Volume 164 — United States Reports

Held: , That this court will not go*behind the findings of fact in the trial court, to inquire whether’they are supported by the evidence; (2) , That G.’s action was commenced within the time required by the statutes existing when it was brought; (3) , That the judgment of the court below thus, establishing the respective liens of G. and of C. was correct.

<p>Letters patent No. 331,920, issued to George W. Taft, December 8, 1885, for a machine for making, repairing and cleaning roads, are void, if not for anticipation, for want of invention in the patented machine.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>• This was one of the claims originating in the depredations committed by French cruisers upon the.commerce of American citizens prior to the year 1800, commonly called French Spoliation Claims. Pursuant to the provisions of the act of January 20, 1885, c. 25, 23 Stat. 283, the claim mentioned in this proceeding (among many others of a like nature) was presented to the Court' of Claims, and that court, made an award, advising the pa}rment of the claim, which was reported to Congress, pursuant to the act above mentioned, and Congress, by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 540, § 4, 26 Stat. 862, 897, 900, appropriated money-“to pay the findings of the Court of Claims on the following claims for indemnity for spoliations by the French prior to July 31, 13.01,” (among others, on page 900,) “ on the' ship Hannah, Richard Fryer, master, namely, ... to John A.. Brimmer, administrator of John Gilliat; deceased,' $35,840.44.” By the last clause in the act (page 908) Congress added a. proviso as a condition to the payment of the awards mentioned therein, which reads as follows: “ Provided, That in all cases where the original sufferers were adjudicated bankrupts the awards shall be made on behalf of the next of kin instead of to assignees in bankruptcy, and ■ the awards in the cases of individual claimants shall not be paid until the Court of Claims shall certify to the Secretary of the Treasury that the personal representatives on whose behalf the award is made represent the next of kin, and the courts which granted the administrations, respectively, shall have certified that the legal representatives have given adequate security for the legal disbursement of the awards.”</p> <p>John A. Brimmer, the administrator to whom, by the act of 1891, the appropriation was ordered to be paid upon the condition above recited, was unable to comply with the same, and Congress by the act of August 23, 1894, c. 307, 28 Stat. 424, 487, enacted “that the sum of $35,840.44, appropriated to be paid- to John A. Brimmer, Jr., administrator of John Gilliat, deceased, in the act entitled ‘ An act making appropriations to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1891, and for prior years and for other purposes,’ be paid to the person or persons entitled to recover and receive the same, to be ascertained by the Court of Claims upon sufficient evidence and certified to "the Secretary of the Treasury.” Proceeding under the above enactment, Charles G. Gilliat, the appellee, presented his petition to the Court of Claims for the payment of one third of the • sum named, on the ground that he was a grandson of one of the three original sufferers by reason of the seizure of the ship Hannah, above mentioned, and had been duly appointed administrator de bonis non of the'estate of his grandfather by the chancery court of the city of Biclnnond and State of Virginia. The Attorney General answered the petition of the claimant, denied the allegations therein, and asked judgment that the petition be dismissed.</p> <p>Upon the hearing the Court of Claims decided that .the petitioner was the administrator of the estate of Thomas ; Gilliat, who was one of the three members of the firm of Gilliat & Taylor, the original sufferers, and that the petitioner represented the descendants and next of kin of the above-mentioned Thomas Gilliat, and the court certified to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment to such administrator to the extent of one.third of the sum of $35,840.44, appropriated by the act of M-arch 3, 1891, being the sum of $11,946.81, which was the extent of the interest of Thqmas Gilliat in the partnership of Gilliat & Taylor.. The Attorney General in his notice of appeal described the certificate of the Court of Claims, which it made to the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to the above act of March 3, 1891, as a judgment, and as such assumed to appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court of the United States. The notice of appeal was filed and allowed in open court by the Chief Justice of the Court of Claims, and the record being before this court,a motion was made to dismiss the appeal.</p>

<p>Sections 651 and 697 of tlie Revised Statutes, relating to certificates of division in opinion in criminal cases were repealed by the judiciary act of March 3,1891, 26 Stat. 826, both as to the defendants in criminal prosecutions, and as to the United States; and certificates in such cases cannot be granted upon the request either of the defendants or of the prosecution. liider v. United States, 163 U. S. 132, on this point adhered to.</p>

This was a petition by Kurtz, who was clerk and commissioner of the Circuit Court for the Eástern District of Wisconsin, for fees alleged to have been earned by him in both capacities. The case resulted in the allowance of a large number of disputed items, and a final judgment in favor of the petitioner in the sum of $165.10. The government appealed, and assigned as error the allowance of certain items specifically set forth, in the opinion.

In October, 1888, Joseph Birtwell brought an action in the. Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, against Leverett Saltonstali, collector of the customs for the revenue district of Boston, to recover excess of duties paid under protest on importations. The trial resulted in a judgment for Birtwell, which was brought on error to this court, where the same was reversed and the case was returned to the Circuit Court for a new trial. 150 U. S. 417.

<p>ERROR TO ■ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: as it is to the place where the court is held in the district of its actual location. Why these convicts were sent to a penitentiary outside the district in which they were, tried does not appear, but we are bound to presume that the action of the court in that particular was taken for a good and sufficient reason, and was dictated by what it conceived to be the best interests of the government.

On July 25, 1892, the United States issued a patent for the land in controversy to Gustav Venzke, one of the defendants in error. The other defendants in error are his mortgagees. On January 11, 1883, one Willis B. Simpkins made a preemption entry of the land, and received a receiver’s final receipt, the land at that time being public and subject to preemption entry under the laws of the United States.

Held: that, without deciding whether the claim of the department that its inspectors were entitled to free transportation was or was not well founded, the. silence of the company, and its acquiescence in the demand of the government for such free transportation operated as a waiver of any such right of action. The case is stated in. the opinion. Mr. Joseph K. McCammon and Mr. Charles II.

Held: that this was a sufficient judgment' for all purposes. Entries made by a jailor of a public jail in Alabama, in a record book kept for that purpose, of the dates of the receiving and discharging of prisoners confined therein, made by him in the discharge of his public duty as such officer, are admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution in the Federal courts, although no statute of the State requires them.

Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe, 164 U.S. 105 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the circuit court's decision was valid due to the case's diversity jurisdiction. They dismissed the case because a Supreme Court petition must invoke the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and the common law copyright claim did neither.

Held: that ,a Federal question was presented by the record, but that the proceeding was only one to secure evidence; that in the securing of such evidence no right protected by the Constitution of the United States was invaded; that the State might determine for itself in what way it would secure evidence of the regularity of the proceedings of any Of its municipal corporations; and.that unless in the course of such…

Held: interest may be levied under process of execution on judgments recovered in the courts of such State; and it shall be calculated from the date of the judgment, at such rate as allowed by law on judgments recovered in the courts of such State.” We see no reason why this section, or '§ 3621, fixing the rate of interest upon delinquent accounts of public officers at six per cent, does not apply to this case.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that an equitable claim by a surety to percentages of payment retained by the federal government has priority over the claim of an assignee-lender.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the amount involved for each subscription did not reach the amount necessary to give this court jurisdiction; that the subscriptions could not be united for that purpose ; and that even if they could, there having been a cross bill in the case, the judgment upon which must affect rights of parties not before the court, the court could not take jurisdiction. Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The rule that in all proceedings instituted to recover moneys or to set aside aticl annul deeds or contracts or other written instruments on the ground of alleged fraud practised by a defendant upon a plaintiff, the evidence tending to prove the fraud and upon which to found a verdict or decree must be clear and satisfactory extends to cases of alleged fraudulent representations, on the faith of which an officer of the government has done an official act upon which rights of the party making the representations may be founded; and in this case the evidence on the part of the plaintiff, when read in connection with that which was given on the part of the defendants, falls far short of the requirements of the rule.</p>

This was an action originally brought in the District Court for the Third Judicial District of the Territory of Utah by the Société Anonyme des Mines de Lexington, a French corporation, against the Old Jordan Mining and Milling Company, to recover one half the- expense of certain repairs made to a canal or water ditch owned by them in common.

<p>Doing that which it is necessary to do, in'order that a newly created land otiice may be in a proper and fit condition at the time appointed for opening it for public business, is a part of the official duties of thé person who is appointed its register and receiver.</p> <p>The claimant having entered on the performance of such duties at a now office in Oklahoma .on the 18th of July, 1890, and having been engaged in performing them, in the manner described by the court in its opinion, from thence to the 1st of September following, when the office was opened for the transaction of public business, is entitled to compensation as register and receiver during that period.</p>

<p>The last clause of section 4 of the act of March 2, 1891, c. 496, 26 Stat. 822, entitled “ An act to credit and pay to the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia all moneys collected under the direct tax levied by the act of Congress approved August 5, 1861,” does not refer to or cover the cases of those owners who are mentioned in the first clause of the same section.</p> <p>Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 178, affirmed to the point that it is the duty of the court, in construing a statute, to ascertain the meaning of the legislature from the words used in it, and from the subject-matter to which it relates, and to restrain its meaning within narrower limits than its words import, if satisfied that the literal meaning of its language would extend to cases which the legislature never designed to embrace in it.</p>

<p>APPEAL EJSOM THE COURT OE CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Eugene W. Coughran and Nathan H. Cottrell filed their amended complaint in the district court of the first judicial district of the Territory of Utah on December 15, 1891, against Henry C. Bigelow and H. P. Henderson, showing that on April 26, 1890, E. A. Reed and H. H. Henderson, as prin- • cipals, and the defendants as sureties, executed and delivered to the plaintiffs a bond conditioned for the performance of a contract on the part of the said principals to convey to'the…

This was an appeal taken by Horace M. Cake and the administrators of William B. Moses, surety upon a certain undertaking of his to pay Francis B. Mohun, appellee’s intestate, such sums as the court should find to be due the latter as receiver of the furniture, equipments and- other personal property of the hotel known as La Normandie, in the city of Washington.

In March, 1S93, the Citizens’ Bank of Louisiana, a banking corporation created by the legislature of Louisiana, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana, against several defendants who were sheriffs respectively of ■ a number of parishes in that district, seeking to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the payment of taxes alleged to be due from the bank on lands owned by it in the several parishes.

Held: first, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against the *327 mining claim Until the patent had been issued, following in this particular King v. Thomas, 6 Montana, 409; and, second, that the matters alleged as an estoppel having taken place before the time the plaintiffs made their application for a patent, and notice of such application having been given, that all adverse claimants were given an…

Held: in effect, that the law taxing the property of the railroad impaired the obligation of the contract contained in the charter. But his opinion was not the

<p>' APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OP THE TERRITORY OP ARIZONA.</p> <p>Emma J. Gonzales, in October, 1891, filed a bill of complaint in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the Territory of Arizona, against E. W. French, probáte judge of the county of Yavapai and Territory of Arizona, and former trustee of the inhabitants of the.town of Flagstaff, of the county of -Coconino, and J. E. Jones, probate judge of said county of Coconino, and the successor as trustee of the inhabitants of the said town of Flagstaff, and therein alleged that she was the equitable owner of a certain tract of land containing 120 acres, and forming part of section 16, T. 21N., R. 7 E. of the Gila and Salt -River meridian. The facts, as alleged by her, were substantially these: Prior to the survey of said township, Thomas F. McMillan, Frank Christie and Conrad Farriner, who were citizens of the United States, over sthe-age of. twenty-one years, and qualified preemptors, while prospecting for a home upon the public lands-of the United States subject to preemption, or that might so become when the same should be surveyed, settled on this land, intending •to claim the same as preemptors, and were on said land at the date of survey in 1878 ; that they had built dwelling houses thereon and reduced portions of it to cultivation prior to such survey ; that they continued to' improve and claim the same until in June, 1883, when the plaintiff bought from the said • occupants all their improvements and took possession thereof; that she afterwards, and while living on the land she now claims, built a dwelling bouse thereon and made other improvements, prior to April 2, 1885, of the value of $3000; that, on said date, she made formal application to the register and receiver of the United States Land Office at Prescott, Arizona, to be allowed to file a preemption declaratory statement for the land, and to enter the same, tendering to said officers the proper price therefor, said application being made before any adverse claimant was known, but her application was rejected on the" ground that the land was reserved for schools ; that on February 3, 1889, Congress passed an act for the relief of the inhabitants of Flagstaff, Arizona, the tract involved in this suit being embraced in the half section mentioned'in said act, by which it was provided that the probate judge of Yavapai County might’ enter the south half of section sixteen, township twenty-one north, range seven east, in trust for the occupants and inhabitants of Flagstaff. The bill further alleged that the tracts settled on at the date of the survey were excepted by section 2275 of the Revised Statutes of the United States from the reservation of the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections in each township for school purposes, but that, if not so excepted, the land claimed by her wyas released from any such reservation by said act of February 13, 1889, and became subject to her settlement claim; that the said French, probate judge, had been permitted, on Januarjr 17, 18S9, to make townsite declaratory statement for the benefit of the inhabitants of Flagstaff for said half section ; that she, the plaintiff, contested the right of the said French to make townsite entry, and prosecuted her protest by successive appeals to the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the Interior, but that a patent of the United States was issued to said French on said entry for said land; that at the time she purchased said improvements and settled on the land, the town of Flagstaff was unorganized and unknown, and none of the inhabitants were then settled on said land or claiming any part of it; and that on the organization of Coconino County the land in suit became a part thereof, and the defendant Jones became probate judge of the new county and the successor to French in the trust. The plaintiff asked a decree declaring that the settlement and occupancy of said land, at. the date of survey, by qualified preemptors, excluded the same from the reservation for school purposes; that, by reason of defendant’s purchase of the improvements and her own occupancy and improvements, a right of entry attached thereto in her; that the refusal of the local officers to allow her filing in 1885 was unlawful; that the act of February 13, 1889, did not take away any of her rights, but, if anything, released any claim tiie Territory of Arizona might have to the land, and that, under the town-site laws referred to in said act, her rights as a settler were and are superior to those of the inhabitants of Flagstaff, ás to the particular- part of the section covered by her claim ; and that the said patentee, as trustee for the said inhabitants, in so far as the land claimed by the plaintiff is embraced in said patent, should be decreed to' be the trustee of the plaintiff, and be required to deliver a deed for the same to the plaintiff.</p> <p>The defendant demurred to the complaint on the general ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was sustained by the District Court. The plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint, and a final decree was entered dismissing the bill. The plaintiff thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court of the Territory, where the judgment below was affirmed, from which decree an appeal was taken and allowed to this court.</p>

Held: that it shall not be for a longer period than five years. It is clear that if Congress had intended to make these provisions for . the taking and holding of real estate subject to any other conditions, its intention would have, been apparent in additional provisions of the law.

At the Marcli term, 1895, in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa, Avihgton A. Edgington was tried and found guilty of the crime of making a false deposition on April 13, 1894, in aid of a fraudulent pension claim on behalf of his mother, Jennie M. Edgington, claiming to be the widow of Francis M. Edgington.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that as they were admittedly owners, as' they themselves neither purchased nor redeemed the land, and as they are not held by any necessary intendment of law to have been represented by the actual purchaser, they are entitled to the benefit of the remedial statute of 1891.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP CLAIMS.</p> <p>On April 16, 1891, appellant, under authority of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, 26 Stat. 851, filed his' petition in the Court of Claims to recover the sum of $12,375 for certain property, to wit, two geldings, of the value of $500 each, and ninety-one head of horses, of the value of $125 each, alleged to have been taken or destroyed by the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians on November 17, 1867. A traverse having been filed the case was submitted to the court upon the evidence. Certain findings of fact were made, the second of which is as follows :</p> <p>“The depredation was committed on the 17th November, 1867, near the town of Fort Collins, in Larimer County, Colorado, by the defendant Indians. The claimant never presented this claim to the Department of the Interior nor to Congress nor to any officer or agent of the government until his petition in this case was filed in this court on the 16th April, 1891. ' It is supported only by the testimony of the claimant himself and one witness. Since the claimant testified he has filed his own ex parie affidavit, stating that the witness above referred to £ is the only person with whom I am acquainted who is familiar with the theft complained of,’ and that of thirteen persons who followed the Indians at the time they took his horses he does not know the whereabouts of any except the witness produced, and that he had used every endeavor to discover the other witnesses, but can secure no information except that they are dead. The court is not satisfied by this evidence as to the extent of the depredation or the value of the property.”</p> <p>Upon this finding judgment was entered in favor of the defendants, 29 C. Cl.. Ill, from which judgment the claimant appealed to this court.</p>

On April 23, 1892, defendant in error, as plaintiff, filed in the district court of the county of Gallatin, Montana, his complaint against the railroad company to recover a sum of money paid as the contract price of a tract of land conveyed by it to him. The contract was alleged to have been made on January 16, 1886, by the company, with Nathan Frost, who, in the same year, transferred his interest to John R. Foster, who, in 1888, in like manner conveyed to the plaintiff.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The cáse is stated in tbe opinion.</p>

Held: in one case, that a contract by the owner of a valuable estate, employing lawyers to avoid a lease thereof and to recover the property, and promising to pay them a certain sum out of- the proceeds of the land when recovered and sold, was not within the statute, because all this might have been done within a'year; and in another case, that a contract, made early in November, 1869, to furnish all the stone required to…

Held: that the appellate jurisdiction of this court did not exist, because the validity of a statute of the United States, etc., was not drawn in question; and this upon the construction of § 702 of the Revised Statutes, to which we have already referred; and the court expressly said that Utah does not fall within the clause concerning constitutional questions, because the section is in terms limited to Washington alone.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion. .</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That as the libellant was chargeable with knowledge of the provisions of the charter party no lien could be asserted under maritime law for the value of the coal so supplied; *459 (2) Without deciding whether the statute of Now York would be unconstitutional if interpreted as claimed by the libellant, it gives no lien where supplies are furnished to a foreign vessel on the order of the charterer, the furnisher…

<p>In the absence of parties interested, and without their having an opportunity to be heard, a court is without jurisdiction to make an adjudication affecting them.</p> <p>A court of equity cannot properly interfere with, or in advance restrain the discretion of a municipal body while it is in the exercise of powers that are legislative in their character.</p> <p>Legislatures may delegate to municipal assemblies the power of enacting ordinances relating to local matters, and such ordinances, when legally enacted, have the force of legislative acts.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated'in the opinion.</p>

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court case that, among other things, approved the use of a jury instruction intended to prevent a hung jury by encouraging jurors in the minority to reconsider. The Court affirmed Alexander Allen's murder conviction, having vacated his two prior convictions for the same crime. Such an instruction became known as an Allen charge and is given when, after deliberation, a jury reports that it is deadlocked and unable to decide on a verdict. Because it is used to dislodge jurors from entrenched positions, the Allen charge is sometimes referred to as the "dynamite charge" or the "hammer charge." Allen is based upon the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the federal courts. Thus, it is not binding on state courts.

Held: ~ (1) That the equitable jurisdiction of the court ought not to lie extended to enforce a covenant plainly not made for the benefit of Christmas, and in respect of which he possessed no superior equities; (2) That the changes which the lapse" of time had wrought in the value of the property and in the situation of the parties were such as to render it inequitable to decree the relief sought as against Bryan; (3)…

This was a bill brought by the United States against the Oregon Central Railroad Company and the Oregon and California Railroad Company, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon, to quiet title to about ninety thousand acres of land in the State of Oregon; and a cross bill filed by the defendants to quiet title to the same land in the Oregon and California Railroad Company.

Held: that this principle had no application in this case; that the law did not require that the accused should stand still and permit himself to be cut to pieces, under the penalty that, if he met the unlawful attack upon him, and saved his own life by taking that of his assailant, he would be guilty of manslaughter; that under the circumstances the jury might have found that the accused, although in tlie wrong when he…

Held: That the Secretary of the Interior had no authority to certify lands under the railroad act of 1856 which had been previously granted to the State by the Swamp Land act of 1850; (2) That whether the lands in controversy were swamp and overflowed ' lands within the meaning of the act of 1850 was to be determined, in the first instance, by the Secretary of the Interior; and that when he identified lands as embraced by…

Held: That the new corporations created out of the old one did not acquire the immunity and exemption granted by the act of 1834 to the original company from legislative control as to the extent of dividends it might earn; (2) That the statute of Kentucky passed February 14, 1856, reserving to the legislature the power to amend or repeal at will charters granted by it, had no application to charters granted prior to that…

Held: that this court would not disturb the judgment of the court below on such technical grounds, apparently an afterthought. For the hearing of the objections of the appellants against the assessment of the tax the court convened on the 14th of March. The notice published by the tax collector was that the sale would begin on the 20th of March.

Held: convened “ a special term of the District Court for the county of Santa Fé in and for the first judicial district in and for the Territory of New Mexico,” to be begun on March 18, 1895, “ for the term of four consecutive weeks, and for such further time as in the discretion of the judge of said court may be deemed proper and necessary for the disposition of any business now pending in said court or that may come…

Held: so many discreet persons as it may deem necessary, wrho shall be called £'commissioners of the Circuit Courts,’ and shall exercise the powers which are or may be expressly conferred by law upon commissioners of Circuit Courts.” But it is well known that the term‘££ United States Commissioner ” is generally understood to mean a commissioner acting under the authority of section 627 of the Revised Statutes, and that…

<p>The power of this court to issue a writ of mandamus to an inferior court is well settled, but, as a general rule, it only lies where there is no other adequate remedy, and cannot be availed of as a writ of error.</p> <p>The objection to the jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, presented by filing the demurrer for the special and single purpose of raising it, would not be waived by answering to the merits upon the demurrer being overruled.</p>

Held: that, under the circumstances, the company was liable to the plaintiff in an action at law for the damages found by the jury; that the conduct of the railway company in procuring, or, at least, in acquiescing in the withdrawal of the receivership and the discharge of the receiver, and the cancellation of his bond, and in accepting the restoration of its road, largely increased in value by the betterments, affords…

Held: that this charge covered the case where no threats were made; where no active resistance was overcome; where the woman was not unconscious; where there was simply non-consent on her part and no real resistance; and that such non-consent was not. enough to constitute the crime of rape. The case is stated ia the opinion. No appearance for plaintiff in error.

Held: however, that when the business of the company which is wholly within the State, is but a mere incident to its interstate business, such fact would furnish any obstacle to the valid taxation by the State of the business of the company which is entirely local.

Held: that, under those circumstances, it must be adjudged that he was a citizen by adoption, and consequently that the jurisdiction over the offence charged is, by the laws of the United States and treaties with the Cherokee Nation, vested in the courts of that Nation. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Whitmey for defendants in error. No appearance for plaintiffs in error.

Held: that those deeds were no evidence of the prior payment and discharge of such levy taxes and assessments. It is well settled that the punctuation of a statute is not decisive of its meaning.

Held: that the carrying of such books and papers from Kentucky to Ohio was not, within the meaning of the statute, a carrying of a paper, certificate or instrument purporting to be or representa ticket, chance, share or interest in or dependent upon the event of a lottery, so called gift concert, or similar enterprise, offering prizes depending upon lot or chance, as provided for in such statute; as the lottery had…

<p>error to the district court or the united states for the DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

ORIGINAL. This was a petition for an order to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, to allow an appeal to this court from a decree of that court affirming a decree of the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, dismissing the bill of Charles F. Jones against The Merchants’ National BanJc, of Boston; and also for a citation to such bank to appear and show cause why such decree should not be corrected.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>This was a writ of error to review the conviction of the plaintiff in .error for the murder of one Anna Maledon at Muskogee, in the Creek Nation of the Indian Territory. The conviction was a second one for the same offence, the first having been set aside by this court upon the ground that improper evidence had been received of an alleged dying declaration. 160 U. S. 553.</p> <p>The evidence tended to show that Carver, a man. about ■twenty-five years of age, was grossly intemperate in his habits, and upon the day the homicide took place had been drinking a mixture of hard cider and Jamaica ginger, and was so intoxicated that he could hardly walk; that deceased, who had been his mistress for several years, had agreed to meet him in the evening at a certain mill'crossing in Muskogee. .They met at about half-past eight, when he soon began to threaten her that he would, before daylight, kill her and One Walker, of •whom he appeared to have been jealous. He was armed with a revolver and his conduct indicated that he was- crazed with liquor. During his walk with the deceased, he met a man whom he drove off at the point of his pistol, and amused himself by firing it off at a lot of cattle, which were within range. Meeting one Crittenden, the deceased, believing that Carver was unfit to care for her and accompany her, asked Crittenden,' with whom she was acquainted, to take her home. Crittenden started with them, when Carver got out his pistol again, flourished' it about and fired it off twice, once in the air and once in the ground. After walking some fifty yards or more Carver again took out his pistol, flourished it around, and, either intentionally or accidentally, shot deceased in the back and mortally wounded her.</p>