Volume 15 — Federal Cases

This was an appeal from a sentence of the district court, in favour of the appellees, the obligees, in a bottomry bond against the ship Lavinia; the property of the assignees of Peter Blight, a bankrupt.

[In the matter of William Law, involving the subject of the oath to be taken by attorneys and counselors of the national courts, under the act of congress of January 24,1805 (13 Stat. 424).]

Assumpsit for professional services rendered by the plaintiff [John Law], who was an attorney and counsellor of this court.

[This was an action at law by the administrator of John Law against Alexander Scott.] The defendant was brought in upon a ca. sa. for costs in a suit which was pending at the time of his discharge under the insolvent act.

<p>Case No. 8,131.</p> <p>Land Grants — Grant to John Law — Treaty with Prance — Louisiana Purchase.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,132.</p> <p>Waste — Bill in Equity to Restrain — Holder of Certificate of Sale — Land Sales upon Execution.</p> <p>1. In Wisconsin, under the Revised Statutes of 1849, the holder of a certificate of sale of land •on execution cannot maintain a bill to restrain waste. He has neither title nor right of possession until his deed is issued.</p> <p>2. The laws for the sale of lands upon execution contain the whole system,, and the court cannot supply any supposed deficiencies.</p> <p>NOTE. For the present statute concerning waste, which has taken the place of the one upon which this decision was founded, though following most of its provisions, see 2 Tayl. St. Wis. (1871) 1695, § 9. For the present statute, as to redemption from sales of lands under execution, consult same volume, page 1557 et seq. For a full discussion of the subject of injunctions to stay waste, with numerous citations of authorities, consult High, Inj. c. 9.</p>

<p>[In the matter of James Lawrence and others, alleged bankrupts.]</p>

The bill in this case was exhibited to obtain an injunction to enjoin the trial of a case on the common-law side of this court. A motion is now made on the bill, exhibits, and affidavits, for the issue of an injunction. The facts as set forth in the bill, and the objections urged against the granting of the injunction, are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Samuel E. Lawrence against Joseph E. Cupples and others, for the infringement of a copyright]</p>

Bill in equity [by William B. Lawrence against Richard H. Dana, Jr., Charles C. Little, Augustus Flagg, John Bartlett, Henry J. Miles, and Martha B. Wheaton], praying for an account, and for an… Held: by birth, association, and still more by his own labors and merits, a rank among the leading men of his day.

<p>Case No. 8,137.</p> <p>Creditor’s Bin, — Assignment foe Benefit of Creditors — Assent of Assignees • —Preference.</p> <p>1. An assignment of property to creditors, or for their benefit, to others, cannot be held void for want of consideration.</p> <p>[Cited in Gates v. Labeaume, 19 Mo. 27; Hard-castle v. Fisher, 24 Mo. 73.]</p> <p>2. To give an assignment of property validity, the assignees must assent to it.</p> <p>[Followed in Pierson v. Manning, 2 Mich. 462. Cited in Gibson v. Chedic, 1 Nev. 497.]</p> <p>3. By the common law a debtor may give a preference to certain creditors over others. And this is not prohibited by any statute of Illinois.</p> <p>[Cited in Fuller v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio St. 363; Mathews v. Stewart, 44 Mich. 216, 6 N. W. 635.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,138.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Transfer — Through Agency of Third Party — Register — Power to Administer Oath — To Take Deposition— Charge to Jury.</p> <p>1. Although-a register may have no authority to take a particular deposition, he has full authority to administer oaths, and when by the assent of parties he has taken such a deposition to be used in evidence in a cause, the same becomes a sworn statement made in the case to be used as evidence therein, to which the party causing the deposition to be so taken cannot object.</p> <p>2. It is not error to direct the attention of the jury to the distinction between “reasonable cause to believe,” and “actual belief.”</p> <p>[Cited in Babbitt v. Walbrun, Case No. 695.]</p> <p>3. If a father-in-law, when his son-in-law is known by him to be insolvent, and within a few days of his voluntary application to be adjudged a bankrupt, buys, out of the usual course of trade, a large portion of the insolvent’s property, and gives notes payable at long dates, cashes the notes and pays to his own son as mortgagee the money thus furnished, in discharge of a mortgage on the property of his daughter, who is the wife of the bankrupt son-in-law. that is certainly a transfer of the bankrupt’s property to his wife in fraud of his creditors through the agency of the wife’s fnther, and therefore fraudulent and void.</p>

This was a libel in rem filed [by John S. Lawrence] against the brig [Lieutenant Admiral Callomberg] to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by a cargo of fruit shipped on board the brig at Palermo, in December, 185-, to b$ carried to this port. The answer averred the full performance of the bill of lading, except that 414 boxes of lemons and oranges perished from inherent tendency to decay, and without fault or negligence on the part of the vessel.

Bill in equity to vacate assessments for street improvements upon lands of the orators’ testator, in the city oj ->e.\v a or, . up it the ground that the assessments, though regular in form, were fraudulent in fact, and for that reason void, but constituted a cloud upon the title.

Assumpsit on a policy of insurance. A verdict being found for the plaintiff, in this case, it was, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, referred to auditors, to ascertain the amount of the loss for which the underwriters were liable, deducting the salvage.

This was an action upon a judgment recovered in this state in favor of the plaintiff [Mary J. Lawrence], to which the defendant [Henry W. Remington] has interposed two defenses: First.

This action was brought to recover a balance of account claimed to be due to the plain • tiff, under the4 following circumstances. The plaintiff was employed to execute certain stone work, in constructing the locks on the Schuylkill Canal, for which he was to receive a stated compensation, as was proved by witnesses on the trial.

[This was a libel in rem by Sebastian D. Lawrence and others against the steamship .Roanoke for collision.] The libel in this case was filed by the owners of the schooner Sidney Miner, to recover for the loss of the schooner and a full cargo of coal and marble, by a collision with the steamboat, which happened about 11 o’clock on the night of April 5, 1856, about 18 miles south of Barnegat. The night was clear with a good breeze from the northwest.

<p>[This was an action at law by Lawrence and Emmerson against Sherman.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,145.</p> <p>Official Bonds — Suit against Surety — Receipts of Postmaster — Judgment more than Penalty of Bond.</p> <p>1. A transcript from the postoffiée department, to show the indebtment of a postmaster, need not contain a full copy of his quarterly returns. In such return, the postmaster strikes the balance due by him, and this is sufficient to charge him.</p> <p>2. Where the surety is charged with receipts, for postage, for a part of the quarter, the return for the full quarter is evidence, to show an average liability for a part of it.</p> <p>3. A payment made, by a postmaster, of a greater sum than the receipts for the preceding quarter, should be applied as a credit for the quarter, as well before as after the date of the bond.</p> <p>4. On a penal bond, a judgment can not be rendered beyond the penalty.</p>

Assumpsit to recover a sum of money alleged to be due to the plaintiffs [William Lawrence and Benjamin Adams] from the defendant [William Vernon], as his proportion of a large sum of money paid by them for widening the lower end of Doane street, upon which the defendant was an abutter and owner of real estate. Plea the general issue.

<p>[This was an action at law by Josiah Lawrence against White and Stevens.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,148.</p> <p>State Exemption — Exemption Law Passed aptee Suit Commenced — Greater Exemption— Adoption op Law by Coukt.</p> <p>A suit after it shall have been commenced, cannot be affected by a state law extending the exemption of the property of the defendants, such law never having been adopted by the court; and the law previously adopted authorized an exemption to a more limited extent.</p>

By B. J. M. HURLEY, Register: I, the undersigned, having been designated by the court as the register in bankruptcy, before whom the proceedings in the above matter of the bankruptcy of James H. Lawson are to be had, do hereby certify that in the due course of such proceedings the following question, pertinent to the same, arose, and was stated and agreed to by Francis Brengle, assignee, and James H. Lawson, bankrupt. “Where the bankrupt’s property has been seized and sold…

This case, tried on December 4th, 186S, was the first that has arisen in the Maryland district upon specifications of the creditors against the discharge of the bankrupt [James H. Lawson].

The schooner L. B. Goldsmith was built in Toledo in 1855. In the winter of 1856, she was libeled at Detroit, and decrees pronounced against her to the amount of $750. The vessel was sold by the marshal for $3,-000, and after payment of the decrees, there was a surplus of about $2,250, in' the registry. N. & N. W. Edson file their petition; and claim the greater part, and B. F. Bruce & Co. file an answer, and a petition that the amount be paid to them as managing owners.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States. [Libel by William P. Lea against the ship Alexander and her cargo for salvage.] ■

[This was a bill in equity by Charles W. Lea and others against Frank Deakin for the infringement of an alleged trade-mark.]

<p>Case Wo. 8,156.</p> <p>Limitation op Actions — New Promise.</p> <p>[A promise by a debtor to a bankrupt creditor, acting in behalf of the assignee of an account, to settle the same, is sufficient to take a suit thereon by said assignee out of the statute.)</p>

[Appeal by Phineas Leach from the decision of the commissioner of patents, rejecting his claim for a patent for an improvement in weather strips for doors, etc.)

<p>Case No. 8,157.</p> <p>Bankbuptot — Examination before Register — . Cross-Examination.</p> <p>A bankrupt on examination may be cross-examined by his own counsel.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Collins, Case No. 3,008.]</p>

[These were suits by the Leadville Mining Company against Fitzgerald and others, and by Stevens & Leiter against Murphy and others, to enjoin defendants from taking ore. from ' within the limits of complainants’ claim, and to recover damages for ore already taken. Applications have been made in each case for an injunction.]

Lead-better against Ephisditus T. Kendall for recovery of certain goods belonging to the plaintiff which were alleged to have been illegally seized.]

This was a libel in personam, by George Leak against Michael Isaacson, owner of the steamboat Proprietor, to recover a balance of wages earned as engineer. The facts were substantially as follows: The libellant was hired by the respondent in New .York to go to Charleston, and there to go on board the Proprietor as engineer. No wages were agreed upon; but the value of the services for the time for which the libellant was attached to the boat was shown to he $70.

<p>Case No. 8,161.</p> <p>Carriers — Delivery op Cargo — Shipping—De-murrage — Evidence of Party in Interest.</p> <p>[1. The carrier fulfills his undertaking by bringing the cargo to the appointed port with notice to the consignee of that fact and the readiness of the ship to deliver it at a convenient and proper place.]</p> <p>[2. The testimony of the clerk of the respondent will overcome that of libelant testifying for himself.]</p>

<p>[This was a libel in rem and in personam by Prince Sears and others against one cask of oil and Samuel Banker.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of Mississippi.) The libel was filed [by Thomas P. Leathers] to recover damages of the respondent [the Salvor Wrecking & Transportation Company] for wrecking and dismantling the steamboat Natchez, which was sunk in the Yazoo river, and which the libelant claimed to be his property.

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the district of Kansas.] In January, 1876, a petition in bankruptcy was filed by a single creditor against the Leavenworth Savings Bank, alleged to be a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Kansas. An order to show cause was issued and served.

■ Oliver R. McNary filed his petition in bankruptcy, alleging that the Leavenworth Savings Bank is a corporation, organized under the laws of the state of Kansas, and owes debts exceeding the sum of three hundred dollars; and that the petitioner’s demand exceeds the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars; and that said hank made a voluntary assignment of all its property and effects, on or about the 21st day of December, 1875, with intent to hinder and delay the creditors of…

<p>Case No. 8,167.</p> <p>International Law — The Rights or Consuls— Treaty with Hanseatic League — Admiralty Jurisdiction over Seamen’s Wages under Treaty.</p> <p>[The convention of April 30, 1852, between the United States and the Hanseatic League, does not preclude a citizen of the United States, who has served as a seaman on board of a vessel belonging to one of the Hanse towns, from bringing his action for wages for such service, in the admiralty courts of the United States.]</p>

In bankruptcy. Petition for discharge, both from individual debts, and debts of the firm of Nye & Leavitt, in which the bankrupt [Albert Leavitt] was a partner. Sundry creditors objected, because the bankrupt had fraudulently preferred one creditor, and had fraudulently conveyed away property to prevent its distribution in bankruptcy.

This was an action of assumpsit upon two notes held by the plaintiffs [Thomas H. Lea-vitt and Francis Hunnewell]. One was for the sum of $5,000, drawn by the Tolland County Peat Company, June 27th, 1866, payable to the order of the defendants, four months after date, and purported to be endorsed by the latter. It was payable at the First National Bank of Rockville, and was duly presented, payment refused, and protested.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. [This was a libel by Francis W. Leavitt and others against George W. Jewett and others to recover for damages sustained by a collision.]

<p>Case Mo. 8,171.</p> <p>Comers — Jurisdiction—Citizenship Averment— Repugnant Averments — Lost Note Assigned —Right op Promisee to Bring Suit — Legal Right to Note after Assignment.</p> <p>1. The citizenship of the party, which is to give jurisdiction to the court, must be specially averred.</p> <p>2. That the plaintiffs are citizens of New fork, to wit, of Illinois, where the suit is brought, is a repugnant averment.</p> <p>3. On a lost note which has been assigned, suit must be brought in the name of the assignee. The promisee being in possession of the note, and having assigned it merely for the purpose of collection, may strike out the assignment, and sue in his own name.</p> <p>[Cited in Parks v. Brown, 16 Ill. 456.]</p> <p>4. The legal right is vested in the assignee, and can only be divested by striking out the assignment as above, or by reassignment. Counts before verdict may be discontinued.</p>

Logan made his will as follows: “X devise to my wife Julia Logan, for her maintenance and support, my house and lot, &c., during her life, and at her decease to become the property of Joshua Logan; the said property not to be subject to sale or mortgage, but to descend to his children, free and unencumbered; but in case he has no children living at his death, then and in that case to become the property of my daughter, Julia Richardson, in fee simple, or of her heirs, in…

<p>[This was an action at' law by Samuel Ledgerwood and others against Pickett's heirs.]</p>

This was a motion to have the petitioner examined before a commissioner, prior to a decree being passed. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that until he was declared a bankrupt, he was not subject to examination. Cur ad vult.

<p>Case No. 8,176.</p> <p>Executors — Will Requesting no Security — When Allowed in Virginia.</p> <p>The orphans’ court of Alexandria county cannot, in any case, grant letters testamentary without security, unless the testator’s visible personal estate is sufficient to pay all the debts.</p>

<p>Case Ho. 8,179.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Illegai.lt Preferred Creditors— Bight to Prove Debt — Two Claims, Only One Preferred.</p> <p>1. The amendments of 1874 [18 Stat. 178], so far as they change the existing law in reference to the rights of assignees to recover property transferred in contravention of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)]: and in reference to the proof of debts by creditors who have taken a preference, are not retroactive and do not apply where the proceedings in bankruptcy had been previously commenced.</p> <p>[Cited in Warren v. Garber, Case No. 17,196.]</p> <p>2. Under the prior law a preferred creditor who did not surrender his preference until he was compelled to do so by the judgment of a court, could not prove his debt.</p> <p>3. If a preferred creditor has two separate claims and receives a preference on one of them alone, he may prove the other.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Aspinwali, 11 Fed. 138.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,180.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Flight while upon Bail — Contempt — Right Thereafter to be again Liberated — Pardon — Nominal Punishment Thereafter.</p> <p>1. A person accused of a series of crimes, under each of two distinct heads, was, after a regular commitment, liberated upon a regular recognizance of bail, on the usual condition to appear in court to answer any charges, and not depart without leave. Under one of the heads of accusation, three bills of indictment were afterwards found for certain of the offences with which he was charged. He was tried, under one of these indictments, and convicted. Before sentence he absconded. Having been afterwards arrested and brought into court, he was under this conviction, sentenced to pay a fine and undergo a certain imprisonment. By a special pardon, this imprisonment was remitted, on condition that the fine should be paid. The pardon did not apply to the charges in the other two indictments for offenses under the same head of accusation as the offence of which he had been convicted, nor to any of the offences charged under the other head of accusation. The fine having been paid, and his imprisonment under the sentence having been terminated by the pardon, he was in custody under a recommitment to answer the other charges. Upon a subsequent application by him to be admitted to bail, his flight was considered such a wilful breach of the essential condition of his liberation upon bail that his privilege of such liberation had been forfeited.</p> <p>2. This forfeiture of the privilege was independent of. or collateral to, the contempt of court which had been incidental to the wilful breach of the condition. Therefore, after the contempt was purged, or sufficiently punished, his detention in custody, without admission to bail, might be continued under the recommitment.</p> <p>3. A renewal of the forfeited privilege of liberation upon bail was not demanded of right, and could not be reasonably asked of grace, nor allowed under an exercise of properly regulated ju•dicial discretion, because it was apparent, from his former flight, that, if again thus liberated, he might probably again abscond.</p> <p>4. But, beyond the proper duration of imprisonment for the contempt, his detention without admission to bail should not be prolonged, except for the purpose of secure custody till trial or other lawful deliverance from commitment.</p> <p>5. The forfeiture of the ordinary privilege of liberation upon bail involved no forfeiture of his ulterior privilege of deliverance — either by trial •or otherwise — without unreasonable delay. If a new privilege of deliverance on bail arose from delay of trial, the only proper effect of the forfeiture of the original privilege would be upon the amount of bail requirable, and the number of sureties. And if he would otherwise, from unreasonable delay of trial, be entitled to an absolute discharge, the forfeiture of the original privilege might not prevent such discharge.</p> <p>6. The charges against him under the same head as the offence of which he had been convicted were so complicated with it that all of them had necessarily been considered in determining the measure of the punishment in the sentence to which the pardon applied. The indirect effect of the pardon, therefore, was that, if he should be convicted afterwards of another offence under that head, his punishment would be but nominal. In determining the punishment imposed by that sentence, none of the charges against him under the other head of accusation had been thus considered. But under this other head no indictment had been found for any one of the offences charged; and from the past and inevitable future delay it was apparent that, if hereafter indicted for any of them, he would not be triable under such new indictment until after a longer imprisonment than would be allowed without admission to bail in a case originally not bailable. The circumstances were such that this would have been the case if he had not absconded. He was, therefore, admitted to bail, hut in an increased amount, with an addition to the ordinary number of securities.</p>

[This was an action on a policy of insurance by David B. Lee against the Aetna Insurance Company. Heard on motion to remand cause to the state court]

This was an action on the case tried by Judges McLEAN and LEAVITT and a jury, to recover damages for the alleged infringement of letters patent [No. 7,027] for an “improvement in hanging circular saws,” granted to Nicholas G. Noreross January 15, 1850, and assigned to plaintiffs March 28, 1856.

Bill for an accounting and to recover of defendants the proceeds of goods consigned to them, the bill of lading for which had been assigned to complainant by the consignor as security for his draft drawn against the goods shipped.

[This was a proceeding in equity by George Washington Custis Lee against Azro Chase, sole heir of George W. Chase, deceased.] The finding of the court, and the judgment rendered, were as follows, and were based upon the late decision of the United States supreme court in the case of Tacey v. Irwin, 18 Wall. [85 U. S.] 548. The finding was agreed by counsel.

<p>[This was an action by James Lee and Co. against the Chillicothe Branch Bank of the State of Ohio.]</p>

This was an action brought by the plaintiffs, as indorsees of the defendants, on fourteen bills of exchange.

The bankrupt, John ¡H. Luehrman, was a member of the firm of Woerheede, Luehr-man & Bro., owning one-third interest in a planing-mill and its business. The firm was solvent. In June and July, 1868, the bankrupt indorsed for the firm of Th. Klein-schmidt & Co. two notes, one for two thousand five hundred dollars, maturing September 24, 1868, and the other for three thousand five hundred dollars, falling due October, 1868.

[This was an action at law by Hannah Lee against the Guardian Life Insurance Company to recover upon a policy issued by defendant upon the life of her husband.]

The plaintiff [George W. C. Lee] sued in ejectment for the recovery of the'Arlington estate, near Alexandria. Held: occupied, and possessed by the United States, through its officers and agents, charged in behalf of the government of the United States with the control of the property, and who are in actual possession thereof as public property of the United States for public uses, in the exercise of their sovereign and constitutional powers, as a…

In ejectment. The case came on for trial on the merits of this term of the court, the same counsel on either side in attendance as on the trial of the question of jurisdiction [Case No. 8,191], and was put to the jury. The- only questions of law that could arise in the» case were of course upon the prayers of counsel for instructions to the jury.

This was an action upon the case upon the statute of Virginia of 25th January, 1798, §§ 6, 7, by [E. J. Lee,] the owner of a slave, against [Benjamin Lacey,] the master of a Georgetown packet-boat, for damages for carrying the plaintiff’s slave from Alexandria to Georgetown, whereby the plaintiff lost the service of the slave from the 29th of April to the 21st of May, and was put to great expense, &c. There were two counts upon the statute, namely, one for carrying away, and…

This was an action [by Henry Lee] against the defendant [Levi Lincoln], as collector of the port of Boston, to recover back the amount of duties, paid under protest, upon a quantity of gunny cloth, imported by the plaintiffs, and charged with the duty on cotton bagging by the collector.

This was a bill in equity brought to enforce a conveyance to the plaintiff [John C. Lee] of one-sixteenth of a vessel called the Philip Tabb, and to account for the profits received from it. The complainant claimed title to this extent in the vessel in consequence of its having been bought and paid for by Joseph Lee, on the 24th of October, 1832, and the said Joseph dying in 1845, John Whipple, his administrator, having assigned the above share of Joseph to the complainant.

At Law. Action by John Lee & Son against the New Haven, Middletown & Willimantic Railroad Company to recover for work done under a construction contract. Heard on defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Detinue for negro Frederick. IV. Wilson made a deed of trust of this negro to Mr. E. J. Lee, to secure Mr. Kennedy.

Bill in equity, wherein complainant [Richard B. Lee] seeks to establish a trust in his favor as to certain lands situate in the city of Oakland, held and claimed by the defendants [Daniel Rogers, administrator, and others]. The pleadings and evidence establish the following facts: In the years 1858 and 1859, Andrew J. Coffee was the owner of the lands in question. He had become embarrassed.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] The libelant [Hamilton L. Lee] having obtained a judgment in personam against the respondents [James M. Thompson and others], issued an execution thereon, which was returned that no property could be found.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by T. S. Lee against William Thornton and Thomas Monroe.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,204.</p> <p>Arrest in Civil Cause — Affidavit to Hold to Bail — Whole Debt not Due — Sureties not Resident.</p> <p>When a bond for the payment of money is filed, an affidavit to hold to bail is not necessary, and the court will not mitigate the bail upon affidavit that the whole is not due; nor receive as bail persons not resident in the district.</p>

<p>[This was a bill for an injunction by Harry Harewood Leech, Felix G. de Fontaine, and Charles Dimetry against William G. Fre-ligh.]</p>

The alleged bankrupt [William Leeds] was a dealer in live stock. His business done through the bank, alone, had exceeded $500,-000 per annum. His real estate, worth about $8,000, was incumbered to the amount of less than half its value. The alleged acts of bankruptcy were giving a warrant to confess judgment, and a suspension of payment of his commercial paper for fourteen days.

This was a plea of land, wherein the plaintiffs demanded against the tenant, James Cameron, seizin and possession of certain tracts of land therein described, and alleged that they were lawfully seized of the premises within twenty years last past; and that the said Cameron hath since entered into the premises, and thereof unjustly disseised them, and still unlawfully held the premises from them. Plea, the general issue.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] The appellees in this case [Caleb Goodwin, Andrew' Flannigan, and Samuel Trimble] filed their libel in the district court against the appellant [Heury Leef] and Luke League, as joint owners of the schooner Light, to recover for wrork and materials furnished said vessel.

<p>[In the matter of Israel Le Favour, a bankrupt.]</p>

This was an action [by Charles Le Franc against Frank Richmond] for the possession of a tract of land in Santa Clara county, and was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, by consent of parties, at the July term of 1864.

<p>[This was a bill in equity, filed by Henry Leger, a citizen of the state of New York, against John Rice, Theodore Cuyler, Samuel C. Perkins, John Price Wetherill, Lewis C. Cassidy, Henry M. Phillips, William S. Stakeley, Henry W. Gray, Daniel M. Fox, Samuel W. Cattell, Henry Huhn, citizens of Pennsylvania, asking for an injunction against the defendants to restrain them from proceeding in any manner in the construction of certain public buildings in the city of Philadelphia by virtue of an alleged authority contained in an act of assembly of Pennsylvania approved August 5, 1870 CP. L. 1871, p. 1548), and also asking that said act be declared unconstitutional and void.</p> <p>[The said act provided, according to its title, “for the erection of all the public buildings required to accommodate the courts, and for all municipal purposes in the city of Philadelphia and to require the appropriation by said city of Penn Square, at Broad and Market streets, to certain institutions (such as the Academy of Fine Arts. Franklin Institute, etc.), in the event of said square not being selected by a vote of the people as a site for said buildings.”</p> <p>[The act designated the defendants to be commissioners for the erection of said buildings, giving them power to fix the compensation of employés, elect their own members to fill vacancies, to erect buildings upon ek ther Washington or Penn Squares, as determined by the vote of the citizens, held at an election authorized by the act of March 30, 1870 (P. L. 1870, p. 677), which act provides that the citizens of Philadelphia county should by ballot express their preference for a site for public buildings in said city, provided, however, that the buildings should not be placed in Independence Square.</p> <p>[The said commissioners were also empowered to make requisitions upon councils for funds, and at the proper time remove certain buildings from Independence Square.</p> <p>[It was alleged that said act was unconstitutional, because it contained three distinct subjects, the second of which was not mentioned in its title, viz.: (1) The construction of public buildings by the commissioners on either Penn or Washington Squares; (2) the removal of buildings on Independence Square; (3) the contingent donations of Penn Square to four private corporations.</p> <p>[Also because the legislature had delegated to the voters of Philadelphia the power to legislate upon the question whether certain real estate, of great value, and theretofore used for public purposes by prescription, should be given away to certain private corporations, in violation of the constitution of the United States and that of Pennsylvania.]</p>

This was a bill for dower in two tracts of land, which had been sold and conveyed by the husband on the 28th of October, 1776, to P. Marchinton. who conveyed the same to General Humpton, under whom the defendant claims, and for rents and profits since the institution of this suit.

Motion to remand cause removed to the circuit court of the United States, Western district of Pennsylvania, from the chancery of New Jersey, to the latter court.

The plaintiffs [John Lehmaier and others] made two importations of goods in the year 1852. They had purchased the first about two months before shipment, and the price in the invoice was the purchase price. On an appraisal and a reappraisal the value had been raised more than 10 per cent., and the penalty of 20 per cent, was accordingly exacted, and paid under protest.

The plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant on a promissory note, and sued out an attachment on the alleged grounds that the defendant had sold, and was about to sell, his property, with the fraudulent intent to cheat his creditors.

[In error to the district court of the United States for the Middle district of Alabama.] On the 18th of February, 1873, Lehman Brothers filed in the district court of the United States for the Middle district of Alabama, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, their petition in the usual form, and containing the necessary averments, praying that Albert Strassberger might be adjudged a bankrupt.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the Southern district of Ohio. Held: in the district court, that the measure of damages was the difference between the market price at the time when the plaintiffs learned that the sale had been made and the price at which the sale had been made. This discovery was on October 10, 1S73. On October IS, 1S73, Stone became bankrupt.

[This was a bill in equity by B. Leidersdorf and others against J. G. Flint for an injunction. Defendant demurred upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction. The case is now heard upon the demurrer.]

<p>Case No. 8,220.</p> <p>Obstructions in Navigable Rivers — Right to Construct Piers or Booms — Acquiescence — Duty or Boom Owner — Rights — How Construed— Boom Owner mat Use Channel Remaining.</p> <p>1. The Oconto river is, in contemplation of law, a navigable stream.</p> <p>2. Individual property owners upon its banks have, strictly speaking, no right to construct booms or piers in it without authority from the legislature.</p> <p>3. The status of the owner of such boom or pier is not changed by the fact that they were purchased and not constructed by him.</p> <p>4. Where the construction of such piers and booms had been acauiesced in by the public, their owners must be considered to have acquiesced in their construction and maintenance by one another. One boom owner cannot bring a suit against another simply for the construction and maintenance of a boom.</p> <p>5. Nevertheless it is the duty of the boom owner not to interfere with the rights of other persons or their property on the river, and he must use unusual diligence in keeping a passage-way clear.</p> <p>6. It seems, that as to any person not connected with any Buch obstruction, the construction and maintenance of piers or booms would be illegal, and the owner would be accountable for any damage so sustained.</p> <p>7. The rights of the public should be liberally, and those of the boom and pier owners strictly, construed.</p> <p>8. The owner of a pier or boom does not thereby cease to have the right to use the channel which remains — he still retains that right in common with all others.</p> <p>NOTE. As to how far riparian owners may erect wharves and piers, and the limitation by navigability of the stream, consult Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black [06 U. S.] 23; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. [77 U. S.] 497. The erection of a dam without legislative authority in a river, in fact navigable, is unlawful, whether it interferes with the navigation of the river or not. Wisconsin River Imp. Oo. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61. Any erection or obstruction not authorized by competent legislative authority, which materially interferes with the paramount right of navigation, is unlawful. Northwt. stern Packet Oo. v. Atlee [Case No. 10,341], decided by Dillon, X, in the United States circuit court of Iowa.</p>

<p>[Petition for discharge, in the matter of John Leighton, a bankrupt.]</p>

The libel alleges that on the 12th of June, 1857, the libelant [Thomas Leitch] was a pilot, duly licensed and qualified according to the laws of the state of New Jersey and the statutes of the United States, to pilot vessels to and from the port of New York, by way of Sandy Hook; that being then on board the pilot-boat Thomas H. Smith, upon the high seas, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court, about eight miles off Barnegat, seeing the said…

<p>Case No. 8,224.</p> <p>Common Carrier — Liabilitt of — How Limited— Bill of Lading — When Limitation Binding — Effect of Tender.</p> <p>1. The common-law rule that in the absence of express contract a common carrier is liable for all loss or damage sustained by property in his hands as carrier, unless caused by the act of God or the public enemy, affirmed.</p> <p>2. The carrier may limit his responsibility by special contract with the shipper, in which case the contract, and not the rule of law in the absence of a contract, becomes the measure of the carrier’s responsibility.</p> <p>3. The question as to whether the carrier, in the bill of lading given to the shipper, has inserted a clause limiting his liability to a specified valuation of the goods shipped, is a question of fact for the jury; but the legal effect or construction to be given to such contract is a question of law for the court.</p> <p>4. Where the carrier has plainly embodied into the contract a clause limiting his liability to a specified amount, as by writing it distinctly in the printed blank used as a bill of lading, with no attempt at concealment, so that it can be read at once by any one reading the contract, the shipper is bound by such limitation, where he accepted the contract or bill of lading without objection or dissent, even though he neglected to read it and was, in fact, ignorant of its particular provisions. Such a ease is distinguishable upon principle from those where the carrier has attempted to limit his liability by an obscure notice, in fine print, or otherwise concealed, so as to escape the attention of the shipper.</p> <p>5. In the absence of any limitation in the contract, restricting the carrier’s liability to a specific valuation of the goods shipped, the jury are authorized, in case of loss, to find the carrier liable for the full value of the goods, as shown by the proof.</p> <p>6. A tender of a less amount than that due is of no effect. A tender of a sufficient amount, if made after suit brought, only has the effect of stopping costs against the defendant making tbe tender from the time it is actually made.</p>

A demurrer to the original bill of complaint was sustained by Mr. Justice Miller and Tudge Hallett, at the July term, 1877, with leave to file an amended and supplemental bill. Such a bill has been filed, and the defendants severally demur to the same. It is on this demurrer that the cause is now before the court. The amended and supplemental bill is filled with redundant and irrelevant matter, but it states in substance the following facts: 1.

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Northern t district of Illinois.] Certain' creditors [Levi Z. Letter and others] of the insurance company, on the 14th of November, 1872, filed a petition in bankruptcy against it, alleging various acts of bankruptcy, and asking that it be adjudicated a bankrupt.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[Iii the matter of Simeon Leland and others, bankrupts.] This was an application to compel a witness to answer certain questions put to him on a reference ordered at the instance of the assignee in bankruptcy. It appeared that Warren Leland, one of the bankrupts, had, before the bankruptcy, issued five hundred bonds of $1,000 each, with coupons attached, secured by a mortgage of real estate.

[In Wp matter of Simeon Leland, Warren Leland, and Charles Leland, composing the firm of Simeon Leland & Co., bankrupts.

[In the matter of the bankruptcy of Sime-on, Warren and Charles Leland, composing the firm of Simeon, Leland & Co. Warren and Charles Leland composed a second firm, called Leland Bros., who owned and operated a hotel at Saratoga Springs.

<p>Case No. 8,232.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Evidence—Attorney —Discharge of Bankrupt.</p> <p>1. Creditors, opposing the discharge in bankruptcy of two of the three bankrupts above named, offered in evidence depositions made by each of the three, in an equity suit brought by the assignee against the bankrupts and other parties, and also the decree made in that action. They also offered to prove statements to other parties made by the third to the bankrupts: Held, that the deposition made by each of the two bankrupts was evidence against himself; that the deposition and statements made by the third were not evidence against either of the two; and that the decree, was evidence against each of them.</p> <p>2. The creditors also offered to call as a witness the counsel who appeared for the bankrupts, but he declined to be sworn, requesting the counsel for the creditors to state what they expected to prove by him, and promising to admit it, if it was proper to do so: Held, that the counsel must be sworn and examined as a witness.</p> <p>3. The creditors also offered in evidence a bill of complaint in an equity action brought by the assignee against H. and others, a notice of appearance for H. and for one of the bankrupts and his wife, a withdrawal of that notice, a refusal by the complainant’s solicitor to receive the withdrawal, a supplemental bill and the answer of the bankrupt’s wife thereto, and a satisfaction of mortgage referred to in the bill; Held, that none of said papers were admissible in evidence against the bankrupts.</p> <p>[NOTE. The right of another creditor to prove his claim, passed on in Case No. 8,233. The action of the assignee in bringing suits against the fraudulent preferred creditors is sustained in Case No. 11,220. The right of the sheriff to fees, Case No. 11,221. The right of the district court to expunge the claim of the fraudulently preferred creditors, Case No. 8,235.]</p>

[In the matter of the bankruptcy of Simeon, Warren and Charles Leland. composing the firm of Leland & Co. For the proceeding heretofore had in this case, only incidentally connected with this case, see Cases Nos. 8,228, 8,220. 8.230, 8,231, 8,232. and 8,234.] Nathan D. Morey presented to the court a petition, setting forth that he had a claim against the estate of the above bankrupts for unliquidated damages, arising out of the following facts, viz.: That, in 180S, the…

<p>Case No. 8,284.</p> <p>Bankruptcv — Chattel Mortgage — Not Recorded at Debtor’s Residence — Vendor’s Lien in Bankrupt Court.</p> <p>1. N. sold to L., and delivered into his possession, certain chattels, taking therefor the note of L., payable one day after date, without grace, and a mortgage on the chattels, to secure the note, and renewals of it, endorsed on it. Four noteg\ias one renewal of it, made three days after its date, were endorsed on it, the latest of which became due in six months. The mortgage was not renewed, within twelve months, under the law of New York, by filing it in the town where L. resided. Afterwards, L. was adjudged a bankrupt. The chattels were never taken back into the possession of N., and passed into the hands of the assignee. N. claimed their proceeds, the notes not having been paid: Held, that N. had no lien as vendor, apart from the mortgage lien, because he had parted with the possession of the chattels, and the sale was not on an agreement that the title should not pass, or that the delivery of possession should be other than absolute.</p> <p>[Cited in Hutchinson v. First Nat. Bank, 133 Ind. 280, 30 N. E. 952.]</p> <p>2. The mortgage, because not so filed, was void as against creditors, and as against the assignee in bankruptcy, representing them.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Field v. Baker, Case No. 4,-762. Cited in Platt v. Stewart, Case No. 11,-220.]</p> <p>3. So long as N. did not take possession of the chattels, the statute as to filing the mortgage operated. although the first note was not paid at maturity, and the other notes were not given until two days afterwards.</p> <p>4. Although the title of the 'mortgagee of the chattels becomes absolute as between him and the mortgagor, by forfeiture, on default of payment of the mortgage debt, it is, nevertheless, necessary to file the mortgage, if the possession of the mortgagor is suffered to continue.</p> <p>5. The assignee in bankruptcy represents all the creditors; and. whatever right they might assert as creditors, if they had obtained judgments, he may, for their benefit, assert, whether it be to set aside conveyances by the bankrupt which are fraudulent and void as against creditors, or which are otherwise, as against them, invalid.</p> <p>[Cited in Barker v. Barker’s Assignee, Case No. 986: Re Werner, Id. 17,416; Miller v. Jones, Id. 9,575; Re Duncan, Id. 4.131; Platt v. Preston, Id. 11,219; Platt v. Mead, 9 Fed. 96; Platt v. Matthews. 10 Fed. 281; Olney v. Tanner. 18 Fed. 636; Jones v. Smith, 38 Fed. 381; Pearsall v. Smith, 149 U. S. 231, 13 Sup. Ct. 835.]</p> <p>[Cited in Mass°y v. Gorton, 12 Minn. 145 (Gil. 83): Tabor v. Cilley, 53 Vt. 488; Edwards v. Entwisle, 2 D. C. 48.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For a construction of the real-estate mortgages, see Case No. 8,230, and the re-examination of the same debts, Case No. 8,231. The bankrupts’ discharge, in Case No. 8.232. The right of certain creditors to prove their claims, in Case No. 8.232. The action of the assignee in bringing suits against certain fraudulently preferred creditors is sustained in Case No. 11,220. The right'of the district court to expunge the claim, of fraudulently preferred creditors is considered upon appeal by the circuit court in Case No. 8,235.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,236.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Preferences — Right to Pbove Debt.</p> <p>A determination by the district court, in a bankruptcy proceeding, to which a creditor was a party, that such «editor had received a fraudulent preference, and that, in consequence thereof, he was disabled to prove any part of his debt, is an adjudication which debars him from subsequently proving his debt and authorizes the district court to expunge his claim, when proved.</p>

<p>The libel in this case is filed by [Francis Leland] the owner of the ship President Fil-more, to recover the freight on 116 hogsheads of tobacco, brought from New Orleans to this port in August, 1853, under a bill of lading which specified that the tobacco was shipped “deliverable at the Tobacco Inspection wharf,” to be carried to the port of New York, and there delivered to the respondents [William Agnew and others]. The ship arrived at this port during the latter part of August, and, as the yellow fever then prevailed at New Orleans, she was compelled to undergo quarantine. Tobacco, however, was permitted to be brought up to the city without undergoing quarantine. The ship having been ordered to be discharged, the libelant notified the respondents to get a permit, and take their tobacco from the ship. The respondents insisted that the libelant should lighter it up to the Tobacco Inspection wharf, but the libelant refused to do this, telling them that if they did not send lighters for it, it would be stored at the Atlantic docks at their expense. Thereupon the respondents sent lighters for the tobacco, and brought it up to the city. The libelant then brought this suit for the freight, and the respondents tendered and paid into court the amount of freight, less the expense of lighterage, claiming to deduct that from the full freight.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was an appeal from a decree of the district court, dismissing the following libel.

<p>Case No. 8,239a.</p> <p>Notes — Action against Assignor — Diligence in Prosecuting Maker — Maker not Found.</p> <p>1. The assignee of a note must use due diligence, by prosecuting the maker to insolvency, or show some sufficient excuse for the failure, before he can hold the assignor liable.</p> <p>2. That the maker is a transient and unsettled person, without averring insolvency, is not sufficient to excuse the holder from using due diligence.</p> <p>NOTE. If the maker is notoriously insolvent, so that a suit would be fruitless, the assignee is not bound to sue him, before he can resort to the assignor, because the law never requires an useless act. Saunders v. Marshall, 4 Hen. & M. 455.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,239b.</p> <p>Contract — Absurdity—Want of Consideration —Contra Bonos Mores.</p> <p>1. L. and P. agreed to run a horserace, and it was stipulated that if either failed to run the race, the obligation for six cows and calves should be in full force against the other; held, that this contract was absurd in its terms; that the court would not reform it according to the supposed intention of the parties, and that no action would lie upon it.</p> <p>2. Where there is ambiguity in a contract, the court will search out if possible the intention of the parties, and enforce it accordingly; but a construction which would impose a liability on one party when the letter fixes it on the other, cannot be tolerated, and especially where the contract is without a valuable consideration, ánd immoral-in its tendency.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] This is a contest between the Bank of North America, of St. Louis, and [J. B. R. Lemoine] the assignee of Earickson A Boyd, bankrupts, respecting the liability of that firm on the indorsement of the name of the firm upon two promissory notes. A copy of one of these notes is as follows: “St. Louis, June 11, 1873.

This was an action to recover back an excess of duties imposed by the defendant [Hugh Maxwell] as collector of the port of New York, and was removed by the defendant, by certiorari, into this court, from the supreme court of New York. The article imported was a refuse of woolen cloths, used by paper manufacturers in making velvet paper.

The streets of Georgetown are common highways. If the hack-owner be not a resident of Georgetown, and if he charges nothing for carrying the passenger into Georgetown; if he only cbar-.ges for carrying him to the western limits of the city; he does not violate the by-law. The contract was to take the passenger from the Capitol to the Union Tavern, in Georgetown.

<p>The petitioner [Mary L. P. Lenox.] was the widow of William A. Lenox, who died, leaving a last will and testament, in which he bequeathed to her all of the personal, estate left to him under the will of his father. Peter Lenox. She claims that she is entitled to receive under her husband’s will the share her husband would have received as one of the distributees under his father’s will. The other legatees under the will of Peter Lenox filed a caveat claiming they were the sole legal heirs and distributees of the deceased William A. Lenox, and claiming the whole of the residue of the estate of Peter Lenox, now in the hands of the executors of the said Peter.</p> <p>The substance of the will of Peter Lenox will appear in the opinion.</p> <p>The case was argued by the counsel on both sides before the judge of the orphans’ court, NATHANIEL P. CAÜSIN, and EDWARD N. ROACH, Register of Wills.</p>

[This was a suit by John Lenox and Hewes Scull, as administrators of William Lenox, deceased, against Frederick Notrebe, Mary Ann Hamilton, and Margaret Hamilton, infants, etc., on original bill; and Mary Ann Hamilton and Margaret Hamilton, infants, etc., by their guardian ad litem, against John Lenox and Hewes Scull, as administrators of William Lenox, deceased, and Frederick No-trebe on cross-bill. Heard on motion for the appointment of a receiver.]

[This was a suit by John H. Lenox, surviving administrator of William Lenox, deceased, against Frederick Notrebe and others on original bill; and Mary Ann Hamilton and Margaret Hamilton, by their guardian, against Frederick Notrebe and others, on cross-bill. A receiver was appointed in this case. Case. No. 8,240b.] Bills in chancery.

<p>Case No. 8,247. •</p> <p>Conflict of Laws — Notes and Bills — Lex Loci Contractus. •</p> <p>The indorser at Alexandria, of a foreign bill of exchange, to a merchant in New York, is only liable for damages according to the law in force in Alexandria.</p> <p>[See Bank of Illinois v. Brady, Case No. 888.]</p> <p>[NOTE. This case, upon error, in the supreme court, was reversed, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivering the opinion of the court, in which he held that under the Virginia statute the charges of protest constituted an essential part of the debt, and should be set out in amount in the declaration. The declaration in this case declared for the charges of protest, but did not give the amount. Upon this ground — that the declaration does not state the demand with certainty — the judgment was reversed. 1 Cranch (5 U. S.) 194.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,248.</p> <p>Collision — Dark Night — Crowded Harbor-Compass — Vessel- at Anchor — No Lights —Both in Fault.</p> <p>1. It is culpable negligence in a ferry boat, to run on a dark night, through a crowded harbor, relying solely on a brass compass, which would not traverse so well as a lighter one, which was on board at the time.</p> <p>2. By the maritime law, a vessel at anchor, in a thoroughfare, in a dark night, is bound to exhibit a light.</p> <p>3. In a ease of collision, both vessels being in fault, the aggregate damage and costs were equally divided.</p> <p>[Cited in The Mary Patten, Case No. 9,223; The City of Hartford. Id. 2,750; Vanderbilt v. Reynolds.'Id. 16,839; The Pennsylvania, 15 Fed. 817.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,250.</p> <p>Collision in a Slip — Propeller’s Screw — Notice-Costs.</p> <p>1. A canal-boat was moored at a bulkhead, by lines sufficient to enable her to withstand all the ordinary forces of wind and tide. A large propeller, with a screw 11 feet 9 inches in diameter, was lying at the pier, with her stern towards the canal-boat, and 40 to 75 feet distant. A short time before the sailing of the propeller, her engine was put in motion, making about 30 revolutions a minute. This was done without any notice to the canal-boat, and the current made by her screw parted the canal-boat’s fasts, whirled her round in the slip three times, and drove her against the bulkhead with such force as to sink her: ffdd, that the propeller bad no right to set in motion such a current of water, in a crowded slip, without, in some way. notifying vessels likely to be affected by it, so as to give them opportunity to protect themselves from it, by getting out extra fasts, and that the propeller was liable for the damages.</p> <p>[Cited in The Daniel Drew, Case No. 3,565.]</p> <p>2. The question being a new one, no costs were awarded against the propeller.</p>

<p>Case lío. 8,251.</p> <p>Collision at Sea — Steamer and Schooneb— Speed — Fog Horn.</p> <p>1. A schooner was sunk by a steamer at night, some fifteen or twenty miles off Sandy Hook. The night was boisterous and dark, and, as the steamer claimed, foggy. The steamer was running six or seven knots an hour, although, as she claimed, an approaching vessel could not be. seen more than a leneth ahead. No fog horn was blown on board the schooner, and she claimed that the night, though dark, was not foggy. Held, that the steamer was in fault in keeping up such a rate of speed in such a locality on such a night, whether it was foggy or not.</p> <p>2. The schooner could not be held in fault for the omission to blow a fog horn, for the reason that a horn, if blown, would not have been available. on such a night, to give any useful notice to the steamer.2</p>

<p>Case No. 8,253.</p> <p>Collision — Stale Claim — Laches—Seamen’s Effects.</p> <p>1. The owners of a schooner filed a libel against the steamship Leo, owned by a corporation, to recover for her loss by collision. Before the trial of the cause, libels were filed against the Leo, on behalf of the seamen, on the schooner, to recover for the loss of their effects by the collision. No process was issued however on these libels until nearly five years thereafter, during which time the suit of the owners had been carried by appeal to the supreme court of the United States, which had held both vessels in fault. After such decision processes were issued on the seamen’s libels against the steamship, which still continued to be owned by the same corporation, although nearly all its stock had in the meantime been transferred to other hands: Bdd, that, if the libellants were ordinary persons, or if the libels had not been filed within a reasonable time, the claims would have been held to he lost by neglect to prosecute: but. the libellants being seamen, it was the duty of the court of admiralty to prevent their losing their claims by reason of the negligence of their proctor, if it could be done without injustice.</p> <p>2. No injustice would be done here by a decree in favor of the seamen, as the claimants were the same and were chargeable with knowledge of the fact of the loss of the seamen’s effects.</p> <p>3. The transfer of the stock of the corporation made no difference, for it could not be supposed that such claims as these could have made any difference in the value of the stock.</p> <p>4. The seamen therefore must have a decree for half their damages without interest or costs.</p> <p>[NOTE. There is no report of either of these' cases in the supreme court, and an examination of the supreme court docket fails to show any such case having been docketed. The records of the circuit court show that on October 2, 1873, a petition and bond on appeal were filed, but the proceedings appear to have been carried no further. In Case No. 8,254 the circuit court held (reversing Case No. 8,251) that the collision was the result of negligence of both vessels.]</p>

<p>[This was a libel by the owners of the schooner Saxon against the steamship Leo for damages on account of collision. There was a decree in favor of the libelants. Case No. 8,251. The case is now heard upon the question of witness fees.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,254.</p> <p>Colusión — Steamer and Sail Vessel — Thick and Stormy — Full Steam — Lookout—Dutx op Sail Vessel to Blow Fog-Horn.</p> <p>1. In a dark, thick and stormy night, and against a strong wind, a head sea, and the tide, a steamer was making all the speed she could, carrying steam up to the limit of her right. She collided with a sailing vessel: Held, that she was in fault for not slackening her speed. •</p> <p>2. Under articles 15 and 16 of the act of April 29, 1864 (13 Stat. 60, 01), the positive duty of avoiding collision with a sailing vessel is imposed on a steamer, and the speed of the steamer should be so regulated that she may be under control, and a collision be avoided, after the presence of the other vessel is ascertained.</p> <p>[Cited in Richelieu & O. Nav. Co. v. Boston Marine Ins. Co., 26 Fed. 602.)</p> <p>3. A steamer held in fault for not keeping a sufficiently careful lookout to discover the lights of a sailing vessel which she ought to have seen at a distance within which a collision could have been avoided by her after seeing such lights.</p> <p>4. A sailing vessel under way held in fault for not blowing a fog-horn in a fog.</p> <p>5. Neglect to blow a fog-horn being established, the vessel must show affirmatively that the horn, if blown, could have produced no effect.</p> <p>6. Both vessels being in fault, the damages were apportioned.</p>

On the 7th of January, 1871, a creditor’s petition, with proofs, was filed against defendant, praying that he be adjudged a bankrupt, etc. Thereupon a rule upon him to show cause was granted. He appeared, answered, and demanded a jury, and the parties proceeded to take testimony upon the issues made.

<p>Case No. 8,256.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Contract op Af-freightment-Waters within a State.</p> <p>Where a libel was filed against a vessel upon a contract to carry cargo on board of her from New York City to Troy, in the same state, to recover damages for an injury, from negligence, received by the cargo on the voyage, the owners of the vessel and cargo all being residents of New York state: Held, that the cause was one of admiralty jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,257.</p> <p>Bail in Civil Cases — Special Bail — Penalties —Pkobable Cause on Oath.</p> <p>Probable cause on oath must be set forth to justify the court in holding defendant to special bail, under act of congress of 26th February, 1795 [1 Stat. 420].</p>

<p>[This was a motion to set aside a writ of summons by one Leonard against the Lycom-ing Fire Insurance Company.']</p>

Trover for certain goods. John Withers being indebted to the plaintiffs, Leonard '& Thomas Cooke, and also intending to indemnify them against their suretyship, in a replevin bond given to release the same property from distress for rent due to L. Summers, it having Been seized by Neale as bailiff of Summers, by a writing not under seal, mortgaged to them the property in the hands of Neale.

<p>Case Ho. 8,200.</p> <p>Admiralty — Jurisdiction—Collision.</p> <p>[See Case No. 16,900.]</p>

<p>[This was a libel in admiralty by Job M. Leonard and others against Mark Whitwill to recover damages for losses sustained by collision.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,262.</p> <p>Practice in Admiralty — Seamen’s Wages — Suit in Rem — Master—Mate—Carriers—Goods not Delivered — Proper Action — Cargo Sold by Master — Right to Contribution.</p> <p>1. Where the mate, upon the decease of the master, succeeds to the command of the vessel, he cannot sue, in rem. for the extra compensation he thus becomes entitled to as acting master.</p> <p>2. According to the English and American cases, the mate must sue in the admiralty as mate. His claim for services as temporary master, either demanded as additional wages or as a quantum meruit, murt be agitated elsewhere. By the well-settled rule in admiralty, the master of a ship is entitled only to an action- in personam for the recovery of compensation for his services.</p> <p>3. The holder .of a bill of lading has a remedy in admiralty against the master on his undertaking, or personally against the owners of the vessel, or against the vessel m rem, where the goods shipped on board are not delivered.</p> <p>[Cited in Robinson v. Memphis & Charleston R. Co., 9 Fed. 139.]</p> <p>4. If part of the cargo be sold in a foreign port by the master, to supply the necessities of the ship, the ownei of it may be entitled, in case the ship or owners cannot satisfy his demand, to proceed against other owners of cargo to contribute, in proportion to their respective interests, towards his indemnity.</p> <p>5. In an action in rem against a vessel, the court cannot take cognizance of collateral equities to enforce them against parties personally, not made parties to the proceedings, where such decree may be prejudicial to their interests.</p>

Libel by the owners of the schooner Brutus against the steamer Leopard for damages, propounded that the schooner, loaded with sand, was coming up Fort Point channel, in the harbor of Boston, at eleven o’clock at night, on the second day of September, 1872,-head-ing about south-westerly, with a light northwesterly wind, not enough to give her steerage way, when she was run into and instantly sunk by the steamer.

This was a case of collision. The libel-lants were the owners of a small steamboat plying on the Kennebec river, between the towns of Bath and Woohvich, as a ferry boat. On the 28th of April, while she was passing on her usual track from Woolwich to Bath, she was run afoul by the schooner Leopard, and considerably injured, and this libel was filed to recover the damage.

Leppein was the assignee of certain bankrupts against whom a decree had passed, on Friday, July 29th. Six days after this decree, but before the property was removed from certain premises, which they rented, the landlord distrained some of the goods for rent, which had fallen due two days after the decree.

[This was an action- of ejectment by Theodore Le Roy against John Carroll and others to recover certain property claimed by defendants under a title by possession, and claimed by plaintiff by virtue of a patent from the United States.]

[This was an action of ejectment by Theodore Le Eoy against Jose A. Chabolla and others. Tried by the court, the parties having duly waived a jury.]

This is an action [by Theodore Le Roy against Charles Clayton and others] to recover land. The premises are claimed to be a part of the rancho “Guadaloupe,” situate in the county of Santa Barbara, granted by the Mexican authorities to Diego Olivera and Teodora Arrellanes. The grant was duly presented for confirmation, and confirmed. under the act of congress of 1851 [9 Stat. 631], applicable to the subject.

Assumpsit with the common money counts. The defendant [Richard Crowinshield,] pleaded in bar of the action the statute of limitations of the state of New-York, where the contract was made, to which the plaintiffs [Harmon Le Roy and others,] demurred.

Motion by defendant to continue the cause, upon the ground, that —e plaintiffs had taken out a commission in this cause, and in another of Gernport v. Union Ins. Co. [unreported], on the same risk; which latter depositions, it had been agreed on record, should be read in this action.

This was an action to recover the possession of certain real property in the county of Santa Barbara, and by stipulation, was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury. Both parties claimed the demanded premises under patents of the United States, issued upon the confirmation of grants of the former Mexican government. Both patents covered the demanded premises.

This is an action to recover possession of the east half of lot seven, in the block bounded by L and M and Fourth and Fifth streets, in the city of Sacramento. On April 23, 1862, Mary A. Wallace acquired the title to the locus in quo, through sundry mesne conveyances from John A. Sutter, the original grantee, under a Mexican grant. Said Mary A. Wallace was born on May 2, 1857.

<p>Case No. 8,273.</p> <p>Appeal Opens the Whole Issue — Possession op Real Property Gives Dse op Same — Courts op Equity will not Injoin Threatened Trespass.</p> <p>1. An appeal to the district court of the United States from a decree of the board of land commissioners created under the act of 1851 [9 Stat. 631], confirming a claim under a Mexican grant in California, opens the whole issue for consideration. The case is to be heard in the district court de novo, upon the papers and testimony used before the board, and such further evidence as either party may produce.</p> <p>[Explained in San Francisco v. U. S., Case No. 12,316. Cited in Grisar v. McDowell, Id. 5,-832.]</p> <p>2. Where the title to real property is in dispute between two claimants, and one of them takes possession of the property, he will not be injoined from its occupation and the erection of buildings thereon before the title is judicially determined.</p> <p>3. Courts of equity will not ordinarily interfere to injoin the commission of a threatened trespass to real property, unless the trespass be one going to the destruction of the substance of the estate, such as the extracting of ores, the cutting down of timber, the digging of coals and the like. The jurisdiction of the court, in such cases, is asserted for the preservation of the property pending proceedings at law for the determination of the title.</p> <p>[Cited in Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 539, 5 Sup. Ct. 566.]</p> <p>[Cited in Newali v. Staffordville Gravel Co. (N. J. Ch.) 13 Atl. 271: Hunt v. Steese, 75 Cal. 624, 17 Pac. 922.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,376.</p> <p>Shipping — Liability of Owner for Debts of Builder — Declaration that He will Pat-Assignment by Builder of Interest — Liability of Assignee — Property in Ship Building —Lien on Vessel.</p> <p>1. In general, the party for whom a vessel is built, under a contract with a shipwright, is not liable for the debts contracted by the shipwright on account of the vessel; in such cases, the contracts for work or for materials are usually made by the shipwright for himself and on his own account, in order to fulfil his agreement with the party for whom the ship is built.</p> <p>2. Where both parties reside in Maryland, and the ship is built there, the mechanics and material men have no lien upon her.</p> <p>3. Where the party for whom a vessel is built ays the money to the shipwright, according to is contract, he is entitled to the delivery of the vessel, and holds her free and discharged from any claim against the vessel, or against himself personally, on account of work done or materials furnished for the shipwright</p> <p>4. In ordinary cases of this description, general declarations made by the party for whom the vessel is built, after the work is done or the materials furnished, that he will pay all bills against the ship, will not bind him, and cannot be enforced in a court of justice.</p> <p>5. Such promises made after the work is done, are without consideration, and cannot, on that account, be enforced in a court of justice.</p> <p>6. But if, while the vessel is being built, the person for whom she is being built, makes advances to the shipwright beyond the sums mentioned in their contract, and takes from him an assignment of all his “r>ght, title and interest in the vessel, as she advances in construction, together with all materials collected and to be collected for the same,” and conceals the fact of such assignment, with a view to . preserve the shipwright’s credit, and enable him, under such false credit, to obtain work and materials for the vessel. without subjecting the assignee to responsibility for the same, this would constitute a design which a court of justice can never sanction.</p> <p>7. The effect of such an assignment would be to divest the shipwright of all interest in the vessel; she would become from that moment the exclusive property of the assignee, not by way of mortgage, but absolutely; all the work already done upon her. as well as all that should be aft-erwards done, would be for his use and benefit; and all the materials already purchased, or after-wards to be purchased, became his property as soon as they were delivered.</p> <p>8. Although the creditors, at the time the accounts were created, supposed that the shipwright still retained his interest in the vessel, and that he was dealing with them on his own account, still, all the work done, and materials furnished, after the date of the secret assignment, were for the use of the assignee alone, and justice requires that he should pay the value of them; and this constituted a sufficient and valuable consideration to support his promise to pay.</p> <p>9. Since, by virtue of the transfer, the assignee obtained all the materials which had been already bought, whether worked up or not, and also the benefit of all the labor which had been already bestowed upon the vessel, there existed a sufficient consideration, in relation to the antecedent portions of the work and materials, as well as the subsequent.</p> <p>10. The taking of certain bills receivable, or his own note, from the fbipwri-M. by one of the creditors. while in ignorance of the secret transfer, would not impair his right to proceed against the assignee, in the event of the security so taken turning out to be worthless.</p> <p>11. The extent of the shipwright’s property in the vessel before the assignment, cannot affect the principle upon which the case is to be decided, if he had an interest to any extent; whatever that interest was, it passed out of him by the assignment, and the vessel, as she advanced in construction, and the materials were collected for her, became the exclusive property of the as-signee, and the shipwright had no longer that interest in them which would have belonged to him by his original contract.</p> <p>LESLIE v. KETSER. See Case No. 8,275.</p>

<p>Case KTo. 8,276.</p> <p>Decisions op State Supreme Court — When Followed — Estoppel.</p> <p>1. The supreme court of Illinois having decided that the legislature cannot by subsequent legislation, render valid a vote by a town to subscribe to railroad stock, if there was no law in force at the time of the subscription authorizing it, the federal court will follow that authority although in conflict with a prior decision of the United States supreme Court.</p> <p>2. Although a town has paid interest on its bonds for ten years, it is not estopped from denying their validity even in the hands of innocent purchasers.</p> <p>[NOTE. This case, selected from several similar cases (not reported), was taken by writ of error to the supreme court as a test case, and the judgment was affirmed (not reported) by a divided court. Subsequently the court below granted new trials in the other cases. Judgments having been rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants brought error, and the supreme court affirmed (not reported) the decision of the lower court. Thereafter the plaintiff in the present action filed a bill of review in the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of Illinois to have the judgment therein set aside. A demurrer to the bill of complaint was sustained, and the bill dismissed (case not reported) for lack of equity. An appeal was then prosecuted by the plaintiff to the circuit court of appeals, Seventh circuit. Jenkins, Circuit Judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, held that the affirmance of a judgment by a divided court was as effective between the parties as though it passed by the unanimous decision of the court. Sustaining the bill would he to overthrow the whole doctrine of res adjudicata, and accordingly the decree of the circuit court was affirmed. 56 Fed. 762.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 8,276a.</p> <p>Copyright — Translation.</p> <p>[A translation from the original Hebrew, of the Pentateuch, is subject to copyright.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,279.</p> <p>Criminal Law — Civil and Criminal Proceedings for Same Offense — Penalty and Imprisonment — Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>1. Section 3318 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that any person who commits any one of the offences therein specified shall pay a penalty of $100, and shall, on conviction, be fined not less than $100, nor more than $5,000, and imprisoned not less than 3 months, nor more than 3 years. ‘ The United States brought a civil suit against L. to recover the penalty of $100 imposed by that section for an offence therein specified, and recovered a judgment therefor, which was paid and satisfied of record. Afterwards L. was arrested on a warrant for the same offence, and was committed for trial. On a habeas corpus: Held, that the criminal proceeding by the warrant was not a proceeding to punish him twice for the same offence,</p> <p>2. The three punishments — the penalty, the fine and the imprisonment — are only one punishment for the same offence, although the penalty is recovered in a civil action, and the fine and imprisonment are inflicted by a criminal prosecution.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Thompson, 45 Fed. 468.]</p>

This was an action of covenant brought in 1805, by the plaintiffs, Stephen G. Letcher and Stephen Arnold) citizens of Kentucky, against Samuel Woodson, a citizen of Virginia, to recover damages for the breach of a covenant, made by the defendant with the plaintiffs, on the 30th of August, 1793, whereby the defendant bound himself, his heirs, &c., in consideration of £40, to be paid in horses, twelve days from the date of the contract, and of £160 in like manner, to be paid…

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of New Jersey.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

The libel in this case is based upon a contract of affreightment of a cargo or cargoes of coal to be transported in respondent’s vessels from Cleveland to Detroit, in November, 1872. A part of one cargo, about 295 tons, was taken on board respondent’s barge Ontario, and the weather being threatening and the closing of the navigation imminent, the barge put to sea, and together with the cargo was lost.

This was an action on the case for money paid, laid out and expended, and for money had and received. The bank having a claim against one Hamilton, a part owner of the ship Alexandria, caused her to be attached at Baltimore, and obtained judgment of condemnation. At the sheriff’s sale, the plaintiff became the purchaser, but under an agreement with the bank that they should exonerate him from all liens and incum-brances on the ship.

Assumpsit, for money paid and advanced for the use of the defendants. The jury not having agreed at the former trial, in .December term, 1803 [Case No. 8,286], the cause now came on again, and the facts appeared to be as follows: The defendants had sold to the plaintiff half of the ship Alexandria, to be delivered to the plaintiff free of all liens and incumbrances.

This was an action of assumpsit. The principal item in the bill of particulars delivered to the defendant [Joseph Dayton] was one for about $1700 principal, interest and costs, paid by the plaintiff [Jacob Lever-inge] under an execution upon a judgment rendered on a custom house bond to the United States, executed by the defendant as principal, and the plaintiff as his surety.

This is a suit in equity, wherein the plaintiffs seek to recover from the defendant a certain sum of money which they allege the receiver of the defendant — the National Bank of the State of Missouri — has in his possession, which is the proceeds of a certain draft drawn by August Taussig on the firm of Taussig Brothers & Co., St. Louis, for $10,000, which said plaintiffs forwarded to the defendant on the 18th day of June, 1877, “for collection and credit.” This sum of money…

The plaintiffs [James Levi and others] in these eases held policies of insurance issued by the defendant companies [the New Orleans Mutual Insurance Association, the Home Mutual Insurance Company, and the Union Mutual Insurance Company] respectively, on the hull, engine, furniture and appurtenances of the steamboat Sabine, which was lost in consequence of a collision with the steamboat Richmond, near Twelve Mile Point, a short distance above New Orleans, all within the…

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Northern district of Illinois.] On February 16, 1876, the bankrupt [Lewis Levin] filed, his petition for discharge. March 25 following was assigned for. the hearing of the petition, and no opposition being on file the case was referred to the register to report as to the regularity of the proceedings. On the same day the bankrupt made his final oath before the register according to the statute.

<p>Case No. 8,292.</p> <p>Liability of Ship Owners — Statute of 1851 — Extent — Foreign Vessels — Service of Process — Power of Congress.</p> <p>1. The United States statute of 1851 (9 Stat. 635), limiting the liability of ship owners to their interest in the vessel, and her freight, is applicable to foreign vessels. It is a regulation of commerce, and not a municipal regulation.</p> <p>[Cited in Thomassen v. Whitwell, Case No. 13,-930.]</p> <p>2. Congress has power to authorize the supreme court to fix by rule the manner of serving process. A rule providing for service of process upon an attorney is valid, and jurisdiction of his client can be thus acquired.</p>

<p>Case Mo. 8,293.</p> <p>Judicial Discretion — Leave to Put in Further Evidence.</p> <p>There being probable cause, on all the evidence, to believe that the vessel was engaged in an attempt to violate the blockade, the court sus-Íiended a final decision, with leave to the libel-ants to put in further proofs as to the place at which the capture was made, and as to the purpose of the voyage, at any time within one year.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,294.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade.</p> <p>On further proofs, vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,295.</p> <p>Examination of Witnesses in Bankruptcy— Notice.</p> <p>1. No notice need be given to the bankrupt of the examination of a witness called by the as-signee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>2. Such examination may be proceeded with, without reference to an examination of the bankrupt, which is being had on the part of creditors.</p> <p>[KOTE. This case was subsequently heard upon the right to examine one of the bankrupts as to property acquired since filing petition,- and upon the right of his counsel to cross-examine him. Case No. 8,296. It was again heard upon the question as to whether attorney for creditors could act as counsel for assignee. Case No. S.299. And. finally, upon whether or not a creditor who has not filed his claim may file objections to the bankrupt’s discharge. Case No. 8,297.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,296.</p> <p>Examination op Bankrupt—Issues op Law and Register’s Certificates.</p> <p>1. Under section twenty-six of the bankruptcy act fof 1867 (14 Stat. 529)], and general order No. 10. a bankrupt is to be examined and cross-examined like any other witness.</p> <p>2. The exclusion by a register of a question in an examination before him, which is objected to, is not raising an issue of law within section four of the bankruptcy act. nor does objecting to the question raise such an issue of law.</p> <p>3. A register has no right to pass upon the competency. materiality, or relevancy of a question.</p> <p>[Followed in Re Bond, Case Xo. 1.618. Cited in Re Graves, 24 Fed. 552.]</p> <p>4. The practice in taking depositions before a register is the established practice in examinations before an examiner in chancery.</p> <p>5. When a register adjourns a question into court under section four of the act. it is not necessary to adjourn further proceedings in the matter until the question shall be decided by the judge.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Heller, Case No. 6,339; Re Blais-dell, Id. 1,488.]</p> <p>6. As to the interpretation of the provision in section six of the act with reference to certificates —quere.</p> <p>7. A certificate by a register stating a question objected to. and that he excluded the question, is not a “special case” under section six.</p>

[This was a proceeding in 'bankruptcy against Samuel Levy and Mark Levy. It was formerly heard upon the certificate of the register as to his practice in receiving and certifying objections. Case No. 8,298. Then again upon the question whether or not notice of time and place of examination of witnesses as to bankrupts’ property should be given bankrupts. Case No. 8,295.

The creditors of the above bankrupts [Samuel M. Levy and Mark Levy] being before the register examining the bankrupts under the provisions of section 26 of the act, the counsel of the bankrupts interposes various objections to questions put by the counsel for creditors, such as, that they were immaterial, &c. The question at once arises whether the register has. (he right to pass upon these questions.

<p>[This was a proceeding in bankruptcy against Samuel M. Levy and Mark Levy. It was formerly heard upon the certificate of the register as to his practice in receiving and certifying objections (Case No. 8,298), and upon the question whether or not notice of time and place of examination of witnesses as to bankrupts’ property should be given the bankrupts (Case No. 8,295). It was again heard upon the right to examine one of the bankrupts upon property acquired since filing petition, and upon the right of his counsel to cross-examine him. • Case No. 8,-296. It is now heard upon the following certificate of the register:]</p> <p>By the Register:</p> <p>I, Isaiah T. Williams, one of the registers in said court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that in the course of the proceedings in said cause before me the following question arose pertinent to the said proceedings, and was stated and agreed to by the counsel for the opposing parties, to wit: Mr. Samuel Boardman, who appeared for the bankrupt, and Mr. Charles H. Smith, who appeared for the assignee and divers creditors of said bankrupt. The respective parties this day appearing before me to proceed with the examination of Mark Levy, one of the said bankrupts, Mr. Boardman, solicitor for the bankrupts, objected that Mr. Smith who had hitherto been and was acting on said examination for and on behalf both of the creditors, and also on behalf of John Sedgwick, the assignee of the bankrupts, ought not to be allowed further to act in said capacity for said assignee on the ground that the 27th rule of this court prohibited the same. It was claimed on the part of Mr. Smith that he did not assume to act as solicitor or attorney for said assignee, but only in the capacity of counsel, and that in such capacity he did not contravene the provisions of said rule.</p> <p>After hearing the respective parties, I decided that it was not competent, under the provisions of said rule, for Mr. Smith to act for the assignee on said examination, as he was, and from the first had been, the attorney and solicitor for divers of the creditors of said bankrupts, in taking testimony for the purpose of opposing the discharge of the bankrupts. And I further certify and report to this honorable court, that the grounds for said decision were as follows: First. Although the word “counsel” is not used in said rule, yet, as the proceedings before me were in the nature of chamber business rather than proceedings in open court, the distinction between attorney and counsel could not be regarded. Second. That if the distinction between the office of attorney and counsel, now contended for, were to prevail, it would render the said rule wholly inoperative. Whereupon Mr. Smith requested that the question should be certified to the judge for his opinion thereon.</p>

This was a writ of error, to the judgment of the district court of the United States, for the district of Massachusetts.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] [This war. a libel by Jacques Levy against the Great Republic for damages for delay and loss caused by the grounding of the steamer, due .to alleged careless pilotage.]

<p>Case No. 8,304.</p> <p>Fire Insurance — Limitation in Policy.</p> <p>[In a policy which provides for proofs of loss, and arbitration of differences as to amount of damage, and forbids the bringing of suit until an award is made, a limitation requiring suit to be brought within six months after the “loss or damage shall occur” means six months after the amount of the loss is thus ascertained, and not six montos from the date of the fire.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,307.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Ohio River — Power or Congress over Navigation — Penaltt — Practice — Seizure — Doty of Steamer as to Posting Synopses of Laws.</p> <p>1. The admiralty jurisdiction of the national courts extends over the river Ohio.</p> <p>2. The power granted by the constitution to congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states,” includes the authority, not only to pass laws regulating trade, but also navigation and intercourse.</p> <p>3. The United States district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime cognizance.</p> <p>4. The act of July 4, 1864 [13 Stat 390], must be regarded as a navigation law.</p> <p>5. A proceeding in rem is the proper mode of prosecution for the violation of the 8th section of the act of July 4. 1864, charging a neglect to post up in conspicuous places in a steamer, synopses of the laws relating to the carriage of passengers, as required by that section.</p> <p>[Cited in Hatch v. The Boston, 3 Fed. 809.]</p> <p>6. In proceedings in rem against vessels for penalties and forfeitures under acts of congress, it is a general rule that a seizure of the vessels must precede the filing of the libels, in order to give jurisdiction to the court; and that consequently such precedent seizure must be averred in the libel. But, if under the act of congress, the owners execute delivery bonds, they thereby waive the objection of the want of a prior seizure.</p> <p>[Followed in The Lewellen, Case No. 8.308. Cited in Hatch v. The Boston, 3 Fed. 811.]</p> <p>7. The act of July 4, 1864. requiring that two copies of the synopsis of the laws relating to passengers on steamers, shall be posted up in every licensed and enrolled vessel carrying passengers, one copy thus posted up is no defense against a prosecution for a violation of the act.</p> <p>8. Hdi, also, that if the owners of the steamer could not procure copies of the synopsis elsewhere, they were bound, at their peril, to apply for them to the secretary of the treasury; and that if they failed to do so. and proceeded on a voyage without the copies, the penalty was thereby incurred.</p> <p>NOTE. For numerous authorities on the various questions of admiralty jurisdiction, con-suit The Flora [Case No. 4,878]: The Celestine rid. 2,641]; The Self [Id. 12.649]. And in the following cases it is held that the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts extends over the Ohio river; The Dick Keys [Id. 3,898]; Seven Coal Barges [Id. 12,677].</p> <p>[Another libel was filed on behalf of the United States for the penalty under Act May 6, 1864 (13 Stat. 63). for failure to paint name on wheelhouse. A demurrer to this libel was overruled at the same term of the court as above. Case No. 8,308.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,308.</p> <p>Name on Steamer — Penalty—Practice—Delivery Bond.</p> <p>1. For a violation of the act of eongress of May 5, 1864 [13 Stat. 63] requiring steamers to have their names pamted conspicuously on their wheel and pilot-houses, the proper remedy is a proceeding in rem.</p> <p>2. This act should not be interpreted as giving the same form of remedy as that of December 31, 1792, but only as giving the same amount of penalty.</p> <p>3. The execution of a delivery bond under the act of March 3, 1847 [9 Stat. 181], is a waiver of the objection that a seizure of the vessel should recede the filing of the libel, and that no seizure ad been made.</p> <p>[NOTE. Another libel was filed on behalf of the United States for the penalty under Act July 4. 1864 (13 Stat. 390), for failure to post synopsis of laws. A demurrer to this libel was overruled at the same term of the court as above. Case No. 8,307.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,309.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Packed with Personal Luggage — Not on Manifest — Issue for Juki-of Fraudulent Knowledge.</p> <p>L. bought kid gloves in Europe, and had them packed as merchandise, in tin boxes, and the boxes put into trunks, which also contained a small amount of his personal baggage. The trunks, and their contents, were put on board of a steamer, at Liverpool, for New York, as his baggage, he going in the steamer as a passenger. The gloves did not appear on the manifest of the vessel. On arrival. L. did not claim the trunks as his baggage. They came off the vessel with the personal baggage of the passengers. The goods were seized as forfeited, Because knowingly brought into the United States contrary to law, in violation of section 3082 of the Revised Statutes, not having been entered on the manifest of the vessel, as required by section 2806 of the Revised Statutes. At the trial in the district court, which took place after the passage of the act of June 22. 1874 (18 Stat. 189), that court, under section 16 of that act, submitted it to the jury to determine, whether L. fraudulently and knowingly, with an actual intention to defraud the United States, did so import and bring the goods into the United States, as to cause or procure them to be withheld from entry upon the manifest of the vessel. Held, that the charge was correct, and that the form of submitting such.question to the jury was a proper compliance with section 16 of the said act of 1874.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Two Hundred and Eight Bags of Kainit, 37 Fed. 327.]</p>

<p>This was an application on petition for the payment of the dockage due on the ship Jerusalem, which had been libelled on a bottomry bond, and sold under an interlocutory order of this court, and the proceeds of the sale brought into the registry. The ship was still lying at the plaintiff’s wharf when she was arrested upon the admiralty process pending in this court. The Jerusalem [Case No. 7,-. 293].</p> <p>[After the sale, a petition for payment out of the proceeds to a tradesman, for repairs, was heard and allowed. Case No. 7,294.]</p>

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

The land owned by the bankrupt individually, and deeded to him individually, having been sold by the assignee, the proceeds of that land are now claimed under a judgment first in order, obtained by Lanier & Co. against Lewis & Adams (in which partnership the bankrupt was a member) on a partnership debt; also by an individualcredit- or of Lewis, whose judgment is subsequent in time to the first. The counsel for the partnership creditor contended: First.

<p>Case No. 8,315.</p> <p>Limitations — Running of Statute during War.</p> <p>The statute of limitations was suspended during the continuance of the war as to alien enemies disoualified to sue in our courts.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Solomon Lewis and others.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,316.</p> <p>Pleading in Equity — Answeb in Sdppobt op Plea — Different Defences — Assignment of Equity — Recordation—Lost Deed — Copy of Deed — Capacity to Convey — Presumption as to Old Assignment — Statute of Limitations —State Claim.</p> <p>1. There must be an answer denying the fraud charged in the bill, in support of the plea.</p> <p>2. The answer being broader than the plea, overrules it.</p> <p>3. Fraud must be denied in the plea as well as in the answer.</p> <p>4. Where one defence is made by the plea, and another by the answer, the plea will be ordered to stand for an answer.</p> <p>5. The ordinance of 1787 regulates the form of conveyance of real estate.</p> <p>[Cited in Reed v. Kemp, 16 Ill. 451; Churchill v. Little, 23 Ohio St 308; Tarbell v. West, 86 N. Y. 288.]</p> <p>6. An equity may be assigned or transferred in any form not prohibited by law.</p> <p>7. Though an equity be conveyed, under the forms of a legal right it does not change the title.</p> <p>8. The recordation of a deed, conveying an equity only, would not be noticed under the law.</p> <p>[Cited in Peterson v. Mississippi Valley Ins. Co. 24 Iowa, 498.]</p> <p>9. A record of a deed in Kentucky, for lands in Ohio, is no notice to a subsequent purchaser.</p> <p>10. A copy of such record is not evidence.</p> <p>11. The contents of a deed, destroyed by accident, may be proved by parol.</p> <p>12. Where there has been a great lapse of time, strict proof of a destroyed deed, under which parties have claimed, may be dispensed with.</p> <p>13. The recording of a copy of a deed in this state, can have no effect.</p> <p>14. Where any act has been done by the trustees, under a trust deed, it is evidence of an acceptance of the trust.</p> <p>15. An agency must be proved to bind the parties interested.</p> <p>16. A trustee is presumed to act for the benefit of his cestui que trust</p> <p>17. Under certain circumstances he may convey to an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration.</p> <p>18. No greater interest can be conveyed by the grantor than is vested in him.</p> <p>19. It is said that a deed is to be construed most strongly against the grantor. The reason for this rule is not perfectly satisfactory.</p> <p>20. In explaining an instrument all the parts of it must be taken together.</p> <p>21. Less strictness in the description of the property is required in a contract to convey, than in a deed of conveyance.</p> <p>22. There being no proof of indebtedness by the grantor, the trust deed cannot be held fraudulent</p> <p>23. Occasional insanity arising from intemperance, not sufficient to set aside a contract.</p> <p>[Cited in HcMeehen v. McMeehen, 17 W. Va. 683.]</p> <p>24. An assignment of a military warrant, under which a claim has been asserted for many years, may be presumed to be genuine, and to have been made for a valuable consideration. After the lapse of nearly half a century, the consideration for such a contract cannot be expected to be clearly established.</p> <p>25. A deed executed by an executor under a will before the emanation of the patent, can convey no legal title. But if the patent issue in the name of the executor, it operates in favor of the prior conveyance by way of estoppel. And this effect follows, whether the will au-thorises the executor to convey or not.</p> <p>26. A warranty is limited by the nature of the estate conveyed. It must have an estate upon which to operate.</p> <p>27. A deed must have upon its face all the requisites of a valid instrument.</p> <p>28. Where a deed conveys title, a warranty can never operate by way of estoppel.</p> <p>29. Where an interest passes under the deed there can be no estoppel.</p> <p>30. The statute of limitations, under the decision of the supreme court of Ohio, bars the heirs of a non-resident, by an adverse possession of twenty years, during the life of the ancestor. But lapse of time will operate as a bar. against a non-resident, under certain circumstances, although the statute does not run against him.</p> <p>31. Chancery will always refuse its aid against conscience where the demand is stale and there has been great negligence.</p> <p>[Cited in Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co. v. Athon, 78 Ind. 17.]</p> <p>[See Baird v. Byrne, Case No. 757.]</p>

This was an action of ejectment brought in 1828, by the heirs at law of Mary Lewis, deceased, and others, claiming under them, against Rice Barksdale, to recover possession of a tract ol land lying in the county of Albemarle, and state of Virginia. Joint and several demises from the heirs and their ven-dees, lessors of the plaintiff, were laid in the declaration.

<p>Case No. 8,318.</p> <p>Notes — Guarantor — Notice op Dishonor — Pleadino at Lav — Averment op Notice-Payee Insolvent.</p> <p>1. A guarantor is entitled to notice of the dishonor of certain notes, the payment of which he had guarantied. The undertaking is collateral, and in all such cases, a notice is indispensable.</p> <p>2. And as a' notice is necessary to give the right of action against the guarantor, the declaration must aver that it was given.</p> <p>[Cited in Dwight v. Williams, Case No. 4,218.]</p> <p>3. An averment that notice was given to the guarantor, more than seven months after the last note became due. and nearly a year after the first one was payable, held to be bad on demurrer.</p> <p>4. When there is an excuse for the want of notice, it should be stated in the declaration.</p> <p>5. If the payee be insolvent at the time the note became payable, a notice to the guarantor need not be given.</p> <p>[Cited in Donley v. Camp. 22 Ala. 659; Harris v. Pierce, 6 Ind. 164; "Van Doren v. Tjader, 1 Nev. 380; Wright v. Dyer, 48 Mo. 526.]</p>

<p>[Action by William Lewis against the administrators of Broadwell.]</p>

This action is brought to recover on overdue interest coupons cut from negotiable bonds issued by the city of Clarendon to the Arkansas Central Railway Company, in payment of a $15,000 subscription made by the city to the capital stock of said company. The following is a copy of one of the bonds: “State of Arkansas, City of Clarendon. No. 17. $15,000 Subscription to the Arkansas Central Railway. $500.

<p>Case No. 8,321.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Wreck — Abandoning the Wreck — When Derelict — Salvage.</p> <p>1. The wreck of a ship is pledged by the maritime law for the payment of wages, and the seamen’s privilege is preferred to ail other claims.</p> <p>[Cited in Packard v. The Louisa, Case No. 10,-652; Davis v. Leslie, Id. 3,639.]</p> <p>2. But if they abandon the wreck, the contract between them and the owners is dissolved; they lose their privilege against the ship and their claim for wages, and they are not restored, by the jus postliminii, on the salvage of the property by other persons. ,</p> <p>[Cited in Pitman v. Hooper, Case No. 11,185. Distinguished in The Massasoit, Case No. 9,-260; Hanson v. Rowell, Id. 6,043. Cited in The Niphon’s Crew, Case No. 10.277.]</p> <p>3. The policy of the law is to connect the right to wages with the safety of the ship.</p> <p>4. Property is derelict, in the maritime sense of the word, when it is abandoned without hope of recovery, or the intention of returning to save it.</p> <p>5. The rights of the owner are not divested by abandonment, but the finder becomes the legal possessor, and acquires a privilege against the property for his salvage, which takes precedence of all other liens.</p> <p>[Cited in Packard v. The Louisa. Case No. 10,652; The John Wurts, Id. 7,434.]</p> <p>[Cited in Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,324a.</p> <p>Sheriff— Liability for Costs not Collected— How Proceeded against.</p> <p>1. When a sheriff fails to make the costs when practicable, he becomes responsible, nor will the order of the client or attorney as to costs change or affect that liability.</p> <p>[Cited in People v. Palmer, 46 Ill. 398.]</p> <p>2. He may be reached by motion.</p>

<p>[This was a suit by Edwin M. Lewis, trustee, against Jay Gould and others. Heard on motion to set aside a replication.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] The libellant, William J. Lewis, on the 27th day of June, 1878, filed his libel in the district court of the United States for this district against the steamboat R. W. Dugan, her engines, etc., and Joseph B. Kinney, part owner etc., in which he alleged the following facts: That about the 17th day of March, 1876, he, said libellant, purchased from said Kinney, the then sole owner, a…

<p>Case No. 8,326.</p> <p>Witness — Attendance—Attachment.</p> <p>Quaere, whether the court can issue an attachment for a witness residing at Winchester, in Virginia, less than one hundred miles from this place.</p>

<p>[This was a bill in equity by Josiah Lewis and others against Humphrey Marshall and others.]</p>

[This was an action at law by the lessee of Lewis, against Meredith.] Plaintiff’s title: An application by E. Slocum, 12th of February, 1793, for 400 acres of land, in Luzerne county, on the east side of Susquehanna, and the north side of Wyaloos-ing creek, about six miles from the mouth of the creek, and fifty perches from the creek; adjoining a manor line of William Penn on the west, and lands of John Shee on the south, and vacant lands on the east and north.

[Ejectment. The company, as a special defense, pleaded a perpetual right of way over the premises in question for its railway, granted by the owners thereof. Demurrer to plea, omitting, however, the allegations in the plea as to the former ownership and the grant to the company by such owners.] 2

[These were libels by Daniel Lewis, Joseph Young, and-Jones against the Orpheus, a vessel which, after attachment under process from the state court, was placed under arrest by the marshal of the district court for the district of Massachusetts.]

This suit was brought [by Charles Edward Lewis] to recover the amount of certain over-due interest coupons belonging to nine negotiable bonds for one thousand dollars each, issued by the defendant. The parties waived the intervention of a jury, and having agreed upon the facts, submitted the case to the court upon the law arising on the agreed facts.

In equity. The bill stated, in substance, that the defendant George A. Smythe, a citizen of Mississippi, brought an action against the complainant [Robert N.] Lewis, a citizen of Louisiana, in the fourth district court of the parish of Orleans, on the 28th of November, 1874, to recover the sum of $3,518.

<p>Case No. 8,336.</p> <p>Salvase — Amount—Sale of Vessel.</p> <p>[1. The court awarded a moiety, amounting to $6,875, where the vessel and cargo aground on the Florida reef would have been a total loss but for the timely assistance of the salvors, rendered at gieat hazard.]</p> <p>[2. A sale of the damaged vessel requested by her master will not be ordered, though the repairs will nearly equal her present value, where the court does not think it to the interest of her owners and insurers and the owners of the cargo.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,335.</p> <p>Removal or Cause under Act or 1866.</p> <p>Motion to remand cause from the common pleas of "Ottawa county upon the grounds: First, that the cause could not be heard as to the removing defendants without the other defendants being present; second, that all the non-resident defendants should have joined in the petition for removal.</p>

This suit was brought by William Rae and Julia Lidderdale, of London, executor and executrix of William Robertson Lidder-dale, who was executor of John Lidderdale, deceased, against James Lyons, administrator de bonis non of John Robinson, deceased.

This was a motion for an attachment against the defendants [Uzal Cory and William D. Cory] for violating an injunction issued upon a final decree, in a suit brought for the infringement of letters patent, granted to the plaintiff [Robert T. Liddle] for an improvement in air-heating furnaces.

<p>Case No. 8,340.</p> <p>Shipping — Bottomry Bond — Hypothecation to Consignee.</p> <p>1. A bottomry bond can be entered into by the master only under circumstances of great distress, and when he has no other means of repairing.</p> <p>[Cited in The Hunter, Case No. 6,904; Leland v. The Medora, Id., 8,237.]</p> <p>2. Hypothecation cannot be made to a consignee.</p> <p>[Cited in Greely v. Smith, Case No. 5,750.]</p>

This was a motion for a new trial on the ground of misdirection in the charge of the court to the jury-3 The material facts in the cause were briefly these: The plaintiff [Henry Lienow] having in the hands of Samuel Williams, of London, funds to the amount of five hundred pounds sterling, and having occasion for money at Hamburgh and elsewhere in his travels upon the continent, procured from Williams a letter of credit, dated 14th July, 1825, addressed to the defendants…

<p>[This was an action in ejectment by Robert Liggett and others against Thomas Marshall and others.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,343.</p> <p>Patent — Infringement.</p> <p>The Boston and Worcester Railroad Company was consolidated with the Western Railroad Corporation under authority of an act of the legislature of Massachusetts, which vested in the new corporation called the “Boston and Albany Railroad Company,” all the powers, rights, franchises, &c., of the old corporations. Held, the new corporation might lawfully use a patented axle box which both the old corporations had been licensed to use.</p> <p>[Cited in Montross v. Mabie. 30 Fed. 236; Lane &'Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U. S. 193. 14 Sup. Ct. 79.]</p>

Trespass on the case [by John Lightner against J. W. Brooks] for an alleged infringement of a patent [No. 5,936]. Pacts agreed. The defendant was a stockholder in the Hannibal and Saint Joseph Railroad Company, which is a corporation created by the laws of the state of Missouri, and was also chairman of the board of directors of said company. The meetings of the directors were usually held in Boston, in this commonwealth.

Case for damages for using the invention of the plaintiff [John Lightner], known as Lightner’s axle boxes, for which he has a patent It came before the court on an agreed statement of facts in which, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the defendant [Otis Kimball] is liable to an action, it was admitted that the patent is valid, and that axle boxes substantially like those described therein are used upon certain cars of the Red Line Transit Company, so called.

<p>Case No. 8,346.</p> <p>Seamen’s Wages — Jurisdiction — British Statute — Desertion—Ofeiciai. Log.</p> <p>1. Seamen filed a libel against a British vessel to recover wages. The owners of the vessel objected to the court’s entertaining jurisdiction of the cause, and the British consul also protested against it. EM, that, while under such circumstances, the court would refuse to entertain jurisdiction unless there were special circumstances in the case, yet in this case, as none of the seamen belonged in Nova Scotia, where the vessel belonged, and when the libel was filed it was uncertain for what port the vessel would sail, and when the cause was heard the vessel had finished her voyage and it was uncertain where she was. a refusal to entertain the cause would be practically a denial of justice and/ the same would be entertained.</p> <p>2. The 190th section of the British merchant’s shipping act [of 1854] did not preclude the sailors from maintaining the action.</p> <p>[Cited in The Sirius, 47 Fed. 827, 828.]</p> <p>3. The libel of the seamen alleged a wrongful discharge from the vessel, in the port of New York, and the answer set up as a defence that the men had deserted. On the trial, the libel-lants were allowed to amend their libel so as to allege a refusal by the master of the vessel to furnish proper food and other ill treatment by him, by reason of which their contract was broken. It appeared on the trial that the men had complained of being compelled to work more hours in port than they thought was right, and that whatever refusal of food there had been, had been in consequence of their refusal to work. The men complained to the consul, who heard their case and decided that they must go back to the ship and go to work, whereupon they went back to the ship, got their clothes and left her. Entry of their having left had been made in the official log by a person not attached to the ship, but under the captain’s direction. The entry was not made on that day, and the date when the entry was made was not stated in the entry. EM, that the lack of the date when the entry was made was fatal to the value of the entry as a proof of desertion of the men under sections 244, 250, and 281 of the act above mentioned.</p> <p>4. The certificate of the British consul that he had examined the entry and that the desertion was properly entered would be disregarded, inasmuch as it was not made to appear that the fact of the entry’s not having been made on the day of the occurrence was made known to him.</p> <p>[Oited in The Topsy, 44 Fed. 636.]</p> <p>5. The circumstances of the case, as shown in the evidence, did not show a justification of the seamen in leaving the ship, but their so doing was so far mitigated by evidence of apparent connivance on the part of the second mate in efforts by boarding-house keepers to induce them to desert, that the court would not hold that their wages were forfeited, and the libellants might recover the amount of wages due.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,348.</p> <p>Prize — Capture in Neutral Watebs — Claims of Private Persons — Proceedings of Prize Courts of the Confederate States — Restoration of Merchant Vessels — Rights of Officers and Crew of a Prize.</p> <p>1.No private person can interpose in a case of prize and make claim for the restoration of the captured property, oil the ground that the capture was made within neutral waters. Whatever claim is made must be presented by the neutral nation whose rights have been infringed. Even a consul, by virtue of his office merely, cannot interpose.</p> <p>2. Where a claimant had his domicil in the enemy’s country, was a permanent resident there, and the property captured was purchased as stock in a trade +o be there carried on, the claim was dismissed, as coming within the decision of the court in the case of The Amy Warwick [Case No. 341].</p> <p>3. If a neutral owner of a portion of the property captured, claims another part, which belongs to an enemy, for the purpose of deceiving the court, the part'belonging to the neutral will be condemned, as a penalty for his fraudulent conduct</p> <p>4. The admission of further proof rests wholly in the discretion of the court; but the exercise of this discretion is aided by certain rules. Some of these rules stated. A motion for further proof refused, where there was no reason to suppose that any further evidence of value could be produced.</p> <p>[Cited in Cushing v. Laird, 107 U. S. 82, 2 Sup. Ct 206.]</p> <p>5. The proceedings of a prize court of the so-called Confederate States are of no validity here, and a condemnation and sale by such a court do-not convey any title to the purchaser, or confer upon him any right to give a title to others.</p> <p>6. The rule under the statute of the United States, 1800, c. 14, § 1 [2 Stat. 16], concerning the restoration to their owners, upon payment of certain salvage, of merchant vessels recaptured, before their valid condemnation, by public armed vessels, applied by analogy to the case of a vessel recaptured after a capture by a Confederate privateer, and a condemnation and sale by a Confederate prize court</p> <p>7. The officers and crew of a prize, in case of condemnation, are not entitled to wages from the prize property. Where a prize is condemned, the officers and crew who are sent in as witnesses in pursuance of the law of nations, are not entitled to witness fees oi compensation for their necessary detention from out of the prize property. Where such persons, after their examination is-satisfactorily completed, are further detained, not for the purposes of the prize cause, but under an order from the navy department for public reasons, their compensation or damages, if they are entitled to any, cannot be charged on the prize property.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,349.</p>

This was a real action, brought by [Gardner Lillibridge] the demandant, as son and heir of Charlotte Lillibridge, deceased, to recover one undivided fourth part of a certain estate, situate in… Held: that the testator meant a dying without children living at the death of the parent, and consequently that it was a good executory devise. In Pells v. Brown, Cro.

This was an action [by Benjamin H. Lillie and others] against [Heman H. Redfield] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an alleged excess of duties exacted on certain entries of segars, of various brands and different grades, which had been procured under a contract, and were invoiced as of first, second, and third grades.. The duties were deposited on the valuations in the invoices.

<p>This was a suit in rom, for supplies furnished for the brig Lillie Mills, in March, June, and October, 1853. The libel was filed October 12th, 1855. It appeared in evidence, that the brig was built at St. Mary’s, Florida, in 1853, was registered there, and that port continued to be her home port, until October, 1854, when she was registered in Portland, Maine. A large portion of the claim was for articles furnished while the vessel was building at St. Mary’s, or before, she left her home port, for the first time. And as to all this portion of the cla;m, the respondent contended that it never constituted a lien upon the vessel. It further appeared, that in October, 1853, the vessel was in the port of New York, the residence of the libellant, who then furnished her with a portion of the supplies now sued for. Since these supplies were furnished, the vessel had been three times at St. Mary’s, remaining two or three weeks each time; three times in the port of Boston, — once for a period of two months, and once for a period of twenty days; and three times in Portland. The libellant had notice of her being in Boston, at the several times she was there. The respondent, George Baker, had purchased seven-sixteenth parts, and the respondents, Yeaton & Hale, five-sixteenth parts of said brig. These purchases took place about a year after the supplies were furnished. The respondent, Joseph D. Cobum, a sheriff, held the remainder of the said brig, under attachments upon mesne process issuing out of the state courts of Massachusetts, in favor of creditors. Upon these facts, the respondents contended, that if any lien ever existed for the supplies furnished in New York, it had been lost as against bona fide purchasers and attaching creditors.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,354.</p> <p>Collision — Vessel at Anchor — Presumption-Prudent and Safe Position — Watch.</p> <p>1. When one vessel drives upon another, which is at anchor in a proper position, the presumption is that the former is in fault.</p> <p>[Cited in The Echo, 19 Fed. 454.]</p> <p>2. It cannot be affirmed, as matter of law, that a vessel, coming to anchor in a harbor, is only obliged to swing clear of other vessels already anchored there. She is bound, if possible, to take up such a position as is prudent and safe under all the circumstances.</p> <p>3. Where a brig was brought to anchor in the daytime,, when the wind was blowing heavily and seemed likely to increase, ten fathoms astern of one schooner, and twenty fathoms ahead of another, and had out, when so anchored, only half the scope of her chains, and, during the night, the schooner ahead fouled the brig, which dragged on the schooner astern: Held, the brig was responsible to the latter schooner, whether she was at all in fault for the first collision or not, because she was anchored too near the schooner astern.</p> <p>4. Semble, she was too near the other schooner also.</p> <p>5. The injured schooner should have had an anchor watch: but as the neglect to keep one did not contribute to the collision, she was decreed to recover her whole damage.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,365.</p> <p>Foreign Judgment — Record — Jurisdiction of Court Rendering — Personal Service.</p> <p>1. Judgments of the several states, under the constitution and laws of the United States, have the effect, as evidence, in all the states.</p> <p>[Cited in Burnham v. Webster, Case No. 2,-179.]</p> <p>[Cited in Melhop v. Doane. 31 Iowa. 400.]</p> <p>2. The record imports absolute verity and cannot be traversed. But when the record of a judgment is offered in evidence, the court called to act upon it must inquire whether the coart rendering the judgment had jurisdiction. If it had no jurisdiction the judgment is a nullity.</p> <p>[Cited in Tenney v. Townsend. Case No. 13,-832: U. S. v. Walsh. 22 Fed. 64S.]</p> <p>[Followed in Babbitt v. Doe, 4 Ind. 359. Cited in brief in Warren v. Lusk, 16 Mo. 102; Stansbury v. Inglehart, 20 D. C. 136. Cited in Rape v. Heaton. 9 Wis. 306 (O. S. 333): Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Iowa. 260.]</p> <p>3. A proceeding by attachment is a proceeding in rem. and cannot bind the defendant in per-sonam. unless he appears to the action.</p> <p>4. If a suit be commenced by attachment, and there is no personal appearance, the judgment beyond the jurisdiction and the property levied on will be of no validity.</p> <p>5. No state can bind, by its judgment personally, a defendant who is not within its jurisdiction, and on whom no notice has been served.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Walsh. 22 Fed. 648.]</p> <p>[Cited in Melhop v. Doane. 31 Iowa. 402.]</p> <p>6. Where it appears, from the record, that process was served on the defendant, or that he appeared in the suit, the fact cannot be denied by plea.</p> <p>[Cited in Thompson v. Emmert. Case No. 13.-953; Logansport Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Knowles. Id. 8.467.]</p> <p>[Cited in Wilcox v. Kassick. 2 Mich. 170; Westcott v. Brown, 13 Ind. 85.]</p> <p>7. The facts on the record necessary to give jurisdiction are material, and cannot be controverted.</p> <p>[Cited in Sprague v. Litherberry, Case No. 13.-251.]</p> <p>[Cited in Wilcox v. Kassick. 2 Mich. 170.]</p> <p>8. The judgment of the court on these facts, if it go beyond the power of the state, will be disregarded. '</p> <p>9. A plea may show in what manner, whether by personal service or by attachment, notice is given, as this does not contradict the record but limits its operation.</p> <p>10. Every government can exercise jurisdiction over the persons and property within its limits but not beyond them.</p>

<p>The libellants [E. Lincoln & Co.] were the owners of a line of packets trading between Philadelphia and Boston, and were- lessees, and for the purposes of their business, occupiers of a wharf on the River Delaware within the city limits. On the 15th of September, 1846, the outer end of their wharf was occupied by one of their vessels, the Robert Wain, which had just completed her discharge. The south side was occupied by another of their vessels, the Sulla, which was then nearly empty, and, according to the regulation of the packet line, was to receive freight till the following Saturday, the 22nd, and then to sail on her regular trip. The Volusia, .a schooner just arrived with a cargo from Palermo, occupied with the consent of the complainants the outer berth abreast of the Robert Wain, and was secured by her hawser to the complainants’ wharf. The Robert Wain being in the act of running from her berth, efforts were made by both the Sulla and the Volusia to occupy It The Sulla succeeded, and early on Monday she discharged the rest of her cargo. The proprietors of the wharf desired to retain her there to await the arrival of freight, but the harbour master, acting under the authority of the wardens of the port, compelled her to give place to the Volusia.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,358.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Lottery Ticket Dealers — Internal Revenue Laws — Special Tax.</p> <p>1. The various provisions of the internal revenue laws imposing penalties on persons for carrying on the business of lottery ticket dealers or lottery dealers without complying with the laws, considered.</p> <p>2. The 13th section of the act of March 3, 1805 (13 Stat. 485), as amended by the act of July 27th, 1866 (14 Stat. 301). is not inconsistent with the 73d section of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat 249). as amended by the act of March 2. 1867 (14 Stat. 471), and the two can stand together.</p> <p>3. A person may be indicted under the 13th section of the act of March 3, 1865, as amended by,.the act of July 27, 1860, for engaging or being concerned in the business of a lottery dealer without having paid the special tax required by law, and, on conviction, be punished by imprisonment.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Page, Case No. 15,988.]</p> <p>4. The special tax on lottery dealers named in the act of July 27, 1866, is the special tax imposed on lottery ticket dealers by the act of 'July 13, 1860 (14 Stat. 113).</p>

<p>Case No. 8,360.</p> <p>Descent — Wills — Power to Sell by Executor —Rents and Profits until Sale.</p> <p>A testator by his will directed his executors to sell his land, and to distribute the proceeds according to the directions of his will and codicil; or to divide the same equally between his widow, his eight children, and his grandson. The lands descended to the heirs at law of the testator, who held a right, at law, to enter upon the same and to receive the profits; and may maintain an ejectment for the same, until a sale or division should be made.</p> <p>[Cited in Gratz’s Ex’rs v. Cohen, 11 How. (52 U. S.) 21.)</p>

<p>Case No. 8,359.</p>

Assumpsit by the indorsee against the in-dorser of a foreign bill of exchange, drawn by Foreman on Rutcher & Westphalia, at Hamburg, in favor of the defendant, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff.

<p>Case No. 8,362.</p> <p>VOLUNTAR!' ASSIGNMENT — EXECUTION LlEN — PRI-ORITV.</p> <p>1. On the 28th of June, 1875, the firm of W. & Co. made a voluntary assignment to L. Thereafter K. & Co., H. W. & Co.. L. & Co., and C. & Co. obtained judgments againstW. & Co. and issued executions, under which the sheriff levied on the goods formerly belonging to W. & Co. and then in the possession of L. as assignee. L. notified the sheriff of his claim and the sheriff called on the execution creditors for indemnity, which each of them gave, and the sheriff proceeded to sell the goods. Before the sale, C. & Co. notified the sheriff that they withdrew the indemnity which they had given and that he must proceed only by virtue of the direction endorsed on their execution. The sheriff sold the property for $2,-606, which he applied on the executions of Iv. & Co. and L. & Co. and returned the others unsatisfied. Thereafter on the 3d of September, 1875, proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced against W. & Co. by other creditors, the act of bankruptcy alleged being the making of the voluntary assignment to L. They being adjudged bankrupts and an assignee having been appointed, he filed a bill in equity against L. and against the execution creditors to set aside the assignment to L. and to compel the execution creditors to account to him for the property taken under their executions: Held, that the title of the as-signee in bankruptcy related back, to the time of the making of the voluntary assignment and that the intervening levies of the judgment creditors were therefore cut off.</p> <p>[See In re Beisenthal, Case No. 1,235.)</p> <p>2. The sheriff and the judgment creditors, except C. & Co., must account for the property taken under their executions. As to C. & Co. the bill must be dismissed, because the sale was not their act</p> <p>3. L., having done all that he was bound to do to protect the property, was not liable to account for the property sold on execution.</p> <p>4. As the evidence proved only that the assignment was void under the bankrupt law, the assignee was not estopped to deny that it was absolutely void under the law of New York, by the fact that it was averred in the creditors’ petition to have been made with intent “to hinder and defraud creditors,” especially as the petition averred also as an act of bankruptcy that it was made in contemplation of insolvency and to defeat the bankrupt law. and the adjudication may have been decreed under this last averment.</p> <p>5. It seems that the averments of the creditors’' petition as to the act of bankruptcy are not conclusive on the assignee.</p> <p>[NOTE. This case was subsequently heard in the district court upon exceptions on behalf of the respondents on the master’s report, and upon morion of the complainant for final decree. The respondents (the sheriff and the judgment creditors! objected to the entering of the decree against them, and claimed that in the former decision of the court there was error; that no case for equitable relief was made out against them. The exceptions were overruled, the report confirmed, and a final decree for complainant entered. 4 Fed. 318. Certain of these respondents perfected an appeal from this decision to the circuit court. Before the hearing of the appeal, and after the time for appeal had elapsed, one of the creditors, Wellstera, Meyer & Ochinger, against whom a decree for $>3,109.24 had been entered, moved to open the decree, so that they might be heard upon the merits of their case. They were served with process, but never filed an answer or made any defense. It was claimed that this happened by mistake and misunderstanding of counsel: that they stood upon the same ground and had the same defense as Cow-din & Co. Their motion was denied, but says Judge Choate: “The case is clearly one in which the court would gladly give these parties relief if it had the power. They are apparently in the position of being called on to pay what other defendants, upon the same state of facts, have been held not liable to pay.” 1 Fed. 378. Circuit Judge Blatchford delivered the opinion upon: appeal, in which he said: “All the points urged by the appellants appear to have been carefully considered by the district judge in his decision. So far as the main questions at issue are concerned, I think they were all properly disposed of except the question of interest.” The onlv question involved in the interest was as to the time for which it should run. 4 Fed. 324.]</p>

[This was a libel in personam by John Lind-rop, a waiter on board the steamer Sierra Nevada, against the master, C. C. Dali, to recover for personal injuries.]

The actor [Samuel Lindsey] was one of the ■crew of the South Carolina, and with the rest had signed articles to proceed from Charleston to Leghorn, and back; with liberty to touch at Gibraltar. The vessel sailed from hence about the 1st May, 1800, and put into Malaga, where the captain sold 200 bags of cocoa, part of his cargo, and received on board 23 casks of wine.

<p>Case No. 8,366.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,367.</p> <p>Practice at Law — Reinstatement op Cause.</p> <p>The court will not. at a subsequent term, reinstate a cause which has been non prossed for want of security for costs.</p>

The petition in this case prayed that the court would order the assignees of the above bankrupts to pay to the petitioner certain moneys in their hands, being the proceeds of goods heretofore sold by the bankrupts, and also turn over certain notes and accounts foy the unpaid purchase-moneys of other goods sold by them. No objection is made to the form of the proceeding.

This is a bill to set aside a secret settlement made by the plaintiff’s late wife, a few days previous to her marriage. The conveyance was to Mary Graham, the sister of the plaintiff’s wife, in trust for the grantor during her life, and, if she died leaving no children, &c. then in trust for Jane, the daughter of the trustee. 'The wife died a few months after the marriage without issue, and the plaintiff qualified as her administrator.

<p>Error to the district court for the Eastern district of Missouri.</p> <p>Winter owed Dinliman $2,300. and interest, to recover which the latter commenced suit in July, 1870, and obtained judgment November 22, on which execution issued November 29, 1870, and was levied by the sheriff on Winter's stock of goods. On the next day after the levy, Winter filed his petition in bankruptcy to be adjudicated a bankrupt, and was on the 3d day of December, 1870, adjudged a bankrupt. On the 15th day of December, the sheriff sold the stock of goods levied on, and there arose from the sale the sum of ?1,5S3.05. Linkman filed a petition in the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri, asking for an order upon the sheriff that the proceeds of the sale be paid to him. The assignee in bankruptcy answers, and insists that the money be paid to him for the benefit of the estate of the bankrupt. The evidence shows that as the time judgment was obtained by Linkman against Winter, the latter was insolvent. It also shows that Linkman knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that Winter whs insolvent, and that Winter was aware of his own insolvency. Winter did not procure suit to be brought, and although he had no real defense to Linkman’s action, he employed an attorney who filed an answer and defended the action as best he could, to gain time; but the only defence made related to the interest claim cf. vki-’: being waived by the plaintiff, the court gave him judgment. There was no contrivance or collusion between Linkman and Winter, to give the former a preference; on the contrary, the debt- or’s desire seemed to be to prevent the judgment and execution. And the question is, whether, under the circumstances, the judgment creditor, or the assignee in bankruptcy, is entitled to the proceeds of the sale under the execution. The district court decided in favor of the assignee. A bill of exceptions was taken, and the cause is here on a writ of error prosecuted by the judgment creditor. No question is made as to the mode of reviewing the decision below.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Michi.gan.] [In the matter of Alexander B. Linn and others against Loring M. Smith.]

[On petition for an appeal by William Linton from the decision of the commissioner of patents rejecting his second claim in specifications of improvement in machinery for making pottery.]

Ejectment for a tract of land lying in Scituate, in Rhode Island. The defendants [Timothy Hopkins and others], as to ninety acres, parcel of the premises described in the declaration, pleaded in bar the statute of limitations of Rhode Island, which provides, that twenty years’ quiet possession shall “give and make a good and rightful title,” &c. And as to the residue of the demanded premises, they disclaimed. They also pleaded the general issue “Not guilty,” as to the whole.

This was an action by William Lippincott, assignee, to recover damages for the infringement of W. Woodworth’s patent for planing, tonguing and grooving boards, planks, &c., and for reducing the same to an equal width. This patent had issued December 27, 1828. The patentee died in 1839, and his administrator procured on the 16th November, 1842, an extension of the patent for seven years, as authorized by the act of 1S36.

<p>Leopold Lippman was brought up on a ha-beas corpus, being in the custody of the marshal of the United States for this district, on an order and commitment made by a commissioner of the circuit court of the United States for this district, under the provisions of the 14th section of the internal revenue act of June 30th, 1864 [13 Stat. 226], *as subsequently amended. For one of the causes specified in that section the assessor of the proper district summoned the relator, who was a tobacco manufacturer, to appear before him and produce all books of account in his possession, custody or care, containing entries relating to his trade or business during a period of time specified in the summons, and to give testimony respecting his returns made as such tobacco manufacturer. The summons was duly served on the relator, the books referred to in it being described in it with reasonable certainty. He neglected to obey the summons, and did not appear or produce the books referred to. The assessor then applied to the commissioner, under the section, for an attachment against him as for a contempt. The commissioner heard the .application, and, satisfactory proof being made to him, issued an attachment to the marshal for the arrest of the relator. The relator was arrested and brought before the commissioner, who heard the case on evidence, and made an order committing the relator to the custody of the marshal, till he should produce before the assessor the books referred to in the summons and give testimony as required. It was alleged that the relator had made false and fraudulent returns to the assessor, and the relator set up that a criminal proceeding had been commenced against him for making such alleged false and fraudulent returns, and that he could not produce the books or give the testimony without crim-mating himself.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Virginia.] On the 17th day of June, 1870, Storrs Brothers, and Blair & Thaxton, claiming to be creditors of Engle & Son, filed their petition in the district court, alleging the commission of sundry acts of bankruptcy, and praying that said firm be adjudicated bankrupts.

[In the matter of Elisha C. Litchfield, a bankrupt. The case was previously heard upon the question as to what effect, the death of the bankrupt, occurring between adjudication and warrant issued, had upon the proceedings. Case No. 8,385.]

<p>[In the matter of Elisha C. Litchfield, a bankrupt.]</p>

On April 24th, 1S74, [Edwin C.] Litchfield . commenced an action of ejectment against ¡ the defendants [Olaf Johnson and Lewis j Johnson] for the south half of the south-east quarter of section 9, township 86, range ¡ 20, and at the May term, 1874, recovered : judgment.

This was a bill in equity for an injunction. Of the many facts alleged in the pleadings, but few need here be stated in order to an understanding of the questions determined by the court. On the 8th of August, 1846, congress granted to Iowa, to aid it in improving the navigation of the Des Moines river, from its mouth to Raccoon fork, alternate sections of the public lands, in a strip five miles wide on each side of the river (9 Stat. 77).

<p>The bankrupt, William H. Little, in this ease, filed his petition on December 10th, 1867, and was adjudged a bankrupt, and on February 8th, 186S, at the first meeting of creditors, an assignee was appointed, and the assignment executed. The petition made no allusion to a copartnership, but, in the schedules attached to the petition, it appeared that debts had been contracted by him in a firm name, and that there were credits due to the firm. On February 25th, 1868, the bankrupt presented to the register a petition, stating that he had filed his petition as a member of a firm, but had omitted to include his partner Dana, and praying for leave to amend his petition and schedules so as to permit his partner to be joined with him in his final order of discharge, adjudging him discharged from the debts of the firm. The register denied the request of the petitioner, and certified the question to the court.</p> <p>2 By the Register;</p> <p>[I, James F. Dwight, the register in charge of this entitled matter, do hereby certify that in the course of the proceedings herein, the following question arose pertinent to the proceedings. Facts: On the 10th of December, 1867, William H. Little, of the city of Elizabeth, New Jersey, carrying on business at No. 24 Church street, New York City, filed his petition for adjudication in bankruptcy and discharge from his debts, in this court. He was duly adjudged a bankrupt, and on the 6th day of February, 1868, at the first meeting of creditors duly held, an assignee was chosen by the creditors, anti subsequently the register executed the usual deed of assignment to the assignee. The petition of the bankrupt made no allusion to a copartnership or copartnership debts; but in the schedules attached thereto, it appeared that debts had been contracted jointly with one Charles H. Dana, in the firm name of ‘’Little & Dana,” and that there were credits due to said firm of ‘‘Little & Dana.” On the 25th of February, the said bankrupt, William H. Little, filed a sworn petition with the register, of which the following is a copy: “Title. The petition of William H. Little respectfully states and shows: That on the 10th day of December, 1867, your petitioner filed with the clerk of this court his petition in bankruptcy as a member of the firm of ‘Little & Dana,’ a firm composed of your petitioner and Charles H. Dana. That in said petition he omitted to include the name of his said partner, Charles H. Dana, and now petitions and asks tnat an order may be made and entered herein, permitting your said petitioner to amend his petition and schedules in such manner as will permit his said partner to be joined with him in the final orders of discharge which may be granted by this court, adjudging him discharged from the debts and liabilities of said firm of Little & Dana. William H. Little.” On this petition, attorneys for the bankrupt moved that the register grant an order in accordance with the prayer of the bankrupt, which motion being denied, the bankrupt, through his attorneys, prays that the question may be certified to the judge for his decision as to whether the register erred in refusing to grant the order prayed for; which prayer is grant-; *-? r~ cordance with the rules in practice, and this certificate is made in conformity thereto. In my opinion the prayer of the petitioner cannot be granted. No allusion to a partner or a copartnership was made in the original petition. Section 36 of the law [of 1867 (14 Stat. 536)], and rule IS of the supreme court, indicate the manner in which copart-ners may be drawn into proceedings in bankruptcy, and I do not see how, at this stage of the proceedings, and in this manner, Charles H. Dana can be included in the matter of William H. Little’s bankruptcy, — which certificate and opinion is respectfully submitted, this 29th day of February, 1868.] 2</p>

<p>Case No. 8,391.</p> <p>Bankruptot—Jurisdiction — Carrying on Business.</p> <p>Where a bankrupt, who filed his petition in the Southern district of New Xork, in December, 1867, was a member of a firm engaged in manufacturing cloths in New Jersey, which failed in October, 1866, and, for six months before the filing of the petition, he had resided in New Jersey. but had a desk in the office of his son in New Xork City, wnere he received and wrote letters. and kept books and papers, and was engaged in closing up the affairs of the concern, but did no other business and had no other place of business: Held, that his petition was not properly filed in this district, and this court had no jurisdiction to grant a discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Fogarty v. Gerrity, Case No. 4,895; Re Penn. Id. 10,926; Re Ives, Id. 7,115; Re Groome. 1 Fed. 467; Allen v. Thompson, 10 Fed. 124.]</p> <p>[See In re Belcher. Case No. 1,237.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,392.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Examination—How Waived by Creditors.</p> <p>It is the right of even a small minority of the creditors present at a composition meeting to insist upon the opportunity for an examination of the bankrupt before a vote is taken; but such right is waived by moving for a vote before such examination has been had.</p>

[This was a bill by William P. Little, as-signee, against T. L. Alexander, to set aside an alleged fraudulent transaction.] On the 1st day of January, 1869, John R. Alexander was largely indebted to various creditors, and had not property sufficient to pay his debts, and these facts were known to himself and the defendant, T. L. Alexander.

This was a motion for a provisional injunction, founded upon a bill and affidavits. The plaintiffs [Edwin C. Little and Oliver Scovill] claimed the exclusive right to print, publish and sell a book entitled “Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of Appeals of the State of New-York, with Notes and References and an Index, by George F. Comstock. Counsellor at Law, Vol.

[Bill in equity by Edwin C. Little and Oliver Scovill against Anthony Gould and others.] This was a motion, after answer, to dissolve the provisional injunction granted in this case [Case No. 8,394].

<p>Claim [by Milton Little] for five leagues of land in Yolo county, rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimant.</p>

This was an appeal from a sentence of eon-•demnation in the district court of the Southern district of New-York. [Case No. 15,611.] The libel stated that Stephen Decatur, commander of the frigate Chesapeake, on the 13th •day of August, 1808, seized the brig Little Ann and cargo on the high seas as forfeited to the United States.

<p>Case No. 8,398.</p> <p>Bankruptcy—Discharge op Bankrupt — Notice op Assignee’s Appointment—Examination or Bankrupt—Refusal to be Examined—CashBook.</p> <p>1. It is not essential to the debtor's discharge, that the assignee should give due notice of his appointment.</p> <p>[Cited in Coombs v. Persons Unknown. 82 Me. 326, 19 All. 827.]</p> <p>2. Nor that the second and third general meetings of his creditors should be held at the expiration of three months and six months respectively, from the date of the adjudication.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Clark, Case No. 2,808.]</p> <p>3. If a creditor wishes to examine the bankrupt. he must procure an appointment from the register of a time and place for the examination. It is not the bankrupt’s duty to see to the appointment. but to be ready to attend on due notice.</p> <p>4. Whether if a debtor attends and refuses to be examined, there is any remedy excepting by motion to commit, quaere ?</p> <p>5. It is necessary to the discharge of a bankrupt trader, that he should have kept a cash-book subsequently to the passage of the bankrupt act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 517)].</p> <p>[Cited in Re Beilis, Case No. 1.275; Re Arch-enbrown. Id. 505; Re Frey, 9 Fed. 379; Re Graves, 24 Fed. 551.]</p> <p>[NOTE. In re Bellamy [Case No. 1,2(37], would seem to require a more strict proof of conformity and regard the jurisdiction of the court to grant the discharge as dependent upon the exact conformity of the proceedings to every requirement of the act. and places the responsibility therefor upon the bankrupt. The case of the text is regarded as more in conformity to the true construction of the act. See Bump, Bankr. (Gth Ed.) 242],3</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This was a petition by [Hiram Littlefield] an alleged bankrupt for revision of a final decree of the district court refusing him a discharge from his debts under his original application.

[This was an action of ejectment brought by the Little Gunnell Gold Mining Company against lumber and others to recover possession of mining claims.]

<p>Appeal from decree of district court in favor of James McNamara and others, owners of the schooner Lizzie Throop, and against the tugs Little Giant and Wm. L. Ewing, for damages caused by a collision in the Chicago river.</p>

The privateer Jefferson, commanded by Capt Downie, on the 3d day of August,, 1812, at a short distance from Machias river, captured the schooner Lively and cargo as prize, carried them into Machias, and from thence to Salem, where she arrived on the 12th of the same month.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] The property in controversy in this case [The Liverpool Hero, and cargo, Simpson, master], having been condemned in the district court, as enemy’s property, and good and lawful prize to the United States’ frigate Chesapeake, Samuel Evans, Esq., commander, and decreed to be distributed, one moiety to the United States, and the qther to the officers and crew of said frigate, according to…

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

Several suits were brought by different sets of salvors against the ship Liverpool Packet for important salvage services rendered the vessel while lying at anchor dismasted, among the Nantucket Shoals. The claimants admitted that salvage was due; and, by agreement of parties, the several suits were referred, under a rule of court, to William Dehon, Esq., to determine the amount due, and the question of costs. It was also agreed that there should be no appeal from his award.

answer. The bill in this cause was filed by the Live Stock Dealers’ and Butchers’ Association, and others, complainants, against the Crescent City Live Stock Landing & Slaughter House Company, and the Board of Metropolitan Police of New Orleans, as defendants. The general object of the bill was to restrain the defendants from taking proceedings to suppress the business of the complainants, in slaughtering animals and selling meat.

<p>Case No. 8,409.</p> <p>Carriers — Dangers op Navigation — Burden op Proof.</p> <p>A common carrier gave a receipt for two casks of wine, received in good order, and agreed to deliver them in like condition at the end of the voyage, the dangers of navigation excepted; in a suit by the shipper for the non-delivery of the goods, the carrier claimed that the wine was lost on the voyage on account of the dangers of navigation and insufficiency of the casks; Held, that the burden of proof is upon the carrier to show that the loss arose from the insufficiency of the casks or the dangers of navigation; and that, if upon the whole proof it was doubtful whether the loss arose from either of such causes, the shipper must recover.</p> <p>[Cited in The Oriflamme, Case No. 10,671.]</p>

<p>[In error to the district court of the United States for the Northern district of New York.]</p> <p>On the 24th of December, 1841, [Yan Vech-ten] Livingston and [Truman K.j Butler, of Utica, recovered a judgment against Adin Burdick, of Brookfield, for $1.897 74¡ which became on that day a lien on real estate of the debtor of sufficient value to satisfy the judgment. On the 4th of May, 1842, Adin Bur-dick made an assignment of all his property to Benjamin Burdick, in trust for the payment of his debts, preferring the debt to Livingston & Butler over all others. The assignee, on the 25th of May, 1842, informed Livingston & Butler of the assignment and ■of the preference in favor of their judgment, and on that day and various other days down to the 11th of July, 1842, he paid them the sum of $3S3 02 in all, which was ■applied on the judgment. On the 27th of July, 1842, an execution was issued on the judgment. Between that time and the 31st of October following, the assignee paid to Livingston & Butler $158 61 more, which was also applied on the judgment. On the 17th of September, 1842, certain creditors ■of Adin Burdick presented their petition to the district court, under the general bankrupt act of August 19, 1841 (5 Stat. 440), to have him declared a bankrupt. On the 9th of January, 1843, sufficient real estate was sold on the execution to satisfy the balance due on the judgment, and on the 5th of April, 1843, Adin Burdick was declared a bankrupt, and [Joseph] Bruce was appointed his assignee. In May, 1844, Bruce brought an action of assumpsit in the district court against Livingston & Butler, to recover the monies paid to them by the voluntary assignee, as having been paid in contemplation of the bankruptcy of the assign- or and by way of fraudulent preference over his other creditors. The plaintiff had a verdict, and. after judgment, the defendants brought the case to this court by writ of error.</p>

This was an action of trespass, brought in the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Virginia, by Edward Livingston, a citizen of the state of New York, against Thomas Jefferson, a citizen of the state of Virginia, and late president of - the United States, for a trespass alleged to have been committed by the defendant whilst he was president, in removing him from the batture. in the city of New-Orleans, in the then territory of Orleans, now the state of…

[These were libels by Herman T. Livingston against the steamship Jewess, and by John L. Lockwood against the same.] These were motions in behalf of a stipu-lator to be discharged from his undertakings. The vessel was arrested on process of attachment'in each suit, and thereupon Mr. Sands, the petitioner, entered into stipulations in each case for costs, and also to satisfy the final decree, and the vessel was accordingly discharged from arrest in the causes.

<p>This was a bill in equity [by Laureston R. Livingston, W. B. Copeland. James Iv. More-head, and others against J. Hervey Jones, Alexander M. Wallingford, and others] to-restrain the infringement of letters patent [No. 2,886], granted to John P. Sherwood, December 14, 1842; reissued October 7, 1856 [No. 401], and extended for seven years from December 14,1856, and assigned to complainants. The claims of the reissued and extended patent were as follows: “I claim making the cases of door-locks and latches double-faced, or so finished that either side may be used for the outside, in order that the same lock or cased fastening may answer for a right or left-hand door, substantially as described. I also claim the peculiar construction and double-action (upon an inclined and horizontal track or way) of the locking-ear, B. as here-inbefore described, and the combination of the locking-car, B. and safety-cars, GG 2, with one another, and with the connecting or vibrating bar and bolt. A. as within described, so as to fasten the bolt, C, securely, and prevent its being picked. I also claim so constructing the bolt as hereinbefore described,, that by simply turning it over in the lock-case, it is adapted to a right or left-hand door.” .</p> <p>2 [The history and merits of the invention in question, were essentially thus: Till within a few years past most of the door-locks used in this country, were imported from England. It was an important object, therefore, to discover or invent some plan by which this article could be made more cheaply and better than the imported, notwithstanding the higher price of labor here. Such an inventor, who, by bringing his invention into market, could expel the foreign article, would evidently be a public benefactor, the article of door-locks being one of immense consumption in this country. This object was in part effected by making the locks of cast-iron.but a difficulty in the way of these cheaper productions was found in the fact that door-locks had to be made right and left, and a lock made for a right-hand door would have to be turned upside down in order to be used on a left-hand door, and vice versa. It became, therefore, a very important object to those who manufactured, and to those who dealt in this article, that this difficulty of right and left hand locks should he some how obviated, and that every lock might be equally capable of use on right or left hand doors.</p> <p>[An American, ■ named Sherwood — under whom the complainants claimed — was the first to invent a mode of effecting this object, and soon succeeded in establishing a manufacture at once cheaper and better than the imported. His patent was for “a new and useful improvement indoor-locks.” The schedule stated that every part of the lock might be made of cast-iron as the cheapest material, but did not claim this as the patentee’s discovery. “What I claim as my invention,” is Sherwood’s language, “Is making the case of door-locks and latches double-faced, or so finished that either side may be used for the outside, in order that the same lock may answer for a right or left hand door.”</p> <p>[The defence set up to the bill was want of originality in the invention; and great numbers of locks were brought into court, many of them old and rusty things, which undoubtedly were cased on both sides. Three were specially relied on; one from the custom house, one from the city hospital, and one from the gate of St. Mark's Church. Several manufacturers of more or less reputation, who were offered as experts, testified that in their opinion these were not essentially different in principle from Mr. Sherwood’s lock. But the defendants did not show either that any one of these locks had been made with an intention to obviate the difficulty of having right and left hand locks, or that practically any one of them had ever, in a single instance, been so used, or that any person, before Sherwood, in seeing any Oue oi tnem. had conceived the possibility of thus applying them.</p> <p>[The custom house lock was, in fact, from an open out-door gate. Its inside was covered tight in order to preserve the works of the lock from the weather and from rust — a device necessary in all out-door locks. It was not well suited for a Janus-faced lock, and was finished on one side only. It was a left-hand* lock, and not a door-lock properly speaking, at all. The lock taken from the city hospital gate was a dead-lock; a right-hand lock. By putting it wrong side out, and making some alterations, it might have been converted into a left-hand dead-lock. The same was to be said of the gate-lock of St. Mark’s Church, and of all the others. The mechanic who made the custom house lock in 1840, swore that it was intended and finished only as a left-hand lock; that he never thought of a Janus-faced lock, and never manufactured one; but had different patterns for right and for left hand locks. And yet undoubtedly to the eye of high inventive genius, the finished production of Sherwood was visible in nearly every one of these rude productions. It required but the “vital spark,” to kindle the train, and to convert, in an instant, the manufacture designed for one purpose, into an object applicable to quite another. Sherwood had no other merit than to have seen, in an instant, that which others had discovered without being in the least aware of it.] 2</p>

3 [Appeal from a master’s report, the case being thus: [Till within a few years past most of the door locks used in this country, were imported from England. It was an important object, therefore, to discover or invent some plan by which this article could be made more cheaply and better than the imported, notwithstanding the higher price of labor here.

This was an action of ejectment to recover the premises described in the pleadings. Mary S. Livingston (formerly McRa) and Julia M. McRa were entitled under the will of their grandfather to the Wateree plantation. Mary S. and Julia McRa were minors, living in Baltimore.

[This was a suit by the lessee of Livingston and Nicholson against Moore, Mahon and others.] The pleadings in this cause continued for upwards of two weeks, after which HOP-1CINSON, District Judge,… Held: and the question now to be decided is, which of them has made good his claim; which of them has proved and maintained his right by the facts of the case and the law’ of the land.

Motion to suppress a deposition. On the 3d of July, 1856, by stipulation between the parties, it was agreed that the testimony of one Whittemore might be taken before a United States commissioner, “subject to all legal objections for irrelevancy and incompetency, but all objections as to the form and manner of taking being hereby waived, and that said deposition may be used as evidence on the trial of this cause, as if regularly taken under the act of congress.” The…

[Bill by Herman T. Livingston against the proprietors of the Ore Bed in Salisbury for the recovery of fifty shares of stock and the ■dividends due upon the same.]

<p>Case No. 8,420.</p> <p>Courts — Inferior Court — Jurisdiction bt Act of Congress — IN Equity — Infringement or Patent.</p> <p>1. The circuit courts are not inferior in the technical sense of the books, but are so only as subordinate to the supreme court. But their jurisdiction is special and limited.</p> <p>2. If jurisdiction of “cases arising under the laws of the United States” be not conferred on the circuit courts by an act of congress, they cannot take cognizance of them.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Barry. 42 Fed. 122; XT. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, Case No. 15,867.]</p> <p>3. And where congress have given an action at law in the circuit courts in certain cases, they do not thereby acquire jurisdiction so as to entertain in those cases a bill in equity not relating to an action at law.</p> <p>4. But, whether, if it should become necessary in an action at law in the circuit courts to appeal to their equity side in aid or defence of such action, those courts would have the necessary equity powers. Query.</p> <p>5. A bill filed to restrain the infringement of a patent, where both parties were citizens of the same state dismissed, and an injunction refused— congress having confined the remedy for a breach of patent rights to an action at law', and the judiciary acts not giving the court jurisdiction in equity, except in cases between citizens of different states.</p> <p>[Cited in Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 782; Nevins v. Johnson. Case No. 10.136; Root v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 105 U. S. 191.]</p> <p>NOTE. The chancellor of the state was aft-erwards applied to for an injunction in this case, and refused it; but on an appeal from his decision to the court of errors, it was granted. 9 Johns. 507. Congress have since supplied this defect of jurisdiction. By the act of 15th of February, 1819, it is provided, “that the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, as well in equity as at law, of all actions, suits, controversies, and cases, arising under any law of the United States, granting or confirming to authors or inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings, inventions, and discoveries: and upon any bill in equity, filed by any party aggrieved in any such cases, shall have authority to grant injunctions, according to the course and principies of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of the rights of any authors or inventors, secured to them by any laws of the United States, on such terms and conditions as the said courts may deem fit and reasonable: provided however, that from all judgments and decrees of any circuit courts, rendered in the premises, a writ of error or appeal, as the case may require, shall lie to the supreme court of the United States, in the same manner, and under the same circumstances, as is now provided by law in other judgments and decrees of such circuit courts.” 6 Colvin’s Laws 369 [3 Stat. 481).</p>

<p>Case No. 8,421.</p> <p>Prize — Spoliation of Papers by the Master— False Destination of the Vessel’s Papers.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,422.</p> <p>Collision at Sea — Steamer and Schooner— Lights — Burden op Proof.</p> <p>1.A collision occurred in the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of New Jersey,between the steamer A. and the schooner L. M., on the evening of February 2, 1875. The steamer was bound from New York to Wilmington, and the schooner was bound up the coast to New York. The wind was from the S. W. or S. S. W., and the schooner was on her port tack. In her behalf it was alleged that she was heading N. N. W.; and that both of the lights of the steamer were seen on her starboard bow, but the red light was shut in and the green light alone remained in view, and the schooner held her course without change, till the vessels were a few lengths apart, when the steamer suddenly ran across the schooner’s bow, and, in answer to a hail from the steamer, the schooner’s helm'was ported, but she struck the steamer’s port quarter with her bowsprit. On behalf of the steamer it was alleged, that the steamer was heading S. by E.; that the red light of the schooner was seen about two points on the steamer’s port bow; that the steamer’s helm was ported, and her course changed to S. by W.; and that the schooner’s helm was starboarded and her course changed towards the steamer, and she kept on till she ran into the steamer. Cross-libels were filed by the owners of the respective vessels: Held, that it was the duty of the steamer to keep out of the way of the schooner, or to establish an excuse for not having done so.</p> <p>2. It was impossible to reconcile the evidence that only the schooner’s red light was seen over the steamer’s port bow, with the evidence that only the steamer's green light was seen over the schooner’s starboard bow; and no satisfactory conclusion as to the real state of the facts could be arrived at from the evidence.</p> <p>3. The burden of proof was on the steamer, to show that the schooner had changed her course.</p> <p>4. She had failed to establish such fact, and must be held solely liable for the collision.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,423.</p> <p>Admiralty — Contracts—Possession—Master’s Interest.</p> <p>1. By the agreement made for the building of a vessel,'it was agreed that one L., who took an eighth of the vessel, should command and sail her as master. L. afterwards sold his eighth to K., who bought it. expecting to go as master of her, and gave a larger price for the share on that account. After his purchase, one-half of the vessel was owned in llamariscotta. Me., and the other half in Portland, Me. He ran the vessel as master for several voyages; and, the vessel being in New York, he was informed by her agent there that one of the Portland owners had sold out, and that the new purchaser -with the Damariscotta owners had joined in appointing M. as master of the vessel. Thereafter M., coming to the vessel when K. was not on board, took possession of her. When K. came to the vessel and found M. on board, there was hard language between them, and M. threatened to have K. arrested. Thereupon K. filed a libel for possession, claiming that he was entitled'to be master of the vessel and had been forcibly dispossessed. Held, that K. did not purchase from L. any right to continue as master.</p> <p>2. The right which L. had to sail the vessel as master was neither by the terms of his agreement nor by its own nature transferable, being a contract resting in personal confidence.</p> <p>3. Under the agreement between K. and the other owners, and under section 4250 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the majority of the owners had the right to remove K. and appoint M.</p> <p>4. There had been no forcible dispossession of K. What took place betwen K. and M.. after M had taken possession, was immaterial and the libel must be dismissed.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,424.</p> <p>Prize — Violation- or Blockade.</p> <p>Vessel and carao condemned as enemy property. and for a violation of the blockade.</p>

This was a libel filed against the schooner L. J. Farwell, to enforce a certain demand in favor of E. J. Burkam & Co., the libel-lants, arising upon the following state of facts: In August, 1874, George B. Dickinson was a forwarding and commission merchant at Detroit. Dennis Driscoll was master of the schooner Farwell, which on the 26th of August was lying at that port.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,428.</p> <p>Salvage — Derelict—The Whole Value Decreed.</p> <p>In a case of derelict property, of small value, notice of the proceedings having been brought home to the owners of it, who failed to appear in the suit and had expressly abandoned the property to the libellants, the court awarded the whole balance ($107) to the salvors after payment of costs.</p> <p>[Cited in The Carl Sehurz, Case No. 2,414.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,427.</p> <p>Evidence — Negligence—Stowage of Freight— Delivery Books — Testimony of Chew — Condition of Freight — Receipts of Vessel.</p> <p>1. The delivery books of a cargo showed that a large amount of lead was taken out before certain corks which were injured. Held, that the books were to be relied on rather than the testimony of the crew to the contrary.</p> <p>2. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the receipt of the vessel for the freight in good order will make a prima facie case against the vessel.</p>

[In the matter of William M. Lloyd, a bankrupt, for whom a petition for adjudication in bankruptcy had been filed. Case No. 8,429.]

[This was a suit in bankruptcy by John Lloyd, the assignee of Peter Gardiner, against Hoo Sue and others. The case is heard on a motion, by the complainant, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding with the sale of certain mortgaged property.]

<p>[This was a suit by John Lloyd, assignee, against J. H. Strobridge.]</p>

<p>[This was a suit by John Lloyd, assignee, against Polly Turner].</p>

This was an application to the court by the complainant to strike from the record the testimony of certain witnesses, upon the grounds, substantially, that no proper foundation has been laid in the answer for their examination, under the provisions of section 4920 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.

[The bankrupt [Worthington S. Locke,] has been fully examined, and his examination, which is not impeached or contradicted, tends to show that he was extensively engaged in trade, in several cities of the United States, ■down to the year 1856, when his business was concentrated at Portland, in Maine; and that in December, 1857, he failed.

Debt, upon an official bond given on- the 23d of December, 1811, by John Walker, Jr. (who was appointed postmaster at Burlington, Massachusetts,) and by one John Walker and the defendant. Joseph Locke, as his sureties, to the postmaster-general, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his office by Walker, as postmaster at Burlington. Plea of general performance.

This was a libel of information, and the case came before the court on a writ of error to the district court of the United States for this district.

<p>In equity. Submitted on pleadings and evidence.</p>

<p>In equity. Submitted on pleadings and evidence for final decree.</p>

Heard on exceptions to master’s report upon the petition filed by Frances L. Bryan and Elizabeth P. Nabors. Held: against the objection of Alexander, that the reference embraced as well the decree of 1860 as that of 1864, and stated the account as though the decree of this court re-opened all the settlements in the probate court.

<p>Case No. 8,448.</p> <p>War — Aliens Resident in Country — Poivisu to Akrest — Regulations — Pleading at Law— Matters Subsequent to Plea — Formal Objections.</p> <p>1. Powers of the president of the United States, tinder the act of congress relative to alien enemies, [1 Stat. 577]. This act having authorised the president to direct the confinement of alien enemies, necessarily conferred all the means for enforcing such orders as he might give in relation to the execution of those powers.</p> <p>2. The marshals of the several districts, are the proper officers to execute the orders of the president, under the act relative to alien enemies.</p> <p>3. It is to the department of state, that a reference must be made for the official acts of the president, in relation to such public measures as are not immediately connected with the duties of some other department.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Collins v. State, 8 Ind. 351.]</p> <p>4. The president may direct some other department to make known such measures as he may establish.</p> <p>5. After the president had established such regulations as he deemed necessary in relation to alien enemies, it was not necessary to call in the aid of the judicial authority, on all occasions to enforce them, and the marshal could act without such authority.</p> <p>6. By the provisions of the law. congress intended to make the judiciary auxiliary to the executive in effecting its great objects; and each department was to act independently of the other, except that the former was to make the ordinances of the latter the rule of its decisions.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Spangler, 11 Mich. 323.]</p> <p>7. A plea, which ' states matters which occurred subsequent to the institution of the suit, is bad on demurrer.</p> <p>8. When objections, merely formal are stated as causes of demurrer, the party taking them is entitled to the benefit of such exceptions, when they are well founded.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,449.</p> <p>Partnership — Dissolution—Note Given bt One —Old Debt — Authority to Settle Accounts.</p> <p>1. After the dissolution, neither partner by any note in writing, can bind the partnership, even for a debt contracted by it. And in this view, a note is a new contract; though it be given to pay a debt of the firm.</p> <p>[Cited in Conklin v. Ogborn, 7 Ind. 555; Gardner v. Conn, 34 Ohio, 192: Woodson v. Wood, 84 Va. 487, 5 S. E. 279.]</p> <p>2. An authority to one party to settle the accounts of the firm, collect and pay its debts, does not authorize the individual to give a note in the name of the late firm.</p> <p>[Cited in Woodson v. Wood, 84 Va. 487, 5 S. E. 279.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,450.</p> <p>Collision — Between Sail Vessels in East River — Inevitable Accident.</p> <p>[NOTE. The libelants appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed this decision. Case not reported. From the decision of the circuit court they appealed to the supreme court, where the decision was again affirmed. Mr, Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court. He considered that from all the testimony in the case it is a fair presumption that the accident was inevitable. He said: “Inevitable accident is where a vessel is pursuing a lawful avocation in a lawful manner, using the proper precautions against danger, and an accident occurs. The highest degree of caution that can be used is not required. It is enough that it is reasonable under the circumstances. — such as is usual in similar cases, and has been found by long experience to be sufficient to answer the end in view, the safety of life and property.-’ But if the accident was not inevitable, the learned justice considered the Ariel to be in fault, or at least there is doubt. He says: “Where there is a reasonable doubt as to which party is to blame, the loss must be sustained by the party on whom it has fallen.” 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 19G.]</p>

<p>[This was an action at law by Doe ex dem Lockwood and others against Leicester Walker.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,452.</p> <p>Patents — Pilot Wheels in Locomotive Engines — Infringement—Act of Mat 4, 1S5S — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. The claim of the letters patent granted to Alba F. Smith. February 11th, 1862. for an “improvement in trucks for locomotives,” namely, “the employment, in a locomotive engine, of a truck or pilot wheels, fitted with the pendent links, o, o, to allow of lateral motion to the engine, as specified, whereby the drivers of said engine are allowed to remain correctly on the track, in consequence of the lateral motion of the truck, allowed for by said pendent links, when running on a curve, as set forth.” is a claim for the use in. and the combination with, a locomotive engine, (that is. a structure having, at its rear end, not a swiv-elling truck, but non-swivelling driving wheels, with axles rigidly attached to the body of the engine.) of a swivelling pilot or leading truck, provided with pendent links, to allow the forward part of the engine to move laterally over the truck, when the truck and the driving wheels are not together in a straight track, whereby' the forward part of the engine can move onward in a line tangent to a curve, while the axles of the driving wheels are parallel, or nearly so. to the radial line of the curve, and the axles of the truck wheels also become parallel to the radial line of the curve, because the truck is made to swivel around the king-bolt, by the action of the rails on the flanges of the truck-wheels.</p> <p>2. The nature of the invention covered by such claim, explained.</p> <p>3. Such claim is not anticipated by the patent granted to Bridges and Davenport, May 4th, 1841. for an “improvement in railway-carriages.” although such patent shows the use. at each end of a railway-car. of a swinging bolster, in a truck swivelling on a king-bolt, the body of the car being connected to the truck-frame by pendulous links, from which such body is hung, whereby a lateral motion of the truck is permitted, independently of the body of the car.</p> <p>4. Nor is such claim anticipated by the patent granted to Kipple and Bullock, December 20th, 1859. for an “improvement in car-trucks.” although the mode of operation of the Kipple and Bullock truck, per se. in a car having a like truck at the other end. is the same, for all the purposes of the truck itself, that it is in a structure which has driving wheels at the other end.</p> <p>5. Nor is such claim anticipated by the patent granted to Levi Bissell, August 4th. 1857, for an “improvement in trucks for locomotives,”</p> <p>6. The arrangement of Bissell, explained.</p> <p>7. The combination of Smith was patentable, because it produces a new mode of operation, and new results, in the structure as a whole, although the truck used by Smith was old, and, as respects itself, in swivelling and in having a lateral movement, operates in the same way as it did in the car which had two of such trucks.</p> <p>8. The fact that Smith’s patent is granted for an “improvement in trucks for locomotives,” and that the truck he uses was old. and that his invention is really an improvement in locomotives, forms no objection to the validity of the patent.</p> <p>9. Under a bill alleging an infringement by making and using the patented invention, the allegation is sustained by proof of using alone.</p> <p>[Cited in Butz Thermo-Electric Regulating Co. v. Jacobs Electric Co., 36 Fed. 197.]</p> <p>10. The 1st section of the act of May 4, 1858. (11 Stat. 272.) which provides, that a suit not of a local nature, brought in a district in a state containing more than one district, against a single defendant. shall be brought in the district, in which the defendant resides, does not apply to a case where the single deft ndant is a corporation created by such state.</p> <p>[Cited in Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 406, 14 Sup. Ct. 407; East Tennessee. V. & G. R. Co. v. Atlanta & F. R. Co., 49 Fed. 612.]</p>

3 [Complainants, assignees of the letters patent granted February 11. 1802, No. 34,377, to Alba F. Smith, for “improvement in trucks for locomotive engines,” filed their bill, complaining of an infringement by defendants, and asking an injunction and account.

In this case, a register in bankruptcy applied to the court, on petition, stating that, the bankrupts [Loder Brothers] having surrendered all their property to him, on his application two custodians were appointed to take possession of and sell certain goods at retail, paying over to him all proceeds of sales; that the custodians had, during twenty-five days, paid over to him $15,000, which he had deposited, from time to time; and that he had drawn checks for the payment cf…

[In the matter of Benjamin H. Loder, a bankrupt. For prior proceedings, see Case No. 8,455.] In this case, the register certified two questions to the court. A deposition for a proof of debt was transmitted to him by another register. The debt was a promissory note, but the consideration of the note was not stated in the deposition, nor was it stated whether any, and, if any, what payments on it had been made.

<p>Case No. 8,457.</p> <p>Discharge op Bankrupt — Principal Debtor— Endorser.</p> <p>1.A firm, one member of which was B. H. L., had been adjudged bankrupt. One B. L., at the request of the firm, subsequently became the owner of substantially all claims against the firm, and had agreed to indemnify them against all claims which existed against them at the commencement of the proceedings. The firm had endorsed the notes of B. L.. for his accommodation. which notes he had used in purchasing the claims against the firm, and he had agreed to indemnify them against any liability on those notes, they transferring to him all the assets of the firm. On June 14th. 1869. the bankruptcy proceedings against the firm were discontinued, and the assignee in bankruptcy was directed to convey to them the assets in his hands; and. on June 15th. the firm conveyed such assets to B. L.. and he by the same instrument agreed to indemnify them as above stated. On the 28th of January, 1870, B. H. L. was. on a petition filed by him, again adjudged a bankrupt, and in time he applied for his discharge. All the debts proved against him. except one, consisted of the notes of B. L., above mentioned, endorsed by the firm. The creditor who proved the other claim, filed a consent to the bankrupt’s discharge, but such discharge was objected to on the ground that his assets, of which there were none, were not equal to fifty per cent, of the claims proved, on which he was liable as principal debtor, and that the assent in writing of a majority in number and value of the creditors to whom he was liable as principal debtor, had not been filed: Held. that, on the evidence, the endorsements of the notes of B. L. by the firm, were contracts independent of their indebtedness to their creditors, and were made for his accommodation; and that such creditors, in taking the notes so endorsed, extinguished the original indebtedness of the firm, and substituted the notes for it, so that such endorsements could not be regarded as contracts to pay the original indebtedness of the endorsers.</p> <p>2. Under the 19th section of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 525)], an endorser does not become liable as a principal debtor, by the mere fixing of his liability as endorser.</p> <p>[Followed in Re Duff, 4 Fed. 520.]</p> <p>3. None of the contingent liabilities spoken of in the 19th section of the bankruptcy act can be regarded as liabilities of a principal debtor, within the 33d section, until they have been put in judgment. or undergone some other change than merely becoming absolute and fixed, in contradistinction to being contingent. A discharge must be granted.</p> <p>[Cited in Corbett v. Woodward. Case No. 3.-223; Gay Manuf'g Co. v. Gittings. 3 C. C. A. 422, 53 Fed. 48.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 8,458.]</p>

[In the matter of Lewis B. Loder, Cyrus W. Loder, and Benjamin Loder, bankrupts. See Case No. 8,458.] By I. T. WILLIAMS, Register: I hereby certify that there were thirty-five claims proved before me at the adjourned first meeting of creditors, held on the 15th day of April instant. That of these creditors twenty-one were present and voted. That each creditor voted for two assignees. That Lyman A. Jacobus had nineteen votes, John G.

This was an action of assumpsit [by Adam Lodge against Adam Lodge and trustees]. No appearance having been entered for the defendant, Hubbard for William Brown, an alien and resident abroad, and a creditor of the defendant, made application by petition to be permitted to defend the suit, under the Massachusetts statute of the 21st of February, 1S24 (St. 1823, c. 142).

Sur motion to issue writ of ne exeat; and motion to quash said writ.

<p>Case No. 8,461.</p> <p>INJUNCTION — JuKISDICTION.</p> <p>This court lias no jurisdiction on a petition accompanied by affidavits to restrain tire enforcement of a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction against the bankrupt, on the ground that it was obtained by collusion and fraud; nor lias it authority on such petition to set aside that judgment, and to inquire and determine what sum. if any, is in fact due from the bankrupt.</p>

This was an action [by Moritz LoewensteiD and Carl Loewenstein against Hugh Maxwell, collector of the port of New York] to recover back duties and a penalty, paid under protest. It was tried before BETTS, District Judge, in December, 1851. A verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for $2,000, subject to the opinion of the court upon a ease to be made, and subject to adjustment at the custom house.

<p>[This was a libel for wages by Linus Logan against the steamboat Aeolian.]</p>

<p>[This was an action by the Logansport Gas Light & Coke Company against Alfred H. Knowles and others on a judgment obtained in a state court of Indiana.]</p>

This was a suit upon a judgment obtained in a circuit court of the state of Indiana against Knowles and Harvey. A complaint was filed against John W. Bain, Knowles, and Harvey, on the 18th day of September, 1865, for the February term of said court in 1866.

The libellant in this case alleged that he shipped on board the Lola, in New York, at ■the rate of $40 a month, for a voyage to a port in Great Britain, thence to a port in the Mediterranean, and back to New York; that the vessel sailed from New York to Dunkirk, in France, where the master wrongfully discharged him, but offered to reship him for $20 a month, which he accepted under duress; that the vessel sailed from Dunkirk to Swansea, where he signed articles at $20 a…

The defendant’s real estate, situate in Lancaster county, Pennsylvania, having been sold on an execution from this court in fa-vour of Lombard, the plaintiff, a question arose between him and some other parties, junior incumbrancers, in the county court of Lancaster, where the lands are situate, as to who was entitled to take the money.

[This was an action at law by Josiah L. Lombard against the city of Chicago to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant in leaving certain excavations unprotected.]

<p>Case No. 8,472.</p> <p>Patents foe Inventions — Infringement — Injunction — Defendant’s Affidavits.</p>

A proceeding in rem to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the libel-lants' schooner, the B. F. Aumack, in a collision, August 21, 1876, with the steamboat C. H. Northram.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Tnis was a claim for a parcel of hides, shipped, as appeared by the bill of lading, on the 19th of June, 1S13, at Buenos Ayres, on board of a British ship [the London Packet, Smith, master] bound to London, for account and risk of D. J. Marino, a Spanish subject, and captured by the private armed brig Argus, in August, 1813.

[This was a bill in equity by Grace Loner-gan against James Fenlon to enjoin defendant from disposing of certain property claimed by plaintiff.]

<p>Case No. 8,476.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Joint and Separate Estate — Agreement by One Partner to Pay Debts of Firm.</p> <p>1. A firm composed of two members was dissolved by agreement, one partner. L.. taking the property and agreeing to pay the debts of the firm. The firm was afterwards put into involuntary bankruptcy. The assignee in bankruptcy received property which had been property of the firm, and also individual property of L., and debts were proved against the firm and also against L. individually. One creditor, M.. filed proofs of debt both against the firm and against L.. both founded in part on firm notes and in part on individual notes of L., but all given for goods sold by M. to the firm: Held, that, as the bankruptcy proceedings were against both of the copartners, as such, the provisions of the 36th section of the bankruptcy act [of 1867 (14 Stat. 534)] must apply, even though there was no joint property.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Litchfield, 5 Fed. 50.]</p> <p>2. The transfer of the firm property to L. having been made honestly and in good faith, upon a dissolution, and for a valuable consideration, and without any fraud or collusion between the partners to defeat the rights of the joint creditors, the joint property became, by the transfer, the separate property of L.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Tomes, Case No. 14.084; In re May, Id. 9.328; In re Hamilton. 1 Fed. 812.]</p> <p>[Cited in Warren v. Farmer. 100 Ind. 597.]</p> <p>3.M. was entitled to be admitted to the list of L.’s separate creditors, and to share in dividends out of his separate estate. The cases of Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cush. 553; Robb v. Mudge, 14 Gray, 534; and Wild v. Dean, 3 Allen, 579, criti-cised.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Lloyd, 22 Fed. 90.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,477.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Assets of the Bankrupt — Secret Trusts — Preference — Resulting Interest— Right of Assignee to Conveyance upon Payment — Full Disclosure — Discharge.</p> <p>1. A. failed in ousiness, owning the fee in part, and the term, under a lease, of the other parts, of certain buildings in which the business was conducted, with an established good will, and owning, absolutely, all the personal property contained in the buildings. He had confessed three judgments, — one to B., a creditor; another to C., his aunt, an alleged creditor; the other to I)., a creditor. Under friendly executions upon the judgments of B. and C., the leasehold and other personal property were levied on and sold for loss than the amount of B.’s judgment. The purchaser at the sheriff’s sale was E., a person in A.’s employment, who bought in pursuance of a previous arrangement with B. For the aggregate of E.’s bids, B., under this arrangement, took E.’s bond, the amount of which was credited on account of B.’s judgment. The understanding was that the business should afterwards be carried on in the same buildings in the name of E., through the agency of A., to secure to B. the payment of all that had been due to him, with interest, and subject thereto, for the benefit of A., or as he might direct. The business was conducted there accordingly, in the name of E., through the agency of A., to secure to B. the payment of all that had been due to him. with interest. and subject thereto, for the benefit of A., or as he might direct. The business was conducted there accordingly, in the name of E., for two years or more after A.’s failure, until the bond of E. to B. and the balance due on B.’s judgment were paid in full out of the avails of the business. E. then, at the request of A., transferred the leasehold and other personal property to C., who executed her bond to E.. conditioned to indemnify him against outstanding liabilities incurred while the business hail been conducted. in his name. He continued in the service of A. in the same subordination as before. The consideration of the transfer to C.. as expressed in it, was composed of the penalty of this bond of indemnity, and the amount of C.’s judgment against A. In the meantime, through the procurement of A., in order to carry into effect an understanding between him and D., a friendly execution upon D.’s judgment had been issued and levied on A.’s fee in the other part of the premises. and this part of them had been sold by the sheriff, and bought in by D., to whom it had been conveyed by a duly acknowledged sheriff’s deed. Thereupon D. had. in pursuance of the same friendly understanding with A., made a complicated arrangement lor the sale of this part of the premises to C.. executing a lease to give her a present right of possession, and an agreement entitling her to receive a conveyance upon payment of the price, by stipulated monthly instal-ments, designated as rent. The amount of these instalments covered that of D.’s former judgment. The purpose of this arrangement had been that the modified equitable interest thus vested nominally in C. should, for the secret benefit of A., be substituted for his former legal fee. C.. having thus the nominal equitable ownership of part, and the nominal legal ownership of the rest of the property, executed a power of attorney to A. to carry on the business in her name. He so carried it on, without interference by her, for several years, until her death, when the power was renewed in like form by her administrator. Out of the avails of the business, A. made sundry payments in C.’s lifetime, in her name, to D., on account of the monthly instalments; and, after her death, continued the business in the name of the administrator. O. died insolvent. Her former judgment against A. was not in the inventory of her estate. Upon the settlement of it, he appeared, on the contrary, to have been her creditor. The inventory included the leasehold and other personal property which had been transferred to her by E. In the name of the administrator. a sale of them was made a year after her death for the purpose of closing the accounts of her estate. A.’s nominal agency for the administrator then ceased. The purchaser did not take possession, but the price was accounted for by the administrator, as if received. After this, A. continued in the possession and control of the property and business. At a later period, more than ten years after his failure, having still retained the possession and control, he became a petitioner for adjudication and relief in bankruptcy. under the act of 2d March, 1867. In the schedules accompanying his petition, the former judgment of 0. was returned as one of his debts. The buildings, etc., and business, were not mentioned. This property, including the outstanding credits of the business and its good will, should have been available as assets of his estate in bankrupted for the benefit of his creditors.</p> <p>2. As tc the leasehold and other personal property sold to E. under B.’s execution, if E. had acquired under it an .absolute ownership, his transfer to 0. would have vested a like absolute ownership in her, and the possession of A., as agent of such successive owners, would not have made the subjects of such possession liable to divestiture through A.’s bankruptcy. But the ownership of E. as purchaser under the execution, not having been absolute, this immunity of the subjects of his purchase subsisted no longer than the continuance of such ownership as he acquired. This was. m equity an ownership, defeasi-ble on the payment of B.’s former debt out of the avails of the business. There was thus a resulting interest in A., whose former ownership was revested in him so soon as B. was thus paid. E.’s transfer to 0. would, therefore, have been wholly inoperative without A.’s concurrence or participation. A. having in fact concurred and participated in it, the title of C., though in form derived from E. as the purchaser under the former execution, was, in effect, derived from a transfer voluntarily made by A. Therefore, assuming the validity of the alleged debt of A. to C.. on which her judgment was confessed, and the consequent sufficiency of the consideration of A.’s transfer to her. it was not such a transfer as. after B. had been fully paid, excluded the application of the rule that a debt- or’s retention of possession renders his transfer ineffectual against creditors.</p> <p>8. Quaere, whether the existence of the alleged consideration as between C. & A., should, without proof, be assumed as against the assignee in bankruptcy representing the creditors.</p> <p>4. As to that part of the premises of which the legal fee was vested in D. under the proceedings upon his execution, he was bound by his agreement with 0. to convey the same to her upon payment of the stipulated amounts; and the beneficial interest 7>f the bankrupt in the agreement thus made in her name was sufficiently established to entitle the assignee in bankruptcy to demand the conveyance upon making such payment, or to entitle him to compel a sale, and receive the surplus after such payment.</p> <p>5. Until a bankrupt has made full and sufficient disclosure, his creditors, or the assignees in bankruptcy, cannot be required to specify objections to his discharge, or definitely abide by their objections, which may have been specified.</p>

<p>In the matter of Henry Long, claimed as a fugitive from service.</p>

<p>This was an action brought by William H. Long, as assignee in bankruptcy of Benjamin H. Spaulding, against William C. Conner, sheriff of the city and county of New York, for damages for the conversion of certain straw hats sold by the sheriff as perishable, under an order of the supreme court of the state of New York, in an attachment suit. The plaintiff had already recovered judgment against one Dickerson, the plaintiff in the attachment suit, for damages for the conversion of this property by reason of the sale in question; but the judgment was still unsatisfied.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,480.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge—Bankrupt ix Custody —Provable Debt — Surety on Bail Bond.</p> <p>1. The body of D. was taken in execution, and he gave a bond with sureties for the liberties of the jail. Subsequently, he was adjudged a bankrupt and received a discharge from all debts provable against him on March 30, 1878. There had been no breach of the bond at the time the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced. D. then applied to the court for an order discharging him from custody, and discharging the sureties from liability on the bond: Held, that, under section 5067 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the judgment on which the execution was issued was a provable debt, although the body of D. had been taken in execution, and was, therefore, discharged by the discharge.</p> <p>2. The taking of the body in execution did not give a lien or security which could not be affected by the discharge.</p> <p>3. The effect of the discharge was to release the judgment, aud also the obligation of the sureties on the bond.</p>

Debt on an appeal-bond — plea, non est factum. On the trial, Mr. Key, for defendant [William Oneale], prayed the court to instruct the jury, “That if they should be satisfied, by the evidence, that the bond was signed, sealed and delivered by Mary Sweeny, and by J. T. Frost and the defendant, as her sureties, and was afterwards presented to Cornelius Coningham, (the justice who had rendered the judgment,) for his approbation and acceptance of the sureties, and was by him…

This was a bill to set aside a sale on a trust deed given by William H. Rogers to William H. King, to secure a certain indebtedness in the trust deed described. The facts in the case were undisputed.

[This was a bill in equity by Arthur B.' Long against Benjamin Soule, Andrew B. Robinson, and Isaac Errett, surviving executors and trustees, and Charles E. Soule and ■others.]

<p>Case No. 8,484.</p> <p>Makitjme Lien — Presumption of Cuedit — Necessary Supplies — Liquors pok the Bar.</p> <p>Where a part of a hill of supplies furnished to a vessel were liquors and other things, intended to be used in a bar, kept on board the vessel as part of a restaurant managed by the railroad company that was using the boat, and a libel was filed against the steamboat to enforce a lien for the whole bill: Ecld, that a lien upon the boat for the value of the liquors, where the evidence warranted the conclusion that the bar was no more than a convenient method employed by the owners for supplying the ordinary wants of the class of passengers transported on the boat, can he enforced.</p> <p>See the case of The Metropolis [Case No. 9,-503].</p>

Longest was a voluntary bankrupt. On December 11th, 1875, he filed his petition for his discharge, which was set down for hearing December 2Sth, 1875. When this petition was filed, no debts had been proved against his estate; but before the day set for the hearing, William S. Culbertson and other creditors proved their claims, and on the 28th of December, 1875, they filed objections to the bankrupt’s discharge.

Petition by assignees [of E. Longfellow & Sons, bankrupts] to be reimbursed out of the proceeds from the sale of incumbered lands for sums paid to save the same from forfeiture.

Tort, by [Levi Longfellow] a citizen of Minnesota against [Marshall A. Lewis] a citizen of Massachusetts for a quantity of butter, alleged to have been converted by the defendant to his own use. A verdict had been rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for a new trial because the same was against law and evidence.

. On the 19th of December, 1807, the bankrupts [Osbourn Watson and Joseph B. De Young, trading as Watson & De Young] rented from Abraham L. Pennock and others, for the term of one year from January 1, 1868, the front store and other portions of premises No. 533 Market street, at an annual rental of five thousand dollars, payable quarterly, and entered upon possession under the lease.

<p>Case No. 8,489.</p> <p>Deed — Unrecorded for Twentt-Six Years— Certified Copt — Suspicion op Fraud — Deed to Son — No Acts of Ownership — Adverse Possession.</p> <p>1. A deed which purports to have been executed in 1S09. but not recorded until 1835, is not recorded within the act of Indiana, which makes a duly certified copy evidence.</p> <p>2. A deed thus executed and recorded by the order of a father to his infant son, must excite suspicion, and needs explanation. The explanations which are attempted in this case rather go to strengthen than remove the suspicions which arise from the facts.</p> <p>3. The father remaining in possession of the premises for more than twenty-five years, and having surrendered the deed to his son and procured a deed to himself, is not guilty of fraud, so as to sot aside the deed thus procured.</p> <p>4. The deed from Kemper to the son was not recorded until after the decease of the father, and it is probable the son had no knowledge of the existence of the deed until after that event. The son. though living with the father, appears at no time to have exercised any acts of ownership over the farm. The possession of the father must be considered adverse to the son. and the son is bound by the statute of limitations.</p> <p>5. The son acquired no title under the deed to him from Kemper.</p> <p>6. But if the deed from Kemper to the son were good, still the deed from the son to the lessor of the plaintiff is inoperative, as it is proved there was an adverse possession of the premises, at the time it was executed.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by Nicholas Long-worth against James Taylor for a specific performance of a contract made for the sale of a lot of ground in the city of Cincinnati.]

[Suit in equity by Nicholas Longworth against James Taylor for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of land. For a former hearing of the case, see Case No. 8,490.]

Action on a protested bill of exchange, dated 19th of May, 1807, drawn by the defendant, at New-Orleans, in favour of the plaintiff, at sixty days after sight, on James Brown & Co. of Philadelphia, for 600 dollars —pleas, 1st, non assumpsit; and, 2d, non as-sumpsit, within six years; and issue joined, with leave to the plaintiff, by the agreement of the parties, to give any legal evidence to prove a new promise, or the inapplicability of the act of limitations.

This was an action on the case. The declaration contains a great number of counts; but the only two which it is necessary to notice are founded, 1. Upon a bill of exchange drawn by the defeudant at New Orleans for $000, upon James Brown & Co. of Philadelphia, in favour of the plaintiff, in the year 1800, and 2.

[This was an action upon a bill of exchange. In a former suit before the court, Case No. 8,493, there was a verdict for the plaintiff. Tbe ease is now heard upon motion of defendant for arrest of judgment and for new trial.]

<p>Case No. 8,496.</p> <p>Deed — Proof of Execution bt Subscribing Witness — Equity — Effect of Registered Deed with Notice of Prior Unregistered Conveyance — Injunction — Notice — Open and Notorious Possession — Easement — Right to Take Water — Canal — Public Use — Water Rights.</p> <p>1. A deed which is more than thirty years old at the time of the hearing, the grantor and one of the subscribing witnesses being dead, and the other testifying to her own signature as a witness, is sufficiently proved, though the witness can neither swear to the genuineness of the grantor’s signature, nor the execution of the deed by him.</p> <p>2. A court of equity has jurisdiction to postpone a registered deed taken with notice of a prior unregistered deed, and to enjoin an .action at law based on the former deed against the grantee under the latter deed.</p> <p>3. Visible possession and occupation by the grantee under an unregistered deed, known to the grantee under a registered deed, is sufficient, if not controlled by other circumstances, to warrant a court or jury in finding notice of the unregistered deed.</p> <p>4. An incorporeal right to water may be granted in gross.</p> <p>[Cited in Goodrich v. Burbank. 12 Allen, 462; Amidon v. Harris. 113 Mass. 64.]</p> <p>5. A canal corporation may permit water to be drawn through its canal for mill purposes, if neither the public use nor any private right is thereby injured.</p> <p>[Cited in Lonsdale Co. v. Moies, Case No. 8,-497.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The case was subsequently heard upon exceptions to master's report, upon which hearing the court explained and construed the decree above. The exceptions were partially sustained. Case No. 8,497.]</p>

This was a bill in equity [against Miles G. Moies], and the case came before the court upon exceptions to the master’s report. Decree having been entered for the complainants in 1857 [Case No. 8,496], the cause was referred to a master, with certain directions hereinafter mentioned.

This was an action of waste under the. statute of Rhode Island (see Dig. 1822, p. 199), for the recovery of the freehold wasted. Plea, the general issue.

<p>Case No. 8,499.</p> <p>Shipping — Master—Bill of Lading — Goods not on Board — Authority from Contracting Purchaser of Vessel — Monet Advanced on Bill.</p> <p>1. The master of a vessel has no power, by signing a bill of lading for goods which are not on board, to charge the vessel or her owner.</p> <p>[Cited in Robinson v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 9 Fed. 139.]</p> <p>2. Nor has he such power, where the vessel is, by the consent of her general owner, in the hand's of a party who has contracted to purchase her, and the latter distinctly authorizes the signing of the bill of lading and induces the master to sign it.</p> <p>3. Where the party who had contracted to purchase the vessel, having possession and control of her, procured, by misrepresentation, the preparation of a false bill of lading, covering goods not on board, and the master of the vessel, in reliance on the representation, signed it: Held, that the vessel was not liable tor the value of the goods named in the bill of lading, but not on board, to a person who, in reliance on the bill of lading, advanced money thereon.</p> <p>[Cited in The Asphodel, 53 Fed. 830.]</p>

In May, 1809. the plaintiff was encouraged by Mr. Sheepshanks of Philadelphia, the agent of Bainbridge and Cartwright of Liverpool, to ship them a large parcel of cotton, on consignment; and at the same time, drew on them, by way of advance, a bill for £1000, sterling, (which was much less than the usual advance.) which bill was endorsed by Sheepshanks, and was duly accepted, the day before the house in England knew of the intended shipment of the plaintiff.

<p>Case No. 8,501.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Debts op Fiduciary Character— Auctioneer — Debt Contracted before Passage op Act.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,502.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Examination op Bankrupt — Right to Consult Counsel before Answering.</p> <p>Whether the bankrupt should be allowed to consult counsel upon his examination, must be determined by the register, according to the circumstances of each particular case.</p>

<p>[In the matter of F. C. Lord, a bankrupt.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the Unit•ed States for the district of North Carolina.] Moore shipped certain cases of mechandise ■at New York by the steamer Lord, consigned to himself at Wilmington, North Carolina, •and received bills of lading for them.

This was a bill in equity, wherein the complainants [Lord, Warren, Evans & Co.] prayed that certain unrecorded mortgage deeds held by them might be decreed, as against the respondents, to be valid and subsisting Hens upon certain real estate therein described, in the same manner and to the same effect as if the deeds had been duly recorded at the time of their execution and delivery.

Action [by I. W. Lord] against the owner of the vessel to recover the value of goods lost by the wreck of the steamship Ventura. The jury was instructed in accordance with the views expressed in the following opinion, and a verdict was returned for the defendants.

<p>Case No. 8,507.</p> <p>Tax Deeds — Effect as Evidence — Constitutional Law — Ejectment.</p> <p>[1. The Wisconsin statute of April 19, 1852 (Laws 1852, p. 783), making a recorded tax deed conclusive in regard to any errors of officers in levying taxes and selling lands to enforce payment, was within the constitutional powers of the legislature.]</p> <p>[2. A tax deed made in pursuance of a sale under the Wisconsin act of April 19, 1852. being conclusive evidence of the regularity of the proceedings, the prescribed notice of redemption is to be regarded as merely directory, and the court is not to inquire whether such notice was regular or rot. But as to tax deed made pursuant to sales had prior to the passage of that act, they are only prima facie evidence of regularity, and thence may be declared void for want of a lawful notice of redemption.]</p> <p>[3. To enable a plaintiff in ejectment to recover on a tax» deed lands originally held by the United States, it must be shown that the land was sold by the United States before it was taxed, but it is not necessary that a patent should have issued.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.] This w’as an information filed in behalf of the United States by the district attorney, claiming the sloop Lord Wellington, as forfeited to the United States for an alleged trading with the enemy.

This is an action on a life policy issued by the defendant on the fifth day of May, 1S70, at Kansas City, Missouri, to Abraham Lorie, for one thousand dollars, containing, among others, the following conditions: “That the said insured is, under this policy, freely permitted to reside in any civilized abode in the Western hemisphere lying north 32d parallel of north latitude, in the United States, lying south of said 32d parallel (except, from the first day of July to the…

<p>Case No. 8,510.</p> <p>Patents — Claims of Patent — Mode of Puacti-sing Extensive Use — Expanded Claim —Reissue.</p> <p>1. The words “as specified,” in the claims of a patent do not necessarily limit such claims to the particular mode of practising the invention described in the patent.</p> <p>2. Where a patentee has described one mode of practising his invention, as the law requires him to do, he must be understood as merely describing the best mode, and not as excluding a method different from it only in a single detail which produces the same result, and is distinctly within its object.</p> <p>3. Where an invention involves reflection and experiment to bring it to practical maturity, its evident utility, indicated by its prompt displacement of other devices and extensive use, strongly attest its patentable merit.</p> <p>4. A reissue may be granted with an expanded claim, to secure to a patentee the benefit of the invention described but not claimed in the original, when caused by the inadvertence of the inventor.</p> <p>[Approved in Lorillard v. Carroll, 9 Fed. 510.]</p>

[These were suits in equity by Peter Lor-illard and others against Eli Ridgway and against Sellers, alleging infringement of certain patents.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of California.) The case was originaly brought in the district court of the United States for the Northern district of the state of California, when that court was in the exercise of the powers of a circuit court of the United States. On a demurrer filed in that court to the complaint, the objection to the jurisdiction of the court raised by the demurrer was overruled.

<p>Case No. 8,512.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Creditor's Petition to Have Claim Expunged — Reference to Register.</p> <p>The district court is authorized in bankruptcy to refer to the register a petition of a creditor praying that the proof of claim of another creditor be expunged on account of matters occurring since the claim was proved.</p>

Bill in equity. The case at this time came before the court upon a motion of the respondents, that the case might be continued until a prior suit in equity, pending in the supreme judicial court of the state, should be heard and determined. Should that motion be denied, then the respondents moved that tlie court should order the cause to be referred to a master, with directions to report whether the cases were upon the same matter and between the same parties.

This was a bill in equity brought to set aside certain provisions in the will of Abigail Loring, formerly of Boston, deceased, and to enforce the rights of the complainants as heirs at law of her estate. [Heard upon motion to continue in Case No. 8,514.] The complainants were Abby R. Loring, Marion W. Loring, Elijah J. Loring, children of Josiah Q. Loring, deceased, who was the son of the testatrix.

<p>Case No. 8,516.</p> <p>Couuts — Derivation- of Power in Federal Courts — Procedure—Gex Goci — New Right —Bill for Discovert — State Statute.</p> <p>1. The circuit courts of the United States derive their jurisdiction as well in chancery as at law, from the constitution and laws of the Union.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Barry, 42 Fed. 121, 136 U. S. 608, note.]</p> <p>2. The laws and usages of a state, which, at ■law. constitute a mode of procedure in the circuit courts, derive their force from their adoption by congress.</p> <p>3. A state can not enlarge nor restrict the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.</p> <p>[Cited in Rich v. Bray. 37 Fed. 275.]</p> <p>4. In those states where no courts having chancery powers ex the chancery powers of the circuit courts arc .he same as in the other states. But the contract, or right, is governed by the local law-, where it originated, and was to be performed. This law, then, constitutes the law of the contract, and will be enforced by the courts of th.e United States.</p> <p>[Cited in Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 243.]</p> <p>5. It does not give a capacity to these courts to exercise jurisdiction, but it fixes the rights of the litigant parties. The jurisdiction is derived from the laws of the Union.</p> <p>6. There is no principle of the common law which pervades the Union, and exists independently of the laws of the states. This rule is found as adopted and modified by the laws and judicial decisions of the respective states.</p> <p>[Cited in United States v. Garlinghouse, Case No. 15,189.]</p> <p>7. If a local law, or usage, originate a new right, it may be enforced hy the courts of the United States, sitting within the state, by the exercise of a common law or chancery power, as the case may require.</p> <p>[Cited in Clark v. Sohier, Case No. 2.835; Buford v. Holley, 28 Fed. 684; Griswold v. Bragg, 48 Fed. 520.]</p> <p>8. The law of this state, which authorizes a judgment creditor, after return of execution, no property found, to file his bill for a discovery, and subject the choses in action, and equitable credits of the defendant, to the payment of this judgment, may be enforced by an exercise of the chancery powers of the circuit court.</p> <p>[Cited in Holmes v. O. & C. Ry. Co., 5 Fed. 84; Mann v. Appel, 31 Fed. 383.]</p> <p>[Distinguished in Shaw v. Aveline, 5 Ind. 385.]</p> <p>9. The law- may be considered as creating a new right which can only be enforced in chancery.</p> <p>10. There being no adequate remedy, under the statute, at law, this court will give relief in equity.</p> <p>[Cited in Singer Manuf’g Co. v. Yarger, 12 Fed. 488.]</p> <p>[See Baker v. Biddle, Case No. 764.]</p> <p>11. This is no enlargement of the jurisdictional powers of this court. It is the application of its ordinary powers to the enforcement of a new-right.</p> <p>12. The remedy under the statute is clear.</p>

Assumpsit brought April 11, 1865, by [James Lorway] an inhabitant of Nova Sco-tia, against [Francis Lousada] the British consul, to recover back certain fees paid to him by the plaintiff under protest, in order to obtain his ship’s papers from the consul; and which fees, the plaintiff alleged, the defendant had no legal right to demand. The defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, to which the plaintiff demurred.

<p>Case No. 8,518.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Application ron Discharge — Objections by Creditors — Right to Trial by Jurt.</p> <p>The only remedy of a bankrupt, where a majority in number and interest of his creditors file their written dissent to his discharge, is to demand a trial by jury.</p>

[This was a bill in equity by William K. Lotlirop and others against John W. Stednmn and others. The suit was brought in a state court of Connecticut, and was removed on petition of plaintiffs to this court. Heard on motion for a provisional injunction.]

This was an action against [Cornelius W. Lawrence] the collector of the port of Nev-York, to recover back an excess of duties paid by the plaintiffs [William Lottimer and Alfred Large,] on an article invoiced as thread-lace, and made wholly by machinery.

[Action at law by William Lottimer to recover of Henry A. Smythe, collector, an excess of duty paid on certain goods. Tried before a jury.] Defendant’s counsel offers in evidence the opinion of the board of appraisers of the New York custom-house, dated September 15, 1804. (Objected to.) Offered, not as deciding the law, but as a fact that the official board of appraisers, in 1864, passing on this question. whether silks in the piece included crape, decided that it did.

The vessel is prosecuted for damages occasioned by her driving, with great violence, against the steamboat Independence, in one of the slips of this harbor. In the afternoon of the 15th of December, 1845, the bark, a Swedish vessel, arrived in this port, and was moored by the pilot, who brought her in, at pier No. 2, North river, on the south side of the wharf. The steamboat lay on the north side of the opposite wharf of the same slip.

<p>Case No. 8,585.</p> <p>Bankruptcy— Illegal Preference —Substitution of Notes — Knowledge of Insolvency.</p> <p>1. Where an insolvent, with knowledge of his condition and with intent to give his hank a preference, substitutes small notes, payable immediately, for older and larger ones held by the bank, some of which have already matured, such substitution as a condition for a further loan having been demanded by the president of the bank with knowledge of the insolvent’s condition, and thereby the bank is enabled more easily to and does obtain judgment upon said notes, and seize and sell the insolvent’s property upon executions issued thereon, such seizure and sale will be declared void, and the amount realized at the sale will be ordered to be paid to the assignee of such insolvent.</p> <p>[Cited in Brown v. Jefferson Co. Nat. Bank, 9 Fed. 264.]</p> <p>2. Where a bank demands of a depositor, who has theretofore always been prompt in his payments, and who has a note overdue and others about to mature, which he has made no arrangements to meet, that he shall, as a condition of a further loan which he requires to meet a borrowed note, substitute smaller notes, payable immediately, for those then held by the bank, and also for such further loan, in order to enable it more easily to obtain judgment thereon, held, that the demand was made with knowlegde of the applicant’s insolvency.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Adolph Louis and Henry Rosenham, bankrupts.]</p>

This was a suit for freedom, under the Virginia act of 17th December, 1792. Charles Scott, senior, the defendant’s father, came to live in Alexandria, in March, 1S02, from Maryland, and brought with him the plaintiff [the negro Loudon], who has remained here ever since he first came, and was hired out by the defendant’s father, who received his wages.

<p>Case No. 8,529.</p> <p>' Coelision—Steamer and Sail Vessel—Prima Faoie Fault—Rule of Passing.</p> <p>1. When a steamer and sailing vessel are approaching each other in such a direction that there is danger of a collision, the sailing vessel has the right of way, and should hold on her course, whether she has the wind free or is close hauled.</p> <p>2. It is the duty of the steamer to take the necessary precaution to keep out of her way. If she does not, and a collision happens she will prima facie be deemed in fault.</p> <p>; 3. When two vessels are approaching each ; other so that there is danger of their meeting. | the general rule is that each vessel is to keep i to the right.</p> <p>■ 4. This in all ordinary cases is the rule whether both are sailing vessels or both steamers, or one is a steamer and the other moved by the wind.</p>

<p>[In the matter of Solomon Louis and others, bankrupts.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,531.</p> <p>Prize — Special Claim — Blockade — Notice to Neutrals — Intention to Violate — Deceptive Representations — Actual Wrongdoer.</p> <p>1. A claimant in a prize suit cannot put in a special claim or answer leading to issue other than the one simply of prize or no prize, without the assent of the United States attorney or the special order of the court.</p> <p>Case No. 8,530. The LOUISA A. [Cited in Prates v. Howland. Case No. 5.000. Nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible.]</p> <p>2. In order to affect a neutral with the penal consequences of a violation of a blockade, it is necessary for him to have been sufficiently informed of its existence.</p> <p>3. An attempt by a neutral vessel to enter or evade a blockaded port, with knowledge or notice of the blockade, is a culpable violation of it, although no warning in writing is given to such vessel.</p> <p>4. If a vessel approaches a blockaded port with knowledge of the blockade, and with the intention of violating it. her subsequent departure under the compulsory direction of a blockading cruiser does not reintegrate her to the state of an innocent trader, and she may still be arrested for the offence.</p> <p>• 5. An attempt, on the part of a neutral owner, to mislead a blockading force by a deceptive representation of his vessel’s papers, amounts to fraudulent misconduct, which justifies the confiscation of the vessel.</p> <p>6. Every dissemblance in the papers will, in the judgment of the prize court, be regarded as intended to conceal what could not be safely disclosed, and as affording evidence that the destination of the vessel was falsified with a design to defraud.</p> <p>7. Tlie question discussed as to the proper method of investigating, in prize eases, acts of misconduct committed by captors on the prize property and the officers and crew of the vessel subsequent, to their arrest.</p> <p>8. The general rule in respect to captures by public ships is that the actual wrongdoer alone is responsible for any wrong done or illegality committed on the prize, excepting acts done by members of the seizing vessel in obedience to the orders of their superiors.</p> <p>9. This court established this practice: That the right of reclamation for damages, in cases of captures made by public vessels, must be pursued by the parties averring the grievance and tort committed upon them, by plea and proof, which admit of counter allegations and full evidence under them.</p> <p>10. An affidavit annexed to a claim is extrajudicial, and is not testimony in the cause.</p> <p>11. A fraudulent attempt to violate a blockade warrants a condemnation, although the claimant may be able to show that the captors have been guilty of irregularities and wrongs towards the prize or its ship’s company subsequent to capture.</p> <p>12. Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade. Claimants ordered to sue out a monition to the captors, and file and serve the allegations and proofs on which they claim damages.</p>

Libel of Moses B. Tower and the Boston Tow-Boat Company, for sendees rendered in raising the schooner Louisa Jane, a pilot-boat of Boston, which had been sunk in the harbor near Fort Independence, Dec. 17, 1S73, by a collision. The libellants asked for meet and suitable salvage. No appearance having been entered for the schooner, the court proceeded, after the return-day, to assess damages ex parte, as usual.

<p>Case No. 8,534.</p> <p>Collision — Duty op Approaching Tugs — Where River Begins — Rule of the River.</p> <p>1. Where tugs are approaching on converging lines, and one gives the signal to pass a-larboard, to which the other answers that she means to pass a-porl, and the first repeats her signal, the first has not the right to presume from a failure to answer her second signal that the other has yielded her course, but should proceed cautiously, and not run across the lines of the other. She must take notice of the fact that there is danger of a collision, even though the other tug may be in the wrong place and on the wrong course.</p> <p>2. The rules of river navigation apply with full force on the Chicago river to the extremity of the pier.</p> <p>3. Outgoing tugs should keep south of the center of the channel, and incoming tugs to the north of it. A tug going out along the North pier is in the wrong place, and chargeable with the consequences.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,536.</p> <p>Pkactice ix Admiralty — Issuixg Commission— Oral Examination.</p> <p>1. Where witnesses on the part of a vessel libelled for collision were brought to Neiv York, and their depositions might have been taken before their departure, but were not, and the claimants afterwards, learning that they would not return to New York, applied for a commission to' England to examine them, but failed to comply with rules 105, 106, and 107 of this court in making the motion, and the libellants were willing to waive the objection of irregularity in the motion, on condition that they might be allowed, in addition to putting written cross interrogations, to cross-examine the witnesses orally: Held, that the oral examination of witnesses on a commission is eminently conducive to a true understanding of the facts of a case, especially a collision case.</p> <p>2. To order such an examination is not a new practice, and is within the power of the court.</p> <p>3. This was a proper case for making an order for such oral examination.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,537.</p> <p>COLLISION OFF THE IRISH COAST — STEAMER AND Sailing Vessel— Darkness — Speed —Vessel Approached from Behind should Show a Light — Porting in Haste.</p> <p>1. Where, on a dark night, a bark, close-hauled on her starboard tack, heading S. W. by AT., having proper lights set, and making no chango of her course, was struck on her port side by a steamer, which came from a direction abaft the bark’s beam: Held. that, prima facie, the steamer was in fault, and the burden was on her of showing the contrary.</p> <p>2. Where a steamer was running seven and a half knots an hour, heading W. by N. half N.. having two men on the lookout, au officer on the bridge, and two men at the wheel, and a red light suddenly came in sight, bearing two points on the starboard bow, and the helm was at once put hard-a-port, and her engines were slowed, stopped, and backed, and the course of the steamer changed a point, but the officer, finding that a collision was inevitable, ordered the helm hard-a-starboard, with a view of lessening its effects, but before the order could be obeyed, a collision took place with a bark, the witnesses testifying that the bark could not be seen sooner, owing to the haziness of the night, and the bark’s lights being hid from view by her screens, in the direction from which the steamer approached: Held, that it was sufficient, to show that-the steamship was in fault, that she was running seven and a half knots an hour, on a coast where vessels were numerous, in weather so thick and hazy, that a red light, which came suddenly into view, was supposed by the officer in command to be half a mile off, but was, in fact, so near, that though her engines were immediately stopped and backed, the collision occurred.</p> <p>[Cited in The Colorado, Case No. 3.028: The Hansa. Id. 6,037; The City of New York, 15 Fed. 029; The Alberta, 23 Fed. 812.]</p> <p>3. A steamship, when approaching another vessel so as to involve risk of collision, must slacken her speed, or, if necessary, stop and reverse; but it is a fault in her to change her course, in ignorance of ihe true course and position of the otlier vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in The Free State. Case No. 5,090; The Monticello, 15 Fed. 480.]</p> <p>4. This steamship was in fault in porting her helm in ignorance of the course and position df the other vessel, and that fault contributed to tile collision.</p> <p>[Cited in The Western Metropolis, Case No. 17.439.]</p> <p>5. The bark was also in fault, when she saw the steamship, as she did. approaching in such a direction that her regulation lights were not visible to the steamship, in not indicating her presence to the steamship by showing a visible light.</p> <p>6. Tlie damages must, therefore, be apportioned.</p>

This is a ease which was transferred from the Sixth district court of the parish of Orleans, and is before the court on a motion to remand. It is a suit in which the plaintiff [state of Louisiana ex rel. John C. Moncure]' seeks to recover from the defendant [Antoine Dubuclet] the office of treasurer of the state of Louisiana. The removal is asked upon two grounds. The first is already disposed of in the case of Johnson v. Jumel [Case No. 7,392].

<p>Case No. 8,639.</p> <p>Practice ix Admiralty — Arrest for Pert — State Laws — Stipulation When not Liable to Arrest — Garnishment or Credits — Rule op Court.</p> <p>1. The statute of 2d March. 1S67 (14 Stat. 543). makes arrests for debt, whether oil mesne process or execution, depend upon the laws for similar arrests in the states respectively, and applies to admiralty proceedings.</p> <p>[Cited in The Hudson, 15 Fed. 176.]</p> <p>2. This court will not order a defendant to give a stipulation to the action, under pain of imprisonment. in a ease in which he is not liable to arrest.</p> <p>3. By a rule of inis court, passed in 1853, a warrant to attach the goods and chattels, or. in default thereof, the credits, of the defendant, may be granted in cases in which an arrest cannot legally be made.</p> <p>[Cited in The Bremena v. Card, 38 Fed. 147.]</p> <p>4. It is within the power of the court to make such a rule.</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] The action -was brought in the district court by the trustees in bankruptcy of the Louisiana Paper Manufacturing Company, to recover of the defendant [Rufus Waples], who was a stockholder in the company, a balance alleged to be due and unpaid on his subscription of stock. [Case unreported.] The company was established under a general law of this state (Rev. St. p. 183) which provided for the…

<p>Case No. 8,641.</p> <p>Constitutional Law — Impairinq Obligation op Contracts — Charter op Private Corporation —Lottery Company — Charter Acted upon— Injunction to Stay Proceedings in State Court — Lottert Penal Laws.</p> <p>1. The act of congress, approved March 3, 1875 [18 Stat. 470], “To determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States, and for the removal of causes from state courts, and for other purposes,” enlarges the jurisdiction of the circuit cohrts to the full limits authorized by the constitution.</p> <p>2. A bill in equity which alleged that a state had. by legislative act, chartered a lottery company with the right to exercise its functions for twenty-five years, the lottery company to pay to the state the sum of 840.000 annually, and had passed a subsequent act repealing the charter of the company, and making it a penal offense to carry on the business authorized by the charter, and which charged that said repealing act impaired the obligation of the contract between the state and the lottery company, disclosed a case arising under the constitution of the United States, of which the circuit court had jurisdiction, irrespective of the citizenship of the parties. .</p> <p>3. The settled doctrine in the United States is that tlie charter of a private corporation is a contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired without an infraction of the constitution of the United States: that a grant of franchise is in point of principle identical with a grant of other property; whether the consideration be large or small is not essential, for the motives or inducements which caused the legislature to pass the act cannot be examined to impair its validity.</p> <p>4. Every valuable privilege given by a charter which conduced to make it acceptable and to promote an organization under it, is placed beyond the power of the legislature, unless the power be reserved at the time the charter is granted.</p> <p>5. AVhere a charter conferring the right to draw lotteries has taken the form of an absolute contract, the responsibility of its creation rests with the legislature: the courts must treat it as carrying the obligation which its terms import.</p> <p>G. A mere license to draw lotteries, which is not inseparable from the essential functions of a corporation, and which has not been acted upon, and under which no rights have been vested, may be repealed by any succeeding legislature of the state by which it is granted.</p> <p>7. But where such license has been acted on. and under it rights have been vested, it cannot be withdrawn by the legislature to the prejudice of those rights. The power of the legislature 1o recall or modify it is to that extent gone.</p> <p>8. The grant of a privilege to draw a lottery made to an individual, where no rights have become vested, can be revoked.</p> <p>9. But where a corporation has been called into existence by a state legislature, for a definite object, declared in the act creating it, and has powers and faculties given to it which are in their nature and operation pertinent to its sole object and necessary to its very existence, its rights and franchises cannot be swept away by a repealing act of the legislature of the state which created it.</p> <p>10. An act of tie legislature created a corporation to continue twenty-five years, and then to be dissolved, with a grant of the sole and exclusive privilege of drawing lotteries for the said period, and for the object expressed in the charter, to make of the business a source of revenue to the state, with power to collect capital, issue shares, and to be controlled by directors chosen under the charter, and required the corporation to pay quarterly in advance a specific sum of money to the auditor of state. JJchl. that a charter having those provisions could not be repealed by the legislature.</p> <p>11. Section 720. Rev. St., which declares that “the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state,” has application only to such proceeding ns had been commenced before the jurisdiction of the federal court attached.</p> <p>12; It is the duty of a federal court to interfere to defend the franchises of a corporation from invasion, though disguised in form and to be effected through state officers clothed with statutory power.</p> <p>[Cited in dissenting opinion in Cbaffraix v. Board of Liquidation, 11 Fed. 647. Cited in II. Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. 564.]</p> <p>13. As an unconstitutional law has no inherent force either to authorize or protect, and therefore no claim, to be obeyed and no power to divest rights, the agents of its administration, of whatever name or character, may be called to answer and are individually responsible.</p> <p>[Cited in M. Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. 504.]</p> <p>14. Generally, courts of equity do not deal with matters of crime, misdemeanors or offenses against prohibitory laws, but they will interfere, by injunction, to stay proceedings, whether connected with crime or not. which go to the immediate or tend to the ultimate destruction of property, or to make it less valuable for use or occupation.</p> <p>[Cited in M. Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. 564; Louisiana v. Lagarde, CO Fed. 102.] ■ '</p> <p>[Cited in Crights v. Dahmer (Miss.) 13 South. 237, 238.]</p> <p>15. Where a charter, such as is described in head note 9. is repealed by the legislature, and the exercise of the rights and franchises conferred by the charter is made a penal offense: HcUl, that the officers of the state charged with the enforcement of the penal laws would be enjoined from arresting or otherwise interfering with the officers and agents of the corporation for acts done by them in the exercise of the rights conferred by said charter.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Crights v. Dahmer, 13 South. 237, 23S.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Louisiana. [This was a libel by Jonathan Strout and others against James Foster and others, claimants and owners of the ship Louisville, to recover damages for injury resulting from a collision. From a decree of the district court in favor of plaintiffs (case unreported), defendants appeal.]

<p>Case No. 8,543.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Failure of Creditor to Appear, upon Citation — Effect of Citation — Default against Creditor.</p> <p>1. Where a creditor fails to appear and submit to an examination of the claim lie has proved against the bankrupt's estate under an order of examina lion, given in accordance with general order 34, in bankruptcy, the register should consider the objections to the claim as admitted.</p> <p>2. The citation throws upon the creditor the burden of supporting his claim by further proof than that already filed.</p> <p>3. It does not necessarily follow that any injustice would be done by taking the default of the creditor, because either party may “for satisfactory cause" review the action of the register before the court.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,544.</p> <p>Mandamus — Effect of Judgment upon Fund tx Countv Theasukek’s Hands — Attempts to Evade Judgment — Contempt — -Warrants in Payment of Taxes.</p> <p>' 1. Upon service of a mandamus execution upon county commissioners, as prescribed by the act of assembly of Pennsylvania of 10th April, 1834, it is their duty: (1) If there be any money in the treasurer's hands unappropriated by previous orders, to cause it to be paid to the party. (2) If there be not money enough in the treasury to satisfy the whole judgment, to pay it out of the first money received. (3) If the taxes of the current year are insufficient to pay the judgments and other expenses of the county, to assess and collect on the next year a sufficient sum for this purpose.</p> <p>2. The judgment of the court is an appropriation of all the money in the treasury, not already drawn or appropriated by previous county orders in payment of previous demands audited and allowed by the controller; and also of the first money thereafter received for the use of the county.</p> <p>3. The commissioners will be held guilty of contempt should they seek to evade tbe process of the court by dividing tbe funds to be collected by taxes and appropriating them before their collection.</p> <p>4. After service of the mandamus execution, the treasurer lias no authority to receive c-ouuty orders of a subsequent date in payment of taxes.</p> <p>5. The provision of the act of 1st January, 18G2, requiring tbe treasurer of Allegheny couuty to receive warrants iu payment of taxes, was not. intended to repeal any of the provisions of the act of April, 1S34, nor can it relieve the treasurer from the proper application of the county funds in the order of their appropriation as previously made.</p> <p>G. It can have no retroactive effect; nor can the legislature lie presumed to intend to aid public oilieers in an astute scheme to evade the performance of their official duties.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,547.</p> <p>Injunction — Notice of Intention to Apply for.</p> <p>It is not necessary to give notice of the application for an injunction.</p>

This was a libel in personam, by William Love and others, against William A. Hinck-ley, to recover pilotage fees, including compensation for alleged extra services, in the sum of $83. cited The Frederick, 1 W. Rob. Adm. 16; The Elizabeth, 8 Jur. 305; The Enterprise, 2 Hagg. Adm. 178, note; The Reward. 1 W. Rob. Adm. 174; The Elvira [Case No. 6,015]; Abb. Shipp. 563.

In bankruptcy. ^Register's report: On the 10th of October, A. D. 1S72, John Love, Jr., applied to the Pair view Deposit Bank, a firm doing business in Fairview, Butler county, for the loan of $2.000, which amount the said bank loaned him, taking from him, according to the usual course of business of the bank, a note, with warrant to confess judgment, allowing six per cent, for attorney’s commission, for the said sum of two thousand dollars.

Defendant, E. B. Washburne, was a resident of Illinois and duly served with process.

Assumpsit, for stone and sand sold and delivered. The defendant produced Owen Mc-Glue as a witness to prove a partnership between the witness and the plaintiff, and that this was a joint contract. objected that the witness was interested. THE COURT decided that he was a competent witness to prove the partnership; but should not be compelled to give evidence of payments made by tlie defendant during the partnership.

This action was brought on a policy for $10,000. The defendant answered that by the terms of the policy, the application with all the statements therein became a part of the policy, and each and every representation made in obtaining the policy were warranties, that among other representations made by the assured, he stated that neither of his parents had ever had consumption, while in truth his mother had died of that disease, and that such representation was a warranty and…

Appeal [by William C. Lovering] from the commissioner of patents’ decision in favor of [W. W.] Dutcher in the interference between the parties relating to improvements for temples for looms.

<p>Case No. 8,655.</p> <p>Salvage — Deuelict—Final Abandonment — Occupation bt Salvoks — Compensation.</p> <p>1. A bark fell in with a schooner three hundred miles from shore in distress. The bark sent provisions, which were returned; the crew of the schooner abandoned her and went on board the bark, which proceeded od her voyage for three hours, when the captain finding the weather more favorable returned to the schooner. The captain of the schooner not being able to induce his men to return to their vessel, the second mate and four men of the bark went with provisions and sails and brought the schooner to port. Held, not a case of derelict, as the final abandonment by the owners and the occupancy by the salvors were contemporaneous acts, and the one would proba bly never have happened unless in a situation where the other was possible, as the boat of the schooñer could not take off all her crew.</p> <p>[Cited in The Cleone. 6 Fed. 525.]</p> <p>2. The actual salvors succeeded in bringing in the schooner and cargo, valued at $90.000, after thirteen days of severe labor and hardship, and after encountering a gale in the Gulf Stream. One-fourth of the value was decreed.</p> <p>[Cited in The Maggie Willett, 27 Fed. 521.]</p> <p>3. The first mate of the bark, who had refused to volunteer, was given the same share only as the other seamen who remained in the bark.</p> <p>4. Distribution of the salvage.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,554.</p> <p>Costs — Counties op Distiiict of Columbia.</p> <p>A resident of Alexandria, suing in Washington, must give security for costs.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,557.</p> <p>Seaman’s Wages — Minor—Suit by Father — Desertion — Shipping Articles — Justifiably Separated — To What Entitled— Charges— Usage.</p> <p>1. Under the general maritime law, desertion does not necessarily work a forfeiture of all antecedent earnings; it rests in the discretion of the court.</p> <p>[Cited in Swain v. Howland, Case No. 13,601; The Balize, Id. 809.]</p> <p>2. Even a statute desertion by a minor, who had engaged in a whaling voyage without his father’s consent, is no defence to a suit by the father for his services.</p> <p>3. The lay in the shipping articles was adopted as the rule of damages, the father not claiming any other.</p> <p>4. If during a whaling voyage, a seaman be justifiably separated from his ship, he is entitled to such proportion of the whole proceeds, as the time he served bears to the whole time of the voyage.</p> <p>[Cited in Antone v. Hicks, Case No. 493.]</p> <p>5. Certain charges by the owners disallowed, usa ge notwithstanding.</p> <p>[Cited in Frates v. Howland, Case No. 5,066.]</p>

<p>Mr. Wright, opposed the motion.</p>

Petition by [J. Baker et al.] mortgagees of the fishing-schooner Florence Reed, of Gloucester, praying that the assignees in this case might be ordered to pay out to them a part of the money received for the sale of a fare of fish.

<p>This is an action of assumpsit to recover the price of a case of black silk cravats, contracted to be delivered under tbe following circumstances: The plaintiffs are commission merchants, residing in Paris. They receive orders and furnish goods for the American market. The defendants are wholesale dealers in French goods, residing in Boston. Mr. Andrews, one of the defendants, visited France in the autumn of 1836, and contracted with the plaintiffs for a quantity of silk goods, and among them two cases of silk cravats, containing a hundred dozen in each case. The terms of the contract were, that the plaintiffs should procure the goods to be manufactured, should send them to "Welles & Greene, at Havre, to be shipped to the house of Mr. Andrews in America. One of the clerks of Low & Berry, who testified to this contract, stated that Mr. Andrews spoke of Welles & Greene as “his agents,” and said that they had been directed by him to follow the plaintiffs’ instructions as to the shiimient. Another clerk testified, that Mr. Andrews directed the plaintiffs to order Welles & Greene to ship them to him at Boston, “through Chadwick & Carrington, at New York.” It also appeared that he directed the cases to be marked C. A. 13 and C. A. 14. The plaintiffs immediately transmitted orders to the manufacturers in Germany to have the cravats made, packed in cases, and marked as above, and sent to "Welles & Greene, at Havre. It appeared that the manufacturers did not know the defendants in the case, nor for whom the goods were destined. They were made wholly on account of the plaintiffs. They were manufactured, packed, marked, and sent to Welles & Greene, at Havre, by roulage (or baggage-wagon). The letter containing the invoice of the case marked C. A. 13, written by the manufacturers to plaintiffs, was dated December 24, 1S36; that containing the invoice of case C. A. 14, was written December 31, 1S36. The plaintiffs sent an invoice of the first case (C. A. 13) to the defendants, by the packet Formosa, which sailed from Havre on the 16th of January, supposing that the case would arrive at Havre in time to go by that packet; and they sent an invoice of the second case by the Frangois I., which sailed on the 27th of January. These invoices were duly received. In point of fact, the case marked C. A. 13, did not arrive at Havre until January 18th, and the ease C. A. 14, arrived January 24th, and both were sent by the Frangois I. Before they had arrived at Havre, Mr. Andrews had directed the plaintiffs to order Welles & Greene to change the marks on the cases from C. A. to A. & Co., preserving the same' numbers, and instructions were accordingly sent to that effect at the time the goods were supposed to be at Havre.</p> <p>Welles & Greene received the goods by roulage, or a baggage-wagon, changed the marks, had them duly shipped, and sent a bill of lading of both cases to the defendants at Boston, and debited the shipping charges to the defendants, through Welles & Co. of Paris, and ike defendants subsequently paid them. The goods were landed at New York; the case A. & Co. 14, was entered at the custom house by Chadwick & Co. (defendants’ agents) by the invoice, transmitted by defendants from Boston. They had also entered the case No. 13, by the invoice, as having arrived in the Formosa,. but of course did not find it on board of her. Having arrived in the Frangois I., and not being claimed, it was sent to the public store, and there burnt in a fire which consumed the building. The bill of lading, it does not appear was ever received. No duplicate invoice was ever sent of case No. 13. It appeared in evidence, that Low & Berry had no control over the goods after leaving the manufacturers, as they were under the charge of government officers, in their transit across the kingdom of France. It also appeared, that it was a common occurrence for invoices of transit goods, that is, goods sent from Switzerland or Germany through France, to come without the goods themselves; the merchant at Paris writing by the packet, which he supposed would carry them, but that in point of fact they sometimes would arrive too late, and in such case, they were always looked for in the next packet It did not appear, that it was the general usage to send duplicate invoices. It was not ascertained, that the case No. 13, had arrived in the Frangois I. until after the fire. On examining the" manifest of the cargo, and the receipt of the storekeeper, it was found that it had been stored and burnt.</p> <p>Upon these facts the defendants contended, That the sale was void, there being no memorandum in writing as required by the statute of frauds. That Welles & Greene were agents of the plaintiffs, who were responsible for their omissions and neglects. That the orders of Mr. Andrews were not complied with, as he directed the goods to be shipped to him through Chadwick & Co. That the plaintiffs were guilty of neglect in not informing the defendants, that the case No. 13, did not go by the Formosa, and in not sending duplicate invoices. That there was no such delivery as to vest the property in the defendants. Upon these points, the case was submitted to the jury. Other matters were commented upon, not material to the issue.</p>

Low having obtained a decree of perpetual injunction against Hauel for using certain trade-marks, G. M. Wharton, for the former party, presented a form of injunction in the English form, commanding and enjoining the defendant, “under the penalty of $-, to be levied upon his lauds, goods and chattels,” henceforth to desist, &c. Mr. Guillou objected that by the practice of this circuit, as appeared by many injunctions which he had examined on the files, a pecuniary penalty was…

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff [Daniel Low] as the en-dorsee of two promissory notes against the defendant [Isaac Underhill], the endorser-one note for $762.37, made by Edward Dickinson to defendant, and dated May 5, 1830, at twelve months, and the other for $5G0, made by Luther Sears to defendant, and' dated May 7, 1830. at twelve months, and' both endorsed by the defendant to the plaintiff in the state of New York.

<p>Case No. 8,562.</p> <p>Removal or Causes — Jurisdiction of Federad Court — Citizenship—Amount Involved — Arising under Constitution or Laws of United States.</p> <p>Under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 470). a civil suit brought in a state court, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, 8500, and in which there is a controversy between citizens of different states, may be removed into the circuit court of the United States, even though the case is not one arising under the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.</p>

Assumpsit by the plaintiff [Edward Low-ber], as payee of a bill of exchange drawn at Philadelphia, by one Edmund Roberts, on the defendant, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The bill was dated 12th of May, 1827, for $500 payable to the plaintiff or order, at four months, for value received “being the amount of one share and interest in the cargo of the brig Mary Ann.” The declaration contained three counts: 1. On the bill as an accepted bill. 2. For money had and received. 3.

On exception of the bankrupt, James Lowe, to the report and account of the as-signee.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern distinct of Pennsylvania.] Lowe had libelled the canal boat Benjamin in the district court. The libel ivas in the ! ordinary form, and set forth, in- the usual general words, “the ebb and flow of the tide within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” &c., and such navigation as was requisite to give the court jurisdiction of the case.

This was an action on the case for the infringement o'f a patent-right. March 23, 1813, Mr. Jacob Perkins obtained a patent for a new and useful invention in the construction of pumps, and afterwards assigned his interest therein to the plaintiff [Francis C. Lowell).

This was a bill in equity, filed to restrain the defendants from infringing two letters patent granted to Erastus B. Bigelow, one for “improvement in power looms,” dated April 10, 1845 [No. 3,9S7], and extended for seven years from April 10, 1859; and the other for “improvement in Jacquard looms,” dated October 23, 1849 [No.-6,806].

The plaintiffs, since 1855, had 'rolled their •carpets upon a hollow stick, which stick, when put into the centre of their rolls of carpet, they claimed to be their trade-mark. The -stick consisted of two pieces, ground on the iDSide. so that when the two pieces were put together they formed a shell with a rectangular opening, and with the corners of the outside rounded off, so that the ends of the stick or shell formed an octagonal ring.

<p>Case No. 8,571.</p> <p>Partnership — Compromise by Individual Partners — Contribution.</p> <p>1. Under the Michigan statute (Comp. Laws, §§ 6109, 0201), providing for sepai ate compromises of partnership debts with individual members of the firm, the remaining partners of the firm who do not compromise cannot be held liable to the creditor for any more than the balance due him, though their joint ratable proportion of the whole debt exceeds that balance.</p> <p>2. They would be liable under section 6202 to their co-partners, who by compromise paid more than their proportion, to make contribution; and this shows that their liability to the creditor must be limited in such c-aso to the balance of the debt unpaid.</p>

<p>[A petition for adjudication in bankruptcy was filed against Samuel Lowenstein and Rosa Lowenstein by Julius Katzenburg. Upon hearing the petition was dismissed with costs. Case No. 8,574. It is now heard upon appeal from taxation of costs.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri.] Lowenstein, who applied for a discharge in bankruptcy, was, on his own petition, adjudicated a bankrupt April 29. 1S72. Debts were proved against his estate, but no assets ever came to the hands of the assignee. His application for a discharge was not made until September 23, 1S74.

<p>Case No. 8,574.</p> <p>Bankruptct —Petition op Creditor — Failure to Pat Non-Commercial Paper.</p> <p>The non-payment, at maturity, of promissory notes that are not commercial paper, is no ground for an adjudication of the debtors as bankrupts, on a petition by a creditor in involuntary bankruptcy. Petition dismissed with costs.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Niekodemus. Case No. 10,254; Re Chandler, Id. 2,591; Re Bunster, Id. 2,-136; Baldwin v. Wilder. Id. 806: Re Carter, Id. 2,470; Re Clemens, Id. 2,877.]</p>

The plaintiffs filed their bill to foreclose a deed of trust on real estate. R. D. Partee and wife, among others, were made defendants, upon the allegation that they had some interest in the said mortgaged premises, or some part thereof, as purchasers, judgment creditors, or otherwise, which interests, if any, have accrued subsequent and are junior to complainants’ lien, and subject thereto.

<p>Case No. 8,576.</p> <p>Limitation op One Yeah as to Application FOIi DlSCHAItGE IN BaNKKDPTCV.</p> <p>The limitation of one year in section 5108 of the Revised Statutes (old section 29), was not repealed by the act of 1874; and a party, who was not entitled to his discharge prior to the act of 1874, can not claim that fact as an excuse for his failure to apply for his discharge within the year, and avail himself of the less stringent provisions of the amended act.</p>

In this case, at the first meeting of creditors, Nathaniel Niles, as agent for Edward W. Seabury, proved and filed a claim of Sea-bury against the bankrupt [James M. Low-erre], but he was not authorized, by any letter of attorney from Seabury, to vote on behalf of Seabury, in the choice of an assignee. Niles then asked leave to withdraw from file the proof of Seabury’s claim. To this the bankrupt objected.

<p>[This was a suit by J. P. O. Lo-wnsdale against the city of Portland, George C. Robbins, Jacob Davidson, A. D. Shelby, Jacob Stitzel, William S. Higgins, J. C. Ainsworth, M. M. Lucas, E. D. Shattuck, Absalom B. Halleck, Orville Risley, and James H. Lap-pens to quiet title to certain lots in Portland. The case is now heard upon exceptions to amended answer to amended bill.]</p>

This bill was filed on the 10th of February, 1847, by Maria Lowry, an alien and subject of the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, stating that Talbot Jones, deceased, of Baltimore, who was her brother, gave and bequeathed by his will, with other things, two hundred and eighty-two shares of stock in the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank of Baltimore, to his sons Samuel Jones, Jr., and Andrew D. Jones, and the survivor of them, in trust, among other things,…

<p>Case No. 8,682.</p> <p>Courts — Admiralty Jurisdiction — Affreightment.</p> <p>The district court has admiralty jurisdiction to enforce a contract of affreightment by a proceeding in rem.</p> <p>[See The A. M. Bliss, Case No. 274.]</p>

[In this case, the libellant [Benjamin Low-ry, Jr-] claimed to recover about $600, for damages sustained by the schooner Cygnet, of S3 tons burden, in consequence of a collision with the steamer [Portland], on the night of November 17th, 183S, when passing through the passage between Thatcher's Island and the Londoner; the schooner being bound from Bangor, (Maine,) to Medford, (Mass.,) with a cargo of lumber, and the steamer being on her way to Portland from Boston.] 1

<p>Case No. 8,584.</p> <p>Indians — Responsibility to State Law — Re-seuved Lands — Sale undek State Law for Debt.</p> <p>1. Indians living within a state, and doing business as merchants, are responsible by the laws of the state, for the payment of their debts. This presupposes that they are not considered under the laws of the United States.</p> <p>2. Lands reserved to them under a treaty, which vests in them the title, but which restricts them from conveying it, except with the consent of the piesident of the United States, descend under the laws of the state, and may be made responsible for the payment of debts.</p> <p>{Cited in Love v. Pamplin, 21 Fed. 761.]</p> <p>{Followed in Blue-Jacket v. Commissioners of Johnson Co., 3 Kan. 355, 364. Cited in brief in Pickering v. Lomax, 120 Ill. 290, 11 N. E. 175.1</p> <p>3. The reservation as to the conveyance is personal, but such lands are subject to the operation of the state law.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Wau-ke-man-qua v. Aldrich, 28 Fed. 497.]</p> <p>[Cited in Taylor v. Vandegrift, 126 Ind. 328, 25 N. E. 549; Board of Commissioners of Allen Co. v. Simons, 129 Ind. 199, 28 Ñ. E. 420.]</p> <p>4. The law, thus substituting an agency, conveys the title without the sanction of the president.</p> <p>5. This court will recognize the procedure of a court of probate, through which Indian lands have been thus sold, where the court had jurisdiction, and the proceedings upon their face appear to have been regular.</p>

Libel for salvage, promoted by the first mate and two of the crew of the schooner Fanny Blake. The L. T. Knights was observed early in the morning of Sunday, August 29, 1869, by the libellants and others on board their vessel, at sea, about fifty miles from Long Island, in apparent distress. On boarding her she was found to be coal-laden and derelict, with about three feet of water in her hold.

Appeal by the owner and claimant from a decree of the district court for the district of Delaware. Libel for salvage. The facts of this case were as follows. On May 1, 1877, early in the morning the libellant discovered the schooner respondent about a mile outside of the Delaware breakwater, and about four miles from the Delaware shore, damaged by a collision with a bark.

<p>Case No. 8,587.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction of Circuit Court— Removal of Assignees — Bill to Compel Assignees to Account.</p> <p>1. The circuit courts have jurisdiction of matters arising under the bankrupt law, as they have of any other subject, where the constitution and laws of the United States give them jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in Cair v. Gale, Case No. 2,435; Pay-son v. Dietz, Id. 10,861.]</p> <p>2. The district courts have not, like the chancellor. in England, exclusive jurisdiction over the entire execution of the bankrupt law. They cannot remove the assignees, nor compel them to account.</p> <p>[Explained in Morris’ Estate, Case No. 9,-825.]</p> <p>3. Plea to the jurisdiction by a bankrupt on a bill filed by his creditors to compel the assignees to account, overruled.</p>

[This was a libel by M. E. Lucas and others against the steamboat Thomas Swann (T. Sweeny and others, owners) to recover for damages sustained by collision.]

<p>Case No. 8,588a.</p> <p>Indictment fob Receiving Stolen Goods.</p> <p>In an indictment for receiving stolen goods, statements made by the prisoner to a witness, admitting that he had received the goods, and disclosing where they could be found, and that lie had better tell the truth in the matter. Held, to be voluntary and permissible in evidence.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,689.</p> <p>Insurance Policy—Compromise—Valued Polict.</p> <p>1. A compromise agreement to constitute a .good defense to « ruit upon any insurance policy, must be binding upon both parties, and of such a character as to operate as a satisfaction of the contract of insurance.</p> <p>[Cited in Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co., 33 Fed. 552.]</p> <p>2. A policy enumerating certain articles with figures indicating dollars placed opposite to each, does not constitute a valued policy.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,690.</p> <p>Lien — Domestjc Vessel —Abvaxces—Necessa-ries — Charter—Costs..</p> <p>1.F. filed a libel against a vessel owned in •the state ef New York, to enforce a lien claimed to exist under the law of the state of New York, passed April 24, 1862. It appeared that F„ as a broker, had negotiated a charter of the vessel for her owrers, who resided at Sag Harbor, for ■a term of six months; that the charterer, who acted as master of her, applied to F. to know where he should get stores for the vessel and F. -obtained from C. an order on L. for the stores, which were furnished to the master on that order. In appeared further that F. also procured .$215 of C. on a pledge of bills of lading and paid it to the master to disburse the vessel. The voyage was broken up so that the security failed •and F. claimed that he owed C. the money. ' It appeared, also, that he advanced to the master $20 for labor in getting the vessel moved from Jersey Flats to Brooklyn, and $49 paid on request of the owners for wages of seamen on a previous voyage, and $25 for obtaining a bond for the vessel when under arrest, which bond was not accepted, and $25 for fees paid at the custom house. And he claimed $4l for commissions in negotiating the charter: Held., that it did not appear that the libellant furnished the stores or advanced the money necessary to procure them.</p> <p>2. It was not sufficiently proved that the $215 was advanced for the purpose of “procuring necessaries” for the vessel, and, besides, it was advanced, not by the libellant, but by C.</p> <p>3. There was no lien on the vessel under the statute for the amount advanced for custom house fees, or for the sum paid to procure a bond, or for the commissions, they not being included in the term “necessaries.”</p> <p>4. For the amount paid for moving the vessel the libellant had a lien, and also for the sum advanced to pay off the seamen, although by the terms of the charter, the charterer had agreed to pay all expenses of the vessel.</p> <p>5. As the principal part of the claim was disallowed. the libellant should not have costs. The ease of The John Farron [Case No. 7,341], distinguished.</p>

<p>This was a libel in rem, filed by Alfred Peabody against the schooner Lucinda Snow, to recover possession of that vessel. W. W. Rogers intervened by claim and answer, setting up a title to the vessel by purchase at auction, under the following circumstances: The schooner was purchased at Boston jointly by the libellant and one Dawson Lincoln, for a joint commercial adventure, the vessel to sail under the command of Lincoln as captain. The two purchasers loaded her with a cargo upon joint account; and in December, 1846, the schooner, thus loaded, was dispatched by Peabody and Dawson, under the command of Dawson, on a voyage to GalveB-ton and a market. She reached Galveston and delivered her cargo, and was there loaded on freight for the Rio Grande; and having accomplished this voyage, she was chartered by the government of the United States for a further voyage, — in the prosecution of which she was cast away on the island of Sacrificios, near Vera Cruz, in the storm known as the great “norther” of May 2,1846. The gale prevented any aid being rendered to the vessel until May 3d, when a survey was made under the direction of Captain Lincoln. The vessel was condemned to be sold; and on May 8th she was sold at auction by the government auctioneer, and was bought by the claimant for $1,750. The libel-lant claimed the vessel as sole owner.</p> <p>(1) The onus of proving the validity of the sale rests on the claimant. The Sarah Ann [Case No. 12,342]; Id., 13 Pet. [38 U. S.] 387.</p> <p>(2) The claimant must make out good faith in the master, and a case of extreme necessity. The master has no authority to sell unless in a case of extreme necessity. 3 Kent, Comm. (5th Ed.) 131. He may sell, provided it be done in good faith, and in a case of supreme necessity, which sweeps all ordinary rules before it 3 Kent, Comm. 173. At all events, a sale can only be justified by extreme necessity and the most pure good faith. Abbott, Shipp. 26. All the circumstances must be submitted to the jury, and they must find both the necessity and good faith. Patapseo Ins. Co. v. Southgate, 5 Pet. -[30 U. S.] 604. It is not sufficient that the sale be one of good faith on the part of the master, and for the benefit of all concerned, unless there be an urgent necessity. The Tilton [Case No. 14,054]. For it is certain that he has no authority to sell unless in a case of extreme necessity, and when he acts with the most perfect good faith. Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 Pick. 262. It is not sufficient that the master acted in good faith and in the exercise of his best discretion; the claimants must prove there was a moral necessity for the sale, so as to make it an urgent duty upon the master to sell. The Sarah Ann [Case No. 12,342]; Id., 13 Pet. [38 U. S.] 387. If the circumstances were such that an owner of reasonable prudence and discretion, acting upon the pressure of tlie occasion, would have directed a sale, from a firm opinion that the vessel could not be delivered from her peril, &c., the sale is said to he valid. The Sarah Ann [Case No. 12,342]; The Fanny and Elmira Hicks, Edw. Adm. 117; The Fortitude [Case No. 4,953]; Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. [Id. 11,949]; Same v. Royal Exchange Assur. Co., 8 Taunt. 755; 3 Brod. & B. 151; Abb. Shipp. 7-24, and cases cited.</p> <p>(3) A more stringent rule is applied as between the purchaser from the master and tht owner, than between the owner and underwriter. The Tilton [supra].</p> <p>(4) Upon the question of necessity, it seems that the actual conduct of the master, in connection with the other circumstances, is to be taken into consideration. In other words, fraud, upon the part of the master, is evidence of a want of necessity. Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. [supra].</p> <p>(5) The fact that the vessel was got off is certainly a strong circumstance against the necessity for the sale. The Sarah Ann [Case No. 12,342]; Abb. Shipp. 22, note. It is, however, by no means conclusive. AVe must weigli all the circumstances. 1. The position and exposure of the vessel. 2. The season of the year. 3. The danger from storms. 4. The expense. 5. The probable chances of success in getting her off. G. The necessity for immediate action.</p> <p>(6) Necessity is not to be inferred from the fact that the sale is in good faith. Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Southgate, 5 Pet. [30 U. S.] 604, 620, 621.</p> <p>(7) A survey is not conclusive as to the state of the vessel, though, if regularly and honestly made, it is very strong evidence. Fontaine v. Plienix Ins.-Co., 11 Johns. 293; Anth. 16, note a. If the surveyors acted fairly, and the master acted fairly, his acts in conformity with their opinions will be justified, unless it shall be made to appear that the facts on which they founded their opinion were untrue, or their inferences incorrect, and the burden lies on those who impeach the survey. The Sarah Ann [supra]. The report is presumed to be made in good faith, and fairly, unless the contrary appears. Gordon v. Massachusetts Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 Pick. 264; The Fortitude [supra].</p> <p>(S) Admiralty surveys are inadmissible to prove the facts they recite. Abbott v. Sebor, 3 Johns. Cas. 46; Saltus v. Commercial Ins. Co , 10 Johns. 4S7. The facts must be proved like other facts. Cort v. Delaware Ins. Co. [Case No. 3.257]; U. S. v. Mitchell [Id. 15,-791]; Hall v. Franklin Ins. Co., 9 Pick. 460. The survey is not evidence of the facts, but only that a survey was made. Watson v. Insurance Co. of North America [Case No. 17,284].</p> <p>(1) This is a possessory action. Now it is clearly impossible to say what interest libel-lant may have in the vessel till the accounts are taken between him and Lincoln, who were partners in the joint adventure of the vessel, her cargo, and freight. That account cannot be taken in admiralty, and this pos-sessory action must fail for that reason.</p> <p>(2) Lincoln and the libellant, being partners in the vessel and cargo, and Lincoln being in charge of the property as master and managing owner, he was competent to give a good title for the whole vessel, (she being wrecked,) on being actually paid for her her full value, as he was by the claimant. 3 Kent, Comm. (3d Ed.) 154. And the co-owner cannot sustain a possessory libel without proving, affirmatively, such collusion or fraud or knowledge on the part of Rogers, as would destroy his' character as a bona fide purchaser.</p> <p>(o) Captain Lincoln was, at the time of the sale, owner of one half of the schooner — the papers of the vessel were in his name, and he was actually half owner. The transaction between him and the libellant was a mere mortgage, neither transferring the title nor the possession, and was not registered nor entered on the register. Lincoln was quite competent, then, to sell and convey one half of the vessel, and receive the purchase-money; and the claimant, Captain Rogers, therefore, in any view of the case, has a good title to one half the vessel, and the other owner having no greater share, cannot sustain a possessory libel for tne whole.</p> <p>(4) Under the foregoing circumstances, the sale to Captain Rogers was more than a sale of a stranded vessel by a mere master. It was a sale by a master having an unusual interest and control, and clothed with an unusual discretion as master, and being also an equal owner and partner, and authorized to advise and direct the master. A purchaser, under such circumstances, will not be held to such stringent rules as are applied to a sale by a mere master.</p> <p>(5) But if this were a case of a sale by a mere master, the title of Captain Rogers would be good.</p> <p>(6) The powers of a master of a vessel flow from the nature and necessities of his employment. He must have, in most matters, the rights of ultimate and absolute sovereignty. He unites the legislative, judicial, and executive functions in the police and management of his ship’s company, and he has the right of eminent domain, so to speak, in all the property under his charge», cargo as well as ship, and whenever required by the perils to which he must be continually exposed, and which in detail can never be foreseen, he may subject it to taxation, (average contribution,) —he may destroy it, (jettison or cutting away,) —he may encumber it, (bottomry,) — he may also use it, (food and clothing.) — he may sell it to make repairs. &c., — and he may abandon it; — and the power to sell the shattered relics of his vessel when stranded, that he may bring home the proceeds to his owner, is as reasonable and necessary as any other of his powers. He has all these powers, subject only to the limitation that in his honest judgment. aidpd by that of those about him, actual injury and imminent peril makes it expedient, for the common good of those interested, that he should exercise the power. Lawrence y. New Bedford Ins. Co. [Case No. 8,140]; Hunter y. Parker, 7 Mees. & W. 342; Smith, Merc. Law, 173.</p> <p>(7) The necessity which the law requires as the justification of the sale of a stranded vessel by the master, is only such necessity as •makes it an urgent duty upon the master to sell for the preservation of the interest of all concerned. The necessity is to be determined in each case by the actual and impending peril to which the vessel is exposed, from which it is probable, in the opinion of persons competent to judge, that the vessel cannot be saved. Lawrence v. New Bedford Ins. Co. [supraj; [The Sarah Ann] 13 Pet. [38 TL S.] 401.</p> <p>(8) This “necessity,” “the actual and impending peril,” must of course be “determined” on the spot, and at the tim* where and when they exist; because there only can they be seen, and there only can the sale take place, and there must the rights of the purchaser be fixed, or the sale would be nugatory or a fraud; and it must be determined by the master, the appointed agent and trustee of all parties, because he alone is there to determine it. .To give strength and respectability to his determination, and to preclude injurious imputations, the law counsels him to protest publicly, before a proper public officer, to have a public survey by sworn surveyors, and suitable public notice and a public sale, but it does not require him or them to judge infallibly. The necessity of a sale cannot be denied when the peril, in the opinions of those capable of forming a judgment, makes a loss probable, though the vessel may in a short time be got off. The fact of her being got off raises no presumption of the master’s incompetency, or that of his advisers. Nor does her strength or condition, or costs of repairs, as subsequently ascertained, raise a presumption against the necessity, because they are all subsequent to “the actual and impending perils.” It is, therefore, not the real and inevitable peril and an absolute necessity which make the sale valid, but the apparent peril and necessity; the probable loss.</p> <p>,(9) The very existence of the necessity, or the duty or expediency of a sale, presupposes that there are other persons whose means and resources or wants are such that in their hands the actual and impending peril is not so formidable as in those of the master, and that they can make it profitable to buy, otherwise there could be no sale.</p> <p>(10) The “actual and impending peril” is made up of many elements. The incompetency, want of means (no matter how produced) of the master, — the locality, — the proportion of vessels lost or saved on the same beach, — the general opinion of the hopelessness of a loss, —the absence of mechanics, and of tools and materials, — the liability to sudden and unwarned perils rendering it necessary for all other vessels to keep their own means under their own control, — the existence of a state of war, — and the lawlessness and absence of regular government, — all enter more or less into the peril.</p> <p>(11) Nor can the necessity or propriety of a sale be at all affected by the mode in which the stranding was produced. If the absence of the captain or crew, — the loaning of her chains and anchors, — the neglect of the captain, — caused the vessel to go ashore, or deprived him of the means of getting her off, it would not affect the purchaser. It is the “actual and impending peril,” no matter how produced, which justifies the sale.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,592.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Lease—Possession by Assignee— Rent — Place op Storage.</p> <p>The bankrupt corporation occupied a store in Fulton St., New York, under a lease for a term of years, at a yearly rental of $3,000. A petition was filed against the corporation in August, 1870. and an adjudication was subsequently had and an assignee appointed, who on the 7th of February, 1877, took possession of the goods and removed them from the store. He never had actual or constructive possession of the store, and no sales were made therein. The goods brought less than $3,000 upon the sale. The landlord claims for rent of the premises from the time of the filing of the petition to the time of removal by the assignee: Held, that the assignee never became assignee of the lease, and that the landlord can only claim as against the estate for the use and occupation of the premises as a place of storage or safe-keeping, and that forty dollars a month was a reasonable sum for such use and occupation under the circumstances.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Ives, Case No. 7,116; Re Wheeler, Id. 17.490. Distinguished in Re- Secor, 18 Fed. 320.]</p>

Claim for [the Rancho Ulpines] a tract of land, quantity unknown, in Solano county, rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimants [Juan M. Luco and Jose Leandro Luco].

Trespass, for assault and battery and false imprisonment, to try the right of freedom. [Charles Slade], offered a deed of gift of the plaintiff by Colonel William Lyles to Miss Ann Lowery, whom W. H. Lyles afterwards married, acknowledged before Mr. Bowie, a justice of the peace of Prince George's county, Maryland, and a certificate of the clerk of Prince George’s county, that Mr. Bowie was on that day a qualified justice of the peace, and a certificate of J. M. Gantt, chief…

This case originated in the following state of facts. The complainant, Philip Riñes, a minor, had been engaged in the service of the schooner Lucy Anne, of Southport, district of Wiscasset, during the cod-fishing season of 1859. The season embraced two voyages, one in hand-line fishing, the other in a troll-iug voyage. After the completion of the second voyage, Riñes left with the master's consent, who did not settle up his wages.

<p>Case No. 8,698.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — Materials Furnished — Jurisdiction or Admiralty Over Lakes — Act or Congress — District Court.</p> <p>Contracts for materials furnished, at the home port, in the building of steamboats and other vessels, are not within the act of congress extending the jurisdiction of the district courts to certain cases upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting the same, approved Eeb. 20. 1845 [5 Stat. 72(1],</p> <p>[Cited in People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. (61 U. 8.) 402; The Edith, Case No. 4.283.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,597.</p> <p>Prize — Enemy Property.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property.</p>

This case came before the court for decision on the report of Commissioner Campbell. The assignee had 'set apart to the use of the bankrupt [Edward H. Ludlow] various articles as necessaries, and also articles of jewelry belonging to the wife of the bankrupt, and some as part of his wearing apparel. Exceptions were taken to the allowance, and the decision of the assignee,, .with the exceptions, were referred to the-commissioner for proof and a report thereon.

<p>[This was a bill in equity by E. Ludlow, trustee, against the Clinton Line Railroad Company, and Patrick Lavin for the foreclosure of a mortgage.]</p>

[In review of the action of the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana.] The petition was filed by the children of the bankrupt, John H. Ludwigson, for the review of an order of the district court, made by virtue of section 50(13 of Revised Statutes, directing a sale of certain real estate returned by the bankrupt on his schedule as a part of his estate.

<p>Case No. 8,602.</p> <p>Judgment — Assignment—Payment without notice — Silence of Assignee.</p> <p>1. Payment to original judgment creditor, made at any time before the judgment debtor has notice that the judgment is assigned, is valid.</p> <p>2. When a judgment debtor pays to the judgment creditor a part of the amount of the judgment by agreement between them that such payment shall operate as a full satisfaction, such agreement is void, as wanting a sufficient consideration.</p> <p>3. When a judgment creditor assigned his judgment to a third person, and the debtor, hearing a rumor that the judgment has been assigned, but not understanding to whom it was assigned, applied to the assignee for information on that point, and the assignee refused to tell him who was the assignee: 'Held that, under such circumstances, the debtor might safely pay to the original judgment creditor.</p>

At the trial of this cause it was shown that •the legislature of this state passed an act, entitled. “An act to authorize the city of Racine to aid in the construction of certain railroads,” approved February 10, 1853, and authorizing the city council to borrow on the ■credit of the city, three hundred and fifty thousand dollars for twenty years, in such •sums as they might deem proper, on interest not exceeding seven per cent., payable annually' in the city of New York, for…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.] Hearing upon several libels for repairs and supplies. The principal suit was brought by the persons composing the firm of Skinner & Forsyth, for repairs made upon the steamer Lulu. It was heard with.other suits for supplies.

<p>This was an action of assumpsit, in which the plaintiff sought to recover of the defendants a partial loss on a policy, made by them, March 4. 1814, on the brig Columbia, on a voyage from Boston to Savannah. It appeared in evidence, that the brig sailed on this voyage about the 10th of March; that on the 17th of the same month, she experienced a gale and a heavy sea, which blew away the fore top-mast staysail, carried away a great part of the bulwarks, and monkey rail, stove in the cook’s galley, and shipped several very heavy seas, which made her labor very hard; that after this she continued the voyage, lying to in two or three instances, but with generally moderate weather, carrying all sail, till the 27th of March, when she experienced another gale, and shipped a sea, burying the brig all up in a clear sheet of foam, and swept her decks of her jolly-boat, spars, roundhouse, and two water casks, the fore spencer being also carried away. There was no other loss on the voyage. There were several questions of law, raised by the defendants, growing out of other evidence, and the transactions for a settlement of the loss, a reference of the matter having been made by the plaintiff’s agents in Boston, and a decision given by the arbitrator against his claim, by which he refused to abide. But the main question raised, was, whether these two losses could be added together to make an average of five per cent, under the policy; and upon this point there was considerable evidence.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,606.</p> <p>Claim fok Rest — Right of Homestead — Judgment fok Debt — Supekiokity—Waivek of Lien fok Rent.</p> <p>Where a landlord, having a claim for rent, which is in Virginia superior to the right of homo-stead. solicits and obtains an office judgment by-confession for the amount due him as “recovered for debt,’’ the law of Virginia making the right of homestead superior to a judgment for debt: Held, that here was waiver of the specific lien for rent, and an acceptance of a judgment for debt in lieu of the rent, and that the homestead might be allowed as against the judgment.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,608.</p> <p>Parent and Child — Services op Minor Child —Seamen — Ddtt op Consul — Authority op Master — Liability op Owner por Seamen’s Wages.</p> <p>1. A minor,’ without the knowledge of his father, concealed himself on board a vessel bound on a whaling voyage, and was not discovered, until the vessel was at sea. The master soon after-wards put into Fayal, where he might have left the minor with the American consul. Held that the father was entitled to recover for the services of his son, from the time the vessel left Fayal.</p> <p>[Cited in The Hattie Low, 14 Fed. 880.]</p> <p>[Cited in Gabrielson v. Waydell, 135 N. Y. 7, 31 N. E. 970.]</p> <p>2. The master might have left the minor with the consul, without paying the three months’ extra wages. It would, in such case, have been the duty of the consul to provide for him, and send him to the United States.</p> <p>3. The court allowed as compensation, such proportion of the lay given to those who shipped as boys, as the time after the ship left Fayal, bore to the time of the whole voyage.</p> <p>4. The owners are liable for the wages of a seaman, employed by the master, notwithstanding he may have had a complement of men without him.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,609.</p> <p>Possession- — Chaktek—Excepted Perils — Kigiit op Master to Bell Cargo — Breaking up Voyage — Injury to Vessel and Cargo.</p> <p>1. A bark was chartered for a voyoge from New York to Montevideo, by a charter which contained the clause, “dangers of the seas, fire .and navigation mutually excepted.” The charterer put on board a full cargo of lumber. On the day the loading was completed, a fire broke out on board, which made it necessary to fill the vessel with water. Both vessel and cargo were damaged, and the cargo had to be unloaded, but could have been carried forward in a damaged condition. In its damaged condition, it was worth in New York $4.947 2G, and the freight due on performance of the voyage under the charter, was $0,105 29. The charterer offered to supply a new cargo, to be carried under the charter in lieu of the damaged one, but the master refused to give up the damaged cargo without payment of full freight. No offer was made to carry the cargo forward in any other ship. The ship was repaired at a cost exceeding her value when repaired; and the master, being without funds to pay for the repairs, which were liens on the vessel, advertised for a loan of .$17.000. which was more than the value of the bark and cargo, upon the security of the vessel, her freight ■and cargo. Thereupon the charterer demanded his lumber, and, on a refusal to surrender it. except on payment of full freight, filed a libel against the cargo for possession; and. by means cf the process issued thereon, took the cargo from the possession of the master, and it was aft-erwards delivered by the marshal to the charterer. on a stipulation for value taken in court, to return the cargo or pay whatever the court should decree the ship to be entitled to receive by reason of the removal of the cargo. The master also filed a libel against the charterer to recover the full freight and the average charges: Held, that -the charterer was entitled to have substituted a sound cargo in place of the damaged cargo; and that the refusal of the master to accept the substituted cargo thus tendered, entitled the charterer to treat the charter as broken by the ship, and to demand the damaged cargo without payment of freight.</p> <p>2. The act of the master in advertising for such a loan on the credit of the cargo, as well as •of the ship and freight, was without authority, and authorized the charterer to treat the voyage as broken up by the fault of the ship: and it entitled him to demand the cargo without payment of freight.</p> <p>3. The charterer, therefore, was entitled to a decree declaring him entitled to the possession of the lumber with costs: and the master’s libel must be dismissed, with costs.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,610.</p> <p>Ex parte Deposition? — When- not Received.</p> <p>1. An ex parte deposition, taken under the act of congress [1 Stat. 73]. de bene esse, will not be received unless all the provisions of the act be strictly followed.</p> <p>2. When the officer taking the deposition ex parte, did not certify that the witness was “cautioned” as well as “carefully examined and sworn,” as provided by law, the deposition will not be received.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,612.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Locus in Quo — Construction of Statute.</p> <p>1. In a suit in rem. in admiralty, in the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York, against a vessel, she was attached by the marshal on the 1st of April, 1875, under process in the suit, while she was afloat in the navigable waters of the Hudson river, lying west of Manhattan Island and to the south of the mouth of the Spuyten Duyvil creek, and where the tide ebbed and flowed, she being fastened, by means of a line, to a dock at Jersey City, in the state of New Jersey, and outside low-water mark, said wharf projecting into the navigable waters of the Hudson river lying west of Manhattan Island and to the south of the mouth of Spuyten Duyvil creek: Held, that the place where the vessel was arrested was within waters subject to the jurisdiction of said court.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Hall v. Devoe Manuf’g Co.. 14 Eed. 184, 185. Cited in The Norma, 32 Fed. 411.]</p> <p>2. The jurisdiction of said court over said locus in quo, in such a suit, existed prior to the agreement of September 16th. 1833, between New York and New Jersey, which is set forth in the act of June 28, 1834 (4 Stat. 708), and nothing in that agreement or in that act restricted that jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in Malony v. City of Milwaukee, 1 Fed. 613. Disapproved in Re (Devoe Manuf’g Co., 108 U. S. 417, 2 Sup. Ct. 905; Hall v. Devoe Manuf’g Co., 14 Fed. 184. 185.]</p> <p>3. Sections 541 and 542 of the Revised Statutes do not have the effect to alter such jurisdiction so that it does not extend to such locus in quo.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Hall v. Devoe Manuf’g Co., 14 Fed. 184, 185.]</p> <p>4. The effect of the Revised Statutes enacted June 22, 1874, considered, as to altering statutory provisions in force on the 1st day of December, 1S73.</p> <p>[Ciled inThommasen v. Whit will, 12 Fed.903.]</p>

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Michigan.] [Suit by Lyall against Miller & Little, administrators of Little.]</p>

<p>Cáse No. 8,614.</p> <p>Collision in New York Harbou — Fog—Vessel at Anchor and Ferry-Boat — Mutual Fault — Article 20.</p> <p>1. A sloop lying at anchor in the Hudson river off 51st street, was run into, in a fog, just before daylight, by a ferry-boat coming from Weehawken, and trying to make the ferry slip at 42d street. . The tide was ebb. The sloop was well inside of the usual track of the ferryboat, she had no watch on deck, and gave no signal to the ferry-boat, as the latter approached, blowing her whistle: Held, that there was faulty navigation on the part of the ferryboat, in being so far out of her course.</p> <p>[Cited in The Drew, 35 Fed. 792.]</p> <p>2. The absence of a watch on the sloop, was the neglect of a precaution required by article 20 of the rules for avoiding collisions.</p> <p>[Cited in The Clara, Case No. 2,787,102 U. S. 203; The Erastus Corning, 25 Fed. 574; Hadden v. The J. H. Rutter, 35 Fed. 366.]</p> <p>3. Both vessels were, therefore, in fault.</p>

[This was an action by James L. L.vell against Daniel Goodwin for trespass on the ease. The defendant moved to. set aside the writ of summons.]

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.]</p> <p>[In admiralty.]</p>

[This was an action of trespass on the case by James L. Lyell against Daniel Goodwin. The defendant filed a motion to vacate the writ of the summons and the service thereof. See Case No. 8,616.]

<p>Case No. 8,618.</p> <p>Counties — County Treasurer — Order op Board op Supervisors — Presentment and Remand— Notice op Dishonor — Negotiability—Jurisdiction op Federal Court.</p> <p>1. Counties are established by law, and need not be proved.</p> <p>[Cited in Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 273.]</p> <p>2. Rot. St. Mich. 1846, p. 70. § 40, providing, “that the county treasurer shall pay money on the order of the board of supervisors, countersigned by the chairman and sinned by the clerk,” an order in that form will be presumed to be correct, and the official act of the board of supervisors.</p> <p>3. Such an order is a county liability, drawn-by one county officer upon another, for payment out of county funds, and no presentment and demand and notice of dishonor are necessary.</p> <p>[Cited in Pelton v. Crawford Co., 10 Wis. 72; International Bank v. Franklin Co., 65 Mo. 114. J</p> <p>4. The statute expressly authorizes such or-deri for county indebtment, to be drawn by the-board of county supervisors, and does not provide that they may not be negotiable.</p> <p>5. An action lies against the county upon such county oruers in the United States court, when the sum in controversy and the character of the parties confer jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in M’L'ean v. Hamilton Co.. Case No. 8.881; Vincent v. Lincoln Co.. 30 Fed. 752.]</p> <p>[Cited in Savage v. Crawford Co., 10 Wis. 54.J</p>

<p>Case No. 8,619.</p> <p>Evidence — Copy op Patent bt County Recokdeb.</p> <p>A certified copy of a patent, by the recorder of a county, is not evidence, as the law does not require the patent to be recorded in the county.</p> <p>[Cited in Moran v. Palmer, 13 Mich. 375.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,621.</p> <p>Counties — Suit against Countt — Judgment against County — Duty of Supervisors — Remedy at Common Law — Equitable Relief— Creditor’s Bill — Execution on County Property.</p> <p>1. A county is made subject to a suit by an act of the state.</p> <p>[Cited in Vincent v. Lincoln Co., 30 Fed. 753.]</p> <p>2. At common law a county' was not liable to a suit.</p> <p>3. On a judgment being obtained against the county, the supervisors are required to levy the amount on the people of the county.' And if they shall fail to do this, a mandamus may be issued to compel them.</p> <p>4. This is a common law remedy, but the object of this bill is to subject certain bonds and mortgages to the satisfaction of the judgments which cannot be reached by mandamus. The remedy at law, therefore, is not adequate.</p> <p>5.A creditor’s bill may be filed against a county. No objection is perceived why an execution may not be levied on the property of a county.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,620.</p> <p>Taxation' of Costs.</p> <p>There can be no taxation of costs, except under the act of 1853 [10 Stat. 161]. That law abolishes all previous laws on the subject, without any reservation.</p> <p>[Cited in Ethridge v. Jackson, Case No. 4,-541.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,622.</p> <p>Collision — Probability op Testimony — Conflict of Testimony.</p> <p>[1. Where, in a collision between a steam tug and a schooner, the testimony is in direct conflict, the court will, after examining all the circumstances, give its decision with the side whose testimony is the most reasonable.]</p> <p>[2. A collision occurs between a steam tug and a schooner, and the latter is sunk. There is a direct conflict in testimony between the parties. each accusing the other of being wholly at fault. An examination of the injury done to the defendant steam tug by the collision shows that the tale as told by the witnesses for the defendant is the most probable. Upon this state of facts the court decides for the defendant.]</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal to the circuit court, the learned judge, after examining the testimony in the case very carefully, reached the conclusion that the steamboat Conestoga was in fault. The decision of the district court was reversed, and decree entered for libelants. Case No. S,(j'22a.J</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] [This was a libel by the owners of the schooner Margaret against the charterers of the steamer Conestoga, for damages for collision. The claimants filed a cross-bill for damages from the same collision. The court, dismissing the libel, reserved its decision as to the claim of the respondents. Case No. 8,-622. Libelants appealed.]

<p>Case No. 8,623.</p> <p>Pleading — Defective Declaration.</p> <p>A declaration against “the common council of Alexandria,” for work and labor done for “the mayor and commonalty,” must show how the new corporation is liable for the debts of the old.</p>

Action upon an account. The principal question of law arose on the following facts: The plaintiff shipped on board the defendant’s vessel, which he commanded, a parcel of goods, on the joint account and risk of plaintiff and defendant, to he carried to Port Republican; where, by agreement, the same were to be sold by the defendant, for the joint account, without any charge by defendant for freight or commission. The bill of lading and invoice corresponded.

Bill in equity [by Thomas Lyman against James Arnold and others] for an injunction to prevent a removal and sale of certain stones dug out of a canal, and also for relief. The cause came on to be heard upon the bill, answers and depositions.

This was an action in which the plaintiffs [William Lyman and others] counted on bills of exchange, accepted by the defendants [Brown, Hibbard, Browne & Co.] and indorsed to the plaintiffs. The original writ, by which the action was commenced, was returnable to and entered at the last term.

<p>Case No. 8,628.</p> <p>General and Unlimited Partnership — Partnership Transactions — Joint Funds — Real Propertt —Legacy — Will — Construction— Parol Evidence — Husband and Wipe — Family Expenses — Dissolution op Partnership— Accounting — Contract to Make a Will — Rescission — Compensation por Improvements apter Dissolution op Partnership — Compensation por Partner’s Services.</p> <p>1. Two brothers, in 1784, entered into copart-' nership without any agreement in writing, the principal object of which at first was to‘carry on the business of trade and merchandise, and boating on the Connecticut river. It was understood between them that all their property was to be in common, aDd that each should be at liberty, on joint account, to do any kind of business, make any contracts, or enter into any speculation at his discretion. This partnership lasted until 1820, and during the period of its continuance, one brother, who had a numerous family, resided in Vermont, and the other, who had no children, in Connecticut, and the family expenses of both were defrayed out of the joint funds, no account whatever being kept of them, and no partnership account having been kept or settled during the whole period. As the capital and means of the brothers increased their business was extended, and they entered into navigation at large, and each imported goods, built, purchased and sold vessels, purchased land in different states,. turnpike and toll-bridge shares, and built bridges and took the deeds and evidences of title to both or either, as he pleased. In the absence of any written agreement between the parties, or any verbal contract with respect to the extent of the copart-nership and share, the nature of their connexion was to be collected from the course of their business, their casual declarations, and occasional letters and ratifications of each other’s previous acts. It was held to be impracticable to draw any line or set any fixed limits to the partnership that would do equal justice to the parties, but that the partnership must be considered as general and unlimited, and all their property of every description as held in common, and that the separate acts of one, however ill judged, disastrous and unsatisfactory to the other, if done in good faith, were partnership transactions.</p> <p>2. Where a lot of ground belonged to one of the partners before the commencement of the partnership, but buildings were afterwards erected upon it with the joint funds, of much greater value than the lot, and the proceeds of the property when sold were applied to the uses of the firm without objection, the whole was held to belong to the partnership.</p> <p>3. At an early period in the partnership one partner received a large legacy under the will of a third person, and without the knowledge of the other partner applied it to the use of the partnership; held, that as everything was intended to be held in common, and after such a lapse of time, all individual interest in the legacy was to be considered as abandoned.</p> <p>4. Whether one partner has a claim upon the firm for private funds put into the concern without the knowledge of his copartners. Quaere.</p> <p>5. Parol evidence of an intent on the part of the testator that the bequest should be for the joint benefit of both brothers, rejected; no such intent appearing from the will.</p> <p>6. Another legacy left to the wife of a partner was for the same reasons held to belong to the joint property, as when received it became the property of the husband.</p> <p>7. The understanding that no charge was to be made for family expenses was held to extend to the expenses of the children While minors and members of the family, as the parent might command their services, but not to advances made them after they became of age.</p> <p>8. Salaries paid to the children, after they became of age. as clerks, held to be a charge against the partnership.</p> <p>9. Lands bought by a commercial partnership, for the partnership purposes, are considered, in equity, as forming part of the partnership fund and stock in trade, and standing on the same footing as the personal property, particularly during the lives of the partners; and in a court of equity, it is immaterial whether the title is vested in one or both of the partners, for it considers the partner having the legal title, as a trustee for those beneficially interested.</p> <p>10. There was evidence that, in 1814, one of the brothers wished to dissolve the partnership, but agreed to continue it on the other promising to make a will in favor of himself and family; that the will was made and afterwards destroyed, and that for this reason the brother in whose favor it was made in 1820 dissolved the partnership without the other’s consent; and it was held, that the destruction of the will did not justify the dissolution of the copartnership, but that the dissolution was a rescinding of the contract by one brother, which liberated the other from any obligation to make the will.</p> <p>11. Whether such a contract to make a will would have been enforced if it had not been rescinded. Quaere.</p> <p>12. The defendant insisted that the real estate should be divided by allowing each party to retain what stood in his name and was in his possession at the time of the dissolution, at its then valuation; and if there was a balance, crediting it to the party entitled to it. But the court held, that a partner is always entitled to have the partnership wound up by a sale of all the property, as the best mode of ascertaining its value.</p> <p>13. The prayer of the bill was for an account, and that the joint fund be divided between the parties, and for general relief; but that a sale of the property was included in the prayer for general relief, and not inconsistent with the specific relief prayed.</p> <p>14. It was contended that the court could not enforce an order of sale, except of the lands lying within the district; but held that the order would not require the agency of any officer out of the jurisdiction of the court; that it was to act only on the parties; and that the powers of the court were amply sufficient to direct a public sale of the land, and to compel the parties to convey the title accordingly.</p> <p>15. The property in separate portions had remained. by tacit consent, eight years after the dissolution, in the possession of the different parties. and each had made valuable improvements on the part in his possession, and it was referred to commissioners to ascertain and report the value of such improvements, to be allowed to the party making them.</p> <p>16. But this was done only from the extraordinary character of the case, which would not admit of the application of rules by which ordinary partnerships are settled, one of which was admitted to be, that one partner could not call upon the. other for compensation for improvements made after the dissolution.</p> <p>17. A partner is not entitled to compensation for his services, except by special agreement; and the same rule applies after a dissolution. Each partner then becomes, with respect to the property in his hands, a trustee for the other; and it is tvell settled that a voluntary trustee is not entitled to compensation for personal services, but only for actual charges and expenses.</p> <p>18.The costs directed to be made out before any decree should be made as to costs.</p>

[This was a bill in equity filed by the Lyman Ventilating & Refrigerator Company to restrain the defendants Newell Chamberlain and others from the infringement of a reissued patent. The original letters patent were granted to Azel S. Lyman March 23. 1S5G. No. 14,310.]

<p>[This was a bill in equity by the Lyman Ventilating & Refrigerator Company against William Lalor.]</p>

[This was a bill in equity by the Lyman Ventilating and Refrigerator Company against John Southard. The defendant moves for an order directing complainant to give security for costs.]

A. leased premises to Lynch & Bernstein at í?S,000 a year, payable quarterly. On a default of payment he commenced summary proceedings, under the statutes of the state of New York, to dispossess them, on April 9th, 1S73, before the end of the first year.

[This was a libel by Thomas Lynch and others against William Crowder, for wages.] This was a British ship, with a British crew, shipped in England, and bound to Staten Island; and thence to a port of discharge in the United Kingdom. She brought out a cargo for Quebec, and passengers to Staten Island, where, on her arrival, the men requested to be discharged.

<p>Case No. 8,637a.</p> <p>Pi iz: — Action— Essentials op Answer — Condemnation — Lien fob Advances — Bill op Lading.</p> <p>1. What statements are necessary in an answer and claim.</p> <p>2. Vessel and cargo condemned as enemy property.</p> <p>3. What is necessary to be proved by parties claiming a lien for advances on enemy property captured as prize in an enemy vessel.</p> <p>4. In prize law, a bill of lading transmitted to a party to cover his advances on cargo shipped does not pass the title to the cargo.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,638.</p> <p>Bail — Insufficiency-—-Sale op Goods Delivered ox Bail — Additional Securitt — Difference between Actual Value and Original Bail— Property Seized as Prize — Sale — Goods in Hands of Bona Fide Purchaser.</p> <p>1. The cargo having been delivered to the claimants on bail before hearing, it afterwards appeared that it had been appraised at less than its real value, and that the security was in too small an amount. A motion was made that the cargo be restored to the custody of the court, but it appearing that it was no longer in the possession of the claimants or the bail, but had passed to bona fide purchasers, the court awarded monitions against the claimants to pay into court the difference in amount between the proceeds or value of the cargo delivered to them and the amount of the hail.</p> <p>2. Property seized as prize may be pursued in rem into the hands of all persons who become possessed of it, or by monition against such persons, if its proceeds have been brought into court.</p> <p>3. It matters not whether the prize goods remain in kind or have been disposed of bona fide by sale. The holder of the thing or of its proceeds may be compelled, by monition, to deliver the same into court, to be there disposed of according to the rights of the captors.</p> <p>4. And this may be done as against persons having the proceeds of prize property in their hands, when an insufficient stipulation has been taken, on a delivery on bail.</p> <p>[See cases Nos. 8,037a and 8,G39.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York.] [This was a suit for the condemnation of the schooner Lynchburg and her cargo, captured by the United States steamship Quaker City. A decree for claimants was entered (Case No. 8037a), and an appeal is prosecuted therefrom.]

[This was a suit by Nathaniel Lyndon against Gorham and Greene, and Silliman, their trustee.] From the answer of the trustee in this case it appeared, that he had effects in his hands of the firm of Gorham & Lawrence, but not of the firm of Gorham & Greene, or of either of them separately.

<p>[In the matter of J. H. Lyon, a bankrupt]</p>

Action against the tug Lyon and her master to recover damages done to the schooner Tom Dyer, by a collision with the brig Hollister.

[This was an indictment, under the act of July 14, 1798, against Matthew Lyon, for the publication of a seditious libel.] The indictment which was found on October 5, 1798, contained three counts, the first of which, after averring the intent to be “to stir up sedition, and to bring the president and government of the United States into contempt,” laid the following libellous matter; 2 “As to the executive, when I shall see the efforts of that power bent on the promotion of…

[This was a libel by Lyon and Billard to recover possession of a lot of lumber and ■shingles, which were shipped on board the sloop Columbus, and which the master refused to deliver.]

<p>[In the matter of Julia Lyons, a bankrupt.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,660.</p> <p>Dischauge or Debtou — Composition — Levy of Execution on Personae Property — Jurisdiction of District Court.</p> <p>1. If a resolution of composition has been duly ratified, it confines the secured creditor to his security, and discharges the debtor from personal liability for the secured debt.</p> <p>2. If a composition is entered into for cash payments, secured by a mortgage on real estate, the district court has no jurisdiction to restrain a creditor from levying an execution on personal property, although the name of such creditor was pioperly placed on the list of creditors.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Hinsdale. Case No. 6,526; Re Negley, 20 Fed. 500.)</p> <p>[Cited in Pupke v. Churchill, 91 Mo. 81, 3 S. W. 831.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,651.</p> <p>Judgments — Motion to Set Aside — Failure to Give Securitv for Costs — In Ejectment — Serv- . ice or Notice — Against Casual Ejector.</p> <p>1. A failure to give security for costs, under the general rule of the court, no cause for setting aside a judgment.</p> <p>2. Nor is the misapprehension of counsel a ground for doing so, under ordinary circumstances.</p> <p>3. A judgment against the casual ejector, is different from an ordinary judgment, and may be set aside for good cause, after the expiration of the term at which it was entered.</p> <p>4. In the notice offered to the declaration, the tenants should be named, and on them the notice should be served.</p> <p>5. When the tenants are not named in the notice it is defective, and does not authorise a judgment against the casual ejector.</p> <p>6. On the merits, connected with circumstances of great hardship, the court, in the exercise of their discretion, will set aside a judgment against the casual ejector at a subsequent term from that at which it was entered.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,653.</p> <p>Patents — Shoe Lasts — Comdination—Purpose op Description in Patent.</p> <p>1. The claim in a patent for an improved shoe-last was as follows: “The sectional shoe-last a. b. c formed in the manner specified, with the measurement 4 (which is the line .drawn across the last from the corner of the toe to the back of the heel, at the upper parti as short as the measurement at the line 6 (which is the line drawn around the base of the last, from the corner of the toe to the centre of the heel at the junction with the sole), for the purposes as specified.” Meld, that the claim was not for a combination. where the invention consisted of a new arrangement of several old elements, but was for the peculiar form of the described device, in which the toe was elevated higher than usual, the back of the heel thrown forward, and which was as short in the first measurement described as in the second.</p> <p>2. The purpose of the requirement of law, that an invention shall be described, in the patent, in such full, clear, and exact terms as to enable one skilled in the art to construct and use the same is twofold: first, that, when the patent has expired, the public may avail themselves of its benefits: second, that, while the patent is in force, the public may not ignorantly infringe it, for want of clear definition of its character.</p> <p>3. It is not a defence to the charge of infringement upon a patent for an improved shoe-last, that it cannot be construed to embrace boot-lasts, when it appears in evidence that respondents had used the invention, without- alteration, in the manufacture of boots as well as shoes.</p> <p>4. It was set up in defence that the respondents did not infringe the rights of the complainants. because the last made by respondents was made in two, while that of complainants was made in three sections. Meld, that such a de-fence only had force where the patent of the complainant was for a combination, all the elements of which were old, and which was only infringed when the entire arrangement or combination was wrongfully used.</p> <p>[Cited in Rees v. Gould. 15 Wall. (82 U. S.) 194: P. P. Mast & Co. v. Rude Bros. Man-uf’g Co., 3 C. C. A. 477, 53 Fed. 124.]</p> <p>This was a bill in equity founded upon letters-patent [No. 30,495] on a certain improvement in shoe-lasts. The inventor, one Nathaniel Jones, during the pendency of his application, assigned the entire interest to the complainants, to whom the patent issued September 16, 1S62. The bill charged that the defendants had on the 1st of June, 1863, infringed the patent, and prayed for an injunction and for an account. The defences were: First, that the assignor of the complainants was not the original and first inventor of the ■ improvement set out in the patent; second, that the invention was not described in such full, clear, and exact terms as to enable a person skilled in the art to construct it; third, a denial of infringement on the part of the respondents.</p>

[This was a libel in rem by Ferdinand Maas against the schooner Pedee for failure to deliver goods under the terms and conditions of a bill of lading.] This was an action brought to recover for the nondelivery of 533 hides, shipped at Aspinwall on July 2, 1855. under a bill of lading consigning them to the libelant at this port.

<p>Case No. 8,664.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Debts Due Petitioning Creditors — Aggregate Indebtedness.</p> <p>Debts under $250 are to be reckoned both in computing the debts represented by the petitioning creditors and the total probable debts of the bankrupt</p>

In admiralty. [The ninth article of the libel mentioned in the latter part of the opinion of the court is as follows: “That, by reason of said master and owners of said barque taking on board thereof as passengers for the yoyage mentioned in the third article (from Londonderry to Philadelphia) the said libellants, it became and was the duty of said master and owners to furnish to said libellants severally food and drink, comforts, necessaries, and kindnesses, during said…

Assumpsit on a special contract respecting flour. prayed the court to instruct the jury, that they ought to regulate the damages according to the price of flour on the day when the flour ought to have been delivered, and cited the following cases: Groves v. Graves, 1 Wash. [Va.] 1; Dutch v. Warren, 1 Pow. Cont. 337.

<p>Case No. 8,658.</p> <p>Maritime Lien — Supplies — Home Port — Seamen’s Wages — Transfers of Vessels — Knowledge — Place of Enrollment.</p> <p>1. Credit given for supplies furnished a steamboat in her home port, is presumed by the maritime law to have been given to the owner or master, and not to the boat.</p> <p>2. A claim for wages being a lien on the boat, under all circumstances is an exception to the general rule. Where persons in good faith have given credit to a steamboat for necessary supplies and repairs, as a foreign boat, such persons are not afiected by the fraudulent character of sales or transfers by which the boat was placed in the position of a foreign boat.</p> <p>3. If such persons were apprised of the real nature and character of the transfers, or are fairly chargeable with such knowledge, they must be viewed as participants of the fraud, and can have no claim to any benefit resulting from it.</p> <p>4. Whatever may be the character of a transfer of an interest in a steamboat, it vests in the purchaser a legal title in that interest, which those dealing with the boat are justified, in the absence of any knowledge to the contrary, in regarding as prima facie valid and unimpeachable.</p> <p>5. A collector’s office, where bills of sale are made matters of record, is the place where alone it may be presumed persons dealing with a boat would search for information in regard to a title.</p> <p>6. The place of enrollment is not conclusive as to the home port of a vessel or boat, and evidence is always admissible to prove the actual residence of the owner, and such evidence furnishes the test of the character of the boat as foreign or domestic.</p> <p>[Cited in The Rapid Transit, 11 Fed. 330.]</p> <p>7. The supplies of material-men to a ship belonging or represented to belong to owners residing in another state, are to be deemed to be furnished on the credit of the ship and the owners until the contrary is proved.</p> <p>8. The clerk of a steamboat has no power to bind the boat for a loan of money without the authority of the master for his acts. .</p> <p>9. If the clerk procures money on the credit of the boat without the sanction of the master, and the master directly or impliedly assents to it. it will be regarded as the act of the master, and a lien will be created.</p> <p>10. A pilot on a steamboat who assents to an arrangement by which another person agrees to account to him for his wages, does not by so doing, waive his maritime lien on the boat.</p> <p>11. A maritime lien is equivalent to an express hypothecation of the boat, and all subsequent transfers or changes of title are subject to this prior and paramount lien; nothing but payment will discharge the boat from its operation.</p> <p>12. Under the constitution of the United States and the legislation of congress, jurisdiction in the enforcement of maritime liens is vested exclusively in the national judiciary.</p> <p>13. Credits given to a boat in the progress of construction are not liens by the general maritime law.</p> <p>14. The purchaser of a boat sold by order of a state court, takes it subject, in his hands, to any lien or interest existing in favor of other parties prior to his purchase.</p>

<p>[This was a bill by Allen Campbell McAr-thur and others against William Allen and others. Heard on demurrer to the bill.]</p>

Motion by the plaintiff to remand the cause to the state court from which, on the petition of the defendant, Usher, it was removed into this court. The facts pertaining to the motion are these: On the first day of the present term, Usher entered in this court a certified copy of the summons, or process, by which the action was commenced in the state court, and of the returns thereon.

<p>[This was a suit by Charles McArthur against Young Hogan. Heard on appeal.]</p>

<p>Case No. 8,665.</p> <p>Examination of Bankrupt — Order—Affid wit.</p> <p>Where the assignee of a bankrupt applied for an order for his examination, which was granted, and, after his examination under it had been commenced, the bankrupt moved to vacate the order because it was not founded on affidavit, which motion the register denied: Meld, that the register's decision was correct. .</p> <p>[Cited in Re Solis, Case No. 13,165; Re Dole, Id. 3,965.]</p> <p>[See Case No. 8,6G6.]</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Minnesota.] The plaintiff is the assignee in bankruptcy of the Winnebago City Mill Company. The action was brought to recover $576.63 alleged to have been received by the defendant of the bankrupt April 20th, 1S76, as a fraudulent preference under the bankrupt act [of 1S67 (14 Stat. 517)].

<p>Case No. 8,668.</p> <p>BANKRUPTCY — STORAGE RECEIPT — RIGHT TO OFFSET against Assignee — Tort.</p> <p>1. The bankrupt was extensively engaged in manufacturing flour and storing grain in an elevator attached to its mill. Defendant, prior to the bankruptcy, and in' ignorance of the insolvency of the corporation, purchased a storage receipt which had been issued by it, and subsequently demanded a delivery of the grain, which was refused. In an action brought by the as-signee to recover money of the bankrupt which tlie defendant had in his possession at the time of adjudication, held, that the value of the grain so converted might be set off.</p> <p>2. Where the set-off is founded on a duty which tlie plaintiff owes the defendant, the wrongful act can be waived and a set-off is proper; but where the cause of action is a tort, then the wrongful-act cannot be waived.</p> <p>[See Case No. 8,667.]</p>

Case, for carrying away a slave whereby the plaintiff lost his service; and debt, under the act of Virginia, of 17th December, 1792 (Rev. Code, P. & P. Ed., p. 195), for three hundred dollars penalty for carrying away tlio same slave. Both actions were tried at the same time by the same jury. Question — Whether the master of the vessel is liable to the penalty, if he did not know that the slave was on board at the time he sailed?

The bill, which was filed in 1802, by George M'Call, and Richard Smilie, surviving partners of M'Call, Smilie & Co., an English firm, states, that prior to the Revolutionary war the firm was largely engaged in business in the then colony of Virginia, and established a house in the town of Dumfries, under the direction of their factor, Henry Mitchell; that a certain Burr Harrison, now deceased, became indebted to them in the course of dealing, to the amount of £237 11s. 10d.,…

This was an action [by Hamilton McCall and another] against [Cornelius W. Lawrence] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of the court on a case.

This was an action for false imprisonment, and by the stipulation of the parties was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury. The facts in the case are fully stated in the following findings of the court: First.

On motion to remand. Suit was commenced by plaintiff in tbe circuit court of Marquette county by attachment. This was on January 31. 1870. The sheriff levied on certain lands, and as the defendant was a non-resident, publication was made under the state statute. Plaintiffs attorney en'tered the appearance of defendant July G, 1870, and on tbe 22d of same month took bis default for not pleading to the declaration.

This was an application to compel a purchaser of land sold by a receiver under a decree in this cause, to complete his purchase, or for a re-sale of the property and an order that the purchaser pay the deficiency. The bill in this suit was filed by the plaintiffs [Robert McCalmont and others] as judgment creditors of the defendant Susan Lawrence, to set aside, as fraudulent, a conveyance and assignment of lands made by her immediately before they obtained their judgment.

This was an application for a habeas corpus The petitioner was an officer in the army of the late so-called Confederate States, and, as such, surrendered and was paroled under the agreement made between the authorities •of the United States and the commanders of tne armies of the so-called Confederacy, after which he took the oath prescribed in the amnesty proclamation of the president of May 29th, 1865, but was subsequently arrested and confined in jail in Knox county,…

<p>Case No. 8,680.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,681.</p> <p>Shipping — Charter—Repairs by Owner pro Hac Vice — Admiralty—Pleading—Practice-Amendment of Answer.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel was repaired in the port of New York, upon the order of D. & R., to whom she was consigned, proceeded on a voyage, and was sold abroad on a claim for bottomry, and thereafter the ship-carpenter, who did the repairs in New York, brought suit against the owners, who resided in New York and Brooklyn, and they answered separately — B. setting up that the consignees, D. & R., were owners pro hac vice under an agreement to manage and control the vessel, receive all earnings and pay for all repairs and supplies, for a specified money consideration; and J. setting up the same agreement and also that libellanthad knowledge of it: Held, that it was not open to the defendants to dispute the authority of D. & R. io order the repairs; and having admitted their ownership and accepted the repairs in the increased value of their vessel, they are prima facie liable to pay therefor.</p> <p>2. D. & R. were not proved to be owners pro hac vice, and this defence set up in the answers was not established.</p> <p>3. While it appeared from the proofs that defendants were actually mortgagees out of possession. no such defence was set up in their answers and no question of their liability as such could therefore be considered.</p> <p>4. At the trial, the defendant J. asked leave to amend answer and set up that he was mortgagee out of possession: Held, that having pleaded ownership, and set up an agreement only consistent with ownership, and having stood by at the trial and applied to amend only after the effort to prove charter by the other owner had failed, he cannot now be allowed to amend.</p>

Action on an accident insurance policy. The policy provided that in case of injuries effected through external, violent or accidental means, the company should be liable; but that the liability should not extend to any bodily injury of which there should be no external or visible sign, nor to any injury happening directly or indirectly in consequence of disease, nor to any case except where the injury was the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death.

<p>[In the matter of John Q. McCarty, a bankrupt.]</p> <p>The case was heard on objections and proofs reported by a commissioner.</p>

This is a bill in equity to quiet title [by William M. McCarty against Charles A. Mann and others], and involves the validity and construction of an act of congress approved July 27th, 1854 (10 Stat. 798).

<p>Case Mo. 8,687.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Builders—Work and Material — Contract on Land.</p> <p>[See Case No. 6,172.]</p>

This was a bill in equity, which was heard upon the motion of complainants for a preliminary injunction.. The defendants filed neither answer nor affidavits denying the averments of the bill.

Allegations were filed by Cornelius Mc-Clean, a creditor, against Thomas Plumsell, a petitioner for the benefit of the “Act for the relief of insolvent debtors within the District of Columbia,” upon which he was found guilty. prayed that the debtor might be committed to close custody, although he was out upon a prison-bounds bond.

<p>[In the matter of J. McClellan, a bankrupt.^</p>

<p>Case No. 8,695.</p> <p>Judgment — Default — Excuse—Motion to Set Aside — Close of Term — Attorney —Vigilance.</p> <p>1. Where the attorneys for the defendants had the files of the papers in their possession, and had mailed them from an interior city on the 7th of October preceding the great fire at Chicago, and afterwards supposing them to have been destroyed, paid no further attention to the case, and the plaintiffs accordingly obtained judgment by default, the papers not having been lost, but being delivered to the clerk after the fire, held, the court will not at a subsequent term set aside the judgment.</p> <p>2. On the authority of Cameron v. McRoberts, 3 Wheat. [16 U. 8.] 591. and McMicken v. Per-rin, 3 How. [44 U. S.] 507; Cook v. Wood, 24 Ill. 295; and Smith v. Wilson, 26 Ill. 1S6, — the court has no power to set aside a judgment or decree after the close of the term at which it was rendered.</p> <p>3. The attorneys for the defendants were not absolved from their responsibility by the mere supposed destruction of the records, but should have exercised increased vigilance to know what steps it was necessary to take to protect the rights of their clients.</p>

[This was an action at law by John Me-Clintick against David Cummins. The suit was originally before the courr upon demurrer in Case No. 8,700.]

<p>[This was an action at law by John Me-. Cleod against George H. Gloyd.]</p> <p>Replevin, returnable to June term, 1820. Discontinued by the non-appearance of the defendant.</p>

[This was an action at law by John Me-Clintick against David Cummins. It was first heard upon demurrer (Case No. 8,700), and subsequently upon defendant’s notice annexed to his plea of'general issue (Case No. 8,698). A jury was waived, and it is now heard upon the pleadings and evidence as before the court. |

<p>Case No. 8,700.</p> <p>Pkactice at Law — Indiana—Affidavit to Plea —Notes—Fkaud in Execution — Assignment —Consideuation—Dukess—Issue.</p> <p>1. Under the statute of Indiana which requires a plea that denies the execution of the instrument on which the action is brought, to be sworn to. if the plea be filed without oath, it admits the instrument; but is good for all other legitimate purposes.</p> <p>[Cited in Magee v. Sanderson. 10 Ind. 2G3.]</p> <p>2. A plea of fraud in the execution of the instrument need not state the facts which constitute the fraud.</p> <p>[Cited in Brickill v. City of Hartford. D7 Fed. 218.]</p> <p>3. The assignment of a negotiable note, as well as the note itself, purports a consideration.</p> <p>[Cited in Smith v. Bainbridge, 6 Blackf. 12.]</p> <p>4. The plea of duress, by the maker of the note, as against the assignee, is bad. unless there be an averment of notice to the assignee.</p> <p>5. To a plea that the note was given and the assignment made without consideration, the plaintiff should take issue on the want of consideration of the note or of the assignment, and not on both.</p> <p>G. Where such issue is made, as the note and also the assignment purport a consideration, the proof of want of consideration devolves, in the first instance, on the defendant.</p> <p>[Cited in Yeatman v. Cullen. 51 Blackf. 247.]</p> <p>7. An issue must be single, though it may embrace several facts.</p> <p>8. An issue is formed, generally, of an affirmation and denial: and not of two negatives.</p> <p>[NOTE. This case was subsequently heard upon the question of valuable consideration as raised by the notice annexed by defendant to his plea of the general issue. Case No. 8,698. It .was again and finally heard by the court (a jury being waived) upon its merits. Case No. 8,699.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania.] [This was a libel by James McCloskey and others, owners of the schooner Marian Gage, against the steamship Achilles and others, for damages sustained in a collision.]

<p>Case No. 8,702.</p> <p>Courts — Federal Jurisdiction' — Want of — How Taken Advantage of — Voluntary Appearance-Waiver.</p> <p>1. In the courts of the United States, if at any stage of a suit it becomes apparent that the cc-urt has not jurisdiction no further proceedings will be had, and the case will be dismissed on that ground as to those parties to whom the objection applies.</p> <p>2. A suit was brought by a citizen of Illinois in the Southern district of Ohio upon a joint contract against two defendants, one of whom resided in said district and the other in the state of Indiana. The declaration averred the residence of the defendants, and the return of the marshal showed service on both, but the declaration did not aver that the defendant residing in Indiana was served within the Southern district of Ohio: Held, that in such case it was not necessary to aver on the record that the defendant, residing in Indiana, was served within said district, and that by virtue of section 1 of the act of February 28, 1839 [5 Stat. 32l], jurisdiction was conferred upon the court to proceed to the trial and adjudication of such suit as against all parties regularly served with process.</p> <p>3. Where a co-defendant, who resides in a district other than the one where suit is brought, voluntarily appears and pleads to the suit jointly with the other defendants, it is a waiver of any exception to the jurisdiction of the court.</p>

2 [This -was a suit in equity [by Mary F. McComb against Ira Beard] under letters patent [No. 19,490] for “an improvement in metallic ties for cotton-bales,” granted to Frederic Cook, March 2, 1858, and duly assigned to complainant. The infringement charged was under the third claim of the patent. The accompanying .engravings represent the form of the Cook tie, upon which the third claim is based.

This was a bill in equity, which was heard upon the motion of complainant [Henry S. McComb,] for a preliminary injunction. At the same time was heard a demurrer to the bill filed by defendants.

2 [Suit brought upon letters patent [No. 19,490] for an “improvement in metallic ties for cotton-bales,” granted to Frederic Cook, March 2, 1S5S, and assigned to plaintiffs.

<p>In equity. The bill set forth that in March, 1806, the complainant [Henry S.] McComb agreed with Crane, the treasurer of the Credit Mobilier, to take two hundred and fifty shares of the capital stock of the corporation, and draw for that amount on Fant, for whom the shares were taken. Fant declined paying the draft and taking the stock. McComb then agreed to take up the draft, and Fant transferred his right to the stock to him. McComb tendered ?25.000, the agreed price of the shares in May, 1866, but refused to allow Crane to have the money, unless he would then issue him a certificate. Crane offered a receipt, and promised a certificate on the return of the president, who was then ■In Omaha. McComb refused to pay on these terms. In June, 1S66, the entry of the receipt of the $25,000 for the. stock by the draft on Fant was cancelled by a cross entry. The bill prayed that the stock should be issued to McComb with all dividends paid in the interval. Under the ruling of the court, the only material point on the present hearing was whether an ownership of shares by •contract was shown.</p> <p>The contract passed the title. The books showed that the draft on Fant was accepted s.s payment. While the stock was below par the plaintiff was given no reason to suppose his right would be denied, and the remedy of the company was to sue on the draft.</p> <p>The contract was for cash, the draft being taken as cash. When that was returned unpaid — no shares having been issued — the situation of- the parties was precisely that of a ■seller for cash who receives a check on a bank where there are no funds, and the ■goods have not been delivered. The purchaser cannot keep the seller forever in the position of one who retains goods, as security for the price. The act of the company in cancelling the credit by the cross entry in' June, 1SGG, showed they had abandoned the contract. After that the position of Mc-■Comb was that of any other buyer for cash, •where nothing had been paid and no delivery made. No title ever passed.' It was merely contractual, and that ended by the neglect to pay within a reasonable time.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,712.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Amending Proof — Security— Rent — Wages—Priority.</p> <p>1. A sale of the goods of a manufacturer who had been declared a bankrupt was made by order of court at the manufactory, and the proceeds paid to the assignee, which amounted to two thousand one hundred and sixty-six dollars and seventy-four cents. The landlord claimed two thousand seven hundred dollars for one year’s rent; there was also due to operatives fifteen hundred dollars. The laws of New Jersey secure to the landlord a preference over other creditors, for one year's rent, from the proceeds of the sale of personal property on the demised premises; the same privilege to operatives in manufactories, for one month’s wages. The landlord proved his claim for rent as an unsecured creditor, but afterwards asked leave to amend the proof by setting forth his security. To this the assignee objected, and claimed further that the operatives were entitled to be paid for one month’s wages in pieference to the claim of the landlord. Held, that a creditor having security, and proving his demand in ignorance of his privilege, and omitting to mention his security, should be allowed in the absence of fraud to amend his proof.</p> <p>2. The twenty-eighth section of the bankrupt act [of 1SG7 (14 Stat. 530)] does not give to the five classes of creditors therein enumerated, any priority over secured creditors. By the laws of New Jersey, landlords and operatives, in cases of this nature, are entitled to the payment of their preferred claims, pro rata.</p>

<p>Case No. 8,713.</p> <p>Naturalization — Inaccurate Statements —No Deception Intended — Re-Naturalization.</p> <p>1. The validity and efficacy of a judgment admitting a person to citizenship, are not impaired by an inaccurate statement in its recitals; they constitute no part of the judgment.</p> <p>2. Accordingly, where the record of naturalization of an applicant for citizenship of the United States was perfect, but inaccurately recited that the ajjplicant had resided within the United States for three years preceding his arrival at the age of twenty-one years, no deception being intended, the applicant being entitled to be admitted on other grounds, and these facts appearing on an application for re-naturalization, it was Jichi. that there was no occasion for further proceedings, and the application was denied.</p>

This was a suit brought in the district court of the United States by [Marvin B.] McNeil, as assignee of Broughton & Co., bankrupts, against [James] McCord, Nave & Co., to recover certain moneys received by them from the sheriff of Clay county, Kansas, the same being the proceeds of the sale of certain personal property of Broughton & Co., which had been attached by McCord, Nave & Co. (the plaintiffs in error), in a suit brought by them against Broughton & Co. in the…

[This was a suit in admiralty by David McCord against the steamboat Tiber to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an accident.]

<p>Case No. 8,717.</p>

This was a libel in personam for wages, by Edward McCormick against Edwin R. Ives rand John Chambers.

This was an order to show cause why a writ of attachment should not issue against the defendants [Edward T. Jerome and Moses Jerome] for disobeying a writ of injunction [by Cyrus H. McCormick] issued and served in this cause.

This was a bill in chancery filed in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, by Cyrus H. McCormick against John H. Manny and others, charging them with infringement of his patents for improvements in the reaping machine, dated January 31st, 1845 [No. 3,895], October 23d, 184S [No. 5,335], re-issued May 24, 1S53 [No. 239].

<p>Case No. 8,735.</p> <p>Patents — Abandonment — Forfeiture —Invention — Unsuccessful Experiments — New Combination — Reaping Machine.</p>

This was an action on the case [by Cyrus H. McCormick against William H. Seymour and Dayton S. Morgan] for the infringement of two several letters patent granted to the plaintiff, one on the 31st of January, 1845 [No. 3,S95], and the other on the 23d of October, 1847 [No. 5,335, reissued May 24, 1853, No. 239], for improvements in reaping machines.

This was an action in the case, for the infringement of letters patent. The declaration was founded on two letters patent granted to the plaintiff — one on the 31st of January, 1845 [No. 3,895], and the other on the 23d of October, 1S47 [No. 5.335, re-issued May 24, 1S53, No. 239]. It was tried on both of the patents in June, 1S51, when the jury failed to agree on a verdict.

Action was brought [against Henry Walker] on the following promissory note: “$4,-200. Washington, Sept. 21, 1839. Twelve months after date, I promise to pay to the order of Colburn & Tufts, for value received, at the Bank of Metropolis, forty-two hundred dollars. Jno. Walker.” Endorsed by Colburn & Tufts, Lewis Walker, Henry Walker and Charles McCormick. The plea was infancy.

[This was a libel by Charles McCoy and-others, owners of the schooner Pennsylvania, against the owners of the steamer Curri-tuck.] The ease is that of a collision between the-barge Dispatch, in tow of the Currituck, and the schooner Pennsylvania, in tow of the Molyneux. On the 12th October, 1874, the Dispatch ran into the Pennsylvania and sunk her. at the east end o( the Dutch Gap Cut, on the Elizabeth river, a few miles from Norfolk.

<p>Case No. 8,730a.</p> <p>Administrators — Appearance—Voluntary— Process.</p> <p>1. The want of ten days’ notice to an administrator, of the presentation of a claim to the probate court, cannot be made a ground of objection where the administrator voluntarily appears.</p> <p>2. Appearances cures all defects and irregularities in process and the want of service, and dispenses with the necessity of process.</p>

The petition states that plaintiff is a citizen of Kentucky, and has leased the Cincinnati Stockyards at 815.000 per annum for three years. That the Cincinnati Stockyards cover about twelve acres of land in Cincinnati, adjoining the United Railroads Stockyards, and are fully equipped for business. having cost 8300,000. That the Ma-lietta and Cincinnati Railroad affords the only access to either stockyards, and that the business can only be done over that road.

This was an action of debt for interest due on certain “coupon bonds,” issued by the commissioners of Washington county, Pennsylvania. Held: and that the citizens of Washington had decided, by a large majority of votes, in favor of malting such subscription.

<p>On writ of habeas corpus.</p>

The libel in this case originally was by the owners of the vessel lost by collision with the steamship, for her loss, and also for the loss of the libellants’ cargo on board. On the trial, evidence was offered of a cargo on board belonging to other persons not named in the libel.

<p>Libel in admiralty, in personam [by McCready, Motte & Co. against R. L. and W. E. Holmes],</p>

<p>[This was a libel in admiralty by James W. McCready against the schooner Robert I. Poulson.]</p>