Volume 177 — United States Reports

Held: That the defendants, citizens of Massachusetts, were necessary parties to the suit. 2.

transferred from the circuit court of appeals for the ninth CIRCUIT. The statement of the case will be found in the opinion of the court.

Quackenbush v. United States, 177 U.S. 20 (1900), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the court held that The appointment of an officer of the United States and the issuance of his commission are distinct acts. Appointments must be made as required by law and the commission cannot alter these requirements.

The 'Waters-Pierce Oil Company is a private corporation incorporated under the laws of Missouri, and its principal offices are situated in St. Louis. It was incorporated to deal in naval stores, and to deal in and compound petroleum and other oils and their products, and to buy and sell the same in Missouri and other States. Its capital stock was originally one hundred thousand dollars, but was subsequently increased to four hundred thousand dollars.

<p>If the Circuit Court of the United States, after sufficient service on a defendant, . erroneously declines to take jurisdiction of the case or to enter judgment therein, a writ of mandamus lies to compel, it to proceed to a determination of the case, except where the authority to issue .a writ .of mandamus has been taken away by statute.</p> <p>Under articles 1223 and 1224 of the Revised. Statutes of Texas of 1895, an action cannot be maintained against a partnership, consisting of citizens of other States, by service upon an agent within the State.</p>

The Lake Street Elevated Railroad Company was incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois in the month of August, 1892, with a capital stock of five million dollars, which was increased in the month of April, 1893, to ten millions of dollars, consisting of one hundred thousand shares of the par value of .one hundred dollars each.

<p>error to and appeal from the supreme court of the territory OF NEW MEXICO.</p> <p>The statement of the case is in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: in our opinion, that the receipt of such Avarrants pursuant to legislative authority and in payment of an indebtedness due the State from the individual paying them is an illegal transaction and amounts in law to no payment Avhatever. .

Held: that in order to vest an *119 applicant under the regulations of 1828, with title in fee, either absolute and perfect, or conditional and imperfect, to public land, substantial compliance with the preliminary requisites to a grant was essential, it was necessary that a grant should be evidenced by an act of the governor, clearly and unequivocally conveying the land intended to be granted, and a public record, in…

This suit was brought by plaintiff in error to have itself adjudged the owner of a right of way over the northwest quarter of section eight, in township one hundred and forty-one, of range 64, in the county of Stutsman, State of North Dakota.

Held: the institution of an action against the land for the recovery of the tax appearing against it in the list; and, inasmuch as the nature of the right sought to be enforced, and not the mode of procedure, is the test,— we are unable to see why it should make any difference whether the action is in rem or vri personam, — against the property instead of against its owner.

The Union Refrigerator Transit Company filed its bill in the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against Stephen H. Lynch, treasurer of Salt Lake County and collector of taxes therein, alleging: “ That it is and was during all the times hereinafter mentioned a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Kentucky ; that its principal office and place of business is in the city of Louisville, in said State, and…

Plaintiff in error, a citizen of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and of the United.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPBEME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Dismissed on the authorities cited.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE OHIO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This case came here upon a certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, under the act of March 3,1891, c. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826. The action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey by the plaintiff against the railway company to recover damages for an alleged injury to his person caused by the neglect of the defendant while the plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant’s cars.

<p>A representation as to a fact, made knowingly, falsely and fraudulently, for the purpose of obtaining money from another, and by means of which such money is obtained, creates a debt by means of a fraud involving moral turpitude and intentional wrong, and such debt is not discharged by a discharge in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: without, to an extent, diminishing the source of' supply as to which all other'owners of the surface must exercise their rights. The waste by one owner, caused by a reckless enjoyment of his fight of striking the reservoir, at once, therefore, operates upon the other surface owners. Besides, whilst oil and gas are different in character, they are yet one, because they are unitedly held in the place of deposit.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.</p> <p>This case was argued with No. 84, ante, 190, and by the same counsel.</p>

<p>The judgment below in this case is affirmed for the reasons given in Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana, No. 1, ante, page 190.</p>

The proceedings under review originated in the.Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, by the filing in that court, on January 23, 1896, of a petition on behalf of Mrs. Gordon, the appellee herein.

The three corporations directly or indirectly involved in this controversy are the Northern Division of the Cumberland and Ohio Railroad Company, the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railway Company and the Louisville and Nashvilie Railroad Company. In order to abbreviate we shall refer to them respectively as the Cumberland' and Ohio, the Cincinnati and Lexington and the Louisville and Nashville.

Held: That she was in fault for so doing, and that this was the primary cause for the collision which followed.

Held: using the language of the court in the Whited case, that the latter clause “ swallowed down ” the former, and that there was no warranty binding upon the plaintiff. In Patridge v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 17 Hun, 95 , it was said of the agency clause; “ This is a provision which deserves *270 the condemnation of courts, whenever it is relied upon to work out a fraud, as it is in this case.

Held: that no sale of the farm property was intended; that the title to the same remained in the father, and that the property was not subject to. execution by creditors of the son. This was an intervening petition by the defendant in error, *277 Lewis Hatch, filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in the case of Joseph G. Heim, Receiver, v. Frank.

Held: that there was on the part of the entryman a distinct violation of section 2262 of the Revised Statutes, with regard to contracts by which the tract for which he applies is not to inure to another’s benefit, and the adverse judgment of the court below is sustained.

<p>Keim was honorably discharged from the military service by reason of disability resulting from injuries received in it. He passed the civil service examination, and, after service in the Post Office Department, was transferred to the Department of the Interior at his own request. Soon after he was discharged because his rating was inefficient. No other charge was made against him. Held that the courts of the United States could not supervise the action of the head of the Department of the Interior in discharging him.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>This case comes on appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona, 53 Pac. Rep. 575, affirming a decree of the District Court of Maricopa County in favor of the defendant in a suit brought by the appellant to restrain the defendant from maintaining in its canal a dam in such a way as to impede the flow of water in appellant’s canal, or to destroy a certain water power claimed by appellant.</p> <p>The facts as shown by the findings and statement prepared by the Supreme Court are as follows: The appellee was the owner of' the Mesa Canal. On January 10, 1891, it made a contract with A. J. Chandler, who subsequently transferred his rights thereunder to the appellant. The material portions of the contract are as follows:</p> <p>“ This article of agreement, made and entered into this 10th day of January, A. D: 1891, by and between the Mesa Canal Company, a corporation duly organized and legally existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Territory of Arizona, having its principal office and place of business at Mesa city in the county of Maricopa and Territory of Arizona, party of the first part, and A. J. Chandler of the city of Phoenix, in the county and Territory aforesaid, party of the second part, witnesseth:</p> <p>“ That, whereas, the said party of the first part is an irrigating corporation, and as such is now the owner operating the Mesa Canal in said county and Territory.</p> <p>“ And, whereas, said party of the second part desires to increase the size and capacity of said canal between the point in Salt River where the water is now taken out, or by consent of the directors of the Mesa Canal Company may hereafter be taken out, and a'point in said Mesa Canal known as ‘Ayers’ head gate,’ so as to increase the flow of water through said portions of said canal as aforesaid, and for the purpose of the party of the second part, his associates and assigns, obtaining water thereby through said canal, and in order to have the said canal increased in size, dimensions and capacity without cost or expense to said party of the first part, and without in any way interfering with the rights, titles, interests nor privileges of said party of the first part in and to said canal and the water flowing through said .canal, except as hereinafter provided.</p> <p>‡‡,‡‡‡‡‡‡</p> <p>“ Now, therefore, the Mesa Canal Company, party of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar to it in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and for the further consideration and purposes herein contained and expressed, does for itself and for its successors or assigns hereby grant unto the said A. J. Chandler, his associates, heirs or assigns, forever, the following rights and privileges upon the terms and conditions herein expressed, viz.:</p> <p>“ That the said A. J. Chandler, his associates, heirs or assigns, shall have the right and privilege of entering upon any and all of the following portions of said Mesa Canal at any time prior to the first day of March, A. D. 1891, for the purpose of widening and enlarging and increasing the size and capacity of said Mesa Canal between the point in Salt River where the water is now or may hereafter be taken out for said canal, and a point on said canal known as ‘ Ayers’ head gate,’ and enlarge and increase the size and dimensions of the main-dam and head gates at the point of commencement of said canal in Salt River, and enlarge and increase the size and capacity of. said Mesa Canal so that the same when so enlarged and increased in size shall have a carrying capacity in addition to its present carrying capacity not exceeding forty thousand inches of water miners’ measurement, nor less than ten thousand inches of water miners’ measurement, and said enlargement shall be fully made and completed by the thirtieth day of December, A. D. 1891. The present carrying capacity of said Mesa Canal for the purpose of this agreement shall be seven thousand inches miners’ measurement.</p> <p>“ All the cost and expense of enlarging and increasing the size of said dam, head gate and canal as aforesaid shall be borne and paid by the party of the second part, his associates, heirs or assigns, forever. And said enlargement shall be made without in any way interfering with any of the rights, titles, interests or privileges of said party of the first part in and to the said canal and the water flowing through said canal, except as hereinafter provided.</p> <p>“ The party of the first part hereby reserves the right to further enlarge said portion of the Mesa Canal whenever they deem it necessary to do so, provided such enlargement shall not interfere with or lessen the rights or privileges herein granted to the party of the second part', his associates or assigns.</p> <p>“ Said party of th¿ second part, his associates or assigns, shall in enlarging said main dam, head gates.and canal as aforesaid, in all respects enlarge said dam, head gates and canal in a good, substantial and workmanshiplike manner, according to the most approved methods of constructing and building irrigating canals.</p> <p>“All suits, liabilities, costs, expenses or judgments, and all damages or loss incurred or sustained by the party of the first part caused by said enlargement, shall be borne by the party of the second part, his associates or assigns forever, and all suits or proceedings against the party of the first part by reason of said enlargement to be defended at the expense of the party of the second part.</p> <p>“ It is expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto, their successors or assigns, that at all times when there is an abundance of water in Salt River liable to appropriation and flowage through said canal when so enlarged, then and at all such times the said party of the first part shall have the right to use from said canal in addition to the amount hereinbefore specified as the capacity of said canal two thousand inches of water, miners’ measurement.</p> <p>“ The management and control of the canal between the point known as ‘Ayers’ head gate’ to and including the dam in Salt River when so enlarged as aforesaid shall be in the party of the second part, his heirs, associates or assigns. Provided, that the party of the second part, his heirs, associates or assigns, shall before he or they are entitled to receive or use any water through said canal, first deliver to the party of the first part, their heirs or assigns, at the.point in said Mesa Canal known as ‘Ayers’ head gate,’ and shall continue to deliver, the seven thousand inches of water miners’ measurement above expressed as the carrying capacity of said Mesa Canal, or such portion thereof as may be apportioned to said Mesa Canal by decree of ány court. Provided, the stockholders who are now using or may hereafter use water above the ‘Ayers’ head gate’ shall have their water delivered to them as at present above the ‘ Ayers’ head gate’ aforesaid, or said stockholders shall have their water delivered to them at the ‘ Ayers’ head gate ’ with the other stockholders, as they may demand. Provided, further, that the water shall be delivered to the party of the first part after the completion of said cañabas aforesaid for a period of five years without cost to the party of the first part, their successors or assigns, and thereafter for a sum not exceeding three dollars per share per year forever, to be paid for in the same manner as they now pay for the same.</p> <p>“ Provided, further, that if the said party of the second part, his associates, heirs or assigns, shall neglect to deliver water as agreed herein, or shall fail to carry out any of the terms of this agreement, and shall be notified by the directors .of the Mesa Canal Company of such failure or neglect to carry out the terms of this agreement, and shall still neglect to carry out the terms of this agreement for a period of ten days thereafter, or in such case as a break in the canal, head gates and dam whereby the water is turned out for a period of five days, then and at all such times it is hereby agreed by the party of the second part, his heirs, associates or assigns, that the directors of the Mesa Canal Company shall have the right and power to take full charge and control of said enlarged portion of said Mesa Canal without process of law, and the same shall become the property of the Mesa Canal Company and shall so remain until the party of the' second part, his associates, heirs or assigns, shall fully comply with the term and requirements of this agreement, and then shall revert back to the party of the second part, his associates, heirs or assigns, and shall be and remain in the party of the second part, his associates, heirs or assigns, so long as the terms of this agreement shall be by them complied with.</p> <p>“ This agreement shall not give or convey to the party of the second part, his associates, heirs or assigns, any title or ownership in or to the capital stock of said Mesa Canal Company, but shall only convey such privileges and rights as are herein mentioned.” •</p> <p>The appellant, as the transferee from Chandler, enlarged and reconstructed the Mesa Canal down to a place called the “ Division Gates,” which point had by mutual' consent been substituted for Ayers’ head gate as the point of division of the waters, and delivery by the appellant to the appellee of the water to which the latter was entitled. In thus énlarging and reconstructing the canal the appellant raised the grade thereof for the purpose of carrying the water at a higher elevation, thereby enabling the canal to cover more and other lands, and at the point where the division gates were located the elevation was about five feet above the grade of the canal before reconstruct tion, and by the construction of those gates at that point the appellant delivering the water to the appellee secured a fall of five feet in the water thus delivered.</p> <p>Other findings were as follows:</p> <p>“After appellant had delivered the water in the manner aforesaid for some years, the appellee built a dam in its canal a short distance below the division gates that raised the water and caused it to flow through a lateral ditch, which enabled the appellee to irrigate some lands on which it had not been able to place water through its canal from its former elevation. The effect of this raise in the water was to reduce the fall at the division gates.</p> <p>“ After appellee had built its dam and backed up the water, as aforesaid; appellant had constructed a water wheel and a mill for grinding grain to be driven thereby, and had erected them at. the division gates, so that the wheel was turned by the water as it fell from the division gate into the Mesa Canal, a distance of about five feet. Afterwards appellant increased the height of the dam that it had formerly built to such an extent that it raised the surface of the water and backed the same up against ' the division gate in such manner as to destroy three and one half feet of the five feet fall and totally destroyed the water power.</p> <p>“ The water raised by the dam and the water affording the water power thus destroyed is the 7000 inches of water which appellant is obligated by the terms of the agreement aforementioned to first deliver to the appellee before said appellant is entitled to receive or use any water through said canal.</p> <p>“ A further result of the erection of the water in appellee’s canal below the division gates was to very slightly, if at all, impede the flow of water in appellant’s canal above the division gates and thereby detract very slightly from the carrying capacity of appellant’s canal.</p> <p>“ The cost of the reconstruction of the canal from Ayers’ head gate to the division gates exceeded ten thousand dollars, and the water power created at the fall was equal to about forty horse power.”</p>

This was a suit brought in November, 1895, in the District. Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, by the United States against Joseph S. Harris, Edward M. Paxson and John Lowber Welsh, receivers of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, to recover a penalty in the sum of five hundred dollars for an alleged violation of sections '4386, 4387, 4388 and 4389 bf the Revised Statutes of the United States.

On October 9,1893, Oliver Ames, 2d, and Samuel Carr, executors of Frederick L. Ames, deceased, and Peter B. Wyckoff and Edwin F. Atkins filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eighth Circuit a bill of complaint against the Union Pacific Railway Company and a number of other companies in which the Union Pacific Railway Company had interests, praying for the appointment of receivers, the enforcement of certain alleged liens, and the administration of the…

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>This is an action of ejectment brought to recover a tract of 7500 acres of forest land, known as the northwest quarter of township 24, Great Tract One, Macomb’s Purchase, situated in Franklin County, in the Northern District of the State of New York.</p> <p>The plaintiff deráigned title by various mesne conveyances from one Daniel McCormick, who became the grantee of the State of New York in 1798. The defendant claims through deeds executed to the State of New York in pursuance of sales for taxes.</p> <p>The defendant also set up as a defence a six months’ statute of limitations contained in chapter 448 of a law enacted in’ 1885 —certain statutes against champerty — the illegal organization of the plaintiff in error, and a former adjudication made on an application to cancel one of the tax sales under which the State claimed title.</p> <p>The first sale upon which the title of the State is based was made in 1877 for unpaid taxes of 1866 to 1877, inclusive. A certificate was issued dated October 18, 1877, showing a sale to the State of the whole of the northwest quarter for the sum of $2756.40, and subsequently a deed in the usual form, and dated June 9, 1881, which was recorded in Franklin County clerk’s office June 8, 1882.</p> <p>The subsequent sales were made respectively in 1881 for the unpaid taxes of 1871 to 1876; in 1885 for those of 1877 to 1879; in 1890 for those of 1881 to 1885. At all of the sales except the first one the property was treated as already state property, and struck off to the State without giving opportunity for bids. Certificates and deeds were duly issued to the State in pursuance of the sale of 1881 and 1885 in due form, and duly recorded in the clerk’s office of the proper county. A certificate alone was issued in pursuance of the sale of 1890.</p> <p>The taxes for the years 1866- and 1867 were assessed against the whole quarter as one parcel. In the years 1868, 1869 and 1870 the whole quarter was not assessed, and so much of it as was assessed was placed upon the rolls in two parcels, and described as follows:</p> <p>“ Township 24, Great Tract One, Macomb’s Purchase; NAY. excepting 1000 acres, lying in N.'W". corner; also 1215 acres which is water, leaving 5285 acres.</p> <p>“ Macomb’s Purchase, Great Tract One, township 24, 1000 acres, lying in the northwest corner of northwest quarter.”</p> <p>There was evidence tending to show that on the tract in con- • troversy there were bodies of water, but no part of them was within the parcel of 1000 acres laid out in a square form in the northwest corner.</p> <p>In December, 1894, the defendant caused a notice to be published once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper published in Franklin County, of which the following is a copy:</p> <p>“ To whom it may concern :</p> <p>“ Notice is hereby given that the following is the list of wild, vacant forest lands located in the county of Franklin to which the State holds title, and that from and after three weeks from the 22d day of December, 1894, possession thereof will be deemed to be in the comptroller of this State, pursuant to the provisions of section 13 of chapter 711, Laws of 1893.</p> <p>“ William J. Morgan,</p> <p>“ Deputy Comptroller.”</p> <p>The list attached to this notiee contained the land in question.</p> <p>When the testimony in the case was closed the counsel for each of the respective parties, with the approval of the court, admitted that there was no question of fact in the case to be submitted to the jury ; that the issues depended upon the construction that the court should give to the law; and thereupon the jury was discharged, and a written stipulation waiving a jury trial was signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk.</p> <p>The plaintiff requested the court to rule on certain propositions of law which were based on the assumption of the sale of the tract in one parcel for the aggregate unpaid taxes for several years, and claiming the following as jurisdictional defects in the sale and not cured or validated by chapter 448 of the Laws of 1885, or chapter 711 of the Laws of 1893 : The sale of the whole tract for taxes which were assessed against separate and distinct parcels of it; such sale when during one or more of the years a part of the tract was not assessed; such sale when some of the taxes were assessed against the whole tract and others against a part only ; insufficiency of the description to identify and distinguish the parcel sold ; that at the sale of 1881 the comptroller treated the propertjr as that of the State, and struck it off to the State without giving opportunity for other bids; and that chapter 448 of the Laws of 1885 was unconstitutional and void, and repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>These propositions of law the court refused to affirm, and the court’s action is assigned as error.</p> <p>It is also urged that it was error to admit in evidence over the objection of the plaintiff the deed from the State made on the sale of 1881 conveying to the State two parcels of land in the northwest quarter of township 24 by the following description :</p> <p>“ Macomb’s Purchase, Great Tract One, township 24, northwest quarter, 5285 acres, more or less, being all that.remains of the said northwest quarter after excepting therefrom 1000 acres in the northwest corner thereof, and 1215 acres covered by water; 1000 acres in the northwest corner of the northwest quarter.”</p> <p>Also in receiving in evidence the certificate of salé as sued on the sale of 1890, because it was not in evidence of a legal title.</p> <p>The assignments of error may, as is said in the brief of plaintiff in error, be reduced in a general way to two —</p> <p>“First. Is chapter 448 of the Laws of New York of 1885 a valid and constitutional law when set up by the State in its own favor?</p> <p>“ Second. Were the defects shown to exist in the tax sales or either of them of such nature as to be beyond the reach of that ' law if valid, accepting the construction which has been put upon ' it by the New York court?”</p> <p>The act referred to is inserted in the margin.1 The Circuit Court found in favor of the State, basing its decision upon the constitutionality of chapter 448, following Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90, and holding also the law to be curative of the defects urged against the validity of the tax sales. 83 Fed. Rep. 436. The complaint was filed January 25, 1895. The plaintiff sued out this writ of .error.</p>

Held: and erred in holding, the constitutional provision imposing liability on stockholders valid against plaintiffs in error, and not to be in violation of the. contract created by the act of 1853, the benefits of which act were vested, continued and perpetuated in the plaintiffs in error by the act of 1881, and not to be in violation of that provision of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits any State…

Held: that as there was nothing to show that the plaintiff in error and appellant -was interested in the increase to the extent of five thousand dollars, therefore, under the statute of March 3, 1885, c. 355, 23 Stat. 443 , this court had no jurisdiction. The case stated in the opinion. Mr. John S. Flannery and Mr. James R. Keaton for plaintiff in error and appellant. Mr. Francis J. Kearful was on their brief. Mr..

prepared by the court) that “ where adverse claimants are residing upon a tract of land and each claiming the same as a homestead by virtue of priority of settlement, and the Land Department makes a final award thereof, the losing party cannot properly claim the right to continue his residence upon the land for the purpose of bringing a suit in equity to declare a. trust against his successful adversary, when he has already resided upon the land a sufficient length of time,…

of its opinion, prepared by the court, is as follows: “ Injunction — When properly granted. —A filed a homestead entry for a tract of Government land. Held: that upon the authority of Sproat v. Durland, 2 Okl. 21 , A was entitled to an injunction restraining B from interfering with the possession of A, and requiring him to remove from the land in dispute.” 6 Okla. 696 . From the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory the defendant appealed to this court.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OP OHIO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ORIGINAL.</p> <p>On March 26 a motion was made for leave to file the following petition for the writ of habeas corpus and certiorari:</p> <p>“Your petitioner, Bamon Baez, by Tulio Larrinaga, for himself anil in his behalf, respectfully shows that he is a native-born inhabitant of the island of Puerto Eico, formerly a dependency of the Kingdom of Spain, but at the time of the occurrences hereinafter narrated belonging to and forming a part of the territority of the United States of America.</p> <p>“ Your petitioner was also formerly a subject of his Imperial Majesty the King of Spain, but since long prior to the occurrences herein complained of and'ever since, to and including the present time, he has neither owed nor acknowledged allegiance to any other nation or sovereignty than that of the United States of America.</p> <p>“Your petitioner represents unto this honorable court that he is wrongfully, improperly, unjustly and illegally imprisoned and restrained of his liberty at Humacoa, in and on said island of Puerto Eico, by one Samuel C. Both well, called and styled as and being the marshal of the United States provisional court for the department of Puerto Eico.</p> <p>■ “ By act of Congress approved April 25, 1898, it was declared that a state of war had existed and then existed between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, and thereafter,, in the course of the prosecution of such war, the military forces of the United States invaded and conquered the island of Puerto Eico and have ever since remained in possession and control thereof.</p> <p>“December 10, 1898, a treaty of peace was signed at Paris, France, between the, duly accredited representatives of the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Eegeiit of Spain; and the same having been duly reported to the Senate of the United States, ratification thereof was advised by the Senate on February 6, 1899, and, having been ratified by the President of the United States on said date and subsequently by Her Majesty the Queen Eegent of Spain, ratifications thereof were exchanged at Washington on the 11th day of April, 1899, and the treaty was proclaimed by the President of the United States on the same dáy.</p> <p>■ “ By said treaty it was provided, among other things, as follows :</p> <p>“ ‘ Art. IT. Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, . . . ’</p> <p>“ ‘ Art. XI. All Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.’</p> <p>“ Prior to the ratification of said treaty of peace and on or about the 12th day of August, 1898, a protocol or agreement between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain was signed at the city of Washington by the representatives of the two nations, under and by virtue of the terms of which a suspension of hostilities between said nations was declared by the President of the United States.</p> <p>“By article IN of the said protocol it was agreed that Spain should evacuate Porto Rico and that commissioners should be appointed by the signatory powers for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of such evacuation.</p> <p>“ Thereafter an evacuation commission was appointed by the President of the United States, and a similar commission was appointed by the government of Spain, and the commissioners subsequently assembled in the city of San Juan, Porto Rico, and duly arranged the terms of such evacuation, which were accepted by the respective governments, and the evacuation and retirement of the Spanish forces from the island of Puerto Rico occurred on the 18th day of October, 1898.</p> <p>“ Thereupon, and on said date, Major General John R. Brooke, commanding the forces of the United States, in compliance with the orders of the President, assumed the government of the said island of Porto Rico, and by General Order No. 1, of said date, established the military £ Department of Puerto Rico.’</p> <p>“ Said order, among other things, contained the following:</p> <p>“£The provincial and municipal laws, in so far as they affect the settlement of private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, will be enforced unless they are incompatible with the changed conditions of Porto Kico, in which event they may be suspended by the department commander.’</p> <p>“Your petitioner further shows that after said 12th day of August, 1898, hostilities ceased to exist in the island of Porto Rico between the forces of the United States and of Spain, and that since the 11th day of April, 1899, war has ceased to exist between the nations, and also since the last-named date, if not prior thereto, there has been and is now a condition of peace existing throughout said island of Porto Rico, and there has been neither a state of war with any foreign power in the said island, nor has there been any internal or domestic rebellions, revolutions or dissensions, nor any failure to recognize the authority and sovereignty of the United States.</p> <p>“ Since the occupation of Porto Rico by the United States authorities the civil courts of that island have been in session exercising the same jurisdiction and in substantially the same form as during the Spanish occupation of the island, and such courts were exercising their ordinary civil and criminal jurisdiction during all of the times hereinafter mentioned.</p> <p>“ On the 27th day of June, 1899, by General Order No. 88, of Brigadier General George W. Davis, United States Army, then commanding the department of Porto Rico, and the supreme military authority in said island, there was established a ‘ United States Provisional Court for the Department of Porto Rico.’</p> <p>“Said General Order 88, among other things, provides as follows:</p> <p>“ ‘ Sec. II. The judicial power of the provisional court hereby established shall extend to all cases which would be properly cognizable by the circuit or district courts of the United States under the Constitution, and to all common law offences within the restrictions hereinafter specified.’</p> <p>“ ‘ Sec. IY. The decisions of said courts shall follow the principles of common law and equity as established by the courts of the United States, and its procedure, rules and records shall conform as nearly as practicable to those observed and kept in said Federal courts. . . .</p> <p>“£ Sec. Y. The provisional court shall consist of three judges, one of. whom shall be known as the law judge, and the other two as associate judges, on.e United States district attorney, one marshal, one clerk, three deputy clerks, one stenographer and reporter, one interpreter, one bailiff and janitor, and one messenger. The law judge shall preside and shall determine and decide all technical questions of law. A majority vote of the bench shall determine all questions of fact.' The jury system may be introduced or dispensed with in any particular case in the discretion of the court.</p> <p>“‘Seo. YI. The judges of the provisional court shall be clothed with the powers vested in the judges of the circuit or district courts of the United States.</p> <p>“ ‘ Seo. YII. The district attorney shall be authorized to present to the court information against all parties for violations of United States statutes and regulations. He shall also- in like manner present informations for violations of orders issued by the department commander relating to civil matters, which may be referred to him from these headquarters. '. . .</p> <p>“ ‘ Seo. YIII. In order to define more clearly certain branches of the criminal jurisdiction of the provisional court, it is hereby provided that it shall include and be exclusive in the following classes of cases:</p> <p>“ ‘ 1st. All offences punishable under the statutory laws of the United States, such as those indicated in paragraph I of this order.</p> <p>“ ‘ 2d. Offences committed by or against persons, foreigners or Americans, not residents of this- department, but who may be traveling or temporarily sojourning therein, or against the property of non-residents.</p> <p>“‘3d. Offences against the person or property of persons belonging to the army or navy, or those committed by persons belonging to the army or navy, not properly triable by military or naval courts; but not including minor police offenses.</p> <p>“ ‘4th. Offences committed by or against foreigners or by or against citizens of another State, district or Territory of the United States, residing, in-this department.’</p> <p>“ ‘ Seo. XI. If any party litigant shall feel- aggrieved by the judgment or decree of said court, a stay of ninety days shall be granted such party before the execution of such judgment or decree, upon the filing of a bond by him with sureties in an amount and with such conditions as the court may determine, for the purpose of allowing such party to make application to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari or. other suitable process to review such judgment or decree. But if at the end of said ninety days such process has not been issued by the Supreme Court execution shall forthwith issue.’</p> <p>“ ‘ Seo. XYI. The court shall adopt an appropriate seal which •shall be procured by the treasurer of the island. The clerk of the court shall have the custody of the seal for use in attesting legal documents in the usual manner.</p> <p>“ ‘ Seo. XYII. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph Y of this order the following appointments are announced to take effect July 1st, 1899.’ ”</p> <p>[Here followed the designation of a “ law judge; ” a “ provisional United States Attorney; ” two military officers as “ associate judges; ” and another as “ clerk.”]</p> <p>“ ‘ Private Samuel C. Both well, troop D, 5th U. S. cavalry, is detailed on special duty as marshal of the U. S. provisional court.’</p> <p>“By General Order 216 of said department, dated December 18, 1899, section XI of General Order 88, hereinbefore set forth, was amended so as to read as follows:</p> <p>“ ‘ If any party litigant shall feel aggrieved by the judgment or decree of said court, a stay of ninety days shall be granted such party before the execution of such judgment or decree, upon the filing of a bond by him with sureties in an amount and with such conditions as the’ court may determine, for the purpose of allowing such party to make application to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari or other suitable process to review such judgment or decree.</p> <p>“‘For good cause, this court may extend the time of filing suGh application and record in the office of the clerk of the supreme or appellate.court aforesaid.</p> <p>“ ‘ The stay of execution granted by this court shall be in force until the final - disposition of the case by the supreme or appellate court aforesaid, provided that the party availing himself of the provisions of this section shall not be guilty of negligence in prosecuting his application before the said supreme or appellate court.’</p> <p>“ On the 21st day of September, 1899, by General Order 145 of said department, issued by Brigadier General George W. Davis, United States Army, as aforesaid, provision was made for the holding of municipal elections in said island of Porto Rico, and certain rules and regulations governing the right of the inhabitants to vote at such elections and the manner of exercising such suffrage were therein provided for, among others the following:</p> <p>“ ‘ Sec. Y. An elector to vote at such elections shall possess the following qualifications:</p> <p>“ ‘ a. He must be a bona fide male resident of the municipality.</p> <p>“ ‘ b. He must be over twenty-one years of age.</p> <p>“£ c. He must be a taxpayer of record at the date of his registration, or he must be able to read and write.</p> <p>‘“d. He must have resided upon the island of Puerto Rico for two years next preceding the date of his registration, and for the last six months of said two years, within the municipality where the election is held.’</p> <p>“Thereafter, by General Orders 160 of said department, issued October 12, 1899, General Orders 145 were amended so as to read in part as follows:</p> <p>“ ‘ Sec. YIII. He must be a taxpayer of record in the .municipality in which he votes at the date of this order, or he must be able to read and write. Persons who, pay insular or municipal taxes of any kind, in their own right or name, or in the name of their lawful wife or minor child, or the members of a firm, corporation or copartnership, paying taxes, and the heirs of an estate that pay taxes, are deemed taxpayers under the meaning of this clause. But administrators, guardians, trustees, agents or other persons who pay taxes for other than themselves or their lawful family are not taxpayers within its meaning through such payment.’</p> <p>“£ Sec. XYI. Any person who fraudulently votes, or attempts or offers to fraudulently vote, or attempts to influence or control others to fraudulently vote, at any public election, shall, upon conviction thereof, be subject to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or to imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding three months, or to both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.’</p> <p>“ Thereafter, by special orders of the military authorities commanding the said department, an election was ordered to be held on the 31st day of October, 1899, in the city of Guayama, Porto Eico, for the election of the ordinary municipal officers of said city to fill the offices in the plan of civil government established by the military authority of the United States.</p> <p>“Your petitioner- represents that, being duly qualified in accordance with law and the general orders aforesaid, he voted at said election for the candidates of the party to which he belonged, and thereafter, on or about the 10th day of November, 1899, he was arrested and taken into custddy by one Samuel C. Both well, marshal of said United States provisional court of the Department of Porto Eico, and brought before said provisional court, and was there charged by the district attorney thereof, in an information or complaint which was read to him, with having illegally voted at the said election in the city of Guayama heretofore mentioned.</p> <p>“Your petitioner pleaded ‘Not guilty’ to said charge, and thereafter said United States provisional court proceeded to ury him for said alleged offence, although your petitioner objected to the jurisdiction of said court and denied that he had committed any crime or offence cognizable by said court, and further objected on the ground that'no presentment or information had been returned by a grand jury, and further that he was deprived of a trial by jury in said cause, a jury trial having been demanded by him and refused by said court.</p> <p>“ After hearing the evidence in said proceeding, said provisional court found your petitioner ‘ Guilty,’ and sentenced him to imprisonment at hard labor in the jail of Humacao, Porto Eico, for a period of thirty days.</p> <p>“ Thereupon, in accordance with the provisions of sectibn XI of General Orders' 88, as amended and heretofore referred to? your petitioner applied for a stay of execution of ninety days, to permit him to make application to this honorable court for a writ of certiorari or other suitable process, to review the action, and to set aside the judgment of said provisional court.</p> <p>“ Such application was granted ; and the time allowed under said section having expired, your petitioner has been taken into custody by the said Samuel C. Both well, marshal as aforesaid, and is by him now unlawfully restrained of his liberty and compelled to. perforin infamous tasks.</p> <p>“The proceedings of said United States provisional court are set forth at large in the duly certified copy of the transcript of the record' in said court submitted herewith.</p> <p>“Your petitioner further alleges that he is advised-that said United States Provisional Court for the Department of Porto Pico had no jurisdiction or lawful authority under the Constitution and laws of the United States to cause the arrest of your petitioner or to proceed against him in manner and form aforesaid, and that said pretended process, arrest, order, trial and judgment, and warrant whereby your petitioner was committed to the custody of said Samuel C. Both well, and whereby, in custody of said Samuel C. Both well, he is imprisoned and restrained of his liberty, as aforesaid, were and are, each and all of them, in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the just rights of your petitioner, and are without authority of law and void.</p> <p>“ Your petitioner further alleges that said United States provisional court had no jurisdiction to try him for the alleged offence with which he is charged for the reasons following, among others: ”</p> <p>[The reasons were here set forth at length.]</p> <p>“ Your petitioner further avers that more than thirty other persons, residents of said island of Porto Pico, were apprehended and tried by said provisional court upon the same or similar charges to those preferred against him, and such persons were likewise found guilty and sentenced to undergo like punishment, but the sentences of the court in such other cases have been stayed pending the determination of your petitioner’s application herein,”</p> <p>[Here followed the prayer.]-</p> <p>The petition, was signed: “ Ramon Baez, by Tulio Larrinaga; ” and was verified as follows:</p> <p>“ District ok Columbia, ss :</p> <p>“ Tulio Larrinaga, being duly sworn, deposes and says:</p> <p>“ That he .is an inhabitant of Porto Rico and knows the petitioner, Ramon Baez;</p> <p>“ He has read the foregoing petition by him subscribed and knows the contents thereof, and —</p> <p>“ That the matters and things therein stated are true of his own knowledge except as to matters therein stated on information or belief, and as to those matters he believes them to be true.</p> <p>“Further, this petition is signed and verified by him for and on behalf of the said Ramon Baez for the reason that the petitioner is confined in the island of Porto Rico, and to delay this application by sending the same for the signature and affidavit of the petitioner himself would greatly retard, if not entirely defeat, the relief thereby sought to be obtained.</p> <p>“ Tulio Larrinaga.”</p> <p>Subscribed and sworn to before a notary public March 24, A. D. 1900.</p>

Held: *391 (1) That this court had jurisdiction to revise that judgment: (2) That if there were no question of'a prior judgment, proof that the land had been properly dedicated for a public square to the public use, and therefore had been withdrawn from commerce, would furnish a defence to the claim by any person of a right to sell the property under an execution upon a judgment against the city: (3) That as the city did…

Held: although it was substantially admitted on the record by both parties that the increase of rates was just and reasonable, if not forbidden by the act of Congress. But such action cannot be attributed consistently with reason and justice.

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

In the Superior Court of Douglas County, Wisconsin, in November, 1896, Andrew Doherty filed a petition asking for the appointment of commissioners to appraise certain real estate taken by the Northern Pacific Railway Company for a portion of its line passing through property alleged to belong to the petitioner.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>In July, 1898, the United States, by the Attorney General, filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota a bill of complaint against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and others. The object of the suit was to procure the cancellation and annulment of a certain patent granted to the Northern 'Pacific Railroad Company by the United States on April 22, 1895, for a tract of land lying and being more than ten miles east of Duluth, in the State of Minnesota, and which patent was alleged by the bill to have been inadvertently and mistakenly issued. The case was disposed of on bill, answer and a stipulation of facts. The Circuit Court dismissed the case for want of equity, and the cause was taken on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, where the decree of the Circuit Court was, on July 10,1899, affirmed. An appeal was thereupon allowed to this court.</p> <p>This cause was heard in this court in connection with that of Andrew Doherty v. The Northern Pacific Railway Company, ante, 421. That case came here on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.- The present one is on appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

Held: that this assumption was plainly disproved by the statements in the bill of exceptions; and that the judgment of affirmance denied to the defendant a right dirly set up and claimed by him under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must therefore be reversed by this court on writ of error. The case is stated in tbe

<p>On writ of error or appeal, tlie first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it.</p> <p>A limited partnership, doing business under a firm name, and organized under the act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania approved June 2, 1874, entitled “ An act authorizing the formation of partnership associations in which the capital subscribed shall alone be responsible for the debts of the .association, except under certain circumstances,” is not a corporation within the rule that a suit by or against a corporation in a court of the United States is conclusively presumed, for the purposes of the litigation, to be one by or against citizens of the State creating the corporation. It is not sufficient that the association may be described as a quasi corporation or as a “new artificial person.” The rule does not embrace a new artificial person that is not a corporation.</p> <p>Under the circumstances disclosed by the record'the Circuit Court should allow an amendment of the pleadings upon the subject of the citizenship of the parties, and the case should proceed to a final hearing on the merits in the event the pleadings as amended show a case within the jurisdiction of the court.</p>

Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that an officer of an executive agency may exercise executive privilege to deny a subpoena from a federal court, and the head of that agency may issue a regulation requiring any such disclosure to be approved by that agency head.

Held: that while a man in the full possession of his faculties and under no duress may give away his property, and equity will not recall the gift, yet it looks With careful scrutiny upon all transactions between trustee and beneficiary, and .if -it appears that the trustee has taken any advantage of the situation of the beneficiary, and has obtained from him, even for only the benefit of other beneficiaries, large…

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This was a writ of certiorari to review a decree of tbe Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing a bill-in equity brought for the infringement of a patent, and appealed to that court from an order of the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, granting a preliminary injunction. The bill was filed by the petitioner, Mast, Foos & Company, an Ohio corporation, and was founded upon letters patent No. 433,531, granted to the petitioner, upon the application of one Samuel W. Martin, for an improvement in windmills.</p> <p>In his specification the patentee states that the “ invention consists, essentially, of an improved back gear organization involving an external toothed pinion, and an internal toothed spur gear, the pinion being mounted on the wheel shaft, and the gear having formed on or connected with it the wrist pin, to which the operating pitman is attached, whereby the speed of the main shaft as applied to the wrist pin and pitman is reduced, and whereby, also, all pounding and lost motion is prevented as the pitman connection passes over the center and changes from a pushing to a pulling action. This object is accomplished by the fact that a plurality of the pinion teeth are always engaged with the internal spur gear, resulting in giving a perfectly uniform and smooth and noiseless reciprocating motion to the actuating rod, thereby prolonging the life of the machine by saving it from constant jarring and preventing wear and tear.”</p> <p>********</p> <p>“ The freedom of the organization from lost motion and sudden jerks as .the wrist pin passes over the center renders the operation of the pump smooth and regular. This increases the effectiveness of the pump and prevents undue wear and tear.”</p> <p>The following diagram illustrates the patented combination:</p> <p> </p> <p>Petitioner sought a recovery only upon the .first claim:</p> <p>“ 1. The combination, with a windmill driving shaft and a pinion thereon, of an internal toothed spur wheel mounted adjacent to the> said shaft and meshing with said pinion, a pitman connected with the spur wheel, and an actuating rod connected with the pitman.”</p> <p>Almost immediately upon filing the bill motion was made for a preliminary injunction, which was granted, largely upon the authority of an opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the case of Mast, Foos & Co. v. The Dempster Mill Manufacturing Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 327. An appeal was taken from that order to the Circuit Court' of Appeals, which not only reversed the order for the injunction, but dismissed the bill. 85 Fed. Rep. 782; 60 U. S. App. 325.</p> <p>Whereupon petitioner applied for and was granted a writ of certiorari from this court.</p>

Held: That the appeal and writ of-error could not be maintained, as they fall directly within the ruling in Robinson v. Caldwell, 165 U. S. 359 , where it was held that the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, does not give a defeated party in a Circuit Court the right to have his case finally determined both in this court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals on independent appeals.

<p>A decree is entered, ordering the appointment of commissioners to ascertain, re-trace, re-mark and reestablish the boundary line between the States of Virginia and Tennessee, as established by the decree of this court in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, but without authority to run or establish any other or new line.</p>

<p>A suit brought in support of an adverse claim under Rev. Stat. §§ 2325, 2326, is not a suit arising under the laws of the United States in such a sense as to confer jurisdiction on a Federal court, regardless of the citizenship of the parties.</p> <p>Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U. S. 571, reexamined and affirmed to this point.</p> <p>Although suits like the present one may sometimes so present questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States that a Federal court will have jurisdiction, yet the mere fact that a suit is an adverse suit, authorized by the statutes of Congress, is not, ini and of itself, sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Federal courts.</p>

This was a petition for .a writ of mandamus filed in the Circuit Court for the county of Montgpmery, by the State’s attorney for that county, to compel the defendant railway company, which for several years past has operated, and is now operating, a railroad from St. Louis, Missouri, through the county of Montgomery and the city of Hillsboro, the county seat of such county, to Indianapolis, Indiana, to stop a regular passenger train, designated as the “ Knickerbocker…

This was a suit begun in the District Court for the Fourth Judicial District of Nevada by Nesbitt as part owner of the Fraction mine, .against one William Davidson, the alleged locator of the Sleeper mining claim, covering the same ground as the Fraction mine, to quiet plaintiff’s title and.that of his co-tenants to the Fraction mine, and to recover a money judgment against the defendant.

Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that an individual had the right to use force to resist an unlawful arrest and was entitled to a jury instruction to that effect. In 1899, a tribal police officer, John Bad Elk, shot and killed another tribal police officer who was attempting to arrest Bad Elk without a warrant, on a misdemeanor charge, for a crime allegedly committed outside of the presence of the arresting officer. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, noting that a person had the right to resist an unlawful arrest, and in the case of a death, murder may be reduced to manslaughter. The Supreme Court held the arrest to be unlawful due, in part, to the lack of a valid warrant.

Held: That when the defendant did not verify his answer in a case provided for therein, the note or warrant or other paper sued on was admitted as genuine, but when an answer denying that fact was verified, the plaintiff must prove it as he would have to do at common law in a case where the genuineness of the paper was put at issue by the pleadings.

This cause embraces three suits brought by the Phoenix National Bank against A. J. and R. E. Daggs, defendants in error. They were respectively numbered-2554, 2555 and 2556, and were consolidated by stipulations of the parties. They were brought to recover on three promissory notes, aggregating the sum of $9741.73, signed' by A. J. Daggs, one of the appellants.

Held: That the power to regulate rates was an existent power,, not granted by the contract, but reserved from it with a single limitation, the limitation that it should not be exercised to reduce rates below what was then charged, and that undoubtedly there was a contractual element, but that it was not in granting the power of regulartion, but in the limitation upon it.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>The ordinance of the city of New Orleans set forth at length below in the statement of the case, prescribing limits in that city outside of which no woman of lewd character shall dwell, does not operate to deprive persons owning or occupying property in or-adjacent to the prescribed limits, whether occupied as a residence or for other purposes, of any rights secured by the Constitution of the United States, and they cannot prevent its enforcement on the ground that by it their rights under the Federal Constitution are invaded.</p> <p>Until there is some invasion of Congressional power or of private rights secured by the Constitution of the United States, the action of a State in such respect is beyond question in the Federal courts.</p> <p>The settled.rúle of this court is that the mere fact of pecuniary injury does not warrant the overthrow of legislation of a police character.</p>

By the statutes of Yirginia authority was given to the county courts of the several counties to license ferries.

John D. Scott executed in the District of Columbia, on April 21, 1896,.a deed of voluntary assignment for the benefit of his creditors, embracing in a schedule of his assets, among other property, a life estate in certain land situated-in Montgomery County, Maryland. Horatio Browning qualified as assignee under the deed of assignment.

By their original bill the complainants, alleging themselves to be citizens of the State of Louisiana, complained against P. De Cordova, a citizen of the State of Texas, residing in Travis County, W. R. Boyd, F.' E. Hill, Charles Robertson, J. M. Parker and George W. McAdams, citizens of Texas and residents of Freestone County, and against Joseph Smolenski, as to whom it was merely alleged he “ is not an inhabitant of or found within this district.” The grounds for relief…

The certificate in No. 259 reads as follows: “ This was an action brought by Benj. F. Thiebaud, a citizen of Indiana, as administrator of Chris. Sweetman, deceased, appointed by the Circuit Court of Fayette County, Indiana, against the C., H. and D. R. R. Co., a corporation and citizen of Ohio, to recover damages for the wrongful death of said Chris.

At the April term of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana an indictment was found, charging Augustus F. Leovy and Robert S. Leovy, both of the parish of Plaquemines, State of Louisiana, with, on the 16th of November,'1895, unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly and without permission of the Secretary of War, building and causing to be built a dam in and across a certain navigable stream of the United States known as Red Pass, and outside of…

This was a bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court for the county of Mercer, Illinois, by the defendant in error, John Mc-Caffrey, against the Knapp, Stout & Co. Company, (hereinafter called the Knapp Company,) and the Schulenburg & Boeckler Lumber Company, (hereinafter called the Schulenburg Company,) and its assignees, to enforce a lien for towage upon a half raft of lumber then lying at Boston Bay, in Mercer County.

.This was a suit in equity instituted in the District Court for the "Western District of Pennsylvania, April 30, 1877, by Jane Bryar against James Bryar, her husband, and Robert Arthurs, his assignee in bankruptcy, to enjoin the latter from partitioning or offering for sale an undivided half of seven acres of land in the city of Pittsburgh, for which, as she alleged, a conveyance had been made by mistake to her husband, though she had paid the purchase money with her own…

Held: That as the vessel was an enemy vessel, the presumption -was that the cargo was enemy’s property, and this could only be overcome by clear and positive evidence to the contrary ; (2) That on the face of the papers given in evidence, it must be presumed *656 that when these' goods were delivered to the vessel, they became the property of the consignors named' in the invoices; (3) That the British company got the…