Volume 175 — United States Reports

Held: in an action of ejectment, that a warranty deed made by Petchico, (a Pottawatomie chief, one of the persons named in the third article of that treaty,) in February, 1833, to citizens of Indiana, before the lands had been surveyed, or a patent granted, passed a good title as against a deed made by his heirs after the issue of the patent and his death.

<p>ERROR - TO THE SURROGATE’S COURT OF THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK, STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in .the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Under the laws of the State of New Tort, providing for the Organization of manufacturing corporations, such corporations are not authorized to purchase the stock of a rival corporation, for the purpose of suppressing competition and obtaining the management of such rival.</p> <p>Unless express permission be given to do so, it is not within the general powers of a corporation to purchase stock of other corporations for the purpose of controlling their management.</p> <p>Where an action is brought upon a contract by a corporation to purchase such stock for such purpose, it is a good defence that the corporation was prohibited by statute from entering into it; even though the corporation may be compelled, in an action on quantum meruit, to respond for the benefit actually received.</p>

This was a petition filed by Maria de la Paz Yaldez de Conway and twenty-one others in the Court of Private Land Claims for the confirmation of a tract of land known as the Cuyamungue grant, or private land claim, situated in the county of Santa Fé, Territory of New Mexico, and alleged to contain in excess of five thousand acres.

This was a petition filed by the town of Real de Dolores del Oro and Guadalupe Montoya against the United States, the New Mexico Mining Company, and a large number of other defendants, for the confirmation of a tract of land containing four square leagues, having for its centre the centre of the old Real de Dolores del Oro — being the church situated therein — with a prayer that the tract may be confirmed to the town, or to the petitioner Montoya in his own right, and in…

<p>Since the act of Congress of March 3,1891, c. 539, establishing the Court of Private Land Claims, the courts of the Territory of Arizona have jurisdiction, as between private parties, to determine whether a title under a Mexican grant, which has not been confirmed or rejected by, and is not pending before Congress, and which is asserted to have been complete and perfect by the law prevailing in New Mexico before the cession of the country to the United States, was complete and perfect before the cession.</p>

Held: that the question of the validity of the agreement was one of statutory and local law, and not of the commercial law, or of general jurisprudence ; and that the final decision of the state court thereon was rightly followed by the Circuit Court of the United States. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles A. Clark and Mr. Richard W. Barger for plaintiffs in error and petitioners.

Held: that as there were no facts averred showing that the city had violated, was violating, or intended to violate its contracts with the Bienville Company, and as there was no legislation to that end, the bill was properly dismissed in the court below; and as there was color for the motion in this court to dismiss, the motion to affirm would be sustained. Motion to dismiss or affirm. The case is stated in the opinion.

No number, original. The Embreeville Freehold, Land, Iron and Railway Company, Limited, was a corporation organized under the laws of… Held: reversing the decree of the state Supreme Court, that the fifth section of the act of 1877, in so far as it gave priority to Tennessee creditors over creditors of the same class of other States of the Union, was in violation of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, providing that “ the citizens of each State…

Held: when this case was first before this court, 167 U. S. 467 , 477, that the city Acted vol *134 untarily ; that it was not, in reference to these warrants, as it was to those in the Peake case, a compulsory trustee, but a voluntary contractor; and that it could not, when purchasing property and contracting to pay for it out of a particular fund, and issuing warrants therefor payable out of -such fund, deliberately…

Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the common law circuit court did have jurisdiction over the copyright infringement case because the statutory damages were not a penalty or forfeiture. This case is related to Webster v. Daly. They arose from the same set of copyright infringement disputes regarding Under the Gaslight by Augustin Daly. The United States abolished the circuit court system involved in Webster v. Daly in 1912. The modern analog would be the district courts.

The suit was commenced by a complaint filed October 6, 1894, in a district court of the Territory of Arizona, by a husband against his wife for a divorce from the bond of matrimony for the cause of desertion on and ever since December 18, 1893.

Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that the use of a struck jury did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

<p>Money derived from the sale of a vessel captured in 1863 as a blockade runner, which, pending proceedings in court for condemnation and forfeiture, was deposited by the marshal to await the further order of the court in a national bank which was a special or designated depositary of public moneys, and which deposit was in part lost by reason of the failure of the bank, is not public money of the United States which may be recovered from it under the act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, 24 Stat. 505, generally known as the Tucker Act.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA.</p> <p>The statement of the case is in the opinion.</p>

Held: notwithstanding this exception, to apply to vessels navigating the Great Lakes; but the cases are readily distinguishable.

Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that for a restraint of trade to be lawful, it must be ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract. A naked restraint on trade is unlawful; it is not a defense that the restraint is reasonable.

Held: claimed, used and *250 occupied, owned and grazed upon, peaceably and notoriously, the whole of said lands.

Bolles v. Outing Co., 175 U.S. 262 (1899), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held under the Revised Statutes of the United States, someone seeking damages for copyright infringement is only eligible for damages from illicit copies found in the accused's possession. Copies already distributed are out of scope.

By an act of the State of Texas approved April 3, 1889, (Laws Tex. 1889, c. 78, p. 87,) foreign corporations for pecuniary profit, with some exceptions not material here, desiring to do business in the State of Texas were required to file with the secretary of State a duly certified copy of their articles of incorporation and obtain a permit to transact business in the State, paying a fee therefor, the permit not to be issued for a period longer than ten years from the date…

Held: that the question whether the plaintiffs in error rendered themselves liable to McCormick by reason of their false assumption of corporate authority was one of general law, and not one to be solved by reference to any law, statutory or constitutional, of the United States; and that, as no Federal question was in form presented to or passed upon by the state Supreme Court, and because its judgment was based upon…

Malony v. Adsit, 175 U.S. 281 (1899), is a United States Supreme Court case involving a land lot in the city of Juneau, Alaska. In resolving the land dispute it was held that a bill of exceptions could only be considered if authenticated by the judge who sat on the trial. John F. Malony and Ohlin H. Adsit, the litigants involved, both later became mayors of the city of Juneau. The case was originally tried before Arthur K. Delaney, a United States district judge for the District of Alaska, who later became the first mayor of Juneau. The lower court sustained Adsit's claim to the property, located at the corner of Franklin and Second Streets in Juneau. Malony was the appellant in the case.

Held: that the agreement was one which it was within the power-of the Commissioners to make; and that it did not conflict with the provision in Article I of the Amendments to the Constitution that “ Congress shall make no law inspecting an establishment of religion,” *292 This was a suit in equity, brought by the appellant to enjoin the defendant from paying any moneys to the directors of Providence Hospital in the city…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This controversy is between two claimants to land, one holding a patent therefor from the United States and the other claiming it by virtue of its contiguity to other land for which a United States patent was held. A statement of facts was agreed upon by the parties, and that statement, with some slight additional testimony, formed the basis of a decree in the Circuit Court in favor of the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 54 U. S. App. 668, to review which last decision this appeal'was taken.</p> <p>The facts are these: In the years 1834 and 1835 Ambrose Rice, a deputy surveyor, surveyed and subdivided into sections and quarter sections fractional township 9 south, in range 9 east, and townships 9 and 10 south, in range 10 east, the same being situated in the northern part of Ohio and adjacent to Lake Erie. From his field notes, duly certified to the surveyor general of that land district, the latter prepared a correct plat of the townships, showing the subdivisions thereof, and marking all the actual survey lines and the corners designated by said survey. By the field notes and plat certain sections appear to be fractional, the line on the north being meandered in a general direction from the northwest to the southeast. The tract to the north of this line was described as “ flag marsh ” and “ impassable marsh and water.” Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of said agreed statement of facts are as follows:</p> <p>“ 4. Said plat showed the northerly line of the mainland portion of said survey, a line with its intersection of each township and section line, evidenced by a post placed at such intersection, as the said line was actually surveyed and marked as shown by sáid certified field notes, beginning on the west line of section 19, in town 9 south, range 9 east, and thence running in a general easterly and southerly, but meandering and tortuous course to and across the south line of section 11, in town 10 south, range 10 east.</p> <p>“ 5: The said plat showed the said line of said survey from the west line of said township to a point 2 chains easterly from its intersection of the line between sections 21 and 22 in town 9, range 9, to be the shore of Maumee Bay ; and from that point southerly and easterly the plat shows this line on the northerly and easterly sides of fractional sections 22, 27,26 and 25 in town 9, range 9, sections 30, 31 and 32 in town 9, range 10, and sections 4, 9, 10 and 11 in town 10, range 10, to be the boundary of what is called the ‘ flag marsh ’ and ‘ impassable marsh and water.’</p> <p>“ 6. As shown in and upon said original plat, somewhat east of north from the point where this line of the survey crosses the north and south quarter line through section twenty-two, town 9, range 9, and about a mile and a half from it, began an island called Cedar Island. This extended northerly for more than half a mile, and then southeasterly to a point opposite the said line along the northerly side of section 25 in said township. A short distance southeast of this another island began and extended southeasterly beyond the north line of section 5, in town 10, range 10, projected easterly. Then there was a narrow inlet. A third island began on the easterly side of this inlet, and extended southeasterly almost to what would be the east line of section 11, town 10, range 10. Between these islands and the tortuous line above described was the space designated .‘ flag marsh ’ and ‘ impassable marsh and water..’ No surveyed lines other than the township lines crossed either the intervening marsh or the islands. The northwestern island was named ‘ Cedar ’ and was the largest. The plat showed it as containing 53:83 ácres, all in town 9, range 9. The one next east of it was marked as ‘ Sandy Islánd.’ The plat showed that 7.52 acres of it were in town 9, range 9; 28.49 acres in town 9, range 10, and 1.18 acres in town 10, range 10. The southeastern island was marked as ‘Crane Island,’ containing 18.38 acres, all in town 10, range 10. From the northwest end of Cedar Island to the southeast end of Crane Island was about nine and one half miles. Norman Strait separated Cedar and Sandy islands. Lily Strait lay between Sandy and Crane, and Crane Creek entered the lake at the east end of Crane Island.</p> <p>“ The field notes on the plat showed that the circumference of each island was surveyed or meandered. The plat and marginal field notes also show that the southerly edge of the ‘ flag marsh,’ ‘ impassable marsh and water ’ was surveyed, and that the lines of the fractional sections southerly of the said marsh and water were identical with the southerly edge of the marsh. The computed areas of tire fractional sections and of their respective subdivisions, as shown upon the said plat, conformed to the area included within the said surveyed lines, and did not nor any thereof include any part of either marsh, water or islands.”</p> <p>In July, 1844, patents for several of these fractional sections facing on this marsh were issued to Margaret Bailey, under whom the appellant claims. The patents each recite the number of acres granted, and each states that the tract is a fractional section “ according to the official plat of the survey of said lands returned to the General Land Office by the surveyor general, which said tract has been purchased by the said Margaret Bailey.”</p> <p>In 1852 the State of Ohio applied under the Swamp Land Act of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519, for several thousand acres of lands within the State, among them these marsh lands. This application was, so far as these lands are concerned, rejected by the land department, the official minute on the application being “not swamp and nearly all sold.” In 1881 John B. Marston, under instruction from the General Land Office, surveyed and subdivided into sections and quarter sections the area marked upon the surveyor general’s plat, above referred to, as “ flag marsh ” and “ impassable marsh and water.” The field notes of this survey were returned to the General Land Office and approved, and a plat made, as required. Thereafter the lands thus surveyed and platted were patented by the United States, and the title so conveyed passed by subsequent deeds to the plaintiff below, appellee here. Disclosing the condition of these lands, paragraphs 16 and 17 of the statement of facts are as follows:</p> <p>“ 16. At the time of the making of the survey by Ambrose Kice the waters of Lake Erie were above their ordinary stage, and there was more than the usual volume of water standing upon the land in controversy herein and flowing to and upon the same from the large bodies of land now in Ottawa, Wood and Lucas counties, respectively, having their drainage to and through the said premises in controversy herein.</p> <p>“17. The general character, description and condition of the said land surveyed by said Marston was by him correctly set forth under the title ‘General Description’ in the field notes of the said survey so as aforesaid by him certified to the Commissioner of the General Land Offioe.</p> <p>“ That concerning the portion of said survey in town 9 south, range 9 east, reciting, to wit:</p> <p>“ ‘ The surface of that part of this fractional township, comprised in this survey, is covered with a deep marsh of grass, canes or reeds, wild rice, etc. Many parts of it, particularly in the south and west parts, are mown for a kind of coarse hay. Other parts are filled with bogs and pond holes that do not dry in summer. It receives the natural drainage from the woods on the south and west, which, without any well-defined channel, finds its way across the marsh to the lake. Again, in heavy gales of wind it is subject to inundations from the lake, which, upon the subsidence of the gale or change of direction in the wind, slowly finds its way out again into the lake. - It is bounded along the lake by a sand beach averaging 1 chain in width and 3 feet in height.’</p> <p>“ That concerning the portion of said survey. in town 9 south, range 10 east, reciting, to wit:</p> <p>“'The surface of this fractional township is covered with a deep marsh of grass, canes or reeds, wild rice, etc. Much of the south part can be mown for marsh hay, being In a measure drained by a canal that has been constructed in the township south. Other parts are filled with bogs and pond holes that do not dry in summer. It 'réceives the drainage from woods •on the south and west, which spreads over the entire surface and without any positive channel finds its way to the lake.</p> <p>“ ‘ Again the township is subject to inundations from the lake during heavy gales of wind, which, upon the termination of the gale or a change in the direction of the wind, slowly finds its way back into the lake.</p> <p>“ ‘ This fractional township is bounded on the northeast by Lake Erie; between the lake and the marsh proper is a sand beach, averaging 3 feet high and 1 chain in width, generally covered with bushes and small trees of oak, poplar, willow and cottonwood.’</p> <p>“That concerning the portion of said survey in town 10 south, range 10 east, reciting, to wit •</p> <p>“ ‘ The descriptor! for this township must necessarily be similar to that of the two preceding townships. The surface of that part of the township comprised in this survey is one large swampy marsh land, generally very wet and boggy. Its surface is covered with grass, canes, (or joint grass,) wild rice and such like marsh productions, reaching to a height of ten or more feet. Some parts, especially on sections 10 and 11, can be pastured, but the larger portion is filled with bogs and pond holes, connected by narrow and tortuous channels.</p> <p>“'It receives the drainage from the woods on the south and west and is subject to inundations from the lake. On the prevalence of strong southwest winds this water flows from the marsh into the lake, and upon the occurrence of northeast winds the lake floods the marsh. The principal outlets and inlets are Crane Creek and "Ward’s Canal. This canal is an improvement made by C. B. Ward, of Detroit, Michigan, on section 4, and running across section 5 for the purpose of getting vessels and ship timber from his shipyard on section 5. It is built without locks and is really only a great ditch. Waterway, 50 feet; depth, 7 feet. The buildings (or sheds) at the fishing stations 4 and 11 are the only other improvements.</p> <p>“'A comparison of the survey made by Ambrose Rice in 1834 and 1835 with that made by John B. Marston in 1881 indicates that Sandy and Crane Islands washed somewhat shoreward during the period intervening between the making of said respective surveys.’ ”</p>

Held: that under the act of 1890, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the State, this property in the hands of *310 the agént was subject to taxation in New Orleans, and that such taxation . did not infringe any right secured by the Federal Constitution. Conceding as matter of fact that the assessment in this case was technically in the wrong name, the error is not one that will justify equitable relief by injunction.

Held: on principles established in that and subsequent cases, that it makes no difference that the servant whose negligence causes the injury is a submanager or foreman, of higher grade or greater authority than the plaintiff; and, in discussing the cases, Chief Justice Gray cited the case of Wilson v. Merry, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 326, 332, 334, 335, 336, and some of the observations made by the justices who delivered…

This case came to this court on the following certificate of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: “ In this case, duly argued and submitted to this court, there arises a question of law concerning which this court desires the instruction of the‘Supreme Court of the United States.

Held: That the language of the proclamation was plain, and not open to interpretation; (2) That the Pedro did not come within Article 4 of the proclamation ; nor within Article 5 ; nor within the reasons usually assigned for exemption from capture ; (3) That it must be assumed that she was advised of the strained relations between the United States and Spain; (4) That being owned by a Spanish corporation, having a Spanish…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.</p> <p>The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.</p>

During the late war between the United States and Spain, and on May 21, 1898, the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida condemned the steamship Buena Yentura as lawful prize of war, on the ground “that the said steamship Buena Yentura was enemy’s property, and was upon the high seas and not in any port or place of the United States upon the outbreak of the war, and was liable to condemnation and seizure.” It was thereupon ordered that the…

of the case is as follows: *406 “ One who has been charged as the trustee of H., by. a judgment in the trustee process, and has paid to the judgment creditor, on execution, the sum with which he has been so charged, will not • be protected against H.’s assignee in insolvency, if the first publication of the warrant in insolvency against H. was before the rendition of the judgment in the trustee process, though he had no actual notice of H.’s insolvency until after payment.”…

Held: that there was color for the motion to dismiss, and therefore the motion to affirm could be considered; and as the judgment of the court below did not deprive the plaintiff of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, it should be affirmed. Motion to dismiss or affirm. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. W. H. Bogle and Mr. Charles Richardson for the motion.

This was an action of ejectment brought in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by Grace Abbie B. Eathbone as plaintiff, against Frances Eebecca Hamilton, defendant, to recover an undivided one third interest in a parcel of- land of which the defendant Hamilton was then in possession. The common source of title was one Abram Elkin, who received his deed on July 31, 1867. He was married to Lucy Y. Elkin, April 15, 1863.

La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a law is not invalid when a president signs it during a Congressional recess, so long as it is signed within 10 days.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.</p> <p>The statement of the case is in the opinion of the court.</p>

To the land involved in these cases the appellees claimed a complete and perfect title, and petitioned the Court of Private Land ■ Claims under section 8 of the act establishing the court to so adjudge and confirm it. After due hearing the court did so adjudge, and entered a decree confirming the title to petitioners, from which decree the United States prosecuted this appeal.

Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899), ("Richmond") was a class action suit decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is a landmark case, in that it sanctioned de jure segregation of races in American schools. The decision was overruled by Brown v. Board of Education (1954).

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.</p> <p>The statement of facts will be found in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS.</p> <p>The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This was an action of ejectment commenced on May 8, 1891, in tbe Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Montana by the railroad company, plaintiff in error, to recover possession of the south one half of the northwest one quarter of section 17, township 10 north, range 3 west of the principal meridian of Montana. A trial was had, which resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. 53 Fed. Rep. 48. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 15 U. S. App. 279, and the case remanded for a new trial. The new trial was had before the Circuit Court upon' an agreed statement of facts, and resulted in a judgment for the defendants, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and thereupon the plaintiff sued out this writ of error.</p> <p>The important facts are these: On February 21, 1872, the railroad company filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office its map of general route through the then Territory (now State) of Montana. On April 22, 1872, the Commissioner, by direction of the Secretary of the Interior, transmitted to the local land office in Montana a diagram showing the portion of the line of general route extending through that district, and directed the withholding from sale or location, preemption or homestead entry, the odd-numbered sections within forty miles of such general route. This diagram and order were received and filed in the local office on May 6, 1872. On May 3, 1872, three days before the order was received at the local land office, William McLean, a citizen of the United States and duly qualified to enter the land, made a homestead entry on the tract in controversy. In that fall he moved a small building onto the land and spent his nights there until the spring of 1873, when he married, removed from the premises, and never thereafter resided or made any improvements thereon. Proceedings were taken to cancel his homestead entry, and upon September 11, 1879, it was can-celled. On July 6, 1882, the railroad company filed a plat of the definite location of that portion of its line adjacent to the premises, and thereafter duly constructed its road on that line. The land is within forty miles of the line of general route, and also within twenty miles of the line of definite location and construction. McLean died in August, 1882, leaving a will by which he devised the tract to his widow. This will was duly admitted to probate.</p> <p>On April 21,1876, Congress passed an act, c. 72,19 Stat. 35, the first section of which is —</p> <p>“ Sec. 1. That all preemption and homestead entries, or entries in compliance with any law of the United States, of the public lands, made in good faith, by actual settlers, upon tracts of land of not more than one hundred and sixty acres each, within the limits of any land grant, prior to the time when notice of the withdrawal of the lands embraced in such grant was received at the local land office, of the district in which such lands are situated, or after their ■ restoration to market by order of the General Land Office, and where the preemption and homestead laws have been complied with, and proper proofs thereof have been made by the parties holding such tracts or parcels, they shall be confirmed, and patents for the same shall issue to the parties entitled thereto.”</p> <p>And on June 15, 1880, it passed another act, c. 227, 21 Stat. 237, the second section of which is —</p> <p>“ That persons who have heretofore under any of the homestead laws entered lands properly subject to such entry, or persons to whom the right of those having so entered for homesteads may have been attempted to be transferred by Iona fide instrument in writing may entitle themselves to said lands by paying the government price therefor, and in no case less than one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, and the amount heretofore paid the Government upon said lands shall be taken as part payment of said price: Provided, this shall in no wise interfere with the rights, or claims of others who may have subsequently entered such lands under the homestead laws.”</p> <p>On March 15, 1883, the widow of "William McLean, applied under this last act for the purchase of the tract. Her application was made as widow and not by virtue of any right given by the will of her husband. Her application was contested by the railroad company but sustained by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and afterwards by the Secretary of the Interior, and on his decision a patent was duly issued to her. "^hereupon this suit was brought to test the title conveyed by such patent.</p>

This was an action brought on August 27, 1897, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado, by William H. Blackburn, a citizen of the State of Colorado against the Portland Gold Mining Company, a corporation of the State of Iowa, and W. S. Stratton, a citizen of the State of Colorado.

This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Claims covering two suits in that court, Nos. 17,782 and 17,783, consolidated and heard and decided as ,one suit, in which judgment was entered for the plaintiffs. The first suit was on a contract entered into August 4, 1885, between Lieutenant Colonel W. E. Merrill, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, for and on behalf of the United States, and John K,.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The Canada Sugar Refining Company, a Canadian corporation, on November 27, 1894, filed a libel and complaint in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of -New York against the Insurance Company of North America, a Pennsylvania corporation, to recover insurance effected by the libellant with the respondent in the amount of $16,000 on profits on a cargo of sugar shipped on board the British ship John E. Sayre, at and from Iloilo to Montreal, Canada. The respondent answered, the cause came on' to be heard upon the pleadings, proceedings and proofs, and resulted, June 15, 1897, in a decree in favor of the libellant for the full amount of the insurance, with interest and costs. The case was taken on appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, where, on April 23, 1898, a final decree was entered reversing the decree of the District Court, and ordering that the libel be dismissed, with costs in both courts to the appellant.</p> <p>On the libellant’s petition, on May 10, 1898, a writ of certiorari was granted, under which the cause and the record and proceedings therein were removed into this court.</p> <p>The material facts of the case were as follows:</p> <p>On April 29, 1893, the respondent company insured for the libellant’s benefit:</p> <p>“ $15,000 on profits on cargo sugar; against total loss only; valued at sum insured; shipped on board the British ship John E. Sayre at and from Iloilo to Montreal.”</p> <p>At that time the Sayre was at sea prosecuting the voyage. The libellant had 2462 tons of sugars on board of her, amounting in value to $181,000, and had just completed insurance of the sugars to the amount of $166,145 in the Atlantic Mutual, of which insurance the respondent was informed before its insurance on profits was made. In July following the Sayre stranded on the coast of Newfoundland, and all the cargo was lost excepting about 300 tons, which was saved by the aid of salvors, of which one half went to them as their agreed compensation. The agreement was originally made by the master soon after the stranding; but a few days after-wards the agent of the Atlantic Mutual appeared, to whom the master turned over the salvage operations. He confirmed the previous agreement with the salvors; reimbursed to the master the expenses already incurred by him, and thenceforward, with the libellant’s consent and the defendant’s knowledge and acquiescence, took the complete control and disposition of the cargo. The agent eventually bought from the salvors the moieties of the sugars allotted to them under the agreement, and then shipped all the sugar saved to the order of the insurers to Montreal. The value of all the sugar that reached Montreal was about $20,000, and. the expenses and salvage charges paid by the Atlantic Mutual thereon, and the additional freight to Montreal, exceeded $11,000, so that out of the whole cargo worth $181,000 less than $9000 net was saved. The Atlantic Mutual settled with the libellant as for a total loss, under its policy of $166,145, and it turned over the sugars saved in part settlement of that sum, on about the basis of the average pro rata policy valuation. The respondent contested its liability upon the policy on profits on the ground chiefly that the receipt by the libellant of a portion of the sugars, viz., about $20,000 in value, prevents the loss from being “ total ” within the terms of its policy.</p>

<p>The boundary line between the States of Illinois and Iowa is the middle of the main navigable channel of the Mississippi River; but whether in assessing taxes in Illinois on a bridge running from one State to the other, in crossing that bridge the dividing line was improperly located, is a question of fact the finding of which by a state court is not reviewable here.</p> <p>The same may be said concerning the contention as to whether the bridge was assessed at more than its value and not at the same proportion of its value as other property was.</p> <p>The tax on the capital stock was not a tax on franchises conferred by the Federal government, but on those conferred by the State, and as such is not open to objection here.</p> <p>The tax was not a tax on interstate commerce.</p> <p>As to the objection that the entire capital stock was assessed by the state board of equalization, it is enough to say that the question that the action of that board was in violation of the Constitution of the United States, except so far as it was claimed to be an interference with interstate commerce, was not raised, and therefore cannot be considered here for the first time.</p> <p>No opinion is intimated on the contention that the judgment was erroneous because the assessment, in effect, included the entire capital stock of plaintiff in error as a consolidated corporation.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>This was an action brought in the District Court of Ramsay County, Minnesota, by John A. Smithson against the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, and H. F. Whitcomb and Howard Morris, receivers of the Wisconsin Central Company, to recover for personal injuries while he was serving the Chicago Great Western Railway Company as a locomotive fireman, in a collision between the lpcomotive on which he was at work and another locomotive operated by Whitcomb and Morris, as receivers of the Wisconsin Railway Company, appointed bjr the United States Circuit Courts for the Eastern District of Wisconsin and the District of Minnesota. The Chicago Great Western Railway Company answered the complaint, and the receivers filed a petition for the removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota setting up diverse citizenship, and that they were officers of the United States courts; that the controversy was separable, and that the railway company was fraudulently ■ made a party for the sole purpose of preventing the removal of. the cause. ■ Plaintiff answered the petition and asserted that the company was made party defendant in good faith, and not for that purpose. An order of removal was entered and the cause sent to the Circuit Court, and tHereafterwards that court, on hearing on rule to show cause, remanded it to the District Court of Ramsay County. Defendants Whitcomb and Morris being in default, it was stipulated between plaintiff and themselves that in consideration that plaintiff allowed them to answer, plaintiff should have a trial of the cause at the June term, 1896, of the court, and further “in case of a . final judgment in said action in favor of said plaintiff against said receivers, that the receivers will not oppose the allowance of the same before the master in chancery.” Whitcomb and Morris thereupon filed their answer.</p> <p>The case came on for trial on the morning of April 20, 1897, when Whitcomb and Morris asked leave to file an amended answer, setting up that the court was without jurisdiction because the cause was pending in the Circuit Court. The application was denied, and said defendants excepted. The trial proceeded, and after the testimony was closed, on April 21, counsel for the Chicago Great Western Railway Company moved that the jury be instructed to return a verdict in behalf of that defendant, which motion the court granted. Thereupon the receivers asked permission to file a petition for removal supplemental to the petition already on file, and proffer of petition and bond being treated ns made, the .court denied the application, and exception was taken. On the morning of April 22 the court instructed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, which was done, and thereupon th¿ case went to the jury, which returned a verdict on April 23 against Whit-comb and Morris as receivers, and assessed plaintiff’s damages. Motion for new trial having been made and overruled, judgment was entered on the verdict, and was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota on appeal. 71 Minnesota,. 216. The pending writ of error having been issued, motions to dismiss or affirm were submitted.</p>

Held: that as no certiorari was issued to bring it up, and no motion or order was made for leave to file it, it could not be considered here.

Held: as a matter of fact, that the carriers so conducted their business as to constitute a through line within the meaning of the Commerce Act, and were therefore amenable to its provisions. It did not, however, consider whether the rates to Summerville and Charleston were just and reasonable, because it deemed it unnecessary to do so.

The Paquete Habana; The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning the applicability and recognition of international law by the United States. The Court held that the capture of fishing vessels as prizes of war violated customary international law, which is integrated with U.S. law and binding as such. Paquete Habana influenced subsequent court decisions that incorporated international law regarding other matters. The case is also notable for citing a wide breadth of historical and international sources, including jurists from around the world and foreign state practices going back centuries.