Volume 176 — United States Reports

Held: that he and his predecessor in office refused or neglected to attend them in person or by representative, and he has continually refused to adopt the Atlanta regulations, or any of them, or any regulations similar to them, and insists, as his predecessor in office insisted, upon being a law to himself, and upon using no means of dealing with yellow fever infection in the city of New Orleans, or elsewhere in the…

Held: That nothing in the act of 1864 stood in the way of Congress subsequently granting to other railroad corporations the privilege of earning any lands that might be embraced within the general route of the Northern Pacific Railroad.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The case was submitted November 15, 1897, and was, on the 29th of the same month, postponed until The United States v. Oregon & California Railroad Co., ante, 28, should be heard.

The case is stated in the opinion. This case was submitted with Wilcox v. Eastern Oregon Land Co., ante, 51, and a like disposition was made of it.

<p>EEEOE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The case is stated iu the opinion of the court.</p>

This suit.was brought in the Circuit Court of the United-States for the District of Indiana by the Indiana Manufacturing Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Indiana, against Sterling E. Holt and others, taxing officers of Marion County, Indiana, and of a' township in said county, and some others, constituting the board of review of that county, all of whom were citizens of Indiana, to enjoin the collection of certain personal taxes…

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York dismissing, on demurrer, a bill in equity brought by Cruickshaük and others, copartners doing business in the city of New York, against George E. Bid well, collector of customs for the port of New York The bill averred that complainants were engaged in importing teas from Japan into the United States; that during the month of November, 1897, they imported into the…

Held: the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to curtail the powers of the States to so amend their laws as to make them conform to the wishes of their citizens, to *89 changed views of administration, or to the exigencies of their social life.' It may be readily supposed that the inhabitants of each State understand perfectly their own local needs and interests, and, with the facilities with which the constitutions of…

PETITION FOE LIMITED REHEARING OF THE CASE REPORTED IN 176 U. S. AT PAGE 120. This case was argued March 13, 1899, was decided November 13, 1899, and is reported in Yolume 175 U. S., beginning on page 120.

.APPEAL PROM The district court of the united states for THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was here once before on writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversing a judgment of the nisi prius court, sustaining a demurrer to. the petition of plaintiffs. . Clark v. Kansas City, 172 U. S. 334. The writ was dismissed on the ground that the judgment was not final.- On the return of the case-to the.

Held: that the state Circuit Court, having simply held plaintiffs in error to respond in lawful money, and entered its decree accordingly, and the Supreme Court having decided that plaintiffs in error could not complain of that decree, because not prejudiced thereby, this was not a decision against any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States specially set up or claimed by plaintiffs in error in…

Held: in effect, that the plaintiffs had no grant of the- usufruct of the waters of the river, but only a license to draw from their dam ; that such license was revocable and in subjection to the superior right of the State to divert the water for public improvements, either by the State directly or by a corporation created for that purpose; that the plaintiffs, being but tenants-at sufferance in the usufruct of the water…

Held: July 7, 1883, that tapioca flour was to be admitted free of duty, without regard to the use for which it was ultimately intended, and that the provision in that act for a duty upon “ other starch ” than potato or corn starch did not cover tapioca flour. Decisions, Treasury Department, No. 5802.

On February 3, 1897, the legislature of South 'Dakota passed an act relating to common carriers. Laws of. 1897, c. 110. .The act provided for the appointment of a board of railroad commissioners, and by section 20 this board was authorized to make a schedule of reasonable maximum fares and charges for the transportation of passengers, freight and cars on the railroads within the State.

Held: That, while these' proceedings were taken by connivance and consent of the parties, they were not collusive in a legal sense, as the debt was honestly due and the plaintiff entitled to.the judgment. Held, also: That while the judgment was obtained for the obvious purpose of enabling the trustees to declare the mortgage to be due, the court would- not inquire into the motives of the parties.

Held: that the plaintiff came within the restriction of § 1 of the act of March 3, 1875 : “Nor shall any Circuit or District Court have cognizance of any suit founded on contract in favor of an assignee, unless, a suit might have been prosecuted in said court to recover thereon if no assignment had been made, except in cases of promissory notes-negotiable by the law merchant, and bills of exchange,” and that the Circuit…

<p>The power of Congress to pass laws for the navigation of public rivers, and to prevent any and all obstructions therein, cannot be questioned.</p> <p>When the Attorney General acts under the authority conferred by the river and harbor act of September 19,1890, c. 907, he has the right to call upon the court, upon proper proofs being made, to enjoin the continuance of any obstruction not authorized by statute, and the court has jurisdiction, and it is its duty to decide whether the existing obstruction is or is not affirmatively authorized by law.</p> <p>In such inquiry the court is bound to decide whether the boom, as existing, is authorized by any law of the State, when such law is claimed to be a justification for its creation or continuance.</p> <p>There is no doubt that the boom in question in this case violates the statute under which it was built, because it does not allow free passage between the boom and the opposite shore for boats or vessels as provided for in tlie state law.</p>

<p>Clerks of" the Circuit Court of Appeals, having prepared the records on which causes are heard therein for the printer, indexed, and supervised the printing of the same, and distributed the printed copies thereof, and been paid therefor, may certify one of such copies for use on appli- . cations to this court for certiorari.</p> <p>The reproduction of transcripts, in manuscript or in print, under such circumstances, is not required.</p>

Held: the decision which was demanded from the Commissioner of Pensions required of him, in the performance of his regular duties as commissioner, the examination of several acts of Congress, their construction and the effect which the latter acts had upon the former, all of which required the exercise of judgment to sugh an extent as to take his decision out of the category of a mere ministerial act. Á decision upon such…

<p>Under a regulation requiring railroad tracks running through the streets of a city to be fenced, whenever the grade is “ approximately even” with the adjacent surface of 'the. streets, it is proper for the jury to say whether a track elevated two feet two inches above the surface of the street, is-within thé regulation.</p> <p>Where the declaration averred that there was “ no light” upon the engine to indicate its approach, and the proof was that an insufficient light was carried, it was held that there was no material variance.</p> <p>Where the regulation required that “ a headlight, or other equivalent reflecting lantern,” should be carried upon a train to indicate its approach, it is for the jury to say whether an ordinary hand-lantern is a substantial compliance with the regulation.</p> <p>In determining the existence' of contributory negligence, the plaintiff is not liable for faults which arise from inherent mental or-physical defects, or--want of capacity to appreciate what is and what is not negligence. He is only responsible for the exercise of such faculties and capacities as he is endowed with by nature for the avoidance of danger.</p> <p>While under the circumstances of this case the court‘might have held the plaintiff liable for contributory negligence, if-he had been a man of mature age and average intelligence, as he was a boy of twelve years of age, it was held that the question was properly submitted to the jury.</p> <p>A person crossing the track of a railroad company in the streets of a city for the more convenient performance of his duties is not ipso facto a trespasser.</p>

This suit was brought under the act of September 29, 1890, c. 1040, 26 Stat. 496, to forfeit a land grant made to the State of Alabama in aid of the construction of a railroad from the Tennessee'River at or néar Gunter’s Landing to Gadsden, on the Coosa River, conveyed by the State to the Tennessee and Coosa Railroad Company. The bill alleges that Congress by the act of June 3, 1856, c. 41, 11.

Held: That the rights of creditors whose claims had been filed were not affected by the sale of the property or'by the fact of its transfer to the purchaser; nor did the reservation in the order of sale prevent the purchaser from contesting upon their merits any claims allowed after the purchase under the decree of sale.

CIRCUIT. The Houston and Texas Central Railway Company, a cor-' poration of Texas, formerly owned and operated in that State several lines of railroad, as follows: From Houston to Denison) a distance of .345 miles, known as the main line; from Hempstead, on the main line, to Austin, a distance of 118f miles, known as the Western Division; and.from Bremond, on the main line, to Ross, a distance of 58 miles, known as» the Waco and Northwestern Division; It also owned lands…

On August 21, 1897, the United States filed their bill in the Circuit Court of the United States- for the District of Kansas seeking an injunction restraining defendants from enforcing in the courts of the State of Kansas certain claims against Eli G. Nadeau and John Nadeau, members of the Prairie band of Pottawatomie Indians, and residing on a reserve within the limits of that State.

Held: through Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after reviewing the cases, that the voluntary joinder of the parties had the same effect for purposes of jurisdiction as if they had been com,pelled-to unite; that as no application was made to discontinue as to the three plaintiffs who were citizens of the District of Columbia, and to amend the complaint and, proceed with the cause in favor of that one of the plaintiffs alleged to…

This was a writ of error to a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York affirming a final judgment of the Supreme Court of New York perpetually enjoining the Adirondack Railway Company from taking certain lands by condemnation proceedings. The People of the State of New York brought the action and obtained judgment at a ■special term of the Supreme Court, which was reversed by the Appellate Division, 39 App.

Held: on principle or authority, to foreclose inquiry as to the domicil of the deceased in the courts of •. another State. The general rule is that administration may be granted in any State or Territory where unadminist.ered personal property of a deceased person is found, or real property subject to the claim of any creditor of the deceased.

Held: under the provisions of that act and the Bevised Statutes, to wit, sections 613 and 658 of the Bevised Statutes, the six terms of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, referred *358 to in said statutes, in every year, and has received for holding each of said terms the sum of $300; the same being paid to him by the United States marshal for the Southern District of New York,…

Held: that although the American troops occupied the mouth of the bay, the blockade was still operative as to vfessels bound to the city of Guantanamo. The legal effect of a lawful and sufficient blockade is a closing of the port, and an interdiction of the entrance of all vessels of whatever nationality or business.

This was an action instituted July 14, 1894, by the plaintiff Roller in the District Court of Limestone County, Texas, to recovera judgment against Stephen Holly and William Holly upon five promissory notes for $228 each, dated January 1, 1890, payable to plaintiff, for the purchase price of a tract of one hundred and fourteen acres of land in that county, sold by him to them, and also to foreclose a vendor’s lien upon, the land to the amount of such notes.

Held: that the decision of the Secretary was correct. On March 17, 1897, a patent was issued to the appellee, defendant below, for the southeast one quarter of section 22, in township 65 north, of range 4 west of the fourth principal meridian, in the State of Minnesota.

Held: that witnesses who in the course of administration of the duties of an official position had acquired a familiarity with a certain sig-. nature, although they , had never seen the party write and had never corresponded with him, were competent to express an opinion on the subject of the genuineness of a signature purporting to have been made by that person.

<p>The power to review and set aside the action of local land officers exists in the general land department.</p> <p>When an entry is cancelled, after due notice to the entryman, and after a hearing in the case, it is conclusive against him everywhere, upon all questions of fact; and it cannot be regarded as a mere nullity, when set up against his mortgagee, even though such mortgagee had no notice of the proceeding to cancel the certificate.</p> <p>Such an entry does not transfer the title to the land, but simply furnishes prima facie evidence of an equitable claim for a patent, and the use of the certificate for that purpose is subject to be destroyed by its official cancellation.</p>

Distinct appeals were taken direct to this court from the judgment of the District Court of the United States for the District of Washington, Northern Division, in the case of the above defendant in error, Mrs. Gue Lim, and from the judgment of the Western Division of that court in' the cases of Ah Tong, Yee Yuen and Ah Quong, under the fifth clause of the fifth section of the act of March 3,1891, c. 511, creating the Circuit Court of Appeals, 26 Stat. 826, 828, because the…

Held: that there was reason to claim that the act of 1894 impaired the obligation of the previous contract between the State and the Federal Government, and that a Federal question was thereby raised.

This was also a petition in the same court to enjoin the railroad company from entering upon or taking possession of the canal property and constructing a railroad thereon, but in certain particulars differs from the case already considered.

This case involves the title to a lot, of land in the city of Tacoma, in the State of Washington. The pertinent facts presenting the controversy are as follows: Prior to 1877, Eli G. Bacon and Sophia D. Bacon were husband and wife and citizens and residents of the then Territory of Washington.

Held: that such transportation was not a transaction with a common carrier as such; that the contract was valid, and that the railway company was riot liable for injury due to negligence.

Held: in Grew v. Breed, 10 Met. *527 569 , that administrators of deceased stockholders were chargeable in equity, as for other debts of their intestate, in their representative capacity.” And a similar determination as to the nature of a responsibility like the one in question has been arrived at by the state courts in decisions on kindred statutes, and, indeed, its correctness is not controverted by any authority to…

<p>On motion of the plaintiff made after commencement of the trial of this ' case, a juror was withdrawn, the remaining jurors were dismissed, and leave was given to the plaintiff to amend his declaration within a time named, and the case was continued for the term. Subsequently, on motion of the defendants’ attorney, made after notice to plaintiff, the time within which the amendment could be filed was enlarged, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of the term in which the juror was withdrawn. The plaintiff declined to pay those costs and the court dismissed the case. Held that the trial court erred in so doing, as whatever conditions or rights the defendants were entitled to in consequence of the plaintiff’s motion should have been asserted and adjudged when that motion was made.</p>

Held: that she was not exempt from capture as prize of war by the fourth clause of the President’s proclamation of April 26, 1898. The statement of the case will be found in the

This writ of error brings up for review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirming the judgment of the district court of Itasca County, assessing certain taxes for the years 1888 to 1893, inclusive, on the lands of the plaintiff in error.

This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by the National Bapk of Oxford, a national banking association, incorporated and established under the laws of the United States, and doing business at Oxford in the State of Pennsylvania, against George L. Whitman, a citizen of the State of New York, asserting his liability, under the provisions of the constitution and laws of the State of Kansas, for a debt of more…

' APPEAL PEOM THE DISTRICT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES EOE THE SOUTHERN DISTETOT OE ELOEIDA. The Benito Estenger was captured by the U. S. S. Hornet on June 27,1898, off Cape Cruz on the south side of the island of Cuba, and was brought into the port of Key West and duly libelled on July 2.

Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), is a United States Supreme Court decision which addressed two questions relating to the Due Process Clause: first, whether Utah's practice of allowing prosecutors to directly file criminal charges without a grand jury (this practice goes by the confusing name of information) was consistent with due process, and second, whether Utah's use of eight jurors instead of twelve in "courts of general jurisdiction" was constitutional.

Held: that by so using the money obtained from the New York bank by H. in his capacity of vice president, the Cincinnati bank became bound to account for the same as for money had and received, and could not escape liability to the New York bank upon the mere ground, supposing it to be true, that it was not permitted by its charter to borrow money.

The facts of this case are these: The plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, a creditor of the Commonwealth Loan & Trust Company, a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Kansas, recovered a judgment on December 8, 1893, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas against the corporation for the sum of $16,136.76, debt, and $28.45 costs of suit.

Held: that a Federal question was presented whether this ordinance impaired or interfered with the charter of the railroad company. Held further, that, under its charter, the railroad company had no right to take possession of lands submerged beneath the waters "of Lake Michigan.

<p>In order to maintain a direct appeal to this court from the Circuit Court of the United States under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, as to the jurisdiction of the court below, the record must distinctly and unequivocally show that that court sends up for consideration a single and definite question of its jurisdiction; but this may appear either by the terms of the decree appealed from and of the order allowing the appeal, or by a separate certificate of that court.</p> <p>A certificate of a question of jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States, under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, may be made by the District Judge, even if the decree was rendered by the Circuit Judge.</p> <p>The question whether proceedings concerning the legal or equitable title to land, begun and concluded in the courts of a State, before the commencement of a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States to charge the land with a trust, afford a defence to this suit, is not a question affecting the jurisdiction of that court, but a question affecting the merits of the cause, and as such to be tried and determined by that court in the exercise of its jurisdiction; and if that court, of its own motion, and without hearing the parties on the question of its jurisdiction, enters a final decree dismissing the suit under the- act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 5, upon the ground that by reason of the proceedings in the courts of the ■ State the suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within its jurisdiction, and an appeal is taken to this court upon the question of jurisdiction only, under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 617, § 5, the decree must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings</p>