’ court went too far, it must be restricted. If there is error in any point, though the judgment is right upon the particular point decided, the court examines the entire record and reverses the judgment. Speake v. Sheppard, 6 Har. & J. 81; 1 Am. Com. Law, 388.</p> <p>The orphans’ court has decided that the legacy of $20,000 to the corporation is a specific legacy, and that it carried interest from the death of the testator; but that dividends which accrued between his death and the next pay day belonged to his executors. Generally legacies bear interest only from the end of the year, and the rule is not to be extended; but a specific legacy is an exception, and carries all the Interest or increase. A bequest of “my ten shares of stock” is specific, and the words “out of stock standing in my name” are equivalent * * * where it is $1,000 out of my stock.” A gift of sheep will pass the lambs; so of a bond, the interest due and to be become due. 2 Williams, Ex’rs, p. 876, § 6; Coleman v. Coleman, 2 Yes. Jr. 639; Raven v. Waite, 1 Swanst. 557; Ladd v. Ladd (1824) [Case No. 7,972]; 4 Ves. 471 note.</p> <p>The executors transferred the stock three months after the death of the testator, and claimed the dividend to July 1, “The legacy was a pecuniary one, as it was to come out of the testator’s general personal estate; it was essential to a specific legacy that it should be capable of delivery as a body, and therefore no interest was payable until the end of the year, or only from July 1, or certainly not beyond the testator’s death. 2 Williams, Ex’rs, 880; Coleman v. Coleman, 2 Yes. Jr. 640; Simfnons v. Vallance, 4 Brown, Ch. 347; Innes v. Johnson, 4 Yes. 573; Kirby v. Potter, Id. 747; Walton v. Walton. 7 Johns. Ch. 272; 6 Wheeler, A. C. L. 419; Chaworth v. Beech, 4 Ves. 555; Smith v. Lampton, 8 Dana, 69; Cog-dell v. Cogdell, 3 Dessaus. Eq. 373; Deane v. Test, 9 Yes. 147; Dawes v. Swan, 4 Mass. 208, 215; Sullivan v. Winthrop [Case No. 13,-600]; Smell v. Dee, 2 Salk. 415; Bitzer v. Hahn, 14 Serg. & R. 232; Act Md. 1795, c. 101, subcc. 5, 7, 10. Administrator must retain till expiration of twelve months.</p> <p>2 [The law inclines against specific legacies (.2 Yes. Jr. 639, 640, and note 2), referring to stock to pay legacy is only demonstrative of the fund. The wording must be very special to make a legacy special instead of general. Simmons v. Vallance, 4 Brown, Ch. 347; Innes v. Johnson, 4 Ves. 573. Legacies may be specific in one sense and general in another. Specific as out of a certain fund. Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 262; Wheeler, Am. Com. Law, 420. General or pecuniari-as consisting only of a definite sum and not amounting to the fund itself. Chaworth v. Beech, 4 Yes. 555, note. Leaning against specific legacies in the case of Innes v. Johnson, 4 Yes. 572. There was the particular bond given. Legacy of $1,000 out of my reduced annuities pecuniary. Kirby v. Potter, 4 Ves. 747, see note. The courts are adverse to construing legacies to be specific. 2 Williams, Ex’rs, 840; Smith v. Lampton, 8 Dana, 09; Cogdell v. Cogdell, 3 Dessaus. Eq. 373; Wilson v. Brownsmith, 9 Ves. ISO, reversing Ashton v. Ashton [3 P. Wms. 3S3], as to stock being a specific legacy. Rule clear that interest commences only from the expiration of a year from the testator’s death, unless there is a day named for it. The exception is in cases of children and minors. 6 Whaley, Am. Law, 422.</p> <p>The rule is laid down by the circuit court of the United States in Sullivan v. Winthrop [Case No.' 13,600], that “interest commences in a pecuniary legacy at the expiration of a year from the death of the testator, whatever may be the position of the estate, unless some other period is specified. Buie laid down for interest. Smell v. Dee, 2 Salk. 415; Bit-zer v. Hahn, 14 Serg. & B. 232. The state of Maryland, allows legacy to be paid in part only on condition. See Act Md. Nov. 179S, c. 101, sube. 10, § 7. Payment of even a • specific legacy requires a petition. See section 8. Legatee may, after twelve months, sue for his legacy upon giving bond. See Act. Md. April, 1718, c. 5, § 2. In general, pecuniary legacies bear interest only from the end of the year from the death#of the testator. Hammond v. Hammond, 2 Bland, 306. An annuity, like a pecuniary interest, carries interest only from the end of a year after the testator’s death. Jones v. Stockett, Id. 409.</p>

[Appeal Alburtus Larowe from the decision of the commissioner' of patents refusing a patent for an improvement in self-acting carriage brakes.]

<p>Case No. 8,096.</p> <p>Public Lauds — Ejectment—Equitable Title.</p> <p>1. The location of land with scrip, under and in compliance with the act of congress of July 17, 1854 [10 Stat. 304], passed the fee out of the United States, and was equivalent to a patent.</p> <p>2. In ejectment, the defendant cannot, in the courts of the United States, set up an equitable title.</p> <p>[See Baird v. Wolfe, Case No. 760.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern, district of New York.] This was an action brought by [Stephen Larrabee and others], the owners of the brig Philip Larrabee, to recover for a collision between the vessels in night of September, 1855, while the brig was at anchor off Holmes’ Hole. The only question as to the collision was whether it was the Piedmont which ran into the brig.

On June 6th, 1870, the sheriff of Dakota county, Minnesota, under a power of sale in a mortgage executed by William S. Hardick and Anna J. Hardick, his wife, sold the property in controversy — the west half of the southeast quarter of section thirty (30), township one hundred and fifteen (115), range nineteen (19) — eighty acres of land — and delivered a certificate qf sale to the purchaser, Palona Atherton, which was duly recorded June 14th.

<p>Case No. 8,098.</p> <p>Imprisonment for Fine — Insolvency—Effect of Fine as Judgment.</p> <p>[1. A state insolvent debtor’s act will not operate to release one imprisoned under process of circuit court to enforce judgment of fine in a misdemeanor case.]</p> <p>[2. The act of 1867 (14 Stat. 543) is only applicable to cases of “imprisonment for debt, existing by any laws of any state,” and the act of 1863 (12 Stat. 656) was designed not to make the sentence a judgment in debt for any other purpose than to authorize execution against defendant’s property. Neither act authorizes the release of one imprisoned for failure to pay fine in a misdemeanor case.]</p>

[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] The original petition in this case was filed on May 6, 1874, by [Jules A.] Blanc & Legendre, liquidators of the commercial firm of that name, against the firm of A. Las-trapes & Co., composed of Charles Lastrapes, Alfred E. B. Lastrapes, and Mary L. H. Lastrapes, wife of Dr. A. Landry, of the parish of St. Martin.

[This was a suit in equity by La Société Anonyme des Mines et Fonderies de Zinc de la Vieille Montagne against Charles H. Baxter and others for the alleged violation of complainants’ trade-mark.]

A verdict having been rendered in this case, at April sessions, 1807, and a new trial awarded, the cause now came on again to be tried. The defendant being indebted to the plaintiff, in a certain sum of money, was, in September, 1804, discharged under the insolvent law of this state.

The plaintiffs [W. H. Latham et al.], one a citizen of Minnesota, and the other a citizen of the state of Indiana, sued the defendants [A. H. Barney et al.] in the district court of the county of Waseca, in the state of Minnesota.

<p>[In the matter of Robert Lathrop and others, composing the firm of Lathrop, Cady & Burtis, bankrupts.]</p>

[In the matter of Robert Lathrop and others, comprising the firm of Lathrop, Cady & Burtis, bankrupts. The case was heard upon petition of Morgan and Clark asking that certain proofs of debt filed by C. D. Prescott be disallowed. The court referred the case to the register to report upon the testimony to be taken by him as to what, if any, of the Prescott claims should be disallowed. Case No. 8,103. The case is now heard upon the report and all the papers in the ease.]

[In the matter of Robert Lathrop, Daniel Cady, and Samuel Burtis, partners as La-throp, Cady & Burtis, bankrupts. The district court sent the case to the register to make report as to the rejection of certain claims against the bankrupt filed by C. D. Prescott. Case No. 8,103. The case is now first heard by the register upon the examination of Prescott, and second by the court upon the certificate of the register of refusal to answer.] Cyrus D.

Plaintiff, assignee of Adams, brought this bill for an account, &e., against defendants, to recover an alleged preference under the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)].

<p>Case No. 8,108.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Impairing Obligation op Contract — Tax on Debts or Contracts Owned Out of State — Taxes Paid Condition Precedent to Maintaining Suit.</p> <p>The act of the legislature of Georgia, approved October 13. 1870 [Laws Ga. 1S70, p. 401], which provided that in all suits brought in any court of the state, founded on any debt or contract made before June 1. 1865, or in renewal thereof, the plaintiff should not have verdict or judgment unless the court was satisfied that all taxes upon said debt or contract had been paid for each year since the incurring or making thereof, and that in every trial upon such debt or contract, the fact that the same had been legally returned for taxes, and the taxes paid thereon, should be a condition precedent to a recovery; impairs the obligation of contracts and is therefore unconstitutional and void. .</p> <p>[Cited in Baldwin v. Buswell, 52 Vt. 60.]</p>

Bill in equity, filed by Francis L. Lathrop and Lewis H. Taylor, citizens of the state of New Jersey, for themselves and other stockholders of the Junction Railroad Company, against the Junction Railroad Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, corporations incorporated and doing business under the laws of Pennsylvania.

[In error to the district court of the United States for the Western district of Missouri.] This case came up in the district court on a demurrer to the answer as not stating facts sufficient to constitute a defence. The demurrer was sustained by the district ■court, and the defendant [Gardiner] La-throp, declining to plead further, final judgment was rendered against him, to reverse which he has prosecuted this writ of error.

[This was an action at law by Sylvanus Lathrop against William Stewart. The court overruled a demurrer to a plea of discharge in bankruptcy. Case No. 8,113. The plaintiff then replied that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction. The ease is now first heard upon issue joined on this replication.]

<p>[This was an. action by Sylvanus Lathrop against William Stuart. Heard on demurrer to a plea of discharge in bankruptcy.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,114.</p> <p>Annuity — Duty of Tenant fou Life as to In-OÜMBIÍANOES — MORTGAGES—RECEIVER to Pat Charges.</p> <p>1. A personal decree will be made against the heir for an annuity charged on the land.</p> <p>2. A tenant for life is bound to keep down the interest of incumbrances, although the whole of the rents are exhausted by it.</p> <p>[Cited in Murdock v. Ford, 17 Ind. 55.]</p> <p>3. A court will sometimes appoint a receiver to pay the annual charges on the mortgaged premises.</p> <p>4. The above principles will be applied, if the land under incumbrances shall not sell for the debt secured by the mortgage.</p>

This action was brought [by Norman L. Latson against Herman Strum] upon a charter party of the steamer General McCallum, for a voyage from the port of New York to Tampico and back. According to the charter, the charterer was to bear all the expenses of the vessel, including insurance, and appoint all the officers and crew, except the master and chief engineer, and pay 8100 per day for the use of the vessel upon the voyage in question.

This was an action on the case tried before Judge LEAYITT and a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent [No. 12,GS2] granted to the plaintiff [Alexander B. Latta] April 10, 1S55, for an “improvement in steam generators.” The invention consisted of a boiler formed of a coil, or series of continuous tubes, into which the water was introduced • by means of a hand pump, as soon as the fires were lighted, so that water might be thrown upon hot pipes, and…

The plaintiff [William B. Laub] declared as follows: The said plaintiff, by his attorney, complains, that on the 21st day of February, 1S40. at the special instance and request of the said defendants [Enoch Lansdale and Christopher Lansdale], he let to hire and delivered to them a certain horse and buggy-carriage of the value of $350 to be used by them for one day for a certain reasonable reward, and they undertook and promised, that they would return the said horse and…

This was a libel in rem, filed by the United States against the bark Laurens, and $20,-000 in specie on board her, alleged to be forfeited to the United States for being employed in the slave-trade, in contravention of the acts of- congress of March 27, 1791, and May 10, 1800.

This is a libel in rem filed by the United States against the bark Laurens, and §20,000 in specie on board her, alleged to be forfeited to the United States for being employed in the slave-trade. Former proceedings in the cause are reported in [Case No. 8,121].

<p>This cause came on for hearing on two separate motions of defendants to dismiss the bill of complaint.</p>