Volume 174 — United States Reports

<p>This court has jurisdiction to review by writ of error, under the act of February 9, 1893, c. 74, § 8, a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, maintaining the validity of proceedings for a trial . by a jury before a justice of peace, which were sought to be set aside on the ground that the act of Congress authorizing such a trial was unconstitutional.</p> <p>The provisions of the Constitution of the United States securing the right of trial by jury, whether in civil or in criminal cases, are applicable to the District of Columbia. ■</p> <p>By the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, either party to an action at law (as distinguished from suits in equity and in admiralty) in a court of the United States, where the value in controversy exceeds . twenty dollars, has the right to a trial by jury.</p> <p>By the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, when a trial by jury has been had in an action at law, in a court either of the United States or of a State, the facts there tried and decided cannot be reexamined in any court of the United States otherwise than according to the rules of the common law of England, that is to say, upon a new trial, either granted by the court in which the first trial was had or to which the record was returnable, or ordered by an appellate court for error in law.</p> <p>“ Trial by jury,” in the primary and usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions, is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them upofi the law" and to advise them upon the facts, and (except upon acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence.</p> <p>A trial of a civil action,' before a justice of the peace of the District of Columbia, by a jury of twelve men, as permitted by the acts of Congress, without requiring him to superintend the course of the trial or to instruct the jury in matter of law, or authorizing him to arrest judg-' ment upon their verdict, or to set it aside for any cause whatever, is not a trial by jury, in the sense of the common law and of the Constitution, and does not prevent facts so tried from being tried anew by a common . law jury in an ap'pellate court.</p> <p>Congress, in the exercise of its general and exclusive power of legislation over the District of Columbia, may provide for the trial of civil causes of.moderate amount before a justice of the peace, or, in his presence, by a jury of twelve, or of any less number, allowing to either party, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, the right to appeal from the judgment "of the justice of the peace to a court of record, and to have a trial by jury in that court.</p> <p>The appeal authorized by Congress from judgments of a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia to a court of record, “ in all cases where the debt or damage doth exceed the sum of five dollars,” includes cases of judgments entered upon the verdict of a jury.</p> <p>The right of trial by jury, secured by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, is not infringed by the act of Congress of February 19,1895, c. 100, enlarging the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia to three hundred dollars, and requiring every appellant from his judgment to enter into an undertaking, with surety, to pay and satisfy the final judgment of the appellate court.</p>

Held: That that provision of the statute violates the clause of the Constitution of the United States, declaring that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him; and that the judgment must be reversed.

Held: That under the circumstances the appellant retained the right to have the offence for which he was extradited disposed of, and then to depart in peace, and that this arrest was in abuse of the high process under which he was originally brought into the United States, and cannot be sustained.

In March, 1896, the American Refrigerator Transit Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, filed, in the district court of Arapahoe County, State of Colorado, against Frank Hall, treasurer of said county, a bill of complaint seeking to restrain the defendant from enforcing payment by the said transit company of certain taxes assessed upon refrigerator cars owned by the company, and used for the transportation of perishable freight over…

Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that when someone begins printing a serial book in a magazine, they may file for copyright of the entire book even if the book does not exist as a completed whole. Failing that, the book is in the public domain, as expected. Specifically, the Court found that The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table by Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. had entered the public domain because of its publication in Atlantic Monthly without copyright notices or an attempt to register a copyright.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The case is stated ia the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.</p> <p>The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: (i) That the receiver, being an officer of the United States, the action against him was one arising under the laws of the United States, and this court had jurisdiction; *126 (2) That it was competent for the directors of the Arkansas bank to empower the president, or cashier, or both to indorse the paper of the bank, and that, under the circumstances, the New York bank was justified in assuming that the dealings…

<p>error to the circuit court of the united states for the southern district of california.</p> <p>The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>The provision of the act of 1891, c. 517, § 3, that no judge before whom “ a cause or question may have been heard or tried ” in a District or Circuit Court shall sit “ on the trial or hearing of such cause or question” in the Circuit Court of Appeals, disqualifies, a judge, who has once heard a cause upon its merits in the Circuit Court, from sitting in the Circuit Court of Appeals on the hearing and decision of any question, in the same cause, which involves in any degree matter on which he.had occasion to pass in the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SURROGATE’S COURT OE THE COUNTY OF KINGS, STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The statement of the case is in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That the contention that the stipulation operated to prevent a recovery was without support in authority or reason; and (2) That it was not a part of the public policy of the State of New York to insist upon personal liability of sureties, and forbid bail to become indemnified. Held: (1) That these conclusions involved no Federal question; (2) That under the circumstances described in the

Held: for the reasons stated, that it was sufficient in itself to constitute, under the circumstances mentioned, a color of law for the annexation, and for the application of the principles of estoppel as above mentioned. The legality of the present city organization was for those reasons sustained.

Held: That the proper entry should have been an affirmance of the decree rather than a dismissal. A receiver may defend, both in the court appointing him and by appeal, the estate in his possession against all claims which are antagonistic to the rights of both parties to the suit.

Held: That the defect complained of was merely a matter of error, which did not render the verdict a nullity. This case is before tbe court on error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.

Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196 (1899), is a 5-to-2 ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that the bed under the Potomac River between the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Virginia belonged to the United States government rather than nearby private landowners on the District of Columbia side.

Held: That the remedy of the company upon the warrants was at law, and not in equity, and that the court below should have dismissed the bill, without prejudice to the right of the company to bring an action at law.

In May, 1895, Edward Hawkins, as receiver of the Indianapolis National Bank, brought a suit, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Hampshire, against the First National Bank of Concord. At the trial a jury was waived, and the court found the following facts: “ The plaintiff is receiver of the Indianapolis National Bank of Indianapolis, which bank was duly organized and authorized to do business as a national „banking association.

This case came on appeal from the Court of Claims. The matter of dispute is disclosed by the second and fourth findings of the court, which are as follows: Second. “ On the 26th day of June, 1847, near the Arkansas River, on the route from western Missouri to Santa Fé, at a place in what is now the State of Kansas, Indians belonging to the Osage tribe took and drove away 32 head of oxen, the property of said decedent, which at the time and place of taking were reasonably…

Held: That the testimony tending to show contributory negligence on the part of Preeman was conclusive, and that nothing remained for the jury, and that the company was entitled to an instruction to return a verdict in its favor. *380 This was an action by the widow and minor children of Thomas A. Freeman, originally brought in the Circuit Court for the District of Washington against the receiver of the Northern Pacific…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>In this case the trial court at the close of the testimony, which is detailed in the opinion of this court, instructed a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals.</p>

This suit was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. It was brought by the plaintiff, as receiver of the Capital National Bank of Lincoln, Nebraska, for the purpose of recovering from the defendants, who were stockholders in the bank, the amount of certain dividends received by them before the appointment of a receiver.

Held: that by the judgments relied upon by complainant, it had been conclusively adjudicated as to those defendants that the Hewitt Act constituted an irrepealable contract, and that the provisions of the revenue act of 1892 in conflict with that act impaired the terms of such contract, and were void. *412 ( 88 Fed.

Held: at special term, that the counsel to the corporation of the city of New York had no greater powers than an ordinary attorney to bind his client. People v. Mayor &c. of New York, 11 Abb. Pr. 66 .

<p>Appeal from the .Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky.</p>

In these cases the respective trust companies who are appellants', all four being Kentucky corporations chartered subsequent to the year 1856, filed their respective bills to enjoin, the assessment and collection of certain taxes. The want of power to assess and collect the taxes complained of was in each bill made to depend upon two substantially identical grounds, which were briefly these: First.

<p>The assertion in this ease of an irrevocable contract with the State touching the taxation of the plaintiff, arising from the Hewitt Act, is disposed of by the opinion of this court in Citizens' Savings Bank of Owensboro v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636.</p> <p>The taxes which it was sought to enjoin in this suit were imposed upon the franchises and property of the bank, and not upon the shares of stock in the names of the shareholders, and were therefore illegal because in violation of the act of Congress.</p>

<p>Third National Bank of Louisville v. Stone, Auditor, ante, 432, and Louisville v. Third National Bank, ante, 435, followed.</p>

The Bank of Louisville in these two oases filed its bills to enjoin the collection of certain taxes. The matters to which the bill in the first case (No. 359) related were certain franchise taxes for the years 1893 and 1894, the assessment and certification of valuation whereof had been made prior to the filing of the bill.

By the sixteenth section of the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1893, c. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 645, the President was authorized to appoint, by and with.the advice and-consent of the Senate, three commissioners “to enter into negotiations with the Cherokee Nation, Choctaw Nation, Chickasaw Nation, the Muscogee (or Creek) Nation, the Seminole Nation, for the purpose of the extinguishment of the national or tribal title to any lands within that Territory now held by any and…

This was a bill in equity filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by the Fenton Metallic Manufacturing Company against the appellant to recover for the infringement of letters patent number 450,124, issued April 7, 1891, to Horace J. Hoffman, for improvements in storage cases for books.

Held: quoting Bassett v. El Paso, 88 Texas, 168, 175, that it was unnecessary to ascertain the rate per cent required to be levied in order to raise the proper sum and to actually levy that rate of tax at the time; that if the laws of 1881 and 1887 had never been passed, the county would have had no authority under the constitution to contract the debts represented by the bonds, nor to levy a tax for the payment of the…

Held: that the settled practice of prize courts forbids the taking of further proof under such circumstances.

<p>For the reasons stated in the opinion of the court, it is precluded from looking at the so-called statement of facts, and when they are excluded from the record there is nothing left for review, and the judgment below is affirmed.</p>

<p>The provision in the act of July 27,1866, c. 278, exempting from taxation the right of way granted to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, does not operate to exempt the right of way when acquired from private owners and not from the United States; and the judgment in this case made at this term and reported on page 186 of 172 U. S., having been made under a mistake of facts, is modified to that extent.</p> <p>The assessments on the superstructures, on so much of the right of way as was taxable, were not assessments of personal property, but were clearly assessments of real estate; and the fact that the improvements were designated by name, and some of them given a separate valuation, did not invalidate their assessment as real estate. •</p>

Held: a new board of directors was elected, and the meeting was adjourned to March 22, 1890, when it was voted by a majority of the stockholders to reject and disapprove the contract with the construction company, and the guaranty placed on the bonds of the Beattyville Company, as having been made without legal authority or the approval of the stockholders, and to empower the board of directors to take all proceedings…

This was a motion for leave to file a petition for a rehearing of a case decided at October term, 1897, and reported in volume 170 U. S. at page 681.

Held: That the statute as thus interpreted could not be held to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. The statement of the case will be found in the

Held: that a voluntary assignment, without preferences, valid under the laws of the State of New York, was void as against an assignee in bankruptcy, and this latter case was approvingly referred to in Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U. S. 513 .

In May, 1891, the Columbus Construction Company, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois an action at law against the Crane Company, a corporation of the State of Illinois. The case was put at issue, and the trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $48,000.

This was action of assumpsit begun in the district court for Bernalillo County, Territory of New Mexico, on the 17th day of July, 1894, by Charles H. Gildersleeve against the Eio Grande Irrigation Company. The declaration is in the ordinary form, containing a special count upon a promissory note for the sum of $50,760, dated June 30, 1890, bearing interest at the rate of twelve per cent, and containing also the common counts in assumpsit.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>In January, 1896, Kent K. Hayden, as the duly appointed receiver of the Capital National Bank of Lincoln, Nebraska, filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York a bill of complaint against the Chemical National Bank of New York.</p> <p>The bill alleged that the Capital National Bank, on the 21st day of January, 1893, was insolvent and stopped doing business, and that on the 22d day of January, 1893, the Comptroller of the Currency closed said bank and took possession of its assets and affairs; that for a period long prior to the 15th day of January, 1893, the said bank was insolvent, and its insolvency was known to all its officers; that ever since the 2d day of June, 1881, there had been mutual and extensive dealings between the two banks above named, in which each had acted for the other, as correspondent banks do, for the making of collections and the crediting of the proceeds thereof; that the Capital National Bank kept an active deposit account with the defendant, and that settlements on the basis of such accounts were made at periodic times during all said period, and any balance after the correction of errors, mutually agreed to be charged or credited, was at such periods credited or debited, as the fact might be, upon the books of each of said banks to a new account, and the prior accounts thereby and in that manner adjusted and settled.</p> <p>That the defendant bank had refused to pay or honor the drafts drawn upon it by the Capital National Bank presented on or since January 21, 1893; that since January 22, 1893, the defendant bank had received many and large • sums of money belonging to and for the account of the Capital National Bank, some of it being the sums of $2935.60, $815.79 and $735, from the officers of the Capital National Bank, and the rest from the third parties which remitted the same to the defendant for account of the Capital National Bank, and that, in particular, it had received on January 23, 1893, five thousand dollars from the Packers’ National Bank, and two thousand dollars from the Schuster Ilax National Bank, and divers other sums from others, on that day and since; that the defendant had refused to account for and pay over to the complainant the said collections. Wherefore it was prayed that an accounting be had, and that the defendant be ordered to pay over what might be thereby found due.</p> <p>The defendant bank answered, admitting the preliminary allegations of the bill, but denying its knowledge of the insolvency of the Capital National Bank on or prior to January 21, 1893, but averring that up to the 23d day of January, 1893, it was informed and did believe that'the said Capital National Bank was entirely solvent, and dealt with it and gave it credit as a solvent bank.</p> <p>The answer denied that on and after January 21, 1893, it had ceased to pay and refused to pay all drafts drawn upon the defendant by the Capital National Bank, but admitted that on the 23d day of January, 1893, because of information ■then for the first time received of the struggling condition of said bank, the defendant bank did refuse to pay the drafts of the Capital National Bank, which was then indebted to the defendant in the sum of at least $13,992.93 on balance of account, besides large amounts of negotiable paper, indorsed by the Capital National Bank, then held by and previously purchased or discounted by the defendant bank, and the proceeds of which had been credited to the account of the Capital National Bank— all of which transactions were averred to have been made in the usual course of business between the banks, and without any knowledge, notice or belief on the part of the defendant bank that the Capital National Bank was insolvent or in any danger of becoming so.</p> <p>The answer denied that the defendant had, since January 22, 1893, received many and large sums of money belonging to and for account of the Capital National Bank, but admitted that since January 21, 1893, it had received certain, remittances and payments in the form of cheques or drafts, for account of the Capital National Bank, all which it had placed to the credit of the Capital National Bank, which had left the Capital National Bank indebted to the defendant bank in a large sum, in the form of balance of account and negotiable paper indorsed to the defendant by the Capital National Bank; and the answer alleged, on information and belief, that said remittances and payments were made by the Capital National Bank, or by other banks and bankers, by the direction and order of said Capital National Bank, through the United States mails, and were so ordered, made and remitted before the appointment of any receiver for said Capital National Bank, and before it ceased to pay its obligations or had suspended its usual and ordinary banking business, and that said remittances by said Capital National Bank, or by other banks and bankers, by it ordered to be made to the defendant, were made in the ordinary and accustomed course of business between the defendant and the Capital National Bank, and when received by the defendant were by it placed to the credit of the Capital National Bank.</p> <p>The answer admitted that it had received the sums of $2935.60, $815.79, $735, $5000 and $2000 on the 23d day of January, 1893; that the said sums of $2935.60 and $815.79 were remitted to the defendant on or about the 19th day of January, 1893, and the said sum of $735 on or about the 20th day of January, 1893, by the said Capital National Bank, which, on said respective days, deposited and delivered the same in the United States mail, in letters addressed to the defendant, in the usual and accustomed course of business, and before said Capital National Bank had suspended payment or stopped business, and before it was taken charge of by the receiver; that the said sum of $5000 was remitted to the defendant on or about the 19th day of January, 1893, by the Packers’ National Bank, and the said sum of $2000 was remitted to this defendant by the Schuster National Bank on or about January 19, 1893, by being by said banks respectively deposited in the United States mail, in letters addressed to the defendant, in the usual course of business, and before the Capital National Bank suspended payment or stopped business, and before it was taken charge of by the receiver. And thp answer alleged, on information and belief, that said remittances to it by the' Packers’ National Bank and the Schuster National Bank respectively were made in virtue of orders and directions previously given to them by said Capital National Bank on or about January 18, 1893, in the usual course of business between them- and the Capital National Bank.</p> <p>A replication was filed and evidence put in on behalf of the respective parties. It was stipulated that the Capital National Bank continued to transact the usual and ordinary business of a national bank up to the close of banking hours on January 21, 1893; that the ordinary mail time between Lincoln, Nebraska, arid the city of New York is fifty hours; between Lincoln and South Omaha, Nebraska, where the Packers’ National Bank is situated, is two hours and forty minutes; between South Omaha and New York City, forty-eight hours and thirty-seven minutes; between Lincoln and St. Joseph, Missouri, where the Schuster Hax National Bank is located, is seven hours and twenty-eight minutes, and between St. Joseph and New York City is fifty hours and fifty-five minutes. The complainant put in evidence an account or statement, furnished by the defendant to the complainant, showing the. transactions between the Capital National Bank and the Chemical National Bank from January 3, 1893, to January 27, 1893, showing a balance on the last day of $13,317.94, against the Capital National Bank and in favor of the Chemical National Bank.</p> <p>The complainant likewise put in evidence a draft drawn on January 13, 1893, by the Capital National Bank on the Chemical National Bank for $5000, to the order of T. M. Barlow, cashier; and a protest of said draft for non-payment on January 17, 1893; also a statement of various drafts drawn by the Capital National Bank on the Chemical National Bank, at different times, in favor of third parties, and protested for non-payment on and after January 24, 1893. These protested drafts amounted to $44,264.66.</p> <p>The defendant called as a witness its cashier, "William I. Quinlan, who testified that when the draft, for $5000 to the order of T. M. Barlow, cashier, was presented and payment refused, the Capital National-Bank had no deposits or funds on deposit with the Chemical National Bank out of which such draft could be paid, and that the account of the Capital National Bank had been' overdrawn for some time. The defendant put in evidence a letter dated January 19, 1893, from the Packers’ National Bank, enclosing its draft for $5000 on the Fourth National Bank of New York, to be placed lo the credit of the Capital National-Bank, and letter, dated January 18, 1893, from the Schuster Hax National Bank, enclosing its draft for $2000 on the Chemical National. Bank, to the credit of the account of the Capital National Bank.</p> <p>Further evidence was put in by the respective parties, which it does not seem necessary to state.</p> <p>On March 16, 1897, after argument, upon the pleadings and proofs, the Circuit Court dismissed the bill of complaint with costs. An appeal was taken from this decree to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and on January 31, 1898, that court affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court. And from the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals an appeal was taken and allowed to this court.</p>

This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff in error against tbe defendant to recover possession of 160 acres of land situated not far from Tacoma in the State of Washington.

Held: that this contract was illegal, not only as tending to lessen competition, but also because the parties had committed a fraud in combining their interests and concealing the same, and in submitting the different bids as if they were bona fide, and that the court Will not lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of an illegal contract, nor will it or any court enforce any alleged rights directly…

This case originated in a petition filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Yermont, for the review of a decision of the board of general appraisers to the effect that certain imports made by the petitioner into the port of Newport, of “ sawed boards and plank, planed on one side, tongued and grooved,” and entered as “ dressed lumber,” were not entitled to.be admitted free of duty as “sawed boards, plank, deals and other lumber, rough or dressed,”…

The facts in this case are as follows : The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company, hereinafter called the New Albany Company, in 1889 and 1890 placed a guarantee upon $1,185,000 of the first mortgage bonds of a Kentucky railroad corporation.

On May 21, 1897, the United States, by their Attorney General, filed their bill of complaint in the district court of the third judicial district of New Mexico against the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company, the purpose of which was to restrain the defendant from constructing a dam across the Rio Grande Eiver in the Territory of New Mexico, and appropriating the waters of that stream for the purposes of irrigation.

Held: that the Iowa court had jurisdiction, and that the Kansas courts did not give to the proceedings in Iowa the faith and credit they had in Iowa, and were consequently entitled to in Kansas, and the judgment must be reversed. The defendant in error brought an action against the plain *711 tiff in error in a justices’ .court of Belleville, Republic County, Kansas, for the sum of $140, for wages due.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT Of APPEALS Of THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the Circuit Court clearly erred in declining the request of counsel/ in respect of the act of 1882. *729 Spurr was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee on three indictments, each containing several counts, for the violation of section 5208 of the Revised Statutes, which provides: “ It shall be unlawful for any officer, clerk or agent of any national banking…

This appeal brings up for review a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California dismissing a bill filed in that court by the San Diego Land and Town Company, a Kansas corporation, against the city of National City, a municipal corporation of California, and John G. Routsan and others, trustees of that city and citizens of California. 74 Fed. Rep. 79.

<p>certiorari to the court of appeals for the fourth circuit.</p> <p>The statement of the case is made in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: her capture was made by the Army of the United States, it cannot be doubted that the capture was at once complete upon her being taken into the possession of the national forces, and brought by them to Mound City, Illinois, in February, 1862.