¶1. Mr. Irving S. Shapiro, Attorney, Department of Justice, and Mr. Abraham H. Mailer, Special Appellate Attorney, both of Washington, D. C., Office of Price Administration branch, Office of Temporary Controls, with whom Mr. J. Grahame Walker, of Washington, D. C., Attorney, Office of Price Administration branch, Office of Temporary Controls, was on the brief, for appellant.
¶2Mr. Bernard Margolius, of Washington, D. G, with whom Messrs. Joseph B. Dan-zansky and Raymond R. Dickey, both of Washington, D. G, were on the brief, for appellee.
¶3Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and EDGERTON and PRETTYMAN, Associate Justices.
¶5In a civil action brought in the District Court by the Price Administrator, a consent decree was entered enjoining the ap-pellee from selling automobiles at prices in excess of established ceilings. Later the Price Administrator sought to institute criminal contempt proceedings, alleging violation of the injunction. A rule to show *882cause was issued. Hoffman filed a motion to dismiss the rule. The District ¡Court granted the motion. Thereupon the United States appealed.
¶6The motion to dismiss, which was supported by an affidavit, was upon the ground that the rule had issued because of transactions revealed by books, contracts and other documents produced by Hoffman under a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Office of Price Administration, after Hoffman had specifically claimed immunity under the Fifth Amendment and the Compulsory Testimony Act.1
¶7Under the Criminal Appeals Act,2 an appeal in a criminal case may be taken by and on behalf of the United States direct to the Supreme Court from a judgment sustaining a plea in bar · Case Law">special plea in bar. A criminal contempt proceeding is a criminal case.3 The motion to dismiss because the proceeding was barred by the Compulsory Testimony Act was clearly a special plea in bar; Therefore, a judgment sustaining *883that motion, is reviewable, under the Criminal Appeals Act, upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court.4 The statute further provides that appeals may not be taken to this court where such an appeal to that Court is provided, and that this court shall certify to that Court a case which should have been taken there directly.
¶8It was held in United States v. Burroughs 5 that the then Criminal Appeals Act did not apply to the District of Columbia. But the Act was amended in 1942, and under its present provisions appeals to this court, by name, are specifically provided. Moreover, Section 128 of the Judicial Code, as amended,6 gives this court power to review judgments of the District Court in criminal cases on appeals taken by the United States “in cases where such appeals are permitted by law.” This latter clause was part of the act amending the Criminal Appeals Act in 1942, and clearly brings this court within the terms of that amended Act.
¶9It follows that pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act this court, being of the opinion that this appeal should have been taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States, must certify the case to that Court.
¶10Appellee contends that the appeal was not properly taken by the United States, because the United States was not a party to the proceeding below, and that this court should, therefore, dismiss the appeal. But we think that the Criminal Appeals statute contemplates that the entire appellate proceeding should be in the Supreme Court and that, therefore, that Court must determine all questions involved. We do not think that the Act contemplated a division of the appellate proceeding so that this court, or another Circuit Court of Appeals, would determine the propriety of the procedural aspects of the appeal, including the rights of parties to appeal, and the Supreme Court would then determine only the merits of the substantive questions.
¶11Case certified to the Supreme Court of the United Stales.