Volume 163 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The construction of a sewer line by the Town of Coventry has generated litigation almost as prodigiously as it has carried effluent to the West Warwick sewer treatment plant. In the consolidated appeals before the Supreme Court: (1) Roadepot, LLC and Keyserton, LLC (collectively, Roadepot) appealed from a partial summary judgment in favor of Home Depot U.S.A, Inc. (Home Depot) obligating Roadepot to pay certain disputed sewer assessment charges (2) Roadepot appealed from a judgment, following a bench trial on Home Depot's counterclaim, requiring Roadepot to reimburse Home Depot for sewer assessment charges paid by the latter from 2005 through 2014 and (3) Home Depot cross-appealed from the trial justice's decision limiting its request for prejudgment interest and denying its claim for late fees on the sewer assessment charges. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court to the extent it required Roadepot to pay Home Depot a sum equal to the Fast Track Assessment payments made by Home Depot before September 17, 2009. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all other respects and remanded the case to the Superior Court to conduct further proceedings.

This case arose from the August 15, 2005, sale of an approximately 360-acre tract of undeveloped land located on Dye Hill Road in Hopkinton (the property). The plaintiffs, Charles E. Fogarty and James Ottenbacher, averred that the sale of the property to an entity of which the defendants, Ralph Palumbo and Jonathan Savage, were principals, without their consent, was fraudulent they each consequently filed an eight-count complaint in Superior Court. The plaintiffs also named Pilgrim Title Insurance Company (Pilgrim), which was the title insurance and escrow agent in connection with the sale of the property, as a defendant in this case. Following discovery, all three named defendants, Palumbo, Savage, and Pilgrim, filed a total of five motions for summary judgment, all of which were granted by a justice of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment as to Pilgrim on the plaintiffs' negligence counts against it, as it held such claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of the discovery-rule exception. The Supreme Court vacated the hearing justice's decision to grant summary judgment on all counts against Palumbo and Savage based on the plaintiffs' purported failure to present evidence of lost profits, as it deemed that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. However, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on counts 6 (fraud), as it deemed such counts to be derivative. Moreover, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on counts 4 (tortious interference with contractual relations), counts 5 (tortious interference with prospective contractual relationship) and counts 8 (civil conspiracy) as to both Palumbo and Savage, and on counts 3 (breach of contract) against Savage. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in part, vacated the judgment in part, and remanded the record to the Superior Court for further proceedings with respect to the plaintiffs' two remaining counts against Palumbo.

The plaintiffs, Stephen L. Key, as Trustee of the Stephen L. Key Trust – 2008, and individually, and Melanie D. Mitchell, appealed from a judgment entered in Superior Court in favor of the defendants, Brown University and the City of Providence. The first count of the plaintiffs' second-amended complaint sought a declaration pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (G.L. 1956 chapter 30 of title 9) that Brown University's construction of an artificial turf field hockey field with attendant bleachers, press box, electronic scoreboard, and public-address system was an unlawful use under the Providence zoning ordinances. Ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek such a declaration, a Superior Court justice granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count 1 and entered judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the hearing justice erred in finding that the plaintiffs had no standing with respect to count 1 of the second-amended complaint because the plaintiffs did indeed allege an injury in fact related to their home—allegations which referenced measurable economic injuries that they had suffered as a result of Brown University's project. The Supreme Court, therefore, vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded the matter for further proceedings.